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MA DISSERTATION

**“THE IMPACT OF IDENTITY ON FOREIGN POLICY: THE
CASE OF MACEDONIAN NAME DISPUTE”**

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STATEMENT OF APPROVAL

The approval of this Master Thesis by the Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies of the University of Macedonia does not necessarily imply that the Department share the author's opinions.

ABSTRACT

The Macedonian name dispute between Greece and North Macedonia refers to a 27-years diplomatic process. In this historical ground, this research seeks to answer the question of to what extent the Greek Macedonian identity has the power to explain the Greek foreign policy actions realized during the name dispute. To conduct a theoretically correct inquiry, this research employs identity as the conceptual ground and applies the Constructivist International Relations Theory and Ontological Security Theory as the theoretical framework. From this point of view, the historical facts of the Macedonian name dispute are scientifically interpreted by using these theoretical and conceptual explanations. In the end, this research mainly proposes that throughout the Macedonian name dispute, the Greek foreign policy actions were mainly shaped by Greek security concerns consisting of ontological and physical security and fundamentally ontological security is the primary source for these security concerns. By doing so, this research aims to contribute to the Ontological Security literature as well as explain a certain period in Greek foreign policy. That is, the Ontological Security Theory mainly seeks to put the concept of ontological security beside the concept of physical security. However, this research carries the main argument of Ontological Security Theory a step further by illustrating a possibility that the concept of ontological security for actors can be in a primary position in front of physical security.

Keywords: *Macedonian Name Dispute, Greek Macedonian Identity, Greek Foreign Policy, Constructivism, Ontological Security Theory*

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ABBREVIATIONS

EU	:	European Union
FYROM	:	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
IR	:	International Relations
NATO	:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OST	:	Ontological Security Theory
PASOK	:	Panhellenic Socialist Movement
UN	:	United Nations
USA	:	United States of America

INTRODUCTION

This research seeks to produce a scientific explanation for the Greek foreign policy actions during the Macedonian name dispute. This name dispute between Greece and North Macedonia¹ refers to a sort of diplomatic process that these actors sought to pursue their foreign policy goals.² If we accept foreign policy as a process consisting of orientations, plans, commitments, and actions by an actor towards other actors, one should examine the source of orientations, plans, and commitments in order to explain why actors realize certain actions.³ To explain actors' behaviours, though many notions, such as economy, geopolitics, energy, the balance of power, and so on, might be employed, this research is going to employ the concept of identity. In this regard, this research focuses on the Greek Macedonian identity in order to scientifically explain the actions of Greece during the Macedonian name dispute. To put it another way, this research seeks to answer the main research question that "to what extent do Greek Macedonian identity have the power to explain the Greek foreign actions realized during the Macedonian name dispute?"

To develop a theoretically correct answer to this question, this research is going to employ the Constructivist International Relations (IR) Theory and Ontological Security Theory (OST). By employing these theories' explanations, the historical facts of the Macedonian name dispute are going to be interpreted in a way producing a scientifically correct explanation for the Greek foreign policy actions. To put it another way, the historical facts and conceptual details are going to be obtained through the first and second chapters respectively. Then, the third chapter including Constructivist

¹ In 1993, the country was accepted as a member state in the UN as former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)

² Zhidas Daskalovski, 'Clashing Historical Narratives and the Macedonian Name Dispute - Solving the Unsolvables', *Trames* 21, no. 4 (2017): 328–35, <https://doi.org/10.3176/tr.2017.4.03>.

³ Fatih Tayfur, 'Main Approaches to the Study of Foreign Policy', *METU Studies in Development*, 1994, 117, <https://bit.ly/3xCjdO>.

International Relations (IR) theory and OST is going to provide a theoretical framework, which illustrates how identity can be an explanatory element for a state's foreign policy actions. In the end, by logically applying these theoretical and conceptual explanations to the historical facts, this research is going to present an explanation to illustrate to what extent Greek Macedonian identity shaped the Greek foreign actions during the Macedonian name dispute. To conduct the research, academic books, academic journals, official agreements, and newspapers are going to be sources that we are going to collect our data.

In this direction, the first chapter is going to be about historical details of the Macedonian name dispute. Accordingly, this chapter is going to include the historical facts that this research seeks to scientifically interpret. To do so, two sub-parts are going to be included: the Greek Concerns and The History. Through these sub-chapters, the main Greek concerns during the Macedonian name dispute and the historical events that happened during the name dispute are going to be presented. By doing so, a solid and clear historical ground is expected to reach, which presents what Greece mainly worry about and what exactly happened chronologically.

Also, this point should be mentioned here: As we are going to see in this chapter, there is no clear, exact, and undisputable definition of the Macedonian Identity. Even among Greek historians, politicians, anthropologists, there are different definitions or explanations over this issue. Hence, to investigate what are the correct explanations or who are the “real Macedonians” is out of the cover of this research. For this reason, this research accepts the official Greek claims after 1991 as the exact and indisputable explanations over the Macedonian identity and it is going to conduct its theoretical analysis over this assumption.

The second chapter is going to be about the concept of identity. Thus, this chapter is building up the conceptual ground of the research. It is going to employ different definitions of identity from the relevant literature in order to answer what identity is and also it is going to present different types of identity to develop a better understanding. In the end, it is expected to reach a sort of assumption about what can be accepted as a definition of identity.

The third chapter is going to present the theoretical framework of the research. In this direction, it has two sub-chapters: The first sub-chapter is going to present the main points of the Constructivist IR theory. For this, it is going to explain the Constructivist stance towards social reality, nature of the international system, actors' identity, interests, and behaviours, and ultimately the relation between identity and foreign policy. The second sub-chapter is going to demonstrate the cornerstones of the OST. For this, it is going to present the definition, origin, and components of OST together with what OST contributes to security studies and what OST obliges states to do. In the end, through this theoretical framework chapter, it is expected to reach an argument demonstrating actors' identity as an explanatory element for their foreign policy actions.

The final chapter is going to synthesize the other chapters. In other words, this chapter is going to apply what is acquired from the conceptual ground and the theoretical framework chapters to what is presented in the historical ground chapter. For this, firstly, it is going to answer what Greek Macedonian identity means for Greece by using the conceptual ground chapter. Then, the relations between Greek Macedonian identity and the Greek state are going to be presented by using the theoretical framework chapter. Lastly, an answer to the question of how do Slav Macedonians' actions during the name dispute relate to the Greek Macedonian identity is going to be produced.

By doing so, in the end, it is expected to confirm the main argument which claims that "throughout the Macedonian name dispute, the Greek actions were shaped by Greek security concerns consisted of ontological and physical security and fundamentally ontological security is the primary source for these security concerns." Through this argument, this research aims to explain a certain period in Greek foreign policy. Also, it is expected to contribute to the relevant literature by proposing the argument that in some cases, the concept of ontological security can be in a primary position for actors in front of physical security.

1. THE HISTORICAL GROUND: THE MACEDONIAN NAME DISPUTE

Starting with the independence declaration of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia as the “Republic of Macedonia” on 17 September 1991⁴, the name dispute between Greece and North Macedonia refers to a 27-years rivalry of cultural, historical, and geographic narratives composed of different understandings of Macedonian regional boundaries and diverse interpretations of ancient Macedonian history.⁵ In other words, it refers to an identity-based dilemma⁶ rooted in the common usage of the same name by different actors to identify diverse ethnic, regional, and historical entities.⁷ It began the Greek response to the independence proclamation of Skopje, which used the name Macedonia.⁸ In response, Greece presented three conditions for the recognition; Skopje should promise there will be no territorial claims against Greece, should declare there is no ‘Macedonian minority in Greece’, should not use the term Macedonia in its name.⁹ Then, the Batender Committee, which is

⁴ Aristotle Tziampiris, ‘The Macedonian Name Dispute and European Union Accession’, *Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea* 12, no. 1 (2012): 153, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2012.661225>; Alexis Heraclides, ‘The Settlement of the Greek-Macedonian Naming Dispute: The Prespa Agreement’, *Security Dialogues / Безбедносни Дијалози* 241, no. 2 (2020): 49, <https://doi.org/10.47054/sd202049h>.

⁵ Daskalovski, ‘Clashing Historical Narratives and the Macedonian Name Dispute - Solving the Unsolvable’, 328–35.

⁶ George Koukoudakis, ‘The Macedonian Question : An Identity-Based Conflict’, *Mediterranean Quarterly* 29, no. 4 (2018): 3, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1215/10474552-7345415>.

⁷ Evangelos Kofos, ‘The Controversy over the Terms “Macedonians” and “Macedonian” : A Probable Exit Scenario’, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 5, no. 1 (2005): 130, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1468385042000328402>.

⁸ Matthew Nimetz, ‘The Macedonian Name Dispute: The Macedonian Question-Resolved?’, *Nationalities Papers* 48, no. 2 (2020): 207, <https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2020.10>.

⁹ Tziampiris, ‘The Macedonian Name Dispute and European Union Accession’, 153.

established by the European Economic Community to determine the legal conditions for recognition of new states in the Balkans, raised Greek concerns related to the “Republic of Macedonia” and requested assurance from Skopje do not have territorial claims and hostile propaganda against Greece and to not use a name implying irredentist desires.¹⁰

In this sense, this chapter seeks to present some details of the Macedonian name dispute in order to prepare the historical ground of the research. To do so, initially, the Greek concerns over the usage of the name Macedonia by the Socialist Republic of Macedonia will be presented. Afterwards, a historical overview explaining the whole period will be presented.

1.1.The Greek Concerns

The usage of the term ‘Macedonia’ by Skopje, in the early 90s, caused security concerns in Greece. The new republic introduces itself to the international arena as ‘Macedonian’, however; according to people in Northern Greece, who at the same time identify themselves as Macedonian, using the term ‘Macedonian’ by a set of people with Slavic origin was highly oxymoronic¹¹ and refers a sort of irredentist action rejecting the Greek understanding of Macedonian identity.¹²

For Greeks, more or less northern Greece corresponds with ancient Macedonia. The term Macedonia/Macedonians refers to Greek cultural heritage, not has a Slavic origin. As Slav-Macedonia is just an invention by Joseph Tito for sort of irredentist

¹⁰ Koukoudakis, ‘The Macedonian Question : An Identity-Based Conflict’, 8.

¹¹ Nimetz, ‘The Macedonian Name Dispute: The Macedonian Question-Resolved?’, 206; Andreas Demetrius Floudas, ‘A Name For a Conflict or a Conflict For a Name? An Analysis of Greece’s Dispute With FYROM’, *Journal of Political & Military Sociology* 24, no. 2 (1996): 302, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45294323>.

¹² ‘Macedonia’s Name: Why the Dispute Matters and How to Resolve It’, Balkans Report, 2001, 14–15, <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/122-macedonia-s-name-why-the-dispute-matters-and-how-to-resolve-it.pdf>.

actions¹³, the legitimate right to use the terms Macedonia and Macedonian exclusively belongs to Greeks.¹⁴ In return, people in North Macedonia claims the Macedonian nation is a mixture of ancient Macedonians and Slavs. Hence, the Macedonian nation is the product of the integration of Hellenic and Roman people as the descendants of ancient Macedonians with Slavic majority in the 6th – 7th centuries.¹⁵

In this point, it is useful to look at the usage of the noun Macedonians and the adjective Macedonian. As Kofos emphasizes, there are differences between them and their derivatives in ethnic, regional, historical, and cultural contexts. On the one hand, the noun ‘Macedonians/Makedonci’, in North Macedonia, refers to legally citizens of the state and ethnically local Slavs, while the noun ‘Macedonians/Makedhones’, in Greece, indicates regionally and culturally ethnic Greeks living in Greek Macedonia. However, the common usage of the word ‘Macedonians’ by diaspora from Greek Macedonia, North Macedonia, and the Bulgarian Pirin creates ambiguity. On the other hand, the adjective Macedonian stems from i) geographical region Macedonia, and ii) from *the name of the people in its regional, ethnic, historical variants*. The adjective Macedonian is spelt in the Slavonic language of North Macedonia as ‘Makedonski’, which identifies ethnic Slav quality, while in the Greek language it seems as

¹³ ‘Macedonia’s Name: Breaking the Deadlock’, *Europe Briefing N’52* (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2009), 3, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/95305/b52_macedonias_name.pdf; Andreas Demetrius Floudas, ‘Pardon? A Conflict for a Name? FYROM’s Dispute with Greece Revisited’, in *The New Balkans: Disintegration and Reconstruction*, ed. George Kourvetaris et al. (Columbia University Press, 2002), 88–89; ‘Macedonia’s Name: Why the Dispute Matters and How to Resolve It’, 15.

¹⁴ Kyril Drezov, ‘Macedonian Identity: An Overview of the Major Claims’, in *The New Macedonian Question*, ed. James Pettifer (Palgrave Mcmillan, 1999), 55; Persefoni Zeri, Charalambos Tsekeris, and Theodore Tsekeris, ‘Investigating the Macedonia Naming Dispute in the Twitter Era: Implications for the Greek Identity Crisis’, *Hellenic Observatory Discussion Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe*, 2018, 27, <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/89256/>; Victor Roudometof, *Collective Memory, National Identity, and Ethnic Conflict: Greece, Bulgaria, and the Macedonian Question* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002), 67–68.

¹⁵ Daskalovski, ‘Clashing Historical Narratives and the Macedonian Name Dispute - Solving the Unsolvable’, 336.

‘Makedonikos’, which refers to regional and historical Greek roots. Obviously, the dilemma stemmed from the common usage of the same appellation by different actors in foreign languages as Macedonia and Macedonian to refer to different ethnic, regional, historical entities. Hence, the hotspot is here, that is, who achieves to put its historical or cultural content into international usage of Macedonia might gain a sort of monopoly over the possession of the cultural, ethnic, regional, and even legal commodities of the term Macedonia/Macedonian, which might damage other usages of Macedonia/Macedonian.¹⁶

To clarify the concerns, it is better to have a glance over the transformation of the Macedonian issue within Greece through the contribution of Evangelos Kofos.¹⁷ Despite the issue had had little significance before the mid-80s, during the 90s it gained considerable importance.¹⁸ In Greece, a sort of nationalist front, uniquely linking the army, the Church, socialist ‘patriotic’ PASOK, and followers of *leftist party* ‘Synaspismos’, has gradually emerged by the 90s. They had revisionist theories over how Greek foreign policy should be formed in the Balkans.¹⁹

Before the nationalist front, the generally accepted understanding over the Macedonian issue in Greece was as followings: the Greek Macedonia more or less coincides with the territory of ancient Macedonian Kingdom; the culture of the ancient Macedonians just constitutes a part of the Hellenic heritage; the Macedonian regions geographically includes Greek Macedonia, Vardar Macedonia, and Pirin Macedonia; the terms ‘*Slav Macedonians/Macedonia*’ were used to distinguish Greek Macedonians/Macedonia from Slav inhabitants of the wider Macedonian region; it was accepted that Slavs in the wider Macedonian region are ethnic Bulgarian, not

¹⁶ Kofos, ‘The Controversy over the Terms “Macedonians” and “Macedonian” : A Probable Exit Scenario’, 129–32.

¹⁷ Evangelos Kofos, ‘Greek Policy Considerations over FYROM Independence and Recognition’, in *New Macedonian Question*, ed. James Pettifer (Palgrave Mcmillan, 1999), 226–62.

¹⁸ Kofos, 234.

¹⁹ Kofos, 234.

ethnic Macedonian; the ancient Macedonian language is identified with its Hellenic origin; and it is rejected that there is no '*Macedonian*' minority, '*Macedonian*' nation, and '*Macedonian*' language other than Greek Macedonians and Greek Macedonia.²⁰

Then, the new nationalist front coined sort slogans as '*Macedonia is Greek*' and '*Macedonia was and will be always Greek*'. Indeed, the slogans and their reflections on the Greek folk, as seen in huge public demonstrations in Thessaloniki, were interpreted by certain parties as an irredentist instrument of the nationalist front in order to pursue territorial claims against Skopje in the middle of a chaotic situation stemmed from the disintegration of the Yugoslavia.²¹

As Evangelos Kofos emphasizes, though a little historical knowledge over the history of Balkan is sufficient to distinguish the difference between the terms, the slogans had become the '*battle cry*' of Greece against recognition of Skopje. What the nationalist front sought to achieve through the slogan is to defend their people cultural heritage, and to prevent a sort of annexation of Greek Macedonia by others who might deliver a yearning of reunified Macedonia.²²

However, the overarching result of that coined slogan was a sort of perception in Greek public opinion as '*the Greek Macedonia is only and unique Macedonia*'. The perception caused another argument as '*no other region apart from Northern Greece and no other people apart from Northern Greek can be associated with the term Macedonia and Macedonians as well as the heritage of ancient kingdom of Macedonia*'.²³ Also, the abovementioned official view hold before the emergence of the nationalist front started to be updated: the historical Macedonian region was exclusively associated with Northern Greece; since other '*Macedonians*' were results

²⁰ Evangelos Kofos, 'The Unresolved "Difference Over the Name": A Greek Perspective', in *Athens-Skopje: An Uneasy Symbiosis (1995-2002)*, ed. Evangelos Kofos and Vlas Vlasidis (Athens: ELIAMEP, 2005), 131–32.

²¹ Kofos, 'Greek Policy Considerations over FYROM Independence and Recognition', 234–35.

²² Kofos, 235.

