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PhD Thesis

Small States in regional conflicts. The cases of Kuwait and Cyprus

PhD Candidate: Styliani Gerani

Supervisor: Prof. Ilias Kouskouvelis

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Three-member Advisory Committee:

Ilias Kouskouvelis, Professor, Department of International and European Studies, University of Macedonia

George Spyropoulos, Professor, Department of International and European Studies, University of Macedonia

Charalambos Papasotiriou, Professor, Department of International, European and Regional Studies, Panteion University

Στυλιανή Γεράνη

Acknowledgements

To my mother

To my father
In Memoriam

Acknowledgements

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Περίληψη

Abstract

Μικρά κράτη σε περιφερειακές συγκρούσεις.
Οι περιπτώσεις του Κουβέιτ και της Κύπρου

Στην επιστήμη των Διεθνών Σχέσεων το θέμα των μικρών κρατών έχει εξεταστεί διεξοδικά, ειδικά στον 21ο αιώνα. Η παρούσα διατριβή αποσκοπεί στην εξέταση των μικρών κρατών εμπλεκομένων σε περιφερειακές συγκρούσεις. Τούτο θα επιτευχθεί διττώς: μέσω των υπαρχόντων μελετών επί των μικρών κρατών, αλλά και με τη βοήθεια του Νεοκλασικού Ρεαλισμού. Στη μελέτη αυτή αναδεικνύεται η σημασία των περιφερειακών συγκρούσεων για το διεθνές σύστημα, καθώς αυτές οι συγκρούσεις δύνανται να διεθνοποιηθούν λόγω των μεγάλων δυνάμεων που συχνά εμπλέκονται σε περιφερειακή σύγκρουση. Λαμβάνοντας ως σταθερά ότι τα μικρά κράτη λειτουργούν στο περιφερειακό τους σύστημα και αγωνίζονται για την επιβίωσή τους, η παρούσα, διά της εξέτασης των περιπτώσεων του Κουβέιτ και της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας, μελετά στρατηγικές επιβίωσης των μικρών κρατών σε διπολικό και σε πολυπολικό σύστημα. Έτσι, επισημαίνεται αφενός, ο αντίκτυπος του διεθνούς συστήματος στη διαμόρφωση στρατηγικής ενός μικρού κράτους ευρισκομένου σε σύγκρουση και, αφετέρου, αναδεικνύονται στρατηγικές επιβίωσης. Τούτων δοθέντων, αποβλέπει στο να απαντήσει επαρκώς στο κεντρικό ερώτημα, πώς ένα μικρό κράτος μπορεί να προσελκύσει μία μεγάλη δύναμη, να δανειστεί και να διατηρήσει στην κατοχή του το φορτίο ισχύος της μεγάλης δύναμης για να επιβιώσει.

The Strategies of Small States in Regional Conflicts.

The cases of Kuwait and Cyprus

Small states in International Relations theory is a topic that has been examined thoroughly especially in the 21st century. This thesis sets out to investigate small states that are in regional conflicts, not only in the frame of the small states literature, but also with the tools for analysis provided by Neoclassical Realism. It aspires to explain the significance of regional conflicts for the international system since such conflicts can be internationalized by drawing in great powers. Taking as a constant that small states operate in their regional system and strive for their survival, this thesis, by setting under scrutiny the cases of Kuwait and the Republic of Cyprus, will pinpoint aspects of small states' survival strategies in two different types of international system; a bipolar and a multipolar. Through these lenses the study will highlight on the one hand, the impact of the international system on the strategy formation of a small state in conflict, and on the other, strategies to survive. Hence, it appeals to answer the central question, how a small state can draw, borrow and retain the strength of a great power to secure its survival.

Introduction

Overview

"The object of war is a better state of peace-even if only from your own point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire."[1]

Studying small states has been challenging. Knowing that small states' primary goal is survival and considering their inherent vulnerability, small states literature presents strategies to survive. When a small state is engaged in a territorial dispute with a more powerful regional actor, the former's capabilities are inadequate to ensure victory. In that case, a small state must act as a smart one; it must assess rationally its strategic environment and design an effective strategy to meet its objective.[2]

The peculiarity of regional conflicts is that they may attract the interest of the great powers, especially when the interests of the latter are at stake. Thus, a regional conflict might be internationalized; international organizations can be mobilized as arbiters or as a forum to find a solution; a great power may be engaged in every aspect, directly or indirectly. The situation can get out of control, if the great powers' struggle for power and prevalence in a specific regional system drives them to an open-end competition. In every case, the small state must survive. Since this is impossible without a great power coming to its aid, the underlying theme that runs this thesis is how a small state in conflict can draw, borrow, and retain the strength of a great power to secure its survival, especially in the multipolar system of the 21st century.

This thesis examines the cases of the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Cyprus. These two states are interesting to explore their strategies in regional conflicts. Kuwait is mostly known for its oil wealth and the annexation by Iraq that led to the 1991 US-UN led operation against the latter. The case of Cyprus is one of the most researched topics for the protracted conflict with Turkey, the European Union accession of Cyprus, and its ongoing resource exploration activities.

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[1] B H Liddell-Hart, *Strategy*, New York, Praeger, 1967, p.75.
[2] J Pertti, "From Small to Smart: Reflections on the Concept of Small States", *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, Vol.9.,1998, pp 61-62

These two small states are located in significant and adjacent regional systems, the Gulf and the Eastern Mediterranean.[3] Both have to operate in cooperation with other regional actors and to balance against greater powers' intervention. Resources are another linking element. Kuwait is a wealthy state and a pivotal ally for the West. Cyprus puts efforts on exploiting its resources and on turning itself into an energy hub for the European continent, as well as on becoming a reliable partner not only for its regional states in the turbulent Mediterranean but also for the Western powers, mostly the US and the European Union member-states. The major difference between these two small states is that Kuwait has managed to be freed and has restored its sovereignty, while the Republic of Cyprus faces an ongoing occupation of its 36,2% of its territory and a secessionist state in its occupied northern territories. In that context, these small states are obliged to survive.

The examination of the strategies followed by the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Cyprus in the sub-regional systems of the Gulf and the Eastern Mediterranean respectively, will provide adequate answers on how, why and when a small state can secure its survival by drawing external aid to its cause.

Objective of the Thesis

Conflicts in regional systems that are considered open systems, can impact upon the international system if a spill over occurs, since great powers have to safeguard their interest across various regional systems and so they may interfere when their interests are at stake. Here lies the importance of the Gulf and the Eastern Mediterranean; what happens in the former most of the times affects the latter positively or negatively. The presentation of significant historic events in the cases of Kuwait (Chapter 2) and Cyprus (Chapter 3) will provide an overview of the aforementioned issue.[4]

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[3] This thesis considers the following eight nations as the states that constitute the Eastern Mediterranean region: Greece, Cyprus, Israel, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and Libya. D Pipes, "The Threat of Radical Islam and the Future of the Eastern Mediterranean", BESA Center, Bar-Ilan University, February 21, 2017, http://www.danielpipes.org/17349/radical-islam-eastern-mediterranean

[4] The Suez crisis, impacted upon the Cypriot fate since it placed Cyprus in the center of the British interests. The British diminution of power in the Gulf and the Middle East, the Yom Kippur War, the OPEC crisis were pivotal events in the US decision-making on the 1974 Turkish invasion, as it will be analyzed in detail in Chapter 3.

As literature review shows "the most popular assumption among small state scholars regarding geography has nothing to do with their immediate environment but with the role that a small state's location can play in the conflict between Great Powers."[5] Hence, to illustrate the conflicts of small states against a more powerful regional actor this study intends to show if a small state can draw the great power for the former's aid.

In a multipolar international system it is unavoidable for the great powers not to be engaged in many regional systems. Their goal to defend their interests against real or future threats is perpetual. That said, great powers face systemic incentives to establish a sphere of influence in regional systems. This goes without saying that the fate of the less powerful is interrelated with the powerful ones. In order to comprehend regional conflicts it is important to refer to the interaction between powerful and less powerful states so as to present a holistic approach regarding the impact of the international system.

In pursuing the goal of this thesis, the cases of Kuwait and Cyprus will be investigated as follows; first, the strategic environment within which small states are ensuring their survival, as well as the interplay between small and great powers and latter's perspectives in the region will be analyzed. Hence, every chapter begins with the examination of the strategic environment and the great powers' strategies, their leadership policies and the critical events that affected the small state's fate; regional and international developments; structural restrictions; regional limitations. Through this examination, not only one can read better the limitations or the opportunities, but also by examining the larger questions of the great powers and their role in the sub-regional systems of Eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf, possible answers as to what extent small states can pursue their strategic goals and under what circumstances are to be presented. Second, to comprehend the impact of the international system upon a small state's strategy and to understand phenomena that have occurred during the examined periods, emphasis will be given on domestic politics of both the small state and

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Furthermore, in the case of the US-UN war for the Kuwaiti liberation, when Operation Desert Storm began with an air campaign, Iraq fired Scud missile at Israel. Despite Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir's, intentions to retaliate, Shamir responded to American calls for restraint. See: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees, *Crisis on Cyprus, 1975: One Year After the Invasion : a Staff Report,* July 20, 1975, U.S Government Printing Office, Washington 1975., Maureen Dowd, "War in the Gulf: President Bush Urges Israeli Restraint in Phone Appeals to Shamir", *The New York Times,* 20 January 1991, https://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/20/world/war-gulf-president-bush-urges-israeli-restraint-phone-appeals-shamir.html

[5] R Pedi, *Theory of international relations: Small states in the international system*. Diss. University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, 2016., p.71

the great power. This thesis assumes that during the decision-making process, leadership weights cost and benefits before it takes any action.

In sum, small states in order to secure their survival are compelled to seek external aid. Small states in regional conflicts with more powerful actors are ill-equipped due to insufficient material power. Thus, they must seek for a great power that will provide diplomatic, military, financial protection for their protection. Is it possible for a small state to motivate or exploit or use a great power for its own sake? Under what circumstances and by what tactics and strategies is a small state able to gain advantage or even use the great power for its own benefit? An extended analysis of the strategic environment as well as great powers' interests, regional actors' posture and a presentation of the small state's strategy at every designated period of time is a prerequisite. Finally, an assessment on the strategies of Kuwait and Cyprus will bridge the gap in Cyprus' and Kuwait's literature in cumulative and coherent insights regarding the security challenges that these small states face given the lack of an applicable and coherent theory on small states.

Methodology

This thesis is neither a detailed history on the Gulf wars and the issue of the Turkish invasion and occupation of Cyprus, nor its aim is to cite and quote historical facts or simply refer to the literature on small states. The aforesaid approach does not push the boundaries of science and certainly has no novelty value on the strategies of small states. For this reason, it is based on the use of historic events to answer why particular policies were adopted and to explain the behavior of the actors and specific outcomes of each case study. The essence of the case studies lies in their capability to work paradigmatically. The under-examination case studies will not provide a compass on how small states may act under similar circumstance. Case studies are useful tools to display how an actor operated and to extract conclusion on a possible pattern of behavior.

The qualitative approach is the most appropriate method for this study. Data were collected from primary sources as written documents, maps, interviews on the internet or in newspapers, transcripts, statements, observations of situations. Also, British and Kuwaiti

reports referring to issues under examination, documents from international organizations and institutions as the United Nations and the European Union, official documents from ministries of the states under examination, declassified documents from the United States Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency and the United Kingdom's Foreign Office were used as well. Secondary sources included academic studies and published works, i.e., dissertations, newspapers, websites, etc.

All in all, this thesis' methodology aspires not only to explain the linkage between causes and consequences but also to provide a guide for future action when actors find themselves in similar conditions. By putting under scrutiny these two case studies and testing law-like generalizations is possible to identify elements of comparability in similar cases and thus to address the main question adequately.[6] At last, the use of historic facts to shed light on the strategies of the actors combined with Neoclassical Realism is expected to address sufficiently the major objective of this thesis.

Thesis research questions

David Vital has stated that "the significance of the minor power itself within the general scheme of great power politics is essentially determined by its contingent role–its intrinsic capabilities being too limited to signify."[7] This work is specifically concerned with the examination of the foreign policy of two small states. The almost 70years of each state's foreign policy has been under scrutiny to draw conclusions on the thesis main question.[8] As this study will demonstrate, both states share behavioral characteristics that the small states literature ascribes to them. The following summary of the case studies will familiarize the reader with the research questions.

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[6] This thesis follows the methodology of neoclassical realism as it has been identified by N M Ripsman, J W Taliaferro & S E Lobell in their work *Neoclassical realist theory of international politics*, Oxford University Press, 2016.
[7] D Vital, *The survival of small states: studies in small power/great power conflict*, London, Oxford University Press, 1971, p.9.
[8] Each case study has been studied since its independence that for both is placed in the decade of 1960 till 2018.

Kuwait since its independence in 1960, has been challenged mostly by Iraq, which has invaded and proclaimed it as its 19th province. Iraq shares a 254km land border with Kuwait and since it owns 12nm territorial sea, it reduces Iraq's exit to the sea thus becoming landlocked.[9] After two wars, in 1991 and 2003, Iraq has dealt with severe domestic collapse following the overthrown of Saddam. However, in 2016, Iraq has managed to improve its security and financial stability.[10] Recently, Iraq questioned once again Kuwait's maritime border with it. Iraqi lawmakers accused their government of surrendering to Kuwait the maritime border, which in 2003 was demarcated by the two countries and also referred to the United Nations.[11] This incident is important to understand how fragile the Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations are. Iran, that has an advanced nuclear program, has never given up on trying to influence the Gulf.[12] Its nuclear program and provocations are worrisome to the Gulf states. Recent developments like the Qatar crisis, the Kurds referendum, the Iranian expanding presence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, further intensify the regional fragile politics and call for the shaping of a rational strategy for the small state of Kuwait in order to survive and even enhance its position in the Gulf.[13]

The narrative of the Republic of Cyprus (henceforth RoC), bears similarities to the State of Kuwait. Cyprus' strategic importance made it valuable to great powers and thus it was colonized by many of them. The last of the colonial powers, Great Britain, granted its independence in 1960 after a militant struggle that lasted from 1955-59. In 1974, co-existence between the Greek-Cypriots (henceforth G/Cs), who were the majority on the island and the Turkish-Cypriot (henceforth T/C) minority, was interrupted, after the illegal invasion and occupation of the northern part of the Island.[14] In 1983, the Turkish forces established a secessionist state, the self-proclaimed "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus", "TRNC", that is not recognized by any state or international organization other than the invader, Turkey. Since

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[9] CIA the World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ku.html
[10] CIA the World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html
[11] T Habib, "Kuwait, Iraq embroiled in new territorial dispute", *Gulf News,* 2 February 2017, http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/kuwait/kuwait-iraq-embroiled-in-new-territorial-dispute-1.1971891
[12] NTI, "Iran", January 2019, https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/iran/
[13] S G Jones, "War by Proxy: Iran's Growing Footprint in the Middle East", 11 March 2019, CSIS Briefs
[14] The 1974 Turkish invasion violated not only the Zurich-London agreements but most of all the UN Charter that clearly prohibits the use of force against member-states. The argument of "peace operation" falls in void because the T/C were never subject to widespread or systematic human rights abuse, neither they were subject to crimes against humanity or ethnic cleansing. Their right to existence was never threatened. Consequently, Turkish operations were violating the UN Charter thus making the G/C subject to ethnic cleansing and causing a humanitarian crisis and an ongoing refugee issue.

the invasion in 1974, the "Cyprus Problem" has been negotiated at the United Nations (henceforth UN). A milestone in Cyprus' history is the 2004 proposed Annan Plan that was rejected by the majority after referendum. On May 1st, 2004, Cyprus abandoned the Non-Alignment Movement (henceforth NAM) and the entire island joined the European Union (henceforth EU). However, the EU acquis is implemented only to the areas under the internationally recognized government.

Today Cyprus is trying to make the most of the recent proved gas reserves.[15] In other words, the RoC attempts to empower itself by exploiting its strategic position, resources, formal and informal alliances in the turbulent Eastern Mediterranean, in order to use them as leverage to improve its position in the regional balance of power. Unfortunately, Cyprus has to deal with a much more powerful state, Turkey, that is not only struggling to achieve a de jure recognition of the TRNC but also bullies Cyprus' exploration efforts and strives to annex the occupied territory and have it as its 82nd province.[16] Turkey's strategy does not only aim at legitimizing the partition thus revising the status quo, but also at upgrading the status of the secessionist state by using the same tools as the RoC does to prevent it: the EU, the UN and the formation of bilateral, trilateral partnerships mostly with neighboring states.

Therefore, where is the linkage between these two case studies? The so-called "Cyprus issue", "Cyprus Question", or "Cyprus Problem" is a challenging subject to research in comparison to the Kuwaiti crisis when it comes to assessing the posture of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), of the great powers and the Western handling of the two invasions; the 1991 Iraqi to Kuwait and the 1974 Turkish to Cyprus. Two small independent states have been invaded by a stronger neighbor, Turkey and Iraq respectively. A significant difference is that, after the invasion of Iraq in Kuwait, the former suffered the consequences of Article 2 (4). In both cases the international community condemned the invasion and the subsequent military occupation, and the UNSC adopted resolutions under Chapter VII. However, Turkey did not annex the northern part, although today it threatens to annex it. Saddam Hussein annexed Kuwait and proclaimed it as the 19th province of Iraq. Kuwait was liberated by an unprecedented US-UN led operation, while the Republic of Cyprus still faces a de facto

[15] CIA the World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cy.html

[16] T Eroglu, "Erdogan adviser wants to annex north Cyprus (updated)", *Cyprus Mail Online,* 26 April 2017, http://cyprus-mail.com/2017/04/26/erdogan-adviser-wants-annex-north-cyprus/

partition. Reversing the consequences of the illegal declaration of the TRNC is today's Cyprus' strategic challenge.

Kuwait and Cyprus keep strong connections with the West. Kuwait is a pivotal ally for the USA, while the RoC is an EU member. Kuwait is an Arab monarchy and has proceeded to a few democratic changes. Cyprus maintains good relations with its neighboring states in the Eastern Mediterranean. Along with Israel and Greece, it is the only other stable democracy in the region. Cyprus' current strategy focuses on building bridges and efficient relations with its neighbors. Finally, despite the fact that Kuwait was liberated and its sovereignty was fully restored, developments in the Gulf and Kuwait's powerful neighbors like Iran, are considered critical for its security. Cyprus still deals with the occupant power, Turkey, and a secessionist entity in its northern territory that craves to upgrade its status to a de jure state.

The examination of the Republic of Cyprus in conjuction with the case of Kuwait leads to the following questions complementary to the thesis main one:

1) What is the impact of the international system and the great powers' involvement on a small state's security when a territorial dispute occurs?

2) Does being non-aligned[17] affect negative or positive a small state's strategy when compared to the type of the international system that it operates within?

3) How domestic variables influence a state's strategy? Is there a continuity in a small state's strategy due to systemic limitations?

Addressing the main issue as well as the three aforementioned questions, this study purports to examine if Kuwait's salvage had to do with how itself handled wisely and efficiently its components of power, in contrast with Cyprus' ongoing occupation. Has Kuwait formulated and implemented a successfully strategy by exploiting its assets or the interests of great powers and systemic structure were the catalysts for ensuring its sovereignty?

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[17] The Non-Aligned Movement was formed during the Cold War. It was initiated largely by the then-Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito, as an organization of States that did not seek to formally align themselves with either the United States or the Soviet Union, but sought to remain independent or neutral. Every non-aligned state's goal should be to adopt an independent policy based on the coexistence of states with different political and social systems and on non-alignment or should be showing a trend in favor of such a policy. NTI, "Non-aligned movement (NAM)", 31 May 2018, https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/non-aligned-movement-nam/

The key-findings of these case studies should not only be able to answer the research questions but also to provoke further inquiries for future research.

Period and scope of the thesis

In order to comprehend Kuwaiti strategy, and to point out if there is a continuity in its strategic designation, a chronicle of the threats that has confronted and still faces must be recorded.

1.   From 1961, the Kuwaiti independence, till the 1990 Iraqi invasion;

2.   From the Operation Protective Shield and the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War till the US war of 2003;

3.   From the post-2003 US war and the fall of Saddam till 2018; current strategic challenges in the Gulf and the Iranian conundrum.

The Republic of Cyprus is struggling with an ongoing occupation of the one third of its territory. Nicosia is the world's last divided city and Cyprus is among the most heavily militarized states in the world. Turkey, the invading power, bullies over the Cypriot exploration activities in its Exclusive Economic Zone (henceforth EEZ). However, this is not the only predicament of Cyprus. Having a secessionist entity in its northern occupied territories and Turkey's aspirations to become a neo-Ottoman hegemon, the following periodization suits best to examine Cyprus' strategy:

1.   From independence till the 1974 illegal Turkish Invasion;

2.   From 1974 and the illegal Turkish occupation of the island to the EU accession of the Republic of Cyprus;

3.   Cyprus' strategic U-turn: From the post-Annan plan impasse to the formation of its strategic cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond

Outline of the thesis

This thesis consists of four chapters.

Chapter 1 provides a framework for analysis on the survival strategies of small states. It presents small states literature in conjunction with the predicament of this thesis. How the literature so far responds in this thesis main argument? What are the proposed solutions for a small state to survive in a regional conflict? Suggested strategies and tactics will be underpinned in order to highlight literature's lacuna and bring into the light, via the examination of the cases of Kuwait and Cyprus, new approaches for the challenging issue of the small states' survival.

Chapter 2 presents the case of Kuwait. This chapter provides an overview of all regional and international phenomena at the aforementioned periods. Special attention will be paid on the policies of the USA, Great Britain, Iraq, Iran. Great powers' intervention, regional rivalries will demonstrate not only the ongoing power game in the region, but also the implications over the Kuwaiti strategic choices. Kuwait's strategy at each period of time will be thoroughly analyzed. From its domestic politics to regional affairs, the goal is to determine the outcomes of its strategic choices and to conclude on the thesis research questions.

Chapter 3 presents the case of Cyprus. This chapter has two major purposes: first, to investigate the strategic choices and outcomes of the great powers. Apart from Great Britain and the USA, this chapter will focus on the Turkish and the Turkish-Cypriot strategies and tactics from independence till 2018. Second, to comprehend the roots of conflict and motivations behind the decision makers' strategy it is imperative to highlight the leadership. Explaining the decision-making and crisis management of the engaged actors will contribute to understanding their strategies and especially the Cypriot strategy against a revisionist Turkey.

Conclusion

CHAPTER 1

Framework for analysis

> *"However useful it may be for certain purposes to focus on relations among the two to five greatest aggregations of territorially organized power, fifty years ago I learned that there is a great deal more to world politics than politics among the first-ranking nation-states."*
>
> William T.R. Fox. 1986[18]

1.1. Introduction

For a great period of time, great powers' strategies prevailed over many issues in International Relations (henceforth IR) literature. A change in the body of literature happened in the early of the 20th century when research started to shed light on small powers. After WWII and before the end of the Cold War, the terms "small powers", "small states", "weak states" were being used indiscriminately to describe these actors.[19] Considering the milestone of 1960, when many countries gained their independence because of the decolonization and the end of the Cold War, these two historic events resulted in focusing on examining these actors of the international system.[20]

The end of the Cold War marked a new era in the IR literature, since numerous small states emerged as the USSR collapsed and the international arena undergone major changes. Hence the need to explore these actors that were obliged to survive in the new world order.

Studying small states contributes to the apprehension of their possibilities and abilities except for the well-known vulnerabilities and weaknesses. Till today there is a body of literature based on both successes and failures: on the one hand, research presents how these non-powerful actors succeeded and survived despite their power insufficiency, and on the other, there are scholars that underline disadvantages, relative strength, limitations and the

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[18] W H Wriggins, *Dynamics of regional politics: four systems on the Indian ocean rim*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1992.

[19] O B Cappis, *Die Idee des Kleinstaates im Deutschland des 19.* Jahrhunderts, Basel ,1923., E Sieber, *Die Idee des Kleinstaates bei den Denkern des 18.* Jahrhunderts in Frankreich und Deutschland, Basel, 1920. W Kaegi,"Der Typus des Kleinstaates im europauischen Denken", Neue Schweizer Rundschau. N Amstrup, "The Perennial Problem of Small States: A Survey of Research Efforts", *Cooperation and Conflict,* XI, 1976, 163-182. pp.163. 40, W E Rappard, "Small States in the League of Nations", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 49, 1934, pp. 544-575.

[20] As Amstrup has put it "the field of small state theory has not been lacking in contributions." Amstrup, p.178.

primacy of great powers as well. In short, IR literature introduces an optimistic and a pessimistic view.

The end of the Cold War brought about a growing interest in regional security· what may start as a territorial dispute can have negative spillover effects on regional and international security. Regional security is critical for the small states. Since they have a narrow scope of interests and they are more vulnerable to regional threats, especially those coming from powerful actors in their neighborhood, small states are forced to focus on the subsystem to which they belong. Small states are system ineffectual, but the effect of the international system on them is inversely proportional.[21] Thus, the study of small states fills the void in IR literature especially in regional conflicts where small states' survival and interests are focused. The more we explore this field of IR theory, the merrier we introduce new ways to approach small states and the novelty to demonstrate possible patterns of their behavior that, according to scholars, differs from great powers.[22]

The end of bipolarity did not bring an end to the great powers' interference, as it will be showed in this thesis, which deals with events that have occurred in two different international systems; a bipolar and a multipolar. In fact, great powers' antagonism not only thrives in regional conflicts, but a situation can be further entangled by the struggle of regional powers. Hence, a mixture of national interests, most of the times contrasting ones, triggers disputes among regional players.

This chapter aims at presenting the literature of small states. The reader will be introduced into a presentation of the literature that illustrates small states' survival. The literature on small states provides the appropriate tools to analyze the strategic and domestic environment, small states range of options and their strategic limitations. The presentation of the recommended strategies, tactics and means that can empower the weaker part and alleviate the power disparity, will provide to the reader on the one hand, the literature's framework so far, on the other, it will underscore the literature's lacuna.

All in all, to present the framework for analysis, the quest for the definition of small states will be referred. Both the definition and the characteristics that literature attributes to

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[21] M I Handel, *Weak states in the international system*, Frank Cass, 1981. pp.21-22.
[22] cf. P R Baehr, "Review: Small States: A Tool for Analysis", *World Politics,* Vol. 27, No. 3, Apr., 1975, pp. 456-466, B Thorhallsson, "The Size of States in the European Union: Theoretical and Conceptual Perspectives", *Journal of European Integration*, 28, 1, 2006, pp. 7–13., M A East, "Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models", *World Politics*, Vol. 25, No. 4, Jul., 1973., pp. 556-576.

them is important to understand how these actors adopt strategies and behave in regional conflicts. Theoretical approaches to regional conflicts are useful to draw results on the small state's predicament of this study.

Small states literature presents strategies and means to empower themselves, since their primary trait is the incompetence in material power. Nevertheless, when it comes to their survival in regional conflicts, this thesis aspires to question literature's consistency, since it does not give the sense of a coherent and comprehensive tool to analyze these less powerful actors that often found themselves entangled in a regional conflict directly or indirectly. Should the theoretical conundrum be answered, the main issue: how a small state can draw, borrow and retain in its possession the strength of a great power to secure its survival will come into prominence.

1.2. On definition

A small state is an "autonomous entity with its own unique psychological as well as behavioural characteristics and modes that distinguish it from large states let alone the great powers. … while there does not exist a single definition of the small state recognised by all, … the significant fact from the standpoint of this inquiry is that the smallness of the state, i.e., its limited power, generates a substantive difference between the problems and constraints, the alternatives and policy options faced by a small state as opposed to a large one."[23]

Small states scholars are often concerned with the timeless question of the definition.[24] Which state is small? Is it small and weak? What is a micro-state? Till today scholars have not

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[23] E Karsh, *Neutrality and small states,* London and New York, Routledge, 1991, pp.3-4.

[24] In early studies scholars use the term "small power", e.g. R L Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, New York and London, Columbia University, 1968., A Baker Fox, *The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in WWII*, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1959., R Vayrynen R, "On the Definition and Measurement of Small Power Status", *Cooperation and Conflict*, V,I 1971, 91-102. We could have avoided this complicated and time-consuming effort of the definition by endorsing the view that simply defines these states as non-great powers. This definition goes hand in hand with the historical developments of the 19th and 20th century, when new states emerged due to decolonization and the break-up of empires. Any discussion on size, is about a comparative concept, where any attempt to define small states precisely can only be arbitrary. This is something that most scholars agree with. Of great importance is also the concept of contextual effects, since the context, sub regional system, in which these states are acting in a given time or a situation, may bear influence upon the definition or upon what falls into this category. I B Neumann & S Gstohl, "Lilliputians in Gulliver's World: Small States in International Relations",

agreed upon a common definition or the principal criteria that define a small state.[25] There is a great variety of definitions that encompasses various aspects of small states characteristics to define this category. Common ground is that they are not great powers; their resources are limited; vulnerability is inherent. Scholars have attempted to define these actors in many ways. There are quantitative approaches that are based on numbers as population, land area, etc. Undoubtedly using, for example, population as an indication to categorize small states is imperfect and inadequate, since there are other parameters as location or position in the international system that this approach leaves behind.

The perception approaches that are rooted in constructivism attempt to define small states by linking these actors' behavior with perceptions as state's image, its conduct of behavior, leader's perceptions etc. This attempt does not assist in a crystal-clear definition. Also, there is the behavioral approach that tries to underline small state's behavior. However, it is bold to define small states based on behavioral characteristics as smallness, limitations, or lack of influence.[26] In addition, there are many exempla in the IR literature that display small states that have managed to survive against all odds and against their limited capabilities.[27] The relational approach which gives rise to the concept that smallness is relative and dependent on a specific spatiotemporal context. In other words, a small state may not be categorized as small in a different regional system and in the absence of a more powerful neighbor. Finally, the residual approaches makes a distinction between the great powers and all the other powers in the international system.

All in all, there are numerous definitions and approaches that attempt to define and associate a definition with the small state's essence. In reality it is complex to clearly

Reykjavik, Centre for Small State Studies, University of Iceland, 2004, p.4, as quoted in B Thorhallsson & A Wivel, "Small States in the European Union: What Do We Know and What Would We Like to Know?", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Volume 19, Number 4, December 2006. p.653., Ingebritsen et al.(eds), *Small States in International Relations*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, Reykjavik, University of Iceland Press, USA, 2006, p.6.

[25] For a comprehensive presentation on the definition, see R Pedi, pp.18-44.

[26] There is a broad category of definitions that bases on quantitative and qualitative criteria or even a combination of these variables.B Thorhallsson, "The Size of States in the European Union: Theoretical and Conceptual Perspectives", *Journal of European Integration,* 28, 1, 2006, pp. 8–14. A Clive & N Nugent, "Introduction: Small States and the European Union", *Current Politics and Economics of Europe,* Volume 11, Number 1, 2002, pp.1-10., p.2-3, R Vayrynen, p.99.

[27] E Inbar, "The Future of Israel Looks Good", *The Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies*, 18 April 2018, http://jiss.org.il/en/inbar-future-israel-looks-good/, V Ingimundarson, "A Western Cold War: The crisis in Iceland's Relations with Britain, the United States, and NATO, 1971-74", *Diplomacy & Statecraft* , 14(4),2010, pp 94-136., E Bjol, "The Power of the Weak", *Cooperation and Conflict*, Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, 3(2), 1968, pp 157-158., A Baker Fox.

accomplish such a task. However, all attempts seek to explain questions on their survival despite being vulnerable, on punching above their weight despite power disparity. "Scholars agree on which states are small, yet they use different paths to approach smallness."[28] This thesis will be parsimonious on defining these actors. As Amstrup has put it:

> "In the greater part of the literature, it seems to be assumed that given a satisfactory definition of an independent variable, viz. size, it is also possible to predict something about some dependent variable, viz. the 'behavior' of small states. But, obviously, this dependent variable is no less elusive than the independent variable of 'size'."[29]

Therefore, I conclude that: "… it is impossible to define any of the groups of states in the international hierarchy in one concise, precise, and elegant statement. In terms of strength, states are not static entities. Their position in the continuum is constantly being challenged, tested and changed."[30]

"All such limits are highly artificial", states Handel in his attempt to justify his choice on "weak states", regarding the quantitative or qualitative restrictions on the categorization of small states.[31] Nevertheless, definition is not a precondition or an obstacle to examine the way these states pursue their strategic goals. Whether a small state will be an active or a passive actor is not determined by its size. Relative power is best calculated when we take into consideration geographical position, challenges, proximity to an enemy or a friend, threats, and whether the possesed and available power corresponds to a state's objectives.[32] In conclusion, it will not be an exaggeration to talk about the elusiveness of the key concept of small states.[33]

To sum up, this thesis defines small states as these powers that are unable to ensure their security by themselves due to their inherent vulnerability. The fact that small states have a narrow scope of interests, forces them to focus on the regional subsystem to which they belong. Finally, it should not be forgotten the fact that small states are system ineffectual but

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[28] R Pedi, p.44.
[29] N Amstrup, p.165.
[30] M I Handel, p.48.
[31] M I Handel, p.31. Important is his observation that while trying to define these actors we compare them with the powerful players of the international system, albeit it is more essential to compare with weak ones. pp.36-7.
[32] M I Handel, p.52.
[33] N Amstrup, p.178. P R Baehr stresses the «insufficiency of the concept as an analytical tool" in P R. Baehr, p.466.

the effect of the international system on them is inversely proportional.[34]

1.3. On small states' characteristics and strategies

In an attempt to illustrate the dynamic of a small state in a regional sub-system and to add a theoretical dimension on the strategies of small states on how to draw the great power in, it is important to highlight what characteristics and behavior in regional conflicts each school of thought attributes to these less powerful actors. To unfold the immense literature on small states, the following literature review will present the main points that small states scholars have focused on. The critical questions that need to be answered are: if there is a distinctive pattern of behavior and why under similar circumstances the outcomes of the small states' strategies are different.

As it has been mentioned above, small states' weakness is the one that shapes their behavior that, consequently, distinguishes them from the other powers of the international system. As Rappard underlines, it is not because they are more saintly but because they are less apt to be successful sinners.[35] Distinct behavior comes "not from any qualitative difference between small states and others but from limitations their smallness places upon their capacity to implement significant decisions in foreign policy".[36] Therefore, an inquiry into the following issues must be made: do small states project distinctive patterns of behavior? Are small states able to dominate their external environment via specific capabilities or strategies? What does it take for a small state to prevail not only by its own means but also by exploiting a great power? Under what circumstances is this possible? What are the pros and cons of participating in international organizations and alliances as strategic options? How decisive is the role of leadership in ensuring national interest? Are there proper means and strategies that lead to the manipulation of the great power for their own benefit?

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[34] M I Handel, pp.21-22.
[35] W E Rappard, pp 574.
[36] R Purnell, *The Society of States; an Introduction to International Politics,* London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973.p.98-99.

The literature of small states covers a wide range of topics: from the definition of small states, which is a controversial theoretical topic, as it has been analyzed above, to their characteristics; advantages and disadvantages of their size -territorial, population, armed forces- strategies; participation and exercising influence in international organizations and institutions; their position in the international system and more. The main issues in the early studies of the 20th century revolved around how they secure their national interest, the implications of their smallness and their survival.[37] Small states literature in the Cold War era was preoccupied with security issues, their position in a bipolar international system, opportunities and survival strategies.

Small states literature of the post-Cold War era blossomed because of the new world order. Small states proliferation after the USSR disintegration as well as the regional integration in the European continent, prompted researchers to pay attention to systemic changes and to illustrate whether their size is associated with a specific behavior. Security concerns and their position in the international system dominated this era's literature. At this era, literature introduces small states as actors who are interested in general interest and fight for it. They are peaceful entities, unlike great powers who are contemplated in terms of power and competition.[38] Thus, small states are portrayed as aid donors[39], bargainers, balancers, mediators, as successful agenda-setters and world norms influencers, advocates for human rights, norm-entrepreneurs. They are presented to project diplomatic skills, bearing good reputation or use their good reputation to enhance their position, even cultivate this rosy image in order to play an active role, and as mediators, for example in the international arena. Swiss foreign policy is highly connected with its role as a peacemaker. Meanwhile, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Iceland are presented as exemplary small states that thrive as norm entrepreneurs in international arena.[40] All the above-mentioned characteristics that

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[37] cf. A Baker Fox

[38] cf. J Duursma, "Micro-states: The Principality of Liechtenstein", in Ingebritsen et al., eds, pp.89-146., C S Browning, "Small, Smart and Salient? Rethinking Identity in the Small States Literature", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 19:4, 669-684, 2006, p.674.

[39] J S Hoadley, "Small States as Aid Donors", *International Organization*, Vol. 34, No. 1, Winter, 1980, pp. 121-137.

[40] C Ingebritsen, "Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia's Role in World Politics", *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association* 31(1):11-23, 2002, A Graf & D Lanz, "Conclusions: Switzerland as a paradigmatic case of small-state peace policy?". Swiss Polit Sci Rev, 19: 410-423. 2013, doi:10.1111/spsr.12048

literature attributes to small states can contribute to exert influence and thus maximize their power since they lack in material power.

Small states surpass their limited resources by acquiring skills and knowledge on issues that make them experts, even compensate their vulnerability by fostering activity in various economic fields as offshore banking. They pursue positive actions in the international society, have more room for maneuver, more social power, good economic performance,[41] exemplary domestic policy, leadership and good governance. Scandinavian states' political stability is often appraised and noted as an important foreign policy asset. Singapore and Switzerland are two small states that excel at governance, economic competitiveness, significant military capabilities, strong political leadership and long-term planning.[42]

Smallness is not such a negative trait since it encourages flexibility and hence, they are more effective in decision-making. Meanwhile, diplomatic mediation[43] and diplomacy in general are regarded as key policy tools. Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia are four small states that rely heavily on their diplomatic skills to adapt to turbulent times.[44] Literature also focuses extensively on small states' voting behavior and on their possibility of maximizing opportunities via their participation in international organizations and institutions, even on their impact upon the international agenda.[45] Common ground of the above-mentioned is that small states are not "mini versions" of great powers, but that they may have different objectives and policies worth studying.[46] Finally, a great amount of literature is about the struggle of a small state *vs* a great power.[47] Czechoslovakia is a well-known case study of a

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[41] A Payne, "Small states in the global politics of development", *The Round Table*, 93:376, 623-635.

[42] R P Barston, *The Other Powers: Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States*. London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1973, J A K Hey, ed., *Small States in the World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior*, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003, I Kouskouvelis, "'Smart' leadership in a small state: The case of Cyprus" in S N Litsas & A Tziampiris, eds., *The Eastern Mediterranean in Transition: Multipolarity, Power and Politics*, London, Ashgate Publishing pp. 93-117., Y Guo & W J Jie, eds, *Singapore and Switzerland: Secrets to Small State Success*. World Scientific, 2016.

[43] A Chong, "Small state soft power strategies: virtual enlargement in the cases of the Vatican City State and Singapore", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 23:3, 2010, pp.383-407.

[44] M Jazbec, "Small States and Diplomacy: An Indispensable, though Much Diversified Relation." Halduskultuur - Administrative Culture 11 (1), 2006, 66-83.

[45] J W Lamoreaux & D J. Galbreath, "The Baltic States As 'Small States': Negotiating The 'East' By Engaging The 'West'" *Journal of Baltic Studies*, 39:1, 1-16, 2008, p.11., B Thorhallsson & Anders Wivel, p.1., A Clive & N Nugent., pp.1-10.

[46] Ingebritsen et al., eds, *Small States in International Relations*, Seattle, p.16.

[47] D Vital, *The survival of small states: studies in small power/great power conflict*, London, Oxford University Press, 1971,

small state against a more powerful state, Germany. The example of Czechoslovakia highlights the importance of a sufficient internal and external security for the small state.[48]

Nevertheless literature presents many exempla of small states regarding their limits, capabilities, successes and failures on addressing a threatening opponent. From each case the reader extracts strategies and possible outcomes of behaviors under certain circumstances.

Literature, especially of the early ages, pinpoints the weaknesses of small states on managing their external relations since their margin for error is limited. In addition, their impact on great powers and the international system is also limited. This is an assumption underlined both by scholars of Grand Theory as well as by the small state scholars. The strategic importance of Cuba to the USA and former's limited economic capability are some of Cuba's foreign policy primary problems.[49]

Small states literature associates smallness with limited interests.[50] Literature presents studies that indicate successful examples of small states that, in the majority, are placed in their regional system. However, the peculiarity lies in the fact that, despite the success that literature introduces, not all small states manage to accomplish their aim. Cyprus struggles to avert the legitimization of a secessionist state in its northern occupies territories. Kuwait's foreign policy collapsed the moment it was annexed by Iraq, as it will be showed in this thesis. Ergo, does literature answer comprehensively the question if there is a distinct behavior? For Rothstein "there are certain factors which have led to similar patterns of behavior among nearly all Small Powers, despite their differences."[51] Handel contends that there is difficulty in formulating general laws in order to establish a behavior of the weak state.[52] Nevertheless, literature renders some characteristics that can attribute distinct behavior; great concern on ensuring survival, narrow scope of interests, less freedom of activity, passivity, vulnerability.

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[48] Czechoslovakia did sustain for a notable period of time a war against Germany, however its leadership is what intrigues mostly and can be used as a lesson-learned on the significance of leadership for a small state. D Vital, *The survival of small states: studies in small power/great power conflict*, London, Oxford University Press, 1971, pp.13-53.
[49] H J Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power Peace*, brief edition, revised by Kenneth W. Thompson, McGraw-Hill, USA, 1993., K N Waltz, *Theory of International Politics,* Waveland Press, Inc., Illinois, 1979., R O Keohane, "Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics", *International* Organization, 23 (2), pp 291–310, 1969.,pp 291–310., H Mouritzen & A Wivel, eds, *The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration*, London, Routledge, 2006, R P Barston, ed., *The other powers: Studies in the foreign policies of small states*, G. Allen and Unwin, 1973, pp.210-251.
[50] B Thorhallsson, *The role of small states in the European Union*, Routledge, 2017, P J Katzenstein, *Small states in world markets: Industrial policy in Europe*, Cornell University Press, 1985, R P Barston.
[51] R L Rothstein, p.24.
[52] M I Handel, p.106.

Usually they are considered as peaceful actors. However, they do use force, but not in the frequency and to the extent that great powers are able to do so.

Small states' narrow scope of interests is an advantage from the point of view that they focus on fewer issues, hence paying attention or even becoming experts on specific areas, as literature suggests. However, they do go after their long-term interests. A critical detail is that they can not implement any ambitious goal without mobilizing external aid. Small states like Austria and Switzerland may be considered as advanced and welfare states but they still do not have the adequate hard power to cope with the evolving up-to date warfare.[53] External balancing is vital especially in conflict where external assistance "is the result of the much smaller war potential of the weak states as compared to that of the great powers."[54] Keeping in mind this trait in conjunction with the fact that small powers are preoccupied with regional developments, what are the suggested strategies for survival in regional conflicts?

Inherent vulnerability compels a rational actor to seek for empowerment through internal and external balancing. Internally, it must be militarily, politically and economically strong enough to withstand any pressure as well as to turn any attack to be unworthy. Suffice to say that every aspect of its economic life is highly dependent on its political relations. From trade and foreign assistance to arms sales, any political decision on economy has implications on a wide spectrum of a state's agenda. Needless to say, that a robust economy is a sine qua non to maintain and develop effective defense.

Internal balancing is, on the one hand, a safe option for empowerment, on the other, is not capable of working successfully in the long-term, especially when it comes to regional conflicts, and certainly the prolonged ones. "Defence in depth is not a viable strategy"[55] due to its limited capabilities. Henceforth, the question that is being raised is: given the limited resources and the fact that a small state is incapable to withstand a prolonged conflict, how reliable is the option of military alliances?

Location is a determinant in the small state-great power equation. "Proximity to strong powers has always created vulnerability to pressure from larger neighbours, while control of

[53] C Gebhard, "Is Small Still Beautiful? The Case of Austria", Swiss Political Science Review 19.3, 2013, pp. 279-297.
[54] M I Handel, 103.
[55] D Vital, *The inequality of states: a study of the small power in international relations*, Clarendon Press, 1967.p.60.

strategic routes and resources has enhanced the bargaining positions of small states."[56] The end of the Cold War and the subsequent changes in the power distribution accentuated fears coming from regional powers since the latter gained more freedom of action. Meanwhile, revisionist powers' aspirations did not fade with the decline of the two superpowers' antagonism. Russia's interest in the Caucasus and central Asia is still fervent while Turkey and Iran pursue a revisionist agenda. Thus, the security dilemma of small states became more acute.

A small state's conflict against a powerful, revisionist opponent is a conflict over its survival. The former must by all means avoid such conflicts. However, when this is inevitable, all options must be put in the spotlight. Hence, conflict management is vital. The aim of the small state is twofold; on the one hand, to diminish the intensity of the conflict to save resources, and on the other, to heighten the value of the risk of a protracted conflict, if not to attack from first place. The defense of a small state itself is not sufficient to ensure endurance in the battle. The duration of war cannot be predicted. Usually it surpasses the expected time thus exhausting the available resources without guaranteeing a successful outcome. Furthermore, the deterrence of a small state should be effective enough not only to deter the opponent from engaging in a war of attrition, but also to project strong defense so that an attack against it to be costly and inefficient. A small state should also keep in mind that, under circumstances, another power might interfere in favor of the opponent. Literature suggests strategies to enhance small states position: from effective defense and self-reliance to alliances -formal and informal, equal or unequal-, and the ability to influence a great power to interfere. Also, diplomatic, military support, patron-client relations, adoption of a passive or an active strategy and balancing or bandwagoning, under conditions, are introduced options.[57]

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[56] E Inbar & G Sheffer, eds., *The national security of small states in a changing world*, Frank Cass, London, Portland OR, 1997, p.2.

[57] A Wolfers *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics,* Baltimore, London, The John Hopkins Press, 1962., D Vital, *The inequality of states: a study of the small power in international relations*, R L Rothstein, E Reiter & H Gärtner, Ed., *Small states and alliances,* Heinz Physica-Verlag, 2001, V Krause & J D Singer, "Minor Power, Alliances, and Armed Conflicts: Some Preliminary Patterns" in E Reiter, & H Gärtner, Ed., *Small states and alliances*. ed., Physica-Verlag, 2001, C Carney, "International patron -client relationships: a conceptual framework", *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Summer 1989, vol. 24, no.2. 42-55, D Rodman, "Patron-client dynamics: Mapping the American-Israeli relationship", *Israel Affairs*, 4:2, 26-46, 1997, DOI:10.1080/13537129708719466, C C. Shoemaker & J Spanier, *Patron-Client State Relationships. Multilateral Crises in the Nuclear Age*, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1984, Ifestos, "Patron-Client Relations in the Emerging Security Environment", *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations,* Vol.14, No.2, 1992., S M Walt, *The origins of alliance*. Cornell University Press, 1987.

Kenneth Waltz's balance of power theory contends that when states feel threatened, they tend to balance against the stronger and so they forge alliances with weaker parts (external balancing). Furthermore, the actors tend to strengthen their own capabilities (internal balancing). Stephen Walt denotes that states balance against threatening states and coalitions. So far balancing against a threat is a normative strategy for Realism. Nevertheless, the policy that threatened actors will adopt as balancing or bandwagoning, depends on the actor's position in the international system, the resources of the great powers as well as their offensive capabilities, aggressive intentions and geographic proximity. Balancing a threat is not easy to be accomplished especially when it comes to small powers. In general, balancing and bandwagoning are not efficient strategies for many powers in the international system let alone for vulnerable states. In any case, the external environment must be calculated thoroughly and each actor's capabilities must also be considered carefully. In other words, a combination of systemic and unit-levels variables affects how a state will respond to a threat.[58]

An array of strategic options are available to the small state to secure its survival: participation in alliances and international organizations and institutions that hold a security agenda, treaties, patron-client relations, even dependence on a more powerful state and nuclear deterrence. Denmark is following an active policy in NATO for decades while Sweden, that after WWII chose the path of neutrality and the maintenance of strong-armed forces, during the decade of 1990 showed a strong preference for international cooperation and thus became more involved in non-military alliances. Sweden through this non-participation in military alliances is an active small state and an agenda-setter in humanitarian issues and conflict prevention. Sweden also aims at influencing common security policies via its participation in international organizations and institutions.[59]

Neoclassical realism expects that great powers will show a preference over policies to maximize security. Thus, it is in their intention to favor relative gains. When a small power turns to a great power for help there is a danger to lessen its freedom of maneuver. The latter forces

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[58] When designing a strategy a restrictive strategic environment leans towards less action since it entails systemic impediments. In a permissive environment there is more room to choose among policies as balancing or bilateral agreements, alliances against a common enemy, etc. But as it has been highlighted, it is more than the international system itself. The intervening domestic variables influence defense and foreign policy strategy formation. Of all those that have been mentioned, perceptions of external threats by leadership and elites is critical as well as social cohesion. See R L Schweller, "Unanswered threats: A neoclassical realist theory of underbalancing." International security 29.2, 2004, pp.159-201., Bandwagoning is assumed more likely for the small powers. S M Walt, pp.17-32, 147-53, 173-5.
[59] E Reiter & H Gärtner, Ed., pp.89-111.

the small state to act smart, to form a strategy that it will make use of its assets as strategic location, resources, its good economic and military status as well as the type of threat that affects also the great power's interests.

