Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.lib.uom.gr/handle/2159/26147
Author: Λατσίδης, Αλέξανδρος
Title: Μισθολογικές διαπραγματεύσεις και ασύμμετρη πληροφόρηση
Date Issued: 2021
Department: Διατμηματικό Πρόγραμμα Μεταπτυχιακών Σπουδών στην Οικονομική Επιστήμη
Supervisor: Φιλιππιάδης, Ελευθέριος
Abstract: Current developments in the theory of strategic bargaining exhibit how informational asymmetries can lead to extended and costly bargaining. These models can be applied to contract negotiations, yielding an economic theory of strike activities. In this paper, so as to determine the decision or not for strike likelihood, five scenarios of negotiations are carried out between the union and the firm under an asymmetric information regime, in which the union is unsure about the firm’s future profitability and the firm does not know some union’s private information.
Keywords: Strike activity
Asymmetry information
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
Information: Διπλωματική εργασία--Πανεπιστήμιο Μακεδονίας, Θεσσαλονίκη, 2021.
Rights: CC0 1.0 Παγκόσμια
Appears in Collections:ΔΠΜΣ Οικονομική Επιστήμη (M)

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