²³ Kofos, 235.

of Tito's expansionist policy, just Northern Greece has a legitimate right to employ the name Macedonia; and the term Slav Macedonian was rejected as it put Slavs on Macedonian cultural heritage.²⁴

Those reflected newly discovered Greek '*Macedonologues*' which was damaging historical facts for just political desires, as Kofos emphasizes. The argument, '*the Greek Macedonia is the only Macedonia*' has no historical justification. It is even accepted by many Greek politicians and historians, that is, the geographical region of Ottoman Macedonia composed of Northern Greece, Pirin Bulgaria, and today North Macedonia. The main results of the misperception of the ill-informed Greek public were as the followings: an attitude towards Greek policymakers who use even the terms *Slav-Macedonia* or *Vardar Macedonia* as '*national treacher*'; another slogan which dominate the early negotiations as '*not the term Macedonia and not its derivatives*'; and a sort of nationalist reaction in Skopje calling for the reunification of Macedonia even before the declaration of independence, which was reflected a counter motto as '*Thessaloniki is ours*'.²⁵

Moreover, the Slav Macedonians' arguments in the early 90s were as the followings; Firstly, it is not a subject to have two different countries alleging the same nationality. There is a difference between the name of a country, '*the Republic of Macedonia*' and the name of a region, '*the Greek Macedonia*'. The '*ethnonational Macedonian identity*' in Skopje should not be mixed with '*the regional Macedonian identity in Northern Greece*'. Secondly, to decide which name a state will use is just a legitimate right of a sovereign and independent country under the right of self-determination. Since Slav Macedonians made their decision in September 1991 as an independent and sovereign state, they have a right to determine their own name, in terms of self-determination. Thirdly, as determining the name of a country refers to

²⁴ Kofos, 'The Unresolved "Difference Over the Name": A Greek Perspective', 131–33; Roudometof, *Collective Memory, National Identity, and Ethnic Conflict: Greece, Bulgaria, and the Macedonian Question*, 67–69.

²⁵ Kofos, 'Greek Policy Considerations over FYROM Independence and Recognition', 236–37; Kofos, 'The Unresolved "Difference Over the Name": A Greek Perspective', 131–33.

domestic affairs of the country, other parties' interference has no legal basis, that is, the Greek claims and requests are perceived by Skopje as an intervention of its interior affairs and disrespect to independence and integrity of the sovereign state.²⁶ Also, they thought to use the appellation '*Macedonians*' is directly associated with their existence.²⁷

In such an environment, after the independence declaration of Skopje, the main concern of Athens was to hold the Slav Macedonians' nationalist and sort of irredentist actions.²⁸ Slav Macedonians' claims as 'Macedonians' were perceived as appropriation of a part of Hellenic cultural heritage and threat to Greek territorial integrity by Greek official view in the early 90s.²⁹ Accordingly, Skopje does not have a right to use the name 'Macedonia' in terms of history and culture. Even if in the moderate situation, it might be possible to use the name with a clear sign reflecting the difference between Greek Macedonia. The Greek position in this time was as the following: Using the name Macedonia is a part of irredentist action; and the terms Macedonia exactly refers to ancient Greek-Macedonian culture and heritage. Hence, there is no opportunity for Skopje to access European Union (EU) and NATO unless they change their name.³⁰ Indeed, Greece sought to prevent Skopje to prepare a base for further possible irredentist claims against Greece,³¹ which anxiety of Greece might

²⁶ Daskalovski, 'Clashing Historical Narratives and the Macedonian Name Dispute - Solving the Unsolvable', 331–33.

²⁷ 'Macedonia's Name: Breaking the Deadlock', 3.

²⁸ Kofos, 'Greek Policy Considerations over FYROM Independence and Recognition', 238.

²⁹ Nimetz, 'The Macedonian Name Dispute: The Macedonian Question-Resolved?', 207; 'Macedonia's Name: Why the Dispute Matters and How to Resolve It', 14–15.

³⁰ Daskalovski, 'Clashing Historical Narratives and the Macedonian Name Dispute - Solving the Unsolvable', 329–30.

³¹ Kofos, 'The Unresolved "Difference Over the Name": A Greek Perspective', 126–27; Roudometof, *Collective Memory, National Identity, and Ethnic Conflict: Greece, Bulgaria, and the Macedonian Question*, 133, 134.

be rooted in Tito's desires of the reunification of the Macedonian region as a part of his revisionist and assertive foreign policy.³²

1.2. The History

For those reasons abovementioned, Greece perceived the declaration as a sort of irredentist action and raised its concerns in the international arena. In response, Skopje realized two constitutional amendments as the following: There will be no territorial claims against Greece; and there will be no interference to neighbour states' sovereignty and domestic affairs in minority issues. However, there was no change in though Greece requested from Skopje to change the term Macedonia.³³ So, Athens prevented Skopje's recognition by the EU in January 1992. Skopje turned its face to United Nations (UN), that is, applied for recognition.

On 14 February 1992, almost one million people gathered in Thessaloniki to deliver a message to their government to fight the name Macedonia. After that, in April 1992, in negotiations, we saw Greek maximalist position, which declare the term Macedonia cannot be used in the republic name in any way. So, during the period of 1991-94, any possible opportunity of EU accession for Skopje was almost impossible because of the Greek position, though they did not officially apply.³⁴

In April 1992, the Pinheiro Plan was prepared to deliver a solution for the name issue. Accordingly, it includes two parts: Mutual respect to the territorial integrity of parties; and assurance by Skopje associated with no territorial claims, no irredentist actions, and no hostility activities against Greek Macedonia, and no demand related to minorities and reunification of Macedonia. Also, a new name '*New Macedonia*' was

³² Koukoudakis, 'The Macedonian Question : An Identity-Based Conflict', 6; Floudas, 'Pardon? A Conflict for a Name? FYROM's Dispute with Greece Revisited', 88–89.

³³ Tziampiris, 'The Macedonian Name Dispute and European Union Accession', 154; Koukoudakis, 'The Macedonian Question : An Identity-Based Conflict', 8.

³⁴ Tziampiris, 'The Macedonian Name Dispute and European Union Accession', 154–55.

offered. However, while the first two were accepted, the latter was rejected due to the Greek maximalist front calling for *no Macedonia and its derivatives*.³⁵

On 6 August 1992, Russia recognized Skopje as '*the Republic of Macedonia*', which created a sort of international environment in favour of Skopje. Encouraged this environment, Skopje put the Sun of Vergina, which is a Greek Macedonian symbol, on its flag and produced school textbooks, stickers, maps, posters including direct signals to the so-called "Greater Macedonia". This action was interpreted by Greece as a sort of irredentist action against Greek cultural and territorial integrity.³⁶

In May 1993, another mediation attempt was conducted by UN mediators Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance, which offered the name '*Nova Makedonija*'. It included some obligations: No hostile and irredentist activities against other parties; no usage of other party's cultural symbols, emblems, notions, etc.; and respect to official names. But mainly due to Greek mass public demonstrations in 1993, Mitsotakis' government refused the proposal.³⁷

In April 1993, Skopje gained admission from the UN with a provisional name, called the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.³⁸ But, the admission was realized under a certain condition, as well as usage of the provisional name until the mutually

³⁵ Kofos, 'Greek Policy Considerations over FYROM Independence and Recognition', 239; Koukoudakis, 'The Macedonian Question : An Identity-Based Conflict', 10; Kofos, 'The Unresolved "Difference Over the Name": A Greek Perspective', 134–35.

³⁶ Koukoudakis, 'The Macedonian Question : An Identity-Based Conflict', 11; Floudas, 'Pardon? A Conflict for a Name? FYROM's Dispute with Greece Revisited', 92; Floudas, 'A Name For a Conflict or a Conflict For a Name? An Analysis of Greece's Dispute With FYROM', 300.

³⁷ Kofos, 'Greek Policy Considerations over FYROM Independence and Recognition', 240; Koukoudakis, 'The Macedonian Question : An Identity-Based Conflict', 11; Kofos, 'The Unresolved "Difference Over the Name": A Greek Perspective', 135.

³⁸ Daskalovski, 'Clashing Historical Narratives and the Macedonian Name Dispute - Solving the Unsolvable', 328–29.

acceptable solution, hoisting new members flag including Vergina Sun was delayed, which reflects respect to Greek concerns.³⁹

In February 1994, FYROM gains official recognition by the United States of America (USA), who recognized Skopje with its constitutional name later in May 2004. In response, Greece imposed an economic embargo against FYROM to force Skopje a sort of compromise. However, this embargo caused a negative attitude towards Greece in the international arena.⁴⁰

In this unfavourable international atmosphere, on 13 September 1995, The Interim Accord was signed between parties, which resulted in a sort of normalization and rapprochement between parties though the main concerns in the name dispute remained alive. Some action was conducted by FYROM: Firstly, the flag of FYROM, which was including the Sun of Vergina and interpreted by Athens as usurpation and appropriation of their cultural heritage and a sort of irredentist action, was changed; secondly, an assurance in preventing irredentist actions against Greek cultural and territorial integrity was provided. In return, Athens recognized Skopje internationally and gave a promise not to object to the application of Skopje to the EU and NATO with the provisional name of FYROM or another mutually accepted name. The Interim Agreement created a benign atmosphere in bilateral relations. Indeed, in negotiations, Greece was the stronger party because it is a member of the EU and NATO, so it has veto power.⁴¹

³⁹ Kofos, 'Greek Policy Considerations over FYROM Independence and Recognition', 240; Koukoudakis, 'The Macedonian Question : An Identity-Based Conflict', 11.

⁴⁰ Tziampiris, 'The Macedonian Name Dispute and European Union Accession', 155; Koukoudakis, 'The Macedonian Question : An Identity-Based Conflict', 11–12; Kofos, 'The Unresolved "Difference Over the Name": A Greek Perspective', 136–37.

⁴¹ Nimetz, 'The Macedonian Name Dispute: The Macedonian Question-Resolved?', 208–10; Tziampiris, 'The Macedonian Name Dispute and European Union Accession', 155; Daskalovski, 'Clashing Historical Narratives and the Macedonian Name Dispute - Solving the Unsolvables', 328–29; Kofos, 'The Unresolved "Difference Over the Name": A Greek Perspective', 136–37.

From Interim Accord until 2004, together with the rapprochement between parties, FYROM made satisfactory progress in the European path. Ultimately, they formally submit for the accession process in March 2004. Though the USA recognition to Skopje with its constitutional name in November 2004 empowered Slav Macedonians' hand in negotiations, the Greek position was strictly presented by Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis: "*there is no possibility that FYROM will accede to the EU without having resolved in a mutually acceptable manner with Greece in the issue of the name*".⁴² However, in 2004, Karamanlis was ready to approve a compound name, which refers to a sort of deviation from the Greek maximalist view.

However, after 2006, bilateral relations started to deteriorate as the nationalist Nikola Gruevski, the prime minister of FYROM between 2006 and 2016, came to power in FYROM. FYROM gains official recognition by the USA, who recognized Skopje with its constitutional name later in May 2004.⁴³ FYROM, in December 2006, changed two airports' names, Skopje and Ohrid with Alexander the Great and Saint Paul. Those actions were perceived by Greece as irredentist. For Athens, Skopje violated the Interim Accord by those irredentist actions. Those are interpreted by Athens as Skopje turned to its maximalist position that creates affiliation with ancient times, reflecting a sort of '*ethnogenetic dogma of Slav Macedonians*'. In return, Athens turned to using a carrot stick policy and Kostas Karamanlis declared that unless there is a mutually accepted solution, Skopje never joins an international organization.⁴⁴

In April 2008, considering Greek concerns, in Bucharest NATO Summit, it was decided to delay the invitation of Skopje to NATO until reaching a mutually

⁴² Tziampiris, 'The Macedonian Name Dispute and European Union Accession', 156–58.

⁴³ Koukoudakis, 'The Macedonian Question : An Identity-Based Conflict', 12–14.

⁴⁴ Tziampiris, 'The Macedonian Name Dispute and European Union Accession', 160–61.

accepted solution.⁴⁵ Indeed, since Gruevski's provocative and nationalist attitudes, the name dispute remained unresolved until Zoran Zaev came to power in May 2017.⁴⁶

The home stretch of the name issue was successfully mediated by Mathew Nimetz, *the UN mediator in the Macedonian name dispute for 20 years*. Indeed, it was not an easy task for both parties, as Nimetz emphasized; people in FYROM have been living as 'Macedonian' since the end of the second world war. It was tough to change their identity. On the other side, people in Greece were worried about a sort of damage to their cultural Macedonian identity. However, to a solution, a sort of statement as '*no one tries to steal your Macedonian identity, but we need a geographic modifier as you do not correspond whole Macedonia*' was declared to both parties, and then on 17 January 2018, Nimetz offered five names: *North Macedonia, Upper Macedonia, Macedonia-Skopje, Vardar Macedonia, and Nova Macedonia*.⁴⁷

On 24 January 2018, Alexis Tsipras, the prime minister of Greece between 2015 and 2019, and Zoran Zaev, the prime minister of North Macedonia between 2017 and 2020, met at the Davos World Economic Forum and compromised on further bilateral relations to finally solve the name dispute. It is decided that the negotiations will continue via foreign ministers under the control of prime ministers. Zaev's government illustrated its benign intention to solve the name issue by changing the name Alexander the Great Airport and Alexander the Great Highway with Skopje International Airport

⁴⁵ Tziampiris, 160–61; Evangelos Kofos, 'The Current Macedonian Issue between Athens and Skopje : Is There an Option for a Breakthrough ? ELIAMEP Thesis', 2009, 1, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/102334/eliamep-thesis-3_2009-kofos.pdf; 'Macedonia's Name: Breaking the Deadlock', 5–6.

⁴⁶ Koukoudakis, 'The Macedonian Question : An Identity-Based Conflict', 14.

⁴⁷ Nimetz, 'The Macedonian Name Dispute: The Macedonian Question-Resolved?', 211; Heraclides, 'The Settlement of the Greek-Macedonian Naming Dispute: The Prespa Agreement', 51; 'Macedonia's Name: Why the Dispute Matters and How to Resolve It', 15.

and Friendship Highway respectively, and by declaring the acceptance of a geographic modifier before the term Macedonia.⁴⁸

Ultimately, on 17 June 2018, the parties reached a mutually acceptable solution in the name of Skopje as '*the Republic of North Macedonia*' through the Prespa Agreement. As Nimetz emphasizes, it was a trade-off; Skopje will use the name North Macedonia erga omnes, in return, Greece will support Skopje in its integration to EU and NATO.⁴⁹ According to Prespa Agreement, the nationality of North Macedonia citizens has been accepted as 'Macedonian' and their language has been accepted as 'Macedonian language'.

To develop a better understanding of the solution, some articles of the Prespa Agreement should be mentioned here. Firstly, most important point is that the understanding of the term Macedonia has been accepted as different on both sides. The term Macedonia in North Macedonia has a different historical and cultural context than Macedonia in Greek Macedonia.⁵⁰ That is, the term Macedonia used by North Macedonia has been presented with no affiliation with ancient Macedonia, and the language of North Macedonia has been accepted as a language with Slavic origin. Secondly, another important point related to agreement are respect to independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity of parties, and no toleration to hostile and irredentist activities.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Koukoudakis, 'The Macedonian Question : An Identity-Based Conflict', 14; Heraclides, 'The Settlement of the Greek-Macedonian Naming Dispute: The Prespa Agreement', 51–52.

⁴⁹ Nimetz, 'The Macedonian Name Dispute: The Macedonian Question-Resolved?', 212.

⁵⁰ Final Agreement for the Settlement of the Differences as Described in the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 817 (1993) and 845 (1993), the Termination of the Interim Accord of 1995, and the Establishment of a Strategic Partnership between the Parties, 17th of June 2018, Article 7, <https://www.mfa.gr/images/docs/eidikathemata/agreement.pdf>

⁵¹ Nimetz, 'The Macedonian Name Dispute: The Macedonian Question-Resolved?', 213; Heraclides, 'The Settlement of the Greek-Macedonian Naming Dispute: The Prespa Agreement', 55; Ioannis Armakolas and Ljupcho Petkovski, 'Blueprint Prespa? Lessons Learned from the Greece-North Macedonia Agreement', 2019, 3, <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/skopje/15509.pdf>; Stefan

Through the Prespa Agreement, on the one hand, Greece has acquired its main objectives: Change in the name of Skopje; preserved the ancient Macedonian heritage; and prevented irredentist actions. In return, Athens accepted 'Macedonian' nationality and language other than Greeks with the provision of Slavic origin. On the other hand, Skopje achieved Macedonian nationality, national identity, and language. Also, possible accession to NATO and the EU is another major achievement for North Macedonia.⁵²

In sum, this chapter presented the historical details of the Macedonian name dispute. To do so, firstly, it examined the Greek concerns over the issue. In this regard, the main concern of the Greek official view is to protect the Greek Macedonian cultural heritage and their territorial integrity. For this reason, they sought to prevent the usage of some elements belonging to Greek Macedonian cultural heritage by Skopje. Otherwise, they thought they would permit Slav Macedonians to damage Greek Macedonian cultural heritage and make possible some irredentist claims by Skopje against Greek territorial integrity. Afterwards, this chapter sought to follow the chronological events during the name dispute in order to catch the main behavioural pattern of Greece. Accordingly, it is fair to propose that during the name dispute, Greece behave in the direction of the main concern abovementioned. Indeed, when Greece perceived Slav Macedonians' actions as irredentist and culturally threatening, they presented a strict position, however; when they perceive Slav Macedonians' actions as friendly, not irredentist, they presented a benign position.

This historical ground is going to be interpreted to discover to what extent the Greek Macedonia identity is an important factor in understanding Greek foreign policy actions. However, before that, the nature of identity or what identity means should be

Rohdewald, 'Citizenship, Ethnicity, History, Nation, Region and the Prespa Agreement of June 2018 between Macedonia and Greece', *Südosteuropa* 66, no. 4 (2018): 578, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1515/soeu-2018-0042>.

⁵² Heraclides, 'The Settlement of the Greek-Macedonian Naming Dispute: The Prespa Agreement', 56; Rohdewald, 'Citizenship, Ethnicity, History, Nation, Region and the Prespa Agreement of June 2018 between Macedonia and Greece', 578.

explained. Hence, the next chapter is going to be about the conceptual ground of the research, namely identity.

