Επιλογή ποιοτήτων σε καθεστώς δυοπωλίου όταν η διαφορά ποιότητας των προϊόντων δεν μπορεί να παρατηρηθεί με ακρίβεια από τον καταναλωτή.

Abstract

In this work we try to shed light on location competition under demand uncertainty and leverage. Assuming a duopoly a la Hotelling, we use a quadratic transportation cost model and assume uncertainty over the exact realization of the right end of the consumer distribution, where firm 2 is located. We show that when leverage is not decided before locations, a) some leverage is always beneficial for the firm that faces uncertainty in its turf (firm 2), and b) leverage moves both firms to the left, resulting in firm 2 being located closer to the center and firm 1 further away from it.