

The integration of Syrian refugees into the German labor market. A case of migration - development Nexus?

## Abstract

Large numbers of Syrians have fled the nation since the start of the revolution in 2011 and the subsequent deadly civil conflict that followed. More than six million Syrian refugees and asylum seekers are presently dispersed over Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Germany, Sweden, and more than a hundred other countries across the world, as reported by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR). Economic integration is one of the significant obstacles that refugees encounter in their new country. This is especially true in regions where the local culture, language, and system are completely foreign to the norm. Many Syrian refugees are also relocating to Germany from other European countries. Over 35% of all asylum applications in Germany were submitted by Syrian migrants in 2015 and 2016. As a result, Germany has implemented a wide range of policies and initiatives since 2015 to smooth and quicken the transition. The impact of the current Coronavirus epidemic on the integration of Syrian immigrants into the German job market is even less well understood. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze how Syrian refugees have adjusted to the German labor market.

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# Chapter 1

## 1.1 Introduction

When the number of Syrian refugees reached one million in September 2013, the strain put on neighboring countries increased significantly (Ayoub, 2019). A large number of other immigrants were also making the perilous journey to Europe. In 2012, a total of 72.500 people were recorded as having crossed that “bridge”. The amount climbed to 283.500 in 2014, and then to 1.800.000 in 2015. As a consequence of this, 2015 is the year that is remembered as the year when the refugee crisis began in Europe (Hartnett, 2019). The majority of people left by traveling via a number of different channels in the Mediterranean Sea. Following the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, the Central Mediterranean route from Libya to Italy was the most traveled between the two countries until 2015.

On the other hand, in 2015, an increasing number of migrants crossed from Turkey to Greece or Bulgaria along the Eastern Mediterranean route before continuing to Central and Northern Europe (Chwalisz, 2022). It is especially noteworthy that travel via the so-called Balkan corridor, which connects Turkey and Greece, has also increased. The key reasons that led to this increase were not only the continuing and rising crisis in Syria but also the deteriorating conditions in neighboring countries as well as a change of administration in Greece; something which resulted in less control along the Mediterranean coast. Thus there were considerably fewer obstacles in a long way to central Europe. All these combined with the visibility and the determination of migrants, including Syrian refugees and other groups, as well as the support they received from advocacy organizations and people made it a lot more feasible for them to reach their final destinations. In addition, in the name of Open Democracy, Northern Macedonia opened its borders in the summer of 2015 and permitted unrestricted travel across its borders (Europe, 2016).

In other words, migrants began their trip from Macedonia and continued it via Serbia and Hungary on their way to their final destinations, which included Germany and other countries throughout Europe (El-Shaarawi & Razsa, 2019). According to interviews carried out by

journalists with Syrians residing in Hungary, the primary reason for this desire to migrate to Germany was frustration with the lack of economic opportunity in Hungary and the belief that greater chances would be found in Germany's larger economy (Hartocollis, 2015). In an attempt to stop any further entry of migrants into the nation, the government of Hungary revealed its intentions to build a barrier along the border with Serbia in the southern part of the country in July 2015. Many migrants, most of whom were from Syria, rushed to the border in an attempt to enter the nation before the barrier was completed (Smale, 2015). In the last week of August 2015, the hamlet of Parndorf in Austria, which is located on the border with Hungary, made the discovery of a truck that was found to contain 71 human remains. The identities of some of the deceased have been established, including citizens of Syria and Afghanistan. It was assumed that they had engaged the services of smugglers in an effort to get to Germany (Brücker, Kosyakova & Vallizadeh, 2020).

The civil conflict in Syria has resulted in a refugee crisis of catastrophic proportions. A significant number of Syrians have sought refuge in neighboring countries like Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and Turkey, and a rising number of others are doing the same. Within the scope of this study, consideration is given to the extent to which the international community, and more specifically Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States, have shared the costs and liabilities associated with the Syrian refugee crisis. Specifically, the United States, Germany, and Sweden are given the most attention.

These four nations have been selected, because they are known for their strong track records of assisting those who are in need during times of crisis and because they take in a considerable number of people who are seeking refuge each year.

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) annual report on the trends of asylum applications from 44 industrialized nations, the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Germany were among the top five countries receiving asylum claims between 2009 and 2013 (UNHCR, 2014). In general, most countries have shown a real commitment to assisting the situation of Syrian refugees, something which is a very positive sign. However, the United States and the United Kingdom are the largest single-state bilateral contributors to humanitarian assistance for the Syrian crisis. Furthermore, the United States and

Sweden have taken in the most Syrian refugees among industrialized countries outside the area, and Germany as well as Sweden have taken in the most refugees overall (Ostrand, 2015).

## **1.2 Historical Background of the Syrian refugee crisis**

On March the 15th in 2011, severe fighting broke out in Syria when the regime of Bashar al-Assad violently repressed student rallies. Uncertainty and fighting persisted in certain regions. The backlash was devastating for innocent people, especially children. Half of Syria's population, in other words more than 13 million people, has been displaced from their homes due to the conflict. Among them are the 6.8 million refugees and asylum-seekers who have left their own nation. There are now 2.8 million asylum-seekers in the world, while 6.9 million Syrians have been displaced inside their own country (Barron, Harmgart, Huck, Schneider & Sutter, 2021).

Protests in Syria were initially peaceful. In March 2011, young people in the southern city of Daraa marched to the streets demanding changes from the government. This uprising occurred in the context of the Arab Spring, which swept the Middle East and North Africa with the help of social media. The world community now acknowledges March the 15th as the beginning of the Syrian civil war, as this day has become known as the "day of wrath" in Syria (Barron, Harmgart, Huck, Schneider & Sutter, 2021).

Both the government's police and demonstrators became more violent as demonstrations extended throughout Syria. The Syrian military faced off against an increasing number of militant organizations in a civil war by the next year resulting in the refugee crisis. In other words, this is a crisis that followed because of the fighting between government troops and extremist groups for control of the country leading millions of children and their families to lose their homes and be displaced (Barron, Harmgart, Huck, Schneider & Sutter, 2021).

At the moment, Syria is one of the world's most unstable settings due to its weak government and the destruction of social services and institutions. Some of the many factors that have resulted in the mass exodus of Syrians from their homeland are the ones listed in the next few lines. According to Nugent, nearly 13,000 kids have been killed or wounded in the civil

conflict that's been going on for the last several years (2021). Specifically, Syrian children, the nation's future, have lost parents and siblings, been shot at, missed years of school, and seen horrific bloodshed and cruelty; about 2.4 million kids are not in school (Nugent, 2021). Moreover, healthcare facilities, schools, utilities, water and sewage systems, and other essential infrastructure have all collapsed - many of the city's historic buildings and bustling markets are now nothing but ruins (Nugent, 2021). The bonds of friendship and trade that linked neighbors together were broken by the war; a devastating war that has destroyed the economy, and now 90% of the people are below the poverty line (Nugent, 2021).

Although some of the 6.8 million Syrian refugees have made it to other nations in the region by land or water, the vast majority are still located in the region. In specific, over 3.6 million Syrian refugees have sought sanctuary in Turkey, making them the world's biggest refugee population. Outside of designated refugee areas, most Syrians in Turkey lack easy access to even the most basic necessities of life (Barron, Harmgart, Huck, Schneider & Sutter, 2021).

Furthermore, around fourteen percent of Lebanon's population is made up of Syrian refugees. Refugees sometimes get by with very few resources in makeshift tent cities rather than organized refugee camps. They have a hard time paying for necessities like food, housing, and utilities since they have so few legal ways to get money (Barron, Harmgart, Huck, Schneider & Sutter, 2021).

Another 675 thousand Syrians have sought sanctuary in Jordan. Together, the Za'atari and Azraq refugee camps are home to over 120,000 people, and thanks to the efforts of relief organizations, they have transformed barren wastes into thriving communities (Nugent, 2021).

Over the course of the last year, Iraq has taken in more than 260,000 Syrian refugees. More than a million Iraqis have migrated to the northern Kurdistan area to get away from ISIS. Integration of refugees into host communities places pressure on social support systems (Nugent, 2021). In Egypt, there are now 141,300 Syrian refugees.

Many youngsters in Syria have no memories of a time before the conflict. The future of the children who will need to reconstruct Syria is in jeopardy due to the devastating impact these conditions have had on their mental, physical, and social well-being (Nugent, 2021).