When a great power is not actively engaged in other regions and its interests are at stake, then there is a good chance for the small state to maximize its influence on the great power and draw it in its cause. Nevertheless, a small state should minimize the implications of drawing in a great power. Such an act implicates not only its limited room from maneuver, but also it can deteriorate its position in its regional system. There are plenty of examples in international relations on small states that attempt to engage a great power by offering military or political benefits as military establishments or voting devotion in international organizations and institutions. Since 1955 the USSR exploited the Western absence from the Middle East. By establishing patron-client relations with many Arabs states, the USSR strengthened its military presence in the warm waters of the Mediterranean. Meanwhile, Finland is known for making peace with the enemy. The perceived German threat to Russia forced the USSR to keep a strong interest over Finland. After the end of the WWII, the Finish had established good relations with the Russians. In the case of post WWII Finland, this small state chose to submit to the great power who's in sphere of influence fell. Thus, it succumbed to the USSR but prevented a military disaster and its occupation.[60]

"Military force is not everything in the relations between states, but where there is both the capacity and the will to employ it, it necessarily overshadow all else."[61] Having posed as the small state's predicament the survival of small states it goes without saying that military, economic and political power are critical. If a small state is militarily equipped adequately a pre-emptive strike is demonstrated as a deterrence strategy. Japan fought a preventive war against Russia in 1904-1905. Israel did so during the Six-Days War in 1967.[62] In any case it takes military efficiency, a prudent leadership, ability to mobilize political support at home and abroad as well as domestic cohesion.

States that are threatened mostly by neighboring powers usually seek help from extra-regional powerful states. When facing a revisionist opponent, a small state's capability to deal

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[60] D Vital, *The survival of small states: studies in small power/great power conflict*, pp.99-117.
[61] Ibid, p.1.
[62] B Strauss, "Preemptive Strikes and Preventive Wars: A Historian's Perspective", Strategica, Issue 44, August 29, 2017, available at: https://www.hoover.org/research/preemptive-strikes-and-preventive-wars-historians-perspective

with the more powerful is in decline. A small state is literally incapable to employ an attack on its own. Force can by no means be directly employed against the more powerful. To that it should be highlighted that force cannot be also employed directly against a great power. Israel might be conducting surgical strikes in Syria and Lebanon to deter Iranian revisionism, but is Iran able and willing to attack the USA? Hence, a tactic that should immediate be adopted by the small state is to raise high the risk of the cost of being attacked by its revisionist opponent. Raising the value of the stake can be achieved via soft and hard power. However, drawing the great power in the conflict is the most efficient strategy because a great power possesses material capabilities, immunity to military pressures, vast means -military and non-military- to act. The presence of a great power in a regional conflict raises the cost of attacking its protégé. Thus, a small state could deter the revisionist power.

In conclusion, qualified and adequate armed forces, readiness to employ military strength, ability to attract foreign aid and a grand strategy rationally shaped to meet the small state's needs and challenges is the answer to the quest for survival. Also, the most encountered strategic options for small states in regional conflict are to pledge for the support or intervention of a great power or to forge regional coalitions. However, what literature does not accentuate is that "Weak states must learn to 'draw on' or 'borrow' the strength of other states. They will try to manipulate and commit, if they can, the strength of other states (mostly great powers), in order to secure their interests."[63]

Should there is an outcome that we can extract from the aforementioned is that, even under similar circumstances, small states act differently, and the results also are not the desirable ones to secure their interest successfully. Furthermore, there is no general consensus to explain this. Usually scholars seek explanations by setting in the spotlight different aspects of power. Moreover, the way scholars attempt to explain small states strategies differs, since they follow different approaches: there are scholars that focus on power disparity and the international system, on domestic variables even on components of power. Nevertheless, as a general conclusion can be extracted that the impact of the international system upon a small state's behavior is a significant determinant.[64] By observing the changes in the international system, small states subsequently face new challenges, since vulnerability is inherent, and they are called upon to design an efficient strategy accordingly by taking into great consideration

[63] M I Handel, p.120.
[64] R Pedi, pp.49-53, 65.

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changes in the balance of power.

Despite changes in the international system, small states are certainly not handicap. There are strategies to increase their power or even better to influence a great power that will bear their burden and do the job for them. Literature presented tactics and strategies for this purpose. Thus, comprehending international system is a sine qua non in order to design a successful strategy. Also, there are domestic factors that do enhance their position thus making them attractive to great powers; location,[65] resources, diplomatic skills, a strong economy, the regime type, military capabilities, leadership etc. To conclude, a combination of international and domestic variables, under circumstances, can empower a small state.

1.4. Thesis theoretical framework

Small states literature has exhausted issues that revolve around how a small state survive as well as on the components of power that contribute to punch above its weight. Foremost it presents successful paradigms. However, these successful strategies do not seem to be applicable to other states, even when similar conditions exist. The literature of small states in regional conflicts is fragmented, since it is also based on case studies or studies on conflicts in specific regional systems, mostly from the point of view of great powers' competition over a region. As it has been mentioned thoroughly, the international system is the most popular factor to analyze a small state's behavior. Other most referred and relevant to this thesis factors are: geography, history, a state's image, the political system, economy -resources included-.[66] Hence, the theoretical framework needs to be further examined. As Morgenthau has put it "a great power is a state, which is able to have its will against a small state… which

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[65] The importance of location and specifically of not giving up territory is noted in the case of Czechoslovakia in 1938 that accepted to lose strategic frontiers thus surrendering to Anglo-French pressure. The case of Israel on the contrary is against any retreat from territories that considers strategic for its survival as the Golan Heights and an undivided Jerusalem. Royal institute of International Affairs (RIIA), Documents on International Affairs, 1983, ii, p.328, in D Vital, *The survival of small states: studies in small power/great power conflict*, London, Oxford University Press, 1971, The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, "Might at a critical moment. National security policy for Israel", September 2019, Jerusalem, Israel.
[66] Η Ι Κουσκουβέλης, *Εισαγωγή στις Διεθνείς σχέσεις*, Αθήνα, Εκδόσεις Ποιότητα, 2004, p.149.

in turn is not able to have its will against a great power".[67]

Regions do express their own dynamics. Exploring regional systems is important in order to examine the "why" and "how" an external actor decides to intervene as well as the regional actors' strategic challenges and choices. The concept of a region is relative. This thesis adopts the definition that a region is "marked not only by certain boundaries of some salience but by discernible similarities within these boundaries".[68] Nevertheless, many regional systems as the Gulf and the Eastern Mediterranean are important because they can be affected and penetrated by economic and political means, by military activities from outside actors as well as by ideological, cultural, religious means, even by a common historical background of the surrounding states.[69] Hence, regional systems should be treated as open systems that can impact upon the world affairs. To this, it should be added other domestic and ideational factors as political culture, socio-economic status, perceptions on identity and the decision-making progress as well as leadership's determinant role. Thus, a researcher can get an analytical framework for analysis to extract its conclusions.

On the whole, this study attempts to research in depth small states' survival in regional conflicts against a revisionist opponent by combining the examination of the strategic environment and the strategy of the small state at a designated period of time. Having set three periods that cover almost 70years of every case study, the researcher has the opportunity to highlight and to present the strategies of the main actors and the interrelation between regional and outside actors. To achieve that, neoclassical realism provides the most suitable and efficient theoretical framework.

The wide range of interests in many sub-regional systems makes great powers skeptical to get involved in a regional conflict. A great power can be interested and involved in a regional conflict due to uncertainties over its future in a sub-regional system. The more she is interested the merrier for the small power that hopes to drag her in. Hence, here lies the importance of neoclassical realism; it incorporates internal and external factors. It is placed in the broader tradition of the Realist school of thought but it also incorporates variables of Innenpolitik and

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[67] H J Morgenthau, *Science: Servant or Master?,* New York, New American Library, 1972 as quoted in I B Neumann, "Lilliputians in Gulliver's World?: small states in international relations", 2004

[68] P Hansen, "Adaptive Behaviour of Small States: The Case of Denmark and The European Community", In P J McGowan, ed., Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, Vol.2, Sage Publication, Inc., 1974. p .153.

[69] G Nonneman, "The Three Environments of Middle East Foreign Policy Making and Relations with Europe", in G Nonneman, ed., *Analyzing Middle East Policies and the Relationship with Europe*, Routledge, 2005. p.23.

constructivism. Thus, it draws from Realism the importance of power as distribution of power but its explanatory power lies in the introductory of cognitive variables as the perception and misperception of systemic pressures and states' intentions. It highlights the importance of domestic variables that affect the power and freedom of action of the decision makers in foreign policy. In other words, it denotes the importance of an inside-out analysis. It assumes that states respond to the international system's uncertainties "by seeking to control and shape their external environment. … To understand the way states interpret and respond to their external environment, they say, one must analyze how systemic pressures are translated through unit level intervening variables such as decision-makers' perceptions and domestic state structure. In the neoclassical realist world leaders can be constrained by both international and domestic politics." [70]

Neoclassical realism has the predictive and explanatory power to address the theoretical problems that this thesis presents. This approach identifies variables at several levels of analysis: from systemic constraints and great powers' interference to regional security and the decision-making of all actors involved, great powers and small states, as well as the importance of leadership. Consequently, it provides to the researcher a comprehensive framework for analysis for all kinds of powers of the international system.

The international arena is viewed as an anarchic state-system that its actors are engaged in never-ending struggle for survival. Ensuring power and influence due to uncertainty on each other's intentions and capabilities is vital. Among neoclassical realism's fundamental principles that add value to its explanatory power are: the importance of international structure; "states construct their foreign security policies primarily with an eye to the threat and opportunities that arise in the international system, which shapes each state's range of policy options."[71] Thus, the behavior of a state must first and foremost be explained by its position in the international system and its relative material capabilities. However, key domestic level variables as leader image, strategic culture, the state-society relations and domestic institutions are the quintessence to highlight structural realism's inefficiency in explaining decision-making and leadership's crucial role in shaping a state's strategy. In

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[70] R Gideon, "Review: Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy", *World Politics*, Vol. 51, No. 1 Oct., 1998, pp. 144-172, p.152, Z Fareed, "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay", *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 1, Summer 1992.
[71] N M Ripsman et all., p.19.

addition, human nature, national morale, misinformation, diplomacy and how leadership perceives systemic stimuli are variables that influence a state's national security behavior. Finally, it contends the "problems of rationality" and the "clarity of systemic signals", meaning that the international system does not shows clearly signals on threats and opportunities.

A state's strategic environment should be placed under scrutiny due to the parameters of uncertainty and lack of clarity. To examine thoroughly a state's strategy and assess its intentions as well as its strategic environment, neoclassical realism introduces four parameters that influence a state's strategy: leader images, strategic culture, state-society relations, domestic institutions. These variables in conjunction with the international stimuli affect the policy selection and the strategy formation of a state since a range of options are available to them as a result of systemic constraints and domestic political imperatives.[72] That said, when a threat is imminent there is less room for unit-level intervening variables according to neoclassical realism. The less intense the threat the greater the role of the domestic variables that influence a state's foreign policy.

To conclude over the outcomes, a researcher should identify the key decision makers that in critical times where involved in and influenced the formulation of foreign policy at that time. Apart from leaders, these can be individuals, experts, prominent figures in a government, even groups of people like lobbies etc. In other words, in a permissive environment, ideology and domestic variable do have a prominent role in shaping foreign policy. When the strategic environment is restrictive, systemic variables prevail over ideational. Ideology prevailed in the USSR when Germany and Japan were defeated and a vacuum of power was created in the Eastern Europe. In that permissive environment the USSR launched its ideological, political and economic "war".

A "permissive" or "restrictive" environment shapes a state's response.[73] In restrictive environments, meaning those that threats and opportunities are imminent, domestic politics matter less. This was the case in the 1967 Six- Days War between Israel and the Arabs when pre-emption seemed to be the most efficient strategy due to the imminent threat. Hence, the argument that leaders do not always respond as rational actors due to an array of reasons as cognitive limits and flaws, historical experiences, domestic variables as decision-making, are

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[72] Ibid., pp. 33-57.
[73] N M Ripsman et all., pp.52-57.

some of those that neoclassical realism identifies and thus it further contributes to adequate explaining international phenomena.

Correlation between time and decision-making is crucial. When there is time to make a decision, there is more room to interfere for more key-players as legislatures, elites, lobbies, interest groups that pursue their interests. In contrast, when time is limited, leader is the main actor that takes the lead. In sum, the main variables that neoclassical realism identifies - strategic culture, state-society relations, national values, culture preference, domestic institutions- all are significant and influence the outcomes.

When trying to illustrate how states respond to external stimuli, changes in the international system should be attributed to the great powers' grand strategic choices that affect relative power and international outcomes. Power distribution and the type of international system influence the short- and long-term policies of small states because of the interactions among the great powers. For example, a great power's overextension or its attempt to question the status quo can lead to a systemic war since the other powers will attempt to balance. Nevertheless, the black box must be opened. As neoclassical realism contends even these structural changes have their roots in the great powers' decision-making process on pursuing an aggressive or restraining strategy. This goes without saying that everything should be examined in the light of time and short-term or long-term strategies. When it comes to the former, it is a matter of highlighting all actors involved in foreign policy. When it comes to the latter "it takes time for the grand strategic choices of one or more great powers to affect the grand strategies of others and more time for the interaction of great power grand strategies to help determine systemic outcomes."[74] International structure does influence the systemic outcomes but "the international distribution of power rarely dictates a single behavioral response or grand strategic approach for states to pursue."[75]

For all these reasons and as it will be demonstrated in this thesis, time frame is important to explain the outcomes. In addition, domestic variables will further shed light to the adoption of specific grand strategies by great and small powers. The case of Saddam Hussein who was a dictator and provoked the USA before and after the Cold War, meaning in a bipolar and a multipolar international system, is a case in point to showcase the interactions of states, not only in the strict approach of structural realism but also to present the outcomes

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[74] N M Ripsman et all., p.88.
[75] N M Ripsman et all., pp.148-9.

of states' interaction. States do act within a given type of international system that limits their foreign policy choices and affect international outcomes. However, over the long-term when domestic variables are interfering as the nature of leadership that can mobilize state resources and challenge the status quo, balancing, expansion or retreat is the outcome of many parameters than keeping it strictly in the frame of structural theory.

All in all, neoclassical realism is the most efficient approach to explain state policies, short-term or long-term. How a state response to international structure? How a state exploits the opportunities and responses to international threats in every type of international system? Given the primacy of systemic constraints, what domestic variables are salient that contribute in understanding the international phenomena and the decision-making process of small and great powers?

The international system is of great importance to comprehend and analyze a small state's behavior, the differences between these small powers and the great ones and to explain the regional environment via the perceptions and perspectives of all the actors involved. However, it is important to deepen into the domestic politics of each state since domestic affairs affect decisions on foreign policy. As Elman puts it: "any generalized claim for the causal priority of international or domestic explanations of small state behaviour is unwarranted. Both levels of analysis matter because while the international environment influences domestic political choices, these institutional decisions shape foreign policies in later periods".[76] Finally, an examination of the domestic-level variables is needed in order to comprehend the impact of domestic politics on the shaping of a state's grand strategy and simultaneously the challenges and limitations that induces in a small state. From the point of view, both of the great power and the small state in regional conflict, the international system, domestic politics and leadership will be also the framework for analysis.

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[76] M F Elman, "The foreign policies of small states: Challenging neorealism in its own backyard", British Journal of Political Science, 25(2), 1995, pp.171-217.

CHAPTER 2

The case of Kuwait

'Kuwait's future security and the enjoyment of the asset of oil which they did not discover, have not exploited and cannot defend by themselves alone, depends on an ally who will not only help them defend it but respect their ownership of it.'[77]

Introduction

Kuwait, a small state located on the extremely important Persian Gulf, or the Gulf.[78] Mostly known for its vast oil revenues, the US-led operations for its liberation after the annexation from Iraq in 1990, and the US war in Iraq, in 2003, that its implications influenced the whole region. The State of Kuwait is a typical small state; with a total area, only 17,818 sq. km and a population of 2,832,776 (July 2016 est.). Characterized for its "strategic location at head of Persian Gulf", it shares borders with two countries; Iraq (254 km) and Saudi Arabia (221 km) but also faces across the sea Iran, another source of concern for the State of Kuwait.[79]

The history of Kuwait starts in the 17th century when pearl fisherman, traders, and pirates created the Gulf's harbor. The Ottoman as well as Persian Empires allowed the small Kuwaiti communities to develop and create a sea power that proved to be sufficient to protect the Sheikdom at that time.[80] Kuwait, an Arab monarchy, has been ruled by the Al-Sabah dynasty since the 18th century.[81] In 1961, Great Britain granted Kuwait independence, but Kuwait was considered to be important especially after the World War II for both Great Britain and the United States.

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[77] British Ambassador G. Noel Jackson, as quoted in M Joyce, *Kuwait, 1945-1996: An Anglo-American Perspective,* Frank Cass, London-Portland, 1998, p.171.

[78] This thesis will use the term "Gulf" in order to define the region that is also named as the Persian or Arabian Gulf.

[79] CIA the World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/ku.html

[80] L Guazzone, "Kuwait's national security policy and its influence on the Gulf region", *The International Spectator,* 24:2, 63-71, DOI: 10.1080/03932728908456670, 1989, p.63.

[81] The Al-Sabah dynasty that rules Kuwait for centuries, migrated from the Arabian Peninsula with other tribes in 1716. The tribe from which the Al-Sabah family traces their origin is the same to the ruling families of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. This is an important detail to bear in mind in order to affiliate the political relations of these actors. A R Assiri, *Kuwait's Foreign Policy: City-State in World Politics*, Westview Special Studies on the Middle East, Boulder, Cob., Westview Press, 1990., p.2.

Kuwait's security has been challenged many times. The threat of Ottomans before 1899 induced Amir Mubarak Al-Sabah to seek protection from Britain. Sadly, for Kuwait that at that juncture wished to be under British protection, Britain refused to undertake that role.[82] Nevertheless, the increasing interest of many international actors as Germans, Ottomans, Russians for this region, prompted Britain to announce the 1899 agreement between Britain and Kuwait. This was an unquestionable patron-client relation with Great Britain, which was responsible not only for the small state's defense, but also acquired the right to control its foreign policy. In that way, Britain drew a line in the sand to stipulate British primacy in the area. Soon after its independence, Iraq projected its irredentism six days after Kuwaiti independence, when Iraqi President Abdul Karim Qassim, threatened to annex Kuwait. In 1972, Iraq claimed the islands of Warba and Bubiyan. In 1973-74, Iraqi forces moved a step further by occupying part of northern Kuwait. In 1975, they de-escalated by withdrawing from the area. The Arabs mediated in the aforementioned crises.[83]

On August 2nd, 1990, Kuwait founds itself once again being attacked by Iraq. Small Kuwait undoubtedly was not in the position to confront superior Iraq under its own limited power. After several weeks of aerial bombardment, a US-UN led coalition was the answer to the Iraqi attack. A ground assault on February 23rd, 1991, that lasted for four days resulted in Kuwait's liberation. An outcome of the war was the immediate need for oil infrastructure reparation, which costed more than $5 billion.[84]

In 1991, the Al-Sabah family returned to power and made an effort to transform Kuwait into today's Arab monarchy. This domestic choice demanded many political reforms but the decision was not taken lacking directions. Since threats from Iraq reemerged after the 2003 USA-UK war, Kuwait valued highly its relations with the West, especially with the USA, the only power that at that time could diligently protect Kuwait. Hence, this Western kinship was also the reason for its domestic reforms, as the historic election of four women to its National Assembly, in 2009.

Today Kuwait deals in its internal affairs with uprisings on issues of corruption, citizenship and needed reforms. All these resulted in Amir's decision to dissolve the National

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[82] Joyce, pp. ix-x.
[83] M A Tetreault, "Autonomy, necessity, and the small state: ruling Kuwait in the twentieth century", *International Organization* 45.4 (1991): 565-591. p.586.
[84] CIA the World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ku.html

Assembly on seven occasions. Regionally, Kuwaiti security is still challenged by extremists that also compromise its internal security by terrorists' attacks. However, throughout its history, Kuwait has confronted enemies that have sought to destabilize or even subvert its government. Scholar and former senior Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official Graham Fuller has stated "that prior to the 1990 Iraqi invasion, Kuwait maintained a 'rotating enemies list' of countries seeking to dominate, overthrow, or subvert the government". This does not come as a surprise when studying the security environment in the Gulf and the threats that come from Iraq, Iran, Egypt (Nasser-era), and even Saudi Arabia and Syria.[85]

The case of Kuwait is a thought-provoking case study. First of all, an Arab State, Iraq, attacks a sister-state, the city-state of Kuwait, in order to change the regional balance of power and establish a hegemony. An Arab monarchy strives to preserve its Arab identity while cooperates and is protected by the West with defense agreements that voluntarily has agreed with. Kuwait's existence has been questioned a long before its independence and since then it has been challenged and seriously has been threatened almost in every decade after its independence. The small state of Kuwait seems to push for ensuring survival. Its strategic environment includes powerful neighbors, at least more powerful than itself, and its state characteristics are actually disadvantageous to it; inherently vulnerable due to its size; a mainly flat topography; located though in the Middle East along the Persian Gulf, in a strategic location; plus the possession of nine islands. Regional and extra-regional powers throughout the ages have claimed or tried to conquer this small piece of land. Every attempt of them, especially after its independence, worth to be studied, mainly because it will add a more theoretical dimension on illustrating the "how" and "why" this small state addresses every threat, security challenges, regional developments and yet survives.

The literature on Kuwait has covered mostly the Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf wars of 1991 and 2003. The foreign policies of Great Britain and the US in the region and the Arab interaction in the Gulf are also topics through which the small state of Kuwait has been studied. Recently studies have emerged on its foreign and security policy as a small state in the Gulf; its security concerns during the 1991 Gulf war; the impact of the Iraqi invasion and the strategies of great

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[85] W A Terrill, "Kuwaiti national security and the US-Kuwaiti strategic relationship after Saddam", Army War Coll Strategic Studies Inst Carlisle Barracks PA, 2007.p.9-10.

powers in the region have been analyzed thoroughly.[86] This study attempts to fill the gap of the small state of Kuwait in regional conflicts, from independence till 2018, including today's revisionist Iran. It is a holistic approach that its range starts from a bipolar system and ends in a multipolar system, that one great power, the USA, dominates the international system.

This thesis examines the strategic environment by emphasizing on the major developments of every period, as well as on the role of the great powers involved in conjunction with Kuwaiti strategic challenges and preferences. Throughout this whole period the reader is introduced into the dynamics of regional conflicts and their implications on the international system. Through the small states literature Kuwaiti strategy is assessed in every aspect: its posture in the international system; its internal and external affairs; governance; security threats; the importance of possessing assets as location and resources; the capability of influencing regional and extra-regional actors for its benefit. It attempts to critically examine and explain, wherever is feasible, the great powers' and Kuwait's interactions. How and why their relations where formed and developed over time? Finally, through the analysis of the Iraqi invasion and the recent developments in the region, meaning the Iranian nuclear threat and the Saudi-Iranian antagonism, it will be highlighted the impact of the Gulf region on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A mosaic of interrelated and conflicting interests of regional and extra-regional powers shape the politics of this region and all these impact upon the survival of the small state of Kuwait. Henceforth, how Kuwait has managed to survive despite all the aforementioned adversities? How important was the great powers' intervention? Did it manage to make a great power to intervene so as to serve its interests?

In order to comprehend Kuwait's strategy, we have to cite the past and ongoing threats that the State of Kuwait confronts. At this point it must be clarified that in this thesis it is considered as First Gulf War the US-UN led operation for the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 and as Second Gulf War, the US-UK war in Iraq in 2003.

Hence, the periods that have been chosen to be examined are:

1. From 1961 and the Kuwaiti independence till the 1990 Iraqi invasion
2. From the Operation Protective Shield and the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War till the US invasion of 2003;

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[86] See Assiri, K S Almezaini & J M Rickli, eds., *The small gulf states: Foreign and security policies before and after the Arab Spring,* Taylor & Francis, 2016.

3. From the post-2003 US war and the fall of Saddam till 2018; current strategic challenges in the Gulf and the Iranian conundrum.

This chapter, as a whole, places under scrutiny the Anglo-American perspective and the strategy of small Kuwait in that frame. British policies and efforts interests to preserve British interests in the region is a key for understanding Britain's efforts to also engage the USA in the Gulf politics. It is also a key for understanding Kuwaiti vulnerabilities, capabilities, domestic policies and options. The Suez lesson-learned brought about the necessity of having American support in Britain's major political choices. In 1972, the USA became the dominant power in the region, as it happened in many other regions where Britain handed the power over to the USA. Dealing with a blow to its power in the after-Vietnam era, oil was also critical for the American strategic concerns. The USA acted decisively in the case of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Standing as the only superpower after the collapse of the USSR, the USA acted as an advocate for Saudi Arabia and Kuwait when both were threatened by Saddam Hussein. Overall, regional and international developments impelled Kuwait to strengthen and reorganize itself.

2.1. From 1961, the Kuwaiti independence, till the 1990 Iraqi invasion

The following unit is split in two sections: the first tells of the strategic environment in the period following the independence of Kuwait till the annexation by Iraq. In this section, the policies of the great powers as Great Britain and the United States of America are being assessed, as well as the strategies of the regional actors that were the catalysts for regional developments and the fate of Kuwait. The second section explores the strategy of Kuwait at that juncture. The purpose of this unit is to underline the strategy of Kuwait and the role of the major actors, great and regional powers, from the establishment of the state to their posture vis-a-vis Iraqi revisionism that resulted in the annexation of Kuwait. What was the strategy of the great powers regarding the Gulf in a bipolar international system and how their strategic options affected Kuwait? How great powers dealt with Iraqi revisionism? How regional actors accelerated the developments? Did great powers do everything to avoid Iraqi aggression or

did they misunderstand Iraqi intentions? What was Kuwaiti strategy at that time? How Kuwait failed to ensure its survival?

2.1.1. The strategic environment

The under-examination period is marked by the dominance of two great powers sequentially: Great Britain and the United States of America. There is an analogy of these great powers' role in the Gulf during their determining presence in the region in 50s and 60s, 80s and 90s respectively. Great Britain, after granting independence to Kuwait, secured a defense umbrella for small Kuwait. Britain was eager to guarantee the free flow of Kuwaiti oil and to solidify its economic interests in the post-colonization era when its power was declining. Two decades later, the USA was strongly interested in securing oil supplies in the Gulf region and thus prompted the formation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task force in 1980.[87]

In this section, the strategic environment of the Gulf from Kuwaiti independence to its annexation by Iraq is going to be mapped. Starting from the evolution of the Anglo-Kuwaiti relations and the sub-sequent American firm presence in the region, the main concerns of the political actors will be developed as well as their strategies and pursued goals. All the above will be entangled with the regional actors' aspirations and policies that further perplexed the Gulf politics and even had side effect on the encirclement of Israel, during the critical period of the Iraqi invasion. The formulated policies and their results will draw conclusions on: what prompts a superpower to intervene decisively in a regional conflict? What is the impact of a great power's interference on a small state's strategy formation? Finally, regional balance of power and the instrumental role of Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq will be examined thoroughly since their posture triggered regional and extra regional developments.

Mapping the policies of regional actors will address another argument of this thesis, that small state's destiny is mostly determined by its regional environment. Threats in the majority are regional. What strategies are able and efficient for a small state to ensure its

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[87] K P Davis, "Observations on the Rapid Joint Deployment Task Force: Origins, Direction, and Mission", June 1982, The Rand Paper Series, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, R Stables, Relations between Britain and Kuwait, 1957-1963, PhD diss., University of Warwick, 1996., p.2.

survival vis-à-vis a more powerful actor given that they are incapable to defend themselves and hence they need an external actor to do so?

The strategic environment after the 1961 crisis is quite interesting: power competition between Iraq and Egypt for the primacy in the Arab world; the UAR-Jordan-Saudi alliance, and Britain that emerges benefited from the Arab struggle for power. In the 1960s and onwards the USA changed its attitude toward the Gulf and undertook greater role, partially because of the British power in decline. The Anglo-American alliance was not carefree. Britain's interests were foremost focused on ensuring oil flow, sterling and British petroleum companies' profits. The US' interests were not exclusively of economic nature. American interests were bearing on a set of a Cold War considerations, regional peace and stability. The US' oil interests were also based on Iraq and Saudi Arabia, thus viewing the small Gulf sheikdoms as an area of British responsibility. The War in Yemen was also a source of concern for the US, since it had implications in Saudi Arabia, where the USA placed its interests.[88]

An array of events in the 1960s further complicated the regional environment thus attracting great powers' intervention. From the Yemen war to the 1967 Six Days War, superpowers' interest expanded to the whole Middle East area. Meanwhile, this decade was not a trouble-free period for the state of Kuwait both domestically and regionally.[89] A thorough analysis of the strategic environment of this first period cannot exclude the Egyptian factor. Nasser who was a leading figure in 1960s due to his struggle to prevail in the Arab competition in the region, tried also to influence the Gulf and consequently Kuwaiti politics. Ergo, before analyzing the strategies of Great Britain, the USA and Iraqi revisionism, it is valuable to examine firstly the role of Egypt and its implications in the region.

While the Iraqi-Egyptian competition for power in the region was intense the Kuwaiti-Egyptian axis had also an interesting impact on the regional events. Before independence, relations with Egypt were strong and high-powered; high influential Egyptian teachers inculcated nationalist ideas to the new generations of Kuwaitis especially in the pre-independence era. A repercussion of this was a rise in attending Egyptian universities than British. Egypt, apart from enhancing its status in the region, kept a lid on the Kuwaiti oil. Nasser and its growing influence were becoming a serious obstacle for the British designs in the

[88] Stables, pp.220-2, 229.
[89] A side effect of the economic development was a social rising and especially the middle class.

region. This was a double-edged sword for the Kuwaiti ruler. On the one hand, he had to keep up with the Arab identity, especially after the Suez crisis, on the other, Britain was the only external power to ensure its security. Despite Nasser's anti-British stance, the Anglo-Kuwaiti relation emerged intact by virtue of the British interest, not only in the region but also in keeping the ruling family in charge.[90]

Kuwaiti independence was not granted recklessly by the British. Britain was gradually granting autonomy to Kuwait through the latter's membership in international organizations. During the 1960s, discussions were held in London regarding the status of Kuwait and by 1961 British intentions on Kuwaiti independence were widespread that forced Qassim to state that there were "no frontiers between us and Kuwaiti people".[91] Great Britain's anticipation was that Iraq would not react aggressively when it comes to a declaration of an independent Kuwait.[92] This huge misperception is considered the first fail of the British-Kuwaiti policy.

Iraq emerged as a revisionist power as soon as it attained its independence as a kingdom in 1932. A "republic" was proclaimed in 1958, but in fact this "republic" never stopped being ruled by strongmen until 2003,[93] when Saddam Hussein was eliminated once and for all. Its interest in Kuwait has its roots in the era when both countries had special relations with the British. Relations with Iraq have been quite turbulent since then. After WWI, Iraq exploited nationalist elements and interfered in Kuwaiti domestic politics to reduce British influence. In 1936, Iraq attempted to extend a water pipeline from Shatt-al-Arab to Kuwait City. This critical move, which could have framed Kuwait's dependency on Iraq, was avoided ably by turning down the offer. Two things must be mentioned· first, that the water issue was crucial at that time, but security considerations prevailed. Second, despite the pan-Arabic belief of favoring union with Iraq, Kuwait followed wisely the British advice. Security concerns prevailed above other considerations, as ignoring popular pan-Arab voices that, on the one hand favored union with Iraq, and on the other, could had affected leadership's decision-making. The latter can be found as a norm regarding Kuwait's strategy toward Iraq.[94] It should also be mentioned that

[90] Joyce, pp.31-50, 55-56
[91] Majid Khadduri, "Republican Iraq – A Study in Iraqi politics since the revolution of 1958, London: Oxford University Press, 1969, p.169, as quoted in Stables, p.162.
[92] Stables, p.163
[93] CIA, The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html
[94] Guazzone, p.64-5.

the discovery of oil revenues in Kuwaiti territory in 1937-8, is deemed fundamental for Iraqi claims on Kuwait and the basis on any annexation arguments by various Iraqi governments.

In 1959, there was no indication that Qassim was intended to annex the small sheikhdom, although Britain was anxious on any such possibility, especially due to Kuwaiti inadequate forces.[95] In 1961, six days after the declaration of Kuwait's independence, the Iraqi president, not being satisfied with the turn of events, tore up the official draft that was handed over to him and later called Kuwait as an integral part of Iraq. In essence, Iraq invaded Kuwaiti borders and retreated only after severe British political and military pressure.[96] Qassim's intentions for the annexation of Kuwait were unambiguous. The ground for the Iraqi claim was the illegal separation of Kuwait from the Ottoman province of Basra by the 1899 agreement between Great Britain and Kuwait. The true reasons for that claims had to do with the oil wealth, the domestic politics of Iraq, that Qassim was looking to shift focus from the domestic agenda to external affairs, and of course with the strategic location of Kuwait as an exit to the Gulf. All in all, the Iraqi encroachment shaped not only the Kuwaiti strategy on its relations with Iraq but it was an omen for what could follow. Kuwaitis found themselves totally unprepared, ignorant, with no hard power to deal with the actual Iraqi threat. Subsequently, this event affected "the national consciousness of the Kuwaitis".[97]

The Iraqi threat and the whole regional balance, as it was shaped at that period, practically obsessed Kuwaitis to achieve a higher level of security. While preparing for the second anniversary of Kuwaiti independence, Britain still worked closely with Kuwait. A very important observation at this period is that the Saudis had not resolved the Neutral Zone question and the Arab League was not eager to assist Kuwaiti defense. Nevertheless, at this high tensioned period Kuwait was saved by the regime change in Iraq. On February 8th, 1963, a coup in Baghdad ended the Qassim era with his death.[98] Kuwaiti recognition in October 1963 by Iraq is reported to have been exchanged for significant financial contribution to Iraq.[99]

In 1973, another Kuwaiti-Iraqi dispute crisis broke out ten years after the first one. The catalyst was the major Iraqi concern on its location; the fact that it was landlocked and the

[95] Joyce, p.102.
[96] S A Yetiv, *Explainng foreign policy: US decision-making in the Gulf wars*, JHU Press, 2011.p.21.
[97] Assiri, p.19.
[98] Joyce, pp.112-3.
[99] L Freedman & E Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict: 1990-1991.Diplomacy and War in the New World Order*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1993.p.44.

Iraqi wish to expand its route to the sea. This is the main reason for every claim on the islands of Warba and Bubiyan. In the 1973 crisis, the Iraqis had already employed army on Kuwaiti territory from the late 60s and after the British withdrawal, on grounds of protecting the port of Umm Qasr from an Iranian attack. Even when the Iranian threat was inexistent, the Iraqis continued their presence in the area and built a road through the Kuwaiti territory leading to their station in the Gulf.

On March 20th, 1973, the Iraqis occupied a Kuwaiti police post and a new crisis begun. Kuwait motivated great and regional powers to come to its aid, employed its economic weapon, set in motion the Arab public opinion. The Arabs in general disapproved of the Iraqi moves. They succeeded in preventing an escalation but failed in managing Iraqi thirst over Kuwait. The US and the UK adopted a "hands off policy" while the Soviets supported morally the Iraqis. Bottomline, the old Iraq-Kuwait enmity proved that it was able to destabilize the regional order and bring the region in the brink of war.[100]

The Iran-Iraq war,[101] an 8-year bloodbath, was a watershed for the decade of 1980. First of all, the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and the Islamic revolution of 1979, changed Iran and affected its politics till nowadays. It actually threatened the Gulf status quo especially of the small sheikdoms. The Iranian revolution itself was a threat to the internal security of Kuwait due to the Shia factions that from time to time had expressed their dissatisfaction in comparison to the Sunnis citizens of Kuwait.

Overall, the strategic environment after the Iraqi threats was shaped as follows: Saudis sided with Kuwait not only because of the Saudi-Iraqi enmity but also because of the agreed Neutral Zone between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia that entered into force on July 25th,1966, and still needed to be further negotiated.[102] Nasser's posture, who, on the one hand did not wish to support Iraq but, on the other, had to put up with the Saudi Arabia-Britain Axis is also worth mentioning. Nasser remained an advocate of the Arab Unit at any cost and the idea of influencing the Emirate was ghosting the Saudis. Finally, in 1973, the occupation of a Kuwaiti

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[100] A M Kelly, "The Soviet Naval Presence during the Iraq-Kuwaiti Border Dispute: March-April 1973", No. CNA-PROFESSIONAL, Center for Naval Analysis, Arlington, VA, 1974.

[101] E Karsh, *The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988*. Vol. 20. Osprey publishing, 2002.

[102] Oil in the Neutral Zone was found in 1933. See "Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Agreement to partition the Neutral Zone", *International Legal Materials 4,* no. 6 (1965): 1134-138., http://www.jstor.org/stable/20689992., H M Al-Baharna, "A Note on the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone Agreement of July 7, 1965, Relating to the Partition of the Zone", *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 17, no. 3 (1968): 730-35., http://www.jstor.org/stable/757019.

territory along a narrow border strip on the grounds of protecting its coastline against an Iranian attack, should be underlined. Iraqi forces remained in place for a decade against Kuwaiti will.[103]

2.1.1.a. British interests: power, oil, business and sterling

The Anglo-Kuwaiti relations covered a range of issues and did actually change over time. This bilateral relation is rooted in the early 19th century when Great Britain's primary goal was to safeguard its communication routes, which resulted in supporting friendly players in the region. A number of agreements that followed aimed at solidifying British presence by undertaking the role of protector of the sheikdoms from any aggressor.[104] Since this relation dates back to 1899, when the Al-Sabah family negotiated with Britain the rules for obtaining protection from external powers, the Ottoman empire at that time. Britain, a great power and a former colonial empire, offered diplomatic, political and military protection to its ex colony, Kuwait. After showing marks of decline, Britain had a strong interest in securing oil flow at reasonable prices from the Gulf, in safeguarding its business interests and its strategic assets. Thus, Kuwait exchanged resources for protection. By accepting the terms of the agreement, Kuwait was officially entering into the British sphere. Any act related to the sovereignty, as leasing or selling territory, should be approved by the British. The Kuwaiti relation with Great Britain contributed to the establishment of a firm regime and to a better control of its domestic politics, as well as to the establishment of a defense umbrella against any external threat.

The Gulf became valuable for Great Britain in the aftermath of the WWII, after the loss of India and Pakistan and especially after the political disaster of Suez. During the 1950s, Britain was trying to strengthen its position in the region and to cement the Anglo-Kuwaiti relation. The Cold War competition, the dependence on Gulf oil, the deterioration of British economy, the Kuwaiti willingness to invest in British economy and the political developments in Iraq and Egypt placed Kuwait in the center of British policy in the region. It was a strategic, economic,

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[103]Yetiv, p.21.
[104] U Rabi, "Britain's 'special position' in the Gulf: Its origins, dynamics and legacy", Middle Eastern Studies, 42:3, 351-364, 2006, DOI: 10.1080/00263200500521123. p.35.

political matter as well as a matter of British imperial significance. To this end, Britain was interested in engaging the USA to work together to efficiently address the strategic regional challenges and to sharpen their presence in the region. For Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, an independent Kuwait was considered as the cornerstone of the British Middle East Policy.[105] Britain firmly believed in ensuring Gulf rulers' confidence, otherwise "if the Gulf Arabs lost confidence in the British, they would look to Saudi Arabia",[106] which would be damaging for the Western interests.

During the negotiations for Kuwaiti independence, Iraqi intentions on Kuwaiti oil revenues emerged, indicating Iraqi aspirations on Kuwait. Iraq, was an important actor in the region for the British interests, since the latter had military bases on Iraqi territory and the former was considered as the Nasser's counter-balance actor, until the Iraqi revolution in 1958. Iraqi intentions after the 1958 Qassim's coup were a bit tricky for Britain's Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). On the one hand, they had to assess Iraqi plans and on the other, they had to be prepared for every scenario: from an Iraqi invasion to a subversion within Kuwait.[107] British determination was so strong that, at that period, it was sedulous to "ruthlessly intervene"[108] to secure Kuwait -and British interest- erga omnes. Furthermore, Kuwait was also challenged domestically. It lived in fear of a coup d'état from a Nationalist movement or from expats that were imported as labor force. Hence, the Kuwaiti unwillingness to trust its security upon the Arab world. The "East of Suez" policy seemed to benefit both on securing its participant's interests.[109]

Independent Kuwait was placed high on British foreign policy agenda. First of all, Kuwait was of strategic importance even before the 1899 agreement due to its location in the Gulf port. Second, the oil factor popped up in the early of the 20th century, when Britain conducted geological surveys that proved to be promising[110]. In the end of the WWII and onwards, Kuwait "experienced both the blessing and the curse of oil wealth."[111] In 1960-63, Kuwait was one of

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[105] Hiro, p.19.
[106] Joyce, p.25.
[107] R A Mobley, "Gauging the Iraqi Threat to Kuwait in the 1960s", CIA Library, Last Updated: Aug 03, 2011 02:48 PM, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol45no5/html/v45i5a03p.htm#_ftnref7
[108] Stables, p.125.
[109] see P Mangold, "Britain and the Defence of Kuwait, 1956–71", *The RUSI Journal*, 120:3, 44-48, 1975, DOI: 10.1080/03071847509420849
[110] The first geological survey was made in 1913 when British geologists characterized the venture as worth pursuing. Joyce, p.xix.
[111] Joyce, p.xxi.

the major producing countries of crude oil. Kuwait's crude oil production rose from 81,9 million tones in 1960 to 97,2 million in 1963. The main increase of its oil production occurred in 1962, thus holding the 36,7% of the total world production in 1963 and becoming the leader.[112]

Britain was a strong advocate for granting Kuwait independence. This is the reason why they guided them through this process and encouraged Kuwait to participate in various international organizations a while before its independence, as the Arab League in 1952. Moreover, Britain desired to strengthen Kuwaiti military capability and thus they encouraged the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia defense pact of July 1961. British strategic considerations on Kuwaiti independence were associated with the overwhelming importance of the region to British economy and British petroleum companies as well. Any change in the control of the oil flow by one of the other three big producers, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, would have serious implications on the already waning British economy. Kuwaiti independence would safeguard all the above-mentioned. To this end, preserving the Al-Sabah ruling family was imperative.[113] The issue of the succession of the Sheikh Abdalla was crucial to Britain. No matter who would succeed, the inability to influence domestic politics remained, something that was uniquely felt in the 1960s.

After granting independence to Kuwait, Britain continued to guarantee for the latter's security in case the Kuwaiti government requested for aid. The old-fashioned relation, meaning the 1899 agreement, was terminated and replaced by an "internationally irreproachable Treaty of Friendship".[114] Providing security to the state of Kuwait was a sensitive subject. Britain had to carry this task out without damaging neither the ruling family's credibility nor Kuwait's relations with the other Arabs. Both Kuwait and Britain had a common understanding that a long-term presence of British troops will disturb the Arabs. Also, Britain was aware that its actions were approved by the Arabs since, on the one hand there was a widespread disapproval of Iraqi actions on annexing Kuwait, on the other, Iraqi relations with the USSR were not endorsed by the Arabs.

Qassim's intentions on annexing Kuwait were apparent. The military movements of the Iraqi troops towards the Kuwaiti border cleared up the former's intentions. Six days after

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[112] United Nations, "Economic Developments in the Middle East 1961-1963. Supplement to World Economic Survey 1963", United Nations, New York, 1964.
[113] Stables.p.197.
[114] Balfour-Paul, End of Empire in the Middle East, p.118. as quoted in Joyce, p.87.

Kuwaiti independence British troops stepped in Kuwait at the request of Sheikh Abdullah, after Kuwait was claimed as a part of Iraq on historical grounds. This was the first major crisis that both Kuwait and Britain were compelled to deal with and also a failure of the British-Kuwaiti policy; both missed to anticipate Iraqi intentions.

This first British intervention and the use of Arab forces to back up Kuwaiti sovereignty further embedded the area in the Cold War competition. As the British Ambassador to Kuwait conveyed to the Foreign Office, Qassim was aware that a union of Kuwait and Iraq would need the Soviet support, thus further engaging British forces in the Cold War antagonism.[115] This whole issue made it to the United Nations and the Arab League. Kuwaiti secretary spoke about the possibility to endanger the international peace and security while the Iraqi complaint about the "armed threat by the United Kingdom to the independence and security of Iraq."[116] In the UN arena, Great Britain attempted to bring the issue in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Two resolutions were debated; Great Britain's and the Arab Republic's. At the 960th meeting on July 7th, 1961, both draft Resolutions were rejected. Suffice to say that the USSR vetoed the British draft in the UNSC while Egypt underlined a pan-Arabic approach. The Arab Republic failed to gather the adequate votes.[117] Meanwhile, the Arab League's interference was more successful. Having in mind to avoid and to dissociate any British solution and ward off non-Arab troops, it undertook efficient resolutions and managed to form an Arab force and replace the British troops. The former remained in Kuwait until February 19th, 1963. Finally, it should be mentioned Nasser's support over Kuwait.[118] Nasser used his influence to put aside Iraq and firmly supported Kuwait.

To sum up, the crisis of 1961 brought together a combination of peculiar forces to Kuwait's aid. First of all, it was a watershed for the small sheikdom because it showed its insufficiency in ensuring its security. Second, it was a reminder that it was in the constant need

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[115] Mangold, p.285, 289-90

[116] United Nations Security Council, "Provisional agenda for the 958th meeting of the Security Council, to be held in the Security Council Chamber at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 5 July 1961", http://repository.un.org/handle/11176/81850.

[117] United Nations, "Complaint by Kuwait, Complaint by Iraq", United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/59-63/Chapter%208/59-63_08-13-Complaint%20by%20Kuwait,%20Complaint%20by%20Iraq.pdf

[118] New York Times, "Nasser Supports Kuwait Against Iraqi Annexation," *The New York Times*, 28 June 1961, https://www.nytimes.com/1961/06/28/archives/nasser-supports-kuwait-against-iraqi-annexation-nasser-supports.html

of having external powers as a defense umbrella and to keep an eye on its powerful neighbors, Iran and Iraq.

The British military response is a proof of the importance of the region for the extensive British interests.[119] The overthrown of the Qassim regime in 1963, further favored Great Britain since Iraq's political succession seemed a more conducive regime. The ensuing events of the Arab antagonism and especially the power game for the Arab world between Egypt and Iraq also benefited Great Britain. Kuwait emerged stronger after the 1961-63 crisis and played the card of aid-donor not only in the Arab world but also in other Muslim and Third World countries.[120]

Before concluding British policy in the region, it is of great importance to refer to the British perceptions on America's role and vice versa. For Britain, the US support of its strategic planning was regarded fundamental, since British presence was preserving Western interests. However, Britain's reduction in power and the Suez aftermath indicated that Britain alone was incapable of taking effective action in the region. The decade of 1960 was challenging for the British. developments as: the Operation Vantage; the overthrow of Qassim and the war in Yemen; the role of Egypt; the revolution in Syria and the Arab League's attitude, all further complicated British policy objectives. An important outcome was that Britain succeeded in maintaining bases in the region. Britain's true motives were related more with how to salvage British economy that was in severe decline in the Gulf. Oil and sterling depositions were the primary constituents in shaping British strategy. Kuwaiti oil was an important asset for the Western economies. Cold War considerations were less important.