2. THE CONCEPTUAL GROUND: IDENTITY

Developed in early modern Europe and gained a new understanding in the 19th century, the concept of identity, according to Ned Lebow, is *the secular descendant of the soul*.⁵³ Its entrance to social science is based on the works of Erik Erikson over *identity crisis*, despite the contributions of Gordon Allport, Nelson Foote, and Robert Merton, who were using the notion of identification relatedly with ethnicity, sociological role theory, and reference group theory respectively. However, studies of symbolic interactionist Erving Goffman and social constructionist Peter Berger had more influence on raising the concept of identity in the literature.⁵⁴

On the other hand, identity has emerged in the international relations literature in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a narrative to explain the nature of the state and their interests. Emerged as an alternative narrative to the realist-rationalist view in understanding the nature of international relations, identity was illustrated as an “*inescapable dimension of being*” and “*a frame that politics refers in acting*”. The concept is directly linked to the uptrend of Constructivism, that is, some trends, namely, the postmodern zeitgeist, end of the cold war, globalization, and the European Integration, raised questions about concepts associated with modernity and the Westphalian system. In return, identity has emerged as a perspective enabling one to re-read the social reality.⁵⁵

As mentioned, recently appeared in the centre of debates in many subfields of social science, the concept of identity still is sort of conundrum that it is hard to

⁵³ Richard Ned Lebow, ‘Identity’, in *Concepts in World Politics*, ed. Felix Berenskoetter (SAGE Publications, 2016), 73–75.

⁵⁴ Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, ‘Beyond “Identity”’, *Theory and Society* 29, no. 1 (2000): 2–4, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3108478>.

⁵⁵ Felix Berenskoetter, ‘Identity in International Relations’, *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*, 2017, 1–4, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.218>.

propound a comprehensive meaning despite wide range using.⁵⁶ Though many employ the term in place of *individuality* or *personality*, it corresponds mostly more than those.⁵⁷

Hence, this chapter seeks to discover the concept of identity in order to prepare the conceptual ground of the analysis. To do so, firstly, the question of *what is identity* will be answered by addressing the contributions of some up-front social scientists, namely Stephen Lawler, Richard Jenkins, Kate Woodward, James Fearon, Roger Brubaker, and Frederick Cooper. Then, to develop our understanding of identity, types of identities will be examined. Though it might be possible to present countless types, here some of them, such as personal, collective, group, corporate, state, ethnic, and role identities, which are presumed to be helpful for our analysis, will be presented.

2.1. The Definitions

Etymologically extended over the Latin *idem* meaning the same, identity has three different dictionary definitions: i) *who or what somebody/something is*; ii) *the characteristics, feelings or beliefs that make people different from others*; and iii) *the state or feeling of being very similar to and able to understand somebody/something*.⁵⁸ Furthermore, the verb *identify* is directly associated with the noun identity. It has three definitions: i) *to recognize somebody/something and able to say who/what they are*; ii) *to find or discover somebody/something*; and iii) *to make it possible to recognize who*

⁵⁶ D. James Fearon, 'What Is Identity (as We Now Use the Word) ?' (Stanford University, 1999), 1–2, <https://web.stanford.edu/group/fearon-research/cgi-bin/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/What-is-Identity-as-we-now-use-the-word-.pdf>.

⁵⁷ Philip Gleason, 'Identifying Identity: A Semantic History', *Journal of American History* 69, no. 4 (1983): 912–13, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1901196>.

⁵⁸ 'Identity', Oxford Learner's Dictionaries, accessed 27 June 2021, <https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/identity>; 'Identity', Online Etymology Dictionary, accessed 9 August 2021, <https://www.etymonline.com/word/identity>.

*or what somebody/something is.*⁵⁹ Whatness, recognition, similarities and differences are key points in those definitions. Hence, it is fair to culminate the concept of identity with certain characteristics composed of similarities and differences which present what somebody/something is, and which distinguish those from others.

According to Steph Lawler, identity is a sort of slippery term that it is not possible to suggest a certain overarching definition for its nature as its definition mostly contingents upon *how it is thought about*. Despite the sliding nature of the term, if one tries to explain more or less what identity means, she generally refers to some social roles and personal characteristics. Also, the dilemma between identity which includes simultaneously sameness and alterity is emphasized as another important aspect of what we call identity. That is, the identity reflects the uniqueness of individuals, while it puts individuals into certain common social categories.⁶⁰

According to Richard Jenkins, firstly, identity answers the questions ‘*who is who*’ and ‘*what is what*’. This refers to a process of *identification*. Defined as multi-dimensional categorization, identification enables us to map the world we live in. Without the map, it is hard to know *where we are* and *what we are doing*. In this sense, identity, and identification, accepted as cognitive mechanisms classifying components of the social environment, are seen as a fundamental base for the organizations of the human world.⁶¹ Without those, the world would be more chaotic, as Ted Hopf emphasizes.⁶² Secondly, accepted as social identity, human identity refers to individuals’ understanding concerning *who they are* and *who others are*. Resulting from everyday interaction, identity is not a fixed entity, but rather changeable over

⁵⁹ ‘Identify’, Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries, accessed 9 August 2021, <https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/identify>.

⁶⁰ Steph Lawler, *Identity Sociological Perspectives*, Second (Polity Press, 2014), 7–10.

⁶¹ Richard Jenkins, *Social Identity*, fourth (Routledge, 2014), 6–14, <https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=9GWLAAwAAQBAJ&pgis=1>.

⁶² Lebow, ‘Identity’, 84.

time.⁶³ Thirdly, identity is a concept intertwined with similarities and differences. Matching someone or something with certain properties not only puts them into a certain social category but also illustrates those who are not in this category, hence, the notion of identity simultaneously presents a certain social position with its alterity by using similarities and differences.⁶⁴

According to Kate Woodward, firstly, the puzzle of identity, more or less is associated with the question of '*who am I?*'. Though this definition creates a sort of affiliation between identity and personality, there is a considerable difference between those. Though identity includes some sort of personal characteristics, it is more than those and also involves some active choices about persons' characteristics.⁶⁵ For instance, persons might be inherently shy, talkative, extroverted etc., but they might prefer to support the PAOK football team or prefer to be a professor at university. The former presents personality, while the latter refers to what we call identity. That is, each person has a sort of personality including various natural or inherent personal features, the difference of identity is being something to take up by personal choice. By answering the question of *who I am*, identity includes me, you, us, and others. That is, identity refers to a sort of classificatory system which put something or someone in a certain position in society.⁶⁶ Secondly, the puzzle of identity is composed of some labels and symbols which demonstrate similarities and differences within or between a group of people. Labels, symbols, and representations included in identity tell *who is the same with us* and *who is different from us*. In this way, boundaries in society between categories, such as us and others, are constructed. For example, by looking at a person's t-shirt, another person wearing a PAOK t-shirt can easily recognize who is a supporter of PAOK or not. Those help people to recognize themselves as possessing

⁶³ Jenkins, *Social Identity*, 17–19.

⁶⁴ Jenkins, 22–23.

⁶⁵ Kath Woodward, 'Questions of Identity', in *Questioning Identity: Gender, Class, Ethnicity*, ed. Kath Woodward, second (The Open University, 2004), 6.

⁶⁶ Kath Woodward, *Understanding Identity* (Arnold Publisher, 2002), 1–2.

the same identity with some and different identity from others.⁶⁷ Thirdly, the puzzle of identity has a sort of tension between internal/personal and external/social. Though identity includes personal choices, namely human agency, indeed it is restricted by a social world, namely social structure. In other words, individuals have sort of ability to take up a certain identity and to make a rational choice, while simultaneously the social structures, which are noncontrollable by individuals, restricts the movement area that individuals act or determines tools that individuals use.⁶⁸ Also, the restriction or structure of the social world can directly determine who I am since identity is an answer of not only *how I see myself*, but also *how others see me*. Hence, identity is a socially recognized stance despite the contribution of human agency. Lastly, a person simultaneously might have identities more than once, which means *multiple identities*. Someone might be a teacher, a student, a father, a son at the same time. Also, it might be a successful teacher in its own internal view, but it might be seen as unsuccessful by others.⁶⁹

According to James Fearon, firstly, answering the question of *who are you* can be accepted as an immediate solution for the puzzle of identity. Thus, some predicates associated with someone, or something can be accepted as components establishing their identities. Those predicates, directly attributed to someone or something's essence, might be *multiple*, which depend on the social context. In this sense, those predicates put individuals into a social category. Indeed, it is hard to distinguish identities from social categories since they are quietly intertwined, and it is hard to determine which one comes first. But Fearon escapes from this dilemma by identifying *identities as social categories*.⁷⁰ Indeed, Fearon emphasized the dual sense of identities; identity as *social category* and identity as a *personal characteristic*. The first refers to a group of individuals possessing certain qualifications and expected

⁶⁷ Woodward, 'Questions of Identity', 6–7; Woodward, *Understanding Identity*, 1–2.

⁶⁸ Woodward, *Understanding Identity*, 1–2.

⁶⁹ Woodward, 'Questions of Identity', 7.

⁷⁰ Fearon, 'What Is Identity (as We Now Use the Word) ?', 11–13.

behaviours distinguishing them from those who are out of the group, while the latter refers to personal distinguishing features establishing the source of *individuals' self-respect*. Despite there being no necessary linkage between those, Fearon argues the fact *social categories bound up with bases of individual self-respect* provides an understanding for many aspects of psychological and sociological reality.⁷¹

According to Brubaker and Cooper, who highlight the meaning of identity as either *too much* or *too little* or *nothing at all*, offers different usages for identity: firstly, they unveil identity as a baseline for social actions. Accordingly, identity propounds a perspective on social actions driven by not *universal self-interest* but rather *particularistic self-understanding*. Secondly, evoked to the *collective phenomenon*, identity refers to *sameness* shared by a group of people. Further, this sameness creates a sort of group solidarity and consciousness, which establish the base for collective action. Thirdly, understood as the essence of *self-hood*, identity refers to something foundational for *social being*, while it points out *the inconstant, multiple, changing, and fragmented* nature of the social being.⁷²

2.2. The Types

Mainly there are two types of identity as *personal/individual* and *collective/group* identity,⁷³ however; as much as there are social environments, like gender, nationality, ethnicity, race, religion, age, sexuality, employment, there are different identities associated with those social environments. Hence, this sub-part is going to discover some of them.

Settled at the centre of the question of *who am I*, personal identity refers to *the identity of an individual*. Indeed, it is a sort of identity which mostly correspond with

⁷¹ Fearon, 2–36.

⁷² Brubaker and Cooper, ‘Beyond “Identity”’, 1–8.

⁷³ Cynthia Robinson-Moore, ‘Cultural Contracts Theory’, in *Encyclopedia of Identity* (SAGE Publications, 2010), 165.

daily usage of identity as it indicates a set of traits or characteristics like values, beliefs, purposes, philosophies, which make the individual possessing those distinct from others or unique.⁷⁴ Mostly supposed as the same with personal identity, self-identity has a different context since it refers to a sort of awareness over individuals own identity. In other words, personal identity indicates, as mentioned above, certain characteristics of an individual, while self-identity means an understanding of personal identity, which refers to the distinction between the terms.⁷⁵

Though the terms self and person are directly associated with individual characteristics, those are simultaneously social as their formation is a social process. However, the concept of social identity, though might be accepted as an embracing term, refers to a certain type of identity. Accordingly, it means “*the internalization of common identities*”. In other words, the social identity indicates common characteristics, features, beliefs, traits, etc., that are shared by a set of people.⁷⁶

The group identity, which might be put between personal and social identity, refers at the same time to both a sort of “individuality” and collectivity. On the one hand, group members create a commonality including shared values, beliefs, traits etc., as in social identity. On the other hand, they establish a sort of “individuality” that makes their group unique across other groups.⁷⁷ In this sense, Fearon’s type identity, used by Wendt as label producing social categories, can be illustrated as a sort of group identity.⁷⁸

⁷⁴ Amanda G. McKendree, ‘Personal Identity Versus Self-Identity’, in *Encyclopedia of Identity* (SAGE Publications, 2010), 545.

⁷⁵ McKendree, 546–47.

⁷⁶ Richard Jenkins, ‘Society and Social Identity’, in *Encyclopedia of Identity* (SAGE Publications, 2010), 766–67.

⁷⁷ Lawrence R. Frey and Stephen P. Konieczka, ‘Group Identity’, in *Encyclopedia of Identity* (SAGE Publications, 2010), 316–17.

⁷⁸ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 225.

Emerged in the 1950s and used initially in studies of design, corporate identity refers to the perception and claims of an organization over who it is. In the concept of corporate identity, the focus is on the question of who or what we are by the members of the organization.⁷⁹ But, corporate identity is used with a different meaning by Alexander Wendt. Accordingly, Wendt describes personal identity for people, however; when the referent object is organizations, like states, Wendt uses corporate identity instead of personal identity. Hence, in Wendt's terminology, corporate identity equals the personal identity of organizations.⁸⁰ In the chapter on Constructivism, there are further explanations over Wendt's understanding of corporate identity.

Rooted in the history, culture, economy and geography of a state, a set of *interests, values, self-understandings, and orientations* constitute the state identity. It creates a baseline on which states act. The notion of state identity reflects basically a fact that states, as political communities, have a sort of collective understanding of self. Presented as complex and multilayered, the idea of state identity is accepted as flexible and evolving over time through interaction with other actors, though it has a relatively stable nature. Put the state identity at the centre of understanding international relations, Constructivist international relations theory emphasized its constructed nature and influence on determining actors' behaviours.⁸¹

The notion of ethnic identity basically refers to common national and regional heritage, culture, language, and religion shared by a group of people. A sort of *kinship* common in a group of people, which makes them distinct from other communities, constitutes the heart of ethnic identity.⁸² Seen as related to ethnic identity, the notion of national identity generally refers sort of characteristics that constitute a nation and make the nation unique. That is, since a historical territory, shared origin, common myths, a shared culture, common historical memories, and even a common economy

⁷⁹ Oyvind Ihlen, 'Corporate Identity', in *Encyclopedia of Identity* (SAGE Publications, 2010), 140–41.

⁸⁰ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, chaps 224–225.

⁸¹ Anne M. Brown, 'State Identity', in *Encyclopedia of Identity* (SAGE Publications, 2010), 782–84.

⁸² Alwin A.D. Jones, 'Ethnicity', in *Encyclopedia of Identity* (SAGE Publications, 2010), 58–59.

establish the root of a nation, those refer to what we called national identity.⁸³ As Bechhofer and Mccrone emphasize, *national identity* refers to *how people choose to think of themselves in cultural-territorial terms*.⁸⁴

The role identity, in a sense, is different from all types of identities since it refers to a different dimension of identification. In society, individuals may settle in a wide range of social positions. Those positions bring together certain roles or expectations and those roles direct individuals' conduct. In this sense, *the meanings* associated with individuals as a result of those social roles are what we call the role identity. In other words, the answer to the question of *what does it mean to be in or having a certain social role* is the role identity. Each role identity includes internal meanings. Those internal meanings have common and personal dimensions. While the common or cultural dimension of the role identities is learned through interaction with others, the individual, or personal dimension of it is learned through a person's self-understanding. In this sense, different meanings might be produced by individuals. What is important here is the correspondence between individuals' meanings and behaviours; there must be harmony between individuals' role identity standards and their actions. This is verified or not thanks to others' feedbacks; if feedbacks from others over individuals' conducts correspond with individual's role identity meanings, *the identity verification* occurs; if not, *the identity unverification* occurs. The former put individuals in a good feeling, the latter makes them bad. In the second circumstance, individuals have three options; they either change their role identity meanings or change their conduct or ignore feedbacks of others.⁸⁵

In sum, this chapter sought to explain the concept of identity. In this direction, firstly, it employed many definitions from existing literature in order to answer the question of *what is identity*. Secondly, some types of identities were demonstrated.

⁸³ Benjamin J. Broome and Harry Anastasiou, 'Nationalism', in *Encyclopedia of Identity* (SAGE Publications, 2010), 498.

⁸⁴ Frank Bechhofer and David Mccrone, 'Identity, National', in *Encyclopedia of Race, Ethnicity, and Nationalism* (The Wiley Blackwell, 2016), <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118663202.wberen145>.

⁸⁵ Jan E. Stets, 'Role Identity', in *Encyclopedia of Identity* (SAGE Publications, 2010), 648–49.

Having considered these definitions and types, this chapter proposes that the concept of identity can be accepted as the answer to the questions of *who is who* and *what is what*. In other words, an actor's identity can be accepted as its answer to the question of who is he/she. By answering this question, identity puts things and actors in a social position that mainly shapes their perspective of reality.

The next chapter is going to be about the theoretical framework which enables us to scientifically examine the Macedonian name dispute.

3. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CONSTRUCTIVISM AND ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY THEORY

This chapter seeks to develop a theoretical framework to explain to what extent an actor's identity shapes its behaviours. To do so, Constructivist IR theory and OST were employed. In this sense, this chapter is going to present the cornerstones of these theories respectively. In the end, it is expected to reach a sort of behavioural explanation that theoretically illustrates to what extent or how actors' identity shapes their conduct. In this sense, these theoretical findings will be employed in the next application chapter as explanatory elements for the case study.

3.1. Constructivism

In the 1980s, Constructivism was raised with the end of the Cold War as a new approach challenging to positivist and rationalist stance of neorealism and neoliberalism in international relations.⁸⁶ Accordingly, after the Cold War, what mainstream IR traditions expected to happen has not happened, which was interpreted as a lack of explanation and prediction power by Constructivists.⁸⁷ In this context, Constructivism offered a new insight to understand social reality and elements of the international system.⁸⁸

In this regard, this sub-section seeks to build up a Constructivist narrative regarding actors' identities and actions. It makes it in a way coming from general to specific. That is, starting with the attitudes of Constructivism towards the social reality,

⁸⁶ Christian Reus-Smit, 'Constructivism', in *Theories of International Relations*, ed. Scott Burchill et al. (Palgrave Mcmillan, 2005), 188; Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach* (Routledge, 2003), 14.

⁸⁷ Trine Flochart, 'Constructivism and Foreign Policy', in *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*, ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne (Oxford University Press, 2016), 81.

⁸⁸ Robert Jackson and George Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations, Theories and Approaches* (Oxford University Press, 2013), 209–10.

the narrative continues with a Constructivist perspective to the nature of the international system, actors' identities, interests, and behaviours, and it culminates with the nexus between identity and foreign policy of actors. In the end, it is expected to reach a sort of argument that illustrates the impact of identity on actors' actions.