In particular, more than 6.8 million refugees in 2021 came from Syria, one of the world's most hazardous nation. This was more than any other nation since over 6.9 million people have been forced to flee from their homes in Syria. Surrounded by Syria, Turkey has taken in over 3.6 million refugees, making it the world's biggest refugee host country. Moreover, about 13,000 children have been killed or wounded in Syria's ongoing civil conflict and an estimated 5.8 million children in Syria and surrounding countries need humanitarian help to achieve their most basic needs, such as food. In fact, there has been a 51% rise in the number of individuals who are food insecure. More than half of the Syrian population is living on less than \$1.90 per day, which is considered severe poverty.

### **Syrian refugee crisis timeline**

In the year 2010, Syria has become a progressive nation on the foundation of ancient history. Syria's long and illustrious cultural heritage spans more than eight thousand years. Accordingly, the World Bank classifies it as a lower-middle-income nation with rapid economic growth and the country's economy relies heavily on agriculture, manufacturing, tourism, and oil. Free universal healthcare and elementary and secondary education are also provided. At this point, it should also be mentioned that Bashar al-Assad, Hafez's son, took over as president during this period.

One year later, in 2011 the conflict in Syria escalated. After months of mostly peaceful rallies in southern Syrian towns, security forces there finally cracked down violently in April. Expectations for positive change because of the Arab Spring had been dashed by violent repression. Even though the opposition gathered, they did not seem to work together. Any sanction and other forms of international pressure to modify the administration ultimately failed.

In 2012, people in Syria were running away from bombings and repression. Particularly, in March, thousands of Syrian migrants arrived in the poor Bekaa Valley in neighboring Lebanon while in July, the Za'atari Refugee Camp in Jordan opened up close to the border with Syria. Even though it was meant to be a transitory housing area, thousands of Syrian refugees have been living there for years. According to the U.N. Human Rights Council, Syria committed war crimes in August, including acts that breached recognized international agreements and might have included attacks on people.

However, the year that can be considered as the peak of the conflict is 2013 as more than 1 million Syrians fled their country since March. April of the same year saw the confirmation of chemical assaults and Assad, the president of Syria, had been blamed for the violence. 2013 has also been the year that people have started delivering food, water, medical treatment, and basic goods to Syrian refugees whose number doubled to 2 million fleeing their country since September.

Afterward, the coming year saw a rise in humanitarian needs despite a worsening environment for relief organizations trying to reach those in need. One million refugees, or about one-sixth of Lebanon's population, had been living in the Azraq refugee camp since it opened in April. There was significant pressure on the country's social services due to the influx of migrants. In June, ISIS declared a caliphate over its controlled territories in Syria and Iraq. There were about 3 million Syrian refugees in countries bordering Syria, with 100,000 having made it to Europe. In total, around 250,000 Syrian refugees and over a million Iraqis had fled to the Kurdish area of Iraq.

In 2015, the influx of Syrian refugees and migrants into Europe became a major issue. In order to prevent migrants from accessing Europe, Hungary built a wall along its border with Serbia and then sealed it off. Due to a lack of funds, the World Food Programme reduced food distributions to refugees in Jordan and Lebanon. The world was shocked by the image of Alan Kurdi, who was first reported as Aylan Kurdi in September. Dr. Vinh Chung told CNN's Carol Costello, "That might have been me" when referring to Alan Kurdi. "That's me or my child washed up on the beach face down and dead." Each day, thousands of migrants flood into Greece, and one million people would enter Europe this year alone.

Syria has been ravaged by years of conflict in 2016. In February, officials from the United States and Russia worked together to secure a temporary halt to fighting that would allow the United Nations to deliver supplies to Syrians in remote areas. After a vehicle bombing in June, Jordan shut down its border, leaving tens of thousands of Syrian migrants stranded. When the Syrian government retook Aleppo from rebels in December, innocent bystanders were once again caught in the crossfire while their release through a temporary truce was unsuccessful.

Syrians were looking for peace and security in 2017. In the month of March, it was reported that over 5 million people had evacuated Syria because of the ongoing turmoil there. In

April, 58 people died in what was likely a nerve gas assault. In July, the G20 conference successfully mediated a truce in southwest Syria. Daraa, ar Raqqa, Homs, Hama, and the city of Deir Ez-Zor were all seeing continuing fighting. Because of the violence this year, almost 900,000 people in Syria had been forced to leave their homes.

Moving on, aid for the needy was constrained by the ongoing conflict in 2018 and international agreements to de-escalate the conflict did not stop the fighting. However, 2.9 million people were still living in places where help could be reliably delivered because of security concerns.


In 2019 new challenges arose for Syrian refugees. The months of January and February brought snow, rain, high winds, and temperatures that were close to freezing to Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan. As the conflict in northwest Syria escalated from April to September, more than 400,000 people would be forced to leave their homes between May and October.

Many more people would have to leave their homes by 2020. Since the fighting in northwest Syria escalated in December 2019, around 900,000 people had fled to the north, near the border with Turkey. Since hospitals and schools had been bombed, many people were forced to endure the bitter weather and lived outside. Concerns about an epidemic among IDPs were heightened when the first case of COVID-19 was discovered in Idlib in July. By the end of August, thousands of cases of COVID-19 had been verified in northwest Syria. In September, two new cases of COVID-19 were recorded in the Azraq refugee camp in Jordan, home to more than 36,800 people seeking asylum. More than 100,000 people were forced to flee their homes in October as combat along the border between Syria and Turkey continued.

Tensions among families were likely to rise again in 2021. The Syrian crisis, then in its eleventh year, had taken a major toll, with 6.8 million refugees and asylum-seekers fleeing the country, and another 6.9 million people being displaced inside Syria as of March 15.

Children were still bearing the burden of the ongoing battle in 2022. An estimated 12 million Syrians were going hungry every day, according to a U.N. study issued on May 10. The number of Syrian children in need of humanitarian help had reached an all-time high, at almost 5.8 million while in the United States alone, there are at least 2.4 million children who are not in school.

## Number of foreigners from Syria in Germany from 2011 to 2021



published by Statista research Department

### 1.3 The context of migration and humanitarian migration in Germany

A total of 101 million individuals are estimated to have been forcefully relocated throughout the globe according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (as of December 2022). By the end of 2021, this number had risen to 89 million, with over 53 million of them being relocated inside their own country. These numbers have risen dramatically in recent years due to a number of factors, including the mass exodus of millions of Ukrainians from their homes and other displacement movements in places like the Sahel and Myanmar. Children and teenagers, who account for about half of the displaced population, have unique protective needs.

Conflicts, persecution, and gross breaches of human rights are major contributors to individuals being uprooted from their homes. The nations closest to the hotspots of violence, and hence the countries of first admission or transit, are the ones that have to deal with the largest influxes of refugees and internally displaced people (Welker, 2022). However, there may be other reasons why individuals leave their homeland, including a lack of economic opportunities and weakened governmental institutions. Migration is a term used in these situations. Unlike refugees and internally displaced people, migrants are not automatically entitled to any kind of protection. Many individuals are being forced to leave their homes or are moving altogether because of the (direct and indirect) consequences of climate change. The Internal Relocation Monitoring Centre projected that there will be 23.7 million additional instances of displacement owing to climate change or natural catastrophes until 2025, with 5.9 million individuals being permanently relocated (Welker, 2022).


Germany is doing its best to safeguard migrants and address the conditions that prompt them to leave their homes. Taking a more proactive role in promoting peace and security across the globe is central to Germany's cautious foreign policy. The role of diplomacy in this is essential. Germany wants migrant flows to be actively guided and directed because it is in Germany's and Europe's national interests as well as due to the fact that it is in line with Germany's international humanitarian duties. The goal is to promote migration that is safe, orderly, and legal. All of them have a role in Germany's foreign policy (Gest, Kysel & Wong, 2019):

- Projects aimed at averting crises reduce the likelihood that individuals would be forced to abandon their homes in the first place. Participation in peace missions is only one example; other initiatives include efforts to help reform the Nigerian police force and have more representative elections throughout Africa.
- Crisis de-escalation is a priority for German foreign policy on the bilateral, European, and international levels. Opportunities for individuals to remain or return in war and post-conflict settings have been created because of stabilization programs, such as those in the Lake Chad region/basin. In addition to re-establishing order, they also bring back healthcare and operational infrastructure.