Unquestionably, the US presence was essential. After the Iraqi revolution of 1958, the USA acted in concert with Great Britain regarding the strategic objectives in the Gulf. The US interests were mostly served, at that time, in the Arabian Peninsula but also in the Gulf, two regions with unique features. The powerful regional competition between the Arab states brought a change in the US' plans and made the Americans to realize the necessity of preserving the security of friendly states, like Saudi Arabia, in order to maintain regional peace

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[119] Snell-Mendoza argues that the Middle East was not regarded as a priority in the Macmillan's administration political agenda. Under that period's circumstances, meaning the British economic instability; the Suez lessons learned; the British 1961 intervention was mostly based "on the fear of the risks entailed by any failure to ward of an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait." in Mangold

[120] Assiri, pp.19-31.

and stability. An immediate consequence of the alteration of US' behavior was the benefits in British foreign policy from the US policy change.[121]

Britain withdrew from the region in 1971. Britain's economic, military and political interests in the 19th century on Kuwait were centered in the Anglo-Kuwaiti relation more than in British strategic considerations. Initially, Kuwait was not in the center of the British interest since Britain already had treaties with many Gulf states. It was the Berlin-Bagdad railway that brought into the light the strategic location of this small state.[122] Hence, Britain focused mostly on regulating and even conducting its external affairs. There was absolutely no interference in internal administration or imposing any kind of western-administration style on the Gulf sheikdoms. However, this by no chance implies that Britain did not favor a strong ruling family that would serve its interests over any attempt to influence the state on democratic reforms.[123] During the decades of 50s and 60s, when territorial disputes threatened the peace and stability in the region, Britain undertook the role of mediator. Britain aimed at avoiding confrontations and thus favored closed ties between Iraq and Kuwait.[124]

A significant part of Britain's grand strategy had to do with the oil flow at reasonable prices, the financial benefits for British oil companies, regional and economic stability combined with its strategic goals, meaning maintaining defense facilities and retaining flying rights to preserve their interests in the region. Britain's concern, despite its decision to withdraw from the region, was to act as a stabilizer between the strong actors Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the small Sheikdoms. This also explains British policy of non-intervening in interstate disputes and not alienating the Middle East states from the West, given the possibility of becoming USSR's satellites. Finally, the Arab-Israeli conflict in conjunction with the Arab nationalism impacted on regional developments.

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[121] Stables, p.219-221.
[122] Tetreault,. p.571-2.
[123] Tetreault, p.568
[124] Rabi, p.357, Joyce

2.1.1.b. The US strategy in the Gulf before the Iraqi invasion

The US established diplomatic relations with Kuwait in 1961, after its full independence from the United Kingdom.[125] During the early 1960s, the Foreign Office expressed its wish to strengthen the Anglo-American cooperation over the Kuwaiti defense. No agreement was concluded at that time between these two actors.[126] After the British withdrawal from the Gulf the USA kept a close eye on the region. Kuwait due to its location and its resources was considered to be extremely important. The USA signed an agreement with Saudi Arabia in 1957. With a declining Britain, America took over to fill the void. This was not an easy task to undertake given previous American experiences in Vietnam and of course the Cold War tacit struggle. The 1961 crisis between Iraq and Kuwait found the US seriously concerned on the peace and security in the region and on the preservation of Western interests. At this point, the State Department supported British plans but the Arab ambiguous stance intricated the whole situation, thus making the West anxious on the insufficiency of the regional Arab force and on Kuwaiti mistrust toward Saudi Arabia, which was willing to help Kuwait.[127]

The USA-Kuwaiti relations have been through many changes. Despite British prevalence, the oil discovery in the early 20th century accelerated the American interest, initially via humanitarian channels. In 1914, American missionaries aimed at Kuwait's social development while in the late 40s American presence in the oil industry (Kuwait Oil Company) was more than negligible.[128] The 1967 Arab-Israeli war turned this relationship into a cold one. The Iran-Iraq war that warmed up again this bilateral relation. During the Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti vessels in the summer of 1986, Kuwait privately asked the USA to fly the American flag and get the US protection. This move ended the Iranian attacks and by the end of 1987, Iran confronted a multinational armada of about 50 warships.[129]

The Six Days War did not upset the USA-Arab relations despite the Arab pressures. The US did not depend that much on Gulf oil as other states and was able to use other regions as passages for its operations. Still, Kuwait was important for the regional stability and a great export market for the US goods. Hence, the Arab states pressed Kuwait to suspend diplomatic

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[125]U.S Department of State, "US-Relations with Kuwait", 12 August 2014,
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35876.htm
[126] Joyce, p.284
[127] Joyce, pp.110-11.
[128] Assiri p.6-7.
[129] E Karsh, Efraim. The Iran-Iraq War, p.51.

relations with the States. The USA followed a moderated policy since Israel was an important ally, but Kuwait was also a force of stability in the Gulf.

Kuwait was really anxious on who would fill the vacuum when Britain withdrew from the area despite claiming that, after British withdrawal, it would not accept any other foreign presence.[130] The small Kuwaiti sheikhdom found itself in a difficult position and unable to replace British security, especially on threats that may come from Iraq, Iran and the Saudis. British withdrawal required a deliberate and careful planning. After having served all its economic, strategic and political interests in the region and while being in a weak position to continue ruling the area, Britain decided to withdraw. Oil and finance shaped the major considerations for its withdrawal but it had to find an alternative. Britain regarded the Arab League as a political tool but for a long time it remained suspicious of Saudi Arabia. It considered the Saudis as the biggest threat for Kuwaiti independence and consequently for the British interests after its withdrawal.[131] "Arab Unity was a myth and it was recognized as such by the Foreign Office".[132] Consequently, the use of the Arab-Israeli conflict for regional antagonism purposes, the rising of the State of Israel combined with the not so successful attempt to make the Arab identity valuable, created a diplomatic and political crisis in the region. All the above could not be addressed by the Arab League itself.

Conflicting interests by Egypt and Jordan regarding the formation of the Palestinian entity confirm the aforementioned. Despite the rivalry between Egypt and Iraq that worked in favor of Great Britain, the latter had to find a reliable successor that would continue all what Britain had accomplished in the area. It could only be succeeded by the USA. To this, it should be added the Iraqi-Soviet protocol, signed in Baghdad in 1971. This strategic alliance was perceived by Saddam as a tool to empower this bilateral relation economically, technically, but also, he stressed the ideological concurrence against the Western imperialism and of course Zionism.[133]

All in all, Britain achieved the desired Western aim which was to keep foreign powers that could undermine the significance of the Anglo-American cooperation over the Gulf away.

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[130] Joyce, pp.158.
[131] Joyce, pp.194
[132] Wriggins, p.183
[133] Hiro, pp.24-5.

An early British withdrawal from the region would create a severe power vacuum ready to be filled by the USSR. This needed to be prevented.

The decades before the Iraqi invasion of 1990 could be characterized as an omen of the international developments that would follow. Egypt was moving closer to the USA. In 1978, the Begin-Sadat Peace Treaty agreement sealed a momentous development for the regional peace and stability. Meanwhile, the British withdrawal and the subsequent security gap that Kuwait had to deal with, compelled the Kuwaitis to seek for another patron despite stating their belief in positive "neutrality" and "opposing policies of alignment and military groupings".[134] Hence, Kuwait turned to the USA.

Being a member of the UN and the Arab League Kuwait was enhanced politically and diplomatically. Its vast oil revenues were used as a means to expand its influence in the Gulf area and beyond. Considering that oil was used to buy protection from the British with an agreement that dated back from 1899 to 1971, this special relationship was urgently needed to be replaced. British withdrawal from the "East of Suez" forced the USA to take the lead in the area in an extremely turbulent period. However, the Gulf was not an area out of American interests because of the British supremacy in the area. The USA was keeping a close eye in the region for strategic reasons so as to ensure its access to the region's vast oil resources and to deny to the Soviets access and influence over the region.

The 1970s was a challenging decade for the American foreign policy in the region. The Yom Kippur War, the 1973 oil embargo led to the interrelation of the Gulf with the Middle East. The USA found itself in the position of safeguarding its interests and simultaneously trying not to dissatisfy its strategic allies, as Israel and Saudi Arabia or to provoke any further crisis. Three American Presidents Nixon, Carter and Reagan contributed to the transformation of the role of America in supporting Britain to become the major security provider in the region. Under President Nixon, the US developed the "Nixon Doctrine" also known as the "twin pillars". One of its aims was to "encourage Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the smaller states to co-operate wholeheartedly with one another to assure that the region remained secure."[135]

The Iranian Revolution of 1979 created a chaotic situation and threatened the Gulf seriously. Khomeini instantly threatened the Gulf States. He regarded their leadership as

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[134] Joyce, pp.159.
[135] Bell R B. Major, USMC, "Expansion of American Persian Gulf Policy by Three Presidents," Command and Staff College, 1990 [Online] http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1990/BRB.htm

corrupted. The anxiety that the Gulf states felt emanated from the fact that they were ill-equipped to address Khomeini's threats.[136] It should not be forgotten that the Shia population in Kuwait was not insignificant. It could spread unrest and divide the Kuwaitis. The Iranian revolution also puzzled the bilateral relations with the Western powers. France for example, a traditional Arab ally from the 60s, was being afraid of the Islamic fundamentalism but also supported Saddam's Baath regime. Overall, the Iranian revolution in 1979, changed the regional politics and at that time it was a proof of the USA's vulnerability. It compelled the USA to further engage itself in the region.

President Carter having labeled the Gulf as a region of "vital interest" to the United States issued the Carter Doctrine. Carter was the first president that actually named the Gulf as "vital" for the US interests.[137] The USSR invasion in Afghanistan was an attempt to come closer to the Gulf's oil wealth. In the wake of the 1979 Soviet invasion to Afghanistan, Carter changed the US doctrine from non-interventionist to one that actually commits the US to deter or respond "to 'outside', as opposed to internal, threats to Persian Gulf security."[138] To this end, the US deployed the Rapid Joint Deployment Task Force (RDJTF) in an effort to increase the American allies' capabilities -non-NATO contingencies- in the region surrounding the Gulf. Deterrence was a major US policy element and by no means any power vacuum should occur so that it could had been exploited by the Soviets.[139]

The Iran-Iraq war was a lengthy, devastating, inhumane, 8-year war, during which Iran supported Iraqi Kurds against Iraq and initiated terror attacks resulting in the worst bloodshed in the region. This war presented another challenge for the US administration. President Reagan basically reaffirmed Carter's doctrine which was indicating the Soviets as the main threat in the region. Reagan was concerned on regional instability and the Soviet's regional objectives. Therefore, he proposed the idea of a "strategic consensus" aiming at persuading regional actors to ally with the US against the Soviet Union and its client states. Reagan's plans did not bear fruit because of the GCC formation that had preceded and the Gulf states' reluctance to overtly ally with the US.[140] At this juncture, the US committed itself to protect

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[136] Hiro, pp.31-32.
[137] Bell
[138] Yetiv, p.19.
[139] Davis
[140] Bell

Saudi's security and subsequently the oil-flow. "Saudi Arabia would become the linchpin of U.S. security in the Persian Gulf region."[141]

The end of the Iran-Iraq war was the product of US interference, which also included a substantial military presence and a strong UN mobilization to intervene to end the bloodshed. Soviet decline in conjunction with USA's general reevaluation of its strategies in the twilight of a new world order led to a collaboration of the two superpowers, starting at the UNSC and the Resolution 598 to the ceasefire of the Iran-Iraq war. The Iraqi victory benefited Saddam in the domestic level since he projected power and skills that impressed his people. Despite his crimes against humanity, especially against the Kurds, by using chemical weapons, Saddam achieved to establish a strong pro-Iraq lobby in the USA and secured a high-profile among the Arab world. The ACC (Arab-Cooperation Council) backed Iraq especially on its claim to all of the Shatt al Arab, a disputed territory with Iran. The USA also believed in taming Saddam and finally transforming his state into a more West friendly.[142]

The decade of 1990s found Iraq stronger, equipped even with chemical and biological weapons but aloof because of the collapse of its ally, Moscow. Hence, Zionism conspiracies combined with the Soviet Jewish exodus to the Jewish State left Iraq deeply lost into its thoughts of an existing American anti-Iraq posture.

2.1.2. The strategy of Kuwait before the 1991 Iraqi annexation

The decade of Kuwaiti independence was revealing for the foreseeable future. Great powers' interference initially obstructed Kuwait to implement its strategy that aimed at establishing a fully independent state. The USSR vetoed at the UNSC the Iraqi threat and the Kuwaiti application on joining the UN.[143] The Soviet support in Iraq continued, mostly because of the Iraqi support over USSR's Berlin policy. Syria's proposals to settle the Iraq-Kuwait dispute,

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[141] Yetiv, p.20.
[142] Hiro, pp.54-61.
[143] United Nations Security Council Official Records, 985th Meeting: 30 November 1961, S/Agenda/985, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.985, United Nations Security Council Official Records, 960th Meeting: 7 July 1961, S/Agenda/960, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.960&referer=http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact_veto_table_en.htm&Lang=E

British presence in the region and the existence of the state of Israel further perplexed the situation. Britain was in decline; the Arab nationalism was arising. Domestic pressures were entangled with security concerns over Kuwaiti sovereignty. A socioeconomic shift from poverty to wealth due to oil revenues whetted Kuwait's appetite and boosted its self-confidence, after being a militarily weak state exposed to regional and international threats.

Western strategic considerations were developed for the region since 1946, when Kuwaiti-British and American interests blended in the oil sector to flow the crude oil from the Sheikhdom to world markets. A few years later, in 1951, a major change occurred when the Iranian government nationalized the Anglo-Iranian oil company thus increasing the importance of Kuwait as an oil producer. In the mid of 1960s, the UK decided to reduce its expenses and withdraw from Aden. That decision had severe repercussions on Kuwaiti security. Britain demanded an advanced warning of three weeks in order to be able to aid militarily. But this choice did not affect at all British determination to become a reliable security provider to the Gulf states, something that also favored Britain itself, since it increased its influence on the Gulf states. Regional stability was somehow imperative for Great Britain not only because it ensured British interests, but also because any turmoil in the region, given the fragile relations between states -Iraq-Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, Qatar, Iran and its claims to Bahrain- could spill over the region.

When in 1961 Kuwait found itself dealing with a number of problems both domestic and external, its society was changing. Kuwait was dealing with a rising and demanding middle class, an aggressive Qassim, that hopefully for Kuwait was soon overthrown. His fall implicated the recognition of the state of Kuwait on February, 9th. On February 18th, the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border opened thus reducing bilateral tensions and enmities.

Kuwait played a significant role during the 1960s and 70s especially in the area of inter-Arab politics. Internal autonomy and external security were intertemporal objectives for Kuwait even before its independence as well as the need to adhere to Arab identity and support the inter-Arab ties. Nevertheless, Kuwait's vulnerability sprung up within a week after its independence, when Qassim claimed Kuwait as a part of Iraq and forced the Kuwaiti leadership to realize Kuwait's weak position. Consequently, while domestic security was mostly handled by the Kuwaiti ruler, the handling of external threats should be attributed to the Great Britain. The Anglo-Kuwaiti relation was for decades a mutually beneficial relation, given that Kuwait was provided with the desirable British defense umbrella.

Soon after Kuwaiti independence, Great Britain retained the role of security provider to the newly established State of Kuwait. The British-Kuwaiti relation was a pure patron-client one. Kuwait, as the client, was important during the 60s, not only because it was the major oil source for the West, but also because of the diminished British economy. An economy in decline could not risk the privileges of British oil companies in the region. Furthermore, the Al-Sabah family proved to be a major investor in sterling thus compromising British economic interest, if any change would take place. In 1961, Britain covered one-third of the petroleum needs from Kuwait and Kuwaiti investments were also of great importance for the British economy. There were no thoughts on replacing British protection with an international guarantee by the Kuwaiti leadership, since they considered the British contribution as the best possible.[144]

All the above mentioned combined with Cold War considerations gave prominence to the region for the British interests. The fact that Britain had two military bases at Bahrain and Sharjah should also be stressed. Despite these facts, Kuwait did not wish to be associated with the West. The Arab identity was its primary concern but it was inadequate to preserve Kuwaiti sovereignty. Kuwait wished to replace British defense umbrella only with indigenous or qualified Arabs as a part of its plan to decrease its dependence. This was quite an ambitious plan, since it would take at least a year to be fully implemented. An affective and immediate response would be to still host British armed forces, while any presence of an Arab League force would be a problem for the British, since it could signify the abrogation of the 1961 agreement or it could end out of British control.[145] Finally, Kuwait's plan to be engaged in the Arab League bore fruit, since the rest of the members ignored the Iraqi position and unanimously admitted Kuwait as a member of the Arab League.

The Iraqi threat a while after the declaration of Kuwaiti independence was a catalyst for domestic changes. On November 1961, Kuwait held its first elections. Two months later Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salim Al-Sabah met with the political resident and set three goals: to demonstrate Kuwaiti independence in the Arab world, to retain British protection and to keep its own people satisfied.[146] Overall, being aware of the military inferiority and the rising

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[144] Joyce, p87.
[145] Kuwait applied to join the Arab League a day after the exchange of Letters, since any independent state had the right to do so. Kuwaiti membership was supported by Saudi Arabia, Jordan and hit the wall of Iraqi intransigence. Joyce, p.186
[146] Joyce, p.80.

nationalism that could shake the Sheikhdom, Sheikh Abdullah wanted to save the emirate, so that he would continue to count on British military protection. Moreover, the 1961 agreement aimed at preserving Arab identity and at promoting closer ties with these states. Thus, he pursued its national interest through the UN and the Arab League.

The formation of OPEC in 1960 along with the British political and economic interests in the Gulf prompted Kuwait to seek greater autonomy which in practice was not feasible, since its dependency from British defense capabilities was both its deterrent and its salvage. Britain was not only a security provider but also a consultant on Kuwait's status and its external relations. Sheikh Abdullah was in favor of a measured diplomacy. Undertaking international responsibilities from the British was something that the ruler of Kuwait was pressing subtly till achieving the transition to a state from a colony. He tried to gradually diminish dependence on Britain but the Iraqi irredentism shattered his plans toward a less reliance on external security.[147] This development was significant because it manifested Kuwait's vulnerability in regional dangers that threatened its existence a week after its independence. Despite wishing to develop its own security forces and rely on them, without external aid, Kuwait was a lost case.

The State of Kuwait tried to follow an independent path, to dispatch itself from the British diplomatic representation and to conduct its own foreign policy, thus decreasing British influence and dependency. A defining moment in Kuwaiti foreign policy was in 1961 when Sheikh Abdullah Al-Shabah announced the doctrine of non-alignment as an official policy. This decision in the heat of the Cold War was implemented by cooperating with non-aligned states of Africa and Asia. This tactic was also a part of the overall strategy to persuade the USSR to waive its veto in the UNSC thus becoming a member. On April 20th, 1963 the UNSC unanimously recommended the Kuwaiti admission and in May 1963, the United Nations General Assembly (henceforth UNGA).

The small state of Kuwait exploited its economic capability to provide financial aid. Kuwait became a major donor at the UN.[148] Additionally, the establishment of the Development Fund was decided and aimed at aiding economically the Arab countries. Arab identity was gaining ground in Kuwaiti decision-making process. Hence, in the frame of pursuing a pan-Arabic policy, it was decided not to intervene in the internal affairs of other

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[147] Stables, p.165-6.
[148] Assiri p.25

Arab states and to be neutral over disputes.[149] An outcome of this policy was the support of the Palestinian cause the "usurped homeland" that Kuwait felt obliged to assist by any means, which included the boycott of the State of Israel.

The 1961 crisis had a destabilizing effect in the regional system: border disputes; Arab antagonism for preponderance; the existence of conflict zones as in Yemen; the Moroccan-Algerian conflict; the Iraqi hegemonic aspirations in the Gulf. The events that followed as the Syrian Revolution and its repercussions, the struggle for regional balance among Iraq, Egypt, Iran and the Saudis further tensed the situation. Britain's decision in the mid of 1960s to renegotiate its commitment with Kuwait was significant. Britain had to reduce its expenses, withdraw from Aden and limit its aid to Kuwait. However, Kuwait never stopped to present itself as a strong advocate of the Arabs and as a mediator that would resolve disputes and unite the Arabs. Kuwait used its financial capability to this end from the early 60s. Hence, it gained credibility and mediation became a feature of its foreign policy. Nevertheless, Kuwait knew that such aid was insufficient and inadequate to its security. Given this deficiency in power effectiveness, the reduced British help seemed to be preferable and more efficient.

At this point light should be shed on the process that took place at the UN to address this crisis. The UK considered the UN and the UNSC of utmost importance to counteract the Iraqi aggression especially after the Suez lessons learned. Since then, Britain considered significant any the legal backing, along with the support of important players as the USA and international organizations as the UN.

Britain fervently pursued Kuwaiti cause at the UN and sought to keep the matter not as a Cold War confrontation but as an issue that threatened the maintenance of international peace and security. Meanwhile, Kuwait with the UAR's assistance worked at the Arab League to solve the crisis. It should also be mentioned that USSR's veto at the UNSC erased any plans for a UN force to be sent to Kuwait. Hence, Great Britain bore the burden of the Kuwaiti security. This development had a negative effect on Kuwait. Any presence of British troops was deprecated by the other Arab states. The aforementioned is one of the perennial problems for Kuwaiti security; the combination of balancing external security provided by the West without harming its relations with the Arabs. Finally, during this crisis, the Arab League accepted Kuwait as a member and denounced Iraqi claims on Kuwait.[150]

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[149] Stables, p.241-3.
[150] Stables, pp.179-87.

This first crisis was indicative of the security needs of Kuwait and of the indisputable presence of an external power that would serve as a defense umbrella. The Iraqi threat, the evolving role of Egypt, the role of Saudi Arabia, the Western and the Arab League's posture all displayed future challenges and dangers for the small state of Kuwait. Kuwait could not make it by itself. Its history ruthlessly proved that Kuwait owned its survival to external actors: Great Britain, the USA etc. Due to its strategic location, its abundant oil revenues and its small size, Kuwait was considered an easy prey from its stronger neighbors. This is why during the first crisis with Iraq, Kuwait turned to Great Britain for help knowing that only its patron could provide adequate military assistance. Furthermore, it pursued its diplomatic goals through the Arab League and the United Nations, where Great Britain was a member of the P5. Regarding the Arab League and despite the fact that it was incapable to replace British defense umbrella, the Arab League was and still is an important political forum for the Arab world.

On July 1st, 5000 British troops were set for the Operation Vantage. Kuwait's strategy, during the Iraqi irredentism 6 days after independence, was based on mobilizing its small army while seeking for external balancing by asking each of the Arab states for their support. Kuwait also called for Great Britain's aid given their defense treaty. It should be noted that Britain and Saudi Arabia responded immediately.[151] Once again Kuwait's strategy was based on external balancing. Needless to say, that all the actors mentioned above came to its aid for the sake of their own interest, too. However, a smart-small state should assess the interests of the great actors in the region, should form its own grand strategy and implement it by relying on its own powers. A combination of external and internal balancing is a prudent option. Unfortunately for Kuwait, the external need was much more critical since it possessed only a small army to mobilize against the powerful revisionist Iraq.

Kuwait strived for its salvation at the UN, since one of its goals was to remove British troops to avoid Arab displeasure. Later, on August 8th, an Arab League force arrived in Kuwait to protect it and then the well-known Arab unity myth uncovered; Libya and Sudan expressed unwillingness to send troops; Cairo had reservations; Lebanon and Yemen were reluctant; the Jordanians did not wish to be hostile engaged with Iraq. A chaotic situation replaced the British troops' withdrawal, but still Kuwait's ruler trust was based more on British protection.[152]

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[151] Guazzone, p.65.
[152] Joyce, pp. 106-9.

In conclusion, the first crisis of June-July of 1961 stressed the vulnerability of small Kuwait and presented the most threatening event for the whole period before the next major crisis, that of the Iraqi invasion and annexation of Kuwait in 1990. This first crisis compelled Britain to reevaluate its strategy in the region, since British interests in Kuwait were more important than those in Iraq. It also forced Kuwait to test its own forces and examine its alternatives on defense apart from Britain. The most important conclusion from this crisis is the delicate balanced Kuwaiti security which without external aid was frail. Finally, the membership of Kuwait in the UN which coincided with the fall of Qassim was a positive development that enhanced Kuwait.

The crisis of 1961 ended up with the fall of Qassim and an agreement between the two rivals:

"Kuwait purchased and Iraq cynically sold recognition, however, a draft of £30 million on the State reserves was necessary and had to be approved by a special session of the National Assembly. On 4[th]October an agreed minute was signed in Baghdad providing for Iraqi recognition of Kuwait and the extension by Kuwait to Iraq of an interest free loan of [Kuwaiti Dinars] KD 30 million repayable within 25 years" [153]

The Kuwaiti recognition came along with the recognition of the boundary delimitation as it was agreed in 1963, after exchanging letters. It was a first step toward a more secure, independent Kuwait. In a surprising move on February 18th, 1963, the Iraqis opened their frontier with Kuwait. The "Agreed Minutes" required the 1961 termination with the United Kingdom, a concession that Kuwait was willing to take. However, the Iraqi recognition of Kuwait did not end the need for British military presence. The demarcation of Kuwaiti-Iraqi border was key for the Kuwaiti security but it always met the Iraqi intransigence.

British persistence to protect Kuwait was consistent with preserving its interests in the area. Britain succeeded in keeping foreign powers away from its sphere of influence and other major oil producer powers as Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia in a distance as well as to minimize the Communist intervention. The close cooperation between Kuwait and Britain also focused on helping the ruling family to stay in power. Unfortunately, the Iraqi revisionist attitude remained

[153] PRO: FO 3711174882: Kuwait: Annual Review for 1963, January 2,1964: Jackson.

the same. Any joint attempt to demarcate border with Iraq was meeting Iraqi intransigence. Iraq demanded the control of Umm Qasr and the use of Bubiyan and Warba.

In 1963, Kuwait established diplomatic relations with the USSR and the Eastern bloc in general. This was another strategic move to eliminate Iraqi threats and simultaneously to reduce its dependency from the West. It tried to remain neutral and avoid any damaging political clashes in its external relations till the collapse of the USSR.

After its independence, Kuwait pursued an active strategy in inter-Arab and regional politics. Kuwait's dinar diplomacy and its surplus of money ousted it to adopt a role as an aid donor, mediator, investor in multiple worldwide sources. It diversified its investments in the Western countries in finance and real estate and also invested in the Eastern Bloc thus strengthening its political relations. Kuwait remained faithful in the Arab world, the main recipient of its aid although not always on political grounds -with the exception of funding PLO and Iraq in the Iraq-Iraq war-.[154]

The 1965 negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait produced no different outcome· no progress on delineation, demarcation, or the establishment of a joint committee authorized to define the borders and provide mechanisms for the implementation of any agreement on the issue. This was a difficult period for the state of Kuwait. The Anglo-Kuwaiti relation was insufficient to meet the security challenges of Kuwait on the border issue since the British guarantee had been limited only at the request of Kuwait, in case of an emergency. Kuwait was left by itself especially when Britain withdrew in 1971. This decision roused the USA, who had to fill the vacuum of power that emerged from the British withdrawal. But this was not the only security issue that Kuwait had to confront. The July 17th Revolution in Baghdad and the ensuing deterioration of Iran-Iraq relations threatened Kuwaiti sovereignty. Iraq now was requesting the port city of Umm Qasr in order to deploy its forces.

Another issue worth mentioning is the implications of the oil wealth on Kuwaiti society. Domestically Kuwaitis enjoyed a lavish life. A thriving economy due to petrodollars was the tool for the ruling family to reshape the Kuwaiti society and to ensure internal stability, mostly by focusing on the middle class and simultaneously by wiping out possible uprising Nationalistic fronts. The ruling family took advantage of the wealth to provide a comfortable life to its citizens. Having joined the non-alignment, Kuwait established diplomatic and economic

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[154] Assiri p.25, 32-48

relations with numerous states, Communist included. However, British plans to withdraw from the Gulf region were a matter of serious concern for the ruler.

When the Anglo-Kuwaiti relation ended, Kuwait tried to count on a rentier policy and simultaneously to rely its security on the Arabs, even on the UN and eventually on the GCC. Although Amir Sabah seemed to be at ease with this development, he continued not only to encourage Kuwait-Arab relations but also he aspired to become a prominent Arab statesman. Hence, Kuwait adhered to its decision on non-alignment in every confrontation, whether it was between the East and the West or among the Arab states. For that reason, an anti-Israel cause flamed up; even Palestinians fighters were trained.[155]

If we could summarize a few foreign policy goals of the post-independence period these would be: political and military security, meaning survival and stability; Arabic ideology and Islamic values; the small state as a donor mostly to impoverished Arab states, and quiet diplomacy which is translated into a network of like-minded states.[156] Kuwait thought very highly of its Arab identity and thus followed a strong posture on Israeli boycott in the frame of Arab solidarity. Kuwait did not hesitate to use a strong rhetoric to destroy Israel and to pressure Israeli supporters to withdraw their support from Israel. It also supported the Arab economic boycott of Israel since the 1950s. In addition, Kuwait has been a strong advocate of the Palestinians, since their relation dates back to the 1920s. Kuwait funded the Al-Aksa Mosque in Jerusalem, held a significant Palestinian community, Palestinians advisers influenced Kuwaiti politics and in 1964, a PLO office was inaugurated in Kuwait. All the above critically affected its relations with the West while it tried to exploit its presence in international organizations for the shake of the Palestinian cause for decades.[157]

On November 11th, 1962, Amir Abdullah signed the constitution and Kuwait became the first constitutional monarch in the Arab Gulf. Under the leadership of Abdullah Salim, Kuwait managed to maintain its independence and to balance its relations with the Arabs, which, most of the times, were not undisturbed. Kuwait also managed to retain a balance among the divisions of Islam and to stay in the center between conservatives and traditionalists. The Amir Abdullah Samir era was the one when Kuwait successfully preserved its independence but not without a cost. Its relations with the Arabs were so often scrutinized

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[155] Joyce, p.145-9.
[156] Assiri, p.xiv.
[157] Assiri, pp.50-53.

that Kuwait reciprocated with loans, donors and gifts. Despite struggling to keep up with the Arab world, the Western Powers were the competent ones to address its vulnerability.

Kuwait attempted to ensure an Iraqi recognition when their relations ameliorated, but it proved futile. Iraq insisted on the abrogation of the 1961 Anglo-Kuwaiti agreement and even raised the issue of working towards an Iraqi-Kuwaiti federation.[158] Therefore, Iraqi threat remained a main concern for a long period. To this end, Kuwait had to utilize every economic, political, military and diplomatic skill. Kuwait did enjoy political Arab support and simultaneously British protection but still the Iran-Iraq war was indicative of the Kuwaiti vulnerability. That war compelled Kuwait to form a strategy that would ensure its survival, given the hostility of these two powerful states, Iran and Iraq, and also the powerful Saudi Arabia.

Kuwait was motivated by its assets to empower itself. Due to its vast oil revenues, it undertook the role of supporting other Arab nations thus becoming a large aid donor. The exchange of oil/money for security had to do either with dealing with a revisionist power or with its patron. The oil diplomacy was becoming a constant. Apart from being resourceful, Kuwait possessed another asset for a small state, its strategic location: an exit to control the Gulf waters, a route to India, an essential theater of confrontation during the Cold War. Retaining bases in the Gulf region, especially after losing Suez, became a necessity for the West in order to counter the East.

The Kuwaiti-Iraqi dispute of 1973 is another typical example for the Kuwaiti strategy in territorial disputes. It attempted to overcome its vulnerability by employing the financial weapon and its humanitarian face to exercise its influence especially in the Third World countries. It incited public opinion from friendly Arab countries and motivated the great powers to support it and secure its sovereignty.

Kuwait, as well as the other Gulf states, found themselves in a difficult position, as expected, when the Islamic revolution took place and the Iran-Iraq war broke out. The events of that war impelled the Gulf States to organize their defense efficiently. The GCC was one of their tools that used to address common challenges. During this period Kuwait did not alter its security policy: internal stability, diplomatic skills, external pragmatism, strengthening its military machine. Its strategy was once again based on multilateral diplomacy by focusing on

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[158] Joyce, pp.130, 141.

regional cooperation and establishing the GCC (May 1981). The Iran-Iraq war literally forced Kuwait to face its vulnerabilities, become proactive and undertake the risk of many political maneuvers among regional actors to ensure its national interest. It was in a position that had to discover and empower itself both domestically and externally.

Domestically, the political regime undertook reforms to address the regional changes. It called for the elections of a National Assembly, that had been suspended from 1976. In general, it reorganized internal politics. It attempted to stripped the Shia sect from critical domestic positions. Unfortunately, it did not manage to avoid political unrest, terrorist attacks, the Iranian harassment and acts aiming at destabilizing the state as well as political protests from Shia sect. The peak of violence occurred in 1987.[159] "The Iranian model stood as a serious challenge to the traditional regimes throughout the region. The political elites of countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco had to devise policies and programs in response to the Iranian challenge."[160] In other words, the impact of the Iranian revolution upon the Arab world was significant, not because of the Shia sects among Sunni majority, but because it reflected the struggle for a social, economic and political equality. The leaders of the small Gulf Sheikhdoms found themselves bounded to proceed to domestic reforms to prevent any revolution in their sovereignty. The early uprisings in Kuwait, since we talk for a period from 1961 to 1988, were related to inter-Arab political clashes, including the Palestinian cause. However, the late violence in 1980s was the outcome of the support from outside powers, as Iran, as it will be presented below.

In the external front, Kuwait kept open doors with the Saudis but remained aloof from Iran. Two things are certain: it kept prioritizing Arabism, but it did not break its diplomatic relations with Iran. Also, it offered its support, including financial, to Iraq, but it rejected latter's claims on leasing the critical islands of Warba and Bubiyan. It tried to remain neutral and not to provoke any kind of Iranian aggressiveness because it had had engaged Kuwaiti territory in the Iran-Iraq war. Nevertheless, every Iranian victory had repercussions in subversive actions on Kuwaiti territory, which was making this neutrality harder to sustain. Moreover, the Kuwaiti pan-Arabic stance needed to be preserved by supporting Iraq. In addition to this, the Sunni

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[159] Assiri pp.64-75.
[160] J A Bill, "The Arab World and the Challenge of Iran", *Journal of Arab Affairs*, Boulder Vol. 2, Iss. 1, 31 Oct, 1982, 29., p.6.

majority of Kuwait was enough influential to affect the leadership. State survival was once again becoming urgent and needed to be dealt efficiently. Despite having introduced in 1978 conscription in order to organize its military and to strengthen the armed forces, this time it was not enough. Once again external aid was needed.

The Iran-Iraq war was a harsh period for the small state of Kuwait, not only because it found itself in between of a two great regional powers' war, but because of the repercussions that it had on Kuwaiti economy, commerce, shipment and trade. Strict neutrality was its initial strategic choice despite the fact that in the summer of 1980 Kuwait officially supported Iraq and kept doing so, as long as the Iranian threat was becoming more imminent. From financial support, oil sales on behalf of Iraq, to pro-Iraq media propaganda, Kuwait kept supporting an unsatisfied Saddam. Both powers pressured small Kuwait. On the one hand, Iraq demanded logistic support and on the other, Iran tried to neutralize it from helping Iraq, thus by carrying out terrorist activities in the Kuwaiti territory.

Small Kuwait was undoubtedly incapable to influence the war developments. Kuwait's assets, as wealth, diplomacy, neutrality and its good relations with the Arabs, did not prevent Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti oil ships. The occupation of Faw peninsula was the tip of the iceberg. In order to address these terrorist attacks, Kuwait asked for protection from the GCC that turned down the Kuwaiti request. GCC's unwillingness had to do with conflicting, in some instances, interests of its member-states. Eventually Kuwait tried to bring the great powers in. The USA at first appeared to be reluctant because it did not wish to commit to an open-ended operation. However, Soviet preparedness to aid, Iran's hostages strategy in exchange of an arms deal that ruined American reputation and the Iraqi attack on the USS's Stark, changed USA's mind and hence the reflagging operation took place.

Another aspect of Kuwait's strategy during this period is that it managed to keep bilateral relations with most of the major actors. It cultivated its relations with the Saudis, since a common danger brought them together; it did not try to isolate Iran, since it knew the implications to its security from an act like this. Furthermore, pan-Arabism remained the core of its strategic thought. During war, Kuwait avoided to have its territory linked to Iraq so as not to become a target and also to deter Iraq from any revisionist thoughts on territorial concessions. Also, it kept open doors to Iran and tried to mediate between these two regional rivalries. It tried to alleviate domestic and the Arab public opinion regarding its reflagging policy under the West, but it did not deter Iranian aggression that was infuriated by the Western

presence. Thus, internal acts of subversion and direct attacks occurred. At this point it should be mentioned that American-Iranian conflict took place in the frame of the regional confrontation that seemed to had been internationalized. The US increased its presence in the region, since Iran escalated its attacks against American targets. The final act was played at the UNSC where the adoption of Resolution 598 demanded an immediate ceasefire.[161]

The GCC and its member-states tried unsuccessfully to mediate between the belligerents. Iran feared that Kuwait will give the two islands to Iraq while Iraqi fear had to do with a possible isolation due to the intense negotiations of the Gulf states with Iran.[162] Despite the fact that the GCC was efficient in Kuwait's liberation, not only financially but also by providing military and political support[163], in that case, it was totally inefficient. Lack in coordination and in an effective army that would undertake Gulf's protection explains the ineffectiveness. At this point it should be mentioned Kuwaiti unwillingness to allow security forces of the Gulf states into its territories because it "feared that the intrusion of Gulf states security forces into Kuwait might harm Kuwait's unique political and cultural system and jeopardize its balanced policies towards other regional states."[164]

Nevertheless, the neutrality that Kuwait projected was not an easy and unchallenged task. As Iran was succeeding in the battlefield and Kuwait was facing terrorism on its ground and an imminent threat of an Iranian attack, this was the time when Kuwait sought for international involvement. This strategic move is characterized as "traditional pattern in Kuwait's security strategy"[165]. External balancing was crucial for its survival. Kuwait was publicly stating in favor of an Arab solution for the inter-Arab problems. Therefore, it managed to bring in great powers as the USA, the USSR, even the UN, for all the reasons that have been thoroughly analyzed in the strategic environment section.

As soon as it was granted its independence Kuwait pursued a proactive strategy by seeking international recognition, strengthening solidarity with the Arab world, establishing diplomatic missions and exchanging ambassadors with various states. It also sought

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[161] Guazzone, p.66-8., Assiri, pp.99-115.
[162] Assiri, p.75.
[163] A Z Talal Alazemi, *Kuwaiti foreign policy in light of the Iraqi invasion, with particular reference to Kuwait's policy towards Iraq, 1990-2010,* thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, University of Exeter, June 2013., p.109-10.
[164] Assiri p.77.
[165] Guazzonne notes that the effort to bring in extra regional powers had limited success.p.68-9.

membership in the Arab League, even before its independence, as a means to effectively battle with the Iraqi threat.[166] Finally, once the Iran-Iraq war ended the need for democratic reforms became urgent. Formulas toward democratization were put on the negotiation table.

All the above were a legal way to gain diplomatic support and counter attack Iraqi propaganda. But how successful was this strategy? Iraqi claims on territorial concessions on behalf of Kuwait never ceased to exist even after Kuwaiti recognition. In 1965, Bagdad kept on claiming the two islands, Warba and Bubiyan, for defense purposes of Umm Qasr. From that time on, the demarcation-delineation problem of the Iraq-Kuwait never ceased to come up given the chance. Baghdad's debt to Kuwait was another source of concern and, as it has been proved, a main reason for the invasion. In 1990, Iraq implied a possible military action against Kuwait if its demands were not satisfied. And so, a new Gulf War started again.

All in all, the aforementioned events, especially the reflagging, is a proof of how a small state can bring the great power in. Kuwaiti leadership was impelled to ask for external aid. Kuwait had to put aside its no Western involvement policy as well as its pan-Arabism strict tradition and its centrist orientation. All proved that Kuwaiti survival was interlinked with the goodwill of its neighbors. Thus, it was compelled since the 1961 crisis to learn how to form and implement a strategy that will include strong armed forces of its own, domestic support and external aid when needed. It gravely concerned on the intervention of the GCC. It played off the two Cold War superpowers and managed to achieve its protection. It also tried regionally to alleviate its sister-states' concerns that were anxious on a Western military presence. Finally, the internationalization of the conflict is another important aspect of why a regional conflict matter.

Kuwait literally owes its existence to external powers that throughout the course of history saved it from expansionism. Whether it was Turkey, the Persians, the Saudis, or the Iraqis, Kuwait saved face with the help of a protector. To this contributed the vast oil revenues, that proved to be a double-edged sword· on the one hand they motivated great powers to protect Kuwait, on the other, they increased powerful neighbors' appetite to gain control over the small sheikhdom. Kuwait was also concerned about its military capability especially in comparison to stronger and revisionist neighbors. Hence, it diverted its arm supplies. From its

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[166] At this point it should be mentioned that the League membership was giving the floor to Egyptians to expand their influence on Kuwait. This fact was a catalyst for the Sheikh Abdalla to slow down the membership. Cf. Joyce, p.52.

independence till the Iraqi invasion, Kuwait was supplied arms by Great Britain, the USA and USSR, West Germany, France and others. Kuwaiti strategy was simple: the diversification of arms suppliers would allow it to maneuver and avoid any political pressures or blackmails. Despite acquiring successfully an arsenal of sophisticated weapons, it lacked in human resources: troops without combat experience; small armed forces; reliance on external powers for training the Kuwaiti army.[167]

Kuwaiti strategy for the first 40 years after its independence was not assertive but it was stimulated by its external environment. Kuwait had a strong desire to remain non-aligned and it did succeed in it till today. It also desired to increase its influence in the region. Its internal stability played a major role for the implementation of this strategy. The rule of Al-Sabah family was somehow a guarantor for state's stability and coherence. The oil boom enabled the rulers to buy off the domestic elites. Meanwhile, Kuwaiti external affairs were a tradeoff for protection and for improving its image, for example by becoming an aid donor - mostly to Arab states- thus creating dependencies. Later, aiming at increasing its security, Kuwait extended its aid program to non-Muslim, non-Arab states. Through participating and funding international organizations it solidified its legitimacy as a sovereign state.

Was the aforementioned a suitable, well-designed strategy? The ensuing events till the 1991 war for the Kuwaiti liberation may answer the previous question.

[167] Assiri, p.77-88.

2.2. From Operation Protective Shield and the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War to the US invasion of 2003

"The World in Turmoil"

"There were very particular reasons why Saddam Hussein seized Kuwait, not least a chronic indebtedness, but his calculations were shaped by his understanding of the meaning of these larger changes for stability of his regime. Equally the initial American inattention to the simmering crisis in the Gulf reflected its complete absorption in European developments while its subsequent crisis management was shaped by a keen sense of the options for working through the UN and with the Soviet Union, as Moscow sought to maintain some international standing through co-operation rather than confrontation."[168]

Introduction

The first Gulf War is a historical event that has been studied thoroughly. An armed conflict that shook the world as we knew it from many aspects; the number of troops that were deployed; the air and ground operations; a major hostage crisis; the unprecedented media coverage and the way that both sides propagated the developments. An almost fragile coalition that underwent many turbulent periods but remained dedicated to its aim.

The Gulf crisis emerged from the ruins of the Iran-Iraq war which is something important to remember. It also happened in a period of a weakening USSR and subsequent changes in the European continent. The Soviet Jews were returning to their homeland, Israel, thus sparking anxiety among the Arabs, especially those of the Middle East. Saddam Hussein had always been keeping up his aspirations of becoming the leader of the Arab World. Therefore, all the above changes combined with the economic situation of his state and the fear of further deterioration due to lowering oil prices, pushed him to find a solution to his problem. Kuwait was the easy prey. An old enemy because of a border dispute dated back to the Ottoman times. The intriguing spot of this dispute is the fact that the territorial issue that emerged at that time, was fixed under British mandate to which both opponents were under its control. In other words, this dispute was handled under the jurisdiction of the same imperial power, Great Britain.[169]

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[168] L Freedman & E Karsh, p.xxx.
[169] In the late 19th century, when the British began to undermine the Ottomans, the British undertook the guarding of Kuwaiti shoreline. This was a first-hand Iraq-Kuwait border crisis that occurred in 1897. When, in

From the point of view of the small state of Kuwait, it was a strategic failure. This war unveiled Kuwait's vulnerabilities and its imminent security needs. It also impelled it to undertake drastic measures domestically and in its foreign affairs. How did it miss to foresee the Iraqi invasion despite Saddam's actions in the early 90s? Undoubtedly, it was a fiasco for the great powers, especially the Western, that for ages were the patrons of the small state. It was also a strategic surprise on behalf of Saddam to see his old frenemies to actively being engaged to end his invasion in Kuwait.

This unit aims to present the critical events during the fervent decade of 1990s. The end of bipolarity and the changes that led to a multipolar system and the so-called "new world order" were the catalysts for the events that unfolded after the occupation of Kuwait. From fierce air and ground US-UN led operations to closed-doors negotiations and the posture of the Arab World and of the Russians, in this period it will be unveiled if Kuwait had any clear strategy to employ or if it followed the same strategy since the first time that it was threatened by Iraq. Finally, it underlines the events that led to the 1991 Operation Protective Shield to Operation Protective Storm. First, the whole regional and international environment will be scrutinized in order to comprehend the complexities of this regional system as well as the inter-relation between the Gulf and the Middle East. Second, it will be explored if the small state of Kuwait reacted as literature suggests in that unique conflict.

2.2.1. The strategic environment

Fundamental changes took place a while before the Iraqi invasion.[170] The international system was changing since the USSR was experiencing a diminution of its power and was forced to tackle Mujahidin guerillas and civil wars within its mainland. The Arab world was experiencing an uneven distribution of wealth, mostly due to the oil reserves and the benefits that a few

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1914, the Ottomans sided with the Germans during the WWI, London invalidated the Anglo-Ottoman 1913 Convention, which defined the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border and a limited Iraqi access to the Gulf, and announced that Kuwait was an 'independent sheikdom under British Protectorate'. In March 1939, a second crisis happened when King Ghazi moved his troops to the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border thus provoking London by threatening to intervene militarily. Following the independence, in June 1961, Iraq disputed Kuwaiti territories. Hiro, pp.9-15.
[170] see Dilip, E Karsh, Efraim, *The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988*. pp.89-92., Yetiv, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, https://www.margaretthatcher.org/search?dt=1&w=Iraq&searchtype=and&t=0&starty=&startm=&startd=&endy=&endm=&endd=&onedayy=&onedaym=&onedayd=

Arab states were enjoying. The Middle East was recovering after a decade of tensions. The 1982 Israeli invasion in Lebanon, the break out of Intifada, all further implicated and complicated the Arab-Israeli relations. An unforeseeable future was ahead. This volatile situation resulted in terrorist attacks in Kuwait which made it vulnerable to subversion. Meanwhile, the Middle East was moving towards having one superpower to invigilate the region, therefore creating negative aspects for the State of Israel, since it was perceived as the "small Satan" by the Arab block. The USA did not wish to dissatisfy its Arab allies and therefore pressured Israel for concessions.

The Iran-Iraq war is considered a milestone for the Kuwaiti existence. Apart from destabilizing the region, it also triggered the Iraqi revisionism toward Kuwait. During this period, Iraqi claim over Kuwaiti territory was expressed via the construction of military installations along the Kuwaiti border in order to protect the Umm Qasr seaport and thus deter Iran.[171] Iraq emerged devastated after the 8-year war: human losses, debt, and a state in tatters. It was that time when Saddam started facing a potential risk of uprisings. While looking to a present economic miracle, tiny Kuwait seemed to offer the solution.

After the war with Iran, one after the other the European great powers supported Saddam in every aspect possible: militarily, economically, politically, despite Saddam's record of suppressing the Kurds and violating fundamental human rights. At that time, Iraq very much enjoyed the Arab support. In essence, Iraq was perceived as an economically exhausted power with low potential of using aggression towards its neighbors. An actor ready to act as a moderate power and so it should be encouraged to do so. When it was unveiled that funds for agriculture coming from the USA were used for military hardware purchasing and even for acquiring nuclear equipment, it was too late.[172] The 1991 Gulf War was phenomenal. The strategic environment of that period depicts the changes that led to the so-called new world order.

