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Author: Strantza, Stefania
Title: International environmental agreements: an emission choice model with abatment technology and spillovers.
Date Issued: 2013
Department: Διατμηματικό Πρόγραμμα Μεταπτυχιακών Σπουδών στην Οικονομική Επιστήμη
Supervisor: Sartzetakis, Eftichios
Abstract: In this thesis we examine the formation and the size of a stable International Environmental Agreement (IEA). An IEA tends to manage global public goods, especially environmental goods such as the global climate. The basic problem of any IEA is the free-rider incentives which hurt the size of a stable coalition. The challenge is to induce sovereign countries to voluntarily coordinate their emissions reduction and abatement efforts rather than to free-ride on the efforts of others. For this purpose, we study an emission choice model (ECM) in which countries have also the option to abate, using an abatement technology. We solve our model applying the leadership approach. We investigate under which conditions the grand coalition can be reached. More specific, we find that the size of a stable coalition can vary from a small one to the grand coalition. Furthermore, we estimate our model when there exist positive spillover effects among countries, concerning the abatement technology. With the spillover effect mechanism, the free-rider incentives are eliminated and the grand coalition is always feasible. In order to solve the model we apply numerical simulations.
Keywords: International Environmental Agreements
Emission Choice Model
Abatement technology
Spillover effects
Stable coalition
Information: Διπλωματική εργασία--Πανεπιστήμιο Μακεδονίας, Θεσσαλονίκη, 2013.
Appears in Collections:ΔΠΜΣ Οικονομική Επιστήμη (M)

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