- As a member of the United Nations' Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response Cluster, Germany supplies emergency shelter, food, healthcare, and education to areas impacted by disaster. Germany helps those most affected by conflicts or who have been displaced due to climate change or natural disasters by supporting the United Nations' humanitarian organizations like the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Program (WFP), as well as NGOs. Germany is the world's second-greatest supplier of humanitarian aid, having contributed 2.57 billion euros in 2015.
- Germany is in continual communication with its European allies to find a shared solution to the refugee and migratory crisis. Consensus and mutual accountability are the foundation for this. To this purpose, it is critical to secure the EU's borders and form bespoke relationships with important nations of origin and transit on a European scale. As part of the EU Resettlement Program, Germany also plays a significant role in hosting refugees who need special protection. For resettlement, the humanitarian admission plan with Turkey, and refugee programs administered by the Länder in 2022, Germany has allocated up to 6,000 spots.
- Germany actively promotes a fairer international division of responsibilities to address and avoid large and prolonged refugee crises and to enhance migration management within the framework of the United Nations, the Group of Twenty, and the Group of Seven. Specifically, Germany backs the United Nations' Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), whose goal is to better distribute global responsibility for refugees, and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (GCM), an international framework for increased cooperation in the field of migration.
- The Federal Foreign Office and its overseas embassies disseminate information locally and via digital media on the risks associated with irregular migration, the benefits of legal migration, and other topics related to emigration and refugees. The goal is to correct intentionally false information and dispel rumors by providing details on the real and legal situation for refugees and migrants in Germany. The Federal Foreign Office also funds information programs in both countries of origin and countries of transit to help people considering migration make educated choices.

- Those who need protection should get it, which is why it's important to improve refugee protection. This means aid must be provided to countries that take in significant numbers of refugees. Germany, for instance, helps nations like Sweden and Finland care for Venezuelan refugees and migrants.
- Most refugees around the globe stay in their native areas, seeking shelter and a fresh beginning in neighboring nations that offer them safety. Integration and the ability to make one's own choices in life are facilitated by educational opportunities in this setting. For 30 years, the Federal Foreign Office has collaborated with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on the Albert Einstein German Academic Refugee Initiative, which provides financial support to refugees so that they can enroll in or continue their studies at universities in Germany (DAFI).
- Germany encourages migrants who are unable to stay lawfully in a third country to return voluntarily to their area of origin for the sake of reintegration.

### What would have to change in Syria for you to be able to return?



## Number of immigrants to Germany in 2021 by country of origin



published by Statista research Department

## Chapter 2

### 2.1. What is Migration - Development Nexus?

The current state of affairs in relation to the link between migration and development has been quite appropriately defined as an "unsettled" one (Papademetriou & Martin, 1991). Since the publication of the influential Ascencio report, a new consensus has emerged that states that rather than stemming or containing migration pressure, development can stimulate migration in the short term by raising people's expectations and by improving the resources that are required to move. This new consensus was reached after the influential Ascencio report was published. The powerful Ascencio report had a role in forming this new consensus when it was published (Ascencio, 1990). Some study on the "new economics of migration" implies that demand for remittances from migrants, for example, rises as development progresses and investment possibilities and returns on investment rise. This is backed by the findings of certain research referred to as the "new economics of migration."

As a direct consequence of this, remittances, which have a beneficial effect on a nation's economic growth, may either stimulate or sustain migratory patterns. To put it another way, there is something that is referred to as a "migration hump" that must be overcome before people will be encouraged to stay put by the betterment of their homelands and migration will begin to diminish (Martin, 1997; Martin & Taylor, 2001). Along with this viewpoint, models of migration have been developed that are based on economic forces such as pull and push factors. Approaches that highlight mediating elements such as social networks, increased communication and transportation interconnections, trade competition between states, government migration policies, and violent conflicts within countries have been included to these models. As a result, there is a more dynamic knowledge of how migrations begin, how and why they end or continue, and the extent to which migrations influence populations.

As the subject of migration has steadily moved up the list of public and policy concerns, it has become increasingly recognized that migration can be affected – either intentionally or unintentionally – by interventions in the related areas of development policy and assistance, as well as by wider policies and practices in both the international and domestic spheres. This

realization has led to a growing acceptance of the notion that migration can be affected by interventions in the related areas of development policy and assistance, as well as by wider policies and practices in both the international and domestic level. This realization has led to a rise in the number of persons who feel that actions in the associated fields of development policy and aid can have an effect on migration. However, neither analysts nor decision-makers have a good understanding of the precise connections that exist between the aforementioned fields of policy and practice, not the least of which is in terms of the relationship between cause and effect. This holds true for every single one of these categories.

Migration and development are connected in a variety of ways, including through the strategies that individuals, households, and communities use to make a living and survive; through large and frequently well-targeted remittances; through the investments and advocacy that are carried out by migrants, refugees, diasporas, and their transnational communities; and through the international mobility that is associated with global integration, inequality, and insecurity. These are just some of the ways in which migration and development are connected. The link between migration and development is a highly politicized topic, which is reflected in the diversity of policy measures that seek to block both national coordination and international collaboration. This is a result of the fact that migration is a very contentious issue. When migration is taken into consideration, the authorities in charge of development are often concerned that their policies won't fulfill their core goals, which might lead to severe repercussions.

There has been an increase in the amount of attention devoted to the relationship between migration and development in recent years, and it is commonly stated that the link has a substantial influence on the evolution of development across the world (Faist & Fauser, 2011; Piper, Rosewarne & Withers, 2017). This is made abundantly obvious in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and Agenda 2030, both of which intertwine migration and development in a manner that has the potential to alter conventional viewpoints on aid and development assistance. The potential for migration to contribute to development is not limited to remittances that are paid back to poor countries on an individual basis, but rather it also incorporates migrant communities (Gagnon & Khoudour-Castéras, 2011).

Recent research has shown that migrants are able to maintain strong ties to their countries of origin by taking part in transnational organizations that are engaged in activities that are significant for the development of their home countries (Levitt & Glick Schiller, 2004). Such activities may include social work, assistance for the needy, or corporate partnership, and they are sometimes managed and carried out by immigrant groups in the nations that are hosting the immigrants. Examples of such activities include social work, assistance for the needy, and corporate partnership (Portes & Zhou, 2012). Therefore, cooperation or 'co-development' with immigrant organizations is often considered useful in host countries (Nijenhuis & Broekhuis, 2010), and it has been launched in order to adapt to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in a more efficient manner. This is because cooperation or co-development with immigrant organizations is often considered useful in host countries (Nijenhuis & Broekhuis, 2010). This was done so that we could accommodate a greater number of individuals. When working together, there is no predetermined pattern that must be adhered to at all times. Instead, it seems that the co-development activities and mechanisms of collaboration across immigrant groups vary quite a bit from one country to the next, particularly in Europe (Portes & Fernández-Kelly 2015). This holds especially true for countries located in Europe.

## **2.2. The ambiguity behind the meaning of development**

Despite the tremendous success that has been made in international liberalization with regard to the movement of money, products, and services, there has not been a corresponding breakthrough in the mobility of labor. The current international institutions of the globe do not provide much opportunity or incentive for discussions on issues concerning the flow of remittances and the mobility of workers. The perception of migrants as a resource for development needs to be strengthened urgently and urgently in order to meet the requirements of the situation. It is believed that remittances have a market value that is twice as high as aid, and they provide assistance to those in need at least as effectively. The developed nations of the world are aware of their reliance on the labor of immigrants. Policies regarding issues such as development aid, humanitarian relief, migration, and refugee protection are rife with internal inconsistencies and can even be seen to be in conflict with one another. Diasporas of migrants

are involved in transnational practices that have direct repercussions for international assistance and development.

How does the path of development in areas of origin affect migration, and what type of influence does it have? It is generally acknowledged that one of the key factors that contribute to economic migration is a lack of opportunities for regional expansion in the destination community. There is a growing body of data that suggests that improved opportunities for local development may, in the short term, lead to an increase in migration, but that, in the long term, travel will become less necessary and enticing (Martin & Taylor, 2001). The majority of the focus in the research that has been done on the migration of populations as a response to locally caused crises – whether demographic, economic, or environmental – has been placed on this aspect of the phenomenon. On the other hand, the literature on structural adjustment and other external variables that determine local development has only paid a limited amount of attention to the consequences on migration. This is because structural adjustment and other external factors are what define local development. This is due to the fact that migration is not the major focus of the kind of study that is being done (de Haan, 1999).

A significant amount of study has been conducted to investigate the hypothesis that migration is a kind of selection, and the focus of these studies has been on the characteristics of migrants. According to the findings of these types of studies, migrants are not typically the most impoverished people in their countries of origin. Furthermore, young adult men who have educations that are, on average, slightly higher than the national average tend to make up the majority of migrants from LDCs, particularly in Africa (Chant & Radcliffe, 1992). In conclusion, there is evidence to imply that the rate of economic growth in a given place is a role in the type of migration that occurs as well as the amount of time individuals stay in a new location after moving there. According to Lindstrom (1996), the length of migration may be larger among migrants who come from regions that are economically active as compared to migrants who arrive from regions that are economically stagnant.

