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Department of Balkan, Slavic & Oriental Studies

**GREECE'S POLICY IN THE BALKANS AFTER THE COLD
WAR**

Master's Thesis

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ABSTRACT

This study aims to shed light on the foreign policy of Greece in the Balkans benefiting from the theory of realism. The threat perception of the countries in the theory of realism effectively determines Greece's foreign policy, especially the Balkan policies. After the Second World War, Greece built its foreign policy on the communist threat until 1974. Following the Cyprus Problem that occurred in the same year and the democratization period in the country, Greek foreign policy was established on the Turkish threat. In order to be part of the Western System, Greece had minimalized its relations with the Balkan Countries ruled by communism. Both the Cyprus problem and the Balkan issue forced Greece to pursue a new foreign policy. The main objective of this new area totally differed from the first period. Preventing Turkey from establishing close relations with the Balkan States, and approaching Europe's political institutions became the priority of Greece's foreign policy. As a result, Greece started to establish contacts with the Balkan States.

In the post-Cold War period, in the first half of the 1990s, Greece again based its policy on threat perception. However, this policy isolated the country in the international arena and in the Balkan peninsula. In the second half of the 90s, Greece modernized its foreign policy and became a powerful actor by establishing new economical networks with the Balkan states. In this new era, Greece started to follow a more active foreign policy.

INTRODUCTION

The main political aspect of the Cold War and post-war period was to increase the interaction among the international actors in political, economic, social, and cultural life. Although each state managed to create a policy following this path, the threat perception and national interests, led to the creation of a subjective policy. The foreign policies of the states were shaped, created, and carried out by basing themselves on this subjectivity.

The foreign policy of Greece in the Balkans, especially after the end of the Cold War, was based on the perception of threat and the effect of national interest. In this dissertation, the policies of Greece in Yugoslavia which will be named the Western Balkan later on will be examined.

Greece was a unique liberal country, which was a member of both EU and NATO and also ruled by democracy. For this reason, it had the potential to guide the Balkan countries by abolishing the communist regimes. That made Greece the leader of the westernization policies in the Balkan regions. After the end of the Cold War, instead of supporting or leading the construction of a European perspective in the Balkans, Greece found itself in the middle of the Balkan problem and became a part of it. Greek foreign policy, especially in 1990-1995, implemented a more nationalistic policy in the Balkans. The general approach of Greek scholars and writers to Greek foreign policy is the inability of Greece to adapt itself to the international and regional conjuncture after the Cold War. According to these scholars, Greece was not able to determine its domestic and foreign policy up to its priorities.

During this period, Turkey's active policy in Balkans created tension in Greece. The Turkish threat on the Greek borders contributed to establishing a threat argument in the Greek foreign policy.

The aim of this research is to observe the Balkan policy of Greece in the 1990s by using the literature written in Greek and English. More intensively, Greek policies in the so-called Western Balkans after the Cold War will be examined. In the first place, the policies of Greece in the Balkan countries during the Cold War will be mentioned, and then it will be expressed how the transformation took place in the Greek foreign policy and threat perception along with other developments in the region within the scope of the Cold War period. Secondly, the Western Balkans policy of Greece in the first half of the 1990s

will be analyzed within the framework of threat perception with a realist approach, and finally, the changes in the foreign policy towards the Western Balkans will be discussed together with the modernization process of the Greek foreign policy after 1995.

THEORY

In this study the post-cold war Balkan policies of Greece will be discussed in the context of realism theory. In the first place, the theory of realism in international terminology will be explained. Then, the foreign policy of Greece and the Greek academic views about realism will be explained. On the context of this theory, Greece's post-cold war Balkan policies will be analysed. The basic aspects of realism can be summarized as follows: the struggle for power was at the center of all politics.

The monolithic structures of the states and their accepted rational character were the base of the realistic theory. Realist thought accepts human nature as bad-created, selfish and self-seeking. In relation to this acceptance, State nature is associated with human nature. Moreover, according to realism, politics and morality are separate issues and morality cannot be applied in the analysis of foreign policies of states or international relations. The other assumption is that the system is seen as anarchist, since there is no central authority in the international system. According to this theory, there is absolute distrust between states and the security problem forces states to gain more power and provide security. This theory assumes that international politics is a process of conflict rather than cooperation. Realism treats other states as hostile or potential threats. That is, each state follows policies that will make it superior to the other in every situation, and this leads to the emergence of an insecure environment advocated by realism. In this theory, when power is mentioned, firstly military power is referred to. Within the framework of power, which is an important concept, realists divide them into military security and strategic issues (high politics), which they consider essential for the survival of the state, and economic and social issues (low politics), which they consider less important. As a result, realism hierarchically adapts the elements of power to the international agenda and places military security first (Morgenthau, 1967).

There is a difference in international relations terminology in Greece. Looking at the international literature, it differs according to the accepted terminology. It is clear that the theories were interpreted and defined according to Greek politics and culture. As an example of this point of view, representatives of liberal thought define themselves as realists. But again, they state that they represent a different "realism" from classical realism. In Greek realism, unlike classical realism; they attach importance to the power factor, but they argue that a conciliatory attitude should be adopted in foreign policy.

Greek realists argue that organizations such as the European Union, economic organizations and non-governmental organizations also play an important role in determining the international relations and foreign policies of countries (Heracleidēs, 2001: p.162). They also discuss that issues such as free trade, political freedoms, and human rights are influential in determining Greece's foreign policy, and that the state is not the only actor in this field. Especially at this point, it is necessary to evaluate the role of other actors together in the foreign policy implementation in Greece and therefore in the Balkan policies (Kōnstantinidēs, 2003: p.137). Some scholars argue that the theory of realism in foreign policy in Greece was put forward from two different perspectives. He explains that both of the aforementioned perspectives actually developed on the basis of classical realist thought. According to this view, the realist approach in Greece gives importance to reconciliation in foreign policy within the framework of the "valid realist point of view". In fact, this point of view coincides with the "Greek realism" expressed above. Within the framework of the mentioned realism, it is seen that the "revisionist realist perspective" gained strength especially with the end of the Cold War. In this sense, "revisionist realist perspective"; active, nationalist and protectionist. Greece is under threat, the threat can come from the East and the North. This theory emphasizes that the European Union should be approached cautiously and that the international system is dangerous and confrontational. It is planned to take the example of the Balkans policy of Greece and analyse it with this theory. After the Second World War, the Greek foreign policy will be explained in the context of the theory of realism with the basic threat perception and the Balkan policy (Kouloubēs, 1997: p.66).

According to this theory, the most important power in the hands of Greece is to defend and protect its national interests through diplomacy. But first, during the Cold War years, a realistic policy began to be followed due to the necessity of international order and also due to the problems with Turkey. The realist approach has also been followed in recent years. However, trying to explain international developments with transformed nation-centered prejudices, within the framework of "national issue" and "national interests" weakened Greek diplomacy (Kouloubēs, 1997: p.13). The reason for this transformation is the limited ability of long-term analysis as the weaknesses of the Greek diplomacy and foreign policy system, and the planning of the foreign policy pursued. problems such as strategic deficiencies, lack of harmony and order among the institutions involved in foreign

policy planning and implementation (Stophoropoulos - Makrydimētrēs, 1997: p.31). These criticisms have common points with the criticisms of the foreign policy of many states. Generally, any failure of the states in terms of foreign policy and the inability to achieve the target are explained by reasons such as lack of harmony and inadequacy.

Tsoukalēs explained the reason for the inward and rigid implementation of Greek foreign policy in the early 1990s. As the main reason for this; He states that the feeling of insecurity causes most Greeks to dream of one day fighting all their enemies (Turks, Slavs, Albanians, and “Franks”-Westerners) on their own at the same time (Kouloumbēs, 1997: p.25). According to this theory, “in a small geography with a large cultural heritage” The effect of living on the Greek ethnic identity caused the foreign policy priority to be given to Macedonia and Albania, along with Turkey, at the end of the cold war period.

If we evaluate Greek foreign policy according to realist thought, distrust towards Communism and Turkey is one of the main factors in the region. According to this theory, the unity policy followed by Greece in order to balance the power of the two countries can be explained. However, Greece was caught unprepared for the new balances that developed with the end of the Cold War period. In this context, it is interpreted that while it has the position and opportunities to be an active country in the Balkans region, where it is located, at least in the first half of the 1990s, due to the threat perception perspective in realist theory, it could not make good use of this chance (Kevin – Ifantis, 1996: p.27). In addition to all these, the Greek foreign policy approach, which is based on power and security, has a unique structure even though it is evaluated according to the theory of realist thought. This is due to both the internal structure of Greece and the political developments that emerged in the process of gaining its independence. Historically, Turkey has been the driving force for the formation of national unity in Greece and the priority issue in determining its foreign policy. In fact, this does not mean that foreign policy is determined in a really realistic way.

As Greek academics have stated, Greek foreign policy, which has started to develop and modernize especially in recent years, has not left the line of realist theory of thought. In this way, it continued to develop in a more flexible, soft and cooperative manner (Tsakōnas, 2003: p.319). The priority of Greek foreign policy is the military security of the country. For such a development to happen for Greek foreign policy, not only the foreign policy makers but also the Greek public needs to be ready for it. In this way, by following

a more moderate and multi-faceted foreign policy, it practices on the adoption of national issues and the interests of Hellenism.

CHAPTER I

1. Greek Foreign Policy in the Balkans During the Cold War

1.1. Greece During the Cold War

When we examine the foreign policy of Greece, the general situation and policies of Greece during the cold war: At the beginning of the 1960s, at the head of the Greek government, there was Konstantin Karamanlis, the leader of the right-wing ERE (Εθνική Ριζοσπαστική Ένωση E.P.E.) party, which won the 1958 elections. Karamanlis believed that historical and geographical data positioned Greece in the West. For this reason, he associates the most important support point of Greek foreign policy with full commitment to NATO (Chourchoulisa-Kourkouvelas, 2012: p.500). For the aforementioned reasons, Karamanlis, who endeavored to develop very close relations with the United States during the eight years (1955 -1963) he spent in power, stated that there was a led to the "golden age". According to the American diplomat who served in Athens during this period; the size of USA influence is huge and it has great prestige.

On a Virgo aspect, EDA (Ενιαία Δημοκρατική Αριστερά Ε.Δ.Α.) was another important figure in Greek politics in the same period. In the elections held in 1958, it received around 25% of the votes. The left party EDA has separated from other parties that make up Greek politics with its goals and ideas such as disarmament, softening in the Cold War and leaving NATO (Close, 2002: p.103). Liberals constituting the central wing is another political party EK (Ένωση Κέντρου) E.K.). The central wing liberals were able to unite under this party title only a few weeks before the 1961 elections (Close, 2002: p.103). The main policy of the USA in Greek domestic politics in this period was to dismiss the EDA from politics and turn the EK into a strong opposition (Papandreu, p.136).

While ERE won the 1961 elections with 51% of the votes, the centrist party reduced the EK 34% of the votes, and the EDA reduced its vote rate to 15%. As a result, EDA became the loser of the elections. EDA could not maintain its 24% vote in the elections held in 1958 in the elections held in 1961. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the attitude of the USA has a significant effect on the decrease in the voting rates of the EDA and the rise of the EK. The US Embassy in Athens welcomed ERE's previous success and winning the elections very positively (FRUS, vol.XVI, s.621).

After the elections, ERE, who won the elections with a significant margin, was accused of rigging the elections and this situation became the beginning of a political turmoil. In order to clarify these allegations, the most important intervention of the EK was to publicly declare that it started an "uncompromising struggle" (Kassimeris, 2010: p.44). On the ERE side; George Papandreou, who eliminated Venizelos in the intra-party conflicts, continued a successful process in his "uncompromising struggle" campaign against ERE. The increasingly harsh public attacks against ERE have targeted all institutions harmed by the right. During this process, rallies, strikes and demonstrations were held all over the country. These events, on the other hand, were tried to be suppressed harshly by the police force in a controlled manner (Tsukolas, 1970: p.202). After all these developments and confusion, Karamanlis' disagreement with the Palace resulted in Karamanlis' resignation (FRUS, vol.XVI, p.676).

After Karamanlis' resignation, the elections held in November 1963 marked the end of the 20-year-long right-wing government in the country. While the EC received 42% of the votes, ERE's votes fell to 39% and EDA almost left the political competition (Koliopoulos - Veremis, 2009: p. 137). After the elections, George Papandreou was appointed as the prime minister, but the EK did not have an absolute majority in the parliament. Papandreou, who did not want to form a coalition, resigned so that new elections could be held (Kassimeris, 2010: p.44).