When did the Gulf become an epicenter for the American foreign policy? As it has been mentioned, Great Britain was the great power responsible for the regional security, until it withdrew from the Gulf. However, the US, in the early 1930s, did not disregard the crucial role of the Saudis due to the latter's oil wealth. Furthermore, the US did make informal commitments to the Saudis during the 1940s regarding its security and in 1947, a pact was

[171] Alazemi, p.184.
[172] L Freedman & E Karsh, p.23-28, 34-9.

made between the USA's President Truman and Saudi Arabia's King Abdul Aziz bin Saud. Also, in 1963, President John F. Kennedy sent U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia to back up the commitment against Egypt's president who attempted to kill members of the Saudi royal family.[173] Therefore, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, US's anxiety regarding both its allies in the region and the balance of power was intense. President Bush clarified that the USA will not withstand military force against friends.

The State of Kuwait became the center of attention for the USA at the outset of the Iran-Iraq war. Since then it had been considered a pivotal partner. The annexation of Kuwait by Iraq further improved the US-Kuwait strategic relations. Since the 1991 US-UN led operation both countries have close military cooperation. Another important milestone is the year of 2003, after the 1991 Gulf war. Due to Kuwait's willingness to cooperate with the US, Kuwait has been considered "pivotal" to the West for securing the Gulf.[174] The elimination of Saddam Hussein and the US invasion in Iraq marked a new era but not the end of the US-Kuwaiti relations. In the following years, new and old security threats challenged Kuwait domestically and regionally. Therefore, US presence and cooperation with Kuwait is a sine qua non for the Kuwaiti foreign policy and the regional developments as well.

The USA in the early 90s had multiple issues to be concentrated on: the disintegration of the USSR, the reunification of Germany, the future of the Eastern European states. Balance of power was changing in many regions. Meanwhile in the Gulf, the years of 1991-2003 were significant for Kuwait. Western intervention came as Deus ex machina to save the small state from one of its archenemies. Nevertheless, the Gulf War of 1990 raises a few questions on the strategy of great powers and the USA specifically. Why did the USA intervene decisively and instrumentally in handling the crisis since the invasion? Were there other options rather than war? Why did the USA feel behind with undertaking stronger reaction against Iraqi aggression? How did the transition to a multipolar international system shape the policies of the main actors, the USSR, the USA and of the European powers?

The Iran-Iraq war was the stepping stone for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The debt to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the fact that Iraq emerged military stronger after the war with Iran,

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[173] P Walter, "Secrete Presidential Pledges over years erected U.S. shield for Saudis", *The Washington Post*, 9 February 1992, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/02/09/secret-presidential-pledges-over-years-erected-us-shield-for-saudis/8252af1b-f6f6-43c1-985b-5385b59f90c2/?utm_term=.4bdbb71fddca,
[174] K Katzman, "Kuwait: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy", Congressional Research Service, November 19, 2014.

since Iraq was provided from multiple suppliers with hard power, diplomatic, logistic support and intelligence. Kuwait was vulnerable to Iranian threats. Iranian air raids on Kuwaiti border took place (12 and 16 November 1980) in retaliation for an alleged Kuwaiti involvement and for aiding Iraq. The latter brought Iraq and Kuwait even closer. Saddam also attempted to change the agenda in domestic politics and so constructed a crisis that would make him be the leader of the Arab world. A lesson learned for Saddam after the war with Iran was that its short coastline was its Achilles's heel. Occupying small Kuwait in the mind of Saddam was the solution to his problems.

Having intel on Saddam's arm movements toward the borders of Kuwait from the time that the military built-up started (mid of July), the USA tried to control the situation and find a peaceful solution. Thus, it issued a statement that it would defend the interests of US's friends and allies in the region. Every difficulty that can be found in international relations arose in this dispute. The Arabs wanted the USA to keep a lower profile; the British were in favor of a peaceful settlement, thus backing the US's handling; the State Department opposed this stance; Saddam was going ballistic. The US administration was trying to pacify Saddam, while the latter was fooling all the actors that were involved. "It was assumed that the crisis would end when the Kuwaitis handed over a substantial amount of cash."[175]

As time was passing, intelligence reports continued to raise awareness on the Iraqi military movements, but since many actors were involved in the crisis management: Egypt, UAE, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the messages were conflicting and mixed. Till the end of July Saddam had not changed neither his posture nor his military deployments. At this point one of the biggest intel failures must be mentioned. The following intelligence services: the Kuwaiti, the Israeli, the British, the Russian, the Arabic, shared the view that Saddam's main objective was intimidation and if military action was taken place, it would be limited to the disputed areas. Furthermore, the persistence of the US on economic sanctions and opposing military action, further convinced Saddam that, in case of attacking Kuwait, the US would remain aloof.[176] Another encouraging factor for Saddam was a meeting between him and the US's Ambassador. In that meeting the US Ambassador stated:

[175] L Freedman & E Karsh, p.54.
[176] L Freedman & E Karsh, p.57, 59, 78., A Bacevich & E Inbar, eds., *The gulf war of 1991 reconsidered*, Frank Cass, London-Portland OR 2003.p.84.

"Mr. President, not only do I want to say that President Bush wanted better and deeper relations with Iraq, but he also wants an Iraqi contribution to peace and prosperity in the Middle East. … But we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait."[177]

For the US, this crisis was complicated. It had to deal with so many actors regionally and extra-regionally, friends and foes, conflicting interests and common ones. The USA did not wish to disturb the delicate balance among the Arabs as well as every bilateral relation of itself with the Arab states. It actually needed the Arab support. Economic sanctions did not have much success and of course the scapegoat for every crisis in the Arab world was the Arab-Israeli conflict, a conflict that the USA had to calculate carefully to avoid a spillover. Thus, a few issues that need to be addressed are: why the West, despite having knowledge of the military built-up, and the deepening of the crisis did not reach the point to prevent the invasion? Was Saddam that skilled at controlling US's actions by deceiving them on his true intentions? Did he deter them from taking any action against his obvious military preparedness?

On August 1st, the USA was informed about the imminent invasion and consequently notified the UNSC. After the collapse of the so-called "Arab solution" the US had to calculate every aspect of the crisis: US' national interest; regional developments; possible spillover to Saudi Arabia; Saddam's ultimate objectives; Kuwait's future; oil flow.

After the joint action at the UNSC, the economic sanctions enforcement and the subsequent embargo and blockade, the USA realized the importance of working within an international framework of consensus. Militarily, the USA was obliged to take action and take into consideration every possible reaction of friendly and non-friendly powers and the possible outcome of this military action. A decisive moment was when King Fahd of Saudi Arabia agreed on accepting US troops on his territory. When this decision was taken even the GCC condemned Iraq.[178] Tehran also opposed the annexation despite Saddam's phenomenal peace proposal to Iran. Syria's Assad also stood by every anti-Iraq action and asserted a leading role in the coalition. Egypt followed the same path as Syria did. Behind all this genuine interest was

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[177] The New York Times, "Confrontation in the Gulf; Excerpts From Iraqi Document on Meeting With U.S. Envoy", *The New York Times*, 23 September 1990, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/23/world/confrontation-in-the-gulf-excerpts-from-iraqi-document-on-meeting-with-us-envoy.html?pagewanted=1
[178] Saudi Press Agency (SPA), 7 August 1990, as quoted in, L Freedman & E Karsh, p.95.

of course the struggle for regional power, financial gains and the possession of the leading role in the Arab world.

The Iraqi annexation of Kuwait, on August 8th, provoked further regional turmoil. This act was condemned not only by the UNSC but also by the Arab League. At the Arab League Cairo summit, it was decided to send troops as part of a multinational force. This was the catalyst for Saddam to play the card of the Zionist conspiracy to undermine the Arab determination to deal with the Iraqi invasion. This was also the time that the Palestinian cause emerged to link his ventures with the pan-Arabic perennial issue. All issues of "occupation" were on the negotiation table: Israel and Palestinian territories, Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon and the withdrawal of Iran from Iraq. Saddam's aspirations to become the undisputed leader of the Arabs entangled Israel that had to bore the burden of an anti-Israeli rhetoric in every aspect: from Saddam's systematical use of the Palestinian cause to change the agenda to PLO, that took the opportunity to bring the issue of the occupied territories in the UNSC. Saddam was trying to breach the West either by using the hostages issue or by playing the card of the Arab-Israeli conflict.[179]

As it has been highlighted, leadership bears a critical role in every crisis management. George Bush's administration acted in an era that the world was moving from a bipolar system to a new world order, where the USA would lead. Therefore, he had to calculate so many parameters and possible outcomes of the crisis management. The Administration's concerns were the Iraqi expansion and possession of the oil reserves not only from Kuwait but also from Saudi Arabia. If Saddam managed to control the regional oil production, which was about 65% of the total world production, the repercussions would not be just about the oil; it would mostly be political. Saddam would be the one that would shape and conduct regional politics and would have a strong say in the international arena. Hence, taking over oil production would be the least of the problems that he would create. Political control of the region was the predicament. Since sanctions, embargo, diplomatic activity at the UNSC and moving forces to the Gulf did not reap the fruits, drastic measures had to be taken to strengthen coalition's capability.

The Iraqi military started building up its forces on August 2nd. Kuwaiti forces were inadequate to repeal the Iraqi military. The Arab-League condemned the bloodshed and called

[179] L Freedman & E Karsh, pp.99-109, 166-179

for an immediate withdrawal of the Iraqi forces. The world community presented an unprecedented unanimity. The UN passed the Resolution 660 condemning the invasion and calling for withdrawal. Meanwhile, the West failed to predict the outcome of the Iraqi movements. "The White House and the State department had concluded that the Iraqi troop built-up was aimed at intimidating rather than invading."[180] And then, the American indecisiveness. There were so many reasons for this: domestic issues as poor economy, lack of domestic support, Congressional elections ahead, public opinion reaction to any military action, the need to act militarily in concert with the other Gulf states as well as other Western powers and finally America's efforts to motivate unwilling states to contribute financially and military to this operation. Meanwhile, the British were ardent to start the offensive plan and set as the most likely time the middle of November.

On August 8th, Bush announced the Operation "Desert Shield" deployment. This operation intended to protect America's ally, Saudi Arabia, from the Iraqi aggression. At this point it should be reminded that the Carter Doctrine (1979) clearly stated that an attack to Saudi Arabia is an attack to the USA. This was something that Saddam might have kept in mind, otherwise he could have orchestrated differently his attack, if he was so much interested in attacking the Saudis.

Another option to address the situation was to concentrate in a political solution. Iran was getting more involved while the Gulf crisis became a man to man war; Bush against Saddam. Bush personifies Saddam as the new Hitler. This is also an explanation for the great number of boots on the ground that the US deployed. Among different views on how to handle the crisis from different actors and national interests, the UN Resolution 665, backed by Bush and Thatcher, was a major success. For the first time use of force was authorized.

International legitimacy was a priority for every Western action to avert the Kuwaiti annexation. Meanwhile, Iraq kept increasing its military capability in Kuwait while using the hostages issue as a leverage. Saddam skillfully used media for his public relations and domestic image. Ultimately, this war was a war of a state-of-the-art propaganda that was televised by both sides. Finally, it was at that phase that Saddam tried to link the Gulf crisis with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Bush strongly dissociated the issues while Moscow tried to keep up with the Iraqi stance. As a result, diplomacy, psychological warfare against Saddam, a

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[180] Hiro, p.111-112.

consistent military built-up, a UNSC in motion were some of the West's tools to confront Saddam.

In the domestic front Bush had to tackle challenges that endangered his presidency: a federal budget deficit, opposition to the Iraqi sanctions and questions on why to help Kuwait. A failure to secure the US Congress concessions followed. All the above-mentioned were combined with Iran's animosity on the US military built-up in the area, the fragile balance between Arabs and Israelis and a little bit later the Intifada that broke out.[181]

Baghdad, despite its provocative speeches and acts, was afraid to challenge the US to avoid air strikes. By the middle of September, the USA had 150.000 troops on the ground but still no clear schedule on how and when they were going to be deployed.[182] The USA was prioritizing a diplomatic solution, should Saddam fully obey to the terms. The cost of the operation kept rising dramatically, especially since the doubling of the forces in the Gulf, plus the constant dilemma on how to address the issue: just as the "Kuwaiti problem" or/and also the "Saddam problem". Bush's goals were crystal clear: immediate and unconditional withdrawal; restoration of Kuwaiti government; restoring stability and security in the Gulf; safeguarding American lives. UN Resolutions (660, 661, 662) endorsed US' posture on immediate withdrawal and were in accordance with the Soviets and many Arab States as well.

As time was passing without any military action, Iraq benefited from this inertia. Saddam was notorious for his inhuman behavior and his atrocities during the Iran war, and "although Bush's rhetoric created the strong impression that Saddam was his target, at no point did he ever suggest that this was a formal objective."[183] At that time several opinions emerged thus dividing the decision-making process. The hawkish stance was in favor not only of an unconditional Iraqi withdrawal, but also to annihilate Saddam and its hard power. The hawkish opinion was backed by Kissinger and a strong Israeli lobby. A dovish stance was putting first the humanitarian aspect of the war. In the middle we find mostly members of the Congress that needed their voice to be heard in order to deliver on the Gulf war.[184] On the other side, Saddam's Guard, the dictator's personal military force, was well equipped, loyal to its chief,

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[181] France continued its policy on linking both issues while Syria and the USA, strongly did not. In the end, the Bush Administration succeeded in avoiding any linkage between these issues.
[182] L Freedman & E Karsh, p.203.
[183] L Freedman & E Karsh, p.219. In 'The Great Debate' chapter iare exposed the arguments of the main departments of the Administration on the 'Saddam Problem' as well as Thatcher's strong posture to get Saddam out. pp.211-227.
[184] Hiro, p. 147-9., 188

committed to the Ba'athist party. These forces were key to Saddam's defense. "Iraq's blitzkrieg was overwhelming."[185]

The debate on how to handle this complicated issue was one of the parts that needs to elaborate. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait happened in a period after a bloody 8-year war in the Middle East. At that time, the West supported Iraq and even after the war, the USA continued its "constructive engagement" policy. This policy's aim was that, since Iraq emerged as the most powerful country in the region, it also needed to develop a workable relation between the USA and Saddam.[186] Although the USA realized that Saddam's aggressiveness after the war was something non-manageable and simultaneously troubling, it still decided to pursue a more conciliatory approach.

The Iraqi crisis was complex in so many aspects. It touched upon domestic politics, personal interest, national interest, public opinion, the hostages issue, even the possibility of Iraq's nuclear capability. Undeniably, sanctions were not effective and action had to be taken. Still the question was how and by whom. Bush did not enjoy the domestic support that Thatcher did and he was not sure on how long this coalition is going to sustain.

In November 1990, the USA held the UNSC presidency. Gorbachev was facing domestic changes and while the USA was pursuing a common strategy with the Russians, Gorbachev, wanted one more chance with his ex-ally, Iraq, before going on the use of force. The issue had to be resolved by the end of the month at the UNSC. Britain was holding a tough line; France assented to the US's proposal; China found abstention as the best diplomatic way to balance its relations with all the opponents. It took considerable time to pass the UNSC Resolution 678 but the USA wanted to explore every available peace solution and to diminish every possibility of conflict. Still, the Western world was negotiating with a dictator keen on holding himself in power at any cost. Hence, what were the chances for the Resolution 678 to be implemented peacefully and Iraq to comply and withdraw from Kuwait?

Saddam was troubling for his Arab brothers, too. Jordan and the leader of PLO, Yasser Arafat, remained fervent allies of the Iraqi leader and he tried to devise peaceful formulas that would be acceptable from all. The entanglement of the Palestinian issue with the occupation of Kuwait was still his main argument. Hence, Saddam managed to put in the EU's agenda the linkage between Iraqi stance and the Palestinian cause. Many Europeans hoped that by

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[185] Yetiv, pp.23-4.
[186] Yetiv, p.24-26.

engaging in this issue, Saddam would comply with the UN Resolutions.[187] At last, Yasser Arafat played a significant role behind the scenes. After discussing with other Arabs, like King Hussein, he persuaded Saddam to release the hostages. The political objective was to finalize an agreement where Kuwait would concede the border strip and lease the two islands in dispute to Iraq. An Arab peacekeeping force was also included in that peace plan.[188]

Saddam remained intransigent and disobedient to the UN Resolutions. The latter in conjunction with the Western irrevocable position on the Iraqi withdrawn and its compliance with the UN resolutions meant that Saddam had to prepare Iraq for war. To this it should be added that Saddam had miscalculated and underestimated the resonance of his acts in the international community. He did not comprehend the undergoing changes of the international system and the balance of power in the Middle East. The impact of the diminution of power of his ally, Moscow, was something that also made unhappy the Soviets themselves, since the USA was becoming the dominant player who shaped the politics. Gorbachev was under a severe pressure by the Americans to back up their plans. He deeply fooled himself by relying on his estimation that the Western coalition will soon fall apart and thus the Arab brotherhood will lead the crisis management.

Concerning the Arab factor, both superpowers and Western powers in general believed in a strong cooperation with the Arabs to resolve the crisis. They were keeping an open dialogue with the Arab states, especially the Saudis, the Egyptians and the Jordanians. Many plans that the Arabs had proposed proved to be in vain and inconclusive. The West was uneasy about the Operation Desert Shield. West's aspirations on implementing successfully this operation meant that it first needed to combine its forces with the use of Arab facilities. Public statements with its Arab allies were critical and this was puzzling. Arab public opinion also needed to be persuaded that the Western presence was not a religious threat or another colonial invasion.[189]

Saddam was a deceptive leader. After a bloody and catastrophic 8-year war with Iran, he had to present to his people the coming war as the result of the American intransigence.[190] He was aware of America's military supremacy but his plan was to harm the coalition that much

[187] L Freedman & E Karsh, pp.263-74.
[188] Hiro, p.270
[189] Hiro, pp.156-189
[190] L Freedman & E Karsh, p.278.

so as to use it as a leverage. He was aware of the western vulnerability on America's public opinion on human losses in wars, especially after Vietnam.

The USA was lost in the decision - making process and bureaucratic procedure. While the US was trying to find how it could achieve a quick win by minimizing its casualties, the fear of an existent Iraqi chemical weapons was also another decision factor. However, President Bush viewed war as an option since October. Bush, as well as the advisors from his inner circle, suggested that war was the desirable solution, thus defying strong domestic and international pressures.[191]

November was a critical month for deciding military engagement with ground forces. Saddam kept using the hostages issue as a strategic asset and as a means to provoke public reaction in the coalition's domestic level. Hence, when war became an issue at the UNSC, Britain supported the US plan, while China, the USSR and France kept reservations. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Syria continued their support on US' war option. The UN support was a sine qua non for the US. Should Bush's warnings on a possible Iraqi nuclear arsenal had had been true and the threat existent, acting under the aegis of legitimacy was more important than anything. However, the IAEA had a crystal-clear view on the absence of such an existential threat.[192]

On December, the crisis was skyrocketed and Saddam's military preparedness was high. He projected leadership skills among the Arabs by asking for an international conference on the Palestinian-Israeli issue. This was another headache for the Bush administration since he had to contain the Israelis; to tackle its Arab and Western allies as Britain, France; to address the USSR and China who shared the same position with Saddam. Finally, as the situation in the US domestic politics was becoming suffocating and no one was happy with an open-ending and costly operation, Bush set a deadline. On January 15th, the deadline Bush had set expired and on January 16th the war broke out.

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[191] Yetiv, p.9

[192] "Hans Meyer, the agency's spokesman at its headquarters in Vienna, said that at Iraq's invitation, two inspectors from the I.A.E.A. -- one from the Soviet Union and one from Nigeria -- had spent four days last week conducting their investigation at Tuwaitha, a nuclear research installation near Baghdad where the uranium is stored. "They found that all the highly enriched uranium stored by Iraq from the former Osirak reactor was where it should be, and none had been diverted," Mr. Meyer said." M W Browne, "Mideast tensions; Inspectors Say Iraq's Nuclear Fuel Wasn't Used for a Weapon", *The New York Times,* 28 November 1990, www.nytimes.com/1990/11/28/world/mideast-tensions-inspectors-say-iraq-s-nuclear-fuel-wasn-t-used-for-a-weapon.html

Operation Desert Storm started with an air campaign on the night of January 16th-17th. A uniqueness of this war was the unprecedented media coverage. The plan was to attack from air, sea, and ground. The purpose of the operation was to start with an air campaign that was anticipated to last short and easily destroy the opponent's capabilities. It aimed at gaining air supremacy and destroy Iraqi command and control system. Iraq chose to conserve its air force by parking them in shelters. The Scud missile operation against Israel and Saudi Arabia was the only offensive action by the Iraqi forces. The Iraqi forces were well prepared long time ago, from phase one. Their strategy included the protection of its warplanes from destruction in the case of an air assault and the building of defense barriers to safeguard the Iraqi infantry. The second phase of the operation intended in destroying Iraqi arsenal, chemical, biological, nuclear weapons included. The last phase was to mobilize ground forces to defeat completely the Iraqi forces. In sum, the air campaign was a blitzkrieg failure. The coalition bombed Kuwait and Iraq thus airing issues for humanitarian crisis. It lasted for six weeks and it succeeded in obliterating transportations infrastructures, logistical facilities, chemical and biological weapons.[193]

Overall, the coalition sustained the war, enjoyed international support and precautionary measures were taken to limit casualties for both military personnel and the Iraqi civilians. Iraqi hostilities were limited to low-level attacks. However, the prolongation of war brought about anxiety to the Arabs mostly due to "collateral damages". Moscow attempted to be the honest-broker. At this point it should be mentioned the danger of coalition's break down. First of all, this war challenged the Arab unity and the so-called Arab-Identity. Two things could have shattered the whole plight: the existent Arab division, for example Jordan sided with Iraq and no one could predict the evolution of the conflict, and the danger of drawing Israel into the war, which would tear apart the coalition since no Arab state would accept Israel to participate in the coalition.[194] Israeli and American tactic of keeping the former away from the Iraqi provocations was prudent.

The end of the war was as dramatic as it was when it started. All participants were striving to gain the upper hand. Gorbachev needed some diplomatic success; Bush was under pressure to conclude every operation that was still on; the Arabs were anxious of a protracted conflict.

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[193] R E Lee, "Technology's Child: Schwarzkopf and Operation Desert Storm, Command Concepts: A Theory Derived from the Practice of Command and Control", Carl, 1999, pp.55-71, Hiro, pp.319-398.
[194] A Bacevich & E Inbar, p.58.

After a proposed Moscow plan that would help Saddam to save-face and a coalition ultimatum to withdraw until February 23rd, America responded with a massive of all forces that were available to eject Iraq from Kuwait. Operation "Desert Sabre", a ground offensive operation, was launched on February 24$^{th.}$ The Soviets, after their peace plan was rejected, expressed their disapproval and so did Iran and Jordan. Following fierce ground battles of 100 hours and a six weeks air campaign, on February 28th, Kuwait was finally taking its state back.

2.2.2. The Kuwaiti Strategy

Kuwaiti independence armed Kuwait with a sense of entitlement. Its wealth and aid to many states, including Iraq, somehow strengthened its attitude toward Iraq and believed that the latter should be grateful. Hence, Kuwait moved its foreign policy toward meliorating its relations with Iran and Syria, something that later irritated Saddam. During the Iran-Iraq war, Kuwait sided with Iraq, mostly due to its fear of an internal subversion. This decision led Kuwait to lease the Bubiyan island to Iraq to improve Iraqi defense against Iran. It even adopted openly a pro-Iraq posture that was transmitted through Kuwaiti television and press. Another Kuwaiti predicament was how deep it would go with its affiliations with Washington, since it did not wish to disturb its relations with the Arab states. Partly, this was also a cause for its strategic failure that resulted in its annexation.

On July 15th, 1990, Saddam Hussein had built his armed forces to the south of Kuwait thus posing the real threat of invading. Kuwaiti strategy was certainly not of surrendering to Saddam's absurd demands. Its negotiation tactic was of dealing with Iraq with the latter abandoning every claim over Kuwait. Still, Kuwait was not as alarmed as it should had been. What Kuwait actually misunderstood was that Iraqi posture was not to bargain; it was a final offer leading to Iraqi determination to annex Kuwait. This serious misperception ensued by the distorted view of a not possible military use of force by Iraq. Kuwait's misperception on the possibility of an Iraqi invasion was that it would affect only a limited disputed area. When, in the mid of July, Iraqi intentions of invading became apparent, Kuwait changed its strategy. It gathered its GCC Arab allies, mobilized the UN and used Egypt's Hosni Mubarak as the

mediator.[195] In the end of July, during the Jeddah negotiations, Kuwait offered to write off a part of the debt in return for border settlement. The Iraqi delegation frantically withdrew and the Kuwaitis naively believed that the negotiations were still on and, in exchange of a small price, it could achieve its security.[196]

On August 2nd, 1990, Iraq attacked Kuwait. It took 12 hours to conquer this small state. What is remarkable is the fact that the 16.000 strong Kuwaiti army was not fully mobilized "in line with government's attempt not to provoke the Iraqis."[197] At first, a request for outside help was made by the Emir to the American Embassy but the Emir asked "not be made public or treated as official."[198] When the situation further deteriorated the above-mentioned appeal was removed. Kuwaiti obsession over not internationalizing the crisis and its preference on an Arab solution harmed its situation. It was obvious that Saddam would not give up on Kuwait neither he was willing to allow the Al-Sabah family to return to power.

Undoubtedly, Saddam bears the responsibility for this war; for the severe economic difficulties; the domestic political environment after the war with Iran; for his prestige and the possibility of being humiliated from another defeat in front of his people. Saddam's intransigence was obvious from day one. He tried to appease everyone that was standing in his way and insisting on giving up on the annexation of Kuwait, his 19th declared province. From blaming the USA and the UN to deceiving his Arab allies and even blowing every negotiation by demanding to accept his arguments, Saddam showed clearly that he had no interest in a peaceful solution that would make him retreat from his initial position.

The multilateral system, the West's tolerance and its moderate stance toward Saddam's regime and the bilateral relations of the coalition's states with Arab states, further perplexed the crisis management. What should be underlined is Saddam's art of deception. During all this time, he bluffed in summits or private meetings by conveying messages of reconciliation, while he eventually followed the path of aggression. He never clarified his terms on withdrawal and snubbed blatantly all the UN resolutions.

Coalition's strategy based on economic sanctions, embargo and political isolation was not fruitful at all. On the one hand, aggression should not be tolerated at all, on the other,

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[195] At that juncture, Saddam was assuring Mubarak about not having any intention in invading Kuwait. L Freedman & E Karsh, pp.49-50, 55
[196] L Freedman & E Karsh, p.60.
[197] L Freedman & E Karsh, p.67.
[198] L Freedman & E Karsh, p.67.

West's policy was not sufficient to compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The military option and the possibility of escalating into war against Saddam's forces was not successful at its early stages, because of West's mixed signals. The latter boosted Saddam's confidence on the possibility of a no-war condition and on winning this conflict, but he clearly misunderstood the state of Western forces and the its capabilities. The deployment of ground forces brought an end to Kuwait's annexation and resulted in Saddam's surrender.

Even so, what was Kuwaiti strategy toward Iraqi aggression? Did it use its assets that previously assisted it to implement its strategy? Was Kuwait a smart state so that it had a strong say in the regional developments by trying to influence its allies? Did it contribute to its liberation, or the international system and the great powers' confluence were determining to settle the conflict by themselves? Finally, did Kuwait succeed in the main thesis question; did it draw, borrow and retain in its possession the strength of a great power in order to survive?

First of all, Kuwait's greatest asset, oil, should be underscored. The oil weapon was not only employed by Kuwait to achieve its goals but also by Iraq. Kuwait ranks 9th in the world's crude oil production.[199] Oil was and still is an important component of power for Kuwait. It would not be an exaggeration to say that it still plays one of the greatest role in shaping its relations with great powers and it contributes to overcoming its inherent vulnerabilities. Oil was also the critical factor that led Iraq to first threaten and then annex Kuwait, since it provoked Iraqi revisionism. The beginning of the oil era, in the mid 1940s, is also stigmatized by the improvement of Kuwait's relations with the Saudis. What alleviated their divergences was the realization of common interest in the case of cooperation in the oil sector. Therefore, joint sovereignty over the neutral zone was the first step toward peaceful coexistence and joint ventures.[200]

Till today, Kuwait employs diplomatic and economic tools that are at its disposal to achieve its foreign policy aims. Kuwait is one of the largest aid donors in the Arab world and it takes advantage of its oil profits to benefit weaker actors. Being an aid donor is something common in the small states literature and Kuwait knows how to exploit its resource superiority and manipulate it for its own benefit, when issues come up. This strategy for achieving its political objectives is fruitful regionally. Simultaneously, Kuwait becomes pivotal for the

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[199] CIA factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2241rank.html#ku
[200] Guazzone p.65.

Western allies. Being able to grant loans at about US$ 18.4 billion as of September 30th, 2015, Kuwait has benefited 104 countries and thus consolidated its regional supremacy.[201]

In the case of its bilateral relations with Iraq, Kuwait also used the economic weapon during the crucial crises after its independence, by giving loans, aid, and enhancing Iraq's political and economic capabilities. In 1963, Iraq recognized Kuwait's independence by the concession of a loan. Furthermore, during the reflagging crisis in the Iran-Iraq war, Kuwait used its economic weapon to lease from Moscow tankers. It actually followed the same pattern in the late 1990s but this time in exchange for Soviet diplomatic support.[202] Hence, in 1990, oil played an important role in Kuwait's liberation and influenced the developments and the decision making of both sides. Regarding the oil flow, it should be highlighted that the Western economies were far less affected, unlike Iraq and the Third World economies. Therefore, Middle East's complex balance of power was also an important feature of this conflict. Iraq was losing ground while Iran was moving up. West, in order to balance Arab's sensitivities needed to demonstrate agile and cautious moves. Kuwait had to be once again under the Western defense umbrella.

Saddam used the oil weapon as a means to blackmail and undermine the political objectives and military planning of his opponents. From an oil shock on world markets to conquering the oil revenues of Kuwait, Iraq was able to press for retreats. Equally the West hoped to press Iraq via oil to abide by the UNSC resolutions. In the absence of the oil factor, Kuwait may have never been invaded and the USA may have not been so motivated to revert the Kuwaiti sovereignty or to defend Saudi Arabia resolutely.[203]

"Saddam proved to be neither a strategist nor a soldier. His poor understanding of military affairs, and his complete subordination of military strategy to the ultimate goal of protecting his regime, drove him to fight a political war, with one eye set on his post-war survival".[204] But he survived. He dealt with the Kurds in the north and anti-Shia Muslims in the south apart from the US-UN operations that targeted him.

Kuwait despite having failed in its strategy, since it was annexed, still held a few strategic points worth mentioning, apart from oil. "The Kuwaitis did not 'leave one stone unturned' in

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[201] Kuwait Fund For Development, "Loans and Grants and Technical Assistance for Arab Countries as of September 30, 2015", www.kuwait-fund.org
[202] Hiro, p.41.
[203] L Freedman & E Karsh, pp.180-8, 214.
[204] Ibid. p.435.

trying to influence the US."[205] Kuwait played the public relations card well enough. It hired seven firms to work on the propaganda war.

2.2.3. The first Gulf War. Lesson learned

When the invasion broke out, there were no military options available for the USA. The allies pressed for exhausting every "peaceful" tool firstly, as it happened with the enforcement of sanctions. Saddam's intentions were to establish a hegemony over Kuwait so that his financial, political and strategic nightmares would end once and for all by conquering this tiny but strategically and economically significant state. Saddam was presented by the Iraqi media as the "savior" of the sister-state, since the situation in Kuwait was narrated as an indigenous uprising. There was people's resistance which resulted in mass civilian killings, deportations, missing persons and war prisoners, hostages and refugees. Saddam did try to change the demography of Kuwait. Unfortunately for Saddam, an international condemnation of the invasion followed while he was trying to play the Arab card.

The 1991 invasion and annexation prompted Kuwait to realize once again its constant need of external aid. But this was not the only issue. It also compelled the protagonists-the USA mostly and Britain- to plan thoroughly the operation and to form a grand strategy. Would this include mostly economic sanctions? How much force would be needed? And what would be the fate of the Saddam regime?

The Iraqi road to Kuwait's annexation was not paved with roses. Saddam justified his aggression on historical grounds (part of Basra), political, (Western colonialism) personal interests, since he wanted to unite the Arab world and become its leader, and of course the oil factor and the accusations of Kuwait stealing Iraqi oil. The Ba'athist ideology also played vital role. Saddam did not hesitate to use as an excuse Kuwait's domestic politics in order to legitimate the invasion[206] It is worth mentioning that, a while before the invasion, Iraq was keeping the tones low regarding its claims over Kuwait. However, while its fiscal deficit was deepening, especially after the war with Iran, and no Arab state was giving up on Iraqi demands

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[205] Yetiv, p.87
[206] Saddam mentioned the dissolution of Kuwaiti National Assembly in 1986. Yetiv, p.22

on reducing oil production or forgiving Iraqi loans, Kuwait became the main target of Iraqi verbal aggression.

The 1991 operation had many difficulties. From economic pressure to military losses, the strategic calculations of the West were burdensome: Communism was retreating; the West was focused on the European challenges after the German unification; the restructuring of Europe to create a stable and secure environment. The USA had to get over the Vietnam failure. Britain had to confront the new international environment that was being shaped by the renewal of the American-German relations. Meanwhile, Saddam's personality was devious and therefore it was uneasy to calculate the repercussions of the Western strategy on this conflict.

All the above created an idyllic environment for Saddam that made to the point to gather his forces on the border with Kuwait in the mid of July, 1990. His obsession with remaining in power combined with the economic catastrophe after the war with Iran, not only forced him to design the invasion but also to solidify his regime, especially after the USSR disintegration and the succession of dictators in Eastern Europe. It was that time that Saddam became really anxious about his future and the Western stance towards him.

Saddam's personality was ambivalent. From being moderate on the use of force to his pre-emptive strike against Iran, all should had alarmed the West. His strategy toward Iran had limited objectives and he escalated only after Iran attacked non-military targets.[207] "For once, a regional conflict had not served as a proxy for superpower confrontation".[208]

After the Iraqi invasion too many questions were raised towards the solution.[209] Arabs wanted to deal with the invasion in the frame of the Arab brotherhood without any external interference. America was anxious that the situation was getting out of control and that it was not anymore a regional conflict. Meanwhile different versions of what should be the solution to the Iraqi-Saddam problem aroused from the enmeshed Arabs and the Arab League, a really convenient problem-solving procedure for Saddam himself who seemed to enjoy all this delay and tried to achieve the "satellization of Kuwait"[210]. Contradictory interests and different interpretations of the crisis led to the understanding that an "Arab solution" was not

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[207] L Freedman & E Karsh, p.20-1.
[208] Ibid. p. xxix.
[209] Ibid. p.69-72
[210] Ibid. p.72.

feasible.[211] Hence, the ball ended in the court of the superpowers and the UN to firmly determine the outcome of that crisis. Finally, the major European powers considered the issue as one of international order.

The US-UN led coalition and the Kuwaiti deployed means prevailed. Critical were all the UN Resolutions that the UNSC and the great powers voted and implemented in favor of Kuwait. The UNSC Resolution 660 was a forewarn of an international action to answer the provocative Iraqi position which was followed by economic sanctions, a full economic embargo. The US-UN led coalition was composed of 28 states. For several months sanctions were imposed on Iraq. After a five months occupation and an unprecedented media coverage from both sides that further implicated the decision-making process, it was demanded from Saddam to leave the Emirate before January 15th, 1995. The fear of a possible Iraqi attack to Saudi Arabia that would be disastrous for Western interests, prompted the Saudis to come to an agreement with Washington and London and permitted the stationing of troops (Operation "Desert Shield"). A surprising aspect of the Operation was the Kuwaiti furiousness with Yasser Arafat, who in the past enjoyed full support by the Kuwaitis but now he was sided with Saddam. This story changed the attitude of Kuwait toward the Palestinians and anyone else that had cooperated with the Iraqi regime was not welcome.

Saddam's strategy was similar to the one against Iran. Saddam was firm when he planned to annex the whole of Kuwait and not just a few islands and oilfields, as most believed. He was aware of the dangers against him, if the whole of Kuwait was not shallowed and also was confident that no Arab country would ask for American support.[212]

The 1990 Gulf war was from Saddam's point of view, a justification of his claims, a personal offense that he had to deal with, since the Kuwaitis did not treat him with respect. It was also a matter of survival for Iraq due to its vast debt as well as a matter of domestic affairs, since himself would be the liberator of the usurped Iraqi land. Thus, the Kuwaiti annexation was not only a failure of this small state but also a failure of the international community to realize and act preemptively against Saddam's well-known practices from the Iran-Iraq war. When Saddam adopted his hostage policy as a human shield to pressure foreign powers to forgo intervention or to undermine the economic sanctions, this aggression should had been

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[211] An "Arab solution" was preferable by the Russians. From their point of view, a blank cheque to the USA would be an indication of their decline in power. Freedman, Lawrence, and Efraim Karsh, p.79.
[212] L Freedman & E Karsh, p.62.

expected given the way that Saddam had treated the Kurds and his past on using chemical weapons.

Many plans were proposed to Saddam especially by the Arabs aiming at withdrawing from Kuwait and simultaneously at saving his face. But, in this historic event, too many actors were involved and too many interests were at stake. In this complicated situation where Arabs wished not to damage their image and the West was not willing on sacrificing its fundamental principles, including international law, in the end all parties agreed except for Iraq, that the latter should withdraw from Kuwait. Hence, he had to prepare for war.

As the war was ending, Saddam was wishing to save-face and to present his defeat as a voluntary act. It should be pinpointed that the coalition had no official plans to move against him. The war was being waged in the frame of the UN mandates and there was absolutely no planning on what they wanted to do with Iraq and Saddam after the Iraqi withdrawal. If something was agreed, this was the fact that the situation consisted a threat for the international peace and security, something that was mentioned in the UNSC resolutions. Also, regarding the Iraqi domestic affairs, the UNSC Resolution 687 handled the issues of the boundary between Iraq- Kuwait and the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Kuwait. In this resolution the UNSC expresses concern regarding the Iraqi threats to use chemical and biological weapons and "decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless under international supervision, of: a) all chemical and biological weapons… b) all ballistic missiles… ".[213]

A ceasefire was signed on February 21st, 1991 -Iraq was actually forced to sign-. The Iraqi war left an economy in a bad shape with a growing budget deficit. When Operation "Protective Shield" was deployed, regional powers were anxious on possible territorial changes. The long-term war, despite the fact that it was expected to last short, shows exactly the predicament and the dangers of a regional conflict.

After liberation, Kuwait managed to keep British and American troops on its ground. The Damascus Declaration of March 6th, 1991, was decisive for the long-term defense security of the small Kuwait.

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[213] United Nations, United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, April 3, 1987, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/687

2.3. From the post-2003 US war and the fall of Saddam till 2018; current strategic challenges in the Gulf and the Iranian conundrum

Introduction

"President Saddam Hussein articulated his strategy in an interview with French television. He argued that Western victory in the Gulf would require not only defeating Iraq's military and destroying its economy, but also overthrowing his regime: a monumental task. He would 'win' just by hanging on, he maintained."[214]

"In March 1991 Bush was given an intelligence estimate predicting that Saddam would be out of office within a year, although even then there was some dissent by those who remained impressed by his control of both the military establishment and the Baa'th Party."[215] But this was something that never happened. After Saddam's defeat, the USA seemed to have no conclusive plan for the day after. The fact that he still was a dictator conduced to empowering his political profile. The latter combined with the erosion of the American influence in the region served well his personal interest. Meanwhile, Arab identity remained a strong factor for driving regional politics despite the timeless inter-Arab power games.

Soon after the liberation of Kuwait, Iraqi nightmares aroused from the Shia front. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and of course the USA had to confront the Shia faction in Iraq and the potential lining up with Iran. The US policy was divided between empowering Iraq to tackle the insurgents or abandoning it, thus making room for the creation of another Iran-style theocracy. The Israeli lobby in the USA was pushing towards the dethroning of Saddam. Britain remained firm in its position on easing the UN sanctions against Iraq "for so long as Saddam Hussein remains in power".[216] The Bush administration was also committed to annihilate Saddam.

"So long as Saddam remained in power, America could never have genuine peace with Iraq. He could not be trusted. ''Left alone, free to reconsolidate his brutal dictatorship and military machine, we know that he will act again to brutalize his own people and to threaten his neighbors. Without constant international

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[214] Hiro, p.164.
[215] L Freedman & E Karsh, p.417.
[216] J Pienaar & L Doyle, "UK Maintains Tough Line on Sanctions Against Iraq", *Independent*, 11 May 1991, https://www.globalpolicy.org/iraq-conflict-the-historical-background-/gulf-war-and-a-decade-of-sanctions.html

monitoring of and pressure against this leader, this Iraqi government will continue

to pose a danger."[217]

Any acts on empowering Shia factions were perilous. Hence an economic strangulation that would provoke public discontent sounded more effective.[218]

The International Atomic Energy Agency (hencefoth IAEA) fulfilled its inspection regarding the Iraqi nuclear weaponry. From 1991 to 1998 the IAEA seized relative documents that demonstrated the extent of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program and by the end of 1992, it destroyed and removed facilities and equipment relevant to nuclear weapons production. In early 1994, everything was removed from Iraq. By December 1998, the agency was "confident that we had not missed any significant component of Iraq's nuclear programme." It should be noted that for 4 years after the 1998 inspection, the IAEA continued its analytical work, using satellite imagery and other information.[219] The UNSC Resolution 1441 was determined for strengthening the IAEA authority to inspect Iraqi facilities.[220] Iraq was certainly weakened and the Iraqi people were seeking to continue their lives amid chaos but in a secure environment. Hence the question war or not war was raised once again in the White House.

One of the substantial reasons that Saddam was defeated in the first Gulf War was his strategic miscalculation of his capabilities in comparison with his opponents. Saddam's defeat inaugurated a new era in the Arab-Israeli relations and the peace process. In October 1991, at Madrid peace conference, a majority of Arabs sat for the first time at the negotiating table with Israel.[221] The American prevalence, its immense influence in the region which had to do with the American aid-military, politically, diplomatically- on Arabs and Israel, affected things towards a negotiation process. What followed overturned all hopes for a peaceful solution.

This unit examines the strategic environment of the Gulf's critical decades of the 90s and 20s. The latter was marked by the 9/11 attack that changed the world; the subsequent 2003 war in Iraq and its implications on the regional and the international system; the Saudi-Iranian regional competition and the Iranian revisionism. All these will be presented with

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[217] M Fletcher & M Theodoulou, "Baker Says Sanctions Must Stay as Long as Saddam Holds Power, *Times*, 23 May 1991, https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/169/36389.html
[218] Hiro, pp.418-9.
[219] General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, "The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq", Monday 27 January 2003, IAEA, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/status-nuclear-inspections-iraq
[220] United Nations, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441, 8 November 2002, http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/1441.pdf
[221] A Bacevich & E Inbar, p. ix.

strong references on the regional powers' strategies. The aim is to examine the USA's and its allies' strategy in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War. Was the second Gulf War the unfinished job of the 1991 operations that had to be done? Is there a distinctive designated strategy after the 1991 war towards the 2003 war? The decisions that led the Western world in the war will be discussed as well as the position of the Gulf states at that time. The examination of the aforementioned will aid in understanding Kuwaiti strategy at that times. The perplexed Gulf politics of these decades will reveal if there is a continuation in Kuwaiti strategy especially on its neutral policy, from independence to today's multipolar system.

2.3.1. The strategic environment. "An Unfinished Business? "

Introduction

"My Fellow Americans,
America is at war. This is a wartime national security strategy required by the grave challenge we face – the rise of terrorism fueled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder, fully revealed to the American people on September 11, 2001. This strategy reflects our most solemn obligation: to protect the security of the American people. …
America now faces a choice between the path of fear and the path of confidence. The path of fear – isolationism and protectionism, retreat and retrenchment – appeals to those who find our challenges too great and fail to see our opportunities. Yet history teaches that every time American leaders have taken this path, the challenges have only increased and the missed opportunities have left future generations less secure."[222]
GW Bush

The 1991 Gulf War could be characterized as an Arab civil war since an Arab state attacked a sister-state. Saddam played both the pan-Arabic and Islamic card to mobilize support and even tried to de-legitimize Arab governments that were considered by Saddam belligerents.[223] As it has been written above in detail, regional powers had to re-invent themselves because of the changing regional environment. It was a historical unprecedented of Arabs aligning with the USA which is always considered Israel's greatest ally. Still, the outcome is considered

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[222] G W Bush, The White House, 16 March 2006, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/intro.html,
[223] A Bacevich & E Inbar, pp.27-33.

ambiguous. As it will be described in the following lines, America viewed the operation victorious; an opportunity to obliterate the Vietnam catastrophe and establish the new world order. However, in this new world order America's role has been skyrocketed. It created the conditions for an almighty US that had implications on its foreign policy. Inaction was no more an option. This military and political prestige also meant that the US had to undertake the leading role not only in the Gulf, but also in different regional systems, as it happened in Haiti, Bosnia, Rwanda etc.

The years of 1991-2003 were significant for the State of Kuwait. The Western intervention came as Deus ex machina in 1991 to save the small state from one of its archenemies. The aftermath of the Kuwaiti liberation that resulted in Iraqi instability in combination with the sectarian strife, especially the one coming from Iran, compelled Kuwait to be alert and to form a suitable strategy. Iraq's provocative behavior continued after the liberation with Saddam attempting to cross the Kuwaiti border or move his army toward the borders.[224] The establishment of the UN Iraq/Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission further strengthened Kuwait's position because it gave control of two oil fields and reduced Iraq's access. Iraq accepted the decision after "severe international pressure".[225] Kuwait remained a firm advocate of the international law regarding the implementation of the UNSC resolutions.

Eternally, wars are fought to achieve political ends. As Clausewitz famously put it "war is a continuation of politics by other means."[226] The period before 2003 was a period of low intense threats: Iraq was declining, Iran was restrained, the US-UN were patronizing the Gulf. Iraq was a constant threat for Kuwait and for other GCC states till 2003. However, this period of time Iran emerges as the main regional threat.

This section aims at analyzing the strategic environment starting from the strategy of the USA. Understanding the GW Bush administration, its doctrine and the philosophy behind is quintessential. The 9/11 attacks that changed the world forever, the war in Afghanistan, and the Iraqi War had great implications not only on the US foreign policy but also on the Gulf states that were in need to reassess their strategy. US' crucial role in taking over the Gulf's

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[224] Terrill, pp.37-9.
[225] UNSC, Security Council resolution 833 (1993) on demarcation of Iraq-Kuwait boundary, 27 May 1993, http://repository.un.org/handle/11176/51145 , Terrill, p.45-6.
[226] C Von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, 1989.

security had many regional implications such as: terrorist attacks against US forces, insufficient coordination between GCC members, partly because of their reliance on the US defense umbrella.

The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 changed the entire security landscape. The GCC states sided with America since many of the Arab countries were pleased with the idea of dethroning Saddam, hence they assisted US' efforts logistically. Yet, the GCC lacked not only in planning the day after but the Gulf States continued acting individually instead of planning a common security policy. The most serious implications of Iraqi regime change were the Sunni extremism, the rise of Shiite violence and a fear of Iraq's subjugation to Iran. The state of Kuwait assisted Iraq after the elimination of Saddam with projects that aimed at stabilizing the area and promoting the standards of living that had seriously deteriorated due to war.[227] However, the GCC failed in planning Iraq's re-stabilization and in foreseeing Iran's ascendancy. In 2005, Iran showed its hegemonic ambitions and GCC had no plan on confronting Iran's nuclear program apart from resting their worries on the US to handle this issue.[228]

Critical issues are raised while exploring this period. Could or should the coalition with the USA in charge have turned a victory into a durable postwar settlement? Saddam's large ambitions, the plan to eliminate a sister-state, the posture of regional powers as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the eagerness of the great powers to intervene decisively and finally the operation "Desert Storm", reasonably raise the following questions: should Saddam had been dethroned since the 1991 Gulf War? Was it a failure to remove Saddam back then? Would the world be the same if Saddam had been politically exterminated, especially when it comes to the 9/11 attack?