The research that is now available demonstrates that the relationships between migration for economic reasons and mobility related to refugees are stronger than was originally anticipated when looking at these connections. Despite the fact that it might be difficult to keep a

clear distinction between migration that is voluntary and migration that is forced, it is nonetheless important – especially in regard to policy – to raise the following questions: Is there a significant difference in the nature of the link that exists between migration, both voluntary and forced, and development? Are there differences between migrants and refugees in terms of their motivations to contribute to community growth? Despite the fact that this is the aspect of the topic that requires further investigation, it is most likely the one that has garnered the least amount of attention from researchers. The information that is now available suggests that, over the long run, economic migration brought about by development will be minimized, but migration brought about by forced political change is likely to be reduced by democracy (Zolberg & Cherbo, 2001). It is difficult to get a complete understanding of how economic growth is affected by migrations brought about by refugees.

According to the findings of research on the migration of refugees, the majority of refugees come from countries that are considered to be impoverished. Consequently, economic factors, such as a lack of development options, may also be considered to be the fundamental driver of refugee travel. The fact that not all impoverished nations are responsible for sending refugees adds support to the notion that either poverty creates political violence, which in turn leads to conflict, or that poverty interacts with political violence as a fundamental cause of war. This viewpoint, however, is called into question by the fact that not all impoverished nations are responsible for sending refugees. There is evidence to demonstrate that the "final push" that comes in the shape of poverty can inspire individuals to leave politically unfavorable conditions. This "last push" can encourage people to leave politically uncomfortable situations (Schmeidl, 2001).

In spite of this, the inclusion of the role that transnational social networks played in encouraging, supporting, and redirecting the flow of asylum seekers and other immigrants into Western Europe may still raise questions concerning the reasons why people fled their homes. As a result of this, Crisp (1999) suggests that the concerns of means and motives have always maintained a significant distance from one another. Despite this, the underlying evidence that migrants and refugees alike continue to send significant remittances to the countries from which they came remains unaffected.

### **2.3. Does the German public policy concerning the Syrian refugee crisis qualify as migration - development nexus?**

One of the ways in which immigrants may have an effect on the flow of international trade is that they bring with them their preferences for a variety of goods and services, which in turn creates a demand for the products of the nations from which they originated. Immigrants may have an effect on international trade flows in a number of other ways as well. On the other hand, there is a dearth of information regarding the total consumption levels and patterns of migrants. This information might be useful. According to research conducted by the Centre for Turkish Studies in 1992, the total consumption volume of the Turkish people living in Germany was projected to be somewhere around 10 billion German Mark. This estimation was derived from responses given by residents of residences in both Turkey and Germany to a survey (Sen 1994).<sup>10</sup> There are presently 45,000 Turks who have established themselves in Germany by purchasing either an apartment or a house. They have a larger interest in consumer goods than Germans do, and they are a significant consumer group in markets for homes, vehicles, and the stock exchange. The findings of the study that was carried out by the Zentrum für Türkeistudien in 1992 indicated that Turkish families had a higher consumption rate than German households had at the time.

This finding goes opposed to a prevalent assumption that may be made from the corpus of relevant literature, which indicates that migrants should have a far higher savings ratio than locals do on average. The reason for this is that migrants anticipate a decrease in their future income if there is a high possibility that they will return home, or they estimate that the marginal utility of spending would be higher in their home country. Both of these factors contribute to migrants' decision to stay in countries where they are less likely to return. The occurrence of this event can be attributed in part to both of these variables. The majority of the money that immigrants save is often remitted back to their families who remain in their country of origin. According to the findings of Straubhaar and Vadean and Piracha (2010), the total amount of migrant remittances in the year 2002 amounted to 149.4 billion dollars in the United States. Because of this number, they were able to surpass the amount of official development aid and obtain 83% of the total FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) flows worldwide in the same year. It is

anticipated that the remittances sent by migrants will have a significant positive impact on the development of the countries that receive them, despite the fact that the direct financial effects of remittances in industrialized countries, in the form of retained consumption and investments, are negligible. They should contribute to the stimulation of economic development, offer impetus for local entrepreneurial endeavors, and generally boost the opportunities for advancement. If this proves to be the case, then remittances would assist alleviate the pressure that impoverished nations are under to migrate, which would be to the indirect advantage of the industrialized world.

However, the relationship between economic progress and migration is a subject that involves a great deal of nuance. There is considerable debate over the amount to which remittances contribute to economic growth in the nation that receives them. This is because the bulk of the money that is received through remittances is spent on consumption rather than investment. Despite this, even if remittances are spent for consumption, the ensuing multiplier effect may greatly improve a nation's gross domestic product.

## Chapter 3

### 3.1. The concept of rapid labor market integration in national, regional, and municipal governments' public policies & how it works in practice

Refugees, those with subsidiary or another protection status, and resettled refugees all fall under the category of humanitarian migrants, and these migrants have distinct characteristics from other migratory categories (EU free-mobility zone, labor migrants and family migrants). Their demographics and skill sets, as well as their reasons for leaving their home countries and the chance that they would settle permanently in their new countries of residency, might vary

widely. Because of the unique vulnerabilities they face, humanitarian migrants necessitate policies that are both specific and broad. Many people encounter mental health issues because of the harsh events they had to endure throughout their forced migration. As a result, they have even more trouble than other migrants finding work once they arrive in a new country. Migrant workers typically come with a limited or nonexistent network in the host nation and a skill set acquired in an environment with vastly different employment prospects. Many people lack the necessary identification documents that would establish their educational or professional backgrounds (Horvath, 2019).

Asylum seekers frequently face an uncertain legal status, particularly throughout the application procedure. Those who are granted refugee status in accordance with the Geneva Convention on Refugees are first provided with a place to stay. Refugees who are granted asylum are entitled to a renewable three-year residence permit under the EU Qualification Directive. In the vast majority of EU countries, the permit is valid for 5 years. Most Member States require refugees to meet specific requirements before they may apply for permanent residency (such as basic language skills or familiarity with the host country's political system) Those granted subsidiary protection under the EU Qualification Directive are eligible for a two-year residence permit (Art. 24 of Directive 2011/95/EU), which is valid for one year. Even while there is the potential for permanent residency for those with subsidiary protection status, there is no current data to compare the two. Furthermore, some Member States have national complementary protection statuses that do not derive from the Qualification Directive, but whose applicability is examined within the asylum procedure, and which may provide a form of protection to significant numbers of persons fleeing indiscriminate violence. However, there are no recent statistics contrasting the significance of different types of protection (Dörig, Kraft, Storey & Battjes, 2016).

According to the available statistics, refugees have historically had a more difficult time breaking into the local labor market and have fared worse than other migrant groups. Moreover, half of the humanitarian migrants were employed within six years of arriving in the EU, and it took as long as fifteen years for their employment rates to converge with those of labor migrants. This fact reaffirms the common perception that refugees have a difficult time adjusting to life in their new nations. Refugees, in comparison to other immigrant groups with similar qualities, are

less successful in the job market (Damos de Matos & Liebig, 2014). Asylum seekers, on the other hand, may show the biggest employment rate growth over time among the various immigrant categories. Bevelander and Irastorza's (2014) research in Sweden corroborates this observation in Germany. According to research conducted by Dustmann and Görlach (2016), after ten years, refugees have made greater progress than any of the other migrant groups in their cohort, resulting in better incomes and longer working hours. Refugees who are granted permanent residency are less likely to return to their country of origin than other migrants. In comparison to short-term stays, immigrants who intend to make their new home permanent have a stronger motivation to build their human capital.

Swedish STATIV data also hints that the pace of labor market integration is affected by the state of the labor market at the time of entry. Large discrepancies might be seen between different time periods. When the job market is robust, it appears that refugees need much less time to find work. Long-term research has shown that when immigrants arrive at times of significant local unemployment, their employment rates and wage assimilation worsen (Aslund & Rooth, 2007). As many European economies continue to struggle after the global financial and sovereign debt crises, this is more important than ever. Although this is a valid issue, it is somewhat allayed by the fact that current asylum seekers have been shown to choose countries with favorable labor market circumstances (such as Germany and Sweden).