The elections held in February 1964 resulted in a great victory for the EK. EK came to power with 53% of the votes (Koliopoulos - Veremis, 2009: p. 137). However, the atmosphere of stability provided by Papandreou after the elections did not last long. By 1965, Greek political life was mingled with allegations regarding the ASPIDA organization (Αξιωματικοί Σώσατε Πατρίδα Ιδανικά Δημοκρατία Αξιοκρατί), allegedly involving Prime Minister Papandreou's son Andreas Papandreou, who was Minister of State for Coordination. According to the allegations, the organization named ASPIDA planned a left-wing coup against the government (Papandreu, p.136). After the allegations were made public, A. Papandreou had to resign. Prime Minister Papandreou came face to face with the Greek King after the steps he wanted to take to initiate an investigation. This disagreement between Papandreou and the King resulted in his own resignation (Tsukolas, 1970: p.219).

After G. Papandreou's resignation in July 1965, Greek domestic politics entered a complex process. Instead of holding re-elections, the King gave G. Papandreou's Deputy Prime Minister Stephanopoulos the task of forming the government (Doumanis, 2010: p.138). After the new government was formed, former Prime Minister G. Papandreou started a second resistance against the new government. With the withdrawal of the coalition members, an interim election government was established, which decided to hold elections in May 1967 (Woodhouse, 1991: p.289).

On 21 April 1967, shortly before the elections to be held in Greece, a junta formed by a group of colonels from the Greek army, under the leadership of Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos, seized power. However, most of the officers who participated in the coup had previously served in the Greek intelligence organization KYP (Κεντρική Υπηρεσία Πληροφοριών, ΚΥΠ) (Gallant, 2001: p.197). Konstantin explains the coup plan to Maragkou as follows; He used the "Prometheus Plan" prepared for NATO based on the existence of a communist threat in the country. Declaring that it suspended all political activities in the country, the junta administration appointed Supreme Court Judge Konstantin Kollias as prime minister (Maragkou, 2009: p.347).

After the coup was successful, Konstantin Kollias, who was appointed as the Administration and prime minister, contacted the US Embassy in Athens. Kollias informed the Embassy staff that they were pro-US and NATO supporters (FRUS, vol.XVI: p.594). However, the US embassy preferred to be cautious against the junta administration. The Embassy informed the coup administration that they were disturbed by the coup and that the constitutional order should be restored (FRUS, vol.XVI: p.594). The US administration continued with an international attitude supporting this decision; Another reaction he gave after the coup was to completely stop the military aid to Greece and to impose an arms embargo (Pedaliu, 2011: p.103). However, the US administration continued by announcing that it suspended all diplomatic relations with the coup government established in Greece. However, Athens did not recall its Ambassador to Washington. The US administration defended its stance on this issue by explaining that it was unnecessary to recall the Ambassador since the Ambassador presented his letter of credence to the King of Greece and the King was at his post. However, as stated in many sources, it is also important that the US administration does not want to close the ways of dialogue with the junta administration (Veremis, 1992: p.16).

The attitude of the USA towards the junta established in Greece has changed. The measures taken after the April 1967 coup d'etat began to be lifted gradually as of the second half of 1967. The most important factor in this development was the Arab-Israeli War that started in the Middle East in June and the USSR sent a large fleet to the Mediterranean. The fact that the tension in the Middle East did not rise was reflected in the relations between the USA and Greece. The developments in the Middle East and the Mediterranean have jeopardized the interests of the USA and NATO in the southeast. The fact that the war increased Greece's strategic value one more time enabled the US administration to gradually remove the distance between it and the Greek junta (Chourchoulisa-Kourkouvelas, 2012: p.500).

In the report presented to US President Lyndon B. Johnson in July 1967, Secretary of State Dean Rusk recommends that the measures taken against the junta administration are dysfunctional and that relations with Greece should be normalized due to the developments in the region. did not prevent the junta from making a coup. The USA had to give up its stance in a short time in line with the developments in the region.

1.2. 1949-1974

There were various political attempts to create a Balkan federation in Greece in the 19th and early 20th centuries. However, considering the researches related to the period, it shows that these initiatives are characterized as marginal (Goumenos, 2005: p. 21). In addition, the Megali Idea (Gourgouris, 1996: p. 144) is an idea that has emerged as different forms of the doctrine. In the same period, Greece's Balkan neighbors were shown to be strong periodically due to various developments. For example, Goumenos stated the occupation of Macedonia by Bulgaria and the struggle for dominance between the parties in this region. It claims that this definition, which was used for Bulgaria in that period, preserved its vitality in Greece, since Bulgaria acted as the 'manager' of the Slavic minority living in Greece until after the Second World War (Goumenos, 2005: p. 21).

One of the most important policies implemented by Greece in the Balkans region in this period is related to Albania. The most important problem in the relations between Greece and Albania can be explained as follows:

Chamerya, Geographically; It is the name given to the region stretching from the shores of the Ionian Sea to the Ionian mountains in the east and the Gulf of Preveza in the south.

Chameria is a region divided between Greece and Albania, with much of it in Greece. Most of the part of the Chameria geography on the Greek side is located in Thesprotia, while the rest is in Preveza and Ionian regions. The source of the Chameria problem started at the 1912 London Conference. The Chameria region, which was under Ottoman rule after the 15th century and mostly Muslim Albanians, was given to Greece at the London Conference convened after the First Balkan War, except a few Albanian villages remained in Albania. After the said arrangement, many Albanians living in the region had to migrate and thus the Albanian population of the region began to decrease. Then there was the "Convention and Protocol Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Peoples" signed between Turkey and Greece on January 30, 1923. Greece also evaluated many Chamerian Albanians under the contract and sent them to Turkey because they were Muslims. It is estimated that the number of Albanians sent to Turkey is around 85,000 (Türbedar, 2004: p.117). It was decided to establish a mixed commission on the Turkish-Greek exchange, including the Chamerian Albanians. In 1924, the commission's decisions included that Greek people of Muslim and Albanian origin and, more specifically, residents of the Chameria region should be excluded from the exchange (Vickers, *The Cham Issue Albanian National & Property Claims In Greece*, 2002, p.4). At the 30th session of the Council of the League of Nations, it was declared that the Greek administration's definition of "Greeks of Turkish origin" encouraged mass migration and pushed them to adopt a second identity (Turkish identity as well as Albanian identity). With this approach, they promoted the protection of the minority of Albanian origin. However, the policies implemented by the Greek administration in this period were in the opposite direction of the League of Nations commission. By placing Orthodox immigrants from Anatolia in Chameria, Greece created a reason for Albanian Muslims to migrate. With this policy, Albanian settlements in cities such as Petrovica and Shendallinja were evacuated until the end of the 1920s. In addition, many Chamerian Albanians had to migrate to Albania or Anatolia (Vickers, *The Cham Issue Albanian National & Property Claims In Greece*, 2002, p. 5). In 1926, although the policies of Greece were softened a little more for the Chamerian Albanians, on the other hand, it became a threat and a source of concern for Greece due to the strengthening of Italy-Albania relations in the same years. This problem, which has an important place in Albanian politics, started in this way.

Another important point of the Chameria issue in the Greek-Albanian relations is both the Second World War and the Greek civil war during the Metaxas rule. In 1936, Metaxas's declaration of dictatorship with the approval of the King of Greece, together with the Chamerian Albanians, marked the beginning of a more problematic period for the Albanian policies of Greece (Jelavich, 2009, pp. 220-222). In the regions where Chamerian Albanians lived in Greece, Albanian changed the names of places, places and signs with Greek ones. However, Albanian was banned and Albanian property was confiscated. During the Metaxas period, the policy of changing the population structure of the region always remained on the agenda. It also aimed to adapt Albanians to Hellenic culture (Vickers, *The Cham Issue Albanian National & Property Claims In Greece*, 2002, p.5). Under this policy, Albanian is not officially accepted in Greece. Education and training, including primary education, has been nationalized by Greece. This situation has led to a policy adopted by Albania. According to Weiner, while many problems that can be resolved through bilateral dialogue and mediation have the capacity to result in mutual gain, they become a mess as Balkan disputes. As a result, Greece's use of the title of EU membership resulted in favor of Greece, as seen in the example of North Macedonia. Greece, which indirectly acquired its ability to influence the foreign policies of neighboring states through its EU membership, also establishes the same policy on Albania (Weiner, 1971, p. 674).

The third stage is it coincides with the period of World War II and after. During the Greek Civil War between 1944-1945, The remaining Muslim Albanians had to go to Albania as a result of the activities of the right-wing Democratic National Union of Greece (Εθνικός Δημοκρατικός Ελληνικός Σύνδεσμος-ΕΔΕΣ) (Vickers, 2002: p.3). The number of Chamerian Albanians who migrated from Greece in the post-1945 period is around 30 thousand (Biberaj, 1999: p.15). Regarding the events that took place between 1944-45, Albania declared 27 June as the "Greek Chauvinist Genocide Against the Chamerian Albanians" with a law enacted in 1994 (Vickers, 2002: p.9)

After 1945, the real estates left behind by the Chamerian Albanians who immigrated to Albania were expropriated by Greece or given to the use of landless peasants and Greeks who immigrated to Greece. The ownership of the mentioned real estates was regulated by the laws enacted in 1952 and 1954. With another law enacted in 1953, new settlements in the evacuated Chamerian villages were legalized. In the 1970s, the process of transferring

the properties left by the immigrating Chamerian Albanians to the ownership of Greek origins was completed. Thus, these new owners are guaranteed to contribute and serve the state. The Muslim population in Greece has decreased to a minimum (Tsitseliki, 2012: p.312).

Many Muslims were affected by the immigration policies implemented by Greece and Turkey. Therefore, many people took the citizenship of other countries in order to get rid of the population exchange. In order not to go to Turkey, most Chamerian Albanians preferred Albanian citizenship. Chamerian Albanians, who became Albanian citizens after 1945, faced expropriation of their properties in Greece due to the fact that Greece declared war on Albania in 1940 and did not withdraw, so the properties in question were considered enemy property. The policies implemented by Greece on this issue will be examined under a sub-title in the next section.

It is based on perceiving a threat to the border security and status quo of Greece's foreign policy both in its entire foreign policy and in the Balkans region. As mentioned in the theory section, it developed policies within the framework of the relations it perceived as a threat to its cultural and physical security.

After the end of the Second World War, a civil war broke out in Greece. With the onset of the Cold War, it took its place among Western states as well (Close, 1997: p. 15). Greece, along with its neighbor Turkey, became a member of the North Atlantic Organization (NATO) in 1952 and reshaped its foreign policy and security policy according to the conditions of the Cold War until 1974. It followed a strategy according to the conditions of the cold war. Therefore, the main priority for Greece until 1974 was the perception and elimination of the 'communist' threat, especially from its northern neighbors (Βαλινάκης, 2005: p. 20). It is an important detail that the Civil War also had an impact on the strengthening of this perception in Greece. According to Greece, the threat from its northern neighbors, the Western Balkan countries, is a threat to the democratic regime of the country supported by the West. In addition, it was perceived as a threat to the territorial integrity and status quo of Greece (Βαλντέν, 2003: p. 397).

Along with the conditions of the period, the politics and perception of the countries that were Greece's Western Balkan neighbors in this period generally developed with the Cold War conditions. The reason for this was that all the Western Balkan countries bordering

Greece were ruled by the communist regime, and in this process, the 'Slavic' threat was also considered a communist threat. On the basis of this, even the communists in Greece can be considered as a part of the 'Slavic' threat (Marantzidis-Antoniou, 2004: p. 225). However, Tito's support for the Slavic minority living in Greece also caused. Therefore, in this period, Greece's policies were based on the perception of threat from the Balkans and Greece was isolated from the Balkans in this process.

After the second half of the 1950s, the relations between Greece and the Western Balkan countries, excluding Albania, started to develop gradually (Βαλντέν, 2003: p. 399). However, Greece still followed a cautious policy and showed a cautious approach to the Western Balkan countries. As stated before, Greece's foreign policy was shaped according to the conditions of the Cold War and the developments of the period. As an example of this approach, relations with Bulgaria reached a normal point in 1964 and with Romania in 1966. For this period, Albania and Greece did not establish any diplomatic relations. Relations with Yugoslavia are at a higher level. A diplomatic relationship that developed with the support of the USA along with the reality and conditions of the Cold War; It is a short-lived Balkan Pact signed between Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece (Stone, 1994: p. 393).