First of all, the stance of Constructivist theory to social reality seems an appropriate starting point for the narrative: The Constructivist theory propounds a difference between social reality and nature, which refers to the difference between idealism and materialism. Accordingly, the social reality is constituted by ideas and materials; but, while physical entities are in the secondary position, intellectual or ideational ones are on the front. In other words, stressing *the social construction of reality*, Constructivism argues there is no *objective* and *external* social world or reality which is uncorrelated with individuals' or individual groups' minds.⁸⁹ That is, the social reality is mostly a product of *human consciousness or beliefs and thoughts of individuals*, despite in a part it being constituted by *physical entities*. In this point, one of the most crucial aspects of Constructivism is that *the intersubjective beliefs* which refer to shared understandings among a set of individuals provide the physical entities of reality with the meanings. Without the intellectual part, the materialistic conditions mean nothing.⁹⁰ In this framework, Wendt summarizes the whole story; "*500 British nuclear weapons less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons ... because ... the British are friends, and the North Koreans are not*".⁹¹ According to Constructivism, in a world in which there is no ultimate truth, beliefs and ideas about materials consist of most aspects of the social reality.

Secondly, to answer the question of how social reality is constructed would improve our understanding of the Constructivist narrative: An emergent answer of Constructivism to this question is the interaction between agents and structures. In this

⁸⁹ Jackson and Sorensen, 211–13; Flochart, 'Constructivism and Foreign Policy', 84.

⁹⁰ Jackson and Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations, Theories and Approaches*, 212–15; Derek Beach, *Analyzing Foreign Policy* (Palgrave Mcmillan, 2012), 57.

⁹¹ Alexander Wendt, 'Constructing International Politics', *International Security* 20, no. 1 (1995): 73, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2307/2539217>.

sense, the structure means the social context in which actors interact or *recurring patterns of social behaviour* and consists of *shared knowledge, material resources, and practices*, while the agent means actors who are able to choose and interact in the context.⁹² Accordingly, certain relationships between two actors are not fixed and static, rather those evolve and change across time. That is, those certain relationships are products of a historically continuous interplay between two actors, and of an interaction between actors and their social environments. Those interplays determine both a certain relationship between actors and a certain social context in which those actors act.⁹³ The process refers to the concept of the *mutual constitution*⁹⁴ or of *co-constitution*, which is an intrinsic aspect of Constructivism. Accordingly, *routinized interactions*⁹⁵ between actors contribute to the construction of the structure including institutions, norms, and collective meanings, while the historically constructed structure contributes to the construction of actors' interactions.⁹⁶ There is no *ontologically primitive* one in the Constructivist stance.⁹⁷

After examining how Constructivism explains the nature and construction of social reality, the international system, as a part of social reality, is the third step of the

⁹² Vendulka Kubalkova, 'Foreign Policy, International Politics, and Constructivism', in *Foreign Policy in a Constructed World*, ed. Vendulka Kubalkova (Routledge Taylor Francis Group, 2015), 22; Ian Hurd, 'Constructivism', in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford University Press, 2010), 303; Wendt, 'Constructing International Politics', 73.

⁹³ Hurd, 'Constructivism', 303.

⁹⁴ Karin M. Fierke, 'Constructivism', in *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, ed. Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, Third (Oxford University Press, 2013), 191; Flochart, 'Constructivism and Foreign Policy', 84.

⁹⁵ Reus-Smit, 'Constructivism', 197.

⁹⁶ Hurd, 'Constructivism', 304; Alexander Wendt, 'Identity and Structural Change in International Politics', in *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, ed. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 49.

⁹⁷ Bozdağhoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach*, 15.

Constructivist narrative: In this regard, the most distinctive characteristic of Constructivism is its emphasis on the *social ontology* of international system,⁹⁸ instead of *individualistic ontology*. Accordingly, the international system is not an objective phenomenon existing *out there* but rather is a product of *the context of normative meaning*⁹⁹ which includes *intersubjective awareness, shared understandings, and human consciousness*,¹⁰⁰ that refers to *the world of our making*.¹⁰¹ In other words, the determinants of social reality and the international system are little material but rather mostly ideational,¹⁰² which refers *distribution of knowledge*.¹⁰³ In this sense, as ideas, norms, beliefs constitute the system, once they change, the system changes.¹⁰⁴

Emphasizing the *socially constructed* dimensions of global politics and international relations,¹⁰⁵ Constructivism argues that the international system cannot be understood by just examining material and institutional constraints since it is more than those. The system includes both material capabilities, and social relations, which the latter provides the former with a meaning.¹⁰⁶ The system produces common sense,

⁹⁸ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 372; Wendt, 'Constructing International Politics', 71.

⁹⁹ Fierke, 'Constructivism', 189–90.

¹⁰⁰ Jackson and Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations, Theories and Approaches*, 209.

¹⁰¹ Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (Routledge Taylor Francis Group, 2012).

¹⁰² Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, chap. 3.

¹⁰³ Wendt, 140.

¹⁰⁴ Jackson and Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations, Theories and Approaches*, 209.

¹⁰⁵ Wendt, 'Constructing International Politics', 71.

¹⁰⁶ Flochart, 'Constructivism and Foreign Policy', 85–86; Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach*, 15; Wendt, 'Constructing International Politics', 73; Beach, *Analyzing Foreign Policy*, 57; Wendt, 'Identity and Structural Change in International Politics', 50.

expectations, and social knowledge, which are hidden in international institutions. interactions and provide those with meaning.¹⁰⁷ That is to say, understanding events, phenomena, and patterns in international politics, according to Constructivism, is contingent upon *socially constructed meanings and practices* since an actor behave toward an object or an event with a set of ideas that the actor has regarding those.¹⁰⁸

Elements of the international system are conceived, in Constructivism, as *social facts*.¹⁰⁹ In this sense, *sociality* is directly related to *intersubjective quality* or *shared knowledge*.¹¹⁰ Accordingly, the existence of objects in the international system is not attributed to their material or physical existence but rather those are associated with their social and cultural context which provide them with a sort of social value and meaning. In this point, Constructivism does not propound social ideas or meanings as complete explanatory factors which ignore material forces, rather it emphasizes social ideas and meanings in understanding material constraints.¹¹¹ In this sense, Constructivism offers a distinctive glance to patterns and phenomena of world politics, which puts front the socially constructed aspects of those as explanatory factors. As an explanatory factor, the international system plays an important role in shaping actors' identities, interests, and behaviours.¹¹²

To develop a better understanding of the international system, what Constructivism propounds about the concept of anarchy should be mentioned here. The term, anarchy, used to refer to the lack of legitimate authority in the international

¹⁰⁷ Martin Griffiths, Terry O. Callaghan, and Steven C. Roach, *International Relations: The Key Concepts* (Routledge Taylor Francis Group, 2008), 51–52; Reus-Smit, 'Constructivism', 196; Wendt, 'Constructing International Politics', 73; Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 371.

¹⁰⁸ Hurd, 'Constructivism', 300–301.

¹⁰⁹ Flochart, 'Constructivism and Foreign Policy', 84–85.

¹¹⁰ Wendt, 'Constructing International Politics', 73.

¹¹¹ Fierke, 'Constructivism', 191–92.

¹¹² Wendt, 'Constructing International Politics', 71–72.

system,¹¹³ is accepted as the structural condition of international relations.¹¹⁴ In neorealism, the structural conditions directly establish a group of predictions over actors' behaviours, which refers to *the behaviour of self-help*;¹¹⁵ however, Constructivism contends self-help is not the concomitant of anarchy, but rather a product of certain institutions based on particular identities supported by actors' practice.¹¹⁶ It refers that anarchy needs further assumptions concerning actors' identities and relationships among actors in order to have a set of predictions over actors' interactions.¹¹⁷

In other words, though anarchy is accepted as the typical situation of the international system; it does mean nothing itself. Rather, various social structures within anarchy make more sense. Those various social structures bring about different social identities and different relationships between actors. Hence, states' interests and identities in this direction are determined as a result of different interpretations of social structures by states.¹¹⁸ A quotation from Wendt, in this point, might help understand Constructivist insight over anarchy; "*an anarchy of friends differs from one of the enemies*".¹¹⁹

Wendt mentions three different types of the *culture of anarchy*: Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian. In each one, actors create different social contexts, and their

¹¹³ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 247.

¹¹⁴ Hurd, 'Constructivism', 304.

¹¹⁵ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 102–28; Jackson and Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations, Theories and Approaches*, 216.

¹¹⁶ Flochart, 'Constructivism and Foreign Policy', 82; Wendt, 'Identity and Structural Change in International Politics', 49.

¹¹⁷ Hurd, 'Constructivism', 304–5; Wendt, 'Identity and Structural Change in International Politics', 47.

¹¹⁸ Griffiths, Callaghan, and Roach, *International Relations: The Key Concepts*, 52.

¹¹⁹ Wendt, 'Constructing International Politics', 78.

relationships are defined differently. States, who see each other as an enemy in a continuous war of Hobbesian anarchy, find themselves in a better position in Lockean and Kantian anarchies as rivals and friends respectively.¹²⁰ In this sense, each one suggests a different context, different interaction, and ultimately different behaviour. That is, anarchy creates confrontational behaviours if actors' interactions are based on enmity, whereas anarchy creates cooperative behaviours if actors' interactions are based on friendship. In this sense, if we remember the fact that the social reality is a product of mankind, we can reach the final argument that *anarchy*, as a part of social reality, *is what states make of it*.¹²¹

The fourth component of the Constructivist narrative is about actors' identities, which is found not only at the centre of the chapter but also, in a sense, at the heart of the theory.¹²² The Constructivist approach to identity indicates the agent's sense of self, of others, and of the place in where they interact, which refers to questions about who I am, where I am, and what I have to do.¹²³ According to Wendt, rooted in the self-understanding of actors, identity refers to actors' intentional characteristics producing behavioural and motivational tendencies.¹²⁴ Generally, the nature of and goals of a state presented by elites of this state are illustrated as a component of this state's

¹²⁰ Jackson and Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations, Theories and Approaches*, 216.

¹²¹ Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 391–425, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027764>.

¹²² Maja Zehfuss, 'Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison', *European Journal of International Relations* 7, no. 3 (2001): 318, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066101007003002>.

¹²³ Flochart, 'Constructivism and Foreign Policy', 87; L. Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and J. Peter Katzenstein, 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security', in *The Culture of National Security*, ed. Peter Katzenstein, J (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 41; Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 230.

¹²⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 224.

identity. In other words, an identity of a state determines its rights, responsibilities, and obligations in the international system.¹²⁵

When actors identify themselves, they identify simultaneously other actors. That is, they create boundaries in the international system. When identifying each other and, creating these boundaries, the process mostly depends on the social dimensions of actors' interactions including historical relations, intersubjective beliefs, mutual perceptions, and common understandings. These social dimensions determine what actors perceive from or how actors understand an event or a phenomenon in the international system.¹²⁶ Hence, understanding an event in the international system depends on actors' identities and interactions with others. This situation creates different understandings, as Wendt emphasizes, friends' weapons are perceived differently from enemies' weapons.¹²⁷ In the same way, a sort of speech act can be perceived by actors differently: Some might perceive it as a security threat, while others might perceive it as just freedom.

The Constructivist stance towards actors and the formation of their identities departs from rationalists. Rationalists see actors as directed by *rational cost-benefit calculations* and as with pre-given identities, while Constructivism emphasizes social aspects of them, and argues the normative social structures, which is established by actors' routinized relations or interactions or communications in a process, form actors' identities.¹²⁸ In this sense, the interaction between actors and non-material

¹²⁵ Birgül Demirtaş, 'Constructivism', in *Introduction to International Relations (in Turkish)*, ed. Şaban Kardaş and Ali Balcı (Küre Yayınları, 2014), 172.

¹²⁶ Demirtaş, 173.

¹²⁷ Wendt, 'Constructing International Politics', 73.

¹²⁸ Reus-Smit, 'Constructivism', 196–98; Flochart, 'Constructivism and Foreign Policy', 87; Demirtaş, 'Constructivism', 174; Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security', 41.

structures, such as historical, social, political, and cultural contexts is vital since the interplay contributes to the identification process of agents.¹²⁹

Actors' identities indicate a set of certain behaviours that are directly associated with these identities and that actors should be complied with to be able to represent these identities. Accordingly, identities, as normative entities, distinguish normatively appropriate behaviours from inappropriate ones for an actor in a certain social context and shed light on actors' actions.¹³⁰ In this direction, identity is illustrated as the key notion in Constructivism in order to understand actors' foreign policies. That is to say, as identities have a direct impact on actors' behaviours, it is not possible to analyze foreign policy without considering actors' identities.¹³¹ As Wendt emphasizes, Constructivism argues *identities are the basis of interests* and ultimately behaviours.¹³²

In this direction, Wendt presents four types of identity: corporate identity, social identity, type identity, and role identity. Wendt describes *corporate identity* as the essential feature of actors' individuality, which refers to actors' distinct entities. For people, it refers to the *body and individual experience of consciousness*, while for organizations, it refers to people constituting the organizations and shared beliefs creating common understandings. From Wendt's perspective, corporate identity plays a significant role. Accordingly, without a "*sense of I*", which makes people distinct from others, they cannot be an agent. In the same way, without a collective narrative, which constitutes a states' corporate identity, it cannot have a "*body*" or an agency. In

¹²⁹ Flochart, 'Constructivism and Foreign Policy', 87.

¹³⁰ Flochart, 87; Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security', 38.

¹³¹ Demirtaş, 'Constructivism', 172–73.

¹³² Wendt, 'Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', 398; Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security', 41–43.

this sense, what makes people and states agents in the social process is their corporate identities, which distinguishes them from others.¹³³

In the case of states, corporate identity is in large part related to domestic politics and it creates sort of fundamental interests: i) security, both physical and ontological, ii) recognition by others, and iii) development. In this regard, corporate identity, as Wendt emphasizes, establishes *motivational energy* for states to participate in interactions in the state system. However, the definition of corporate identity contingents upon state actors' self-understanding relatively to others, which refers to social identity.¹³⁴

Social identity, according to Wendt, refers to state actors' sense of self. Created relatively to others, social identities lead actors to answer the question of *who I am* and *who we are*. In this regard, social identities are contingent upon the existence of others, that is, a thesis cannot be understood without anti-thesis. Since this fact directly affects the interaction among actors in the state system, social identities are seen as key points in understanding the mutual constitution between agent and structure. Beyond these, it can be concluded as corporate and social identities establish a base for state actors' interests and certain actions.¹³⁵

Another sort of identity, in Wendt's terminology, is *type identity*. It equals sort of labels creating social categories established by people with various types of commonalities. Americans, economics, professors, even people with blonde hair are just some examples. In the case of states, type identity mostly refers to *regime types*. In this sense, democratic states, fascist states, totalitarians are just examples.¹³⁶

The *role identity* in Wendt's terminology is the same as what is explained in the first identity chapter in this research. Accordingly, when someone or something

¹³³ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 224–25.

¹³⁴ Wendt, 'Identity and Structural Change in International Politics', 51.

¹³⁵ Wendt, 51–53.

¹³⁶ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 225–26.

occupies a certain social position and behaves in the direction of certain norms attributed to this social position, it gains the role identity. In this sense, each social positions have certain behaviours, which refers to collective knowledge or shared expectation over this position and these behaviours. Actors should behave in this direction to represent this type of identity¹³⁷. In this respect, role identities tell individuals with a certain identity how they should behave in order to be a representer of the certain identity.

As an accepted concomitant of actors' identities, actors' interests are the fifth component of the narrative. Indicated as what actors want by Wendt,¹³⁸ there are different stances towards interests. Many non-Constructivist stances argue i) actors' interests are composed of some set of desires related to survival, security, power, and wealth, and ii) those are exogenously ascertained by material constraints and do not have a fluid character for practical objectives. In contrast, approaching interests as a function of ideas,¹³⁹ Constructivism propounds that actors' interests are endogenously contingent upon the social relationships that actors constitute with each other and with their social structures. That is to say, as social relationships are not given and steady but rather changeable and fluid, actors' interests cannot be prefigured. They depend on if states have hostile or friendly relationships with others.¹⁴⁰

In a sense, interests establish a base for explaining behaviours, as actions equal desire plus belief. In this equation, interest equals desires. In the same way, identities establish a base for explaining interests since an actor, without knowing who it is, cannot know what it wants.¹⁴¹

¹³⁷ Wendt, 227–28.

¹³⁸ Wendt, 231.

¹³⁹ Wendt, 95–96.

¹⁴⁰ Hurd, 'Constructivism', 302–3; Reus-Smit, 'Constructivism', 199.

¹⁴¹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 231.

Moreover, actors realize an identification process, which results in corporate and social identities. Those identities constitute the base of interests.¹⁴² In other words, as a product of the identity formation process, interest formation occurs. Without ideas concerning others, interests do not exist.¹⁴³ In both formation processes, the most influential thing is the actors' *communication processes* with others and their social structures.¹⁴⁴ In this sense, it can be argued that states' interests are affected not only by material constraints but also by collective identities and beliefs. Indeed, the identification process is partly a result of the systemic culture, namely the type of anarchy.¹⁴⁵ That is, what states interest is dependent on what type of anarchy exists and, in this direction, how states identify themselves and others.¹⁴⁶

The sixth point of the narrative is actors' behaviours. About actors' conduct, there are two main logics: the *logic of consequences*, that there are many options in front of actors and actors prefer the one with most profit, and the *logic of appropriateness*, that actors should comply with certain norms and identities, and they are not directed by results of actions. In this sense, Constructivism mostly assumes to actors the latter one, though it accepts the choice is partly dependent on material constraints.¹⁴⁷ Accordingly, the behaviours of states cannot be understood with pre-given national interests. Rather, those are understood with states' identities.¹⁴⁸ Also, in understanding states' conduct, according to Constructivists, international institutions,

¹⁴² Griffiths, Callaghan, and Roach, *International Relations: The Key Concepts*, 51–52.