Certain subsets of humanitarian migrants (such as the extremely low-skilled, women, or elderly refugees) lag far behind in terms of labor market results, as evidenced by OECD/EU indicators (2015). In the short- to medium-term, female refugees face much more difficulty finding work than their male counterparts. This might be attributed in part to cultural norms; for example, women's involvement rates tend to be lower in their native nations. In the short to medium term, survey data from primary source countries (such as Syria) show that refugee women's involvement rates will stay low in host countries as well<sup>10</sup>. However, as Sweden demonstrates, refugee women tend to be successful in overcoming stereotypes. Overall, immigrant women fare better in Sweden after 11 years than in any other EU Member State. UNHCR's interviewees notwithstanding the fact that women migrants to the labor market tend to integrate more slowly than men. According to UNHCR (2013) interviews with certain

stakeholders, this trend may be attributable to universally accessible social policy measures for women, such as affordable childcare and generous parental leave policies.

The question is, however, whether or if application procedures and reception circumstances also need to be made more gender-sensitive, in addition to integrating initiatives (such as language courses and training). International bodies have been working on this problem for a long time. In 2008, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) issued recommendations for the safety of female refugees. Guidelines for women-specific facilities and the asylum applications of women refugees can be found in EU legislation. One such provision is included in Article 15 (3) of Directive 2013/32/EU, which specifies that Member States must offer the option of a female interviewer. Asylum is harder to get for women than males, according to new research conducted for the FEMM Committee of the European Parliament (2016).

According to a 2015 OECD/EU report on immigrant employment in the EU Member States, rates in Anglo-Saxon nations are usually higher than those in Continental European or Scandinavian countries. While variations among nations are mostly attributable to changes in the composition of the immigrant intake by migration category (e.g., more humanitarian migrants in Sweden vs more labor migrants in the UK), composition differences cannot account for the whole discrepancy (see table 2 above). Existing research indicate that nations with low entry-level salaries, less employment protection, and a less dualistic labor market had greater employment rates and higher quality positions held by migrants (Aleksynska & Tritah 2013; Ho & Shirono 2015). A variety of factors, including but not limited to minimum wage and employment protection laws, as well as country-specific skill and occupational certification systems, may contribute to the observed employment disparities among displaced peoples. For instance, the QCF (Qualifications and Credit Framework) based British skills system offers more entry points to the labor market than the DQR (German Qualifications Reference) based system. The British labor market may be more accessible for migrants without qualifications from the host nation due to a lack of regulation and qualification requirements in various areas.

### 3.2. Challenges to the employment of refugees that are structural and context-specific

Beneficiaries of international protection have unrestricted access to the labor market, but asylum seekers have limited access; furthermore, EU law mandates that Member States give integration assistance to refugees. However, its implementation varies across Member States since laws alone cannot eliminate thorny problems like those posed by bureaucracy, economics, education, and culture. This research, authored by the European Employment Policy Observatory of the European Commission, discusses the difficulties asylum seekers and refugees encounter while trying to join the labor force in the European Union (EU), Norway, and Turkey (Chalkia, 2021). Significant findings include:

- Only in a few nations can those seeking refuge have immediate access to the labor market. There is a lot riding on the bureaucratic slowness of approving work licenses.
- Asylum seekers have limited access to the labor market, or none at all, in many nations. Workload caps (Netherlands, Austria), occupation eligibility (Cyprus, Hungary, Austria), pay caps (Denmark, Cyprus, Netherlands), and labor market checks (all of which are restrictions) are only few examples (Germany, France, Luxembourg, Hungary and Austria).
- Refugees and asylum seekers face similar difficulties in administration, such as lengthy processes. Having a break in their employment history might hurt their chances of getting a new job. Some businesses are reluctant to hire refugees because of the "administrative burden" involved in doing so (obtaining necessary permits and licenses).
- There are a number of Member States where refugees and, more specifically, asylum seekers face insufficient institutional assistance for their transition into the labor market. Asylum seekers are barred from using state employment services in the Czech Republic, Denmark, and Hungary, among other countries.
- Refugees and asylum seekers face additional barriers to entering the legal labor market due to economic variables like high national unemployment rates or the availability of jobs inside the shadow economy.

- Problems arise when trying to figure out how to properly credit the education and experience of migrants.
- The inability to communicate effectively is another key hurdle. Although many nations provide language instruction to aid in national integration, asylum seekers seldom have access to these programs.

### **Addressing information needs**

The business case for hiring refugees and asylum seekers, navigating the legal and administrative frameworks for doing so, identifying profiles and skill matching needs, and receiving guidance on various support initiatives, such as what challenges to expect on the work floor and how to address them, were all cited as areas in which employers felt they lacked sufficient information. Getting the appropriate data to the appropriate people in the appropriate format is, therefore, going to be a big part of the answer. Potential employers' information demands vary widely across dimensions including company size, industry, and location. While standard resources (websites/brochures) may be able to answer certain queries, they are unlikely to cover all of the unique and specific legal and administrative concerns that businesses have. Additionally, services should make more of an effort to contact business owners (Newman, Bimrose, Nielsen & Zacher, 2018).

There are options, such as "one-stop shopping" or "hotlines." The Danish Employer Hotline is one such service, offering advice and assistance to businesses in their search for qualified refugees and foreign workers. In particular, this would help small enterprises, who do the bulk of the hiring yet have less expertise with refugee recruiting. Partnerships between government agencies, corporations, immigration attorneys, and members of civic society may assist dissect the data gaps and develop effective solutions. If feasible, these methods should also uncover any stumbling blocks posed by the law, which policymakers may then decide to resolve. Here, it's instructive to look to Germany as a case study. To help fill up the knowledge vacuum, organizations like the German Institute of Human Resources (DIHK) and the German Federal Employment Agency have both made significant contributions in recent years. Recently, a debate at the highest political level about the difficulties and possibilities of hiring refugees was initiated by a meeting that Chancellor Merkel organised with companies on September 14th, 2016.

## **The business case**

In order to present a compelling financial case to senior management/shareholders and the broader public, firms need access to more data demonstrating the advantages of hiring refugees. They require evidence of the real versus expected costs and advantages, as well as evidence that hiring refugees and asylum seekers may boost individual firm profits and have a favorable effect on the economy as a whole. Research in this area may look at the long-term effects of hiring refugees and asylum seekers in businesses of varying sizes and in various industries. The increasing ethnic and cultural diversity of the labor force may also present chances for business, therefore it's worth looking into such connections. Statistics on the size and potential of the market comprised of refugees and asylum seekers might also be included. An further, if less quantitative, advantage of investing in employing, training, and mentoring refugees is a more culturally aware workforce, which may boost a company's potential for innovation due to an increase in employee creativity and originality. It also aids in the development of cross-cultural awareness, which helps refugees better assimilate into their new communities, both as consumers and as potential employees. Further research into these advantages is warranted (Newman, Bimrose, Nielsen & Zacher, 2018).

## **Profiles and skills**

In order for businesses to get in touch with qualified refugees and asylum-seekers, it is important that accurate information about their backgrounds and abilities is easily available, while yet maintaining adequate data-protection safeguards. Such data, ideally in the form of a database, should be handled or at least available on a regional level for maximum utility in matching companies with candidates. A tool like this could also help refugees and asylum seekers evaluate their own skill sets in relation to the needs of potential employers, pinpoint areas in which they lack the necessary qualifications, and learn about the available upskilling support services that could help them fill those gaps and improve their employability (Newman, Bimrose, Nielsen & Zacher, 2018).

The European Commission has recently announced the creation of a "Talents Profile Tool for Third Country Nationals" to aid in the early identification and profile of the skills and credentials of asylum seekers, refugees, and migrants. As a result, several nations have

implemented reforms to improve the process of assessing a refugee's unique set of abilities and connecting them with available training and employment opportunities. To speed up the asylum procedure, Norway, for instance, implemented early assessments of practical abilities. Skills evaluation is also planned for in Finland's New Action Plan. The results of the evaluation of abilities are subsequently factored into the choice of permanent residence in order to better meet the demands of the local labor market.

The German government has developed an online platform to help migrants understand the basics of having their foreign credentials recognised and access the resources they need to do so. The Arabic language is one of the 9 supported by this handy tool. Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden are among the rising number of nations with processes in place for refugees who do not have the necessary papers with them (Newman, Bimrose, Nielsen & Zacher, 2018).

### **Concrete guidance on different initiatives**

The development and rollout of new programs should be aided by concrete direction and lessons gained through various types of corporate participation. It's also important for employees and employers to be ready for whatever may come. Effective communication at all levels of an organization requires consistent effort from management. Potential employers of refugees and asylum seekers might benefit from knowing how to handle challenging circumstances brought on by cultural differences. While studies on the newest arrivals do not yet exist, there is a plethora of data from which to draw about diversity management (Newman, Bimrose, Nielsen & Zacher, 2018).