It is analyzed that Greece developed with the approach of creating a strong Greece after joining NATO among the general foreign policy objectives in this period. One of the important reasons for the military coup that caused the longest dictatorship of Greece, called the Colonels' Junta, which was mentioned in the previous title, is a strong Greek claim. During the Cold War period, the Colonels, who made a coup to protect Greece from the threat of communism in domestic politics and to realize a strong Greece in foreign policy, caused a great failure in domestic and foreign policy. International platforms, especially Europe, responded to the military coup with reaction. Even the deal with the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1961 was frozen during the coup period. However, the European investment bank also froze the long-term loans previously agreed for Greece. Also, Greece was not made head of NATO when it was supposed to, and when faced with the threat of leaving the Council of Europe, Greece had to withdraw from the council in 1969. The coup administration of Papadopoulos received support only from the United States in the international arena. The coup enabled the Greek ports to be opened to the United States. This was an important reason why the USA supported the coup regime.

In addition, America and the coup administration had a common point in their anti-communist opposition. However, at this point, while Greece was still distant from the Balkan countries due to communism, Greece's relations with the communist Eastern European countries improved in this period. At this point, it is seen that communism is perceived as a threat as long as it is on the border with Greece. Papadopoulos made his first trip to Romania, and in 1971 the foreign ministers of Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia met in Athens. In addition to these, unlike the past, the coup administration also established good relations with some African countries.

Turkey has a critical importance in the foreign policy of Greece, especially in the Balkans and Aegean policies. Because Turkey's Balkan policies are based on the approach of threatening Greece's position in the region. Besides Turkey, Albania also plays a critical role in the foreign policy of Greece. Greece continued the war with Albania over the rights of the Greek minority. To summarize the subject that will be examined under the title of Albania-Greece: Diplomatic relations were developed and a trade agreement was signed with Albania in 1971. However, minority rights were not included in this agreement. Therefore, the support and trust given by many nationalist Greeks to the regime was shaken (Crampton, 2002, p:218-219). The foreign policy practices of Papadopoulos resulted in situations that developed against Greece, and together with this, it created both an economic and a public chaotic situation in the country's domestic policy. This chaos led to his overthrow by another group of officers led by Ioannides. However, this was not a solution, and the problems continued to grow during the reign of Ioannides. After this, the country's elite decided to democratize and Karamanlis took power on July 24, 1974. Greece in the 1970s presented the same reflection of Greece in the 1950s.

The Cyprus issue emerged in August 1974. The Cyprus crisis marked the beginning of an important period in Greek foreign policy. According to many Greek researchers, being close to America and being in NATO did not benefit Greece much in this crisis. Karamanlis withdrew Greek military force on the NATO military wing and announced that four American bases would be removed from Greece. They were also suspicious of America, NATO and the EEC.

The democratic regime in Greece was interrupted by a coup in 1967. Regarding the foreign policy of the coup regime that ruled the country until 1974, academician Thanos Veremis states that the colonels did not have an ideology or a regular policy of their own when they

came to power. Therefore, he states that they do not have a stable view on how to shape the regime in the administration of the country (Veremis, 1999: p. 129-150). In fact, the foreign policy of the coup administration was a mixture of various ideologies and different approaches (Βαλντέν, 2003: p. 397). He reduced the relations with Greece to the lowest level by citing the military regime administration of European and especially Northern European countries. With the end of the 1960s, the Cyprus problem caused the relations with Turkey to become increasingly tense. With the entry of the Softening Period in the international environment, the coup administration, which became isolated in the international community, led Greece to improve its relations with the Balkan countries. In this process, in which Greece's perception of threat was strengthened due to the coup administration and the Cyprus problem in the international arena, it started to establish diplomatic relations with its border neighbor Albania in 1971 (Koliopoulos – Veremis, 2002: p. 307).

1.3. 1974-1989

The relations between Greece and Turkey, which became increasingly tense due to the Cyprus problem, came to the brink of war. With the developments in Cyprus, the international relations of Greece have changed. This period marked the beginning of a serious change in Greek foreign policy and security policy. For these reasons, the priority of Greek foreign policy is based on the approach of eliminating the perceived international threat (Βερέμης, 2005: p. 39). The threat perception of Greece in foreign policy has been influential not only because of the Cyprus problem, but also because of the problems that cause conflict in bilateral relations, as stated above. The relations between Greece and its eastern neighbor Turkey, the limitation of territorial waters in the Aegean Sea, which forms a large border line, the determination of the airspace in the Aegean, the issue of whether the Eastern Aegean Islands can be armed or not, the debate on sovereignty over certain islands and islets, and minority rights and negative issues. Due to the developments, it has entered a relationship process consisting of crises.

The problems that Greece experienced in international relations also affected its membership in NATO and its relations with the USA. During the crisis in its relations with Turkey, NATO's two allies within the Western system almost came to the point of conflict and both chose to apply to the United States as a mediator and arbitrator (Coulombis, 1983: p. 133). These crises caused another change in Greece's foreign policy. At the same

time, Greece has turned to a Euro-centered and multi-faceted foreign policy instead of the US-based foreign policy that it has been following resolutely until this date, since it did not prevent the USA from intervening in Cyprus and then did not take the necessary steps to ensure order on the island. In 1974, the process that ended the Greek coup administration began. The most important aspect of this is that it provided the transition to the μεταπολίτευση period, which means the re-establishment of democratic regimes and institutions.

The change in Greek foreign policy became evident after the PASOK government came to power. The foreign and defense policies of the PASOK government included strong nationalist and socialist terminology. With this approach, the first goal was to increase the military forces, to strengthen the relations with the countries in the Balkans, the Mediterranean, Western Europe and the Middle East, and to pursue a more independent foreign policy (Tsoumis, 1988, p:103-104). With Papandreou's discourse, the days when Greece breathed with "two lungs, one British and one American" had changed (Vaner, 1990, p: 177). First, Greece followed a policy of approaching the EEC rather than establishing links with the United States and NATO. In foreign policy, Papandreou kept Europe and NATO completely separate, and moved his relations with the EEC to a more economically based point. In addition, it supported its economic policy with the power of the EEC (Verney, 1993, p:134- 135). As another important step, Greece strengthened its relations with many Balkan countries, Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union. In addition to these, it started to appear independent in the international system (Diamandouros, 1993, p: 9).

The developments in Cyprus caused reactions in the Greek public as well as the Greek state. Allowing the country, which is a member of NATO, to invade Cyprus showed that the alliance in question failed. At the same time, this view of the Greek public, who thought that it was pointless for Greece to stay in NATO, resulted in the declaration of Greece's withdrawal from NATO's military alliance (Clogg, 2015: p. 241). Therefore, the parallel path followed by Turkey and Greece in the Western system after the Second World War. from this date on, especially with the change of Greece's foreign policy line. In foreign policy, he turned to Europe instead of the USA and started to deal with the EEC in particular (Clogg, 2015: p. 241). Thus, until 1974, the new threat perception was 'threat from the East-Turkey' instead of the term 'threat from the Balkans-communism'. In

summary, while the Cold War was going on, Greece started to develop and change its foreign and security policies within the framework of the problems and crises in the East. In addition, in this context, it has followed a comprehensive Balkan policy in order to establish peace and establish new relations, especially on its northern borders (Goumenos, 2005: p. 24).

Another development took place in the international environment, which enabled Greece to establish more comfortable relations with its Balkan neighbors as of 1975. The Helsinki Final Agreement was adopted as a result of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in July 1975. Therefore, the culmination of the 'softening' period in the Cold War has been reached. What this means is that the Helsinki Final Agreement was a representation of the détente process between the two poles. Then, it led to the gradual transformation of the communist regimes in Eastern European countries (Σβολόπουλος, 1987: p. 74). At the Helsinki meeting, Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis made a decision to hold a coordination and planning meeting between Greece, Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia (foreign ministers). They state that the main reason for this initiative is that it developed within the framework of the perceived threat in foreign policy (Εμμανουηλίδης, 2015: p.65). The reason for Greece's positive policies towards the Western Balkans has also been shown as securing its northern borders and as a stronger method of action (Κοππά, 2005: p.48).

In 1979, Greece began an initiative to improve Greek-Soviet relations. President Karamanlis visited Moscow. Greece made this visit to absorb foreign policy threats and at the same time to send a message to the United States that it has started to follow a multi-faceted policy. In the same year, Greek Chief Minister Karamanlis, after receiving Bulgaria's approval, organized a meeting for the leaders of the Western Balkan countries where telecommunication and transportation experts would come together, and the meeting was held in Ankara on 26-29 November 1979 (Εμμανουηλίδης, 2015: p.211). However, as a result of this meeting, the two poles of the Balkans Even if the result showed this in terms of the Balkans in general, Greece tried to show that it was a conciliatory party in its problems with the Western Balkan countries and that it followed a multi-faceted policy (Koliopoulos – Veremis, 2010: p.157).

After this period, Greece's accession to the EEC can be defined as 3 separate periods between 1981 and 2002. It defines the first period between 1981-1985, the second period

between 1985 and 1895, and the third period between 1995-2006. While defining these periods; It is stated that the first period was founded on strong doubts about European integration. In the economic field, it was ready to provide financial support in the main economic areas in the relationship between the EEC and Greece. However, the EEC and Greece could not agree on some economic conditions and it was stated that the only way to overcome the Greek economic problems was to continue the EEC policies. Between 1983 and 1985, Greece consciously or unconsciously resisted the Europeanization process in three environments. The areas of resistance to this process are: Privatization policies, foreign policy orientation (EEC demanded a common foreign policy), and state policy implementations for security and defense (Ioakimidis, 1996, pp: 37-38). However, according to the researchers and the enlightened people of the country, the differences in the defense policy of Greece will change over time and will reduce its nationalist priorities (Kavakas, 2000, p: 144-161).

As it was written before, the European and EEC countries that reacted to the seizure of power by a military group in Greece and suspended their relations with the military administration gained importance. Therefore, with the transition to democracy in the country, it gained a special importance in terms of Greek domestic and foreign policy. Karamanlis, the Prime Minister of the transition to democracy, has made membership in the EEC one of the priority issues of Greek foreign policy. Because membership in the EEC meant both entering under a new umbrella of protection against external threats and eliminating the possibility of a new coup attempt in domestic politics. Therefore, membership in the EEC had an important place in Greece's foreign policy. Membership would both strengthen the country's democratic institutions and increase the country's level of economic prosperity, and ensure that it would not be alone in important foreign policy problems (Clogg, 2015: p.240). In parallel with this policy, Greece became a member of the EEC on January 1, 1981.

With the change of government, the leader of PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Party) Andreas Papandreou tried to follow a more independent policy from the USA and even the EEC in his rhetoric in his first term (1981-1985). During the period when the Non-Aligned Movement lost its influence, Papandreou took steps in foreign policy to improve the relations of Greece, especially with the anti-Western countries from African and Middle Eastern countries. Papandreou has a plan for nuclear-free zones. In this context, it came

together with Mexico, Argentina, Sweden, India and Tanzania. In addition, he advocated the idea of establishing denuclearized zones in the Balkans (Koliopoulos - Veremis, 2010: p.168). He tried to revive the proposal for a regionally denuclearized zone and acted almost as the leader of every step towards regional cooperation, especially in the Western Balkans (Kofos, 1991: p.217).

Papandreou tried to maintain Greece's approach towards the Balkans and neighborly relations during his second Prime Ministry period (1985-1989). In the same period, Greece had a multi-faceted foreign policy apart from the crises experienced in foreign policy. When the Greek prime minister came to power, he made harsh rhetoric towards the USA and the EEC, but Greece did not act outside of the US policies, however, as claimed before the election (it became a member of the EEC on January 1, 1981), there was no question of Greece's exit from membership. On the contrary, Papandreou tried to create a shield in foreign policy by using his EEC membership status.

Another important development in this process for the Western Balkans is that, upon Papandreou's proposal, on 27 August 1987, the Greek Council of Ministers abolished the decision on the ongoing war with Albania since the Second World War (Βαλντέν, 2003: p. 332). The meeting in Belgrade on 22-24 February 1988 Balkan countries made evaluations on minority problems in order to increase the measures of trust and security among themselves. Undoubtedly, the timing of the meeting, which was held close to the end of the Cold War, was evaluated as the beginning of a new era between the Western Balkan countries and Greece. The last meeting in the Balkans, shortly before the end of the bipolar world system, was held in Bucharest on 18-20 May 1989 (Kofos, 1991: p.220).