¹⁴³ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 139.

¹⁴⁴ Hurd, 'Constructivism', 303; Wendt, 'Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', 397.

¹⁴⁵ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 125.

¹⁴⁶ Beach, *Analyzing Foreign Policy*, 57–58.

¹⁴⁷ Flochart, 'Constructivism and Foreign Policy', 87.

¹⁴⁸ Griffiths, Callaghan, and Roach, *International Relations: The Key Concepts*, 51; Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 233.

norms, and non-materials entities play a considerable role.¹⁴⁹ Accordingly, those institutions include regulative and constitutive functions. While regulative functions shape fundamental rules for states' conduct, constitutive functions provide behaviours with a meaning.¹⁵⁰

In Constructivism, the question of *who I am* determines *what I want to do*. That is, the identity of actors determines their interests. But how their identities are shaped? Briefly, *normative*, and *ideological structures* determine actors' identities. In this direction, it can be summarized as; produced by actors' interactions, social structures determine actors' identities; actors' identities determine actors' interests, and ultimately actors' interests determine their behaviour in global politics.¹⁵¹

However, the question of how normative social structures shape actors' identities and interests, and ultimately actors' conduct is still vague. In this point, Constructivism proposed three means, namely *imagination*, *communication*, and *constraint*. Firstly, the imagination refers to what actors think about the extent of their conduct. Accordingly, before interaction, actors consider their obligations, limitations, and strategies in accordance with ideational structures. In this direction, they imagine *the realm of possibility* for their conduct. In this sense, social structures shape actors' identities and interests by affecting the images in their minds over *the possible* and *the necessary*. Secondly, the communication refers to actors' interactions with other actors to justify their conduct. Accordingly, states create legitimate reasons for their conduct from established ideational structures to lend credence. Finally, Constructivism argues that since ideational structures establish normative references of a certain social

¹⁴⁹ Flochart, 'Constructivism and Foreign Policy', 82.

¹⁵⁰ Martin Griffiths, Steven C. Roach, and M. Scott Solomon, *Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations*, 2nd ed. (Routledge Taylor Francis Group, 2009), 123; Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security', 38–39.

¹⁵¹ Andrew Bradley Phillips, 'Constructivism', in *International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century: An Introduction*, ed. Martin Griffiths (Routledge Taylor Francis Group, 2007), 60–63.

context for rationalization, and those determine what is true or wrong in ethical and practical terms, actors have to be constrained by the social structures.¹⁵²

As a type of actors' behaviour, foreign policy is the final step of our Constructivist narrative. Foreign policy, as a field of preference in which states think, decide, and perform, at first glance, seems directly relevant to Constructivism since the main assumption of Constructivism that actors make their worlds is found at the centre of foreign policy analysis.¹⁵³ However, in Wendtian Constructivism, domestic factors have no contribution to actors' foreign policies as actors' identities and interests are shaped by their interaction with others, not by domestic forces.¹⁵⁴ Since policies are accepted as products of interplays between *exogenously given* or *pre-given* actors, namely states, Wendt's Constructivism have little to offer in foreign policy. In the foreign policy process, actors are not leaders or interest groups or political parties, but rather states and in this process, the internal forces are not important.¹⁵⁵ On the other hand, according to Steve Smith, the version of Constructivism built up by Onuf sets a place for such domestic forces in foreign policy analysis: Smith argues a sort of commonality between foreign policy analysis and Onuf's Constructivism that refers to the investigation of the interplay between rules, institutions, structures, and agents. But its explanation in this point is not enough to illustrate how Onuf's Constructivism set a more place for foreign policy analysis.¹⁵⁶ Like the argument of Smith about Onuf's Constructivism, Flochart illustrates Constructivism as a useful conceptual instrument in understanding the foreign policy process.¹⁵⁷ Accordingly, Constructivism provides

¹⁵² Reus-Smit, 'Constructivism', 198–99; Flochart, 'Constructivism and Foreign Policy', 85–86.

¹⁵³ Steve Smith, 'Foreign Policy What States Make of It: Social Construction and International Relations Theory', in *Foreign Policy in a Constructed World*, ed. Vendulka Kubalkova (Routledge Taylor Francis Group, 2015), 38.

¹⁵⁴ Smith, 50.

¹⁵⁵ Smith, 50–51.

¹⁵⁶ Smith, 52–53.

¹⁵⁷ Flochart, 'Constructivism and Foreign Policy', 79–81.

a better and brand-new understanding of the base on which foreign policy occur.¹⁵⁸ Despite these intellectual differences under Constructivist IR literature, as mentioned earlier, actors identities and social relations mainly affect their behaviours. For this reason, it is quite logical to propose that like a certain type of actor's behaviour, the foreign policy of actors is mainly the result of actors' identity and social relations with others.

In sum, this sub-chapter sought to explain the main points of Constructivist IR theory in order to prepare a theoretical framework for the case study. To do so, firstly, the Constructivist argument related to social reality was illustrated: There is no objective reality, but rather the reality is constructed. In this regard, the intersubjective beliefs which refer to shared understandings among a set of individuals provide the physical entities of reality with meanings. Then, the following argument was demonstrated that the social reality is constructed as a result of interactions between agents and structure. From this point of view, thirdly, the Constructivist stance towards the international system was explained. In this sense, the international system, as a part of social reality, is not an objective phenomenon out there but rather is a product of the context of normative meaning. Hence, examining material elements is not enough to explain events in the international system, and so, social relations and ideational elements should be taken into consideration. Fourthly, accepted as actors' intentional characteristics producing behavioural and motivational tendencies, the concept of identity was examined from the Constructivist stance. In this direction, Constructivism argues identities are the basis of interests and behaviours. Having considered the results of corporate, social, and role identities, it is fair to propose that actors/states should behave in accordance with their identity. Otherwise, actors/states would damage their agency. Then, this sub-chapter illustrated the Constructivist stance towards actors' interests. In this direction, accepted as dependent on actors' social relationships with other actors and their social structures, actors' interests are mainly the result of actors' identities since Constructivism argues actors who do not know who they are cannot know what they want. At the sixth finding, this sub-chapter

¹⁵⁸ Flochart, 82–83.

demonstrated the Constructivist stance towards actors' conduct. In this regard, accepted actors as behaving with the logic of appropriateness, Constructivism argues actors should behave in harmony with their identity. Hence, the following argument was proposed that actors/states' behaviours can be understood through examining their identities. After having reached the abovementioned findings, this sub-chapter fundamentally proposes that since the position actors are found determines what actors see, actors/states foreign policy can be explained as a result of their identities and social relations.

The next sub-chapter is going to be about OST which is another component of our theoretical framework.

3.2. Ontological Security Theory

This sub-chapter seeks to explain the cornerstones of OST in a way preparing a theoretical framework for the case study. Starting with what the OST is, the sub-chapter secondly explains the origin of the ontological security. Then, it presents the constitutive components of the concept of ontological security and their relations among themselves. Before presenting what, the ontological security perspective contributes to security studies, the sub-chapter explains what actors should do to ensure their ontological security. Finally, it explains what sort of actions that ontological security perspective obliges or offer states to do. In the end, it is expected to reach an argument about the impact of identity on state behaviour.

Firstly, *ontological security refers to the need to experience oneself as a whole or as a continuous person in time in order to realize a sense of agency.*¹⁵⁹ Hence, it is

¹⁵⁹ Jennifer Mitzen, 'Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma', *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 3 (2006): 342, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066106067346>; Ronald David Laing, *The Divided Self An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness* (Penguin Books, 1990); Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Later Modern Age* (Polity Press, 1991).

logical to point out that ontological security deals with the security of identity.¹⁶⁰ That is, ensuring the ontological security means ensuring a stable or continuous subjective answer to the question of who actors are. In this logic, ontological security is accepted as a concept that pulls attention to *security as being* as well as *security as survival*.¹⁶¹

Emphasizing subjectivity as well as physicality, ontological security highlights a need that refers to the sense of biographical continuity. This biographical continuity creates a sort of meaning for actors' actions. The continuity of these biographical narratives enables actors to protect their existence from a sort of existential threat and anxiety which might damage their integrity.¹⁶² That is to say, according to Mitzen and Giddens, having a continuous identity that provides actors with a sense of well-being by preventing existential anxieties is a fundamental need for actors to act and make choices.¹⁶³

In this direction, OST is a sort of attempt focusing on the relation between identity and security of states. It mainly argues that states seek to ensure their

¹⁶⁰ Jennifer Mitzen, 'Anchoring Europe's Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities and Ontological Security', *Journal of European Public Policy* 13, no. 2 (2006): 272, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760500451709>.

¹⁶¹ Jennifer Mitzen and Kyle Larson, 'Ontological Security and Foreign Policy', in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, 2017, 2–3, <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.458>; Helin Sarı Ertem and Aslı Nur Düzgün, 'Ontological Security Theory in the Discipline of International Relations: A Concept- and Literature-Based Review', *Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi* 12, no. 37 (2021): 42, <https://doi.org/10.17752/guvenlikstrj.905751>.

¹⁶² Catarina Kinnvall and Jennifer Mitzen, 'An Introduction to the Special Issue: Ontological Securities in World Politics', *Cooperation and Conflict* 52, no. 1 (2017): 4–5, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836716653162>; J. Brent Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations Self-Identity and the IR State* (Routledge Taylor Francis Group, 2008), 6; Sarı Ertem and Düzgün, 'Ontological Security Theory in the Discipline of International Relations: A Concept- and Literature-Based Review', 55.

¹⁶³ Mitzen, 'Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma', 272; Catarina Kinnvall, *Globalization and Religious Nationalism in India* (Routledge, 2006), 29; Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Later Modern Age*.

ontological security as well as their physical security. In this regard, the concept referring to actors' self-understanding over who they are is illustrated as a normative ground motivating them in their actions and choices.¹⁶⁴

The logic behind the ontological security is as follows: identities are not stable and given entities found in actors' consciousness or mind as an essence but rather they are changing and constructed social positions.¹⁶⁵ Further, they are felt, represented, and sustained via rituals, practices, and relations with other actors. However, reaching a stable self-identity is not easy due to the fragile features of human life involving uncertainties. During life, on the one hand, we are wrapped by a sort of existential anxiety stemming from our mortality. On the other hand, some conditions or events create some other anxieties. Continuously feeling this situation creates ontological insecurity. We should get rid of this feeling. To do so, we need a sort of self-narrative involving our past, today, and future. This provides us with a stable sense of identity. This stable sense of identity ensures our ontological security, and this ontologically secure position enables actors to realize an agency in history. From this point of view, OST argues that in order to have an agency in history and to get rid of the insecurity, states need a stable identity.¹⁶⁶

Secondly, to clarify in detail, the origin of ontological security should be mentioned here. Basically, actors' need to feel their identities are secure¹⁶⁷ or actors' unavoidable existential anxiety about the stable sense of self is found in the origin of the OST. In this sense, in order to realize an agency in history, social actors need to

¹⁶⁴ Mitzen and Larson, 'Ontological Security and Foreign Policy', 2–3; Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations Self-Identity and the IR State*, 8; Mitzen, 'Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma', 344–53.

¹⁶⁵ Jenkins, *Social Identity*, 17–19.

¹⁶⁶ Mitzen and Larson, 'Ontological Security and Foreign Policy', 3; Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations Self-Identity and the IR State*, 3.

¹⁶⁷ Sarı Ertem and Düzgün, 'Ontological Security Theory in the Discipline of International Relations: A Concept- and Literature-Based Review', 42.

ensure a stable identity.¹⁶⁸ Here, it is quite logical to accept the argument about the actor's need as an undoubted assumption, because the absence of assurance about security creates an environment filled with anxiety and fear in individuals' life. This sort of environment enables individuals to realize their agency in a quite limited way: Like war or conflict periods, this sort of environment provides a life in which individuals cannot allocate time to activities that increase their life standards such as art, philosophy, or entertainment but rather it provides a life in which individuals just seek to ensure their survival. It means a quite limited agency. Hence, the argument actors need to feel their self-identity secure is an undoubted assumption.

Accordingly, in the infancy period, individuals developed this sort of stability of self and environment as a result of its routinized care. This creates *emotional inoculation*, which refers to a secure field for individuals. In adulthood, this need continues. Individuals form a self-narrative and routines. This creates a secure field that provides a perspective to life, human, and others and that makes it possible to live without existential anxieties caused by uncertainties. This need is stemmed from another need of individuals to experience their agency in a continuous way. In this point, this sort of self-narrative which binds individuals' past, today, and future into a narrative enables individuals to experience themselves with the same personality. Hence, the concept of ontological security refers to a sort of confidence about the continuity of individuals' self-narratives and social/physical environment. This sort of confidence enables individuals to realize themselves as an agent and to behave in a secure social environment.¹⁶⁹ In this direction, it is possible to say that existential anxieties which are caused by a life filled with uncertainties and discontinuities create the problem of ontological insecurity. To ensure an ontologically secure field

¹⁶⁸ Kinnvall and Mitzen, 'An Introduction to the Special Issue: Ontological Securities in World Politics', 4.

¹⁶⁹ Bahar Rumelili and Umut Can Adisönmez, 'A New Paradigm on the Identity-Security Nexus in International Relations: Ontological Security Theory', *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 17, no. 66 (2020): 25, <https://doi.org/10.33458/uidergisi.720630>; Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Later Modern Age*, 38–39.

individuals should ensure trust to continuity or stability of the social and physical environment.¹⁷⁰

Another explanation for the origin of ontological security comes from Mitzen.¹⁷¹ One of the main requirements of individuals is to realize a sense of agency. The agency is accepted as a sort of ability to make a selection and to pursue certain goals. *An agency requires a stable cognitive environment* or stable identity. In order to realize a sense of agency, individuals should establish secure identities or should feel secure in who they are, which provides them with a stable cognitive environment. In order to create secure identities, individuals should not have uncertainties about their *ends*, accepted as constitutive elements of their identity. If they have uncertainties about ends or about what to expect, they cannot give meaning to their ends and cannot decide how to act. So, individuals should establish a secure field. The main threat during this process is uncertainty: uncertainty about individuals' behavioural and cognitive environment. There should be a certainty about *what to expect*. At least, these uncertainties should be kept to tolerable limits in order for actors to realize themselves.¹⁷²

The relation between identity and uncertainty is crucial to develop a better understanding of ontological security: It is tough to act in uncertainty, however; actions are crucial elements of actors' identity. Hence, uncertainties damage somehow actors' identities and prevent them to pursue a continuous identity. Also, uncertainties create novel events, that actors cannot know what is happening and what might possibly happen and that actors cannot create a correlation between causes and

¹⁷⁰ Sarı Ertem and Düzgün, 'Ontological Security Theory in the Discipline of International Relations: A Concept- and Literature-Based Review', 47.

¹⁷¹ Mitzen, 'Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma'.

¹⁷² Mitzen, 342–46; Mitzen, 'Anchoring Europe's Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities and Ontological Security', 271–72.

outcomes. And so, uncertainties prevent them to behave rationally.¹⁷³ As a result of uncertainties, actors lose their ability to realize themselves as an agent and to act rationally. Thus, they should overcome this sort of uncertainty.

Thirdly, in this direction, identity, self, agency, anxiety, and uncertainty seem like elements related to the notion of ontological security. But what are the constitutive components of the concept of ontological security or how can we organize the components of the concept of ontological security? Here, this research offers a sort of organization based on existent literature: it is logical to illustrate “threats”, “methods”, and “outcomes” as the categories of the elements. In this sense, “threats” refer to *uncertainty, anxiety, chaos, and inconstancy*, which are social phenomena threatening actors’ social existence and “methods” refer to *routines, biographical narratives, daily behavioural patterns*, and *social relations*, which enable actors to reach a specific end, while “outcomes” refer to *insecurity* and *security*, which are social positions that individuals might have as a result of their choices and actions.

Well, what sort of relationship do these components have? The anxiety is a stable component of human existence that individuals cannot completely get rid of. This anxiety, in a way different from the fear, is stemmed from nothingness. That is, individuals are anxious because of things that do not exist and of uncertainties about actors’ social relations and environment.¹⁷⁴ When actors have insufficient information about their social and physical world and they cannot create meaning about them, they confront a sort of uncertainty. This uncertainty brings about a sort of anxiety. This anxiety as well as the uncertainty creates an identity threat. In this case, it is tough for actors to be, to act, and to sustain an identity conception.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷³ Mitzen, ‘Anchoring Europe’s Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities and Ontological Security’, 271–73.

¹⁷⁴ Sarı Ertem and Düzgün, ‘Ontological Security Theory in the Discipline of International Relations: A Concept- and Literature-Based Review’, 51–53.

¹⁷⁵ Mitzen, ‘Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma’, 342–49; Mitzen, ‘Anchoring Europe’s Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities and Ontological Security’, 273.

Though actors' routines, biographical narratives, behavioural patterns, and social relations are ways to overcome this threat, in some cases, various conditions or events might damage to or bring about questions about the stability or continuity of actors' self-narratives and routines. That is, these conditions damage actors' secure field. Therefore, previously suppressed ontological anxiety, uncertainty and inconsistency start to emerge. This sort of emergence causes an anxious life and does not enable individuals to live confidently. In this situation, actors lose their confidence in the stability of their identity and their identity is challenged. This is what is called ontological insecurity.¹⁷⁶

In the same logic, it is propounded that the term chaos refers to insecurity. The situation of chaos refers to a sort of situation of actors in which their existence is fraught with existential anxieties. In this point, the method is offered to solve the problem: actors can overcome this chaos thanks to routinized social relations and behavioural patterns which provides a sort of stable sense of identity or consistent biographical narratives. If actors can successfully control this anxiety creating uncertainty, actors feel ontologically secure and realize an agency. Otherwise, the situation might turn into an identity crisis that actors have a doubt about their agency.¹⁷⁷

Fourthly, though a brief explanation was given, it should be illustrated here what should actors do to ensure their ontological security? Accordingly, it is obvious that ontological security is an existential need for social actors. Ensuring it means ensuring a stable identity or biographical continuity by keeping uncertainties in the social life at the tolerable level and by ensuring a sort of cognitive control on their

¹⁷⁶ Rumelili and Adisönmez, 'A New Paradigm on the Identity-Security Nexus in International Relations: Ontological Security Theory', 25; Kinnvall and Mitzen, 'An Introduction to the Special Issue: Ontological Securities in World Politics', 4; Sarı Ertem and Düzgün, 'Ontological Security Theory in the Discipline of International Relations: A Concept- and Literature-Based Review', 51; Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations Self-Identity and the IR State*, 51.

