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dc.contributor.advisorParaskevopoulos, Christos J.en
dc.contributor.advisorΠαρασκευόπουλος, Χρήστος Ι.el
dc.contributor.authorPapalexatou, Chrysoulaen
dc.contributor.authorΠαπαλεξάτου, Χρυσούλαel
dc.descriptionΔιπλωματική εργασία--Πανεπιστήμιο Μακεδονίας, Θεσσαλονίκη, 2012.el
dc.description.abstractThis essay examines the political implications of Central Bank independence in the case of the European Central Bank in a period of crisis, using as a guide the two core question of new institutionalism; “how was the institution of ECB selected” and “how is the institution of ECB potentially sustained and changed”. By analyzing the history and the politics of EMU, the function of ECB, the measures undertaken by ECB after the beginning of the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and by constantly comparing ECB with the Federal Reserve System of the U.S., it concludes that ECB’s “obsession” with independence, is an obstacle to the resolution of the current financial crisis in the Eurozone. Finally, this essay provides some predictions for the future of the ECB, taking into account the dynamics of politics and the framework of new institutionalism, having as a main objective to open the road for further academic research on the issue.en
dc.format.extent1210970 bytes-
dc.publisherΠανεπιστήμιο Μακεδονίαςel
dc.subjectCentral Bank Independenceen
dc.subjectEconomic crisisen
dc.subjectEuropean Central Banken
dc.subjectNew institutionalismen
dc.subjectEuropean Monetary Unionen
dc.titleCentral Bank Independence, European Central Bank and the financial crisis.en
dc.typeElectronic Thesis or Dissertationen
dc.contributor.departmentΠρόγραμμα Μεταπτυχιακών Σπουδών στις Πολιτικές και Οικονομικές Σπουδές Σύγχρονης Ανατολικής και Νοτιοανατολικής Ευρώπηςen
Appears in Collections:ΠΜΣ Πολιτικές & Οικονομικές Σπουδές Σύγχρονης Ανατολικής & Νοτιοανατολικής Ευρώπης (M)

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