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[227] Katzman, p.13.
[228] J Kostiner, "The GCC States and the Security Challenges of the Twenty-First Century", *Mideast Security and Policy Studies* No.86, The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, September 2010., pp.12-39.

2.3.1.a. The George HW Bush heritage

The examination of the strategic environment after the 1991 Gulf war brings the question if the US had designed a conclusive strategy on the future of Saddam after the end of war. Saddam Hussein, despite the 1991 devastated defeat, did survive and started building his "empire" from scratch. Abided by UN resolutions especially the 686, 687, he started the implementation of his obligations and simultaneously he was empowering himself in order to address his domestic affairs, as a campaign against Kurds that resulted in a million of refugees. After the UN Resolution 688 on the Kurdish issue and the Western decisive involvement in this issue, the "Saddam Problem" was back. Who would now take over and how it would be handled?

Saudis' preference was overthrowing Saddam from within. They also attempted to destabilize the Arab leaders that sided with Saddam like Yemen. They did not hesitate to use their economic power to punish Jordanian and Palestinian leaders. Syria during and after the crisis held an anti-Saddam posture while encouraging opposition.[229] The afterword of all these tactics was not fruitful. The Arab states sustained and survived any de-legitimize act or destabilization. An explanation to this above-mentioned has to do with the growing economy during the 90s mostly because of the oil, the ability of the governors to manage domestic politics successfully and to provide a better quality of life to their citizens in comparison to 50s and 60s. It also has to be underlined that during the devastating Iran-Iraq war, both countries purchased conventional weaponry of 65 billion dollars from external sources. Taken together both accounted for the 22% of the worldwide arms transfer at that juncture. This explains a lot on the one hand, the developments regarding the Iraqi military empowerment and on the other, the war atrocities. Iraq was full and adequately equipped. It managed to obtain sophisticated weapons while deepening the country into further recessions due to external loans and debts. Consequently, issues once again are being raised on the existential matter of the Arab identity, the exploitation of the Palestinian issue by the Arabs, the targeting of Arab governments by other Arab-opponents and their strategies to secure the national interest.

The USA, the leader power of the coalition, had to decide what to do with the post-war situation and the fact that Saddam managed to empower himself. GH Bush's challenge was to

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[229] A Bacevich & E Inbar, pp.30-35.

promote security and stability in the post-war Gulf. But the US declaration of ceasefire was celebrated as a victory by Saddam. The latter skillfully introduced defeat as a victory.

"The defeated state often considers the outcome merely a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political considerations at some later date."[230] Therefore, regarding the question, if the USA should have done more to eliminate Saddam, this will be highlighted in two directions: the first one analyzes the strategic planning of the USA a while before the unilateral decision to declare ceasefire -the decision-making process, leadership's and advisors' thinking-. The second part, will describe the strategic environment after the US' decision to ceasefire. Thus, a full picture will be presented to draw conclusions. To address the first part light will be shed on G. HW Bush administration, his personality, his advisors' influence and the role of the intelligence services.

The ground campaigning was continued during the 90s. President Bush and the heads of the operation had a completely different picture of what was really happening on the ground. There was a lacking in intelligence that resulted in critical misinformation on the theater of war on which they thought it was unfolding according to the plan. The subsequent tragedy was when Bush decided to end the war. He did it while having in mind that the US forces had fulfilled their objectives, that the air and ground campaigns had successfully completed their job and that the Iraqi capabilities had been annihilated. In other words, there was no clear view on the war facts.[231]

The first objective had been fulfilled: Kuwait had been liberated. The Iraqi forces had been expelled. The ground campaign was called successful. A march toward Baghdad to eliminate Saddam was out of line for the following reason: the US never had stated explicitly the overthrowing of Saddam as an objective.[232] This by no means implies that it was not in the agenda. It considered more important the destruction of the Iraqi forces despite the intelligence failure on the non-encirclement of the Iraqi forces that escaped to Basra. It expected an erosion on Saddam's domestic influence. The US had not exerted pressure upon Saddam. It did not wish to use as a leverage Iraqi territory that had in its possession.

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[230] Clausewitz, p.92.
[231] "Schwarzkopf's briefing gave decision makers in Washington the false impression that coalition forces had achieved their goals of encircling the Republican Guard when they had not." A Bacevich & E Inbar, p.129.
[232] M R Gordon, "1991 Victory Over Iraq Was Swift, but Hardly Flawless", *The New York Times*, 31 December 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/01/world/middleeast/victory-over-iraq-in-1991-was-swift-but-flawed.html

Furthermore, there was no political decision on the possession of biological or chemical weapons on behalf of Iraq. This was also an impediment on deciding to march on Baghdad. There were also concerns on further Iraqi collapse. If war was to be continued, there may be created enclaved of Kurds, Sunni Muslims etc.[233] Friedman and Karsh denote that it "had never been intended to remove Saddam by direct means."[234] However, according to Washington Post (August 6th), the CIA director had been instructed, among others, to plan covert operations aiming at destabilizing and finally overthrowing Saddam.[235] The latter was considered a danger to the US' interests. The fear of an invasion in Saudi Arabia was the catalyst for operation "Desert Shield". Furthermore, when the air campaign of the Operation "Desert Storm" was initiated, shelters that had been used as military or civilian purposes were also targeted by the coalition. These shelters were a target for a critical reason. The US intelligence made a list of possible places, mostly bunkers, that Saddam and his family were hidden. As it seems the Bush administration had on the top of its agenda the assassination of Saddam.[236] The latter was evident in the UNSC resolutions.

All in all, the G. HW Bush administration is a typical paradigm of misperception. Apart from intelligence failure, none of his advisors, military and political, portrayed realistically the situation in Iraq and foremost the aftermath of all conducted operations. Hence, the ceasefire was considered as the primary option, after a 100 hour-ground war, on February 28th. As Mankhen points out "It is clear that, to the extent that Bush and his advisors were responding to pressure, it was-generated…. the US leadership failed to understand Iraq's true center of gravity."[237]

After the ceasefire, G. HW Bush's administration enjoyed coalition's trust as well as congressional and public support on the war. The President may be ambivalent because the coalition's political objectives had not been entirely fulfilled, apart from the military aspect, but what about the hot potato of security and stability? Did the USA bet on a people's uprising thus ensuing Saddam's political end?

The handling of the aftermath of the war is indeed a delicate issue that demands military and political sharpness. The Bush administration handled the preparation and conduct of war

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[233] A Bacevich & E Inbar, p.121-140.
[234] L Freedman & E Karsh, p.xxxii
[235] Hiro, p.113.
[236] Hiro, p.362. Kaufman, p.61.
[237] A Bacevich & E Inbar, p.131, 132

ably. But when and how to end a war is a controversial and complicated issue. In the case of ending of the Gulf war, too many parameters were to taken into account in the Gulf area: the Arab post-war attitude; the cost of the continuation of the war against the Iraqi forces; the capacity to annihilate the Republican Guards; the possible losses on American human resources and the subsequent political cost; the misunderstanding of Saddam's capabilities and the nature of his regime that could revive empowered, as it happened. If we can draw a conclusion is that "there was no sentiment at senior levels of the US government for occupying even part of Iraq. In addition, our military was adamantly opposed."[238]

For Clausewitz, a victory would include as a sine qua non a successful completion of conflict, destroying enemy's forces, occupying territory, breaking his will to resist. However, the most important element remains the political success of war. In that case, a stable Gulf without the fear of another Iraq incident or the outbreak of any regional conflict in general was the aim. Did the Western coalition succeed in it? In 1991, President Bush once again confronted Iraq into northern region to protect Kurds refugees. In 1998, President Clinton also faced Saddam for assassination's plots and Osama-bin Laden for terrorist attacks on two US embassies in Africa. Operation "Desert Fox" was launched in December 1998.

Could Kuwaiti destiny had had been different if Bush had not been the President of the USA at that time? A few arguments should be mentioned here about President's personality in order to realize the dynamic of the war that shaped the future of the Gulf. First things first, Bush was one of the highest ranked presidents on foreign policy. His determination and the way he tackled the Iraqi invasion must be also ascribed to his personality. He is responsible for shifting coalition's strategy and he implemented the operation "Desert Shield" successfully. He was lucky as well as visionary, since the disintegration of the USSR facilitated his plans on how to deal with the Iraqi invasion. President Bush did affect the outcomes.[239]

In sum, despite a unique collaboration of states to save the shallowing of a small state from a dictator and the fact that the majority of the Arab world was united with the West, in the end the operation was not successful. Not only Saddam survived but a decade later he had empowered himself. Several months after the military operations, he remained solid, immune

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[238] C Cviic, "The Politics of Diplomacy, Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992.", 837-839, 1996., G.P Putnam, 1995 p.438, as quoted in A Bacevich & E Inbar, p.142.
[239] As Yetiv put it, when trying to understand decision-making process, a cognitive perspective highlights the importance of leadership. Thus it gives a better explanation on how a leader shapes its policies both domestic and foreign.

to severe strikes and an air campaign that lasted for weeks. After attempts to overthrow Saddam through a military coup or a domestic unrest, all ended unsuccessfully.[240] This of course came as not a surprise to a scholar that knows the Ba'athists and the regime that Saddam had established for decades. He would never be allowed to lose face. He would do everything even to present an enormous defeat to his people as a victory. Hence, the Western coalition did not succeed in destroying his arsenal, whether this included chemical, nuclear or biological weapons. Let's not forget that Saddam managed to remove UN inspectors short after the war, at late 1990s. G.HW. Bush's administration was determined to eliminate Saddam during the 1991 war. Consequently, the 2003 US operation was the sequel of the 1991 operation. It seems that the USA, after understanding the failure to contain Saddam and the fact that he was still in charge and getting stronger, in 2003, decided to crush his regime.

2.3.1.b. The George W. Bush Doctrine

The end of the Cold War brought up the conflicting interests among the US and its allies especially in the Middle East where traditionally many Western states' interests diverged from the US'. Strong relations between Western states and their former colonies in the Middle East plus the Western interest in oil, brought the USA and its European allies into dispute. Europe lacked in collective security and thus placed higher value on international law and international institutions. In the case of the 2003 Iraqi war, disagreements among European governments came to the surface. Domestic politics was a significant catalyst on whether to support US' actions. Conservative governments tended to support America while social-democrats were

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[240] After the ceasefire the UNSC adopted Resolution 688 which invited Iraq to:
"to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,59 and to ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972;61
8.   Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of:
(a)   All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities related thereto;
(b)   All ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres, and related major parts and repair and production facilities." UNSCR, Resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991,
http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/687,

skeptical and opposed to war.[241] Many European states due to their interests in the Middle East appeased and applauded for decades Middle Eastern dictators and till today many are reluctant to officially denounce terrorist organizations as Hezbollah due to their wish to placate their Middle Eastern oligarchs friends. France for example was a supplier and helped Saddam to fulfill his nuclear aspirations.

The GW Bush doctrine to invade Iraq was based on the principle that all regimes do not behave alike. For Bush, Saddam's regime was the root for the 1991 war as well as for the one that was coming in 2003. Vigilant containment might had been efficient during the Cold War, but in the 20th century, where the USA and the West began to realize the need for a new strategy to address terrorism, a proactive strategy was a sine qua non.

The George W. Bush administration was definitely marked by the 9/11 events that not only changed the US grand strategy but also the world as we knew it. His foreign policy legacy on the "war on terror" till today generates intense controversy and condemnation. The unprecedented terrorist attack on American soil by Islamist fundamentalists after a quite tranquil decade, that of 90s, was a catalyst for designing the American policy towards Iraq. Questions and controversies were raised not only in the political arena but also in academia that accused President Bush of redefining the traditional American strategic thinking as the policies of containment and deterrence. [242]

> "One of the major causes of the Iraq War of 2003 was the ambiguous outcome
> of the Gulf War of 1990-1991, which left Saddam in power. For a combination of
> understandable reasons, President Bush halted the use of force too soon: fear of
> a power vacuum; the limits of the UN mandate that called for the liberation of
> Kuwait but not Iraq; and the visual images of the so-called highway of death,
> which conveyed the false impression that Saddam's Republican Guard was
> devastated beyond repair. The Iraqi and American people paid a terrible price for
> this well-meaning but imprudent restraint. President George W. Bush did not

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[241] M Newman, "Bush Forcefully Attacks Critics of His Strategy in Iraq", *The New York Times*, 11 November 2005, https://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/11/international/middleeast/bush-forcefully-attacks-critics-of-his-strategy-in.html,
[242] See I H Daalder & J M. Lindsay, *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy*, Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2003., J M Coicaud, *Beyond the National Interest: The Future of UN Peacekeeping and Multilateralism in an Era of U.S. Primacy*, Washington D.C, United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007, p.3, Ikenberry G J, "Is American Multilateralism in Decline?", *Perspectives on Politics* 1, no. 3, September 2003., p.533.

repeat the mistake. He understands that a just and durable peace requires Saddam's total defeat and democratic regime change, which the United States must have the perseverance to enforce. Likewise, the Cold War could not end until the collapse of the Soviet Union's malevolent regime that caused it."[243]

Despite scholars' disagreement, the Bush Doctrine is founded in the US strategic thinking.

The US did not pursue any strategy from 1972 to 2005 in the Gulf. Its posture was limited on unexpected events that came up.[244] Taking into consideration the aforementioned conclusion, the US "was slowly dragged into the region by a farrago of events at the domestic, regional, and global level, culminating in the attacks of September 11th, all of which set up the invasion of Iraq in 2003."[245] The examination of America's grand strategy in that region leads the researcher to the aforementioned conclusion.

First things first, an evaluation of the US strategy in the Gulf since the 1972. Before the 1990, the US pursued a policy of "constructive engagement" with the strongest actor at that times, either Iraq or Iran. The end of the Cold War and the preponderance of American power made it easier for the omnipotent USA to pursue more aggressive foreign policy choices.

During Nixon administration, America adopted the "Twin Pillar" policy (1972-79). At the height of the Cold War, America aimed at balancing Moscow as well as regional actors thus checking Iraqi status and its close relations with Moscow. US' aim was to establish firm relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia to balance Iraq. The Carter administration, which continued Nixon's twin pillar policy, felt the problematic of this approach. Using proxies to protect the American interests and balancing from afar turned out to be inefficient. America's twin pillar policy met the cruel reality of the Iranian revolution that changed forever the region.

When Carter issued the Carter Doctrine it was based on more aggression. President Carter characterized the Gulf as an area of "vital interest" thus threatening to repel any attempt by outside powers to gain control of the Gulf. It was that critical time that the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, another failure of the American foreign policy.[246]

President Reagan followed the Carter doctrine. Concerned on the internal stability of the Gulf states and the Soviet intervention in conjunction with the Iran-Iraq war along with the

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[243] Kaufman, pp.93-4.
[244] Cf. Yetiv. The author expresses his position that the US pursued what he calls a "reactive engagement".
[245] Yetiv, p.x
[246] Bell

"arms for hostages" sales to Iran, the Reagan administration faced great challenges in the region. He upgraded its importance on the US agenda. However, these policies proved insufficient to deter Iraq from invading Kuwait in 1991 or to overthrow Saddam in 2003. Gulf's regional actors and many US' allies were incapable to provide logistics to the US. Thus, the US bore the whole burden. This is another example of the importance of regional conflicts and how they can draw the great power in, as it happened in the Iran-Iraq war.

As it was mentioned above, the GH Bush administration adopted the policy of "constructive engagement" (1988-1990). The Administration having empowered Iraq during the bloody 8year war decided that it should "develop a workable relationship with Saddam Hussein"[247] by using various economic and political stimuli. The outcome; Iraq emerged as an unstoppable, unpredictable threat. This policy continued until the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait when the US realized the nonconstructive results of their constructive policy. In 1991, having secured the support of the UNSC, the US administration managed to gain the desirable legitimacy. Collective security was the vehicle to conclude the operations against Iraq. Economic and military interests were at stake. Hence an alliance of more than 30 nations under the auspices of the UN formed a coalition to tackle Saddam's aggression. However, the end of war brought about critical questions on the strategy that they will adopt the day-after. GH Bush and his advisors seemed concerned on the possibility on marching on Bagdad to dethrone Saddam. The analysis of the motivations of the 2003 war answers two issues: the existence of a continuation on the strategic thought of the USA in the Gulf and the GW Bush's policy and determination to eliminate Saddam once and for all.

America rarely in the region of the Gulf acted as an "offshore balancer" but used multiple strategies to pursue its goals. The US did appease the stronger, or threatened and played off regional actors to balance against the most threatening to its interests regional actors. Another policy that it was chosen during the Clinton administration was "dual containment", aiming at containing both Iraq and Iran not only at regional level but also to impede their attempts to build up conventional and non-conventional military capabilities. It was a strong posture against both actors. It also included efforts to overthrow Saddam or attempts for a regime change in Iraq.[248]

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[247] As quoted in Yetiv, p.66.
[248] Yetiv, p.91.

Iraq was perceived as a capable actor to produce WMD. Iraq retained the necessary capability to do so, if it wished. At this point a few things need to be said on Saddam and its regime. Despite the 1991 devastation, Saddam continued its provocative posture against Kuwait by violating Kuwaiti territory thus defying UN resolutions. Regarding Iran, it continued to develop its military built up which included an attempt to possess biological and nuclear capability. The Iranian defiance was obvious since the decade of 90s. Not only did it annex territory as the three islands of the Greater and Lesser Tunbs and Abu Masa on historical grounds but it also defied the GCC rapprochement. Since the 90s, it exported terrorism, aiming at helping terrorist organization financially as Hezbollah in Lebanon[249].

In 1998, the Clinton administration launched Operation Desert Fox to stop Iraq from its Weapons of Mass Destruction (henceforth WMD) aspirations. Operation Desert Fox marked the end of the containment era. The US shifted its policy to Containment-Plus Regime Change (1998-2001). America's aim for a regime change was not only stated crystal clear in the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 where it was mentioned that "It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime". That statement was repeated by President Clinton during a radio address.[250]

The 2003 was not the outcome of an overnight decision. When Israel carried out operation Osiraq that bombed Iraq's nuclear facilities, Saddam learned to build and to develop underground his nuclear program. Hence, if it wasn't the US 1991 operation, the UN inspectors asserted that Iraq may had been close to develop its nuclear bomb in 1991. Nevertheless, the GH Bush administration acted late because its attention was focused on the collapse of the USSR and the reunification of Germany. Also, during the Clinton era, the "dual containment" was aiming to undermine the Iraqi regime. In 1996, CIA cooperated with Iraqi groups as the Iraq National Congress and Iraq National Accord, to overthrow Saddam. The Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 that was signed by President Clinton aimed also at regime change intended to be achieved via political means, in cooperation with Saddam's internal and external enemies.[251]

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[249] Yetiv, pp.-96-97.
[250] Yetiv, p.111., 110-112
[251] Public Law 105-338, Oct. 31, 1998, Iraq Liberation Act of 1998,
https://www.congress.gov/105/plaws/publ338/PLAW-105publ338.pdf

Concluding, Iraqi intransigence and the Iranian resurgence brought about the issue of eliminating Saddam in 2003 as a continuation of policies dating back to the 70s. After the 1991 war, Iraq was threatening and not cooperating with international organizations as it also happened in 1998 when it stopped UN inspectors and shut down all monitoring activities. Saddam mastered the art of deception. By not allowing the inspectors to assess its state of condition on biological and chemical weapons, Iraq actually raised suspicions that it was capable to produce WMD thus giving the GW Bush administration a golden opportunity to go after Saddam until his annihilation.[252] The 9/11 terrorist attack was the catalyst for planning regime change.

President GW Bush's strategy was neither novice nor designed due to 9/11. The events of 9/11 were determinant to present his strategic thinking: the rise of extremism rendered defensive strategies obsolete; changes to problematic regimes should be made; isolationism should be abandoned; prevention should prevail. Having in mind NATO's reluctance, President Bush was aware that the US was alone in its efforts for peace and stability in the Middle East.[253] The criticism that he had to deal with had to do with the inability of the USA to impose democracy. At this point one should consider the alternatives: was the USA better off with Mubarak and later with Muslim Brotherhood? Where these rogue states domestically able to overthrown their tyrants? What history has taught us on waiting "for the organic growth of democracy" when Europe and the whole world failed to predict Hitler's strategy? Does the Palestinian authority (PLO) that it has been intact from any intervention and free to elect its leadership has succeeded in creating the conditions for uncorrupted and transparent elections?

Saddam was the symbol of American defiance and with radical extremism spreading in the whole region this problem had to be dealt from its roots. Despite conflicting analysis and reports whether he possessed WMD, one thing is for sure: he had a past record of brutally using chemical weapons and launched Scud missiles in the decades of 80s and 90s.

On the argument that the IAEA did not find significant evidence of the possession of WMD, suffice to remind the UNSC resolution that refers to Saddam's inhibition to the IAEA to

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[252] Arms Control Association, "Iraq: A Chronology of UN Inspections", https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002-10/features/iraq-chronology-un-inspections

[253] "The war we fight today is more than a military conflict; it is the decisive ideological struggle of the twenty-first century. On one side are those who believe in the values of freedom and moderation—… And on the other side are those driven by the values of tyranny and extremism. … This war will be difficult; this war will be long; and this war will end in the defeat of the terrorists and totalitarians, and a victory for the cause of freedom and liberty., G W Bush, "Address to the American Legion National Convention", Salt Lake City, 31 August 2006.

inspect the Iraqi facilities.[254] The UNSC resolution 1441 is indicative of the perplexed "Saddam problem". The Iraqi threat of non-compliance with Council's resolutions, the proliferation of WMD and the fact that Iraq "repeatedly obstructed immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to sites designated by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), failed to cooperate fully and unconditionally with UNSCOM and IAEA weapons"[255]. The IAEA report is revealing:

"In September 1991, the IAEA seized documents in Iraq that demonstrated the extent of its nuclear weapons programme. By the end of 1992, we had largely destroyed, removed or rendered harmless all Iraqi facilities and equipment relevant to nuclear weapons production. We confiscated Iraq's nuclear-weapons-usable material - high enriched uranium and plutonium - and by early 1994 we had removed it from the country. By December 1998 - when the inspections were brought to a halt with a military strike imminent - we were confident that we had not missed any significant component of Iraq's nuclear programme. … But no remote analysis can replace on-site inspection - and we were therefore not able to reach any conclusions about Iraq's compliance with its Security Council obligations in the nuclear field after December 1998. … A particular issue of focus has been the attempted procurement by Iraq of high strength aluminium tubes, and the question of whether these tubes, if acquired, could be used for the manufacture of nuclear centrifuges. Iraqi authorities have indicated that their unsuccessful attempts to procure the aluminium tubes related to a programme to reverse engineer conventional rockets. To verify this information, IAEA inspectors have inspected the relevant rocket production and storage sites, taken tube samples, interviewed relevant Iraqi personnel, and reviewed procurement contracts and related documents. From our analysis to date it appears that the aluminium tubes would be consistent with the purpose stated by Iraq and, unless modified, would not be suitable for manufacturing centrifuges; however, we are still investigating this

[254] United Nations, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441, 8 November 2002, http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/1441.pdf
[255] UNSC, Resolution 1441, The situation between Iraq and Kuwait, 8 November 2002, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1441

issue. It is clear, however, that the attempt to acquire such tubes is prohibited under Security Council resolution 687. … "[256]

What is significant when reading the above IAEA report is the need for Actionable Information from Other States and the need for additional co-operation by Iraq. Was it possible given the 1991 US experience in Iraq to trust the IAEA reports? At that time Saddam's behavior was giving the impression of possessing WMD. The latter in conjunction with shared assumptions of intelligence services that he indeed possessed them led to accuse President Bush of waging war on falsified intelligence.[257]

In the GW Bush era when the US was enjoying a unipolar international system and it was the sole superpower, prevalent was the notion that the US should project its power against any actor with hegemonic aspirations that could endanger US' position in the world, including the American interests in important sub-regional systems as the Gulf and the Middle East. The US could not afford any kind of paranoiac dictator to endanger the status quo by possessing or threatening to use WMD.

The GW Bush administration initiated the so-called "war on terror" aiming at ensuring that 9/11 will never happen again. Hence, the "Bush Doctrine" purpose was to alter the strategy of the American grand strategy after the 1991 Gulf War and to focus on the elimination of the "axis of evil" that would, according to the doctrine, bring stability not only in rogue states but it would also create a secure free world by annihilating every source of extremism threatening to Western democracies. The GW Bush administration contends that deterrence was not efficient to address the threats of that times. Instead it adopted the policy of prevention as the proper one that could serve as "a higher form of deterrence".[258]

The "Bush Doctrine" was founded in the following principles: when it comes to rogue regimes and their acquisition of WMD the strategies of deterrence, containment, or ex post facto responses are inadequate to address the afore-mentioned challenges. Therefore, a preemptive strategy deemed more suitable to uproot efficiently terrorism rather than being reactive. The second pillar stands for democratic regime change. All in all, the second pillar was about the "moral democratic realism" that lies in the belief that spreading stable, liberal

[256] IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, "The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq", IAEA, 27 January 2003, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/status-nuclear-inspections-iraq
[257] R Kaufman, *In defense of the Bush doctrine,* University Press of Kentucky, 2007.p.133
[258] C Krauthammer, "The Obsolescence of Deterrence," *The Weekly Standard 8*, no. 13, 9 December 2002.

democracy will combat extremists abroad and safeguard homeland.[259] A combination of blending ideals and securing national interest. It aimed at promoting democracy in the Middle East. However, the policy of promoting democracy was not an outcome of 9/11. It was already existent in presidential strategies after the Cold War.

The policy of prevention is rooted in the American strategy as it happened during the Cuban missile crisis, during the Reagan administration towards fighting terrorism after the 1983 attack at US Embassy in Beirut, and during the Clinton era with the signing of Presidential Decision Directive 39 where it is stated that "the United States shall give the highest priority to developing effective capabilities to detect, prevent, defeat, and manage the consequences of nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) materials or weapons use by terrorists."[260] Hence, the strategy of preventive strike denotes a continuation in the broader American strategic thinking.

The "Bush Doctrine" was neither promoting unilateralism, since the 2003 war was supported by a coalition of approximately 40 nations, nor it was gnoring international law and the UN. Saddam was the one that was not complying for decades with the UNSC resolutions. When US Presidents indicated either conflicting interests with allies or US' interests were at stake, they did not hesitate to act unilaterally as it happened during the Eisenhower years or during Clinton's second term.[261]

The National Security Strategy of the USA as it was formed in September 2002, could be titled "the enemy is terrorism". The security strategy that was followed was based on internationalism, political economic freedom, on improving stability, promoting trade and development, keeping peaceful relations with other members of the international community while aiming at defeating global terrorism. To achieve the latter, allies are a sine qua non. Economic growth, free trade, cooperative actions, defending human rights, justice and religious freedom can be achieved by using the US' foreign aid to promote freedom and democratic values. The fear of terrorists possessing WMD, chemical, biological and nuclear weapons led to the designation of a security strategy that it combats the aforementioned by a proactive counterproliferation policies. Presence of forces overseas, apart from preserving

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[259] Cf. Kaufman
[260] Presidential Decision Directive 39, "U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism," 21 June 1995, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=462942
[261] U.S. Department of State, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954", Washington, DC, 2003, quoted in Leffler, "9/11 and American Foreign Policy," 399., The White House, "A National Security Strategy for a new century", October 1998, http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/1998.pdf

national interest, professes the US commitment to its allies, the willingness to use force and not just deterrence, the possession of strong armed forces and intelligence services. "We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction—weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning."[262]

To sum up the examination of the strategic environment, the decision to wage war to remove Saddam was a part of the first Gulf War's strategic designation. The failure of containment, deterrence, sanctions, presented from the Clinton era two options: regime change and deterrence.[263] Since regime change was on the table from President Clinton, the 9/11 events magnified the possibility of a catastrophic threat if the appropriate measures were not taken.[264] The Iraqi war of 2003 was the outcome of Saddam's deception of possessing WMD. The latter was enough to mobilize the US government to take drastic measures especially after the 9/11. The administration's perceptions on Iraqi ties to terrorism; the adoption of preemption to address global terrorism; the role of intelligence services regarding ambiguous reports on the Iraqi stockpile; the prevalent ideology on democratization by regime change were crucial to deciding to go to war. Finally, it should be added the significance of Gulf's oil in global security and the leadership's perceptions, especially of GW Bush to leave his footprint as a determined leader.

The Bush administration did make critical mistakes on how to handle the day after or the strategic failure to police the Iraqi-Syrian border. The latter gave a golden opportunity to exploit the fractions in the Arab world and to end up in today's fragile Middle East. Meanwhile Bush's democratization proved inefficient by the year 2006.

The US paid the price in human lives and in resources. However, to prevail and succeed in highly demanding operations and in future challenges, a bold decision for more troops on

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[262] Kaufman, 167.

[263] Martin Indyk, Clinton's principal advisor on Iraq, outlined the administration's commitment to regime change: "Our purpose is deliberate: it is to establish clearly and unequivocally that the current regime in Iraq is a criminal regime, beyond the pale of international society and, in our judgement, irredeemable." Martin Indyk quoted in L F Kaplan & W Kristol, *The War Over Iraq: Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission*, San Francisco, CA, Encounter Books, 2003.p.50.

[264] A Glass, "Clinton orders airstrike on Iraq: Dec. 16, 1998", *Politico*, 16/12/2016, https://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/clinton-orders-airstrike-on-iraq-dec-16-1998-232571

the ground as well as a holistic approach to restore the political, military, economic situation and improve the everyday people's lives in a devastated area are needed.

Saddam's overthrow is a US' strategic achievement. Despite the fact that much more boots on the grounded were required, the 2003 operation had implications in the peacebuilding of a more democratic Iraq. American history shows that inertia comes with a high price: the hostage crisis in Iran; the Clinton administration negotiations on nuclear programs of Iran, Iraq, North Korea; recently, Secretary Clinton's Libya problem and President Obama's policy in the middle East and especially the American inaction in Syria's civil war, are some of inertia's dreadful outcomes.

2.3.2 Iran, the revisionist power that re-emerged

"Iran is one of the most influential and powerful nation-states in the Middle East. If it is able to survive the trauma of its own shattering revolution, its relative significance in the area will only increase and it could very well become the superpower of the region"[265]

Iran was designated as a part of the Axis of evil since the GW Bush administration. At that time, Iran was posed as an imminent threat that must be defeated. The Iranian conundrum is comprised by possessing significant nuclear and ballistic capability, financing terrorism and proxies in the Middle East, fueling insurgents in the Gulf and elsewhere. If the Iraqi wars failed, then addressing Iran is a much more baffling task.

All regimes do not behave alike as Realism expects. Hence, the international community must act rationally, foresee the dangers of a totalitarian regime, especially when it possesses WMD or nuclear and chemical weapons and acts multilateral. In 2003, the international community's willingness to aid Bush's administration against the "war on terror" did not have luck. Meanwhile, negotiations between Iran and the West and sanctions imposed by the West on Iran so far did not yield up.

The Iranian case seems more problematic and complex. The Islamic Republic of Iran a theocratic republic, is of greater strategic importance since it is located in the Middle East,

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[265] Bill, p.2

bordering the Gulf of Oman, the Persian Gulf, and the Caspian Sea, between Iraq and Pakistan. Slightly small than Alaska is bordering with friends and foes of the West as Afghanistan 921 km, Armenia 44 km, Azerbaijan 689 km, Iraq 1599 km, Pakistan 959 km, Turkey 534 km, Turkmenistan 1148 km. Its population is estimated 83,024,745 (July 2018 est.) Its economy is relied on oil and gas exports (11.64 billion cu m -2017 est.-), which is the main resource to fund its proxies and design the implementation of its hegemonic aspirations.[266]

Iran remains a peculiar actor and a source of concern not only for the Gulf but also for the Eastern Mediterranean and of course for the great powers that their interests are at stake due to the Iranian irredentism.[267] Iran always viewed the Gulf as the prime area for its potential influence. The continuous US presence in the region and the military cooperation with the Arab states is perceived by Iran as a threat to its nuclear program. Fearing of an attack to its nuclear facilities by the US forces, Iranian officials have threatened with triggering an all-out regional war and firing ballistic missiles in masses against targets in the Arab Gulf states and Israel since the early 2000s.The Iraqi decadence especially after the fall of Saddam and the subsequent power vacuum paved the way for the Islamic Republic of Iran to fill this vacuum and to adopt an aggressive strategy since it did not meet any Western objective. Hence, Tehran's primary targets are, as its officials stated, strategic targets of the US and its Arabian Gulf states allies; vital facilities as oil depots; refineries; power plants and desalination facilities. "The US will be as surprised with Iranian military capabilities as the Israelis were with Hezbollah in last summer's war in Lebanon".[268]

On July 14th, 2015, the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the USA, the EU and the Islamic Republic of Iran) reached the so called "Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)". Its aim, to ensure that Iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful. On October 18th, 2015 the JCPOA came into effect and participants began taking steps necessary to implement their JCPOA commitments. The Implementation Day was on January 16th, 2016. The IAEA had its own significant role since it verified that Iran has implemented its key nuclear-related measures described in the JCPOA, and the Secretary of State has confirmed the IAEA's verification. As a result of Iran verifiably meeting its nuclear commitments, the

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[266] CIA Factbook, 6 September 2019, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html
[267] D Pipes, "The Threat of Radical Islam and the Future of the Eastern Mediterranean", 21 February 2017, http://www.danielpipes.org/17349/radical-islam-eastern-mediterranean
[268] Ynet, "Iran will trigger all-out regional war if attacked, official says", 11 June 2007, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3411328,00.html

United States and the EU have lifted nuclear-related sanctions on Iran, as described in the JCPOA.[269] By implementing the JCPOA, Iran reaffirmed "that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons … The full implementation of this JCPOA will ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme."[270]

On April 30th, 2018, the Prime Minister of the State of Israel Benyamin Netanyahu, on a televised press conference revealed one of the greatest achievements of the Mossad: the smuggling of 100,000 documents from Tehran, that proved that the aforementioned pact with the world powers was based on "Iranian deception". Netanyahu's revelations evinced that the so-called "Project Amad", a secret operation of Iran (1999-2003), on designing nuclear weapons, developing nuclear cores, building nuclear implosion systems, preparing nuclear tests and integrating nuclear warheads on missiles was not halted in 2003 under international pressure.[271] Iran was on a path to "design, produce and test… five warheads, each with a 10 kiloton TNT yield, for integration on a missile."[272]

The policy of Israel on the 2015 Iran deal "fix it or nix it" was in concert with the Trump administration that set a deadline, May 16th, to withdraw from the deal. The Trump administration not only kept reservations on the JCOA; it also had harshly criticized it publicly. However, the US policy on Iran was not shaped for decades wisely. The US military and security competition dates back to the 2000. The theater of war is not limited in the Gulf but also in the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, Gulf of Oman, Indian Ocean, Levant, Turkey, Afghanistan. It further implicates the Arab-Israeli conflict and the US-Russian relations. The Iranian missile program dates to the 1980s. It was fully underway during the Iran-Iraq War and was accelerated in the early 2000s. Hence, as Iran was building up its asymmetric and proxy capabilities, the US strategy was based on empowering its GCC allies to counter Iran.

Before the 2015 Plan, Iran was calling its nuclear program a peaceful one and it did not cooperate with the IAEA. Moreover, the US strategy followed the well-known policy of sanctions and provided sophisticated weapons to its Gulf allies. But Iran had already developed

[269] U.S Department of State, "Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action", 14 July 2015, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf
[270] U.S Department of State, "Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action"
[271] A Bandler, "Netanyahu EXPOSES Iran's Nuclear Ambitions In Speech", 30 April 2018, *Jewish Journal,* http://jewishjournal.com/tag/project-amad/
[272] "Even after the deal, Iran continued to preserve and expand its nuclear know how for future use." A Fullbright, "Netanyahu: Iran brazenly lied about nuclear program, has made plans to revive it", *The Times of Israel,* 30 April 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/pm-iran-lied-about-nuclear-plans-continued-to-expand-program-after-deal/

its own weaponry due to Western support on Iraq during the Iran-Iraq 8-years bloodshed. Iran also sought for strong allies to support it as Russia with whom it signed a cooperation and security agreement.

In 2002, Iran began constructing its first nuclear reactor at Bushehr with the assistance of Russian engineers and technicians. In 2005, Iran and Syria signed a military cooperation agreement to defend against what both sides deemed as the "common threats", meaning the US and Israel. In 2007, the IAEA released a report that acknowledged that Iran supplied transparent records of its past nuclear activities, but that it only has limited knowledge of Iran's then-current nuclear activities. While the US was preoccupied with its Afghanistan operations, Iran continued enriching uranium and sponsoring terrorism. After testing new long-range missile and spreading terror in the region IAEA finally admitted that Iran has weaponized its nuclear program (November 2011). Despite the fact that it lacked in conventional weaponry because it was excluded from international arms sales, Iran efficiently improved its capability on asymmetric warfare and progressively it managed to acquire modern Russian and Chinese weapons. Thus, it is more than evident that not only Iran was able to attack the US, its Arab allies and Israel, but that it could use its arsenal either in asymmetric, irregular, or hybrid war even in a terrorist proxy to a nuclear weapon.[273]

The militant mullahs as it has been uncovered by the Israeli Intelligence Services, have played off all the powers involved in the JCPOA and have violated the agreement by enriching uranium. One could pinpoint that they accomplished this by enjoying the "tolerance" of some of the great powers. In an era of economic global recession, the implications on the oil prices to many US' friends that are dependent from the Iranian resources as Japan can be devastated. The tanker incident at the Strait of Hormuz is indicative of how easily a situation can get out of control.[274]

The US after two not so successful wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, seems to be reluctant to get involved in the Iranian conundrum. Despite President Trump's initial determination to address the Iranian regime, second thoughts prevailed. Another overseas involvement in a costly, detrimental war with uncertain outcome pushes the administration away from decisive,

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[273] A. H., Cordesman & A., Wilner, "Iran and The Gulf Military Balance Volume I: The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions", Fifth Working Draft, Revised 11 July 2012, Center for Strategic and International Studies.
[274] BBC News, "Iran and the crisis in the Gulf explained", 19 August 2019, BBC News, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-49069083

efficient solutions, especially when the US has to act unilaterally, despite the Iranian threat to the Western world and not just to the US and Israel. Meanwhile, totalitarian regimes as Syria and Iran actively work to undermine the relative stability in the Middle East, mostly by provoking the State of Israel. Deterrence and containment on behalf of the Western powers do not work either since the Iranian rulers are getting more and more aggressive. Limited strikes targeting Iranian facilities and Iranian proxies that meddle in the Gulf sheikdoms and Middle East politics via promoting terrorists as Hezbollah, al Qaeda and further complicate the Syrian civil war, should be considered by the democratic forces as a conclusive solution to address global terrorism. As Sir Winston Churchill put it:

> "If you will not fight for the right when you can easily win without bloodshed; if you will not fight when your victory will be sure and not too costly; you may come to the moment when you will have to fight with all the odds against you and only a precarious chance for survival. There may even be a worse case. You may have to fight when there is no hope of victory, because it is better to perish than to live as slaves."[275]

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[275] W S Churchill *The Gathering Storm: The Second World War,* Vol. 1. Rosetta Books, 2010, p.348.

2.4. The strategy of the State of Kuwait in the post-2003 era. An assessment

"The key to understanding the often ambiguous foreign policy of Kuwait is the country's weakness. Its territory is squeezed between three larger, more powerful neighbors which regularly make conflicting demands on Kuwait's leaders. Kuwait has one-resource economy, and a religiously and ethnically divided population in which foreigners outnumber natives"
CIA[276]

The purpose of this unit is to assess the impact upon the strategy formation of the small state of Kuwait after the 2003 US war in Iraq. As Kuwaiti strategy has been thoroughly analyzed since its independence, and especially after the Iraqi invasion, the following analysis aspires to showcase if the principles and determinants of the Kuwaiti foreign policy remain till today intact.

In 2002, when the US-Iraqi confrontation was officially declared, President Bush at the State of the Union Address, openly named Iraq, Iran and North Korea as the "axis of evil". Iraq, in order to prevent any military escalation sought for support.[277] In March 2002, Iraq declared its willingness to re-open negotiations with Kuwait on an issue that it had rejected at the Amman Summit, March 2001. Hence, Kuwait focused on the implementation on behalf of Iraq of the "Conciliation Formula". In late April 2002, the US initiated a campaign for regime change. When first signs of war emerged and Kuwait started reevaluating its economic and political implications in the Gulf due to its geology and proximity to Iraq, al Qaeda threatened Kuwait because of stationing US troops. The Sheikh at first stated publicly his refusal in any military operation against Iraq and simultaneously increased Kuwaiti security. After Saddam's message in 2002, where he showed no signs of regret on the 1991 invasion, Kuwait reevaluated its previous strategy and coordinated its moves with the US, even with the Iraqi opposition to achieve a regime change in Iraq and to plan the day after. On February 15th, 2003 "the Kuwaiti military has declared two-thirds of Kuwait a restricted military zone". Sheikh Sabah was indeed the one and only decision-maker who mattered and supported the US-UK operations for a regime change.[278]

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[276] CIA, National Foreign Assessment Center, "Kuwait's Foreign Policy. An intelligence assessment", May 1981, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp06t00412r000200270001-9, p.iii
[277] G W Bush, *Decision Points*, Virgin Books, the Random House Group Limited, 2010. p.233.
[278] WikiLeaks, "Kuwait 2003 Annual Report To Congress on Allied Contributions To The Common Defense"; Reference ID; 02KUWAIT5416, SECRET, Embassy Kuwait, 2002-12-17, http://www.wikileaks.org/origin/117_0.html, WikiLeaks, "Kuwait Media Reaction, February 3-10: War Against

After the initiation of the US-led operations, Kuwait was clearly in favor of them. Publicly it cemented its arguments on the UNSC resolutions and the legal obligations that Iraq had not comply with.[279] Kuwait had learned its lesson on the financial implications after the 1991 invasion and would never allow that to occur again. In 2004, Kuwait mobilized its economic diplomacy to attract investments after the devastating war.

The period between the two wars was intense for the two countries. Iraq repeated its previous behavior and mobilized more than 100.000 soldiers on the frontiers in 1994. The collapse of Saddam's regime and his elimination brought about changes in Kuwaiti foreign policy. Kuwait focused on economic diplomacy to maximize its margins of political maneuver and to limit any negative impact on its economic growth. Thus, it developed a stable network of allies especially with economically powerful friends. In other words, it converged its interests with the US' to achieve its aim.

The 1991 invasion and annexation laid the foundations for the new security and defense system that the Sheikdom had to reestablish since the Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Between the States of the Arab League, that was signed on June 17th, 1950, proved to be void and ineffective. Article 2 of the Treaty states that:

> "The Contracting States consider any [act of] armed aggression made against any one or more of them or their armed forces, to be directed against them all. Therefore, in accordance with the right of self-defense, individually and collectively, they undertake to go without delay to the aid of the State or States against which such an act of aggression is made, and immediately to take, individually and collectively, all steps available, including the use of armed force, to repel the aggression and restore security and peace".[280]

However, the aforementioned never happened. The defense and security concept of the Kuwaiti state had to change from the scratch since it failed to secure its sovereignty. Should the question "did Kuwait learn any lesson from its failure" is raised, the answer is that it did. "Kuwait was for the most part only loosely associated with regional alliances, and that its non-alignment

Iraq; Terrorism In Kuwait; US Presence In Kuwait; Space Shuttle Columbia; Travel Warning; Repatriation Case", Reference ID; 03KUWAIT544, UNCLASSIFIED, Embassy Kuwait, 2003-02-11. http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/02/03KUWAIT544.html, Alazemi, pp-269-296.
[279] See Security Council, "4726th meeting Wednesday, 26 March 2003, 3 p.m.: The Situation between Iraq and Kuwait", Fifty-eighth year, S/PV.4726, 26 March 2003, United Nations, New York.
[280] "Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Between the States of the Arab League", 17 June 11950, Yale Law School, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arabjoin.asp

was part and parcel of an ideational construct that formed a key part of its foreign policy toward the Arab world [...] Nevertheless, Kuwait's regional vulnerability meant that it could not escape the need to assert its Arabism".[281] It understood the inefficiency of its defense system and it turned for aid to its powerful Western allies that liberated it. Kuwait had not only to defend itself against Iraq but also against Iran. The Shia-Sunni division in the Gulf had and still has significant repercussions on its domestic coherence, stability and security from external intervention.

Kuwait and the GCC members understood the importance of foreign troops' presence after 1991. Since the Arab states failed to protect Kuwait and the West undertook the whole mission under the auspices of the UN, the small sheikdom laid the foundation for defense agreements especially with the USA, apart from the GCC's "Damascus Declaration" and the five security agreements with the P5.[282]

On April 1st,2004, the GW Bush administration designated Kuwait a major US non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally. This move came with a great military bonus for the small sheikdom as military equipment and favorable purchasing arrangements. It was a way to reward Kuwait because it cooperated closely with the Bush administration. It was the most cooperative of the Arab states and most of the operations launched from its soil. Memories from the 1991 invasion did not fade away from the Kuwaiti people. Therefore, they were not negative in the idea of removing Saddam. Furthermore, Kuwait via the UN continued to claim its compensations from the 1991 invasion and until 2003 strongly supported the UN sanctions over Iraq hoping that it would exhaust politically and economically the regime. This Kuwaiti posture had negative impact on Iraq that perceived Kuwait as extremely hostile.[283] In sum, the strategy that describes best that period is the "preventive diplomacy".

A blind spot between the American-Kuwaiti relations was some Kuwait-based Islamic charities accused of ties to terrorism. The US was adamant that Kuwait should comply with the US to stop global terrorism and that it should do its best to stop these fundraising for terrorist groups and enact the terror finance and counterterrorism law. The same call was made on the Syria civil war in 2014. The US repeated its plea to Kuwait that it has become the epicenter of

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[281] P Neil, *Kuwait's Foreign Policy (1961-1977): Non-Alignment, Ideology and the Pursuit of Security,* unpublished Thesis (Ph.D.), University of London, 2006., p.8
[282] Kostiner, pp.3-4.
[283] Terrill, p.40-45.

fundraisers to extremist groups in Syria.[284] At last, GCC's contribution to the "war on terror" was important, since many members of Al-Qaeda's network were Gulf citizens. The GCC did not hesitate to assist the coalition logistically. Also, from 1990 to 2003, it designated a no-fly zone to contain Iraq.