CHAPTER II

2. Greek Policy in the Balkans in the Post-Cold War Era

2.1. Greek Foreign Policy 1990-1995

After the end of the Cold War, Greece, like many countries, was caught unprepared for the rapidly changing policies and developments especially in the Western Balkans. Because the priority of Greece's foreign and security policy was built on a different conjuncture. All applications were carried out through different threat perceptions. After 1974, Greece, which acted according to its own Cold War conditions, tried to maintain this line even though it was criticized many times by the international community for its foreign policy and threat perceptions. Therefore, after the mid-1970s, there was a major break in Greek foreign policy. This rupture has great effects for the Greek state. In addition, all parts of the country were affected by this situation, including the Greek public, the Greek parliament, and the country's influential intellectuals (Tsakonias, 2010: p.36).

Thus, both the Greek diplomacy community and the Greek state were unprepared for the developments that took place with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the collapse of Yugoslavia in the Western Balkans. For this reason, in the first half of the 1990s, there was an obscurity in Greek foreign policy. Issues, which have been the material of domestic politics for many years, were also effective in this period. On the other hand, the fact that politicians, a segment of the society and some interest groups, especially the Greek Orthodox Church, are in an oppositional line of discourse, has caused them to approach the developments around this country within the framework of old habits and old knowledge (Zahariadis, 1996: p.303).

Based on the data, researchers basically explain in one sentence the reason for the inward-looking implementation of Greek foreign policy in the early 1990s. The feeling of insecurity causes a large part of the Greek people to aim to one day be able to deal with all the threats against their country on their own at the same time (Kouloumbes, 1997: p.66). The breadth of Greece, which has a great cultural heritage and its cultural geography, determines its foreign policy priorities. However, especially in the period when the bipolar system ended, the Greek ethnic identity and the influence of cultural geography on foreign policy gave priority to Macedonia and Albania in the Balkans and to Turkey in the east.

With the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Western Balkan nationalisms, which had been suppressed for many years, re-emerged. However, Greece evaluated these developments in the Western Balkans to pursue an active policy in the early 1990s. Greece tried to improve its relations with these countries through policies towards N. Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Albania, where many ethnic and religious elements live in the region. In addition, it was thought by the Greek public that Turkey would be used against the Western Thrace minority and the minority groups in the Western Balkans against Greece by following religious and ethnic policies in the region (Tsoukalis, 1996: p.27). Acting with this threat perception approach, Greece continued to read the developments in the Balkans from its own perspective (Κοππά, 2005: p.50) and as stated, instead of solving the Balkan syndrome-problem, it became a part of it in this process.

According to the realist approach, in the early 1990s, the distrust and threat perception towards Turkey; It shapes and balances the foreign policy of Greece and explains the Balkan policy followed by Greece. In addition, the policies of Greece were not ready for the developing new balances caused by the collapse of the bipolar system in the post-cold war period. Greece had the position and opportunities to be an active and active country in its own region, the Balkans. However, in the first half of the 1990s, Turkey could not evaluate its foreign policy in the direction of the Balkans due to the threat (Kevin, Ifantis, Kostas, 1996: p.27). From another point of view, the power and security weight of Greek foreign policy is evaluated within the framework of realist thought. However, the perception of power and security has a unique structure. This situation arises from the internal policies of Greece and the developments in the formation process of the state. The driving force phenomena that are effective in the formation process of the state and the priority of these elements in determining the foreign policy have led to a policy based on threat perception. The most important point criticized by Greek researchers is the threat perception basis. This point, which shaped the Greek foreign policy, caused the country's image and foreign policy practices to be characterized as the background of its problems (Zahariadis, 1996: p.321).

In this case, it shows that it does not mean that foreign policy is determined in a completely realistic way. Greece basically followed a foreign policy based on some elements that they perceived as "real" with their own perspectives. According to Legg and Roberts, first an unreal reality is created in perception. Perception-based analyzes created after that were

shown as realistic. Every internal and external development and policy that concerns the Greeks of their country is formed by outside intervention (Legg-Roberts, 1997: p.55). Therefore, every statement that does not adopt the view of Greece, generally by other countries, foreign politicians or researchers, has been perceived as anti-Greek. Such initiatives were perceived as an anti-Greek move by all segments of society. It was adopted more intensely by politicians, especially after 1974. This image has been widely used as a political discourse. However, in recent years, realist evaluations of Greek foreign policy have begun to be made. It was during this period that some Greek academics criticized their countries' foreign policy practices and adopted different approaches (Tsakōnas, Panagiōtēs, 2003: p.92). Thus, the strict and security-based foreign policy implemented for many years turned to the Balkan countries after the Cold War, but it did not contribute to the solution of the problem in the process when the balances were re-determined in a complex way (Βαλντέν, p.408).

When this political attitude, which did not comply with the post-Cold War world order, started to cause problems in Greece's international relations, especially in its relations with the EU, its foreign policy strategies and understanding had to be reconsidered. It has a policy that has not been fully modernized.

When the Balkan policies in the post-Cold War period are examined, one of the few issues that stand out is the problems with its northern neighbor FYROM (North Macedonia). Another issue is; Another problem that Greece and Greek society attaches importance to and that causes them to act with nationalistic feelings has also been experienced with Albania. After Albania declared its independence, the newly established Albania-Greece relations started to be problematic. After the borders were determined, the peoples of both countries remained settled on the border of Albania and Greece. The Greek people living within the southern borders of Albania and living in Southern Albania have been the main subject of disagreement between the two countries. For Greece, the Southern Albania problem is still not resolved. In addition, the attitudes and practices of the Greek minority living in this region and the Albanian administration towards this minority also create problems (Balenakes, 2003: p.343).

Two countries after World War II and theoretically until 1987, the war continued, because the war did not end in theory because a ceasefire was not signed between the two countries (Balenakes, 2003: p.343).

In the post-Cold War period, thousands of irregular immigrants from Albania settled in Greece. Thousands of illegal Albanian immigrants who settled in Greece led to an increase in social problems in the country. Because the increase in unemployment among the Greek citizens due to theft, drug trafficking and cheap labor among the immigrants revealed social problems. For these reasons, Greece's deportation of Albanian immigrants further strained the relations between the two countries (Βαλντέν, 2003: p.410). In the regions where Albanian immigrants live intensely, the Greek people's excluding immigrants and seeing them as responsible for every problem caused the creation of an "other" in the Greek society. Especially since 1995, with the normalization of relations with Albania and in the same period, Greece started to follow a more moderate policy towards the Balkan region countries in general. This normalization and moderate approach has been achieved by Greece's various economic initiatives. Some sources write that the relations between Albania and Greece were the result of the conciliatory and benevolent approach followed by Greece after the state crisis in Albania in 1991 and normalized. On the other hand, Greece states that it is one of the countries that invest the most in Albania (Βαλντέν, 2003: p.410).

In the post-cold war period, Greece had problems with both FYROM and Albania in the Balkans. In these problems, both the Orthodox Church of Greece and the Greek media had an impact and contribution in the nationalist policy of the country. But at this point confusion began. Politicians are concerned about votes, and for this reason, they have displayed a popular attitude. However, they have used foreign policy issues for domestic policy and election. In addition, these two country problems in the Balkans have affected the whole foreign policy of Greece. The fact that the approaches related to the solution policies of these problems and the solution proposals of Greece were not accepted in the international environment or that they were not resolved played an important role in shaping the foreign policy (Βαλντέν, 2003: p.410).

The foreign policy followed was based on the Cold War order, and this approach and its implementation style caused a negative image for Greece. In addition, the solution policies of the problems in the Balkans did not give the desired results to Greece. Since the policies followed and implemented did not yield fruitful results and were accepted, Greek foreign policy gradually transformed from the second half of the 1990s and began to take shape in a more moderate line, as stated before and will be examined under a different heading.

Greece has generally softened its stance towards the Balkans. It has adopted a more moderate policy and approach.

In the period when the effects of the cold war continued and energy policies gained importance, the Balkans were an important energy corridor. For this reason, if Greece had implemented these policies from the beginning, it would have made great progress in the Balkans. Many researchers should be able to remain a strategic partner of the hegemonic power with Greece's transforming policy. For this, it should establish closer cooperation with the Balkan countries. The Balkan countries should follow the EU reforms for the European Union integration process and create their own sphere of influence by guiding the realization of reforms in these countries (Beremes, Kouloumbes, p.36-47). In this way, the scope of the increasing Turkish influence and threat in the region will be limited. In addition, if these policies had been implemented from the beginning, Greece would have protected its national interests more clearly (Teodoropoulos, Lagakos, p.47).

Developments in the axis of Greece's foreign policy are evaluated with the threat perception approach. It is recommended to follow a policy as a result of the investigations.

2.2. The Name Issue of the Republic of North Macedonia

The issue of recognition of FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) was the most important foreign policy topic of Greece in the first half of the 1990s and Greek diplomacy spent all its energy on this issue. In the mentioned period, all foreign policy problems of Greece remained in the second place due to Macedonian policy. A large part of the Greek Foreign Policy between 1992-1995 was the issue of preventing the Skopje administration from being recognized by the international community as the Republic of Macedonia.

In August 1991, Yugoslavia, as a nearly disintegrated state, was creating a new map of the Western Balkans. On 8 September 1991, a referendum was held in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). In this referendum, the Slavic majority living in the country voted for the independence of North Macedonia and the independence of the North Macedonian Republic was declared on 17 September 1991 (Τζιαμπίρης, 2003: p.446). The first reaction of the Greek government to N. Macedonia (due to the name of the country) was on 4 December 1991. It took place after the Council of Ministers (Τζιαμπίρης, 2003: p.467). At the Council of Ministers meeting, it was decided that Greece had three

conditions for recognizing N. Macedonia as an independent state. Initially, it was demanded that the Skopje government stop using the name Macedonia. The reason for this is the explanation of Greece; Macedonia refers to and covers a geographical region. In addition, it does not represent the existence of a nation called Macedonian (Clogg, 2015: p.283). The second condition is that Macedonia must declare that it does not have any territorial claims from Greece. Finally, it was asked to abandon its demand for the existence of a 'Macedonian minority' in Greece (Τζιαμπίρης, 2003: p.468).

Greece argued that some articles and national symbols of the N. Macedonian constitution belong to its own culture (Larabee, 2005: p.408). However, the main problem for Greece was related to the name of the mentioned republic. With its EU policy, Greece delayed the recognition of N. Macedonia by the EU for a long time, thus preventing it from benefiting from economic aid funds. Along with these, it closed the port of Thessaloniki, which is one of the main lines of economic life for N. Macedonia, and imposed an economic embargo on this country between 1993-1995 (Clogg, 2015: p.283).

It is seen that Greek diplomats and Greek politicians are unsuccessful in expressing themselves on the concept and name of Macedonia in international platforms. Other countries of Greek diplomats could not convince that Macedonia's name is important for Greece geostrategically, politically and historically. Because, from the point of view of European countries, it is difficult to understand why a poor, small and landlocked country is a threat to Greece, which is a rich and larger country with a democratic, liberal economy (Κοππά, 2005: p.54). For this issue, Loukas Tsoukalis, Greece's message to the world is completely blurred. states that it is expressed in terms of rights and cultural feelings that are highly emotional and meaningless by outsiders. In addition, he says that the message given to the world causes the harshness of that style and the content of the message not to be understood by anyone (Tsoukalis, 1997: p.171).

Internal politics also had an impact on Greece's crisis with N. Macedonia between 1991-1995. In particular, the demonstration held in Thessaloniki on February 14, 1992 with the participation of millions of people, led by the Greek Orthodox Church, shows (Tziampiris, 2000: p.97) that in addition to the complexity of Greek domestic politics, Greece was introverted during this period. In addition, it is seen that the perception of a serious external security threat continues in the country (Βαλντέν, 2003: p.412).

In the first period, the name problem was tried to be overcome in different ways. The membership of the Republic of Macedonia to the UN was realized under the name FYROM, since the objection of Greece could not be overcome. The fact that the membership was realized under a different name created a great uncertainty in the newly independent country. Demonstrations were held in the cities of Skopje, Koçani and Resen to protest this situation. The most striking one among these is the demonstration performed by nearly 600 Macedonian intellectuals in front of the National Parliament building in the capital Skopje (Poulton, 1995, pp. 177-178).