### **Language and cultural awareness**

Language barriers continue to be a major obstacle to entering the workforce. This includes fluency in the country's official language as well as familiarity with specialized terms for the industry, position, and function the refugee or asylum seeker would be required to fulfil. Additionally, it is crucial to address cultural norms around entry into the labor market (such as job application, the interview process, etc.) and the maintenance of work relationships generally.

Therefore, a holistic strategy is needed to guarantee that language and cultural orientation is supplied right away. Workplace behaviours and ethics of the host nation should be emphasized more in integration training. This includes gender issues, which need for a thorough familiarity with and observance of host-country standards with an appreciation for and celebration of workplace diversity. Many different parties may have an interest in this kind of training. Communities of specialists, such as retired professionals or in-training instructors, as well as community and faith-based organizations, may supplement government programs. Both businesses and individuals seeking asylum may contribute, either monetarily or in terms of time and effort, to the development of a language learning program.

### **Public opinion**

It's crucial to have an open discussion about the challenges of hiring refugees and asylum seekers. This suggestion emphasizes the significance of having detailed data and proof (as described above) and a consistent method of disseminating information. The beneficial contributions of refugees and asylum seekers, as well as the obstacles encountered by both sides, should be freely highlighted in this discourse, which should include all key players in society. Defusing xenophobic tensions is crucial to this goal. Together, business and government leaders should stress the need of a welcoming and inclusive workplace that gives people of all backgrounds a fair shot in life (Chalkia, 2021).

### **Co-operation**

Sustainable integration into the labor market requires cooperation between the government and the social partners. Northern Europe, including Austria, has a long history of tripartite collaboration, so they know what they're doing. The "Fast Track" project in Sweden that we discussed above is a model for cooperation between the government and companies in the integration of refugees. In an effort to ease the transition for newcomers into the Danish workforce, the country's companies, unions, and government recently established a tripartite agreement. Funding applications can be made in Sweden by social partners for projects like the localization of validation models. There are a variety of employer-government partnerships in Germany. For instance, the Ministry of Education, the Public Employment Services, and the Confederation of Skilled Crafts have collaborated on a program for up to 10,000 unaccompanied

minors seeking asylum. Through individualized guidance, language classes, and internships, this program works in tandem with regional businesses to better prepare participants for careers in the skilled crafts industry (Chalkia, 2021).

### **Legal and administrative framework**

Complex, internally contradictory, or unevenly applied legal frameworks and administrative structures hamper efforts to help refugees and asylum seekers find gainful employment. Organizations and refugees who want to join the workforce quickly should have quick and simple access to legal guidance. Thus, businesses have advocated for more collaboration between integration and employment services to better assist both refugees and potential employers. In some cases, the current administrative and legal structure may need to be modified. Consider refugee resources like 8 While employers are essential for refugees and asylum seekers to integrate into the workforce, there is a risk that they will cause friction with the most vulnerable members of the host community if they treat them differently than they treat native-born citizens. This is discussed in Migration Policy Debates, N°10, OECD/UNHCR, September 2016. Similarly, the necessity of taking part in integration-related activities may create logistical hurdles to working. In order to give sufficient incentives and make the most of chances for the benefit of businesses, refugees, and asylum-seekers, it is necessary to examine more closely these de facto hurdles and, where feasible, provide temporary solutions and exemptions. While it's important to get people back to work as soon as possible, it's just as important to help them learn the skills they'll need to stay employed in the long run. So, if the placement was for a low-skilled job, integration assistance should continue even after the employee starts working there. Supporting access to skilled employment / avoiding that refugees are left with only unskilled job prospects requires providing chances for combining education and work, as well as reinforced continuing training and education. This also entails making low-skilled part-time work more appealing by means such as on-going education and training. There is now a practice of totally deducting part-time employment income from welfare payments made to refugees (Chalkia, 2021).

### 3.3. Characteristics of Refugee Employment (Performance of the labor market, Routes for integrating into the labor market, Qualitative aspects of employment)

#### **Labor market performance**

Evidence of nationality, but not residency, is provided in official German labor market data. Because of this, it is impossible to give an exact count of the number of refugees who are now working. To estimate the most likely total number of newcomers after 2014, two methods have been developed in recent years. Using official labor market statistics as a proxy for 'refugee,' one may look at the nationalities of the primary countries from which refugees arrive. This implies that although a transgender person escaping Ecuador is not considered a refugee, a Syrian doctor who came in the 1970s is. This workaround is not useful for counting the number of refugees who have found work in countries like Turkey, which has a long history of labor and other migration to Germany and is also home to a sizable percentage of today's refugees. As a result, the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Refugee Survey was designed as a focused survey. 5 Seven thousand nine hundred and fifty refugees and asylum seekers who have arrived in Germany since 2013 are presently represented in this yearly panel survey. 2016 saw the initial survey, with further polls in 2017 and 2018. The most complete picture of refugees' and asylum seekers' integration into Germany's labor market may be gleaned from a combination and comparison of both sources (Brell, Dustmann & Preston, 2020).

The IAB-BAMF-SOEP poll concluded five years after the main flood of refugees came in Germany that refugees (aged 18-64 years) who arrived after 2013 had integrated into the labor market a bit faster than those who entered in the 1990s (Brell, Dustmann & Preston, 2020). In contrast to prior cohorts, when the median time to begin "regular job" was 50 months, half of those who arrived after 2013 had found work 46 months after arrival. As a result, the current group of refugees may expect to enter the labor market four months earlier. Also, the rate at which refugees are employed as a group has risen steadily over the years, which is indicative of their successful absorption into the labor market.

Due to strict regulation (from both the trades and the state as part of the education system) and a near-exclusive focus on credentials awarded inside the system, Germany's Ausbildung (dual vocational training system) is particularly specialized. About half of Germany's population has either finished or is pursuing some sort of vocational training. On the one hand, this approach presents significant challenges for migrants who acquired their professional competence through on-the-job training programs either in their home countries or in transit to Germany. <sup>6</sup> On the other hand, it allows those with less academic interests, knowledge, or language abilities to get access to practical work and education. In Germany, once you complete your occupational training, you automatically get social capital. The Job center actively encourages vocational training and notifies newly arriving refugees of this alternative, so that's one motivation to get started with it. In addition, businesses of all sizes are more open to hiring overseas trainees due to widespread talent gaps across numerous industries. There's also the fact that, in certain cases, asylum seekers who are denied protection can avoid deportation if they enroll in and complete a program of vocational training. Some refugees believe that entering the labor market as a trainee may increase their chances of staying, which would be beneficial for both the refugee and the employer who faces the prospect of deportation. The Ausbildungsduhlung has become controversial because some politicians see it as a loophole to evade deportation. Employers, on the other hand, often protest against the prospect of the deportation of 'their' trainees or employees because they do not want to lose their personnel or because they feel a social obligation to their trainees (Brell, Dustmann & Preston, 2020).

### **Routes for integrating into the labor market**

It is vital to examine the mode of labor market integration in greater depth in order to analyze the procedures by which refugees enter the workforce. For refugees in Germany, the primary sign of a successful transition appears to be proof of social security contribution payment after a period of unemployment. Demonstrates that the vast majority of these people use temporary labour agencies and contract employment. Supporters consider it as the only practical low-threshold facilitation of refugees' entry into the market, while critics point out that the

circumstances and job security for refugees are weaker in this fashion than for those entering the labor market via direct employment.

It is too soon to tell whether or not refugees who go via temp companies will find better long-term work. But there's cause to be skeptical; a 'spring board,' or bridging effect, is typically supposed to occur, but many refugees conduct 'auxiliary jobs,' so these could not be that powerful (see Jahn 2016 for analysis of an earlier cohort, for 2005-2014, of foreign residents in Germany). Temporary employment services typically keep workers for an extended amount of time (three months on average) and smooth their transition from one job to the next. Jahn (2016) shows that the longer a worker stays in the realm of contract staffing, the more detrimental the impacts are in terms of the worker's ability to obtain a job that is not aided by a temp agency.

### **Qualitative aspects of employment**

It's one thing to have a job, but it's another to work in one's chosen industry or at a position that pays well and provides personal fulfilment. Thus, let's move on to the various occupations in which refugees engage. As was previously indicated, many refugees have work experience but lack easily transferrable qualifications due to the certificate-based nature of Germany's vocational training system.