Iraq and Kuwait fully restored their diplomatic relations after the 2003 war. The main bilateral issues that of economic compensations and reparations, were not fulfilled on behalf of Iraq. Kuwait once again had to mobilize the UN to secure its borders and its sovereignty from any breach. But this was not the only bilateral issue. Kuwait pushed towards restoration of its relations with Iraq because a stable Iraq was critical both for Kuwaiti and regional security. Hence, it favorer UN actions that supported every political process in Iraq that would bring stability.[285] It welcomed every domestic effort as the Iraqi interim government. In 2008, the two states established diplomatic relations at an ambassadorial level. On February 26th, 2009, the Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Iraq for the first time. However, the issues that still were in Kuwaiti agenda were that of border security, foreign intervention, sectarian strife between Sunni-Shia and domestic terrorism in Iraq that could threaten social Kuwaiti cohesion. For all the aforementioned arguments, Kuwait reasonably expressed its anxiety on the US' troops withdrawal from Iraq at the end of December, 2011.[286]

Despite the restoration of the Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations, pending issues from 1991 were not resolved as the Iraqi encroachments on Kuwaiti territory till 2011. Repatriation of prisoners of war, compensations and other humanitarian issues were pending. Thus, Kuwait considered important for its benefit to keep Iraq under Charter VII until it fulfills its obligations.[287]

On Iran, Kuwait has expressed its concern over an unsettled dispute for the exploitation of the Continental Shelf in Al-Durra oil field. Kuwait and the GCC states were hesitant on

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[284] Wikileaks, Ibid, "Scene setter For The Kuwait Prime Minister's September 18-19 Visit To The United States: Strengthening An Indispensable Regional Partner", Reference ID;; 08KUWAIT936, SECRET, Embassy Kuwait, 2008-09-02., U.S Department of the Treasury, "Remarks of Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen before the Center for a New American Security on "Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing", 4 March 2014, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/jl2308.aspx
[285] Security Council, "Resolution 1483 (2003) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4761st meeting", S/RES/1483, on 22 May 2003, United Nations, New York.
[286] WikiLeaks "Centcom Commander Fallon Meets With Amir And Senior GOK Officials", Reference ID; 07KUWAIT500, CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN , Embassy Kuwait, 2007-04-07, http://www.wikileaks.org/origin/117_0.html
[287] Security Council, "Letter dated 24 March 2009 from the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council", S/2009/178, 6 April 2009, United Nations, New York.

whether both should challenge Iran over its nuclear program. Needless to mention that condemning Iran might be equated with supporting Israel. Thus, any Iranian provocative response would be justified by the Mullahs.[288] The Iranian nuclear program is not the main nightmare that Kuwait has to tackle. Iran and Iraq have repeatedly used Kuwaiti territory as a battlefield due to the presence of sectarian population of Sunni and Shia. Consequently, Kuwaiti territory is a golden opportunity for Iran and Iraq to play off the two ideologically opposite groups and to use proxies to create domestic problems. The GCC states have strongly condemned any Iranian interference.[289]

After the fall of Saddam, the small sheikdom used extensively its economic weapon to serve its foreign policy goals. By deploying its oil weapon, Kuwait achieved to strengthen itself militarily, to forge allies and deter opponents. In 2009, Kuwait hosted the first Arab Economic Summit on 19-20 January. Its purpose, "to address issues of economic and social development among member-states."[290] The summit was praised on the Arab press for its success in reconciling the Arab world. In general, during the post-Saddam period Kuwait fiercely pursued its financial growth through promoting trade in Arab countries, in EU states as well as in several Asian and African countries. Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) is one of its strongest assets. It is about a political and diplomatic tool that has put Kuwait in the list of the ten greatest donors worldwide since through this it is financing the Arab World. Finally, after the 2003 operation, more than $1.6 billion of its economic aid was mobilized to reconstruct Iraq basing on "purely political objectives set at the Madrid Conference in 2003."[291]

Diplomacy is a critical tool in the Kuwaiti quiver in the post-2003 era. Aiming at establishing firm relations with all countries, mostly with the powerful ones, Kuwait intensified its presence globally by inaugurating more diplomatic missions abroad. Having as a compass the UN resolutions, Kuwaiti foreign policy is focusing on founding enduring relations not only with its regional powers but also with states that participated in the US coalition and those that

[288] Wikileaks, "Parade of Foreign Ministers Talk Iran in Kuwait: No Great Ideas Emerge", Reference ID: 06KUWAIT1921, CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN, Embassy Kuwait, 2006-05-24., Wikileaks, "Scene setter For Counselor Zelikow's Feb. 28 -March 1 Visit to Kuwait", Reference ID:06KUWAIT594, CONFIDENTIAL, Embassy Kuwait, 2006-02-21.
[289] Terrill, pp.65-73. Arab Times, "Gulf states denounce Iran's meddling", 4 April 2011, http://www.arabtimesonline.com/NewsDetails/tabid/96/smid/414/ArticleID/167532/reftab/36/t/Gulfstates-denounce-Iran-s-meddling-/Default.aspx131
[290] Arab States Cooperation and Business Law Handbook, Volume, Strategic Information and Basic Laws, International Business Publication USA, Washington DC, USA, p.17.
[291] Wikileaks, "Kuwait Fund On Iraq, Lebanon, PA And Strategic Investment Initiative", Reference ID; 06KUWAIT399 CONFIDENTIAL, Embassy Kuwait 2006-02-05 http://wikileaks.org/

already has developed security agreements. In 2011, diplomatic missions abroad numbered up to 90.[292]

As it has been put above, security and defense are named number one priority for the State of Kuwait. Kuwait spends more than 5% of its GDP for military purposes. "It has invested heavily in creating some effective force elements and basing and prepositioning that would allow rapid U.S. reinforcement and power projection."[293] Despite its neutral policy it allows along with Bahrain and Qatar the stationing of US' bases. This is a way to safeguard its military needs and compensate for some of its weakness. Kuwaiti military power is relatively limited in comparison to the largest countries that surround it. This is the main and critical reason why it has decided to be under a defense umbrella of the USA. Furthermore, its arms purchases come from diverse sources. Iranian irredentism and the 2017 Qatar crisis challenged Kuwaiti leadership regarding its foreign policy and its military capabilities. If something that the state of Kuwait has learned after two wars in Iraq is that "when countries target Kuwait and/or its neighbors, the state that initiates such action will always suffer unintended consequences, along with all in the region."[294] However GCC's collective security is considering ill to coordinate the six Gulf states' militaries.

The "oil weapon" is the most efficient political weapon in Kuwaiti foreign policy. From its independence it has used oil and sterling to attract great powers' interest and confront Iraq on several occasions. A blessing and a curse at the same time considering that it draws in friends and foes. Today Kuwait ranks in the 9th place of the world's oil producer.[295]

After 2003, Kuwaiti followed the path of its 1991 restoration. It aimed at strengthening its relations with the USA not only politically and economically but also militarily, by becoming NATO partner and signing of a set of agreements on border security, counterterrorism, crisis management, joint military exercises, military education and training. In 2018, a NATO diplomatic mission was officially inaugurated in Kuwait.[296] A free trade area (TIFA) was

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[292] CIA, National Foreign Assessment Center, "Kuwait's Foreign Policy. An intelligence assessment", May 1981, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp06t00412r000200270001-9, Alazemi 160-1.

[293] A H Cordesman & N Harrington, "Iran: Military Spending, Modernization, and the Shifting Military Balance in the Gulf", CSIS, p.32

[294] G Cafiero & T Karasic, "Kuwait, Oman, and the Qatar Crisis", *Middle East Institute*, 22 June 2017, https://www.mei.edu/publications/kuwait-oman-and-qatar-crisis

[295] CIA Factbook, Kuwait, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ku.html

[296] NATO, "Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the meeting of the Counter-ISIS Coalition", 16 February 2017, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_141469.htm?selectedLocale=en, "NATO – Kuwait conference on cooperation with Gulf countries", 12 December 2016,

established between the US-Kuwait in 2004. Until 2018 Kuwait has signed Bilateral Investment Treaties with more than 40 countries.[297]

2.4.1. Iran. The revisionist neighbor

"Any rational security system for the Gulf must include all the eight Gulf countries, including Iraq. But so long as Saddam Hussein is the president of Iraq, it will be excluded from any such scheme."[298]

Iran is always a peculiar actor and a source of concern not only for Kuwait. Iranian wish to dominate the Gulf is constant especially during the last decade when Iraq as a balancer has been weakened. Iran is striving to become the main power in the region. Meanwhile, its revolutionary ideas can divide Kuwait's population and its domestic order. Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' activity that purports to destabilize a country by supporting pro-Iranian movements has been spotted in Kuwait.

Kuwaiti-Iranian relations have been reevaluated on many occasions by the government of Kuwait mostly due to Iran's posture and its regional ambitions. Kuwait has been vulnerable to Iranian threats and subversion in many occasions as it happened during the Iran-Iraq war. Iranian terrorists spread threat in Kuwait by acts of terrorism and subversion. Kuwait's posture towards Iran can be understood in the frame of counterweighting Saddam. Historically Kuwait was always vulnerable to Shiite revisionism and subversion, since Kuwaiti Shiite have in the past supported Iranian policies as in 1980 during Khomeini's revolution.

Following liberation, Kuwait attempted to improve its relations with Iran because it realized that its support to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war did not serve its interest adequately. Kuwait's balancing strategy was altered when relations with Iraq resulted in its invasion. Thus, Iran was chosen as the counterbalance power. Chaos, violence, and terrorism towards Kuwait from Iran followed the break out of the Iran-Iraq war. However, during the Iraqi invasion, Iran

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https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_22060.htm?, "Kuwait inaugurates diplomatic mission to NATO" 26 November 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_160834.htm.
[297] Select USA, "Kuwait Country Commercial Guide", https://www.selectusa.gov/article?id=Kuwait-Trade-Agreements
[298] Hiro, p.446.

kept a neutral posture and did not side with Iraq. Moreover, in the aftermath of the 1991 war, Kuwaitis and Iranians cooperated. This Kuwaiti response can be characterized as typical when it comes to relations of Kuwait with regional actors, since it seeks for "moderate potential enemies through dialogue and economic interaction". At this specific period of time this approach with Iran turned out to be fruitful. Both countries signed 24 agreements on economy, trade, culture, an obvious sign of rapprochement. Kuwait not only realized Iran's positive stance towards Iraqi invasion, but it also attempted to tame any Iranian provocative behavior that could result in the destabilization of Kuwait.

Since the Ahmadinejad presidency things are back to the traditional Iranian Gulf approach: expel USA from the region, influence and dominate regional politics. Kuwaiti nervousness regarding Iran's nuclear program is expressed as an environmental concern. Gulf states cannot do much about the Iranian program, neither can Kuwait by itself since it does not wish to be found in between the Iranian-US confrontation. This is why Kuwait acts as a mediator and encourages a USA-Iran dialogue. Kuwait understands the ability of Iran to exploit the current situation in Iraq. Nevertheless, Kuwait needs to be under the US defense umbrella something that displeases Iran. By maintaining economic and political relations with Iran, Kuwait aims at not provoking the Islamic republic.

Defense cooperation with USA also aims at containing Iran. Kuwait and the GCC countries are worried about the nuclear program. Nevertheless, Kuwait cooperated in imposing sanctions on Iran. Iran-supported militia operating in Southern Iraq have concerned Kuwait since 2011 after a bombing and threat incidents. Iranian spy cells have been revealed in Kuwait that attempted not only to monitor the US military presence but also to destroy Kuwaiti facilities and further deteriorate the Kuwaiti-Iranian relations. The estimated Shiite population in 2016 was around 30 percent of Kuwait's native population of 1.3 million. Finally, it should not be underestimated the ongoing negotiation between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia on the one hand, and Iran on the other, for a joint maritime boundary as well as the fact that no maritime boundary exists with Iraq in the Persian Gulf.

Iran always viewed the Gulf as the prime area for potential influence. The continuous US presence in the region and the military cooperation with the Arab states is perceived by Iran as a threat to its nuclear program. Fearing of an attack to its nuclear facilities by the US forces, Iranian officials have threatened with triggering an all-out regional war and firing ballistic missiles in masses against targets in Arab Gulf states and Israel.

Today, Kuwait and the Gulf states are challenged by the Iranian revisionism. The Iranian-Kuwaiti relations date back before the Iran-Iraq war. The 1979 revolution disrupted the harmonious relations with Kuwait and the sectarian Shia population became a problem for Kuwaiti domestic politics. Kuwait's support to Iraq during the 8-year war deteriorated the relations. However, after the 1991 Kuwait reestablished its relations with Iran as it happened with all the states that supported the Kuwaiti liberation. Another reason toward that end was to prevent any domestic destabilization due to the pro-Iranian elements and the fear of inciting turmoil. Thus, in 1992, both states signed agreements on economy and trade. Following the 1999 official visit to Iran of the Kuwaiti Minister of Commerce, significant Kuwaiti investments and exports up to 22 million dollars are reported in Iran.[299]

Kuwait's preferred strategy is balancing between USA and Iran. It maintains good relations with a regional and extra-regional powerful actor that, according to the literature of small states, is a well-known behavior that can be exercised skillfully. That said, Kuwait was wary of the dangers that Iran can provoke especially taking into consideration the Shia population in its soil. The 2010 discovery of Iranian spy cells in Kuwait that attempted not only to monitor the US military presence but also to destroy Kuwaiti facilities further deteriorated the Kuwaiti-Iranian relations.[300]

[299] Wikileaks, "Kuwaiti - Iranian Trade Relations: An Overview", Reference ID: 07KUWAIT183, CONFIDENTIAL, Embassy Kuwait, 2007-02-07.
[300] In 2010 Security agencies in Kuwait arrested a spy cell working for Iran's Revolutionary Guards to feed information on Kuwaiti and US targets. France 24, "Kuwait nabs alleged Iranian spy cell", 2 May 2010, http://www.france24.com/en/20100501-intelligence-kuwait-iran-spy-cell-al-qabas-us-targets, Reuters, "Iran cell planned attacks in Kuwait, minister says", 21 April 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-kuwait-iran-spying-idUSTRE73K3NO20110421, Aljazeera, "Kuwait charges 'terror cell tied to Iran and Hezbollah', 1 September 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/09/kuwait-charges-terror-cell-tied-iran-hezbollah-150901134517950.html

Conclusion

Kuwaiti history after the British withdrawal and the constant need to safeguard its sovereignty against powerful neighbors explains why Kuwaiti leadership pursued not only external defense for its protection but also sought for a consenting plan to demarcate all areas of the Gulf. The outcome of this draft agreement was the formation of the GCC on May 25th, 1981.[301] Sheikh Saad Al-Abdullah Al Sabah's role (1978-2006) was essential in establishing the GCC in 1981, after convincing the heads of the six Arab Gulf states on the need to act in common for the benefit of all the states of the Gulf.

In 1991, the Al-Sabah family returned to power and contributed to many democratic reforms thus transforming Kuwait into today's constitutional monarchy. However, threats from Iraq reemerged especially after the 2003 USA-UK war. Kuwait values highly its relations with the West, especially with the USA. This is also the reason for its democratic reforms, as the historic election of four women to its National Assembly, in 2009. Till today, Kuwait has confronted uprisings domestically on issues of corruption, citizenship, reforms. All these resulted in Amir's decision to dissolve the National Assembly on seven occasions. Regionally, Kuwait's security is challenged by extremists that also have compromised its internal security after terrorists' attacks.

The US decision to go to war to overthrow Saddam, led Kuwait to change its policy toward Iraq from a reconciliatory to a pro-US posture, thus supporting logistically the US troops. That happened after calculating the risks that the small state would face in case the 1991 events were repeated. The 1991 trauma was a catalyst to decide upon the 2003 policy adoption. International and regional developments did impact on Kuwaiti foreign policy change in 2002. After the 2003 war, Kuwait employed its economic and diplomatic tools to restore Iraq's security and its political and economic stability.

Throughout its history, Kuwait confronted enemies that have sought to destabilize even subvert the government of Iran, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.[302] Despite being small and inherently vulnerable due to its location, Kuwait in the 21st century has remarkably weaponized its economic and political assets, it has exploited its regional system's peculiarities and the great powers' anxieties that struggle to influences the always significant to them Gulf.

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[301] Alazemi, p.108-9.
[302] Terrill, p.10.

Concluding Remarks

"Kuwait's foreign policy is determined by the geopolitical fact that it is small, vulnerable and of great strategic and economic importance"[303]

The previous chapter aspired to examine the strategy of Kuwait and the challenges that it faces in the Gulf. Highlighting 70years of Kuwaiti strategy and having as a compass the presented theoretical framework, it is safe to argue that Kuwait's strategic choices present rigid features regarding its posture regionally and on confronting security threats. A review of its strategy is important to illustrate the "how" and "why" this small state adopted certain policies to tackle threats of a revisionist power and thus to survive.

What is the impact of the international system and the great powers' involvement on a small state's security when a territorial dispute occurs?

Assiri describes Kuwaiti foreign policy "not as active or initiatory, but rather reactive, triggered by events and stimuli outside its boundaries."[304] Kuwait was aware of its strategic location which transformed it into the apple of discord since the 17th century. To survive, it mobilized internal and external factors. When Britain relocated some of its businesses in Kuwait, it automatically placed it into an economic and trading hub which resulted in enhancing its relations with local and international actors and simultaneously it became a target to be subjugated.[305] Thus, Kuwait understood its vulnerability and the subsequent importance of retaining efficient defense forces.

Kuwaiti foreign policy since its independence aims at addressing regional and extra-regional threats via its military empowerment. Since its independence, it continued to be supported militarily by Britain and politically by the Arabs. British presence may have provoked Arab sentiments but at the same time Arab forces were inadequate to safeguard the small Kuwait. Thus, Arab contribution was mostly symbolic.

Security is in the center of its strategy. Having recognized its blind spots due to its vulnerable morphology as well as its assets -e.g. resource wealth and strategic location- that draw in great powers' interest and interference, it designated its strategy accordingly. To

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[303] WikiLeaks, "Kuwait's foreign policy - A Tightrope Philosophy", Reference ID;; 1975KUWAIT00546_bSecret, EmbassyKuwait, 3-2-1975.
[304] Assiri p.11.
[305] See R V Pillai & M Kumar, "The Political and Legal Status of Kuwait", *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly,* Vol.11, No.1, 1962.

enhance its security, it focused on forging alliances. Alliances became the epicenter of the strategic choice of Kuwait even before the 1991 annexation. Iraqi political disorder impacted upon the security of the State of Kuwait. When the Baathist party came to power in Iraq, this resulted in serious incidents of provocations on the demarcation of the terrestrial borders as per Article 1 of the 1963 Treaty (Agreed Minutes). The Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute over the boarders lasted until the 1991 annexation. To address these, it mobilized its economic weapon to aid a needy Iraq. During the Iran-Iraq war, Kuwaiti strategy focused on retaining its internal stability, enhancing its diplomatic skills and strengthening its military machine.

The 1991 occupation resulted in altering its foreign policy posture. Kuwait became more pragmatic. It realized its vulnerabilities, regional peculiarities, and the importance of having trustworthy defense cooperation. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait set the notion of alliance politics as the cornerstone of the Kuwaiti foreign policy. It also shook the notions of "Pan-Arabism" and nationalism, two influential factors until the invasion. At international level, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was the catalyst to reevaluate its ties with global players. Kuwait strengthened its ties with states that led the operations, mostly with the US, Britain, France, Russia, China, Japan and Germany. It also deployed its economic weapon to come closer to them by engaging their economic interests in Kuwaiti reconstruction.

Does being non-aligned affect negative or positive a small state's strategy when compared to the type of the international system that it operates within? Kuwait has adopted an odd "neutral posture"; a mix of ideational factors as pan-Arabism and Islam with a great dose of Western powers defense umbrella to protect it from its powerful regional friends and foes. On the one hand, it retains a central role in the GCC and acts as a mediator, on the other, it has signed a formal security arrangement with the USA.

Since pan-Arabism was at the core of the foreign policy of Kuwait, the Iran-Iraq war forced it to adopt a "neutral stance" to address the challenges against regional and extra regional powers. During the Iranian Revolution it joined the other Arab states and the GCC and supported Iraq. However, Kuwait officially declared its neutrality but unofficially it supported Iraq economically.

Kuwaiti neutral policy is founded in the 17th century. That posture was chosen as a safety net to maintain its security in an area where great powers' competition for power is at high levels. Neutrality was chosen as the ideal posture to maintain regional stability. However, the Qatar crisis in 2017, posed a dilemma for Kuwaiti neutrality. Amidst a severe internal GCC

crisis, Kuwaiti officials' fear was that the failure to settle the Qatar crisis will break up the council thus directly undermining vital Kuwaiti interests. The Saudi-Iranian antagonism behind the Qatar crisis led the Emir of Kuwait to a rational decision. The Emir "makes foreign policy decisions based on painful lessons that Kuwaitis have learned from the numerous Gulf wars, including the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The key lesson is that when countries target Kuwait and/or its neighbors, the state that initiates such action will always suffer unintended consequences, along with all in the region."[306] Thus, Kuwaiti strategy was to mediate in the crisis to avoid any military action against Qatar.

How domestic variables influence a state's strategy? Is there a continuity in a small state's strategy due to systemic limitations? Did Kuwait itself handled wisely and efficiently its components of power, formulate and implement a successfully a strategy by exploiting its assets? Domestic politics and governance did contribute to state's stability and the formation of Kuwaiti strategy. The Al-Sabah family that rules for centuries practically chooses the successor by selecting a member of the family. The Emir is omnipotent despite the fact that the government type is constitutional monarchy. That said, domestic politics drive Kuwaiti foreign policy and the continuity that can be observed is credited to its leadership. A few characteristics that can be ascribed to the Kuwaiti foreign policy and showcase a timeless preference are the following: during the period of decolonization it used as a vehicle the Western dependence on the Gulf oil and its good relations with Britain. Beside its resources, Pan-Arabism was the vehicle of Kuwaiti foreign policy in its early years. Since its defense treaty with Britain it aimed at and managed to successfully mobilize pan-Arabism to strengthen its relationships with the Arab world against Iraqi aggression during the political crisis from 1961 to 1963 (ideational impact).

During the critical period that led to the invasion, Kuwait understood and felt the consequences of its inherent vulnerability. Kuwaiti leadership understood the twofold significance of its location; as a source of concern and simultaneously as an asset. Despite its "neutral" posture, it developed alliances with strong external actors. It comprehended the importance of carefully balancing among its Western and Arab allies.

The Arab nationalistic agenda is in the core of the Kuwaiti strategy. The need for Arab endorsement especially during the first years of independence was heavy. On the one hand,

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[306] G Cafiero & T Karasic

Kuwait undertakes the role of the mediator among regional disputes, on the other, it "repels" any revisionist regional power against Kuwait due to its neutral stance.

After its liberation in 1991, Kuwait adopted a pragmatic approach to secure that such a strategic failure will never happen again. It pursued its interests by pursuing close cooperation with the GCC and the UN to safeguard its sovereignty; by invoking the international law and the UN Resolutions, especially on issues as compensation, restoration of properties, return of prisoners of war, Iraqi disarmament. Security, autonomy, resources had to be protected. It also placed into the core of its strategy internal and external security, the ideals of pan-Arabism and Islam. The Arab and Islamic identities are considering salient ideational factors and have a strong impact upon Kuwaiti Leadership. Finally, Kuwaiti relations improved with Arab states that supported the liberation war, while KFAED was suspended from the states that did not support Kuwait. Till today Kuwait uses its funds to aid the Arab world.

CHAPTER 3

The case of Cyprus: The ongoing occupation

Introduction

Cyprus: "Middle East, island in the Mediterranean Sea, south of Turkey; note - Cyprus views itself as part of Europe; geopolitically, it can be classified as falling within Europe, the Middle East, or both"[307]

The Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960 after an intense anti-colonial struggle against the British colonial power, known as EOKA, a Greek-Cypriot national guerrilla organization (1955-59). Cyprus was under the British rule from 1878 to 1960 when, under the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey relinquished all its rights to Cyprus, which in 1925 was declared a Crown colony.

The decade of 1950 was marked by a worldwide anti-colonial struggle and self-determination. After the EOKA national liberation struggle, the island of Cyprus gained a sui generis independence. In 1959, the Zurich-London Agreements were signed by Great Britain, Greece and Turkey as well as by representatives of the Greek Cypriots (henceforth G/Cs) and Turkish Cypriots (henceforth T/Cs), thus leading to Cyprus' independence (August 16th, 1960). After the ratification of the newly-established RoC, the Turkish-Cypriot (henceforth T/C) and the Greek-Cypriot (henceforth G/C) communities faced the reality of the Zurich-London agreements. The constitution itself turned out to be inefficient since it was conducive to deadlocks. Consequently, soon after the Cypriot independence, tensions between the G/Cs and the T/Cs emerged. The President of the RoC, Archbishop Makarios III, proposed the so-called thirteen amendments to the constitution to improve the functionality of the Republic.[308] Severe intercommunal clashes erupted thus giving the to the T/Cs and Turkey a golden opportunity to question the co-existence of the two communities and the functionality of the Treaty. Cyprus was falling apart due to domestic violence, foreign interference and an inherent

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[307] CIA Factbook, July 12, 2018, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cy.html, (access date: 2/8/2018)

[308] Two anomalies of the agreements' provisions are the separations of the communities and the political and constitutional equation of the 18% T/C minority with the 82% of the G/C majority. However, Makarios' thirteen amendments and the subsequent inter-communal bloody conflicts were the stepping stone for the T/C leadership to claim for a political and geographical separation of the two ethnic communities at the London summit. UK's posture favored the T/C proposals. G Clerides, *My Deposition*. Vol.1. Nicosia, Alithia, 1988 [In Greek], pp.301-2, 311.

constitutional inability for the rule of law to prevail. From now one, the Cyprus problem was no longer a problem of a domestic conflict but a threat to international peace and stability.

On Christmas of 1963, a green line was drawn and divided Nicosia, the capital of the Republic in two sections: the G/C and the T/C area. This green line turned out to be the "Kassandra" for the Turkish invasion that took place almost 10 years after the establishment of the buffer zone.

Today, the small island of Cyprus has a total 9,251 sq. km area of which 3,355 sq. km are under the Turkish rule, and a population of 947.000 (December 2017 est.)[309] again in the Government controlled area of the Republic. The Greeks are the majority with 98.8%, while there are other minorities that consist 1% of the population and includes Maronite, Armenian, T/Cs and an unspecified 0.2%.[310] The Republic of Cyprus is a presidential democracy since its independence and a member of many international organizations.[311] After abandoning the NAM, in 2004 it became a member of the European Union (EU) and later (2008) of the Eurozone. However, it is the only EU member state that the EU acquis applies only to the areas under the internationally recognized government of the Republic while it is suspended in the occupied territories. The EU is actively involved in the reunification process since there is also an ongoing negotiation on the EU-Turkey accession process. Cyprus has still three guarantors powers: Great Britain, Greece and Turkey according to the Treaty of Guarantee in the frame of the Zurich-London agreements.[312]

The ongoing illegal Turkish occupation of the 36,2 % of the Republic, 45 years later is still a matter of peace and stability in a volatile region. With the Syrian conflict affecting the regional and international balance of power, an intense power game on and the involvement of great powers as the USA and Russia; regional players as Turkey and Iran; their proxies as Hezbollah, and the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict, all the aforementioned further endanger

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[309] Γραφείο Τύπου και Πληροφοριών, *Η Κύπρος με μια ματιά*, Γραφείο Τύπου και Πληροφοριών, Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία, 2018.

[310] CIA Factbook, July 12, 2018, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cy.html, (access date: 2/8/2018)

[311] Australia Group, C, CD, CE, EBRD, ECB, EIB, EMU, EU, FAO, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NAM, NSG, OAS (observer), OIF, OPCW, OSCE, PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNIFIL, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO, CIA Factbook, January 12, 2017, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cy.html,

[312] "No.5475. Treaty of Guarantee. Signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960", http://www.mfa.gr/images/docs/kypriako/treaty_of_guarantee.pdf

the already perilous situation. Furthermore, the Eastern Mediterranean is in the epicenter of the two main actors, meaning the USA and Russia.

New developments shape today's politics in the Eastern Mediterranean and most likely will prevail for years to come. The gas explorations and the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zones of the littoral states flare on and re-arrange the regional politics. Friends and foes have adjusted their politics to the new realities. Israel and Greece do remain the status quo powers in the region. Meanwhile, Cyprus is actively engaged and promotes with friendly states as: Greece, Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, bilateral and trilateral partnerships, aiming all at addressing common challenges in security, terrorism, defense, energy as well as shared opportunities and tangible benefits. These partnerships have already motivated great powers and energy companies state or private owned. Thus, the Eastern Mediterranean region has entered in a new era where Greece and Israel are bearing the burden of safeguarding the status quo against revisionist powers as Turkey and Iran that put in jeopardy not only regional stability but

> "a broader crisis that will influence the future geostrategic physiognomy of the Eastern Med. … The two states, together with the Republic of Cyprus, are the only unconditionally western powers in a wider arena that is changing rapidly under the influence of Moscow and Beijing. While the latter – for the time being – is showing an interest in establishing a strong economic and soft-power presence in the region through the One-Belt/One Road Initiative, the former is rapidly changing its traditional attitude towards the Eastern Mediterranean by transforming itself into a blue water naval power."[313]

The case of Cyprus, also known as the "Cyprus Problem", "Issue", or "Question", is one of the most researched topic in the IR field from various perspectives; from the international law and human rights violation because of the Turkish invasion and occupation of the one third of the island to the events that took place before and after the invasion and the role of the great powers as well. The UN as an arbiter and the proposed plans are also examined, though it is not commented adequately the interference of the actors that led to each proposed plan and subsequently to the failed negotiations. Recently, a great amount of literature has inquired

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[313] S N Litsas, "A Perilous Tango for Four in the Eastern Med", *BESA Center* Perspectives Paper No. 765, March 11, 2018, https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/perilous-tango-four-eastern-med/

into the role of the small state of Cyprus in the EU, the UN and its place in the Eastern Mediterranean in these turbulent times. Despite the good omen of the gas reserves, its blooming external affairs, its economic recovery, the Republic still faces a conundrum: the revisionist Turkey and the T/C leadership that claim an international role for the secessionist state of the occupied northern Cyprus and overtly set on the table of the negotiations not sharing but managing all the natural and financial resources of the Republic. The Sultan, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and its muppet "state" openly demand from a sovereign state, the RoC, to further concede to their demanding and to have a strong say in the Eastern Mediterranean energy hub and gas sharing. Turkey bullies Cyprus' allies, especially the ones that it keeps strong military ties like Egypt and Israel.[314] Hence, Cyprus' road to freedom is still not paved with roses. Turkey, even under Trump administration that has condemned Turkeys' posture toward Russia, still remains a value partner, especially after the US decision to withdraw its troops from Syria. As the US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, has put it, the two countries would continue to work with each other in the framework of the alliance and on other matters. "Turkey is a NATO partner with whom the United States has every intention of continuing to work cooperatively."[315]

The literature so far has covered the Cyprus case from various perspectives and perceptions. This chapter explores the survival strategy of Cyprus. Cyprus' strategy against the revisionist Turkey will be examined in two significant periods of time: before the EU membership and after the EU integration. The EU acceptance of Cyprus' membership is considered a strategic success for the small state since it achieved to become an EU member as a whole, thus recognizing the occupied territories as an undivided and integral part of the

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[314] PhileNews, "Οζερσάι: Αν εμποδίσετε γεωτρήσεις μας, θα ξεσπάσει κρίση", 30 Μαρτίου 2018, http://www.philenews.com/eidiseis/politiki/article/506630/ozersai-an-empodisete-gotriseis-mas-tha-xespasei-krisi, Philenews ,"Άγκυρα: Δεν υποχωρούμε από τα δικαιώματά μας στην ΑΟΖ, 29 Μαρτίου 2018, http://www.philenews.com/eidiseis/politiki/article/506149/aggyra-den-ypochoroyme-apo-ta-dikaiomata-mas-stin-aoz, Η Καθημερινή, "Στο δείπνο της Συνόδου Αρχηγών Κρατών τα θέματα της Τουρκίας", 21 Μαρτίου 2018, http://www.kathimerini.com.cy/gr/politiki/sto-deipno-tis-synodoy-arxigwn-kratwn-ta-themata-tis-toyrkias, Η Καθημερινή, "Δεν αρκεί στους Τ/κ το οικονομικό μερίδιο της ΑΟΖ», 19 Μαρτίου 2018, http://www.kathimerini.com.cy/gr/politiki/den-arkei-stoys-t-k-to-oikonomiko-meridio-tis-aoz,
[315] M Lee & The Associated Press, "Pompeo: Despite tensions, Turkey remains a key US ally", *Military Times,* 5/8/2018,:https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2018/08/05/pompeo-despite-tensions-turkey-remains-a-key-us-ally/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=ebb%2006.08.18&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief

RoC. Therefore, in 2003, the year when it was signed the Accession Treaty of Cyprus to the EU, this was the turning point from Republic's long-term strategic choice of NAM to alignment. This milestone will highlight Cyprus' strategic preferences and policies in these two periods, ante-EU and post-EU accession.

This thesis purports to present the strategic choices and outcomes in every period intertwined with the regional as well as the international developments. Once again international system and regional subsystem will be the catalysts for presenting and explaining phenomena of that times. However, in order to comprehend the roots of the conflict and the motivations behind the decision makers' strategy, it is imperative to highlight the factor leadership. Understanding a leadership's policies will contribute to a better explanation of the "why", "when" and "how" their strategies have been chosen as well as the efficiency of these policies to confront a revisionist Turkey and serve Cyprus' national interest. The evaluation of Cyprus' strategy will show: If the NAM or alignment serves best its national interest compared to the type of the international system that it operates within; the impact of the international system and the great powers' involvement intertwined with regional developments. What were the strategic options for Cyprus in every period of time? The examination of the international system in conjunction with regional and domestic variables will prove if there is a continuity in its strategy due to international system's limitations, or if Cyprus' ongoing occupation is a result of unfortunate strategic choices.

To achieve the aforementioned, the periodization emphasizes on the examination of the survival of the small state by placing under scrutiny the strategic environment of the following periods:

1.   From independence till the 1974 Turkish invasion;

2.   From 1974 and the illegal Turkish occupation of the island to the EU accession of the Republic of Cyprus;

3.   Cyprus' strategic U-turn. From the post-Annan plan impasse to the formation of its strategic cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond

The Republic of Cyprus struggles against the invaded power, Turkey. Hence, a thorough inquiry into the perspectives and perceptions of the great powers involved, meaning the USA, Great Britain, Turkey, the former USSR and today's Russia, as well as an examination of the

outcomes of the RoC's struggle at the UN and the EU, will further shed light on the impact of the great powers' strategic choices.

3.1. From independence to the illegal Turkish invasion and occupation of the Republic of Cyprus in 1974

"The anatomy of a national tragedy is never simple. The wounded national pride and the bitterness of the unjust end of a fair case often blur the mind, preventing the objective analysis of the facts and the unprejudiced assessment of our actions and our policy. And yet, in our attempt to avoid our responsibilities, we are often looking, consciously in the worst case and unintentionally to the best, beyond our national borders for the causes of our disaster."[316]
Glafkos Clerides

The following unit aims at illustrating the events that led to the illegal Turkish invasion and occupation of the island. A twofold explanation will be followed; first, an analysis of the international as well as regional developments will be showcased to extract conclusions on the impact of the international system on a small state's strategy. The explanation will exemplify the structural restrictions, the possibility of exploiting regional environment as well as the regional limitations at the period under examination. In other words, the international system will be the compass to initially comprehend the limitations imposed on the small state of Cyprus amidst the heat of the Cold War. How far great powers' interference went so as to aid Turkey's designation on invading and occupying the island? Second, an examination of the domestic-level variables is needed in order to comprehend the impact of domestic politics on the shaping of a state's grand strategy and simultaneously the challenges and limitations that induces in a small state. In this first period, what should needs to be answered is how Cyprus handled the seismic waves of the developments that led to the disasterous and irreversible division of the RoC.

[316] Clerides, p.17

3.1.1. The strategic environment

The supremacy of Realpolitik

"You've got it wrong son. There's only one solution to this island, and that's partition"
George Ball, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State[317]

The first line that a reader encounters when it comes to the "Cyprus Problem" is the division of the RoC as an outcome of the failed coup of the Greek junta against President Makarios. The coup gave Turkey the excuse to invade and occupy the 36,2% of the territory, while they represented only a 18% of the population and a 12% of the territory. Hence, the Turkish forces occupied the one third of the island and enforced partition as a response to this coup. According to the Turkish forces the invasion is called "The Cyprus Peace Operation". Claiming to act under article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee, the Turkish armed forces staged a full-scale invasion against Cyprus. The aim was "to end years long religious and ethnic cleansing of Turkish existence on the island, and in the face of a coup d'état aimed at destroying Cyprus in order to achieve annexation of the island to Greece."[318]

The Turkish narrative is far from true. First of all, the "Cyprus Problem" is more than an ethnic conflict. Second, the Turkish invasion was in violation of all rules of international legality, including the UN Charter. Turkey apart from war crimes, followed a policy of "ethnic cleansing"; forcible mass displacement; deportation; expulsion, and forced evacuations of persons from their homes; detention of both combatants and civilians in concentration camps and elsewhere; torture and execution of prisoners and innocent civilians; murders in cold blood of civilians; mass rapes; displacement of the G/Cs thus creating the unsolved problem of refugees and the surpass of their property, and finally a long list of missing persons.

The Cyprus issue has six main protagonists: the Turks, the Hellenes, the G/Cs and T/Cs the Americans and the British. Since its inception is encircled by the intervention of various international and regional actors as well as by significant events that took place at that time

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[317] Guardian, 2.4.88, as quoted in B O'Malley & I Craig, *The Cyprus conspiracy: America, espionage and the Turkish invasion*, IB Tauris, 2001.

[318] Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Meaningful Anniversary Of The Cyprus Peace Operation Turkish Parliament Proclaims Solidarity With TRNC And Demands Equal Treatment For The Two States On The Island", 15 July 1999, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/meaningful-anniversary-of-the-cyprus-peace-operation-turkish-parliament-proclaims-solidarity-with-trnc.en.mfa

and prompted superpowers' antagonism in the Cold War era. The period from independence to the Turkish invasion is provided for an illustrative explanation of the almighty systemic restrictions. Cyprus found itself in the middle not only of the superpowers' confrontation but also amid severe regional developments that shook the regional balance of power and threatened the power equilibrium of the two rivals, the USA and the USSR, in the important region of Eastern Mediterranean. The examination of this period under the light of systemic and regional developments is a sine qua non in order to comprehend the limitations imposed upon the strategy of a small state.

In this section it will be presented the role that the great powers of that time played and their posture towards the Turkish invasion. How the Cold War and the superpowers' competition contributed to the shaping of the "Cyprus Problem"? What regional developments prompted the Turkish invasion? How the great powers interference shaped the strategy of the small state of Cyprus? How decisive was the role of leadership? Did the NAM contribute to Cyprus' national interest?

The RoC presents to the IR scholar a turbulent example of a small state. Being located at the crossroads of three continents: Europe, Africa and Asia, Cyprus was —and still is- an important passage to the Middle East and to the Gulf. What is least known is the importance of Cyprus as a center for intelligence and of electronic spying since the Cold War.

3.1.1.a. The Anglo-American perspective

The role of the ex-colonial power, Great Britain, and the USA is pivotal for Cyprus' division and occupation. Mixed interests provoked a crisis intentionally that ended in the Cypriot tragedy. The unfolding of the events from the anti-colonization to the invasion will answer the aforesaid issues.

Cyprus became independent in 1960 after a prolonged insurgency, the anti-colonial struggle of EOKA. For long, Great Britain denied Cyprus to self-determination because the former wanted to preserve its military interests on the island. In the midst of the Cold War, the under-examination period was challenging for the British-American relations that were fluctuating from cooperation to competition in the oil-rich Middle East. Regional and

international developments changed the status quo. The turbulent period that begun in 1956 marked by the Suez crisis, impacted upon the Cypriot fate. Great powers' competition, the Greek-Turkish rivalry, an ethnic conflict on the island and an array of plans for the solution of the Cyprus' problem portray the events.

The Suez crisis placed Cyprus in the center of the British interests. Europe relied heavily on the Middle East oil which was transported to Europe via the Suez Canal and hence the Mediterranean. The fear of Soviet expansion during the Cold War further threatened the British presence in the region and Turkey's role as an impediment was crucial. After the British withdrawal from their colonies, the newly established RoC was pivotal for the British interests in the region. Britain lost its dominant role in the Middle East while its economy was dependent on America. The island of Aphrodite became the center of logistics, military support and intelligence for the British.

British efforts to present the Cyprus problem as an ethnic conflict started during the EOKA anti-colonial struggle. It was the time that Britain realized that Turkey can be used to serve British interests by exploiting Turkish opposition to *Enosis* (Union). Turkish insurgents were supported by the British to combat the EOKA forces. The aim was to provoke an intercommunal conflict that would justify British arguments on maintaining Cyprus under British rule so that a bloodshed between the G/Cs and the T/Cs would be avoided. Soon the dilemma division or colony was about to be set by the British.[319]

Regional challenges as the Arab-Israeli conflict threatened British supremacy and its oil interests. In order to defend these interests and its allies and to hinder Soviet influence, Britain needed a base for its operations. In addition, British declining power in the Middle East created a vacuum of power that had to be filled by the USA. Hence, the main British concern was to secure its military presence in the region thus preserving the Western national interests.

Great Britain was in fact undermining Cyprus' integrity to serve its own interests since 1882 when Britain as the ruler, decided that in the legislature body the G/Cs and the T/Cs should participate equally, despite the fact that the T/Cs were a minority. Obviously, the Britons played the card of "divide and rule" to neutralize the supremacy on population of the Greeks and the *Enosis* movement. Long before the Turkish invasion, Great Britain put effort on playing off Ankara against Athens. At that time, the idea of partition "would not arise until the

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[319] Clerides, pp.26-27

island was no longer needed as a base".[320] Nevertheless, the T/Cs publicly were crying for Turkish military presence on the island since 1957, when the Turkish National Assembly unanimously adopted a decision that was stating partition as the sole, just solution to the Cyprus problem.[321] Actually partition, *taksim,* was indeed evoked by the Turks as an excuse to reject peace plans, as it happened in the Hugh Foot plan, in 1958. In short, while British power was in decline, Great Britain placed a high value on Cyprus due to latter's strategic importance to NATO.

When Harold Macmillan came to power his school of thought supported the plan to divide the island between the G/Cs and the T/Cs. A divided island that would include a Turkish territory would serve the British interests according to the supporters of the Macmillan Plan.[322] The Macmillan Plan was the sequel of the Sir Hugh Foot's Plan, the Governor who replaced Sir John Harding and proposed a peace plan in 1958. Foot failed to agree with Makarios on a system of self-government. The British Government decided to proceed unilaterally. Consequently, Prime Minister MacMillan presented a Cyprus plan to the House of Commons in 1958. The aforementioned proposed plans forced the G/C leadership to realize the new realities imposed by the international system and the great powers' needs. Makarios speeded up to announce his support on independency thus changing forever Cyprus' previous preference on self-determination-*Enosis.* Meanwhile, Ankara was steadily aiming at committing London to succumb to its preference which was partition, the only acceptable solution to the problem for the Turks.[323] Cyprus also had to be kept away from the Soviet influence. Hence, the British policy was fluctuating between Athens and Ankara, supporting either the former or the latter, depending on the British interests. The well-known strategy of

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[320] British Cabinet Minutes CM 56 9C, 12.12.56 as quoted in O'Malley & Craig,. p.65.
[321] Clerides, p.65
[322] In short, the Macmillan Plan proposed the creation of a state that would be governed by the partnership of three governors: a Greek, a Turk, a Briton. In its essence the G/C community was equated politically and at a state level with the T/C minority for the first time in Cyprus' history. Fundamental aim, to safeguard British sovereignty over the two bases. Makarios, while being in exile, characterized the Plan as a brutal violation of justice, immoral and totally unacceptable. Turkey rejected the Macmillan Plan on grounds that partition was the safe plan to protect the Turkish Cypriots. However, Denktash shortly rephrased and accepted it. O'Malley & Craig, p.62., Clerides, p.69.
[323] FCO, 51/353, 3 September 1974, in Ν Χριστοδουλίδης, *Τα σχέδια λύσης του Κυπριακού (1948-1978)*, Αθήνα, Καστανιώτης, 2009, p.126

"divide and rule" was the core of the British planning in the region. After British waning, Washington took the lead.[324]

The American posture towards the Cypriot struggle for independence and *Enosis* with Greece should be analyzed in the frame of the US' multilateral relations with Great Britain, Greece and Turkey. The US policy was a pro-British, seeking to avoid not only clashes in the region but also to contain Soviet expansion. For the USA, Cyprus was considered a trilateral problem that included British-Greek-Turkish interlocutors. It certainly endangered regional stability and in combination with the importance of Turkey's location, pressure on Greece was higher than on Turkey. The US undertook the handling of the Cyprus issue in the mid of the Cold War, when British power was declining and the fear of Soviet's expansion in the hot waters of the Mediterranean was growing. Finally, the US was firmly opposed against any internationalization of the Cyprus issue fearing of any formal inclusion of the Soviets in the talks.[325]

In 1963-4, a deadly ethnic conflict erupted on the island, after Makarios's attempt to revise the constitution. Turkey exploited the unfortunate circumstances to once again proclaim partition as the ideal solution for the protection of the T/Cs, after threatening to intervene. The American and British role was definitive. Both seemed to be neutral on Turkish attempts and were skeptical on Makarios relations with the Soviets and Nasser that could further exploit the situation and create chaos in NATO. Turkey repeatedly stated its wish to secure a base on the island and the Americans were informed of a possible Turkish aggression. Nevertheless, no one was willing to stop Turkey but rather to satisfy its wish.[326] In 1964, President Lyndon

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[324] "The Americans tried to scare the Greeks into making concessions. The American Ambassador in Athens, George Allen, told Greek Foreign Minister Evangelos Averoff that there were indications that Britain has decided to pull out of Cyprus, and would leave Greece and Turkey to divide the island between them." O'Malley & I Craig, p.71.

[325] P Lymberis, "Greek-Turkish Crisis since 1955.Implications for Greek-Turkish Conflict Management", Naval Post Graduate School, Thesis, March 1997, Monterey California., p.24-25

[326] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey - Office of the Historian, 83. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v16/d83, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey - Office of the Historian, 87. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v16/d87, "As is usually case, much of foregoing repetitive and even punch-line re time for persuasion being passed and preparedness intervene by force was reformulation of standard theme. However, when this latter evaluated in terms of emphasis on strategic importance of Cyprus during Fulbright talks and of insistence that GOT could not allow Cyprus slip away as had other coastal islands, regardless of whether Cyprus became unitary state or devolved to Greece, there would seem to be strong indication that policy decision has been reached or is in making in accord with which GOT will insist on some form of Turkish presence on Cyprus or right of custodianship as essential ingredient in any solution involving abrogation of present treaties. As of now this is

Johnson telephoned the Turkish prime minister Ismet Inonu and warned him that the US would not intervene in favor of Turkey in case the USSR intervened in favor of Cyprus.

The need of Turkey to protect its southern flank prompted Turkish attitude toward partition. That said, it should be mentioned that long before Cyprus' independence, Turkey favored a dynamic solution to the Cyprus Problem and partition seemed the finest one. When British showed signs to withdraw from the area, Turkey demanded a base on the island. Ten years before the invasion, in 1964, the USA's concern was how to avoid a Turkish invasion and a subsequent Greco-Turkish war between two NATO allies. Turkey's will to use military force to invade Cyprus was stated clearly and the USA was putting great diplomatic effort to de-escalate the crisis, to prevent Turks from invading the island and to prohibit the Communists from exploiting the situation in Cyprus.[327] However, the US' struggle to prevent a Turkish invasion had consequences on Greece to concede to a reconciliatory formula. The USA by no means was willing to go to war against Turkey if the latter invaded.[328] In the risk of a possible intra-alliance conflict that would also damage NATO's image, the West had to be prepared in a possible Turkish invasion.

The USA as well as Great Britain seemed to had planned a detailed outcome of a possible Turkish invasion; from areas that Turkey would occupy on the island to how the USA will negotiate with all parts involved to de-escalate the conflict and thus avoid a Greek-Turkish war. The arrival of the UN and the British troops persuaded Turkey to delay the invasion. From December 1963 to August 1964, the USA managed to avert Turkish aggressions at least on five occasions. Meanwhile the "controlled invasion envisaged in the US contingency plan" was also postponed.[329] It should be mentioned, though, that while Turkey was supporting a division,

still somewhat dim shape emerging from mist but its outline has seemed to have become increasingly clear of late. If this correct and if--if such policy rigidly held, it is obvious that certain mixes which have been tentatively considered to meet Turkish requirements would no longer fill bill. Admittedly, this still somewhat "iffy" but trend seems increasingly strong." 43. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xvi/4757.htm

[327] I must call to your attention, also, Mr. Prime Minister, the obligations of NATO. There can be no question in your mind that a Turkish intervention in Cyprus would lead to a military engagement between Turkish and Greek forces. Secretary of State Rusk declared at the recent meeting of the Ministerial Council of NATO in The Hague that war between Turkey and Greece must be considered as 'literally unthinkable, 54. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xvi/4757.htm

[328] If Turks moved there would be no question of stopping them with Sixth Fleet or other military means, because we would not fight our allies. 70. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom. https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xvi/4758.htm, 75. Memorandum of Conversation, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xvi/4758.htm

[329] O'Malley & I Craig, p.98-100, 119.