The Athens administration followed a harsh policy towards Skopje. However, it pursued policies that Greece's northern neighbor with a population of less than 2,000,000 posed a threat to its borders. These policies have brought about the isolation of Greece in the international arena and the decrease in its credibility in the eyes of EU countries. It became more isolated with the economic embargo application of the Athens administration against the Republic of Macedonia in 1994, and the EU Commission took Greece to court because of the embargo. In this period, in some comments on Greek Foreign Policy, opinions were expressed on the fact that Greece, which did not meet the union standards, was on the agenda to remove Greece from membership.

As a result of these policies implemented by Greece, Turkey has benefited from the international community. In the period of 1991-1995, Turkey's becoming a more effective player in the Balkans than the Athens administration is an important result. As a result, Greece has activated the threat factor, which is one of the most important elements of its foreign policy, in the region.

With the threat posed by the policy it implemented, after 1995, Macedonia made important changes in its foreign policy, especially the name issue. It is possible to attribute the change in foreign policy to several reasons: first of all, Greece wanted to eliminate the isolation within the EU and regain its former prestige in the international community. In addition, Greece has turned into a policy to prevent the threat of Turkey against itself in the Balkans. Finally, the foreign policy implemented by the government prevented Greek businessmen from opening up to markets in the new Balkan countries, which offered viable and profitable investment opportunities. With the effect of economic pressure, the application of a purely political approach in foreign policy has been changed and a political-economic approach has begun to be developed.

As a result of the initiatives of the US Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke, who continued the diplomatic traffic between the capitals of Athens and Skopje in 1995, the delegations of FYROM and Greece, chaired by the foreign ministers of the two countries, Steko Crvenkovski and Karolas Papoulias, met in New York at the beginning of September 1995. After the problems were overcome, the two countries signed the 23-item Interim accord, which is a framework agreement, on 13 September 1995. Interim accord without reference to country names, Greece was named “First Party” and the Republic of Macedonia was named “Second Party”. It is foreseen that the agreement will enter into force 30 days after the signing date (Kut, 1997, pp. 289-290).

Under the Interim Settlement, it was decided that FYROM should change its flag and declare that it constitutionally made no historical claims or territorial claims beyond its present borders. In addition, with the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, Greece's recognition of the Skopje administration is among the conditions. Once these conditions are met, it will lift FYROM's veto against its membership in international organizations and end the economic embargo against the country. For this, it is foreseen to open Thessaloniki Port within 30 days. The parties agreed to resolve the problems between the two countries through diplomacy within the framework of the principle of friendship and good neighbourliness. It has also agreed to deal with the most important issue, the name issue, in this context. According to this agreement, it was decided that FYROM would name it as they preferred (Kut, 2005, p. 290).

The Interim Accord was an important agreement to lift Athens' isolation in the international arena and to restore its former prestige. This policy change of Greece made a great contribution especially for FYROM to overcome the problems experienced due to the economic embargo and to remove the obstacles to its integration with the international community (Çalış & Akgün, 2001, pp. 237-238).

After the agreement they signed in 1995, a new planning started to be made to find a real solution to the problems that Greece had temporarily frozen. However, Greece's relations with FYROM (even though there was no agreement between the two countries on the name), and even with Albania, started to develop from the second half of the 1990s.

2.3. Greece - Albania Relations

Considering the importance that the European Union (EU) attaches to the Balkans and the Balkan countries to the European Union, Greece should have a special place in this issue. Albania and North Macedonia, where Greece has land borders, are candidate countries for European Union membership. Greece has cooperation on many issues with Albania, North Macedonia. There are also unresolved problems with all of these countries. Greece became a member of the EU in 1981. Since it is the first Balkan country with EU membership, it has guided the Balkan countries, including Albania, in this regard, which want to integrate into the West. Therefore, Greece has actively used EU candidacy in general, especially in bilateral problems. Problems in bilateral relations have been moved to the international platform. In general, EU policies have a great impact on Greece's Albanian policies.

With the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the emergence of new countries, new problems are added to the multi-ethnic, very complex politics of the Balkans region. Therefore, the course of relations between Greece and Albania will be effective in the future of the Balkans region.

Many factors can be counted as the determinants of Greek-Albanian relations. The most important of these is the EU factor, but this factor alone is not enough to improve Greece-Albania relations. Main factors affecting bilateral relations: Chameria Problem, Greek minority in Albania, Albanian minority in Greece, Trans Adriatic Pipeline, determination of sea border. Here, there is also the independence of Kosovo, but this issue will not be mentioned in this title as it will take up a large area. Undoubtedly, bilateral and multilateral economic relations are also very important in terms of Greece-Albania relations.

The Chameria problem in the Greek-Albanian relations, which was mentioned in detail in the previous section, continued in the post-Cold War period as well. Greece's policies on this issue are related to its domestic policies as well as its foreign policy.

Expropriated real estates have been registered with the Office of Sequestration. The revenues obtained from these are kept in a special account at the Bank of Greece (Tsitseliki, 2012: pp.312-313). Even though the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, Good Neighborhood and Defense signed between the two countries on March 21, 1996, seems like a new solution for the solution of the Chameria Problem, the Greek side could not make any contribution to the solution of the problem due to its approach that there is no

problem like the Chameria Problem. In 1999, an Albanian-Greek Commission was established to work on the tangible assets of the Chamerian Albanians, but this commission could not become operational (Vickers, 2002: p.11). In 2004, the Albanian Parliament decided to call the Greek Parliament for negotiations on the Chameria Question, but this decision was also rejected by the left parties who did not want to confront the Greeks (Hilaj, 2013: p.411).

The Albanian minority in Greece and the Greek minority in Albania constitute a problem between the two countries. The Greek minority is generally located in the south of Albania in the region called Northern Epirus (Vorio Epirus). The Greek minority in Albania gathered under the Omonia (Democratic Union of the Greek Minority) in 1990 and participated in the elections and entered the Albanian parliament. After its establishment, in the early 1990s, OMONIA leaders demanded autonomy in Northern Epirus, and in the next process, this autonomy or their desire to unite with Greece caused Albania to react against the Greek minority in the country.

In November 1999, during a meeting in Istanbul, he organized a meeting entitled “The Chamerian Problem: The Search for a Solution”. It was proposed at the meeting to establish a commission between the two countries, but this idea was never realized. At the end of 1999, the prime ministers of the two countries Ilir Meta and Costas Simitis held a meeting, but the Chameria issue could not find a place on the agenda. (Vickers, *The Cham Issue Albanian National & Property Claims In Greece*, 2002, p.9) Rather than being seen as a problem by Greece, this is due to the Greek side's characterization of the Cham issue and the state of war as a closed case (Vickers, *The Cham Issue*). - *Where To Now?*, 2007, p.9). However, the Albanian administration demanded the recognition of the existence of this problem in its foreign policy. However, it was stated that Greece wanted this problem to be resolved in accordance with the EU integrity and international law, with which it acted in harmony. In the same period, Sabri Godo, an Albanian politician, made a statement. In this statement, he stated that the declaration of war, which is at the source of all Greek debates, created a state of war and continues this situation because it has not been abolished, should be abolished. According to the politician, he said that if this method is applied, a solution can be found as a result of diplomatic negotiations. On the other hand, the cooperation agreements made according to the claim of the Greek side, the aforementioned state of war automatically disappeared (Vickers, *The Cham Issue- Where*

To Now?, 2007, p.10-11). Greece declares that the state of war law is not valid. However, this situation has created a conflict between the two sides and leads to a bilateral bottleneck that is difficult to resolve in Albania's EU process.

As mentioned before, Greece's declaration of war in 1940 constitutes the legitimate ground for the expropriation of the Chamerian Albanians' properties. As soon as the aforementioned declaration of war is nullified, the biggest obstacle to the claims of the Chamerian Albanians for their property will be removed. Therefore, in order not to face such a situation Greece policy, this is the most reasonable reason why Greece did not annul the declaration of war, even after a long time had passed since the end of the war.

The conjuncture that occurred after Italy declared war on Albania and then on Greece caused Greece to declare war on Albania. The Greek administration cited the Italian-Greek war as the cause and described Albania as militarily aggressor against Greece. Greece, following a policy of necessitating a peace treaty, presented the state of war with Albania to international organizations for the re-discussion of its territorial claims. It is concluded that this policy is followed in order to internationalize the war situation of Greece and to make the international community accept that a war has taken place between Albania and Greece. As a result, the Verlaci administration, which was the head of Albania during the Second World War, has no legal legitimacy. Moreover, until the end of the war, Albania was a country without a legitimate body, decision-making powers, and minimal legal qualifications. In other words, Albania has lost its sovereignty and legitimacy and has no national or international legal character (Dervishi, 2019, p. 30).

The Greek view that Albania is a belligerent party is based on the participation of Albanian battalions in the invasion of Greece together with Italian troops. According to Albania, the soldiers were necessarily involved in the war under the Italian military forces (Dervishi, 2019, p. 30). With another approach, on October 22, 1947, Italy committed to respect the sovereignty and independence of the Albanian state through peace agreements. In this way, Albania received compensation from Italy after the war and is an allied state. The fact that Greece and Albania are allied states also means that the state of war declared in the past should be lifted automatically (Dervishi, 2019, pp.30-31).

After the state of war, diplomatic relations between Albania and Greece were re-established in 1971. Diplomatic missions of the two countries were opened at the embassy

level. The opening of diplomatic missions and establishing relations did not result in an end to the war situation. On the contrary, the state of war remained in force. In 1986, during the term of the Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papadreu, the government decided to abolish the state of war with Albania (Dervishi, 2019, pp.30-31). In 1987, the Greek government declared that the state of war with Albania was officially over (Xhudo, 1996, p.37). However, a document regarding the legal annulment of the decree that came into force was not published in the Official Gazette of Greece and the necessary legal proceedings were not put into execution by Greece. Although the Friendship, Cooperation, Good Neighborhood and Security Agreement was signed between the two countries, no official step was taken to abolish the legal existence of the law of war and no statement was made in this regard (Vickers, *The Cham Issue Where To Now?*, 2007, p.10). After Greece became a member of the EU in 1986, Greece's foreign policy attitude has had changes. For example, a Good Neighborhood and Cooperation Agreement was signed with Albania.

With its EU membership, Greece has followed policies to make its population felt in the region. The state of war between Albania and Greece is not a situation accepted by Greece. Because while there are friendly relations and bilateral agreements, a state of war is not possible at the same time. Looking at the bilateral relations between Greece and Albania, it has a positive process. (Tsaka, 2019).

It can be argued that the Friendship, Cooperation, Good Neighborhood and Security Agreement signed between the two countries in 1996 is the first legal basis for bilateral cooperation. This text of the treaty constitutes an important diplomatic ground to create some mechanisms that will enable the resolution of existing problems along with the problems from the past. Emphasizing the European Union perspective of the countries, this agreement text includes the issues of inviolability of borders, respect for sovereignty and individual rights, respect for minorities and immigrants. At a UN General Assembly, then-President Rexhep Meidani criticized the continuation of a legal state of war between Greece and Albania as follows: “We must ask ourselves... While a UN member state is waging a “de jure” war against other members, acceptable good governance/ can we achieve governance?”

As a result, there are issues that can be resolved through mutual dialogue and cooperation between the two states, as well as issues that can be resolved through binding decisions of

international institutions. The plan to solve all problems through mutual dialogue and cooperation paves the way for Greece to solve Albanian policies within the framework of the binding factor of EU membership.

CHAPTER III

3. The Modernization of Greek Foreign Policy and the Balkans (after 1995)

3.1. Greek Policy In The Balkans

Between 1990 and 1993, the cold war tensions ended in the world, but war broke out in the Balkans and the Persian Gulf. In foreign relations, Mitsotakis started to follow policies compatible with the USA. He supported his policies as the first prime minister to go to Washington in June 1990 after 25 years. In the 1990s, Greek policy was shaped in three main points: the change of former communist states, reforms to reach EU standards and the discipline of the economy, relations with Turkey (Crampton, 2002, p: 335).

For the western integration of the Balkan countries, Greece, as a Balkan country, could establish good relations with other Balkan countries. Along with its own EU integration, it would also support the western integration of the Balkan countries. Thus, Greece would be a regional power and would help Greece in the international arena in its foreign policy problems with Turkey, another threatening power in the region. However, for the Yugoslavian civil war that started in 1993 and the situation that developed in its own region, Greece did not implement this policy. From the 1990 point of view, Greece was expected to play an important role in solving the problem, and while it was expected to show that it was a regional power, the situation developed differently. Because Greece did not follow the policy of balancing elements between the warring states in the Balkans.