According to the IAB-BAMB-SOEP survey, many refugees who have found work in Germany are able to put their prior work experience to use despite their lack of the standard documentation for doing so. This includes 44% of refugees working in "auxiliary activities," 52% of refugees working as skilled employees, 2% of refugees working as specialists, and 3% of refugees working as experts. The data shows that a shockingly high percentage of refugees, around one-third, are working in occupations that are outside their official education or training. This is a fascinating discovery, as research on the topic of labor migration typically conclude that transnational workers lose skills and status when they move to a new country (McGuinness, 2006). An additional possibility is that many refugees spend time in transit or in the initial country of reception, which means that their official training may have taken place in their country of origin, while during the transit period they have acquired new skills and experience but no formal diplomas (ibid: 10). However, 28% of refugees in Germany are working at a lower level than they were before they came here; this number rises to 35% for women, who may view

this mismatch between their credentials and their actual employment as downgrading or deskilling.

Refugees' ability to integrate into the labor market is also characterized in part by their income. When refugees first enter the workforce, their pay is poor, but it eventually rises (Brücker et al., 2020). Those who participated in the IAB-BAMFSOEP poll and who were employed full-time in 2016 reported a gross monthly income of €1,678, while those who did so in 2018 reported a gross monthly income of €1,863. The average gross income for all refugees working in 2016 was €810; in 2018, that number increased to €1,282. (ibid.). Increased full-time work among refugees is likely to account for this trend. The IAB-BAMF-SOEP poll also indicated that for every year a refugee works, their salary goes up by 12%. Refugees in Germany earn 89% of the median income of those born in Germany if they work in jobs that do not require extensive training or vocational qualifications; young refugees (aged 18-25) without significant experience earn 74% of the median income of the same 'German' group; and in skilled professions, refugees earn just 69% of the level. The gap widens as a function of the level of education and experience required for work. There is also a gender wage difference, with women refugees earning roughly 16% less than men refugees after accounting for factors such as education and experience and whether or not they are caring for young children.

### 3.4. The case of Germany vs the case of Sweden

When compared to Germany, Sweden stands out as having achieved far higher levels of success in the field of crafting a coherent integration policy because of the application of a certain theoretical model. This is the case when the comparison is made to Sweden. The empirical data has shown that Sweden has already created a coherent policy framework. Within the confines of this structure, the issues at hand are broken down into their component parts, and the policy goals are spelled out in a way that is easily digestible. Already, steps have been taken to begin the process of methodically putting policy into effect, and this process has been going on for more than three decades. On the other hand, Germany has developed a number of policies that have the potential to make the integration process go more smoothly; nevertheless, these

policies have not yet been effective in building a consistent framework with specific aims. According to our line of reasoning, this distinction between the nations came about because of the fact that each nation founded its relevant policies on a different theoretical model of immigration (Ostrand, 2015).

This model of immigration was chosen by the nation in question and served as the basis for the nation's immigration policies. Initially, Sweden enacted policies that were consistent with an assimilationist model; but, over time, these policies gradually converged into those that were consistent with a multiculturalist model. As a direct consequence of this, immigrants have been accorded equal legal, economic, and social rights from the very beginning of the model. Furthermore, as the model has developed further through time, immigrants have also been awarded cultural rights. Germany's immigration policy was exclusively based on a discriminatory exclusionist approach for the great bulk of the immigrant population, who were referred to as guest workers. As a direct result of this, the group was denied practically all of the rights that were valid for Swedish immigrants, with the exception of limited economic rights. These economic rights were the only rights that were granted to the group (Ostrand, 2015).

However in Sweden, out of a multiculturalist viewpoint, policymaking has progressively taken into consideration a holistic approach in integration. This contrasts with the situation in Germany, where there has been no movement in policy in this direction. In contrast to this, the situation in Sweden is as follows: According to the findings, the model that is most compatible with a holistic approach is the multicultural model, which is one of the models that has been used in these nations. It is also one of the models that have been used in other countries. This is something that we think to be of the utmost importance, especially when taking into account the fact that the holistic component has become officially recognized at the level of the EU for the creation of policies regarding the integration of immigrants (Ostrand, 2015).

## Chapter 4

### 4.1. The German environment for refugees' and asylum seekers' entry to the labor market


Germany has a well-established system for welcoming migrants, but it was put under strain by the surge of arrivals after 2014 and a lack of resources to support the administrative and practical aspects of the process. As a result, many things were handled on the fly, and refugees had to persevere through lengthy, often opaque procedures. In addition, the first welcome and integration processes received a substantial boost from civil society (van Dyk & Misbach 2016). The process itself consists of a number of steps, including the asylum application, the distribution of refugees within Germany, and a wide variety of issues such as housing, education, healthcare, integration into the labor market, language learning, family reunification, and meeting economic, cultural, spiritual, and social needs. We can't possibly cover all that needs to be covered, so this chapter zeroes down on the asylum application procedure and why it's so important to gain access to the labor market.

- Those who have been granted asylum but are mandated to dwell in a refugee center are not permitted to work (s. 61(1) Asylum Act). The mandatory stay in an AE-Wohnrichtung (receiving center) lasts for three months and can be extended to six months;
- Those from safe countries of origin (like EU member states, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ghana, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Senegal, and Serbia) who filed asylum applications after 31 August 2015 are required to live in reception facilities for the duration of their asylum procedure (and, if their application is rejected, in certain cases, until leaving the country) and are not permitted to engage in employment (s. 47(1a) Asylum Act);

Refuge seekers in Germany are required to publicly declare their intent to seek asylum at the country's borders or ports of entry. Afterward, their details are recorded. Name, birthplace, and age are collected alongside fingerprints and a biometric passport photo during this phase. Those who register are given documentation of arrival, which is vital because in high-volume years the actual asylum claim was typically filed several months later. Asylum seekers can get

state-provided housing, food, medical treatment, and monetary assistance in exchange for this document. They are prohibited from working at this time. All the relevant authorities in the asylum process have access to their information since it is recorded in a centralized database. This is done so that duplicate registrations are avoided, and it may be determined if the asylum seeker has already applied for asylum in another EU member state (a "Dublin case"). In this case, Germany is not obligated to oversee the asylum process and can instead ask for its citizens to be sent to another EU nation, usually Italy or Greece due to the presence of a more inadequate refugee care system in these areas. Many of the people who are impacted by these shifts view them as de facto deportations.

### Number of asylum application (total) in Germany from 2010 to 2023



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Asylum-seekers came mostly from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq in 2015–16. Not all asylum seekers in Germany are granted international protection and allowed to stay in the country, although in 2016, recognition rates were high for certain major countries of origin, including 98% for Syrians, 92% for Eritreans, and 70% for Iraqis. While 62% of all applications were accepted, the percentages of acceptance for Afghan and Iranian applicants were lower, at 56% and 51%, respectively. Subsidiary protection status has seen a dramatic increase in the percentage of successful applications, from under 1% in 2015 to more than 35% in 2016. Subsidiary-protected persons are granted a one-year renewable residence visa, and only after two years are their foreign-based family members eligible for family reunification. Otherwise, they are afforded the same protections as those who have a more permanent status.

There were 434,00 open asylum claims as of the end of 2016. The BAMF began working on more complicated cases that had been pending from the previous year, which contributed to a 2-month rise in the average time of an asylum procedure in 2016. The average wait time in the third quarter of 2016 ranged from less than four months for Syrians to nine months for Afghan and Eritrean applicants, fifteen months for Iranian applicants, and sixteen months for Somali applicants. However, these processing periods need to include the time it takes to enter the country (when pre-registration often occurs) and file a formal application. Many people seeking refuge in Germany wait months before they even get an appointment to file their claim. To now, there has been no word on how long these queues could go on. Asylum applicants tend to be somewhat young, with the share peaking at age 18 and gradually decreasing after that. Male candidates made up about 70% of the pool, with 34% falling into the 16-24 age range. Among females, the distribution of ages was considerably more equal; this group made up just around 20% of the population. An overwhelming majority (85%) of refugees surveyed in 2015 from the main origin countries wanted to stay in Germany permanently; this was especially true of Afghans and Iraqis but was also true of a smaller percentage of Syrians.

## 4.2. The refugee reception process & work allowance

The purpose of this search for translations is to provide uniform standards of reception conditions across the EU. The Order:

- guarantees that those who apply for aid may get the things they need, such as a place to live, food to eat, medical treatment if they need it, a place to send their kids (within a maximum period of 9 months)
- supports those who need it the most, such as children who are alone and torture survivors, by giving them priority treatment. To guarantee that vulnerable asylum seekers have access to medical and psychological treatment, EU member states are required to undertake individual assessments to determine the unique requirements of each applicant.
- offers guidelines for the detention of asylum seekers and the exploration of alternatives to detention that do not violate their basic rights.