Greece was looking for *Enosis* and Makarios supported the creation of an axis with Moscow. Thus, Makarios was a threat to the Anglo-American interests due to his pro-Soviet posture. In 1964, Makarios firmly favored the idea that Cyprus should appeal to the UNSC. His decision met Turkish threats to invade. Britain felt that it had to defend its critical bases on the island. Both the US and the UK were well informed on the Turkish designations to invade and there was a high probability of war.[330] British government stated clear that in case of a Turkish invasion, British forces will be withdrawn in the British Bases and Britain by no means shall defend Cyprus.[331]

The failure of the London summit impacted positively on preventing a Turkish invasion and paved the way to the UNSC. While both sides could not come to an agreement and despite the late efforts of Dean Acheson and George Ball, the West was becoming more and more agitated. Western posture towards Turkey was focused on latter's strategic location since it was a barrier for any Soviet aspirations in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. The State Department's declassified documents are revealing on how the US handled cold-bloodedly the case and exploited the situation and the enmity between Turkey and Greece. The American negotiations included the Ball plan and the Acheson plans. Both were rejected by the G/Cs. The former designed a solution based on the geographic separation of the two communities while the Acheson's were rejected because of the provision for the establishment of three T/C cantons over which they would have full administrative control and the establishment of a large sovereign military base in the Karpas in perpetuity. Needless to mention that the military Turkish presence was suffice to instigate hostile actions on behalf of Turkey, since Turkish strategy of expansionism had been crystallized even before the establishment of the RoC.

From 1964 and onwards, the triangle West-Greece-Turkey was heated by the Cold War developments that compelled the West to adopt a more efficient strategy. It refused to sell arms to Greece due to its fears of a strong Turkish reaction. This choice deteriorated the situation since it impelled the G/Cs to seek arms from the East bloc.[332] To this it should be

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[330] Department of State, United States of America, Office of the Historian, "Memorandum of Conference With President Johnson", Washington, January 25, 1964, 6:30 p.m., https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v16/d3, Department of State, United States of America, Office of the Historian, "155. Memorandum for the Record", Washington, September 8, 1964., https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v16/d155
[331] Clerides, p.321-22.
[332] O'Malley & I Craig, p.121.

added Britain's economic problems that were constraining from its defense interests worldwide. The budget cuts that followed impelled Britain to reassess its strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Meanwhile, an array of regional events as the Six Days War, the Soviet built-up of a nuclear arsenal, the closure of the Suez Canal and its implications on the losses of the Middle East oil deepened the crisis. The Americans wanted Britain to continue upholding its role in the region since both powers had a special relationship, especially in intelligence sharing and defense. Facilities on Cyprus at that time were crucial for the West for obvious reasons. Meanwhile the Soviets were preserving a neutral posture since their objective was to keep Cyprus away from NATO.

A few years before the Turkish invasion, the heat of Cold War accelerated the power game. The posture that both the USA and the USSR adopted was decisive for the fate of the island of Aphrodite. In the 1970s, the Soviets managed to surpass US' supremacy in ICBMs. Thus, Cyprus' location became critical for the Americans to monitor this missile race. Turkey's location was valued high as well. These parameters prompted Turkey's aggressive behavior. Turkey consistently constituted an imminent threat of a war for Greece. The aforementioned in conjunction with Greece's unfortunate domestic developments, the military Junta that was still in power and its decisions on domestic and foreign policy, further complicated the situation. The latter presented a critical factor that prompted the USA to favor Turkey so as to de-escalate the crisis and to avoid any war break out. In addition to that, the breach in the US-Great Britain relations also affected the Western posture towards the "Cyprus Problem"; on the one hand, the omnipotent Henry Kissinger, on the other, regional developments like the Yom Kippur war that pinpointed the importance of monitoring and delicate dealing with the Middle East outbreaks. Hence, many European countries and simultaneously NATO partners denied the Americans the use of military bases on their soil to help Israel during the Yom Kippur War. This move further angered the head of the US decision-making foreign policy, Henry Kissinger. Tensions between the USSR and the USA in the Eastern Mediterranean, the British reluctance to help the Americans and the former's denial to use British facilities on the island were decisive in the breach of their bilateral relations.[333]

Cyprus' fate was undoubtedly determined by the great powers as well as by one man, Henry Kissinger, especially in the period before the invasion where USA, not only let a coup to

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[333] B O'Malley & I Craig, p.140-55.

take place on Cyprus, but also turned a blind eye when Turkey invaded a non-aligned state and fired against two allies, the other two guarantors, Greece and Britain.

Great powers' interests prevailed days before the Turkish invasion and while battles were taking over the island because of the Coup. The fear of a regional uncontrolled war, compelled first Great Britain and later USA to act. While Britain's position was –initially-to affirm the legitimacy of Makarios' government, the almighty Kissinger was inert. Washington did not pressure the military junta to back down after their coup d'état against Makarios. British and American motions diverged at that time.[334] Meanwhile, the Cypriot government called the United Nations to order a ceasefire and prevent outside military forces from intervening in the country's affairs. That call fell into the void. "The peace force cannot get involved in the internal affairs of one of the communities," Waldheim, the UN Secretary, stated. But it was obvious that this UN position had all over the fingerprints of the USA and Great Britain that did not act at all and declared that more facts are needed in order to resolve.[335] At last, the Soviets that Makarios had for long put hope on, were ready to cooperate with Turkey in defending the integrity and independence of Cyprus and its legal government.[336]

3.1.2. Turkish policy on Cyprus. Planning the invasion

The purpose of this section is to unveil the Turkish designations on invading and occupying Cyprus. The Turkish invasion of 1974 was neither unintended and impulsive nor a non-designed operation veiled by peaceful intentions. Unravelling Turkish strategic thinking from 1950 to 1974, combined with the great powers' intentions and objectives, the unfolded strategies and decision-making of the aforementioned actors will reveal how the island of Aphrodite underwent an ethnic cleansing that changed it substantially.

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[334] The New York Times, "Cyprus Responsibility", July, 17 1974, http://www.nytimes.com/1974/07/17/archives/cyprus-responsibility.html?_r=0 , and B O'Malley & I Craig, .p.174.
[335] The New York Times, "U.N. Council Hears Plea on Cyprus and Adjourns", 17 July 1974, http://www.nytimes.com/1974/07/17/archives/un-council-hears-plea-on-cyprus-and-adjourns-wider-conflict.html
[336] The New York Times, "Soviet Reported, in Offer to Turks", July, 17 1974, http://www.nytimes.com/1974/07/17/archives/soviet-reported-in-offer-to-turks-described-as-ready-to-help-in.html

The island of Cyprus was under the Ottoman rule from 1570 for three centuries and until it was ceded to Britain in 1878. The interest of the British had to do with the British imperial policy and its efforts to preserve the sea route to India. Under the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), Turkey waived all its rights in Cyprus. By 1970, the ethnic Turks represented approximately a 18% of the total population of the island. The T/Cs were descendants of the occupied armed forces of the Ottoman empire (1571-1878) as well as settlers that inhabited the island at that period. It is important to mention that the T/Cs' desire was to remain under British crown as a colony rather than become independent. Their percentage was inadequate to demand union with Turkey; the T/C population was scattered in many villages and there was no large area inhabited exclusively and massively by the T/Cs.[337]

When Cyprus gained its independency, the newborn Republic was an outcome of an "unplanned pregnancy". The G/Cs were fighting for *Enosis* while the T/Cs for a union with Turkey or at least partition, *taksim,* between Greece and Turkey. An independent Republic at the time of the anti-colonial struggle and before was not in the attentions and scope neither of the G/Cs nor of the T/Cs. In addition, Britain, eager as it was to safeguard its bases on this crucial area, was pressing the two sides to compromise.

To analyze the Cyprus conundrum, one needs to understand the importance of the geographical position of Cyprus especially from a military point of view; from operations and surveillance of the Middle East, to its position as a crossroad of Europe with Asia, Africa and the Arab world. All the aforementioned resulted in the creation of an undesired Republic.[338]

In the words of Ahmet Davutoglu:

"Cyprus, which holds a central position worldwide in terms of almost equal distance from Europe, Asia and Africa, is along with Crete on an axis where the water arteries intersect. Cyprus, which is located between the Straits that separate Asia from Europe, and the Suez Canal, which separates Asia from Africa, also houses a fixed base and an aircraft carrier capable of controlling the Persian Gulf and the Caspian

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[337] CIA, "Impact of partition on the population and economy of Cyprus", *CIA Document Services Branch*, August 1974, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86T00608R000200230003-3.pdf, Clerides, p.26
[338] See Clerides

Sea, and the waterways of Aden and Hormuz connecting Eurasia and Africa. One cannot overlook the strategic position of Cyprus ....".[339]

Ahmet Davutoglu's views, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, on his book "The Strategic Depth. The International Posture of Turkey" do not differ from other officials' statements on the importance of integrating Cyprus as part of Turkey since the 1960s. Long before the 1963 events, prominent politics or academics stated on the importance of Cyprus to Turkey. From Ataturk and Zorlu to the Foreign Minister of Turkey during the events of 1963 that named Cyprus as an "extension of continental Turkey", and finally Gunes, also a Turkish Foreign Minister during the 80s, the following statement on the Turkish invasion as peace operation is indicative:

> "Many states, to a certain extent because if suits their interest, want to
> see the Cyprus problem mainly as our desire to protect the Turkish
> community on the island. Whereas the actual problem is the security of
> 45 million Turks in the motherland together with the Turks in the island
> and the maintenance of the balance in the Middle East."[340]

Turkish atrocities have their starting point long before the London-Zurich Accords. TMT, a Turkish terrorist organization that acted in the island was aiming at Cyprus' partition from the 50s. Provocative terrorist acts targeting the G/Cs as accountable while presenting the T/Cs minority as victims of the G/Cs menace. TMT did not hesitate to murder even T/Cs that refused to join the partitionist movement or were favoring cooperation with the G/Cs. The United Nations reports clearly recognize that "The Turkish Cypriot leaders have adhered to a rigid stand against any measures which might involve having members of the two communities live and work together...".[341]

All Turkish strategic moves aimed at the creation of an independent state in Cyprus, before the TRNC's declaration of 1983. The Turks were aware of the Western designations on

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[339] Νταβούτογλου Αχμέτ, *Το στρατηγικό βάθος. Η διεθνής θέση της Τουρκίας,* μετάφραση Ραπτόπουλος Νικ., επιστημονική επιμέλεια Σαρρής Νεοκλ., 12η έκδοση, Αθήνα, Ποιότητα, 2010, σελ.274., (Quote translated in English by me)
[340] Kemal Ataturk stated "Pay attention to Cyprus, this island is important for us". Zorlu, at the Tripartite Conference on Cyprus in August-September 1955, said "...The importance of Cyprus to Turkey does not arise from a single cause; it is a necessity which emanates from the exigencies of history, geography, economy and military strategy, from the right to existence and security, which is the most sacred of every state, in short, from the very nature of things." All statements can be found in *Turkish Policy on Cyprus and Efforts to Solve the Cyprus Problem,* Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, Nicosia, December 1991, p.6.
[341] Report S/6426, para.106, 10.06.1965

establishing an independent Cyprus so that the British bases will serve NATO's interests, and since partition did not seem feasible, they acknowledged the creation of an independent island with guarantees as the best option. During the Radcliffe Constitutional proposals, the Turks set on the negotiating table their demand on political equality and federation as governance model.[342] Furthermore the Turks kept evoking the British statement of December 19th, 1956, on exercising separately their still right to self-determination.[343] In 1964, Rauf Denktash before the Foreign Office demanded a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. Days before the operation Attila II, in 1974, Denktash repeated his demand in Geneva.[344] Great Britain not only was aware of the Turkish designations, but they were actually designed by the British to protect their interest on the island. On February 13th, 1975, the "Turkish Federated State of Kibris" was declared which was the continuation of the "provisional Turkish Administration" that was established also with Turkish aid in 1967.[345] The decision was condemned by the UNSC.[346]

3.1.3. The Republic of Cyprus' conundrum

In 1960, the island of Cyprus was finally a Republic. After approximately 800 years under successive and continuous domination of the Venetians, Ottomans and Britons, it indeed maintained a strong Greek identity. The Greek language, the Greek Orthodox church and culture were not eradicated despite the foreign presence. The treaty of Guarantee[347] established Greece as a guarantor of the RoC, thus resulting in embodying every development in the island as a part of its national security and foreign policy. Moreover, the G/Cs themselves

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[342] Χριστοδουλίδης, p.100

[343] Χριστοδουλίδης, p.114.

[344] Π Ν Βανέζης, *Γλαύκος Κληρίδης. Δεκάχρονη Προεδρία (1993-2003). Αγωνιώδεις προσπάθειες Λύσης του Κυπριακού*, Εν Τύποις, Λευκωσία, 2006, 134, Clerides, pp. 54-55.

[345] The Zurich London agreements strongly prohibit any secessionist movement. *Turkish Policy on Cyprus and Efforts to Solve the Cyprus Problem,* Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, Nicosia, December 1991, p.16

[346] UNSCR, Resolution 367 (1975) of 12 March 1975, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/367

[347] United Nations "No. 5475. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Greece and Turkey and Cyprus. Treaty of Guarantee", 16 August 1960, United Nations-Treaty Series, 1960, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CY%20GR%20TR_600816_Treaty%20of%20Guarantee.pdf

were deeply devoted to the Hellenic values and they determined themselves as Hellenes, too, despite the fact that *Enosis* was out of the frame.[348]

Turkish plans over Cyprus were exposed long before Cypriot independence. Hence, a prudent leader should not had been surprised against any Turkish designation to avert the status quo. British declassified documents note that Archbishop Makarios had been in favor of NATO since 1966. In a confidential document dated December 15th, 1966, the British had been informed directly from Makarios himself that "his government would give NATO a base, for stationing troops other than Turkish".[349]

The Greek-G/C relation till the invasion is a hot potato. The Cyprus issue has been treated by Greek governments as an issue highly influenced by international and regional developments.[350] Structural limitations upon the Greek state were so strong that the Cypriot struggle from independence till the Turkish invasion was a foreign policy headache for successive Greek administrations. That said, the Cyprus problem was not only an international problem but also a national problem of the Hellenes in Greece and Cyprus. Conflicting interests between the leaderships of the two states in conjunction with heavy international pressure enhanced the emergence to solve the issue. The unfamiliar dimensions of the issue encompass national and international aspects that will be analyzed broadly in the following units and they will be highlighted in the assessment of Cypriot domestic politics in parallel with the Greek handling of the Cyprus issue.

The Anglo-American interference before the Cypriot independence complicated the Greek-G/C relations. Britain was putting effort to balance the conflict between the Turks and the Greeks by proposing solutions as the Harding proposals of 1955 that divided the decision makers in Greece and Cyprus. The failed talks led to unsuccessful Greece's appeal to the UN (1954-55) aiming at internationalizing the Cypriot struggle for self-determination.[351]

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[348] Ν Κρανιδιώτης, Οι *διεθνείς διαστάσεις του Κυπριακού,* Αθήνα, Θεμέλιο, 1983, p.13.
[349] Φ Αργυρού, «Ήθελε ένταξη σε ΝΑΤΟ-ΕΟΚ», *Η Σημερινή,* 30 Δεκεμβρίου 2014,
http://www.sigmalive.com/simerini/politics/193479/ithele-entaksi-se-natoeok
[350] Till 1922 the foreign stance of Greece towards Cyprus was part of the Great Idea (Megáli Idéa). Soon after the Asia Minor catastrophe, the Greek foreign policy changed and the Cyprus problem was addressed in a political-economic context. In 1952, when Greece became a member of NATO, the Cypriot issue was further perplexed in the heat of the Cold war since the Greek foreign policy was encroached in the American agenda and its aspirations in the Eastern Mediterranean. Ν Κρανιδιώτης, Οι *διεθνείς διαστάσεις του Κυπριακού,* pp.13-15.
[351] The talks between Archbishop Makarios and the Governor of Cyprus Field-Marshall Sir John Harding occurred between October 1955-February 1956. The British formula contained an indirect recognition of the right of self-determination and in the interim a wide measure of self-government. Makarios came close to accept the

The Radcliffe proposals[352] had the same fate as those of Harding. By the time the Zurich-London agreements were signed, the Cyprus issue became officially a problem to the Greek foreign policy that needed to be solved as soon as possible, instead of an issue affecting the Greek security and endangering its national interest. After independence, the division between the RoC and the Hellenic Republic became more obvious, especially when Cyprus took a series of decisions as: joining the NAM, the 1963 thirteen amendments and the earlier T/C attempt to control five of the biggest cities in the Republic. At this turbulent period, Athens and Nicosia held diverged opinions on how to handle the upheavals that erupted in the island. Meanwhile, the T/Cs were fully controlled by Turkey. The Greek-G/C divergence was fatal for the 1964 negotiations, since it left room for greater external interference that determined the outcome.

Regional and international developments were not in favor of Cyprus, too. The Cuba crisis and the rising Soviet presence in the Mediterranean as in Egypt, were another political headache for the West. The whole turbulence brought Hellenes and Elladites opposed, since President Makarios wanted to amend the Constitution while George Papandreou the Greek prime minister, was in favor of a joining handling of the crisis. The outcome, Turkey was threating to invade Cyprus and the Greek-Turkish relations were deteriorating.[353] The escalating crisis which also included Turkish Air force strikes and napalm bombardments of military and civilian targets in Tyliria, in August 1964, drove Cyprus to ask for Soviet aid.

Harding plan. However, the British formula was not only complex and vague but also did not provide the wanted security that if being accepted, the colonial power would follow a policy of eventual self-determination to the island via constitutional developments. After the collapse of the Makarios-Harding talks, Britain started to propose the right to self-determination separately for the G/C and the T/C thus introducing the idea of division. Finally, division was on the negotiating table between the Turks and the Britons in case Britain was forced to withdraw from the island. Cf. Clerides, pp.30-44, E Χατζηβασιλείου, *Κυπριακό, 1878-1960: Η Συνταγματική Πτυχή*, Αθήνα, Ελληνικά Γράμματα, 1998, A Karyos, "EOKA and Enosis in 1955-59: Motive and Aspiration Reconsidered", London School of Economics and Political Science. June 2009, http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/4th_ Symposium/PAPERS_PPS/HISTORY II/KARYOS.pdf

[352] The Radcliffe Report presented recommendations for the Constitution. "Very careful arrangements have been devised to protect the interests of all communities." Partition was amongst them as an eventual option "in a such mixed population". Still the exercise of self-determination was open and vague. As Radcliffe put it: "When the international and strategic situation permits, and provided that self-government is working satisfactorily, Her Majesty's Government will be ready to review the question of the application of self-determination." Despite the positive provisions for the Turks and the T/C, Turkey rejected it because it refused to accepted the creation of a unitary state. Cyprus (Lord Radcliffe's Proposals), HC Deb 19 December 1956 vol 562 cc1267-79, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1956/dec/19/cyprus-lord-radcliffes-proposals

[353] N Κρανιδιώτης, *Οι διεθνείς διαστάσεις του Κυπριακού*, p.18-20.

The West had to defend its interests in the island. Thus, it proposed the Duncan Sandy and the George Ball Plan. The plan supported a geographical separation of the two communities via removal of populations and the abolition of mixed villages. Furthermore, NATO would be engaged intensively through an intergovernmental London-based committee that would provide political guidance, without any participation of the RoC in the aforementioned committee.[354] Makarios' acuteness encouraged him to go to the UNSC to demand for a fair treatment despite the heavy pressure from the Undersecretary of State George Ball, that blatantly confessed to Makarios that "the US would do absolutely nothing to avert a Turkish Invasion on the Island."[355] Resolution 186 was a win. The UNSC recognized the "Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order, to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus;"[356] After that, Makarios denounced the agreements of Alliance and Guarantee as invalid.

President Makarios tried to manipulate the East-West confrontation in favor of the Republic. However, it must be understood that the Soviets were never resolute on aiding Cyprus despite the general misperception on the USSR's genuine interest. Cyprus' decision to play off the two Cold War's rivals was not successful. The USSR knowing that the RoC was assigning to it a balancing role, exploited Cyprus' weak position and did not hesitate to play off Nicosia against Ankara. Despite Soviet support on Makarios, Kremlin did not conceal its support on Ankara's efforts to achieve the establishment of a Federal Cyprus. The USSR's main concern was Ankara. Ankara was considered an important element of its foreign policy while Soviet concern on Cyprus had to do with low politics as trade, education, culture, and to safeguard that the RoC would remain unaligned and without NATO affiliations.[357]

The Acheson plans were another apple of discord between the Greek and the Cypriot government. The first draft of his ideas was declined by both governments, especially the Cypriot that opposed any land granting. When the second draft was submitted, Turkey was the one that rejected it.

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[354] M Kontos, N Panayiotides & H Alexandrou, eds, *Great power politics in Cyprus: Foreign interventions and domestic perceptions*. Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014., p.71.
[355] Ibid., p.71.
[356] Press and Information Office, Resolution 186, (1964) https://www.pio.gov.cy/en/ψήφισμα-186-(1964).html
[357] M Kontos, N Panayiotides & H Alexandrou, pp.87-89.

The US diplomat by proposing his plan was aiming at calming the tense in the region. Should the plan had been accepted, it remains questionable that it would had succeeded in restoring the peace in the island since its provisions in conjunction with the Turkish aggression, were favoring Turkish expansionism.[358] The Acheson Plans were a strong indication that the Cyprus issue was in the hands of the Americans. Fearing of a spread of Communism in the Eastern Mediterranean, the US was actively involved. Thus, it proposed the division of the island so that the Greeks that wished for *Enosis,* would take a large part while a small but critical location would be given to the Turks. The pressure upon the Hellenes was enormous, especially after the warming of the RoC-USSR relations and the arms sales agreement to Cyprus (1966- the Czechoslovakian weapons issue).

The Americans did not end up their effort to influence the Hellenes and persuade them to agree on a US-inspired plan. Thus, after the Acheson Plans, Galo Plaza was appointed mediator in Cyprus (1964–1965). In his 66 pages report to the Secretary General, he underlined that the constitution suffered from many fundamental defects while he noted that the T/Cs, on the political level, favored the creation of two separate communal areas within they would enjoy self-government in all matters falling outside federal affairs. Conflicting views as the G/C' desire of a "completely independent, unitary, integral and sovereign state" and the constant T/C preference on partition led to the conclusion:

 "Cyprus continues to be the center of a dispute which endangers both the safety of its own population and the relationships of the countries most directly concerned-Cyprus itself, Greece and Turkey and therefore the peace of eastern Mediterranean and the world as a whole … Each side rests its widely differing political ideas rigidly on the amount of the military force at its command. But an uneasy equilibrium is maintained by two other factors: on one hand the possibility of further armed intervention by Turkey in accordance with the rights claimed from the Treaty of Guarantee and on the other hand the presence and activity of the UN Force."[359]

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[358] The Acheson plans were never officially submitted for negotiations to both sides. Χριστοδουλίδης, pp.138-174.
[359] Press and Information Office, Galo Plaza Report, 1964
https://www.pio.gov.cy/en/assets/pdf/cyproblem/Galo%20Plaza%20Report%20(Sum).pdf

The Plaza Report had many positive aspects that unfortunately the Hellenes did not exploit. The fact that it was suggesting further UN involvement, an undesirable development for the US, it was a golden opportunity for Greece and Cyprus. However, successive Greek administrations chose the path to resume the dialogue via bilateral talks with Turkey, a tactic that Makarios was against but the US was ardent.[360] A while before the coup- d'état in Athens, the Greek Prime Minister, Ioannis Paraskevopoulos, not only chose direct talks with Turkey but the atmosphere between Greece and Cyprus was deteriorating. Greece insisted on not internationalizing the issue thus following the US agenda. Makarios defended his policy but regional developments -the intense USSR presence in Mediterranean, the Six Days War, the 1971 OPEC crisis, the Iraq governmental crisis and the Soviet support, the Yom Kippur war and later the Begin-Sadat peace treaty- plus the Cold war left no room for maneuver for Makarios whose policy was perceived as pro-USSR. Britain and the US looked to Turkey to reverse the Soviet involvement.

When the coup in Athens came to power, the USA faced "a strong possibility that the Turks might be going to invade Cyprus the following day."[361] The US administration possessed reliable information that the Turks indeed planned to launch an invasion. Hence, the USA had to undertook the mediator's role and proposed a four-point settlement in an effort to give each side essential points to reach an agreement and to prevent a war. The Turks however followed their well-known policy of intransigence. According to Vance, "the Turks were demanding for the withdrawal of all the Greek forces above the treaty minimum from the island of Cyprus, and the Turks were seeking what to me was an unrealistic and unreasonable time period."[362]

During the long seven-years period of dictatorship, the Greek colonels not only served NATO interests on Cyprus issue but they also followed down the path of the bilateral talks with the Turks, leaving aside the Cypriot leadership.[363] Conflicting interests, contrasting opinions, mutual mistrust, conspiracies to bring down the Cypriot President paved the way to the Turkish 1974 invasion. During this foggy period the Hellenes and the Elladites were undermining each

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[360] The outcome of the Greco-Turkish dialogue on Cyprus; the Paris agreement and the sign of the consequent Protocol. For more, Χριστοδουλίδης, pp.179-181.
[361] The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, "Secretary Cyrus R. Vance", The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, November 3, 1969, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, pp.31-32
[362] The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, "Secretary Cyrus R. Vance", The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, November 3, 1969, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, p.36
[363] Ν Κρανιδιώτης, Οι διεθνείς διαστάσεις του Κυπριακού, pp.59-60.

other. Meanwhile, the Turks were close to implement a policy that was designed back in the 50s.

The Turks exploited the intra-Hellenic fight and Junta's compliance to settle the issue, and, in conjunction with their military preparedness, they started blowing up the Greco-Turkish talks, driving them intentionally to a deadlock. In addition, the T/Cs set once again on the table the issue of confederation in order to resume the dialogue (September 1971) while Turkey officially threatened to invade.

The period of 1967-1974 serves as the dark side of Greek politics in the 20th century. Athens' "government" was claiming exclusively the management of the Cyprus issue leaving aside RoC's President whose presence was unwelcomed. Makarios was struggling to avoid any despicable plan that would further cause damage to the interests of the RoC. Nevertheless, he was excluded from the talks since the colonels were negotiating directly with the Turks and the Greeks wanted to lead the negotiations and not to be left outside of the decision-making.

The 1971 Turkish elections brought to power Bulent Ecevit, well known for his posture towards Cyprus: partition or domination over the whole island. Cyprus' importance in the mid of the 70s was increasing. Apart from the British bases, the Americans were particularly interested in consolidating their presence in the region for strategic purposes. When on July 20th, 1974, Turkey, invaded Cyprus, thus violating not only the Treaties of London-Zurich but also the article 103 of the UN Charter,[364] London and Washington were aware and well informed on Turkish intentions. Ecevit visited London to ask from the British Prime Minister to take action in common with the Turkish forces invoking the Article 3 of the Treaty of Guarantee. Britain declined.

The US stance is far more interested. Joseph Sisco, the US Undersecretary of State, undertook the task to prevent a Turkish invasion that may lead to a generalized Greco-Turkish conflict and to an unnecessary bloodshed in the Eastern Mediterranean. He visited Ankara and Athens. He put all his effort vehemently to resume the dialogue with the Generals on both sides. Sisco's effort met Kissinger's apathy. This was not a surprise since Kissinger was in contact with Ecevit and knew exactly what was going to happen. Ecevit was about to invade, to

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[364] "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail." Repertory of Practice of the United Nations Organs, 'Article 103', http://legal.un.org/repertory/art103.shtml

conclude what Inonu had left unfinished and the omnipotent Henry Kissinger did not move a finger. He stood distant, unsentimental, leaving the Undersecretary Sisco to save the US' face.[365] Despite the fact that no one aided Turkey, the fact that also no one prevented the invasion, make Britain and the US accountable for their "neutral" stance, since Turkey did not stop on July 20th, but continued its operation on August 15th, the phase II of the invasion, named Attila II, which was also against the UN resolutions calling for respecting the sovereignty of Cyprus and to cease all firing.[366]

Crimes against humanity and violations of fundamental human rights were committed by the Turkish forces. When negotiations restarted in Geneva, Turkish designations on the creation of a bi-zonal state unveiled. A positive outcome was the amelioration of the Greek and Cypriots relations after the restoration of democracy in Greece. The Cyprus issue becomes again a national and thus a vital issue. The difference is that this time both states fight together in international fora to restore the status quo ante of the Republic and to internationalize the issue of the Turkish invasion. It was no more an "issue" or a "problem". It was a matter of an illegal Turkish invasion and occupation of a sovereign state-member of the UN.

3.1.4. From independence to the Turkish Invasion. An assessment

Cyprus' location is simultaneously its asset and its Achilles' heel. From Venetians, to the Ottomans and to the British, this small state was the apple of contention for all the empires the conquered the island. The Greek Struggle for Union with Greece led the British administration to a adopt policies that would exclude any right of self-determination that could lead to such a Union.[367] Today, the Eastern Mediterranean remains a focal point for power struggle among the great powers.

The British military chiefs pinpointed the importance of Cyprus to Britain since the 1950s as a vital link through the Mediterranean and to the Middle East.[368] Cyprus' soil has been

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[365] For the US involvement in the Greek coup in Cyprus on July 15th, 1974, and Kissinger's posture towards the Cypriot catastrophe, cf Κ Βενιζέλος & Μ Ιγνατίου, *Τα μυστικά αρχεία του Κίσιντζερ.*, τομ.1, Λιβάνη, Αθήνα, 2002, pp.165-221.
[366] UNSC, Resolution 353 (1974) of 20 July 1974, UNSC, Resolution 354 (1974) of 23 July 1974
[367] See Ε Χατζηβασιλείου
[368] B O'Malley & I Craig, p.1.

used as a launchpad for Suez's operations from the British as well as for the British and American interventions in Lebanon and Jordan in 1958. The strategic importance of Cyprus for the Western powers is critical for the security of their military facilities. After the Greek and Turkish NATO membership, the importance of the Cyprus issue skyrocketed, fearing of a possible intra-alliance conflict. Throughout the proposed peace plans for a solution of the "Cyprus Problem" over time: the Harding proposals; the Radcliffe constitutional proposals; the Foot plan; the Macmillan plan; the Ball plan; the Acheson plans, the epicenter of the great powers' interest was to safeguard their military bases on the island.

At this period, the impact of the international system was decisive for the fate of Cyprus due to a volatile period in the Middle East that could had been turn out a deathblow for the Western interests. Any attempt for self-determination on behalf of the Hellenes was a backlash for the Greek and the G/C interests. George Ball came with the idea of partition while he was a Secretary of State. Dean Acheson also considered to split Cyprus between Greece and Turkey. Acheson, an esteemed statesman, was willing to downgrade the Cyprus conflict from an international issue to a Greco-Turkish dispute. In that way, the de-internationalization would exclude any undesirable interference and would convert the issue to an intra-alliance conflict. However, regional developments further complicated the fate of Cyprus: the diminution of British power in the Middle East; the fear of Soviet expansion, as it happened in Egypt with Nasser; the Arab-Israeli conflict etc.

Great powers' inertia before, during and after the invasion is quite an issue considering the fact that Great Britain was and still is a guarantor power. The impartiality of the West was evident. The West showed signs to accommodate Turkey's anxiety by providing them first details on almost every proposed plan or by alleviating Turkish concerns with provisions in proposed plans that would meet their demands. Thus, the West and especially Britain found themselves trapped since the proposed solutions to the Cyprus problem were depended on satisfying Turkey's complaints and demands. After all, Turkey's location was essential for the Western interests both with regard to the Baghdad Pact and to NATO.[369]

Relations between London and Ankara were strong that in 1956 partition was for the first time formally on the table, "as Her Majesty's Government recognise that the exercise of

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[369] That occurred during the Harding-Makarios talks and the exchange of correspondence. Also, in the Radcliffe constitutional proposals, partition was on the table as well it was during the negotiations of the Foot plan. Χριστοδουλίδης, p.62, 76-77, 93-95, 115.

self-determination in such a mixed population must include partition among the eventual options."[370] The USA was aware of the Turkish intentions. Washington established and retained open channels with the Greek Junta and as an arms supplier itself, it supported the Greek dictatorship. Meanwhile, an array of events in the US domestic policies was the catalyst: the Watergate and Kissinger's omnipotence on decision-making. Henry Kissinger was serving as a National Security Advisor and a Secretary of State and he was masterminding America's foreign policy. Suffice to mention that his style of operating was dual. Publicly he was calling for stability in NATO's southern flank and for avoidance of any inter-alliance war. At last, the US did not discourage any Turkish operation to invade and divide Cyprus, but it did firmly oppose any UN interference in the Cyprus solution.

Britain's posture was not also a question mark. In 1955, Britain convened in London a trilateral summit among Greece, Turkey and the Great Britain. Thus, it started engaging Turkey on matters of security and defense in the Eastern Mediterranean, including Cyprus, despite the Treaty of Lausanne when Turkey relinquished all its rights on Cyprus. Britain mastered its art of "divide and rule" to control the situation on the island and to safeguard its vital interests in the Middle East in a period that its power was diminished. Hence, the British anxiety to ensure the sovereignty of the British Bases in the London-Zurich agreements.[371] While Britain had every right legally and was also military capable to intervene and stop any Turkish aggression, it did not. "Britain had failed over Cyprus –for reasons which the Government refused to give".[372] Finally, regarding the Soviets, who also had intelligence on Turkish intentions, it has been mentioned that they approached Britain and the USA and suggested joint action but both of these were shunned.

Turkey's strategy is characterized by expansionism. Turkey's posture since 1950 shows the implementation of a resolute, firm and composed strategy that was pursued and partly

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[370] Cyprus (Lord Radcliffe's Proposals), HC Deb 19 December 1956 vol 562 cc1267-79
https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1956/dec/19/cyprus-lord-radcliffes-proposals
[371] Article 2 of the "Treaty (with annexes, schedules and detailed plans) concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. Signed at Nicosia, on 16 August 1960."
 "The Republic of Cyprus shall co-operate fully with the United Kingdom to ensure the security and effective operation of the military bases situated in the Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area and the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area, and the full enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights conferred by this Treaty.". Note that Britain claimed to retain 120miles of the Cypriot territory. Makarios strongly opposed the British claiming. A middle ground prevailed when Britain accepted to agree on retaining 99 miles in the Dekeleia and Akrotiri Bases. In return Makarios granted Radar facilities at mount Troodos as well as firing ranges and ports to use for military purposes.
[372] B O'Malley & I Craig, p.160.

achieved in 1974. The first step towards the implementation of Turkish designations on dividing the island into two geographical and ethic zones was attempted in 1963, during the inter-communal violence that gave to Turkey a golden opportunity to isolate the T/C population into ethnic enclaves. Turkey's expansionism became evident via the so-called "peace operation" of 1974. The invasion was a brutal use of force resulting in altering Cyprus' Greek character so that nothing would remind the Greek presence. Following the establishment of the TRNC, Turkey was and still is attempting to create an independent secessionist state in the north. Via a series of UN resolutions that Turkey has repeatedly violated it shows its intentions to control the southern part, the non-occupied RoC.

The Greek-G/C relations are also perplexed. Despite the fact that both states had to deal with a common enemy, different perceptions drove to a chasm that had to be dealt to minimize any damage control. Greece mishandled the Cyprus issue after the proposed plans (Macmillan, the Acheson's) and the termination of the intercommunal talks of 1968-1974. Overall, almost ever Greek administration was eager to concede to pressures. Before the invasion, Greece's philosophy shortly can be described as endorsing the Enosis by granting territory to the Turks. Meanwhile, President Makarios was pushed aside while Greece was negotiating with Turkey directly whose aim, partition, was veiled by the proposed establishment of a federation.

To Greece, the Cyprus issue was an aspect of the Greek foreign policy. Hence, the Greeks of the motherland, the *Elladites,* were in favor of feasible, not perfect not viable solutions. When Greek prime ministers were negotiating with their Turks counterparts excluding the Cypriots, they were downgrading the Cyprus issue from an issue of international peace and stability to a bilateral issue. However, exemplary was the coordination of both states to establish a Cypriot defense force after the Turkish 1964 bombardments. Prime Minister George Papandreou, planned the formation of the defense forces by sending troops in secrecy. This attempt aimed at empowering the Republic of Cyprus militarily so that it could defend itself in a possible Turkish offensive act without dragging Greece in the conflict, thus deteriorating further the Greco-Turkish relations. After the 1974 invasion, Cyprus became again the core of the Hellenic foreign policy. It became not a part of its national policy but the national policy of the Hellenic Republic.

The intercommunal talks that followed the invasion were, as expected, not fruitful. Turkey and the T/C leadership empowered as they felt, arrogantly declined any peace effort

and obsessively were aiming at their goal: the partition of the island and the creation of an independent state.

In sum, till the Turkish invasion, the Republic's strategy was based on internationalizing the issue so that justice would prevail by implementing the resolutions of the UN and by investing in the UNSG's good-offices that they would prevent Turkish expansionism and T/Cs' intransigence. However, Cyprus did not calculate the intentions of the main actors as the US, the UK, and Turkey that did everything to avoid internationalization and to find a solution in the frame of an intercommunal conflict. Until the final act, for Turkey the RoC will always be the oppressor of the T/Cs, the illegally recognized Republic that will rule the whole island until Turkey and the T/Cs achieve their end: an independent Turkish state that will be able to influence the RoC and interfere with the help of its motherland, Turkey.

3.2. A divided Republic struggling with the occupant power. The road of Cyprus to the European Union accession

A Republic in tatters struggles to preserve its survival in an era of transition from a bipolar to a multipolar international system. The USSR's dissolution, the sharpening Western presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Greco-Turkish uneasy relation portray the big picture within Cyprus was obliged to operate. Meanwhile expansionism, secessionism, consolidation of partition and the final aim, the integration of Cyprus into Turkey concise Turkish aspirations on the RoC.

This unit's objective is to provide to the reader another point of view from the conventional analysis on the peace efforts. To achieve that, it firstly pays attention to the strategic environment; the posture of the great powers; their interests and their intervention either positive or negative to solve the Cyprus issue, till the critical negotiations that led to Cyprus' accession to the EU. Second, it presents Turkey's and T/Cs' strategy towards partition that was formed even before the RoC's independence. Denktash and successive T/C leaders, as it will be showed, facilitated the idea of disengaging from any negotiation under the auspices of the UN that would bind them toward a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation.

This unit deals also with how Turkey evolved its plans in this transitional era but failed to prevent Cyprus' EU integration, which undoubtedly was a small state's success story. Actions and reactions of the great powers will highlight the impact upon a state's strategy formation. Finally, there will be a facile presentation of the critical UN resolutions, the road of Cyprus to the EU accession and its gains as an EU member-state via the presentation of the RoC's strategy. Explaining the RoC's struggle will reveal the great powers' power game, Turkey's hardline stance and Cyprus' response to these challenges.

3.2.1. Great powers' involvement in solving the Cyprus Problem. From proposing peace plans to the EU accession

> *"While the USA insisted emphatically on the withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan, Cambodia and Angola they have not done so in the case of Cyprus. If this happens it will mark the beginning of the end. Let us all join efforts so that this becomes a reality."[373]*

The United Kingdom for strategic reasons and due to the British Middle East retreatment, never stopped interfering in the Cypriot politics. The USA since the Kennedy administration viewed Cyprus in terms of the East-West confrontation.[374] The USSR presence was viewed as an immediate threat of expanding the Soviet influence in the region. The period after the invasion was an intense one. In the heat of the Cold War, both the USSR and the USA pressed for a solution.

In the late 80s, when a Greek-Turkish rapprochement occurred between Papandreou and Ozal, the common ground of their meeting was the need to advance the dialogue between the two countries. Hence, President Vassiliou paid important meetings to the UK, the USA as well as to member states of the European Community aiming at internationalizing the Turkish invasion and initiating talks that would surpass T/C intransigence. During his meeting with the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, on March 31st, 1988, Thatcher confirmed to

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[373] G Vassiliou, *From the president's office: A journey towards reconciliation in a divided Cyprus,* IB Tauris, 2010, p.14, 40
[374] J V Kofas, *Under the Eagle's Claw, Exceptionalism in Postwar U.S-Greek Relations,* Praeger Publishers, United States of America, 2003. pp.31-32,46.

Vassiliou that the current status quo, the island's partition was "unthinkable... and would never recognize the Denktash regime." Also, she reaffirmed that Britain was favoring a unified Cyprus, a federal state that would safeguard democratic freedoms and human rights. She also expressed her wish to include the issue of guarantee.[375]

At the end of July 1988, Vassiliou met President Reagan and vice-President George Bush to check US' intentions on the Cyprus issue and to secure their support. The US stance was moving towards the withdrawal of foreign troops and the protection of human rights. During the third phase of the Talks in May, 1989, the USA was concerned on Denktash's behavior that was constantly driving the negotiations to an impasse. Furthermore, Denktash was threatening to settle Varosha with Bulgarian Muslims. His act provoked the UK's and France's intervention to avoid further displeasing developments. Hence, it conveyed to the Turkish Prime Minister Ozal, its concerns to convince the T/C leader to change his attitude.[376] Simultaneously, the UN wanted to showcase a positive outcome of the negotiations status. Thus, pressure was increased.

Despite the firm interest of the great powers, the RoC found itself again having its hands tied. When the Secretary General summarized his ideas to resume the dialogue in June 1989, in the outline of his ideas he offered a new agreement, a "Food for Thought" as a base for negotiations that was submitted in July through his special representative in Cyprus.[377] The document raised objections on the return of refugees, security and the occupation troops withdrawal, as it was put on the resolution adopted by the "Assembly" of the TRNC. The internationalization efforts were intensified as the US, the UK, the Secretary General and the NAM disapproved the T/C behavior. Despite the UN and especially the so-promised US pressure on Denktash and Turkey that it "would use her influence to secure a successful outcome of the talks, they finally did nothing of the sort."[378]

The 1991 Iraq war affected the ongoing peace efforts since the international community and especially the great powers involved in the UN-US led operation were focused on the Gulf crisis. Soon after the end of operations, the Cyprus Problem came once again to the front. This period also signaled the end of the Cold War, where the US, as the winner, had

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[375] Vasilliou, p.102.
[376] Vassiliou, pp.22-23, p.56, 60
[377] United Nations, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, "De Cuellar's Set of Ideas – Food for Thought", 25 July 1989
[378] Vassiliou, p.101.

an active interest to solve protracted conflicts. For the US, the Cypriot status quo was unacceptable. Despite the US warm interest and President's Bush assurances that he personally will press Turkey to go along with the UN resolutions, the impasse continued. No one dared to condemn the T/C arrogance and depreciation of the Secretary General's good offices; neither the UNSC's members nor the Secretary himself. Every time an issue was settled and the two sides were ready to move on to another issue, the T/Cs either were changing the agenda or they were initiating new parameters to negotiate. The Secretary General though was "willing to make things for Denktash in order to commit him to the procedure of direct talks".[379]

The end of the Cold War enhanced the winner, the USA, and decreased the importance of the NAM but also brought no change to the attitude of Turkey. The reason; the multiple warfronts that the USA had to confront and the strategic location of Turkey that upgraded its importance to the Western aspirations.

This decade was marked by the Cyprus-EU negotiations for the Cypriot EU membership. The US kept its reservations on Cyprus' accession to the EU because of a possible Turkish outrage. Despite a few EEC member's reaction, on June 1994, during the EU summit in Corfu, Greece, the leaders of the 12 member-states included the RoC in the upcoming EU enlargement.[380] Yet, the RoC was anxious because the Cyprus solution was not dissociated from the process of enlargement. That said, in 1995, the USA resumed the peace process with the Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke, to lead the efforts. Holbrooke was aiming at persuading and engaging Athens, Ankara and Nicosia in the dialogue. Washington's belief was that the Greco-Turkish conflict was intertwined with the Cyprus problem thus inducing all the players' good-will to improve the current unacceptable status quo and moving forward with the implementation of the Confidence Building Measures (henceforth CBM) to accomplish regional stability. The USA was apathetic on the T/C intransigence that was disturbing the whole process. Their obnoxious behavior was based on disregarding the international law and demanding concessions on behalf of the Greeks as the implementation of the CBM, that the was the main objective of the USA, in conjunction with the recognition of

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[379] Vassiliou, p.203.
[380] PIO, *European Stand on the Cyprus Problem. Resolutions adopted by the European Union and the Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe,* Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, Nicosia, Cyprus, 2003

the secessionist state. The USA stood by to that behavior. It did not put any pressure on the Turks and the T/Cs to comply with the UN procedure. Meanwhile, for the USA the Turkish invasion was downgraded to a bicommunal "dispute". The implication of the US perception was an unbearable pressure that sometimes was turning into coercion towards the Hellenes.[381]

The Greek government backed the Cypriot candidacy and designed a strategy hoping that they would overcome the aforementioned impediments. The "veto" on the EU-Turkey custom union was its asset. The pressure on the Greeks from many member states was heavy but the bargaining between lifting the veto and Cyprus' accession was fruitful. On March 6th, 1995, the General Affairs Council announced in a "package" decision that included a customs union agreement with Turkey, that Cyprus was suitable for accession to the EU and that the negotiations with Cyprus would begin six months after the end of the work of the Intergovernmental Conference (henceforth IGC), taking its results into account.[382]

The March 6th Conclusion of the EU Council in conjunction with the Turkish invasion in North Iraq, operation "Steel Curtain" in March 1995, changed the USA's policy agenda. The Kurdish issue came to the forefront further implicating the regional stability. The Kurdish issue became another parameter on the US foreign policy designations. Hence, the Cyprus problem was upgraded to the core of the foreign policy for the Anglo-Americans. Despite the attempts on behalf of the Hellenes to exploit the regional developments and especially the tensed Turkish-Americans relations to achieve positive outcomes, the fact that there was no Anglo-American intention to coerce the Turks in the case of the Turkish invasion in Cyprus as in the case of the invasion in Iraq, is indicative of their resoluteness. As Richard Holbrooke put it: "Turkey is at the crossroads of almost every issue of importance to the United States on the Eurasian continent."[383]

In the mid of the 90s, the US administration was again dealing with protracted conflicts, a threat to regional peace and stability. Bosnia, Skopje, Cyprus were in the spotlight of the US foreign policy. The Clinton administration on domestic political grounds desired to showcase foreign policy achievements to the US electorate. Thus, in the 1996, the Cyprus issue was prioritized. The US was persistent in engaging all the actors, Greece, Turkey, the RoC and

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[381] Βανέζης, pp.59-63.
[382] Conclusions of the EU Council of Ministers 6 March 1995
[383] Holbrooke's' testimony before the U.S. Congress, March 1995, "Country Commercial Guide: Turkey Fiscal Year 1999," ed. The United States State Department (Washington, DC: August 7, 1998).

the T/C leadership to impose a framework of fundamental positions within which the final agreement between the communities on the island will be formed. Turkey knowing that it will be in distress, expressed its readiness to negotiate by setting its preconditions; political equality, guarantees, bi-zonality. It clarified that no one should expect from Turkey great territorial concessions despite the fact the G/Cs are the legal owners of the 88% of the territory. Moreover, Ankara expressed to Brussels and to the USA once again its readiness to solve the Cyprus problem.

A rigorous international effort starts to motivate both Turkey and Cyprus to find a common solution. The G/Cs were adamant to the guarantees in contrast with Turkey. As it was expected, the focal point becomes the RoC and its precondition on guarantees which was Turkey's strategic core. From now on, bargaining that involved the USA, the EU and Great Britain starts to lead to the final solution as it was designed during the last decade and it included implementation of the agreed CBM; a federal government; security; demilitarization; territorial issues and the accession to the EU. Britain was the key actor to this final act. [384]

As the date toward the RoC's EU accession was approaching, negotiations were heated up: more great powers' involvement; more pressure upon the RoC; more negotiations with Turkey that remained stubborn to its positions: Cyprus should not become an EU member before Turkey. France, Germany Britain were in favor of a solution to be found before the accession. The Greek prime minister warns the EU member states that if the accession of Cyprus will be disputed while the other nine candidate countries will join the EU, then Greece will veto. From then on, the European Council and the USA pressed for the inclusion of T/C representatives in the negotiations with the latter denying to do so except if they would represent only the TRNC.[385] Meanwhile, Great Britain appoints Sir David Hannay as the UK special envoy to Cyprus. His contribution was essential not only to safeguard British interests on the island but also to drive the talks to a peace plan that would mostly satisfy the British perceptions on the Cyprus solution. At this period Turkey's domestic instability is a parameter for the EU, the US and the UK to press for a solution as soon as possible. Erbakan, an Islamic fundamentalist was the catalyst towards the formation of the Annan Plan.