¹⁷⁷ Sarı Ertem and Düzgün, 'Ontological Security Theory in the Discipline of International Relations: A Concept- and Literature-Based Review', 51–53.

social environment.¹⁷⁸ In the point of ensuring ontological security, understanding the relationship between routines and identity is crucial: Across the existential anxieties and uncertainties, individuals develop routinized relations and stable behavioural patterns since they provide a continuous sense of identity and a sort of cognitive security. Hence, it is fair to say that individuals are attached to routines in order to meet their existential needs above mentioned.¹⁷⁹ In other words, as actors' relations with significant others are routinized, actors strengthen, stabilize, and sustain their identity. And so, *routinized relations with significant others* enable actors to know and solidify *who they are* and to act rationally.¹⁸⁰ In this sense, *routinization* is accepted as a strategy to anchor actors' identity and ultimately to realize their agency.

The logic behind the argument above mentioned is that: in a time, social actors encounter many events and conditions that produce various stimuli. However, they cannot consider possible alternatives and respond to all of them consciously and rationally, which means actors cannot easily know what to do. At this point, routines come into play. Here, routines mean *relatively automatic responses to those stimuli*. They improve actors' cognitive capacity to respond. Actors' physical and social environment, which results in uncertainties threatening actors' identity, is got under actors' cognitive control via attachment to routines. That is, routines protect actors from a sort of chaotic situation and enable them to pursue a continuous sense of identity.¹⁸¹ As Anthony Giddens argue, actors establish a sort of *basic trust system* via

¹⁷⁸ Mitzen, 'Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma', 346; Kinnvall and Mitzen, 'An Introduction to the Special Issue: Ontological Securities in World Politics', 4; Mitzen and Larson, 'Ontological Security and Foreign Policy', 3.

¹⁷⁹ Sarı Ertem and Düzgün, 'Ontological Security Theory in the Discipline of International Relations: A Concept- and Literature-Based Review', 42–45.

¹⁸⁰ Mitzen, 'Anchoring Europe's Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities and Ontological Security', 271–72; Mitzen, 'Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma', 347.

¹⁸¹ Mitzen, 'Anchoring Europe's Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities and Ontological Security', 273; Mitzen, 'Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma', 349.

their routines. This basic trust system is illustrated as a kind of *protective cocoon* that takes into consideration possible threatening conditions across actors' psychological integrity and that includes automatic responses. In this point, routines play a sort of cognitive and ultimately behavioural function: they enable social actors to autonomously perceive their social environment, purposively choose, and rationally act.¹⁸²

Fundamentally, biographical narratives, daily behavioural patterns, and social relations are in a position that ensures ontological security. Continuity and stability in these three phenomena procure actors a sort of sense of confidence by providing an opportunity for actors to previously know and predict. Hence, a sense of control, obtained by actors who know what happens and predict what will possibly happen, protects actors from existential anxieties and uncertainties.¹⁸³ Through this way, actors can catch a coherent and unitary identity, which make it possible to feel they realize a stable agency.¹⁸⁴ Otherwise, when routinized social relations are not sustained and these self-narratives are somehow damaged, a problem in the point of answering the question of who actors are emerges. In this situation, ontological insecurity is realized.¹⁸⁵ In this point, the concept, *shame*, is used to refer to this insecure situation. Accordingly, when actors behave in an incongruent way with their identity, *the sense of transgression* or *the feeling of insecurity* they feel refers to the concept of shame. As Steele emphasizes, shame refers to a *radical disconnect* between actors' identities and actions.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸² Mitzen, 'Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma', 346–47; Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Later Modern Age*, 38–42.

¹⁸³ Sarı Ertem and Düzgün, 'Ontological Security Theory in the Discipline of International Relations: A Concept- and Literature-Based Review', 48–50.

¹⁸⁴ Mitzen, 'Anchoring Europe's Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities and Ontological Security', 273–74.

¹⁸⁵ Mitzen and Larson, 'Ontological Security and Foreign Policy', 3–4.

¹⁸⁶ Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations Self-Identity and the IR State*, 13, 52–54.

Fifthly, well, given the extent of the concept, it should be presented that what sort of contribution does the ontological security provide to IR literature? In this point, scholars applying the concept of ontological security to IR literature argue that as well as physical security, states, like individuals, seek ontological security, which means that they seek to ensure a continuous and stable identity.¹⁸⁷ The key notion here is to humanize states.¹⁸⁸ That is, those scholars consider states like persons. Hence, they argue that states establish routinized relations with others and produce biographical narratives related to their identity in order to catch a relatively stable social environment.¹⁸⁹ Through this formulation, OST obtains a sort of power in explaining irrational or confounding state behaviours which cannot be explained by conventional security studies.¹⁹⁰

Also, OST somehow extends the cover of security studies. That is, in conventional security studies, illustrated as a foremost factor in order to ensure actors' integrity, the concept of security refers to the material or physical security. It mostly points out actors' military power, territorial and institutional integrity, and being of its folk. On the contrary, OST focuses on securing the sense of identity. That is, the OST changed the focus of security studies.¹⁹¹ In this point, it is fair to propose that the referent object of conventional security studies, physical or power-related elements, is widened by theoreticians of ontological security by putting nonphysical elements, like

¹⁸⁷ Rumelili and Adisönmez, 'A New Paradigm on the Identity-Security Nexus in International Relations: Ontological Security Theory', 24; Mitzen, 'Anchoring Europe's Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities and Ontological Security', 271–72.

¹⁸⁸ Alexander Wendt, 'The State as Person in International Theory', *Review of International Studies* 30, no. 2 (2004): 289–316, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210504006084>.

¹⁸⁹ Sarı Ertem and Düzgün, 'Ontological Security Theory in the Discipline of International Relations: A Concept- and Literature-Based Review', 44–48.

¹⁹⁰ Sarı Ertem and Düzgün, 75; Mitzen and Larson, 'Ontological Security and Foreign Policy', 6–9.

¹⁹¹ Mitzen and Larson, 'Ontological Security and Foreign Policy', 5.

the stability of or integrity of identity, on the analysis. Thereby, they provide us with a broader ground explaining states' behaviours.

Finally, as well as explaining states' behaviours in a broader ground, OST points out a sort of normative ground for states' behaviours. Since, as previously mentioned, actors suffer a sort of transgression or disconnect, when they behave in an incongruent way with their identity. In this circumstance, how do actors should behave in order to not suffer this transgression or disconnect? In other words, what sort of behaviours does the concept of ontological security perspective offer or oblige actors to do?

To answer these questions, the following question should be answered: From the ontological security perspective, what is the main purpose of states? It has an exact answer: states seek to ensure their ontological security as well as their physical security.¹⁹² It means that states should procure ontological integrity that refers to a continuous and stable agency. That is, states seek to ensure a stable and continuous sense of agency with existential anxieties and uncertainties kept at the tolerable level.¹⁹³ In other words, the main concern is states' capacity to realize an integrated agency. To do so, the sense of continuity or stability is the main component. For the sense of continuity, states' actions should sustain their identity. There are two possibilities: states' actions either reproduce their identity or contradict their identity. In this point, for our purpose, identity should be supported in practice since the support in practice provides stability in identity. Ultimately, stability in identity contributes to a sense of integrated agency.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹² Mitzen, 'Anchoring Europe's Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities and Ontological Security', 271–72; Mitzen, 'Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma', 344–53; Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations Self-Identity and the IR State*, 8; Mitzen and Larson, 'Ontological Security and Foreign Policy', 2–3.

¹⁹³ Mitzen, 'Anchoring Europe's Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities and Ontological Security', 271–72; Mitzen, 'Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma', 342–46.

¹⁹⁴ Mitzen, 'Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma', 344.

Well, how do states mainly seeking to procure their ontological security behave in order to realize their main purpose? In this point, states should ensure establishing routines in their actions and relations since these routines provide cognitive/behavioural certainty and protect their identity that is mainly required for a continuous and stable agency.¹⁹⁵

Although moral, humanitarian and honour-driven motives are illustrated as certain grounds for state actions by many, in the face of realist cases, states might fall apart this sort of motives. However, they feel a sort of concern or anxiety when they ignore these motives. This is exactly what OST seeks to point out. This anxiety emerges when states encounter a sort of disharmony or unconformity between their identity and actions. Though some actions, in a realist perspective, seem unrealistic or irrational, states should realize those actions in order to meet their identity-related needs. Accepted as important as much as physical security of states, if these needs are not met with realizing these nonstrategic actions, states feel as if their identity and agency are damaged.¹⁹⁶

In this regard, states, on the one hand, should realize a sort of harmony or conformity between their identity and actions in a way their actions support and reestablish their identity. Otherwise, as Steel emphasizes, *shame* is realized. If actors do not catch the harmony between identity and actions and they prefer to sacrifice ontological security instead of physical security, states suffer from the shame. To get rid of this position, states should take attention to the obligatory actions stemmed from states' identity.¹⁹⁷ As well as avoiding shame, states, on the other hand, use their identity to create a logical meaning and justifiable ground for their actions. As Steele

¹⁹⁵ Mitzen, 342; Sarı Ertem and Düzgün, 'Ontological Security Theory in the Discipline of International Relations: A Concept- and Literature-Based Review', 49–51; Rumelili and Adisönmez, 'A New Paradigm on the Identity-Security Nexus in International Relations: Ontological Security Theory', 25; Kinnvall and Mitzen, 'An Introduction to the Special Issue: Ontological Securities in World Politics', 6.

¹⁹⁶ Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations Self-Identity and the IR State*, 2.

¹⁹⁷ Steele, 3.

emphasizes, *state agents must explain, justify, and “argue” what a policy would mean about their sense of self-identity.*¹⁹⁸ In this sense, it is fair to propose that identity is exactly accepted as a normative ground for states’ action and as a perspective from which states/actors look to the social world.

Shortly, this sub-chapter sought to demonstrate the cornerstones of OST in a way preparing a theoretical ground for the case study. To do so, it firstly demonstrated that the concept of ontological security means for actors to protect their answers to the question of who they are, and that OST is an attempt focusing on the relation between identity and security of states. Then, it presented the following argument as the origin of the ontological security concept: Actors need to feel secure in who they are in order to realize an agency in history. Thirdly, by categorizing the components of ontological security concept, such as uncertainties, anxieties, routines, biographical narratives, it illustrated the relations among them. In other words, it demonstrates: i) how do uncertainties, anxieties, chaos, and inconsistency produce a sort of existential threat to actors, ii) how can actors use routines, biographical narratives, daily behavioural patterns, and social relations as methods to overcome these threats, and ultimately iii) what sort of social results can actor reach. Then, the following argument was presented that actors should create routinized relations with significant others in order to strengthen, stabilize, and sustain their identity. In this regard, this chapter presented that OST extended the cover of conventional security studies and produced explanations for confounding state actions. Finally, by presenting the argument that states seek to ensure their ontological security as well as their physical security, it was reached that states should behave in harmony with their identity.

In conclusion, this theoretical framework chapter sought to explain to what extent an actor’s identity shapes its behaviours. For this reason, firstly, the cornerstones of Constructivist IR theory were examined. In this direction, the Constructivist stance towards social reality, international system, and identity, interest, and behaviour of actors were presented. From this point of view, the argument was proposed that since the position that actors are found determines what actors see,

¹⁹⁸ Steele, 11.

actors' behaviours can be explained as a result of their identities and social relations. Secondly, the main points of the OST were demonstrated. Accordingly, its definition, origin, components, and impacts on actors' behaviour were presented. In this direction, it was argued that states should behave in harmony with their identity. Given these findings from these two theories, it is quite fair to claim that an actor's identity can be accepted as a significant explanatory element for an actor's behaviours. The next chapter is going to interpret our case study by using this theoretical framework.

4. THEORISING THE MACEDONIAN NAME DISPUTE

Throughout the name dispute, we see a sort of communication process including actions of Skopje and reactions of Athens. In this sense, this chapter applies the abovementioned conceptual ground and theoretical framework to the historical events. To do so, firstly, what does Greek Macedonian identity mean will be illustrated by employing the conceptual ground chapter. Then, the impact of the Greek understanding of Macedonian identity and collective/biographical narratives produced by Greeks on their existential concerns and their agency will be explained. Thirdly, the question of how do Slav Macedonians' actions relate to these elements will be answered. In other words, what sort of anxieties or what sort of behavioural tendency for Greece do Slav Macedonians' actions produce will be demonstrated. In this direction, in the end, it is expected to answer the main research question, namely to what extent do Greek Macedonian identity have the power to explain the Greek foreign actions realized in the name dispute?

This research mainly proposes the following argument as a scientific explanation for the related historical events: “throughout the Macedonian name dispute, the Greek actions were shaped by the Greek security concerns including ontological and physical security and fundamentally ontological security is the primary source for the concerns”.

Here, ontological security refers to protecting the content of Greek Macedonian identity or the answer to the question of who Greek Macedonians are¹⁹⁹, while physical security refers to protecting Greek territorial integrity and sovereignty.²⁰⁰ OST points

¹⁹⁹ Kofos, ‘The Controversy over the Terms “Macedonians” and “Macedonian” : A Probable Exit Scenario’, 129–32; Kofos, ‘Greek Policy Considerations over FYROM Independence and Recognition’, 235; Mitzen and Larson, ‘Ontological Security and Foreign Policy’, 2–3; Sarı Ertem and Düzgün, ‘Ontological Security Theory in the Discipline of International Relations: A Concept- and Literature-Based Review’, 42.

²⁰⁰ Kofos, ‘Greek Policy Considerations over FYROM Independence and Recognition’, 235–38; Nimetz, ‘The Macedonian Name Dispute: The Macedonian Question-Resolved?’, 207; Tziampiris, ‘The Macedonian Name Dispute and European Union Accession’, 153.

out this fact by proposing that states seek to ensure their ontological security as well as their physical security.²⁰¹ Throughout the process, these security concerns were the main interest of Athens, and they were mainly stemmed from the Greek Macedonian identity and the Greek perception of the historical-social relations between Athens and Skopje.²⁰²

Before examining how this sort of behavioural tendency was produced from the Greek Macedonian identity, and how it affects Greek reactions, here, what the Greek Macedonian identity mean for Greece should be presented:

The Greek Macedonian identity more or less corresponds to whole identity types provided in the conceptual ground chapter: That is, since it is Greek Macedonians' answer to the question of who I am, it can be accepted as a personal identity;²⁰³ since it refers to set of common understanding, beliefs and values shared by Greek Macedonians, it can be accepted as a group identity;²⁰⁴ since it refers to Greece's self-understanding, it can be accepted as corporate and state identity;²⁰⁵ since it finds its roots in common culture, language, and history shared by Greek Macedonians, it can be accepted as an ethnic identity.²⁰⁶ Hence, boundaries between

²⁰¹ Mitzen and Larson, 'Ontological Security and Foreign Policy', 2–3; Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations Self-Identity and the IR State*, 8; Mitzen, 'Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma', 344–53; Mitzen, 'Anchoring Europe's Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities and Ontological Security', 271–72.

²⁰² Wendt, 'Constructing International Politics', 73; Demirtaş, 'Constructivism', 172–73; Flochart, 'Constructivism and Foreign Policy', 87; Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security', 38; Kofos, 'Greek Policy Considerations over FYROM Independence and Recognition', 235; Koukoudakis, 'The Macedonian Question : An Identity-Based Conflict', 6.

²⁰³ McKendree, 'Personal Identity Versus Self-Identity', 545.

²⁰⁴ Jenkins, 'Society and Social Identity', 766–67; Frey and Konieczka, 'Group Identity', 316–17.

²⁰⁵ Ihlen, 'Corporate Identity', 140–41; Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 224–25; Brown, 'State Identity', 782–84.

²⁰⁶ Jones, 'Ethnicity', 58–59.

these sorts of identities are not certain. That is, an identity can correspond to multi types of identity. However, here, the important issue is not to decide which type of identity Greek Macedonian identity corresponds. Rather, the matter is to decide the content of Greek Macedonian identity and to see what the behavioural concomitant of the content is.

Whatever sort of identity the Greek Macedonian identity corresponds, it more or less illustrates who Greek Macedonians are²⁰⁷ by presenting their social position and self-hood, distinguishes Greek Macedonians from other social categories by using symbols reflecting their distinct and essential features,²⁰⁸ and creates a fundamental baseline for their social actions.²⁰⁹ In other words, the Greek Macedonian identity is a part, most probably one of the most paramount parts, of Greek Macedonians' agency. In this sense, the Greek Macedonian identity which illustrates who Greek Macedonians are becomes the referent object of ontological security of Greek Macedonians and ultimately Greek state.²¹⁰ In the same direction, Constructivism argues that it refers to Greek Macedonians intentional characteristics telling who they are and producing

²⁰⁷ Wendt, 'Identity and Structural Change in International Politics', 51–53; Ihlen, 'Corporate Identity', 140–41.

²⁰⁸ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 224–25; Jenkins, 'Society and Social Identity', 766–67.

²⁰⁹ 'Identity'; Lawler, *Identity Sociological Perspectives*, 7–10; Jenkins, *Social Identity*, 6–23; Woodward, 'Questions of Identity', 6–7; Woodward, *Understanding Identity*, 1–2; Fearon, 'What Is Identity (as We Now Use the Word) ?', 2–36; Brubaker and Cooper, 'Beyond "Identity"', 1–8.

