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Author: Vasileiadis, George
Βασιλειάδης, Γεώργιος
Title: The role of external constraints in the Greek crisis.
Date Issued: 2015
Department: Πρόγραμμα Μεταπτυχιακών Σπουδών στις Πολιτικές και Οικονομικές Σπουδές Σύγχρονης Ανατολικής και Νοτιοανατολικής Ευρώπης
Supervisor: Paraskevopoulos, Christos J.
Παρασκευόπουλος, Χρήστος
Abstract: This dissertation is about the role of the external institutions like the IMF and the ECB in the financial crisis of Greece, but also about the role which France, Germany and the European Union had in this crisis. Firstly, in chapter I I analyze the role which the European Monetary Union had during the Greek crisis. The analysis is based mostly on the failures of the legal framework, the Basel III Agreement but most importantly in the imbalances among Euro-zone members and lastly the reforms that should be made. Furthermore, one has to look for the causes of this crisis, which in chapter II are described mostly in three categories: the dramatic financial situation in Greece, which has been hidden for years, a chained reaction to the international financial crisis which erupted in 2007 and the economic imbalances among EU member states. In chapter III I analyze more about the role of the IMF and the ECB in Greece. Moreover one can see in the third chapter the pros and cons of these ‘interventions’ and that Europe as a whole made a mistake of taking IMF on board for trying to resolve the Greek crisis. IMF, as successful as it was with implementing its programs in other countries, made huge mistakes in Greece which the near future will show how important they were. On the other hand ECB relied on its new role as a lender of last resort buying governmental bonds in the secondary markets and lending continuously tremendous amounts of money in the Greek banks through the ELA. The European Central Bank is one of the most important actors in the Financial Crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. The way, how the ECB was operating before the crisis was strictly based on the monetarist concept of central banking, reducing central banks to the guardian of consumer price inflation. Inflation of financial asset prices was ignored, not to speak of financial stability, growth and employment. This reflects basic faults in the design of the ECB, in particular its monetarist obsession with consumer price inflation. Through that we can identify ECB as a player, which contributed with its monetarist approach even to a certain extent to crisis, especially through its participation in the so called Troika. In chapter III I also refer to the role which Germany and France had in the Greek crisis. One would need thousands of pages to describe the relationships among German and Greeks politicians through the years of the crisis and back and forth policy recommendations, so I refer mostly to the no bailout clause which Germany strongly recommended in the beginning of the Greek crisis and that French interests have aligned with German interests for the majority of the crisis period.
Keywords: Greek crisis
Information: Διπλωματική εργασία--Πανεπιστήμιο Μακεδονίας, Θεσσαλονίκη, 2015.
Rights: An error occurred on the license name.
Appears in Collections:ΠΜΣ Πολιτικές & Οικονομικές Σπουδές Σύγχρονης Ανατολικής & Νοτιοανατολικής Ευρώπης (M)

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