As mentioned before, FYROM, which declared its independence after the disintegration of Yugoslavia, became one of the issues that preoccupied Greek foreign policy. This state, which was established in the north of Greece, wanted to take the name of the Republic of Macedonia. However, Greece followed an opposite policy regarding the name issue due to the cultural heritage issue. Therefore, it did not recognize the country as the Republic of Macedonia. (Crampton, 2002, p:336). As a result; Papandreou, who insisted on the name decision, decided to impose an embargo, despite the contrary opinion of Greek diplomats (Ioakimidis, 1999, p: 140-170). The embargo, which started in February 1994 with the reconciliation efforts of the United States, the United Nations and the EU, was lifted in September 1995. The EU announced that it would not recognize the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as the Republic of Macedonia. The former Yugoslav state accepted international recognition as the "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" (EYMC) and

began using two names. Despite keeping the name of the Republic of Macedonia in its constitution, Greece succeeded in the policy it followed in the international arena. However, after the agreement was reached, the two states made agreements to strengthen the relations between them. Moreover, Greece is one of the first foreign investors to invest in this state. In addition, Greek foreign policy supports the country's entry into NATO and the EU.

By the end of 1994, Greece was diplomatically isolated in foreign policy. The Western Balkan policy, on the other hand, was a non-working country. Because there was no country in the Western Balkan geography, apart from Serbia, that Greece did not have conflicts with. On the other hand, Greece, which behaved differently among EU members, was not advancing in parallel with the USA. Turkey's relations with its eastern border were already continuing with many crises due to the Cyprus problem. It has been started to be noticed that the Western Balkan policy of Greece in this process has gradually caused isolation in the geography where the country is located. This led to changes in the policy towards the Western Balkans in order for Greece to get out of its isolation in the international arena and to have a wide freedom of manoeuvre. However, the acceleration of the modernization process of Greek foreign policy was ensured by the administration of Kostas Simitis, who served as prime minister after Andreas Papandreou in early 1996. Instead of its old traditional and nationalist foreign policy, Greece started to follow a policy in line with European standards (Moustakis, 2003: p.42).

The Albanian-Greek migrant problem, which was in the past, continued in this period as well. Albania loosened border controls and many Albanian immigrants crossed into Greece along with the Greeks. This situation increased the tension between the two countries. On April 10, 1994, Greek military forces raided an Albanian military post near the Greek border, killing two Albanian soldiers and wounding three. As a result, the crisis between Albania and Greece culminated in August 1994, when the Albanian court sentenced five members of the Greek ethnic organization Omonia to prison on the grounds that they were against the Albanian government. Greece, on the other hand, implemented a policy against this situation. It responded by freezing all EU aid to Albania and deporting 115,000 Albanian citizens. However, Albania has closed its border. In December 1994, with Albania freeing two Omonia members and reducing the sentences of the others, Greece also took a step forward, allowing limited amounts of aid to Albania. Then, in 1996, an

agreement was signed, enabling the opening of Greek schools and consulates in Albania, and determining the situation of 300,000 Albanian immigrants in Greece.

The policy that Greece followed in the Balkans continued with the collapse of the central government in Albania in 1997. The Greek forces acted together with the Italian forces and established order in the country. It remained in Albanian territory from April to August. In September 1997, three agreements on defense cooperation were signed. After 1997, Greece-Albania relations developed day by day (Crampton, 2002, p:336-338).

During the disintegration of Yugoslavia, it is seen that Greece followed a pro-Serbian policy rather than a balancing factor policy among the states in the Balkans. However, Greece could not maintain this approach. Greek policy is different and has begun to transform. The reason for this is the realization that the attitude exhibited harms the Greek national interests and reduces the influence of Greece in the region. When analysed with a realist approach, Turkey's pursuit of a more constructive Balkan policy in the region and its activeness in the region pushed Greece to change its policy. This situation enabled the transformation of Greece in the face of traditional threat perception.

The modernization process in foreign policy, which gained momentum with the prime ministership of Kostas Simitis, was also effective in domestic politics. Especially in foreign policy, it helped Greece adapt to the post-Cold War conjuncture. The main foreign policy priority of the government of this period was to improve the image of the country that had changed in the previous period and to increase its reliability in the eyes of the EU. There is a consensus among Greek researchers that, as of the second half of the 1990s, Greek foreign policy changed with definitions of 'external', 'preventive', 'flexible' as opposed to 'static', 'reactive', 'inward-looking' foreign policy definitions (Tsardanidis-Stavridis, 2005: p.2017). Moreover, in the second half, it is seen that the foreign policy of Greece is at a more reassuring point, and in this context, it has longer-term plans. However, there is also an opinion that Greece's national interests are better protected by a multi-pronged strategy (Tsardanidis and Stavridis, 2005: p.217). As this view began to develop in general in Greece, Greece's relations with its Western Balkan neighbors started to normalize again. Its membership in the EU, on the other hand, has been strengthened politically and economically with the normalization process of relations. At the same time, although anti-American sentiment increased in the Greek public, as in the Kosovo war, relations with the United States began to strengthen (Lialiouti, 2011: p.127).

Simitis convinced his party that a more balanced foreign policy and harmonious practices with the allies would be more beneficial for the country's interests. These policy practices were criticized by nationalists, but Greek foreign policies were modernized under Simitis. However, it implemented a constructive Balkan policy. With these practices, it has become a leader in the restructuring of Albania. Greece, which started to become a new power element in the region, could not remain indifferent to the Kosovo issue. Greece played a conciliatory role in resolving the problem. During this period, relations with the Balkan states began to develop. For this period, the main points of Greece's foreign policy for the Balkans can be summarized under some headings. First of all, it started to seek ways of political cooperation through the policy of "Security, Friendship and Equal Cooperation". Then it planned to transform this practice into the form of "agreement between Balkan countries". Secondly, it has planned cooperation by assisting the Balkan countries, which want to integrate with the West, establish a democratic society and develop democratic institutions, in drafting laws, public administration and training of public officials. The third point is to create an "Economic Cooperation Area" in the region by giving priority to economic cooperation in the Balkans. In order to realize the economic plans, energy, transportation, communication and tourism etc. cooperation was planned. Finally, it is planned to expand the NATO's Peace Initiative Plan to include the Balkans, by establishing good neighborly relations with Albania and FYROM and improving bilateral relations. Among other things, policy practices were developed by Greece to actively support the aid programs developed by the European Union for the Balkan countries.

When the foreign policy of the period is examined in general, Greece has made an intense effort to maximize its reputation and prestige in the region in its post-1990 policies. Until 1996, Greece followed an uncompromising foreign policy. However, it has implemented practices aimed at gaining an advantage against Turkey both in regional competition and on the grounds that it threatens its northern borders. Especially in 1996, during the rule of K. Simitis, it started to follow a more moderate and cooperative foreign policy. Greece uses most of its foreign policy practices to gain superiority in the region. However, Balkan uses its advantage at an important point in its foreign policy practices: By activating the political and economic advantages provided by EU membership for the benefit of the region, it not only takes its position in the eyes of third countries to an important point, but also aims to be stronger in the face of threat perception.

The equivalent of Greece's threat perception in the Balkans; It is the theory that Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and Bulgaria in the Balkans are surrounded by a "threat circle" as they are influenced by Turkey's foreign policy. The policies created by this theory pushed Greece to make policies in the opposite direction of the policies followed by Turkey. On various platforms, Greece has expressed its view that it is the only Western European country whose territorial integrity has been threatened by a NATO member.

For the Greek government, NATO's bombing of Serbia in 1999 due to the developments in Kosovo was a serious crisis. As stated, this action of NATO caused anti-American sentiment in Greece. As in the Bosnian War, the Greek public sided with Serbia. 95% of the Greek society opposed NATO's bombing of Serbia (Tsardanidis and Stavridis, 2005: p.232). Therefore, the Greek government had to act on a delicate line between public opinion and foreign policy. However, despite public reactions, Greece acted as a NATO member and supported NATO.

In addition, in 2001, 5.6 billion dollars of foreign investment was made to the Balkan countries and 2.4 billion dollars of this investment was made by Greece. In addition, according to the Greek national plan, an investment of 550 million dollars in the five-year plan for the reconstruction of the Balkans was approved by the parliament and could be given to six Balkan countries through bilateral agreements (Greece's foreign policy at crossroads: Europe, the USA, the Eastern Mediterranean. Speech by the Ambassador of Greece HE George V. Savvaides, 14 February 2003).

The issue of Milosevic's losing the elections in September 2000 caused a new change in Greece's Western Balkan policy. After the second half of the 1990s, this development created a new field of activity for the economically active Greek companies in the Western Balkans, especially in Serbia (Larabee, 2005: p.412). Greece, which restructured its foreign policy towards the Western Balkans, supported the EU's initiatives in the region with its economic investments. It tried to change the image he created during the period (Larabee, 2005: p.414).

One of the most important results of the change in the policies implemented by Greece for the Western Balkans is on the example of North Macedonia. It started negotiations to find a name under the mediation of the United Nations (UN). In the negotiations held in New

York in March 2008 under the mediation of UN Special Envoy Matthew Nimetz, no concrete progress could be made. Nimetz suggested a few names to the parties, such as the People's Republic of Macedonia, the Democratic Republic of Macedonia, the Independent Republic of Macedonia, the New Macedonian Republic and the Republic of North Macedonia. Greece welcomed only the name Republic of North Macedonia positively. However, FYROM, which does not accept the time and geographical definition, approached the People's Republic of Macedonia and the Independent Republic of Macedonia positively. In the negotiations, it is seen that Greece insists on a one-name solution - the same in bilateral relations and in the international arena - while the Republic of Macedonia insists on a two-name solution - different in bilateral relations and in the international arena (Time, March 2, 2008).

With the Temporary Settlement, they managed to freeze the issue, but temporarily. Negotiations on the name continued in certain periods under the mediation of the UN. However, it was permanently resolved with the agreement signed between Greece and the FYROM administration on June 17, 2018, on the shore of Prespa lake, which is the intersection point of the Albanian, Greek and Macedonian borders, which envisaged changing the name of the country to “Republika Severba Makedonija” (Pergantis, 2020). With the agreement called “Prespa Agreement”, the two countries came to a common idea. While North Macedonia continues with its plan to build a new nation, Greece adopted the name 'Republic of North Macedonia', which includes the regional name Macedonia, which also includes its own country border (Labropoulou, 2019).

In order for the treaty to enter into force, a referendum and parliamentary approval are required. FYROM Prime Minister Zoran Zaev described the referendum as FYROM's second independence, but the main opposition party VMRO-DPMNE stated that the agreement conflicted with the country's national interests. He did not support this agreement afterwards. However, the President of the Republic, Gorge Ivanov, has declared that he does not accept the ideas that harm the national identity, such as the change of the constitutional name of the country, 'Republic of Macedonia', and therefore he will not vote in the referendum (Şahin, 2018). Despite opposing ideas and statements, in the 30 September 2018 referendum; “Are you ready to join the European Union and NATO by accepting the agreement between Macedonia and Greece?” question was posed. However, the majority of the people did not vote. The participation rate in the referendum

was recorded as 36.08%. The results are; 91.4% voted yes and 5.6% voted no. However, according to the FYROM constitution, there must be more than 50% turnout for the referendum to be valid (BBC, 2018). However, Zoran Zaev stated that despite the constitution, the agreement should be voted on in the parliament. The US administration and the European Union welcomed the results of the non-legally binding referendum (Gotev, 2018).

The Greek people had different expectations for the Prespa Agreement. Most importantly, they did not want the name "Macedonia" to be included in the name of the country. They wanted a name like Republic of Skopje to be used instead (Berberakis, 2019). For the Prespa Agreement to be ratified, an affirmative vote of the absolute majority of 300 seats in the Greek Parliament was required. Despite the great demonstrations and opposition of the people outside the parliament during the voting, 146 deputies voted 'no', 153 deputies voted 'yes', and 1 deputies abstained and the treaty was approved (Sputnik, 2019).