In order to defend human dignity in conformity with the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the present Reception Conditions Directive nonetheless gives Member States some leeway to determine the best approach to provide material reception conditions. As the migrant crisis has shown, the European Union (EU) needs to be better prepared to handle massive influxes of migrants and to provide greater uniformity in reception conditions across the bloc. Therefore, in 2016, the Commission proposed revising the Reception Conditions Directive to better harmonize reception conditions throughout the EU and to minimize incentives for secondary migrations. By decreasing the waiting period, the idea also hopes to improve the applicants' chances of independence and integration. The Commission is in favor of speedy passage of the text of the political settlement reached between the European Parliament and the Council in 2018 (Rast et al., 2020).

The European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), formerly known as the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), published EASO guidelines on reception conditions: operational criteria and indicators in September 2016. All EU Member States are expected to adhere to a set of common standards for their national reception systems, and those requirements and the metrics by which they are evaluated are outlined in the guidelines. The mentioned standards are in line with current practices in EU Member States. The Agency's Management

Board adopted the guidance after consulting civil society organizations and a working group comprised of experts from EU Member States. The working group also included representatives from the European Commission, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Rast et al., 2020).

A sufficient quality of life for all applicants for international protection, including those with particular reception requirements, is a primary goal of the guidelines, which are meant to assist Member States in enforcing such elements of the Reception Conditions Directive as they see fit. Including European Union (EU) nations Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, this research looked at 51 countries that together host 87% of the world's refugee population to determine how they treat refugees' rights on the job. Among the most significant results are the following (Rast et al., 2020):

- Despite having a legal right to work under international law, at least 25% of refugees are located in countries with inadequate legal safeguards for employment.
- Despite legal guarantees of equal protection for both refugees and native-born employees, the right to work is subject to at least some administrative hurdles (in reality) in each of the 51 nations analyzed in the study.
- Approximately 55 percent of the world's refugees are located in countries where they face considerable impediments in exercising their legal right to work. The inability to leave refugee camps, for example, or to obtain government permission to start a company are all examples of such obstacles.
- Strong laws safeguard the employment rights of refugees in high-income countries, but these governments are selective about who they allow claiming refugee status. For instance, several nations forbid asylum applicants from engaging in gainful employment.
- Access to education, which is crucial to labor protections and economic participation, was discovered in the vast majority of nations. Sixty-four percent of refugees are located in nations with good primary and secondary education opportunities, and sixty-two percent have access to any education at all.
- Fewer than 2% of refugees reside in countries with convenient access to formal financial institutions, and only 11% in countries that recognize and validate their prior education and work experience.

Eight of the twelve nations examined in this study scored a four or above on this measure, making Europe the strongest area for refugee employment rights. Results showed that the freedom to labor was severely limited in practices in Greece, Italy, North Macedonia, and Serbia, earning them a score of 3. In Greece, for instance, migrants are sometimes confined to makeshift camps, making it impossible for them to use local resources and find work (Rast et al., 2020).

### 4.3. Access to the German labor market for refugees

In recent years, asylum seekers' ability to enter the labor market has been severely curtailed. In 2019, amendments were made to the relevant laws by the Skilled Workers' Immigration Act, which will take effect in March 2020. The end effect is an increasingly complicated and onerous regulatory framework. Asylum seekers were unable to work before March 2020 because they were required to remain in a temporary holding facility. After three months of residence in the federal territory, individuals may be eligible for work outside of these centers (Gericke et al., 2018).

As of March 2020, asylum applicants at initial receiving centers are still prohibited from working. Due to the prolonged obligation to reside in IRCs, this restriction has been further lengthened. Most adult asylum-seekers currently have to wait 18 months before they may start working; in some Federal States, that wait time is extended to 24 months. However, after 9 months in the asylum procedure, certain asylum seekers with permission to stay at initial reception centers are eligible for an employment permit. Asylum seekers who have an open case with the BAMF or an appeal that has not yet been decided are affected by this. If they meet the other criteria, asylum seekers who have been going through the process for nine months are granted entry to the labor market under Section 61(1) of the Asylum Act. To the contrary, the law forbids such opportunities for those seeking refuge who come from secure countries. Thus, the legislation mandates preferential treatment for the former group. Asylum seekers from safe countries are often required to remain in initial receiving centers for the duration of the procedure, thereby preventing them from participating in the labor market (Gericke et al., 2018).

The authorities have the option of allowing former asylum seekers with a tolerated stay who are still required to reside in reception centers to begin working after a waiting period of 6 months. Those whose requests for suspensive effect were denied after having their applications dismissed as inadmissible or plainly unwarranted while their appeals were still ongoing before the administrative courts. Outside of designated asylum seeker receiving areas, asylum seekers with a valid stay permit are not authorized to work for the first three months of their stay in the country (Kosyakova & Brenzel, 2020).

Until the Asylum Act was updated in 2020, asylum applicants were not permitted to engage in a self-employed job during the entirety of their asylum procedure. This is because the authorization to pursue self-employment is contingent on the possession of a normal residence permit. Permission to remain granted to an asylum applicant does not count. In contrast, the new Section 4a(4) of the Residence Act states that the relevant authorities may authorize any kind of economic activity, including self-employment, for people who have been granted permission to stay or tolerated stay. However, this is only relevant for people who do not reside in designated safe areas.

Access to the labor market is further constrained in practice by factors beyond those already listed. To begin, each time an asylum seeker seeks to enter the workforce, they must first submit a new application for an employment visa. To do so, applicants must provide evidence of a "concrete" job offer, such as a statement from a company saying the asylum seeker would be hired if the work visa is approved, and a description of the position provided to the authorities (Kosyakova & Brenzel, 2020).

In addition, the Federal Employment Agency must give its stamp of approval before an employer may hire someone. Some forms of training, such as internships and vocational education, represent an exception to this general norm. Such clearance is conditional on a number of factors, including a "study of labor circumstances," which means an investigation into whether or not labor rights are respected, and salaries are competitive with those in the surrounding area. Priority reviews, which used to be conducted to determine if another jobseeker (usually a German citizen or a foreigner with a more secure residence permit) would be better

qualified for the post, would no longer be used under the new law set to go into effect in 2020 (Kosyakova & Brenzel, 2020).

There is a lack of up-to-date data on the percentage of asylum seekers who are working or looking for work. The Employment Agency keeps track of the number of jobless people of various nationalities, without regard to legal status, and makes this information publicly available. According to the Institute for Employment Research's study, however, the consequences of Covid-19 have been felt more keenly by those holding citizenship from the primary countries of origin of refugees and asylum seekers than by Germans or EU nationals. Short-term job programs are likely to blame for this group's disproportionately high rate of unemployment in 2020 (Kosyakova & Brenzel, 2020).

## Chapter 5

### 5.1. Findings & Conclusions

Refugees from Syria in Germany were making progress toward full integration by year's end. This process of integration has been severely hampered, however, by the March 2020 spread of the Coronavirus pandemic in Germany and the attendant measures such as lockdowns and limitations on movement. The war against the Coronavirus, even if these closures are just

temporary, will preoccupy the country for the foreseeable future. Medium- to long-term effects of these actions are anticipated to affect all sectors of society, but particularly vulnerable groups. Since residency status is not always granted, many persons are unable to access the resources they need to establish themselves, such as professional language courses, legal advice centers, legal remedies, and initial job contracts. The early stage of economic integration is particularly vulnerable to an economic catastrophe brought on by the epidemic. This is true for both those who are just getting ready to enter the workforce (by, for example, taking language classes) and those who have already done so but are still in the early stages of their professions and so have an uncertain job situation.

The German Institute for Employment Research's monthly Immigration Monitor reports shows that the employment rate of people from war- and crisis-torn countries has been declining on average since 2019. Paradoxically, the rate of unemployment is rising among this demographic. As a result, many Syrian refugees are struggling to make ends meet. An estimated 160,000 Syrian refugees were listed with the German Federal Employment Agency as jobless in August of 2020. If we compare the number of Syrian refugees without jobs in 2020 to that in 2019, we could get a clearer picture of the impact. For instance, in June 2020, there were about 30% more Syrian refugees looking for work than in June 2019 (Kosyakova & Brenzel, 2020).

Syrian refugees in Germany have made rapid progress in integrating into the work sector. However, we are still in the first phases of a very delicate integration procedure. Both Syrian refugees and the German government still have a long road ahead of them. It is especially important to safeguard progress made so far during this period of turmoil.

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