²¹⁰ Kofos, 'The Controversy over the Terms "Macedonians" and "Macedonian" : A Probable Exit Scenario', 129–32; Kofos, 'Greek Policy Considerations over FYROM Independence and Recognition', 235; Mitzen and Larson, 'Ontological Security and Foreign Policy', 2–3; Sarı Ertem and Düzgün, 'Ontological Security Theory in the Discipline of International Relations: A Concept- and Literature-Based Review', 42.

what they have to do, and it creates a motivational tendency or basis for their actions.²¹¹ Also, the Greek Macedonian identity is the source in which a stable and continuous biographical narrative for the Greek Macedonians is produced.²¹²

Well, what sort of narrative do Greek Macedonian identity produce? In other words, how does Greek Macedonian identity bind these people's past, today, and future into a narrative? According to Greek Macedonian identity, the descendant of ancient Macedonians are only Greeks, not Slavs and ancient Macedonia is a part of Hellenic cultural heritage, not Slavic one.²¹³ Also, the term Macedonians/Makedhones refers regionally and culturally to ethnic Greeks living in Greek Macedonia.²¹⁴ Here, it is seen that when Greeks identify themselves, they simultaneously identify Slav Macedonians. In other words, once Greeks claim ancient Macedonian heritage is Hellenic, they allege there is no cultural affinity between ancient Macedonians and

²¹¹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 224,230; Flochart, 'Constructivism and Foreign Policy', 87; Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security', 41.

²¹² Kinnvall and Mitzen, 'An Introduction to the Special Issue: Ontological Securities in World Politics', 4–5; Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations Self-Identity and the IR State*, 6; Sarı Ertem and Düzgün, 'Ontological Security Theory in the Discipline of International Relations: A Concept- and Literature-Based Review', 55.

²¹³ 'Macedonia's Name: Breaking the Deadlock', 3; Kofos, 'Greek Policy Considerations over FYROM Independence and Recognition', 235.

²¹⁴ Kofos, 'The Controversy over the Terms "Macedonians" and "Macedonian": A Probable Exit Scenario', 129–32.

Slavs.²¹⁵ This exactly refers to what Ontological Security literature calls biographical narrative²¹⁶ and what Constructivist IR theory calls collective narrative.²¹⁷

In this sense, by producing a biographical or collective narrative, the Greek Macedonian identity gives a personality or an agency to Greek Macedonians and distinguishes them from Slavs or other nations, cultures, or social entities. Thus, protecting the content of Greek Macedonian identity become an existential concern for Greek Macedonians and the Greek state, which refers to ontological security.²¹⁸ Unless a state has a collective narrative constituting its corporate and state identity, it cannot have an agency. And so, if the Greek definition of Macedonian identity was damaged somehow, the agency of Greece would be damaged, as Constructivism emphasizes.²¹⁹ On the other hand, if the Greek Macedonian identity, accepted as the referent object of ontological security, is somehow damaged, the agency of Greek Macedonians and the Greek state will be damaged, because actors' need to feel their identity in a secure position is found at the centre of OST.²²⁰ As Mitzen emphasizes, in order to realize a sense of agency, actors should establish confidence in who they are or should be kept

²¹⁵ Demirtaş, 'Constructivism', 173.

²¹⁶ Rumelili and Adisönmez, 'A New Paradigm on the Identity-Security Nexus in International Relations: Ontological Security Theory', 25; Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Later Modern Age*, 38–39; Kinnvall and Mitzen, 'An Introduction to the Special Issue: Ontological Securities in World Politics', 4–5; Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations Self-Identity and the IR State*, 6; Sarı Ertem and Düzgün, 'Ontological Security Theory in the Discipline of International Relations: A Concept- and Literature-Based Review', 55.

²¹⁷ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 224–25.

²¹⁸ Mitzen and Larson, 'Ontological Security and Foreign Policy'; Sarı Ertem and Düzgün, 'Ontological Security Theory in the Discipline of International Relations: A Concept- and Literature-Based Review', 42.

²¹⁹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 224–25.

²²⁰ Sarı Ertem and Düzgün, 'Ontological Security Theory in the Discipline of International Relations: A Concept- and Literature-Based Review', 42; Kinnvall and Mitzen, 'An Introduction to the Special Issue: Ontological Securities in World Politics', 4.

the uncertainties at the tolerable level.²²¹ Thus, the state of Greece, as the security-seeker of Greek Macedonians, should protect the content of Greek Macedonian identity and should preserve Greek Macedonian identity from uncertainties.

In this respect, imagination, communication, and constraint are three ways proposed by Constructivism to show how Greece should behave in the direction of Greek Macedonian identity. Accordingly, as the Greek Macedonian identity gives a realm of possible actions to Greece, provides a sort of justification base for Greek actions, and distinguish appropriate behaviours from inappropriate ones for Greeks, it establishes the behavioural ground for Greek actions.²²²

In the direction of these three means, what Greece has to do in order to represent its Greek Macedonian identity refers to the role identity.²²³ In this point, Greece has to realize its responsibilities and obligations stemmed from Greek Macedonian identity, which directly refers to a set of behaviour.²²⁴ Well, what sort of responsibilities and obligations does the Greek Macedonian identity produce?

Throughout the process, Greece sought to protect its definitions and to prevent other definitions and usages by Skopje. Using the term Macedonia in its constitutional name by Skopje, using the Sun of Vergina in its flag, using ancient Macedonian figures to name airports or highways are some suitable examples of how an actor appropriate an identity.²²⁵ In this point, the Greek Macedonian identity can be illustrated as an

²²¹ Mitzen, 'Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma', 342–46; Mitzen, 'Anchoring Europe's Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities and Ontological Security', 271–72.

²²² Reus-Smit, 'Constructivism', 198–99; Flochart, 'Constructivism and Foreign Policy', 85–86.

²²³ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 227–28; Stets, 'Role Identity', 648–49.

²²⁴ Demirtaş, 'Constructivism', 172–73; Flochart, 'Constructivism and Foreign Policy', 87; Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security', 38–43; Wendt, 'Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', 398.

²²⁵ Daskalovski, 'Clashing Historical Narratives and the Macedonian Name Dispute - Solving the Unsolvable', 329–30; Koukoudakis, 'The Macedonian Question : An Identity-Based Conflict', 11.

intersubjective belief that gives meaning or understanding of these physical components of reality.²²⁶ In other words, these actions are not in harmony with the Greek understanding of Macedonian identity. That is, Greece established a sort of understanding about itself, its environment, and its relations with others, which refers to a sort of secure field.²²⁷ However, these actions taken by Skopje are not in harmony with the Greek understanding of Macedonian identity and create a sort of uncertainty about it. Uncertainties, as Mitzen points out, damage actors' ability to realize an agency.²²⁸ In other words, uncertainties prevent actors from predicting what possibly happens, giving meaning to events, and rationally acting.²²⁹ For these reasons, these actions taken by Skopje, resulting in uncertainties, damage Greek understanding of Macedonian identity and its agency.

As well as the ontological security, the proclamation creates anxiety about Greece's physical security. In this regard, the main anxiety was that Skopje might wish to gather the disunited so-called "Macedonian" territories. For this reason, Skopje might produce some territorial claims and might interfere with Greece's domestic

²²⁶ Jackson and Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations, Theories and Approaches*, 212–15; Beach, *Analyzing Foreign Policy*, 57; Wendt, 'Constructing International Politics', 73; Flochart, 'Constructivism and Foreign Policy', 85–86; Wendt, 'Identity and Structural Change in International Politics', 50; Hurd, 'Constructivism', 300–301; Fierke, 'Constructivism', 191–92.

²²⁷ Mitzen, 'Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma', 342–46; Mitzen, 'Anchoring Europe's Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities and Ontological Security', 271–72; Sarı Ertem and Düzgün, 'Ontological Security Theory in the Discipline of International Relations: A Concept- and Literature-Based Review', 47; Rumelili and Adısönmez, 'A New Paradigm on the Identity-Security Nexus in International Relations: Ontological Security Theory', 38–39.

²²⁸ Mitzen, 'Anchoring Europe's Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities and Ontological Security', 271–73.

²²⁹ Mitzen, 'Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma', 342–46; Mitzen, 'Anchoring Europe's Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities and Ontological Security', 271–73.

affairs.²³⁰ However, in this case, ontological security concerns come before physical security concerns because physical threats, such as some rights related to the so-called “Macedonian minority” in Greece or territorial claims, depend on if ontological security will be damaged. Put it another way, in order for Skopje to interfere with Greece’s internal affairs on the excuse of the so-called “Macedonian minority” and to make a request about territorial claims, Greece should be accepted the existence of the so-called “Macedonian minority” in Greece and should be given a sort of permission to Skopje to damage Greek Macedonian identity/ontological security. As Ontological Security literature emphasizes, the anxiety related to Greek physical security stems from nothingness, just from a possibility or uncertainty.²³¹ Also, according to Greek public opinion, the threat to their ontological security is perceived as a bigger issue than the threat to their physical security²³² although they believe that using the term “Macedonia” by Skopje might create an important territorial threat in the near future.²³³ In this regard, ontological security, which is generally thrown background out of focus in conventional security studies, is found at the centre of security concern in this special case. For these reasons, if Greece approved these actions, it would give up from

²³⁰ Nimetz, ‘The Macedonian Name Dispute: The Macedonian Question-Resolved?’, 206; Roudometof, *Collective Memory, National Identity, and Ethnic Conflict: Greece, Bulgaria, and the Macedonian Question*, 133–34; Floudas, ‘A Name For a Conflict or a Conflict For a Name? An Analysis of Greece’s Dispute With FYROM’, 302.

²³¹ Sarı Ertem and Düzgün, ‘Ontological Security Theory in the Discipline of International Relations: A Concept- and Literature-Based Review’, 51–53.

²³² Ioannis Armakolas and George Siakas, ‘What’s in a Name? Greek Public Attitudes towards the “Name Dispute” and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2018’, 2018, 27, <https://www.eliampep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Whats-in-a-name-Report-poll-on-name-issue-2018.pdf>.

²³³ Ioannis Armakolas and George Siakas, ‘Greek Public Opinion and Attitudes towards the “Name Dispute” and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’, 2016, 52, <http://www.eliampep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/FYROM-survey-Full-report-FINAL-Sept-2016.pdf>.

its understanding of Macedonian identity and ultimately its agency and would enable to emerge sort of anxieties its physical security.²³⁴

Hence, here, to maintain and preserve the Greek understanding of Macedonian identity and to prevent other definitions and usages of Greek Macedonian identity by other actors refers to what we call role identity of Greek Macedonian identity or what responsibility of Greece stemmed from Greek Macedonian identity.²³⁵ In Ontological Security terminology, these refer to the sort of relations that Greece should establish with significant others in order to ensure its ontological security, as *routinized relations with significant others* enable actors to solidify who they are.²³⁶ Hence, during the process, in the Constructivist stance, Greece should behave in the direction of its role identity as an actor behaving with the logic of appropriateness, on the one hand.²³⁷ Or, from the Ontological Security perspective, it should establish a certain routinized relations with Skopje that is in harmony with its understanding of Macedonian identity and should put in front its understanding of Macedonian identity, referring to its biographical narrative in order to create a stable environment that uncertainties kept at the tolerable level.²³⁸

²³⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 224–25; Mitzen and Larson, ‘Ontological Security and Foreign Policy’, 3; Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations Self-Identity and the IR State*, 3.

²³⁵ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 227–28.

²³⁶ Mitzen, ‘Anchoring Europe’s Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities and Ontological Security’, 271–72; Mitzen, ‘Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma’, 347.

²³⁷ Flochart, ‘Constructivism and Foreign Policy’, 87.

²³⁸ Sarı Ertem and Düzgün, ‘Ontological Security Theory in the Discipline of International Relations: A Concept- and Literature-Based Review’, 44–48.

Furthermore, like all identities, Greek Macedonian identity produces a set of rights for the representers of this identity.²³⁹ In this case, to use the terms Macedonia/Macedonian, the names of figures from ancient Macedonia, the symbols of ancient Macedonia can be illustrated as rights stemmed from Greek Macedonian identity.²⁴⁰ With the same logic, if Greece permitted Skopje to use these figures, symbols, and terms in a way referring to the ancient Macedonian heritage, it would recognize the so-called cultural and historical affiliation of Slav Macedonians with ancient Macedonia.²⁴¹ Since routines, rituals, practices, and relations of actors represent and sustain their identity, as OST emphasizes, these abovementioned rights used by Skopje ultimately would damage Greek Macedonian identity and ultimately their agency by creating a sort of uncertainty about Greek understanding of Macedonian identity.²⁴² Furthermore, if it was accepted by Greece, Skopje would claim further rights related to the so-called Macedonian minority in Greece. This would damage Greek territorial integrity and sovereignty.²⁴³

From these rights and responsibilities, obligations of Greek Macedonian identity are reached: As an actor with the logic of appropriateness,²⁴⁴ to get rid of uncertainties and anxieties caused by Skopje, Greece should create a sort of

²³⁹ Demirtaş, 'Constructivism', 173.

²⁴⁰ Drezov, 'Macedonian Identity: An Overview of the Major Claims', 55.

²⁴¹ Kofos, 'The Controversy over the Terms "Macedonians" and "Macedonian" : A Probable Exit Scenario', 129–32.

²⁴² Mitzen and Larson, 'Ontological Security and Foreign Policy', 3; Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations Self-Identity and the IR State*, 3.

²⁴³ Kofos, 'Greek Policy Considerations over FYROM Independence and Recognition', 235; Kofos, 'The Unresolved "Difference Over the Name": A Greek Perspective', 126–27; Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, ed. Cambridge University Press, 1996.

²⁴⁴ Flochart, 'Constructivism and Foreign Policy', 87.

biographical narrative involving its past, today, and future.²⁴⁵ Then, these are expected from Greece to behave in the direction of its understanding and also to secure its understanding of Macedonian identity in order to position itself as an agent in history, which refers to ontological security.²⁴⁶ In other words, it is expected from Greece to catch a harmony between its Macedonian identity and its behaviours and also to prevent others' actions which possibly damage this harmony.²⁴⁷ In this way, Greece can ensure a stable identity and ultimately an ontologically secure agency.²⁴⁸ As well as the ontological security, the physical security of Greece, referring to territorial integrity and sovereignty, is expected to be procured by Greece in order to continue its agentic integrity. These will be the main logic or behavioural pattern taken by Athens, that we see during the name dispute.

Well, it is time to interpret the historical events grounding on the theoretical framework and to demonstrate how our scientific explanations fit with the historical events:

The first action in the name dispute was the independence declaration of the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as “Republic of Macedonia” in a way using the term Macedonia belonging the Greek Macedonian cultural heritage.²⁴⁹ It had reflections on Greek's minds concerning their understanding of Macedonian identity and their

²⁴⁵ Rumelili and Adisönmez, ‘A New Paradigm on the Identity-Security Nexus in International Relations: Ontological Security Theory’, 25; Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Later Modern Age*, 38–39; Kinnvall and Mitzen, ‘An Introduction to the Special Issue: Ontological Securities in World Politics’, 4–5; Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations Self-Identity and the IR State*, 6; Sarı Ertem and Düzgün, ‘Ontological Security Theory in the Discipline of International Relations: A Concept- and Literature-Based Review’, 55.

²⁴⁶ Mitzen, ‘Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma’, 344; Flochart, ‘Constructivism and Foreign Policy’, 87.

²⁴⁷ Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations Self-Identity and the IR State*, 2–3.

²⁴⁸ Mitzen and Larson, ‘Ontological Security and Foreign Policy’, 3; Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations Self-Identity and the IR State*, 3.

²⁴⁹ Nimetz, ‘The Macedonian Name Dispute: The Macedonian Question-Resolved?’, 207.

former interactions with the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.²⁵⁰ In the Constructivist stance, there is no objective meaning of Slav Macedonians' actions but rather actors' consciousness or beliefs give meaning to the physical part of the social reality.²⁵¹ Accordingly, Greeks identify themselves as Macedonian, identify people in the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as Slav, so, the terms Macedonia/Macedonian refers to Greek cultural heritage.²⁵² This illustrates how Greek Macedonians' consciousness or mind constituted. Hence, this action of Skopje is a sort of threat to the biographical narrative produced by Greek Macedonians since this proclamation tells people in Skopje are also Macedonian while Greek Macedonians' understanding tells these people are Slav and they have no cultural affinity with ancient Macedonian heritage.²⁵³ The proclamation causes a sort of damage and uncertainty in the Greek understanding of Macedonian identity by producing a contending narrative, since practices, relations, rituals, symbols are accepted as some of those elements that constitute, represent, and support identities.²⁵⁴ From this perspective, the independence declaration of Skopje as the "Republic of Macedonia", using one of the most significant representers of Greek

²⁵⁰ Wendt, 'Constructing International Politics', 73; 'Macedonia's Name: Breaking the Deadlock', 3; Koukoudakis, 'The Macedonian Question : An Identity-Based Conflict', 6.

²⁵¹ Jackson and Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations, Theories and Approaches*, 211–13; Flochart, 'Constructivism and Foreign Policy', 84; Wendt, 'Constructing International Politics', 73; Hurd, 'Constructivism', 300–301; Fierke, 'Constructivism', 191–92.

²⁵² Nimetz, 'The Macedonian Name Dispute: The Macedonian Question-Resolved?', 8.

²⁵³ Nimetz, 206; 'Macedonia's Name: Breaking the Deadlock', 3.

²⁵⁴ Rumelili and Adisönmez, 'A New Paradigm on the Identity-Security Nexus in International Relations: Ontological Security Theory', 25; Kinnvall and Mitzen, 'An Introduction to the Special Issue: Ontological Security in World Politics', 4; Sarı Ertem and Düzgün, 'Ontological Security Theory in the Discipline of International Relations: A Concept- and Literature-Based Review', 51; Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations Self-Identity and the IR State*, 3, 51; Mitzen and Larson, 'Ontological Security and Foreign Policy', 3; Mitzen, 'Anchoring Europe's Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities and Ontological Security', 271–72; Mitzen, 'Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma', 347.

