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Author: Μόσχος, Δημήτριος
Moschos, Dimitrios
Title: Pure, non-cooperative international environmental agreements: a benefit function approach
Date Issued: 2018
Department: Διατμηματικό Πρόγραμμα Μεταπτυχιακών Σπουδών στην Οικονομική Επιστήμη
Supervisor: Σαρτζετάκης, Ευτύχιος
Abstract: In this survey we attempt to create a semi-symmetric model of pure, non-cooperative, full information, Stackelberg I.E.A. game in which a grand coalition can be formed even if the total count of countries reaches the number of n = 200. We assume that the members of the coalition improve, through cooperation and exchange of know-how, their net benefit function. We prove that, contrary to the relatively pessimistic conclusions of the literature, the improvement of signatories net benefit function strengthens the formation of large coalition as well as yields both positive emissions and indirect welfare values
Keywords: ΙΕΑ
Information: Διπλωματική εργασία--Πανεπιστήμιο Μακεδονίας, Θεσσαλονίκη, 2018.
Rights: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Διεθνές
Appears in Collections:ΔΠΜΣ Οικονομική Επιστήμη (M)

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