The agreement, which was put to a vote by the FYROM Parliament on October 20, 2018 and January 11, 2019, was met with major debates similar to those in Greece. It was ratified by the Parliament despite the refusal of President Ivanov and the opposition votes. Following this development, Greece lifted its veto on the process of integration with the EU and NATO, which it promised under the agreement, for "North Macedonia". With the treaty, North Macedonia started a formal procedure to become NATO's 30th member on 6 February 2019. (Behles, 2019). However, in the NATO accession procedure, the accession protocol of all member states must be ratified in their own parliaments for North Macedonia to become an official member. For this reason, it is an important step that US President Donald Trump, who is seen as the leader of the alliance, sent a letter to the Senate on April 30, 2019 and requested the approval of the protocol in NATO by the Senate in order to pave the way for North Macedonia to join NATO (Xinhua, 2019). With the North Macedonian Assembly signing the NATO accession protocol on February 11, 2020, the protocol entered into force on March 19, 2020. It allowed North Macedonia to join NATO on 27 March 2020.

After the Prespa agreement entered into force, the name of the country was changed to the "Republic of North Macedonia". However, although major problems were resolved with the aforementioned agreement, the new situation did not fully satisfy neither North Macedonia nor Greece. Due to the necessity of reconciliation, which is the basic

requirement of the negotiations, both sides made concessions from their national stances. A common solution was sought and accepted. Greece agreed to keep the word 'Macedonia'. North Macedonia, on the other hand, made concessions by agreeing to add a directional adjective to its name. The pressure and incentives exerted by the EU and the USA on the two countries are very important in the realization of this agreement and solution. For example, while encouraging citizens to hold a referendum, North Macedonia underlined that by voting 'yes', the country's path to NATO and EU membership would be opened. In addition, another important factor on the way to a solution is the economic and political situation in Greece and North Macedonia. For example, the effect of the 2009 crisis in Greece continued for a long time in the political and economic field, and it wanted to solve these problems step by step. North Macedonia, on the other hand, is a state with a high youth unemployment rate, economic problems and political instability. In order to solve this situation, first of all, it was willing to solve the problem that its foreign policy could not be integrated into the region and the West with the Greek veto (Ayhan, 2019).

3.2. The Kosovo Question and Greece's Policy

It is necessary to explain Greece's policy in the self-determination process of Kosovo in the Western Balkan policies of Greece in particular in Kosovo. According to the periods, the Greek attitude has changed. Greece has not accepted the independence of Kosovo and does not recognize Kosovo. It is stated that the separation of Kosovo is against international law, but it can set an example for other similar policies. It is also cited as a reason to threaten stability.

The concept of border, which is the main question of the right of self-determination, which is generally accepted in international law: "uti possidetis" is based on the protection of existing borders. Greece followed a policy towards the protection of Serbia's territorial integrity during the self-determination process. Basically, when examining the Kosovo policy of Greece, the concern of border change in the Balkans comes to the fore. It is stated that Kosovo will facilitate the implementation of Croatia's policies and can be perceived as supporting this goal. It was foreseen that revisionist policies such as border change could continue. Greece's Kosovo policy is also associated with North Macedonia. It is noted that North Macedonia will have an impact on the Croatian minority (Karamanlis, 2000: p.10). It is possible for the Serbs living on the Bosnian border to have similar demands in case the Kosovo Serbs leave (Tziampiris, 2005: p.287). Greece is worried that violence will

increase and spread to the region again. In addition, it is seen that the border change due to ethnic reasons such as identity will cause more instability in the region (Karamanlis, 2000: p.10). In addition, there was a concern that the income from foreign investment and tourism coming to Greece would decrease (Armakolas - Karabairis: p.97).

Greece opposed any intervention in Kosovo by using diplomatic elements. Along with diplomacy, the fact that different parties have a consensus on the policy to be implemented is one of the points that Greece considers important in this context (Armakolas - Karabairis: p.112). It emphasizes that consensus should be sought in the solution of any issue that may affect the stability of the Balkans. That is, it refers to different views of EU members on the situation in Kosovo.

Greece has brought up internal options instead of external options of self-determination in Kosovo. At the beginning of Kosovo's self-determination process, it asserted autonomy. He also advocated for human rights in resolving various problems of both Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs. Greece's attitude towards self-determination is understood in the policies and speeches implemented after Kosovo's declaration of independence; Expressions that can be included under the heading of internal self-determination were used. The solution proposal of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs; The focus should be on the protection of human rights, fundamental freedoms, minorities, cultural and religious heritage and improving the standard of living. The mentioned elements are also listed as the priorities of Greece regarding the Balkans. (<https://www.mfa.gr/en/blog/greece-bilateral-relations/pristina/> - 01.09.2021) On the other hand, George A. Papandreou, one of the former prime ministers and foreign ministers, explains that the basis of regional policy is European integration, and bases his thesis on internal self-determination. According to Papandreou, human rights and minority rights need to be protected and respected. Subsequently, the policies implemented in the Balkans, the borders, the territorial integrity will be protected and the separatist tendencies will be fought (Papandreou 2000: p.76). It calls for solving problems through democratic and political reforms. It also states that problems related to self-determination should be resolved through regional or international cooperation.

Greece looked at the Cyprus problem from a different perspective for self-determination. With its unilateral declaration of independence, it was feared that Kosovo would set a precedent for Northern Cyprus (Armakolas - Karabairis: p.115).

At this point, the EU, of which it is a member, has various views associated with self-determination. Separation is the most applied and most common option of self-determination seen in Kosovo and even Northern Kosovo examples. The option to leave is an issue on the agenda of Europe. The figures for 2012 show that there are 14 problems related to separation and 13 problems related to autonomy in Europe. Nine of these problems are located in the Western Balkans (Biermann, 2014: p.491). Three separation articles are on the agenda, while the remaining six are on the agenda with demands for autonomy (Biermann, 2014: p.491).

Another perspective, the policies of the Republic of Cyprus, is important for understanding the Greek policy of the Western Balkans through Kosovo. Cyprus' existence and foreign policy are important for understanding Greek policies. During the Kosovo-Serbia conflict, Cyprus had different attitudes. Until Kosovo declared its independence, the Cypriot government cooperated with various organizations for Kosovo. It is clear that Cyprus supports the talks between the parties, but its policies have changed after the process has progressed towards unilateral independence. Cyprus opposed the unilateral independence of Kosovo. Moreover, it does not recognize Kosovo. No relationship has been established between the two countries since 2007 (Kentas: p.130).

Another area where the views of Cyprus are taken into account is the decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for Kosovo and the attitude of the Cyprus administration. Greece did not comment on the ICJ's decision. Cyprus has interpreted Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence according to the content of the right to self-determination recognized in international law. Serbia's country, border and state integrity and independence have been violated. It has been evaluated as a violation of the UN Charter's Security Council Resolution 1244 (Kentas: p.129). In this case, it is emphasized that the declaration of independence mentioned is not legal. As a justification, he put forward the thesis that a community that is a part of an existing state does not have the right to self-determination (Clerides, 2009: p.39). It is stated that Kosovo does not create the necessary reasons and public characteristics to apply for self-determination (Clerides, 2009: p.35). In addition, he noted that separation should be used as a last resort to solve various problems. On the contrary, it was emphasized that the internal options of self-determination should be applied primarily (Clerides, 2009: p.38).

It is clear that the Cyprus problem and the precedent problem are effective in most of the reasons why Greece does not recognize Kosovo. Kosovo argues in this context that the two events are very different from each other (Armakolas and Karabairis: 115). In the Kosovo issue, although Greece does not present detailed arguments, it is seen that it prefers to pursue a policy with the arguments of the Cyprus administration.

in the Western Balkans; EU integration, Kosovo issue, Kosovo-Belgrade relations are the most important factors affecting Greece's Kosovo policies. Progress has been made in bilateral relations with Kosovo's self-determination process. Greece was the first country to present the idea of a restructuring plan for the Western Balkans in the Kosovo crisis (Papandreou, 2000: p.77). However, Papandreou and the PASOK government opposed putting Kosovo under UN supervision. It has been declared that it will cause instability and violence in the region (Michas, 2002: p.88). Unlike the EU, of which it is a member, Greece negatively welcomed and opposed the progress of the self-determination process in Kosovo. He continued this stance in the plan, which is described as a roadmap for Kosovo's independence. Spain, Cyprus, Slovakia and Romania also supported this policy of Greece (Tzifakis, 2013: p.45). Likewise, Greece has also taken a stand against the recognition of the unilateral separation of Kosovo. As a reason for this, It argued that this legal behavior could cause instability all over the world as a precedent (Tzifakis, 2013: p.45). In this context, it has been argued that the decision numbered 1244 should remain in force and be processed (Tzifakis, 2013: p.45).

According to the survey data, 96-98 percent of the Greek public opposed the NATO operation (Michas 2002: p.79). On the contrary, the attitude of the Greek public was not displayed by the Greek government (Armakolas - Karabairis: p.95). In addition to providing humanitarian aid, it also supported and participated in international missions in Kosovo. 1,500 Greek soldiers were deployed for Kosovo (Armakolas - Karabairis: p.101). As a result of developments such as EU candidacy and activities, progress has been made in the relations between Greece and Kosovo. The visits of the Greek foreign ministers to Pristina can be evaluated in the context of establishing relations (Armakolas - Karabairis: p.103).

The approach of the ICJ on the Kosovo decision of 2010 is important in the context of the function of Greece's policies. The UN General Assembly vote was held for the independence declaration of the Pristina Assembly. The opinion and suggestion that the

Board expected from the ICJ was given an affirmative vote. On the contrary, it is stated that he followed a more moderate and indecisive policy afterwards (Armakolas - Karabairis: 117). Greece did not take an opposing stance in Kosovo's membership to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Thus, Kosovo became a member.

Greece has diplomatic representation in Pristina, Kosovo. It functions as a Liaison Office. The office, which was established under the name of Hellenic Humanitarian Assistance Office, became active during the intervention in Kosovo. After Kosovo passed under UN administration, it was transformed and started to be used as the Liaison Office. It is an important detail that it was attached to the embassy of Belgrade, the capital of Serbia, until 2005. One point that has proven to improve relations with Kosovo is the office's duty to preserve the religious and cultural heritage of the Serbian Orthodox Church (Armakolas - Karabairis: p.103).

Economic relations are also of great importance for understanding Greece's Kosovo policies. Even before Kosovo passed under UN administration, Greece was at the top of the list of importers of agricultural products from Kosovo. Subsequently, one of Kosovo's main buyers of used metal imports is Greece (Armakolas and Karabairis: p.106). Greece, between 2003-2008, is the third country to which Kosovo exports the most within the scope of EU members; It became the second largest exporting country to Kosovo (Armakolas and Karabairis: p.106).

It is understood from here that it is progressing with the aim of developing economic relations with Kosovo. As with other countries in the Western Balkans, Greece seems to follow a policy to improve its relations with Kosovo (Armakolas and Karabairis: p.93). In this context, the opening of the Kosovo liaison office in Athens can be cited as evidence (Koktsdis, Armakolas, Maksimovic and Feta 2014: p.49). In addition, the continuation of reforms and the maintenance of good neighborly relations can be shown. As a different perspective, some academic studies have the thesis that relations with Kosovo progress within the scope of relations with Serbia (Armakolas and Karabairis: p.104).

It is clear that the relations between the two parties have positive elements. However, it could not change the main framework and main thesis of Greece's Kosovo policy. Greece does not recognize Kosovo. It maintains its different stance with the EU on self-

determination. Domestic-foreign politics, Cyprus question, Western Balkans politics and EU relations are the most important reasons.

Unlike Greece, Germany and some members of the EU follow a policy towards the recognition of Kosovo. It is described as the most important element for a stable politics in the Balkans. However, with Greece and Serbia having good relations, Greece, which is a party to the Cyprus problem, prevents Kosovo's recognition with different policies. It focuses on regional policies with a more holistic approach. The most active of the policies pursued in the region is European integration. As the first EU member state in the Balkans, within the scope of the Balkan countries being a part of Europe; it seems to have guided the Western Balkan region for its institutionalization and democratization. The policy is that peace and stability can come to the region with EU membership (Armakolas - Karabairis: p.104). It can be stated that Kosovo and Greece follow a soft policy in their relations. The Greek state does not push Kosovo into international isolation in official contacts (Armakolas - Karabairis: p.118).

3.3. The Bosnian War and Greece - Serbia Relations

Greece approached the developments during and after the disintegration of Yugoslavia mainly in connection with the Macedonian problem. Both the Greek state and the Greek people adopted an attitude close to the Serbs in the war in Bosnia (Clogg, 2015: p.286). As the Greek writer Μαρινέλα Κοππά states: In the early 1990s, concepts such as 'axis', 'containment', 'circle' were mentioned extensively in Greece. and Greece took part in concepts such as 'Serbo-Greek Alliance', 'Orthodox axis', 'Orthodox circle' in this process (Κοππά, 2005: p.54).