Macedonian identity, namely the term Macedonia, was perceived as an irredentist action threatening Greek Macedonians' ontological security.²⁵⁵

This was the first perception of Athens in the face of the first action of Skopje. In the direction of this perception affected by Greek Macedonian identity and Athens historical interaction with Skopje, Greece developed a reaction presenting their identity and security-based concerns: Skopje should promise there will be no territorial claims against Greece, should declare there is no 'Macedonian minority in Greece, and should not use the term Macedonia in its name.²⁵⁶ The first two were related to the physical or territorial security of Greece, which was mostly affected by the impact of Tito's irredentist policies over Greek understanding of actors' historical relations,²⁵⁷ while the latter was related to ontological or identity-based security of Greece, which was affected by Greek understanding of Macedonian identity.²⁵⁸ On the one hand, Tito's irredentist actions had unavoidable impacts on Greek historical understanding.²⁵⁹ Also, anxieties related to the so-called "Macedonian minority" in Greece and a wish so-called "united Macedonia" are important elements of Greek perception.²⁶⁰ These perceptions direct Athens to interpret Slav Macedonians' independence declaration as an irredentist action, which threatens both the ontological and physical security of Greece. On the other hand, the Greek understanding of Macedonian identity told us the legitimate right to use the terms Macedonia and

²⁵⁵ 'Macedonia's Name: Breaking the Deadlock', 3; Nimetz, 'The Macedonian Name Dispute: The Macedonian Question-Resolved?', 207.

²⁵⁶ Tziampiris, 'The Macedonian Name Dispute and European Union Accession', 153.

²⁵⁷ Koukoudakis, 'The Macedonian Question : An Identity-Based Conflict', 6.

²⁵⁸ Daskalovski, 'Clashing Historical Narratives and the Macedonian Name Dispute - Solving the Unsolvable', 329–30.

²⁵⁹ Koukoudakis, 'The Macedonian Question : An Identity-Based Conflict', 6.

²⁶⁰ Nimetz, 'The Macedonian Name Dispute: The Macedonian Question-Resolved?', 206; Roudometof, *Collective Memory, National Identity, and Ethnic Conflict: Greece, Bulgaria, and the Macedonian Question*, 133–34.

Macedonian is exclusively belongs to Greeks²⁶¹ and if Greece permitted Skopje to use this term, it would permit Skopje to damage its biographical narrative and its understanding of Macedonian identity.²⁶²

Realized as a return of the Greek concerns, Slav Macedonians' constitutional amendments were not enough for Athens because it was not included a change in the term Macedonia. This was another action by Skopje, which continues creating physical and ontological security threats for Athens. With the same logic abovementioned, Greece used a strategy to prevent those security threats: it blocked Skopje's recognition by the EU.²⁶³

The same logic was seen in the rejection of the Pinheiro and Owen-Vance plans. While offers of plans preventing irredentist actions and hostile activities were accepted, the conditions offering a new name for Skopje including the term Macedonia were rejected by Athens.²⁶⁴ As the blocking of Skopje's EU path, in 1994 the economic

²⁶¹ Daskalovski, 'Clashing Historical Narratives and the Macedonian Name Dispute - Solving the Unsolvable', 329–30; Kofos, 'The Unresolved "Difference Over the Name": A Greek Perspective', 131–33.

²⁶² Rumelili and Adisönmez, 'A New Paradigm on the Identity-Security Nexus in International Relations: Ontological Security Theory', 25; Kinnvall and Mitzen, 'An Introduction to the Special Issue: Ontological Security in World Politics', 4; Sarı Ertem and Düzgün, 'Ontological Security Theory in the Discipline of International Relations: A Concept- and Literature-Based Review', 51; Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations Self-Identity and the IR State*, 3,51; Mitzen and Larson, 'Ontological Security and Foreign Policy', 3; Mitzen, 'Anchoring Europe's Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities and Ontological Security', 271–72; Mitzen, 'Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma', 347.

²⁶³ Tziampiris, 'The Macedonian Name Dispute and European Union Accession', 154; Koukoudakis, 'The Macedonian Question : An Identity-Based Conflict', 8.

²⁶⁴ Kofos, 'Greek Policy Considerations over FYROM Independence and Recognition', 239–40; Kofos, 'The Unresolved "Difference Over the Name": A Greek Perspective', 134–35; Koukoudakis, 'The Macedonian Question : An Identity-Based Conflict', 11.

embargo by Athens to Skopje was another strategy to force Skopje to reach a sort of compromise.²⁶⁵

Until the 1995 Interim Accord, almost entire actions of Skopje had been perceived by Greeks as irredentist, so, they had developed a sort of reaction to protect their territorial integrity, which refers to their physical security, and to protect their Greek Macedonian identity, which refers to their ontological security. In this direction, Greece had used many strategies such as rejecting Pinheiro and Owen-Vance plans, blocking Slav Macedonians' path to the EU and applying the economic embargo.²⁶⁶

However, at the 1995 Interim Accord, the actions of Skopje had changed and were interpreted by Greeks in a different way. Accordingly, Skopje removed the Sun of Vergina from its flag and gave an assurance there will be no irredentist actions against Greek cultural and territorial integrity. These are not actions with irredentist desire according to Greeks. Hence, in return, Athens recognized Skopje internationally and gave green light to the Slav Macedonians' EU path with the provisional name FYROM.²⁶⁷ It is obvious that once Greek understanding or perception of Slav Macedonians' actions turns from irredentist and threatening nature, Greek reactions became more benign. In other words, Athens, who had not recognized Skopje internationally and had blocked Slav Macedonians' EU path to protect its Greek Macedonian identity and its territorial integrity due to its perception of Slav Macedonians' actions as irredentist, changed its position when this interpretation changed.

²⁶⁵ Tziampiris, 'The Macedonian Name Dispute and European Union Accession', 155; Kofos, 'The Unresolved "Difference Over the Name": A Greek Perspective', 136–37.

²⁶⁶ Kofos, 'Greek Policy Considerations over FYROM Independence and Recognition', 239–40; Koukoudakis, 'The Macedonian Question : An Identity-Based Conflict', 10–12; Kofos, 'The Unresolved "Difference Over the Name": A Greek Perspective', 134–37.

²⁶⁷ Nimetz, 'The Macedonian Name Dispute: The Macedonian Question-Resolved?', 208–10; Tziampiris, 'The Macedonian Name Dispute and European Union Accession', 155; Daskalovski, 'Clashing Historical Narratives and the Macedonian Name Dispute - Solving the Unsolvables', 328–29; Kofos, 'The Unresolved "Difference Over the Name": A Greek Perspective', 136–37.

Although the relations have been started to relatively ameliorate after the Interim Accord, Athens' position had been strict during the process: there was no possible way for Skopje to EU without reaching a mutual solution. FYROM was just a provisional name.²⁶⁸ This stance was Greek official position for many years. Though Skopje realized some amendments, these were not enough for Greece who wants to secure its identity and territorial integrity.

After 2006, the actions of nationalist Nikola Gruevski changed the process. The alterations in airports names in December 2006 were perceived by Greece as an irredentist action. With the same logic abovementioned, Greece turned its strategy and declared that unless there is a mutually accepted solution, Skopje never joins to EU and NATO.²⁶⁹

The dispute remained unresolved until Zoran Zaev came to power in May 2017 because territorial and identity-based threats to Greece were maintained by Gruevski's nationalist and provocative actions.²⁷⁰ Zaev illustrated his benign intention to solve the dispute by changing the airports' name in a way that does not imply irredentism and usurpation. This action of Skopje was perceived by Athens as a positive intention. In re-action, Greece accepted a geographic modifier.²⁷¹

The Prespa Agreement was the final point that culminated the dispute with a compromise. Accordingly, Skopje will use the name the Republic of North Macedonia.²⁷² This is the solution of 27 years dispute, so, here, it should be questioned

²⁶⁸ Tziampiris, 'The Macedonian Name Dispute and European Union Accession', 156–58.

²⁶⁹ Tziampiris, 156–58.

²⁷⁰ Koukoudakis, 'The Macedonian Question : An Identity-Based Conflict', 14; Ioannis Armakolas et al., 'North Macedonia: What Is Next?', 2019, 3, <https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/publications/north-macedonia-what-s-next>.

²⁷¹ Koukoudakis, 'The Macedonian Question : An Identity-Based Conflict', 14; Heraclides, 'The Settlement of the Greek-Macedonian Naming Dispute: The Prespa Agreement', 51–52.

²⁷² Nimetz, 'The Macedonian Name Dispute: The Macedonian Question-Resolved?', 213.

how a state who sought to protect its identity and territorial integrity permitted another state to use a term that might have a possibility to damage its physical and ontological integrity? The answer is on the articles of the Prespa Agreement:

Firstly, when the articles of the agreement were being prepared, Mathew Nimetz persistently emphasized that *no one tries to steal your Greek Macedonian identity*.²⁷³ This is the first key point for Athens, because the mutual solution, though it includes the term Macedonia, will not damage Greek Macedonian cultural and historical heritage. Secondly, as the understanding of the term, Macedonia, on both sides is different,²⁷⁴ this situation is not interpreted as irredentist by Greece. As Skopje accepted that they have no cultural or historical affinity with ancient Macedonian heritage,²⁷⁵ they are no longer threatening Greek Macedonian identity. Also, as Skopje accepted that there will be no hostile and irredentist actions against Greece but rather there will be respect to the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Greece,²⁷⁶ the threat to Greece' physical security was reduced. In such conditions, Greece ensured to protect its Greek Macedonian identity/ontological security and physical security. In return, it changed its reaction blocking Slav Macedonians' European path with another one supporting Slav Macedonians' European goals.²⁷⁷

In conclusion, this chapter sought to reach a scientific argument demonstrating the Greek Macedonian Identity as the determining factor behind the Greek actions during the Macedonian name dispute. To do so, firstly, the argument, the Greek Macedonian identity more or less illustrates who Greek Macedonians are, was reached.

²⁷³ Nimetz, 211.

²⁷⁴ Nimetz, 213; Heraclides, 'The Settlement of the Greek-Macedonian Naming Dispute: The Prespa Agreement', 55.

²⁷⁵ Heraclides, 'The Settlement of the Greek-Macedonian Naming Dispute: The Prespa Agreement', 56.

²⁷⁶ Heraclides, 56.

²⁷⁷ 'Greece Backs North Macedonia's EU Entry ', 6 October 2021, <https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/1169197/greece-backs-north-macedonia-s-eu-entry/>.

This argument made it possible to propose that the Greek Macedonian identity is the referent object of Ontological Security and creates a motivational tendency for Greece. Then, it was demonstrated that the Greek Macedonian identity is the source in which biographical or collective narratives for Greek Macedonians were produced. In this regard, these were argued that i) the Greek Macedonian identity provides an agency to Greek Macedonians and ii) protecting it is an existential concern for Greek Macedonians and the Greek state. Then, it was illustrated that Slav Macedonians' actions during the name dispute damaged the biographical narratives, the Greek understanding of Macedonian identity, and ultimately Greek Macedonian agency. Also, it was demonstrated that causing ontological insecurity produces some anxieties related to the physical security of Greece. Hence, protecting the content of Greek Macedonian identity was illustrated as a behavioural obligation for Greece. For this reason, it was argued that Greece, as an actor with the logic of appropriateness, should be in a position to protect the Greek Macedonian identity. Afterwards, the historical events during the name dispute were interpreted by grounding the theoretical framework and it was seen that our theoretical explanations are quite fit with the historical events. Also, the historical events illustrated us the concept of ontological security, which is generally kept at the secondary position in the shade of physical security in the security studies, here, comes before the physical security concerns and is at the heart of an actor's security concerns. Ultimately, this chapter proposes this scientific argument: "throughout the name dispute, the Greek actions were shaped by Greek security concerns including ontological and physical security and fundamentally ontological security is the primary source for the concerns". To put it another way, we have a scientific ground to claim that the Greek foreign policy actions were mainly shaped by the Greek Macedonian identity during the Macedonian name dispute.

CONCLUSION

This research fundamentally sought to answer the main research question: “to what extent does Greek Macedonian identity have a power to explain the Greek foreign policy actions conducted during the Macedonian name dispute?”. To do so, it logically applied the conceptual and theoretical findings respectively discovered in the second and third chapters to the historical findings obtained in the first chapter. By doing these, the following results were reached:

Firstly, as well as presenting chronological details, the historical ground chapter demonstrated the behavioural pattern of Greece: Greece behave in the direction of its main concerns during the Macedonian name dispute, namely protecting the Greek Macedonian cultural heritage and its territorial integrity. By doing so, this chapter prepared a solid and clear historical ground for the research.

Secondly, the conceptual ground chapter, which examined the definitions and types of identity, provided a sort of assumption over the nature of identity. Accordingly, it propounded the concept of identity as the answer of actors to the question of who they are. By doing so, this chapter enabled us to approach the Greek Macedonian identity as the answer of Greek Macedonians to question who they are.

Thirdly, the theoretical framework chapter combined the main Constructivist stance, in which actors’ identity can explain their conduct as their social position determines their perspective to the social reality, with the fundamental proposition of OST, that states should behave in harmony with their identity in order to realize their agency. In this way, it discovered the scientific possibility in which an actor’s identity can be accepted as an explanatory element for its conduct. By doing so, it enabled the identification of the Greek Macedonian identity as an explanatory element for the Greek foreign policy actions during the Macedonian name dispute.

In the final chapter, in which all data acquired from the chapters were synthesized, firstly by combining the conceptual ground chapter with the ontological security sub-chapter, the Greek Macedonian identity was illustrated as the referent object of Ontological Security perspective since it illustrates who Greek Macedonians are. Secondly, by combining the historical ground chapter with the theoretical

framework chapter, protecting the content of Greek Macedonian identity was demonstrated as the existential concern for Greece as it provides an agency to them. Then, by employing the historical ground chapter with the theoretical framework chapter, protecting the content of the Greek Macedonian identity in the face of Slav Macedonians' actions was illustrated as a behavioural obligation for the Greek state, after having illustrated how Slav Macedonians' actions during the Macedonian name dispute damaged the Greek Macedonian identity and created ontological insecurity. Finally, by using the historical ground chapter, the harmony between the abovementioned theoretical explanation and the Greek reactions during the name dispute was demonstrated. By doing so, this chapter enabled us to scientifically argue that throughout the name dispute, the Greek actions were shaped by Greek security concerns including ontological and physical security and fundamentally ontological security is the primary source for the concerns".

Given the main findings of the research, the following contributions are being proposed to the relevant academic literature:

As well as explaining a period and a certain behavioural pattern in Greek foreign policy history, this research aims to theoretically contribute to the Ontological Security literature. That is, as mentioned above, one of the main contributions of OST to the literature is extending the cover of security studies by putting the non-physical elements to the analysis. In this direction, it fundamentally argues that states seek to ensure their ontological security as well as their physical security.²⁷⁸ As clearly reflected with this argument, in the OS literature there is a sort of attempt to put the concept of ontological security beside the physical/conventional security concepts. In other words, the literature seeks to demonstrate that the concept of ontological security is at least as important as the concept of physical security.

However, this research proposes that in some cases, the concept of ontological security can be the primary position in front of physical security. In other words, by

²⁷⁸ Mitzen, 'Anchoring Europe's Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities and Ontological Security', 271–72; Mitzen, 'Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma', 344–53; Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations Self-Identity and the IR State*, 8; Mitzen and Larson, 'Ontological Security and Foreign Policy', 2–5.

doing the case study, this research illustrated that the possibility of physical threats and assurance of physical security of an actor might depend on the assurance of its ontological security.

Accordingly, the main physical security concerns of Greece, in the case of the Macedonian name dispute, was that Skopje might wish to gather the disunited so-called “Macedonian” territories and that Skopje might wish to interfere with Greece’s domestic affairs.²⁷⁹ However, there would be only a way for Skopje to interfere with Greece’s internal affairs on the excuse of the so-called “Macedonian minority” in Greece and to make territorial claims, only if Greece permitted Skopje to damage the Greek understanding of Macedonian identity. If Greece protects its understanding of Macedonian identity and its biographical narratives stemming from its identity and ensures its ontological security, Skopje cannot find a legitimate ground to make territorial claims for the so-called "United/Greater Macedonia" and to interfere with Greece's internal affair with the excuse of so-called "Macedonian minority in Greece". In this regard, it is quite logical to propose that in some cases, the possibility of physical threats might depend on the assurance of ontological security.

On the other hand, this research illustrated how does the ontological security concerns come before the physical security concerns by presenting the results of the Prespa Agreement. Indeed, through Prespa Agreement, we again see that the main concern of Greece is related to ontological security. Because, when we think of hard-power or realist conditions in world politics, it is quite logical to propose that there always have been doubts about the reliability of thought that an agreement provides for an actor’s physical security. However, an agreement might provide a more solid and reliable ground for the soft-power elements. That is, actors cannot continuously produce contending arguments. They generally need reliable grounds for their arguments, such as historical or scientific supports. Once actors accept an argument, it

²⁷⁹ Kofos, ‘Greek Policy Considerations over FYROM Independence and Recognition’, 235–38; Koukoudakis, ‘The Macedonian Question : An Identity-Based Conflict’, 6; Nimetz, ‘The Macedonian Name Dispute: The Macedonian Question-Resolved?’, 206; Floudas, ‘A Name For a Conflict or a Conflict For a Name? An Analysis of Greece’s Dispute With FYROM’, 302.

is not easy to produce policies stemming from counter-arguments. In our case, for Skopje after accepting they have no cultural affinity with ancient Macedonian heritage, it is not easy to make a request from Greece for a territory to unite so-called “historical Macedonia”. With the same logic, Skopje cannot find a legitimate ground to interfere with Greece's domestic affairs in the excuse of the so-called "Macedonian Minority in Greece" once they accept there is no "Macedonian minority" in Greece.²⁸⁰ Hence, through the conditions of the Prespa Agreement, Greece ensures its ontological security and from this point of view, it also gains a sort of assurance for its physical security. Thus, it is quite fair to propose that in some cases, for actors the assurance of physical security depends on the assurance of ontological security.

²⁸⁰ Heraclides, ‘The Settlement of the Greek-Macedonian Naming Dispute: The Prespa Agreement’, 56.

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