Socially, there is a sympathy towards the Serbs. Michas states that this sympathy and support is sociologically bottom-up rather than top-down, that is, not the support of the elite (Michas, 2002: p.5). Thus, Greece saw the war in Bosnia with its foreign policy understanding and view, and according to this assessment, what happened there as the intervention of powerful foreign powers. The fact that Turkey and the USA sided with the Bosnians also strengthened this perception. Serbian nationalism was understood as a perception of the West as a resistance to the establishment of a new order in the Balkans (Κοππά, 2005: p.55). For example, the Greek reaction in the Srebrenica massacre was 'reluctant'; Greek media preferred not to talk about the massacre committed by the Serbs

after the details of the event were revealed (Michas, 2002: p.76). Serbian leader Milosevic Apart from that, Bosnian Serbs Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic were moderately reflected in Athens in this process (Κοππά, 2005: p.55).

From a diplomatic point of view, Greece tried to follow a balanced policy on a delicate line. It has endeavored to act both as a NATO member state and together with Serbia. Greece did not react to the attacks and massacres carried out by the Serbs at a high level. Until the beginning of 1994, it opposed the use of force against the Serbs. In addition, Greek companies, especially oil companies, have systematically violated the United Nations embargo imposed on the region, despite the lack of explicit support from the Greek government (Michas, 2002: p.68).

Analysing Serbia-Greece relations is important for understanding Greek policies. First of all, concepts such as strategic elements such as security and culture as an identity element play an important role in bilateral relations. At this point, North Macedonia and Serbia; They are shown as countries that have a great importance in ensuring stability and security in the Western Balkans. Greece, which has historical ties with the Serbian community, carries its relations to a sensitive point (Lialiouti, 2011: p.127). Historical relations: It is based on their being orthodox and the reasons for close relationship and cooperation. One of the primary pillars of relations between countries is the economy. Therefore, it is one of the prominent areas in bilateral relations. Even in problematic areas and regions between Pristina and Belgrade, Greece has supported taking economic steps. An example of this is Northern Kosovo. The call of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Greek investment in Northern Kosovo at the end of the 90's (Michas 2002: p.88) can be cited as proof of this.

The fact that Greece is a member of the EU and that Serbia is in the process of EU membership is also important to explain the bilateral relations. However, the subject of self-determination brings a different angle to bilateral relations. Serbia applied for EU membership in 2010. Greece's approach to Serbia has generally led to differences with Western countries. However, with the departure of Milosevic from the administration, Serbian policy has become compatible with the West (Larrabee, 2005: p.411). The reason for this is that the democratization process of Serbia and the policies changed by the membership process to European institutions can be given as examples in this context (Larrabee, 2005: p.411). In some cases, its pursuit of close relations with Serbia has led to

the implementation of policies aimed at isolating Greece from the EU (Larrabee, 2005: p.423).

The EU has no stipulation on the Kosovo issue. Therefore, there is no requirement for Serbia in this regard (Obradovic-Wochnik and Wochnik, 2012: p.1158). After the Thessaloniki Summit held in 2003, in EU policies; There has been a change towards rapprochement with Serbia, efforts to become a member, and a dialogue with Serbia has been established. This summit is considered as an important change point for EU-Serbia relations (Stahl, 2013: p.455). One of the important steps for the resumption of the Stabilization and Accession Process is the cooperation with the Criminal Court of the Former Yugoslavia. In addition, it was interpreted that the relevant agreement was signed before the 2008 elections with the aim of supporting the government of the period (Stahl, 2013: p.461). The EU does not have a consensus on the Kosovo issue. This situation plays an important role in Serbia's EU and Kosovo policies (Obradovic-Wochnik and Wochnik, 2012: p.1160). These policies of Serbia are a reason for Greece not to change its policies on Serbia and self-determination. On the other hand, Serbia has started to take steps in the field of internal self-determination.

Serbia; It follows a policy that aims to make the Kosovo issue an EU issue by “putting it on the agenda of Europe”. In this way, one of the aims of EU membership goal policies is to normalize relations with Kosovo (Obradovic-Wochnik and Wochnik, 2012: p.1162). In this context, it can be said that Greece has some implications from its policies towards Serbia within the scope of EU membership: it is planned to continue the reforms, emphasis is placed on increasing the administrative capacity, and it is aimed to address the Kosovo issue within the framework of European integration (Koktsdis, Armakolas, Maksimovic, and Feta, 2014: p.47).

Greece-Serbia relations are one of the factors determining Greece's Kosovo policies. With the declaration of independence of Kosovo by separating from Serbia, the declaration of independence of Kosovo is not recognized by Serbia. In addition to the non-recognition policy implemented after Kosovo's declaration of independence, Serbia continues the approach of not recognizing this declaration of independence in the international arena by reflecting it on Greek relations. This situation presents Greek policies with a dilemma. Because Greece is a country that has historically good relations with Serbia and attaches importance to these relations. On the other hand, Greece is in a position to develop positive

relations with Kosovo, as it attaches importance to the integration of the Western Balkans with the European Union and the Europeanization of the region. According to the comments of the researchers: Greece will give importance to its relations with Kosovo and change its policies with Serbia, or it will index its relations with Kosovo to Serbia-Kosovo relations and continue on this axis. According to this interpretation, the policy to be followed will cause a strict separation in Greek foreign policy. It is not a situation that is very desirable or suitable for any country in foreign policy. Normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia will lead to a positive development primarily for Kosovo and Serbia, but also for Greece's Western Balkans policies and other regional states. In this context, the negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia, which started on March 8, 2011, had a special and active importance in the relations between Greece and Serbia. The Brussels Treaty, signed on 19 April 2013, aims to normalize relations between Kosovo and Serbia. The Brussels Treaty was welcomed by Greece because, according to Greece, the reduction of tensions between Kosovo and Serbia and the normalization of relations will both make a great contribution to regional security and stability and have a positive impact on Greek foreign policy. In line with the Western Balkan policy, Greece will constitute an important step towards the Europeanization and EU membership of the two countries (mfa.gr). At the conference of UNESCO in November 2015, a decision to reject Kosovo's membership was made as a result of Serbia's efforts, and this decision was described by Serbia as a positive political gain in the international platform (nytimes.com). Similarly, Serbia is making great efforts against Kosovo's desire to join important international organizations such as the European Police Office (Europol) and the International Criminal Police Organization INTERPOL (ICPO-Interpol). In the ongoing process of making the Balkans part of Europe, the issue of Kosovo's independence, which is one of the biggest obstacles to this procedure, needs to be resolved in a way that will create both bilateral and multilateral effects.

CONCLUSION

In summary, the Balkan issue brought a radical and important innovation in the regional policies and this transformed Greece's political approach to the region. Therefore, the important transformations in international politics after the independence of the Balkan states created an unstable ground, for the new policies.

In this period, it is observed that various elements come forward in the Balkans policy according to the international conjuncture. 1991 is an important date since North Macedonia declared its independence after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. With the 1990s, Greece developed a more intense policy with the Balkan countries. After the post-Cold War period, Greece changed its policy and approach. Instead of being a part of the solution, it became the main problem. In order to support this situation; it introduced itself as the peaceful actor of the region in NATO's intervention in Kosovo. Greece pursued policies to become an important actor in the region. It also aims to regain its strategic importance in the region in the long term. Greek Balkan political practices named "Comprehensive Balkan Approach". In the Balkans, foreseeing the possible causes of the problems also includes creating the necessary conditions for political and financial development. When the policies of the Greek governments regarding the region are examined, it is seen that targets such as softer and reducing tensions have been adopted.

The importance of Greece's policies towards the Balkans and its relationship with the region are related to security as mentioned before; In other words, it is directly related to the approach "Greece's security depends on the security of the Balkans" mentioned in the theory part. In a more detailed explanation; For Greece, the goal of regional stability; prevention of ethnic conflict, illegal immigration, economic and political problems; It can be associated with the desire for Greece not to be threatened with the aforementioned problems. Structural problems such as corruption, insufficient economic development, and negative conditions of minorities are underlined; considered as possible causes of instability.

When the Balkan policy of Greece in the Cold War and post-Cold War period is examined, the above policies were explained with their general structure. When examining the foreign policy of Greece, it is important to start with the post-World War II period in order to understand the post-cold war period. Greece is a country that was occupied in the Second

World War and therefore very worn out. As a country that lost many losses, it had a civil war after this great war. This situation caused the country to face even greater difficulties. Greece, which was in alliance with the West during the Cold War, acted together with the USA in its foreign and domestic policy until 1974. Greece, located in the south of the Balkan geography, did not establish close relations with its neighbor Balkan countries until 1974 due to the threat perceptions arising from both the historical past and the conjuncture created by the Cold War. Until 1974, Greek foreign policy and military policies were established with the threat perception approach from the north.

By 1974, the threat approach from the north regressed to the second place in foreign policy. The reason for this is that after 1974, the relations with Turkey came to the point of military contact with the Cyprus problem; Instead of following a US-oriented policy, Greece preferred to follow a multi-faceted foreign policy. When examined in this context, Greece, which has turned to the EC, has also started to prefer active policies in its geography. He started to take steps to improve his relations with the Balkan countries, which he approached as a communist threat. The main reason for this policy change of Greece was perceived as Turkey. As a result, Greece has encouraged different foreign policy practices, since being under the umbrella of the USA did not bring a solution to the problem of Cyprus and could not prevent the growth of the problem. Therefore, in another period when the Cold War continued, the basic threat perception for Greece changed to Turkey, the threat from the East, not from the North.

In the second period of the Cold War policies, with the end of the Cold War after 1974, the developments in the Balkans continued to be approached through the perception of the threat of Greece and Turkey. In the early 1990s, it continued to determine its policies especially towards the Balkan region according to Turkey and Turkey's movements in the region. Greece, as both an EU member and a NATO member, preferred to be a part of the Balkan problem with its leading role in the region.

However, as of the second half of the 1990s, Greece, which was trying to change and modernize its foreign policy, started to adapt its foreign policy to the political order of the post-Cold War era. It has started to re-image on international platforms, also by making economic investments in the Balkans and supporting the EU's initiatives in the region. Trying to solve the problems in the region and to support the Western integration of the

Balkan geography with this method, Greece followed a policy aimed at improving its relations with the countries of the region in this process.

Identity is also seen as one of the important elements of Western Balkan politics. In relation to this, it draws attention at many points that in the Balkans, Greece defines itself as European and aims to Europeanize its Balkan neighbors. However, on the other hand, it is seen that it defines itself as a Balkan country in its relationship with Brussels. In general terms, Athens; It emphasizes softer, open to communication and cooperation policies in order to eliminate insecurity, instability and basic state and administrative problems in the region. This goal stems from the unique cultural and political characteristics and general politics of Greece. Greece; He has the approach that it is not easy or possible to find a solution to the problems of the Balkans on his own. In this context, it follows a collective and reform-oriented policy with EU membership and EU institutionalism. Athens since the 2000s; However, he is of the opinion that stability will come to the Balkans if it is taken into the framework of the EU. It aims to improve the economy of the Balkan countries and accelerate political reforms by becoming a part of the EU. According to Greece, EU-oriented regional cooperation will be the point of rise and confidence in the Balkans.

When the one-to-one politics and relations of Greece with the Balkan countries are examined, it is thought that Balkan policies and European policies affect each other. On the Thessaloniki Agenda during the 2003 EU Presidency of Greece; The accession of the Western Balkans to the EU was on the agenda for the first time. This has led to a focus on drawing the formal framework for participation. Thus, the countries of the region were expressed as potential members for the EU and a safe area began to emerge for Greece. During the 2003 term presidency of Greece in the Balkans, it had a major role in the formation of the "Stabilization and Association Process", which is considered as the main step of the EU, especially regarding the Western Balkans. This step is a clear example of modern foreign policy and realism theory. However, it stands out that it defines cooperation among the Balkan states as a prerequisite for close relations with the EU.

It is considered by both Western countries and their unions and Greece as an actor that can play an important role in ensuring stability in the Balkans. This is because it is both a Balkan country and an EU member at the same time. AB moved the Agency for the Reconstruction of Southeast Europe headquarters to Thessaloniki. This clearly shows the

importance the country attaches to the Balkans and its role in the development of the region.

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