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[384] Βανέζης, p.80-81, 89-95

[385] Ειρήνη Δ. Καρανασοπούλου, «Απειλεί με βέτο ο Σημίτης», *Τα ΝΕΑ,* 21 Νοεμβρίου 2002, https://www.tanea.gr/2002/11/21/greece/apeilei-me-beto-o-simitis/, N Neuwahl, "Cyprus, Which Way? - In Pursuit of a Confederal Solution in Europe", Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper 4/00, Harvard Law School, Jean Monnet Chair, Cambridge, MA 02138, 2000

Turkey's threats to annex the TRNC led the USA to seek for economic motivations to tempt the T/Cs. Thus, Holbrooke proposes the initiation of a bilateral trade between the RoC and the illegal "state" as well as between Greece and Turkey. For the architect of the 1995 Dayton Accord that ended the Bosnian conflict, the importance of settling the Cyprus conundrum as a means to easing friction between Turkey and Greece, was a high priority after the Cold War.[386] Sir David Hannay advised the G/Cs to think seriously of the creation of a state based on the paradigm of Switzerland, which basically is a confederation but it is governed by a federal government. [387]

Cyprus found itself under intense pressure. The Anglo-Americans were favoring a solution on a confederation. During the Helsinki summit, the Turks fulfilled their goal: Turkey was nominated a candidate state despite the fact that it had not had implemented any of the terms as the harmonization with the acquis communautaire. Meanwhile, Cyprus backed at the S-300 installment and removed them from the island, thus making its deterrence unreliable. However, this good will gesture was not rewarded at all. The US administration stated clear that it "will not be able to recognize the TRNC."[388] Also, Sir David Hannay, a genuine Realist representative of the British policy, presented possible solutions that could lead from a de facto state to a de jure.[389] On the same wavelength the US Administration was working hard.

American views can be seen in the evolving position of the Secretary General where he calls upon "both leaders to enter into a process of comprehensive negotiations without preconditions and in a spirit of compromise and cooperation."[390] According to the Secretary, to achieve a long lasting peace the core issues of security, distribution of powers, property and

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[386] D Usborne, "Holbrooke offers hope to divided Cyprus", *Independent,* 6 June 1997, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/holbrooke-offers-hope-to-divided-cyprus-1254373.html, Βανέζης, p.159, 160.

[387] Cyprus News Agency: News in English (PM), "Clerides - High Commissioner's Dinner" 99-01-22, http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/cna/1999/99-01-22.cna.html#01

[388] PIO: Turkish Cypriot Press and Other Media, "Holbrooke: US will not recognize "TRNC", 98-04-07, http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/tcpr/1998/98-04-07.tcpr.html#02

[389] "British Diplomatic Oral History Project, Interview with Sir David Hannay on 22nd July 1999, conducted by Malcolm McBain.", https://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/media/uploads/files/Hannay.pdf "You have to leave the Turks and the Greeks autonomous in their own areas but you have to have some central powers for a federal government. But most of the powers would be in the zones which would be largely mono ethnic in nature. So you are not trying to make them all go and live amongst each other again, as that wasn't a great success last time." p.25.

[390] United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary General of his mission of Good Offices in Cyprus", S/1999/707, 22 June 1999, p.2.

territory must be addressed in the spirit of compromise. He even mentioned formally that the political status of the T/Cs should be considered.[391]

The US was looking for a solution that will leave the past behind. Hence, legalistic debates on federation/confederation ought to be avoided. Constitutional concessions which was the apple of discord between the G/Cs and the T/Cs could be influenced by territorial trade-offs. On settlers, the US administration was handling the issue as a humanitarian, while on the T/C demand for recognition, Washington considered the "acknowledgement" of the T/C secessionist state as de facto recognition without other legal consequences. De jure recognition could only be the outcome of negotiations. In that spirit, Washington pressed the G/Cs to recognize what it was called "legitimate concerns of the T/C" along with the "reality" created on Cyprus since 1974.[392] The aforementioned explains sufficiently the US stance towards the Cyprus issue during the Annan phases and how Cyprus ended in Annan V plan. The US proposed the acceptance of a constitutional solution containing elements of "legitimized partition" aiming at stabilizing the region.

In sum, the US was totally in concert with Turkey, especially when it comes to the suspension of the RoC as it was established in 1960 as soon as a comprehensive solution was about to be agreed upon.[393] Hereafter, especially after the UNSC Resolution 1250, begins a new era of negotiations; no preconditions; all issues on the table; commitment in good faith to continue to negotiate until a settlement is reached; full consideration of relevant United Nations' resolutions and treaties.[394]

As the Annan V formation was bringing to a close, Sir David Hannay stated clear the British policy on the Cyprus issue: "It will not be the Cyprus Republic anymore. ...there will be a central government. There will be two complementary states as described by the United Nations. I am saying that two separate states will make up this government. ... Of course, there will be two states, the Turkish Cypriot state will be in the north and the Greek Cypriot state will be in the south."[395] Rauf Denktash fortified as he was by the developments and the

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[391] United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary General of his mission of Good Offices in Cyprus", S/1999/707, 22 June 1999, p.2.

[392] V Coufoudakis, "Cyprus-The Referendum and its Aftermath", The Cyprus Review, 2004, p.69.

[393] Ibid.p.69.

[394] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1250 (1999), Adopted by the Security Council at its 4018th meeting, on 29 June 1999 "

[395] PIO: Turkish Press and Other Media, "Lord David Hannay was interviewed by Mehmet Ali Birand on CNN TURK. He described the Cyprus problem as the biggest wound of Europe", 02-06-13, http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/tcpr/2002/02-06-13.tcpr.html

empowerment of the negotiation posture of Turkey and of the T/C, since most of their proposals had been the foundation for the Annan V, blatantly claimed a two-states solution, the continuation of the presence of the Turkish troops, a rotating presidency, separate nationality, and the right to veto to broad issues.

When Alvaro de Soto delivered the final text of the Annan Plan, the time was not accidental. It was a mean to press the G/Cs to accept the solution that would result in the EU accession. On December 13th, 2002, when the RoC was approved to became an EU member (Copenhagen Summit of the EC), this approval came with the political commitment that the Cyprus issue must be solved based on the Annan Plan until February 28th.[396]

On July 4th, 1990, the RoC submitted its application to become a member of the European Economic Community (EEC). For the EEC its bilateral relation with Turkey was inseparable from the Turkish occupation. This move undoubtedly led to the Europeanization of the Cyprus Problem. On May 1st, 2004, the RoC acceded to the EU as a whole. The European integration of Cyprus was the outcome of a process which was commenced 30 years ago. Despite the rejection on behalf of the G/Cs of the Annan Plan, and despite some states' attempts to block Cyprus accession, the RoC successfully became an EU-member in the largest wave of EU enlargement. The non-controlled areas of the RoC are still subject to a special regime where acquis communautaire is suspended.

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[396] cf. K Kirisci, "12-13 December 2002 – Copenhagen Summit of the European Council and Turkey", *Euractiv,* (updated: Jan 29, 2010), https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/opinion/12-13-december-2002-copenhagen-summit-of-the-european-council-and-turkey/

3.2.2. Turkish perspectives

"As long as the world does not change its attitude towards the Greek Cypriots, who are deemed to be the legal power-holders in Cyprus, there is not going to be a solution of [sic] the Cyprus problem."
Rauf Denktash[397]

A timeless aim of the Turkish strategy is to secure the existence of the T/Cs and the Turkish settlers in the north. In 1983, the Turkish Cypriot leadership, with the support of Turkey, unilaterally declares the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus". Henceforth, starts a race. On the one hand, the G/C efforts to prevent the legitimization of the secessionist state and on the other, the Turkish and T/C attempts to consolidate their presence as a legitimate actor in the international system. At this point it should be mentioned that the declaration came along with protests by the T/C community.

The outbreak of intra-community clashes is important to comprehend the fact that the secessionist state was created to serve Turkey's national interest and not to preserve the "oppressed" T/C community within the RoC. The imposed constitution in the occupied territories was considered by the opposition and the T/C community a danger to their civil liberties. A 30% of the adult population voted against the submitted constitution. The opposition parties did not hesitate to accuse Denktash of using the TRNC's independence for his party benefit. It is important to highlight that the dissent between the opposition and the leading party in the north was long-standing. Suffice to mention the words of the RTP leader in 1983 "The Constitution of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, declared in 1983, is a copy of the undemocratic Constitution of Turkey."[398] All Turkish efforts to covert the occupied territories into a Turkish province should be mentioned.

Turkey's plan included: imposing constitution; an Ozal's economic plan and all the successive protocols aiming at the consolidation of the TRNC's dependency on Turkey; the alteration of the occupied territories so as to eradicate its Greek heritage; massive influx of settlers that changed the demographic status. An implication of the latter was the influx of illiterate population, criminals in majority, that changed the demographics and turned the T/Cs

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[397] Statement issued by Mr Denktash in Brussels a few days after his meeting with the Secretary-General, Mr Perez de Cuellar. In Vassiliou, p.55.
[398] *Turkish Policy on Cyprus and Efforts to Solve the Cyprus Problem,* Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, Nicosia, December 1991, p.24

into a minority in the occupied territories. Finally, in the 10th Provisional Article the Turkish Army was the responsible force for securing domestic order and defense of the T/Cs. Thus, it is evident the attempt to establish military dependency from the Turkish forces since the early years.[399]

Apart from the military dependency, Turkey pushed for an economic dependency. By bringing in labor force settlers, Turkey's aims to integrate the occupied territories occurred by the continuous militarization and housing settlers from Turkey, thus changing forever the population of the northern Cyprus. Almost every Turkish official as well as T/C leader repeatedly calls Cyprus a Turkish province. Hence, according to them, the invasion was a peace operation to restore the constitutional order. Turkey behaves as the patron of the TRNC. But this is not the full story. Turkish concerns do not touch only the occupied territories. Systematically and for decades the official policy regards the whole Cyprus as a territory that should be under Turkish control.[400] This also explains the peace process' stalemate despite the numerous agreements, talks and UN resolutions on the reunification of the island on a federal basis.

Turkey covertly since 1955 and later openly, during the inter-communal clashes of 1964, was implementing its designations. The pick of the iceberg was the 1983 unilateral and illegal declaration of the secessionist state in the northern occupied area. As it has been mentioned, the West for decades proposed plans that were rejected from the G/Cs mostly on security grounds. This fact prompted Turkish arrogance and irredentism.

Turkey's foreign policy behavior is based on a blame game on the Republic of Cyprus' rejection of plans and expansionism. Since the TRNC declaration, it intensifies its efforts on altering the UN stance towards a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. It provocatively bypasses the fundamental UN resolutions on the Cyprus mediation. Suffice to mention Resolution 541,[401] which crystal clear states that "the attempt to create a "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" is invalid, and will contribute to a worsening of the situation in Cyprus," and Resolution 550, where the UNSC expresses its grave concern over further

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[399] Ibid. p.17-26.
[400] *Turkish Policy on Cyprus and Efforts to Solve the Cyprus Problem,* Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, Nicosia, December, 1991
[401] UNSCR, "Resolution 541 (1983) of 18 November 1983", http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/541

"secessionist acts in the occupied part of the Republic of Cyprus which are in violation of Resolution 541 (1983), namely, the purported exchange of ambassadors between Turkey and the legally invalid 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' and the contemplated holding of a 'constitutional referendum' and 'elections', as well as by other actions or threats of actions aimed at further consolidating the purported independent State and the division of Cyprus."[402]

Overall, the UN strongly opposed any secessionist movement since 1974 and endorsed every resolution that recognized the 1974 Turkish invasion, on the one hand, as an intervention directed against the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the RoC, and on the other, as a threat to international peace and security.[403]

The T/C leadership after the Turkish invasion and especially after the illegal establishment of the TRNC was reluctant to extendedly cooperate and implement any resolution or to endorse any amendment. Turkey and the T/Cs had always had an agenda on Cyprus and firmly followed their designated policy no matter how long it will take. Step by step at that period both were aiming at altering what it had been agreed since the 70s. By pressing harder and messing the negotiation table, the T/C leadership's goal was to impose their agenda even on the critical issues of "the three freedoms"; on the territorial issue, where they constantly fabricating ways to usurp more of the initial 18% that it was assigned to them respectively to the T/C population when the RoC was established. For Turkey and the T/Cs it was off the table any attempt to "deprive" Turkey as the guarantor and to withdrawal the occupant Turkish troops.

In 1986, the Secretary General presented the "Draft Framework Agreement on Cyprus". The Framework ignored fundamental provisions and satisfied mostly the T/Cs by conceding to critical issues as the constitutional, the territorial and the three freedoms. The T/C leader, Rauf Denktash, merrily approved the improved Draft Framework. Given the fact that political equality of the 18% of the population was one of the ultimate goals of the T/Cs, this Draft made it possible.[404] Hence, the T/Cs satisfied as they were by the developments, they were ready to sign this Draft that disregarded previous negotiations and agreements and overlooked human

[402] UNSCR, "Resolution 550 (1984) of 11 May 1984", http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/550
[403] UNGA Resolution 3212 (XXIX) of 1st November, 1974, UNSC Resolution 365 (1974) of 13 December 1974,
[404] Letter Dated 29 March 1986 From the Secretary-General Addressed to President Kyprianou and to his excellency Mr. Denktash Presenting the Draft Framework Agreement on Cyprus., Mr. Denktash's Letter to the U.N. Secretary-General, Dated 21 April 1986.

rights as the three freedoms. Any rejection on behalf of the G/Cs was a scape-goat for the T/Cs. As Rauf Denktash put it: "the international public opinion has, once again, witnessed, with clear and concrete proof that it is the Turkish Cypriots who desire a peaceful solution in Cyprus, and that it is the Greek Cypriots who oppose it."[405]

The intercommunal talks of 1989 and 1990 collapsed. The reasons; first, it was the T/C intransigence; second, it was the unprecedented preconditions that the T/Cs set on the table. The change that Denktash demanded was aiming at having a separate right to self-determination.[406] In other words, T/C designations were intended to the creation of two independent states and the subsequent legalization of the status quo.

The T/Cs followed the same motive in the "Set of ideas-Food for thought" document (July 1989) where they insisted that the occupied part of Cyprus should be recognized as a separate state and thus be granted the right of self-determination. Later, in the milestone document, the de Cuellar "Set of Ideas" (1992), the G/Cs fully endorsed both the Ideas and the map as a basis for reaching an overall framework agreement while the T/C leadership demanded more. Denktash strongly disagreed with the proposed territorial map and especially the delineation despite the fact that the Secretary General met most of the T/C demands and despite the great G/C concessions on territorial issue. Denktash highly objected over basic freedoms as the right to return by inducing the recognition of the "title deeds" and he asked for a Turkish Cypriot Federated State comprising a 29% of the territory. As the Secretary General put it:

> "Mr. Denktash set out four separate proposals for a territorial adjustment. None of these proposals came close to the territorial adjustments contained in the set of Ideas, notably in the area to the west of Nicosia. … the Turkish Cypriot side needs to show the necessary willingness to foresee an adjustment more or less in line with the suggestions embodied in the set of ideas if the delicately crafted balance in the remainder of the set of ideas is to be maintained".[407]

As time passes, Turkish occupation was becoming a real problem for the Turkish aspirations of joining the EEC. Turkish ambitions to recognize internationally the illegal state of the TRNC were fading. The only way to strengthen the Turkish present in the island of

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[405] Mr. Denktash's Letter to the U.N. Secretary-General, Dated 27 April 1986.
[406] United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus", S/21183, 8 March 1990
[407] United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, Friday, August 21, 1992" S/24472, pp.5-7.

Aphrodite was to cement the occupation by issuing "property titles" that belonged to the displaced G/Cs.

The Cyprus occupation was also a matter on fulfilling personal ambitions. Denktash's career was based on his intransigence while an elite of Turkish politicians established their political existence depending on the perpetuation of the occupation and the division of the island. This was also a factor why the Turks and the T/C leadership were highly opinionated and not interested in engaging in a dialogue that would promote peaceful coexistence.

The Cypriot purchase of the missile defense system S-300 increased Turkish aggression. The T/C leader threatened to settle Famagusta, while Clerides already retreated from his initial missile strategy. Clerides not only did not install the missile system but he also refused the stationing of Greek military aircrafts on the Cypriot territory.[408]

All these acts unveil the Turkish and T/C ultimate goal: the creation of an independent state. Despite all the UN's and the EU's resolutions and summits on reuniting the island, the secessionist state perfectly fits for accomplishing Turkish aspirations. The so-called bi-zonal, bi-communal federation of Cyprus is certainly out of the scope of Turkey and its muppet state. A federation will provide less room for maneuver since it entails the establishment of a central governance. Furthermore, its foreign affairs will be bounded by the "Federated Republic of Cyprus". Henceforth begins the great struggle for legalizing the secessionist state of the TRNC, thus legalizing the atrocities of the invasion without being punished for the Turkish crimes. Meanwhile, the need to eliminate any further strengthening of the RoC is a sine qua non for the T/Cs and Turkey. The international recognized RoC is a heavy impediment to the Turkish designations. By being accepted to all international organizations and international institutions as the solemn representative of an internationally recognized state, Turkey and the T/Cs are incapable to present the TRNC as a sovereign "state" in northern Cyprus. That said, it came as no surprise their resistance and the projection of obstacles to the reunification process and the constant blame-game on the G/Cs for the failure of the peace-talks. Even before the initiation of the talks that led to the Annan Plan, the most generous peace plan to the T/C side, Turkish and T/C officials alarmed by the Cyprus' EU accession progress, threatened to reevaluate the

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[408] Βανέζης, p.120.

process.[409] In sum, Turkish perceptions on resolving the Cyprus division has only one aim: the legitimization of the secessionist state and consequently its recognition by the international community as an equal partner with what they call as the Greco-Roman administration of southern Cyprus.

As the EU was affirming that Cyprus' accession was continuing smoothly, Turkey did not hesitate to state clear its objective: "Turkey will take the necessary steps to ensure the integration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus with the international community."[410] The T/C leader insisted on his principles: the accession talks between Cyprus and the EU should be broken off and the upgrade of the TRNC's status and its recognition as a separate entity should take place.

The T/Cs were adamant on a two-states solution. Confederation as the base for negotiation was the first step to fulfill their aspirations. Hence, when Alvaro de Soto, the Under-Secretary-General and Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus, undertook the task to lead the talks, five rounds of proximity talks were decided to take place in Geneva and New York. At the end of the first phase, de Soto presented his preliminary thoughts. He focused on territory, property, security and constitution. On July 12th, 2000, in Geneva, de Soto submitted his proposals which can be characterized abstract and ambiguous.[411] "But that did not mean that there could not be elements of a confederal nature (as well as some of a federal nature) in any constitution for a new Cyprus, as in fact had been the case in Boutros-Ghali's 1992 Set of Ideas."[412]

During the Annan II, the Turks and the T/Cs remained firm to their position: on territory, the present map was not acceptable; on property, strong preference for compensation only; on security, retaining the Treaty of guarantee; on sovereignty, a strong plug for "component"

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[409] HRI, TRT Television network (8:00 hours, 25.7.99) broadcast a live interview with Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit by Cem Kircak and Mustafa Balbay in the studio for the "Sunday Panorama" programme, with correspondent Nur Batur in Athens. "Ecevit admits occupation of Cyprus", http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/tcpr/1999/99-08-02.tcpr.html#01

[410] Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Turkey-TRNC Joint Declaration", January 20, 1997, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-trnc-joint-declaration-january-20_-1997.en.mfa

[411] F Hoffmeister, *Legal aspects of the Cyprus problem: Annan plan and EU accession*, Vol. 67. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006.p.105, Hannay, David. *Cyprus: The search for a solution*. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2005.p.125-127

[412] Hannay, David. *Cyprus: The search for a solution.*, p.127.

states and two "peoples" and that sovereignty should "emanate" from the two sides. As the negotiations were intensifying, the T/Cs were demanding more than the aforementioned.[413]

The Turkish plan does not stop in Cyprus. Turkey's revisionism is patiently designed to annex half of the Aegean Sea, as it happened during the provoked 1996 Imia-crisis to include into their sovereignty many Greek islands. Also, on a daily basis Turkey violates the Greek air space (FIR) and territorial sea waters. Turkey is not naïve. It implements a planned strategy firmly, patiently, while striving to become a regional hegemon that would ensure stability, as Turkey defines stability, from Central Asia, to the Balkans and to the Middle East. In the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey aspires to control areas from Crete to the Cypriot EEZ, thus questioning both the Greek and the Cypriot continental self.

3.2.3. A divided Republic's strategy

After the Turkish invasion and occupation, the RoC was dilapidated. The occupied 36,2% was about the 70% of its economy since the Turks occupied territories where all agriculture, mining, livestock production, tourist accommodations, industrial production and trade were located due to Famagusta's port. About 200.000 G/Cs forcibly expelled and deprived of their right to return since their property was usurped. Missing persons counted up to 1.400 while Greeks and Maronites were enclaved in their hometowns, oppressed, deprived and intimidated. Immediate settlers' influx, heavy militarization of the territories and a complete change of the demography so that "Turkification" to be established once and for all, was the outcome of the operation "Attila".

After the violation of the Treaty of Guarantee by Turkey, when the latter invaded and occupied the island, the United Nations was the arbiter to restore the order and ensure peace and stability. Hence, a number of meetings, intermediate agreements and plans were on the table. The fundamental ones were the 1977-1979 top level agreements between Archbishop Makarios-Denktash and Kyprianou-Denktash respectively. In these two agreements the foundations for an independent bi-zonal, bi-communal Federal Republic were set. Till today,

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[413] Ibid.pp.201-202.

the negotiations are based on these two agreements that indict that Cyprus must be reunited on a federal basis.

This section will focus on Cyprus' strategy after the occupation. All significant developments regarding its accession to the EU and the peace progress at the UN will be mentioned. The purpose is to give prominence to the impact upon the strategy formation of a small state from the great powers' interference and the interaction of multiple interests that many times were conflicting. This is a critical period from many scopes, since it deals with a transitional period from a bipolar to a multipolar international system and from Cyprus' NAM abandonment to the EU membership.

After the illegal declaration of independence of the northern occupied territories, the UN, under the auspices of the UN General-Secretary, undertook the bear to bring the two opponents at the negotiation table. The 1977-79 agreements were the basis but the Turkish disinclination deteriorated the whole process. Following a significant number of resolutions intended to bridge the gap and to make progress, the T/C-Turkish strategy did not alter at all. On the G/C posture, the foreign policy behavior could be characterized as passive. It endorsed the UN resolutions that will be mentioned in the following lines, but it was incapable to exploit the positive aspects. Realism's most known motto: power is the currency of international politics, describes best the results of the never implemented UNGA and UNSC resolutions that could have had restrained Turkish aggression and revisionism.

For a long time, Cyprus' strategy was based on the fallacy that the world powers' interest revolves around the Cyprus Problem. Thus, the Cyprus problem was the focal point of the Cypriot foreign policy. There was a fallacy that the Cypriot interest on averting the occupation and pressing Turkey to comply with international law and the UN resolutions was a shared concern with the great powers. To that end, the Republic spent all of its resources on this issue assuming that the strong actors of the international system and especially those that held a chair at the UNSC, were also extremely concern as the wounded RoC.[414]

Following the 1977-79 agreements and the illegal declaration of the TRNC, the UN's efforts were directed towards the re-commencement of the negotiations between the two communities. The G/C side remained committed to the UN cause while Turkey and the T/Cs' intransigence was once again the main trait of their behavior; no willingness to implement

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[414] Speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, Nikos Χριστοδουλίδης, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, 3 March 2019.

critical UN resolutions as the 541 as well as to sit at the table. Meanwhile, the G/Cs were moving towards concessions to convince the international community on its goodwill and to force Turkey to consider the cost-benefit of a long-lasting solution, should the Cyprus problem was settled.

President Kyprianou's vision included the accession of Cyprus to NATO and the EEC. In private talks with Great Britain's Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, in 1985, Kyprianou requested the accession of Cyprus to NATO and the EEC although he was aware that his proposals did not seem to be realistic in the eyes of the great powers that were keen on accommodating Turkish demands. His strategy was based on his conviction that he was offering the best long-term proposal for a lasting solution to the Cyprus problem. Unfortunately, Britain and the US did not share Kyprianou's ideas. President Kyprianou insisted on the need to press Turkey to withdraw its troops and settlers before any agreement was reached on territorial and constitutional issues. He even raised the issue of demilitarization at the UNGA on May 24th, 1978. Turkey categorically declined any kind of that proposal.

The legal authority on the island, the RoC, was not unrealistic when it set as a precondition the Turkish troops' withdrawal to come first and then any power-related issue, or political, constitutional, even the fundamental freedoms to be settled. By presenting the "Framework for a comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem", Kyprianou's strategy was setting the following guidelines for a lasting solution: a completely demilitarized RoC; settlers withdrawal; the stationing of an international force; the dissolution of any Treaty of Guarantee and the creation of a federal state. Finally, it is important to mention the in the legislature, President Kyprianou supported the "unicameral system" as a more appropriate and alternatively a "bi-cameral system", consisting of a lower house and an upper house.

Margaret Thatcher, despite her initial statement and support of a "unitary" Cyprus, changed both the state rhetoric and terminology into a federal Cyprus, because the word "unitary" bothered the Turks and the T/Cs. Once again Britain sided to the Turkish strategy thus acting impartially. At last, Kyprianou by submitting his "Framework" showed his willingness to succumb to Turkish demands and presented to the UN General Secretary his proposals for a comprehensive settlement designed to meet most of the T/C concerns thus

making major concessions in order to accommodate the latter's demands. The T/C leader rejected the Framework without any clarification.[415]

Both Kyprianou's Framework and the Secretary General's efforts hit a dead-end. In violation of every UN resolution and in disregard of the international law and the international community, the T/Cs proclaimed "elections", a "referendum", or a new "constitution". The G/Cs were working in full-cooperation with the Secretary General to achieve a common ground. The Secretary General's efforts to set a ground for negotiations to bridge any mistrust and prevent further fait accompli because of the aforementioned T/C illegal acts, were nulled.[416] The critical freedom of movement, the issue of settlement and the right of property were still infringed by the T/Cs.[417] Strong disapproval on behalf of Denktash especially on high-level meetings led to successive failures. Most of the arguments were referring to the T/C desire on political equality and were highlighting the peril of a possible annexation of the island to Greece.[418] Also, the term "bi-communal" for the T/Cs is being translated as a reflection "both in form and in substance, cannot be represented to the outside world in a unilateral fashion, exclusively by one of the two national communities in Cyprus, while the other one is ignored."[419] The late line is the core of the Turkish and the T/C attempt to legitimize the so far non-recognized secessionist state in the occupied territories.

The difficult negotiating position in which the RoC found itself is apparent in the document "Agenda for the Third Round of the Secretary-General's Proximity Talks on Cyprus". In the 1984 Vienna Working Points on territorial issue, an 82% of the territory was recognized that should be given back to the G/Cs who forcefully had been expelled from their hometowns after the Turkish invasion. In the "Agenda for the Third Round of the Secretary-General's

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[415] *Turkish Policy on Cyprus and Efforts to Solve the Cyprus Problem,* Annex 3, pp.49-53, Φ Αργυρού, «Ήθελε ένταξη σε ΝΑΤΟ-ΕΟΚ», *Η Σημερινή,* 30 Δεκεμβρίου 2014,
http://www.sigmalive.com/simerini/politics/193479/ithele-entaksi-se-natoeok
[416] Cf. UN Secretary-General's 5-point Scenario, 18.4.1984., Vienna Working Points, 6/8/1984,
[417] Cf. point 3 of the 1977 the "High Level Agreement of 12 February 1977", Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at:
https://www.mfa.gr/images/docs/kypriako/high_level_agreement_february_1977.pdf
[418] Cf. "Agenda for the Third Round of the Secretary-General's Proximity Talks on Cyprus", 27 November 1984, Held at United Nations Headquarters, on 27 November 1984. It is important to mention the provision in this "Agenda" on the Executive power: "There would be a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice-President and there would be no rotation." Also, the: Introductory constitutional provisions, agreed upon at the intercommunal talks in 1981-1982, "'Draft Statement and Consolidated Draft Agreement Presented by the Secretary-General in April 1985.' Draft Statement by the Secretary-General on the Agreement on Cyprus" and the 'Mr Denktash's Reply to April 85 Document', 8 August 1985.
[419] *Turkish Policy on Cyprus and Efforts to Solve the Cyprus Problem,* ANNEX 9 Mr Denktash's Reply to April 85 Document', 8 August 1985, p.86.

Proximity Talks on Cyprus", on territory is acknowledged a 71% to 29% for the G/Cs and the T/Cs accordingly.[420] Nevertheless, the G/Cs' desire was to conclude to a final agreement that would endorse an effective, viable federal system, and that would include fundamental UN human rights since the Turkish invasion created a huge humanitarian crisis that its consequences had to be reversed.

During the 1980s, the G/Cs remained loyal and steadfast to the UN procedures and to the Secretary General's mandates. Vital prerequisites for the G/Cs were: the international personality of the federal republic -guarantees could not be accepted-; the creation of an effective and speedy-deadlock-resolving machine; the safeguarding of the three freedoms; no territorial adjustments; the "integrated whole" approach, meaning that everything that has been agreed would be formally binding when the two sides come to an agreement on all issues.[421] The G/Cs were passing the message of an honest cooperation on the grounds that the Secretary General had set, and that there is no place for alterations should a peaceful agreement would resolve once and for all the dispute.

The G/Cs were drawing a line in the sand to set limits. They demanded an effective federation that would entrench fundamental human rights and that would safeguard a democratic system. Since the G/Cs accepted the Secretary General's Draft Agreement, the latter assured the G/Cs that he would halt any T/C act that would create new faits accomplis. However, this did not happen. On March 29th, 1986, the Secretary General presented a new Draft that ignored major issues of G/C concern as the withdrawal of Turkish troops, and defined crucial issues differently from the April 1985 Draft. This was a turning point for the negotiation process since the side that was most willing to sit at the table patiently and to negotiate, found itself trapped into more concessions on critical issues as settlement and the right to property; on the withdrawal of Turkish troops and settlers; on constitution and the freedoms of movement, and finally the extent of vetoes. The neglect of the aforementioned endangered the functioning of the future state as well as the international peace and stability. Needless to mention that the views on the Draft were happily endorsed by the T/C leader, Rauf Denktash.[422]

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[420] Cf. *Turkish Policy on Cyprus and Efforts to Solve the Cyprus Problem,*
[421] Annex 10, "President Kyprianou's Letter to U.N. Secretary-General" in *Turkish Policy on Cyprus and Efforts to Solve the Cyprus Problem,*
[422] *Turkish Policy on Cyprus and Efforts to Solve the Cyprus Problem,* p.32-33., Mr. Mavrommatis' Letter of Resignation, Dated 1.4.86, President Kyprianou's Letter to the U.N. Secretary-General, Dated 20 April 1986, Mr.

In 1988, George Vassiliou was elected President of the RoC. Soon he was given the name "the businessman" because of his new style of governing and especially of his idea of treating the Cyprus Problem. During the Vassiliou presidency the Cyprus Problem was the focal point not only of the Cypriot foreign policy but it also dictated the whole life of Cyprus in both domestic and foreign affairs.

During Vassiliou's presidency that lasted for one presidential term (1988-1993), his policy was focused on keeping high on the international politics and especially in the UN agenda the Cyprus issue. The President was convinced that the status quo was unacceptable and thus a solution was "of the uttermost urgency".[423] As he stated:

> "The passage of time allows the invader to consolidate the partition and alter the face of Cyprus. It can also lead to negative developments both on the international level – with a possible acceptance of the status quo and the danger of recognising partition – and on the local level with the lack of contact between the two communities."[424]

Vassiliou was oriented towards bilateral talks with the leader of the occupied territories, Rauf Denktash. He insisted on holding intensive round of meetings under the UN auspices. However, he retreated from the policy of "preconditions" that previous Presidents were rigid. The term "preconditions" implied that before the start of negotiations between the representatives of the T/Cs and the G/Cs, there should be a complete withdrawal of all Turkish troops and settlers, international guarantees as well as the implementation of the three fundamental freedoms. This change in the newly elected President's policy satisfied the T/C's intransigence. Rauf Denktash had always been in favor of entering the dialogue without preconditions. Denktash's provocative posture to create chaos by playing the blame-game, victimizing the T/Cs and abandoning any peace-effort was Deus ex machina. Moreover, the international community was never fond of the preconditions. Instead, it favored an agreement that would be the outcome of the negotiations.[425]

Denktash's Letter to the U.N. Secretary-General, Dated 21 April 1986, Notes on "Draft Framework Agreement on Cyprus" of 29 March 1986 (Cyprus Government Positions).

[423] "Outline proposals for the establishment of a federal republic and for the solution of the Cyprus problem", Nicosia 30 January 1989.

[424] Vassiliou, p.3.

[425] Vassiliou, p.7.

This period is characterized by Turkey's and the T/C's intrigue and by Vassiliou's perseverance. The latter firmly believed in abiding to the UN's procedure and sticking to internationalizing the issue by motivating the great powers, especially those that were members of the Security Council. The core of his strategy aimed at increasing international powers' involvement. His goal, to press Turkey by rendering occupation unaffordable and damaging for Turkey's image. Hence, the President via negotiations and via a steady presence in international fora, where the RoC would show its good will and, as he thought, it would be rewarded for its continuous struggle for peace, Vassiliou believed that he would achieve a just and viable agreement.

During Vassiliou's presidency high-level meetings took place under the UN auspices. The President presented proposals aiming at establishing an independent, sovereign, integral, non-aligned Federal Republic. Vassiliou, in order to meet the T/C concerns and alleviate them to continue the negotiations, based his proposals and the whole negotiation approach on the Vienna Working Points of August 6th, 1984.[426] After the Papandreou-Ozal meeting, the Greek and the Turkish Prime Minister respectively, where it was agreed that both countries should intensify dialogue, Vassiliou in concert with the Greek Prime minister moved on taking all necessary steps to internationalize the issue and make Turkey accountable. Vassiliou desired to surpass the deadlock and resume the talks. According to his views, this could be accomplished by mobilizing the great powers. Thus, he pursued the British and American support.

While President Vassiliou was pursuing the relaunch of intercommunal dialogue, Turkey was putting obstacles to torpedo the resumption of the talks. However, the UN accomplished to restart the dialogue on August, 1988. This meeting that occurred in Geneva marked the end of the preconditions but did not mark the end of the T/C intransigence. The T/C leader Rauf Denktash refused to discuss on critical matters that would aid on achieving progress.

Vassiliou's good will emanated from the coming of the new age, the end of the Cold War. He believed that this improved climate would favor cooperation while it would decrease the great powers' competition in the regional subsystems. He was aware that Turkey and the T/Cs wished of a continuation of the status quo. Therefore, the RoC's strategy was based on

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[426] "Outline proposals for the establishment of a federal republic and for the solution of the Cyprus problem", Nicosia 30 January 1989.

internationalizing the Cyprus issue at the UN and the EC. Vassiliou wished to show to the T/Cs and Turkey that the occupation was not only damaging the T/Cs and the international position of Turkey but it was also costly for the latter to maintain enormous Turkish troops and facilitate settlers on Cyprus. The RoC's strategy was based on a fallacy. While the RoC was struggling to resume the dialogue and was aware of the T/C efforts to blow the whole procedure, the Presidency was holding the belief that

> "it is our duty to make Denktash reveal his intransigence at the negotiating table in front of the UN representative so that we can afterwards turn to our friends abroad and give them the proper information with which to exert their influence. The aim is to make the Turkish side relent and conform to the principles of justice and the UN resolutions."[427]

During the period of 1989-1990 a repetitive behavior on behalf of the T/Cs deteriorated the situation. Cyprus submitted proposals based on the high-level agreements while the T/Cs were hardening their position which was far from these agreements. The RoC erroneously believed that they wanted "to convince both the Turkish side and the international community that we were considering the whole procedure with seriousness and a sense of responsibility."[428] Unfortunately, the one sided negotiations entangled the RoC in a series of further concessions since the Turks were unmoved while the RoC was taking seriously the peace process. During the 1989 talks, all that the T/C side wanted was to achieve the legalization of the secessionist state and the right to self-determination.

In July 1989, the Secretary General presented the controversial "Set of Ideas". Despite the fact that this proposal was designed in a way that most of the T/C demands were met while the G/Cs were compelled to concede to continue the peace process, President Vassiliou agreed to them. However, Turkish and T/C intransigence went that far that questioned the Secretary General's mandate and proposed preconditions for the talks. Due to the latter's posture the 1990 meeting in New York collapsed. The T/C plan was unraveling steadily, quietly and elaborately. On the March 2nd, 1990, meeting the T/C preconditions included a significant change in terminology. The term "communities" was equated to "peoples" so that self-

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[427] Vassiliou, p.55
[428] Vassiliou, p.47

determination would apply as a right to the two "peoples".[429] Thus, as Denktash put it in his letter addressed to the UNSG:

"The difficulties which confronted us during our meetings relating to the use of the word communities or peoples have not been correctly reflected in your statement. Whatever terminology is used, it is clear that the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots are two distinct and separate peoples with the right to freely determine their political status. The insistence on use of the word community in a restrictive sense and the refusal to accept any other proposed alternative is tantamount to a rejection of this right. Security Council resolution 367 (1975) was never intended to build a conceptual framework which would restrict or take away any right of the two parties in Cyprus which they already possessed and exercised both before and after this resolution. This right will be expressed once again to transform the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus into one of the component republics of the future federation in Cyprus following the current negotiations, if they result in an acceptable solution to my people. It is only after this process that a solution based on one State in the form of a federal union comprising two peoples will have been achieved."[430]

Denktash's and Turkey's intentions were apparent. Both showed contempt for past resolutions as well as for the UN's procedures to establish a federation or even better a confederation that would be constituted by two peoples thus having the right to self-determination.

In 1992, a new era begins for the Cyprus peace efforts with the newly elected UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Gali. The Secretary General introduced a new "Set of Ideas" for a draft settlement that further expanded the previous concepts. In his proposals, he referred to the establishment of a secular, bi-zonal, bi-communal federal republic composed of two politically equal states. At this point it should be clarified the term political equality as it was defined in the early 90s:

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[429] Thus, the T/Cs violated the UNSC Res. 367 (1975), and the 1977-79 agreements, meaning the base of the intercommunal talks.
[430] United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus", S/21183, 8 March 1990

"While political equality does not mean equal numerical participation in all federal government branches and administration, it should be reflected inter-alia in various ways: in the requirement that the federal constitution of the State of Cyprus be approved or amended with the concurrence of both communities".[431] Furthermore, the UNSC that endorsed the "Set of Ideas" as described in the SG's report (S/23780), it clearly states that "such a settlement must exclude union in a whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession;".[432]

The 1992 "Set of Ideas" provoked a round of negotiations and reactions in the RoC's domestic politics. Cyprus was conceding on issues of substance while the T/Cs were gaining time to strengthen the status quo as they always wished. The "Set of Ideas" included provisions to address the withdrawal of troops, the repatriation of refugees and essential human rights in a manner that was satisfying the Turkish position. The "Set of Ideas" that President Vassiliou happily endorsed, was actually adopting Turkish demands and was damaging any effort to reach a just and viable solution. Turkey was not anymore the occupant power but was in charge of the occupied territories as an equal partner.[433] It seems that the goal of motivating the international community towards exerting influence on Turkey to comply with the international law was falling apart. The great powers and the UN indulged Turkey instead of forcing her to abandon its expansionist plans. Suffice to mention the T/C intransigence to discuss any territorial aspect unless the international community would recognize the legitimacy of the secessionist state.

The euphoria was based on the wish that the US could influence Turkey to change its projects proved elusive. The endorsement of the Set of Ideas as "an appropriate basis for reaching an overall framework agreement"[434] was a death-sentence to the 1977-79

[431] United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus", S/21183, 8 March 1990
[432] United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus", S/23780, 3 April 1992, United Nations Security Council, Resolution 750 (1992) of April 10 1992, United Nations Security council, S/RES/774 (1992) 26 August 1992.
[433] "53. The demilitarization of the federal republic remains an objective. 72. The property claims of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot displaced persons are recognized and will be dealt with fairly on the basis of a time-frame and practical regulations based on the 1977 high-level agreement, on the need to ensure social peace and harmony, and on the arrangements set out below. 73. The first priority will be given to the satisfactory relocation of and support for Turkish Cypriots living in the area that will come under Greek Cypriot administration and to displaced persons returning to that area. "Set of Ideas on an Overall Framework Agreement on Cyprus (1992)",
https://www.pio.gov.cy/en/assets/pdf/cyproblem/Gali%20Set%20of%20Ideas%20(1992).pdf
[434] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 750 (1992) of April 10 1992, United Nations Security council

agreements: on the territorial issue, Vassiliou gave up on Kerynia by accepting the map and conceding to the T/Cs a 27,5% of the RoC and a 54% of the shores; on constitution, he accepted the creation of two parliaments that further decreased the power of a federal state. Furthermore, he handled to the secessionist state the right to sign off bilateral agreements with states.[435] All the aforementioned catastrophic precedents had to be averted. The hot potato was to be handled by the next president elected of the RoC, Glafkos Clerides.

3.2.3.a. From the "Set of Ideas" legacy to the "Annan Plan"

"Who said anything like this? The Gali Ideas were much better than the Annan Plan that we have in front of us. And this is better than any future plan for a solution". [436]

The lesson learned for the G/Cs after the acceptance of the de Cuellar "Set of Ideas" should have been that: first, whatever is proposed formally and especially informally on the table, soon it turns as a base for negotiations thus altering forever any previous agreements to the worst. Second, the T/C position did not move an inch from its initial designations: the creation of two independent states in Cyprus. Denktash's stubbornness that was well known to all the actors involved in the peace process made him predictable. His absolute devotion to no solution is a solution drove him not only to reject diligently proposals but also to avoid stating or submitting ideas. He was never willing to negotiate any concession especially on territory or property and the return of refugees to their homes. Clearly his agenda included: separate sovereignty; the right of unilateral intervention by Turkey; objections on the right to return and refugees' right to property; the recognition of two peoples and the legitimization of the secessionist state. Even at that period when de Cuellar's ideas where favoring the T/C positions, Denktash was not in concert with the "Set of Ideas". Hence, another turbulent period for the RoC and the newly elected president began.

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[435] cf. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 7774, S/RES/774 (1992) 26 August 1992, Adopted by the Security Council at its 3109th meeting.
[436] Tassos Papadopoulos' reply to Vassiliou when the latter asked the former "to what extent the Annan Plan that he was now supporting was so much better than the Gali Ideas which he had fanatically fought against.", Vassiliou, p.260.

The ten-years period of Glafkos Clerides' presidency started with averting the consequences of the previous agreements that bore negative weight for the G/Cs. Clerides as the President of the Republic was obliged to adopt the "Set of Ideas" and the map that was included in, as well as the CBM that the former President, Vassiliou, accepted. However, the greatest challenge that Clerides had to deal with was the downgrade of the RoC to the G/C community as the interlocutor. Actions had to be undertaken in fear of a possible break off of the talks and whatever that could implicate.

President Clerides given the limited room for maneuver, had to find alternatives to empower the RoC. Thus, he aimed at engaging further the EEC in the Cyprus' negotiations and at pressing for the acceptance of its membership as soon as possible. Unfortunately, he found himself in the position of implementing CBM. These CBM were submitted by the UN Secretary-General to the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus on July 1st, 1993 and on May 30th, 1994, as a means to promote an overall framework agreement on Cyprus. Sadly, most of them were harming the G/C interests and many of them were enhancing the illegal "state's" position, as the opening of the airport of Nicosia that would contribute to the wealth of the secessionist state via tourism.[437] Clerides had his hands tied since he had to implement every provision of the Gali Ideas and the CBM. However, he was searching for alternatives to save Cyprus from lethal provisions that would result in unrepairable damages. For example, by accepting the Galli ideas, the RoC was conceding to the establishment of a confederation, thus satisfying a prolonged Turkish demand. Here lies Clerides' decision to focus on the implementation of the CBM to avoid the harmful provisions of the Gali ideas.

The decision to engage the EEC to the peace efforts had its roots in the economic, political and defense aid that the RoC could earn from the institution and its decision-making process. Many times this process proved fruitful since every decision of the European Court or any EEC institution never recognized the legitimacy of the secessionist state. Furthermore,

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[437] "The draft ideas deliver to both sides, and especially to the Turkish Cypriot side, the benefits envisaged in the package of July 1993 and more. They would enable the Turkish Cypriots to enjoy the full benefits of Nicosia International Airport through unhindered direct passenger travel and direct import and export of goods. The Turkish Cypriot airline would enjoy traffic rights similar to those enjoyed by airlines operating from their home airport. The embargo that has weighed on the Turkish Cypriot community for so long would be substantially punctured. Turkish Cypriots would benefit significantly from the reopening of the fenced area of Varosha and their involvement in economic activities there." (para 48). Republic of Cyprus, MFA, Excerpts From the Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council S/1994/629, 30 May 1994, at:
http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2016.nsf/7AC7348E7EB47711C2257F9C0035767E/$file/Confidence-Building%20Measures%20_30%20May%201994_.pdf

many of the CBM that had an economic impact were against the EEC decision on the TRNC embargo. Yet, the pressure on the RoC was heavy on behalf of the UN and the great powers that, by pressing to implement the CBM, they were asking of the RoC to violate the UNSC resolutions as the 550 that enforced the economic embargo.[438]

Despite all the efforts from the UN, the G/C's good-will and the great powers' attempts to persuade Turkey and the T/Cs to implement the CBM, the T/C intransigence prevailed. Collective security was inapplicable in the case of Greece vs Turkey, much less in a divided state vs the occupant power. Consequently, the issue that reasonably is being raised is if the "Set of Ideas" damaged the peace-effort since it encouraged the legitimization of the secessionist state. Should the CBM were rejected by the T/C thus resulting in bringing down the whole process, what then left for the RoC?

The years were passing by imitating the well-known procedure: Turkish intransigence; more pressure on the G/Cs; an impartial UN that was adjusting its posture to Turkish demands in order not to abandon the talks thus provoking the RoC's outrage. The Secretary General blamed both sides for not implementing the CMB while Denktash was the one that was setting back the talks. Denktash strongly opposed the RoC's application to the EEC and the term "single sovereignty and international personality"[439] of Cyprus. Hence, Clerides' strategy was to further involve the EEC in the peace-process and in concert with the Greek government to inform the European members on the Turkish impediments to the solution of the Cyprus issue. He wanted to dissociate Cyprus' EEC acceptance from the Cyprus' solution, meaning that the latter must not be a precondition to the EEC membership, as Turkey was aiming.[440]

In the middle of the 90s, the strategy of the RoC that was having the Greek government's support, was shaped as follows: focus on the Resolution 939 and not on the implementation of the CBM; by-passing any harmful provision of the Galli ideas and of the CBMs as well. Reasonably, one might wonder if the strategic choices of the RoC's leadership were fruitful. Clerides inherited the CBM from Vassiliou as a material and not as a base in the negotiations. Eventually, the CBM turned out a heavy burden for the G/Cs since the UN as well as the USA considered the implementation a significant step towards peace. From now on

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[438] cf. United Nations Security Council, S/RES/939 (1994) 29 July 1994, RESOLUTION 939 (1994), Adopted by the Security Council at its 3412th meeting
[439] United Nations Security Council, S/RES/939 (1994) 29 July 1994, RESOLUTION 939 (1994), Adopted by the Security Council at its 3412th meeting
[440] Βανέζης, pp.43-46

Cyprus was under international pressure to implement the CBM and further be engaged in the talks. Nevertheless, the international community's posture against Denktash's intransigence on the CBM was not equivalent. The G/Cs were consistent both in the talks and the implementation while the T/C were mastering the art of the "blame-game" and avoiding any further discussion that would make them to commit to further "concessions".

Clerides' frustration led him to practice secret diplomacy under the UN auspices at the house of Gustav Feissel, Deputy Special Representative in Cyprus. The purpose, the continuation of the talks as the UN was further pressing to resume dialogue. The outcome of the secret diplomacy that put on the table all the UN agenda, CBM included, was the predictable but unpunished posture on behalf of the T/Cs that continued to deny fundamental principles as the federation and the single sovereignty. Meanwhile the G/Cs followed the well-known strategy of appeasement aiming to keep the T/Cs in the negotiations and to diminish international pressure. Furthermore, many of the CBM were against the EEC principles.

In the mid of 1995, after two years of Clerides' presidency, nothing changed in the Cyprus issue: concessions on behalf of the G/Cs; stubbornness on behalf of Turks and Denktash; obnoxious CBM accepted by the G/Cs and a favorable Anglo-American posture towards the Turks. In addition, the Anglo-Americans pursue for a solution via "secret diplomacy" (May 1995) failed due to Turkish intransigence. However, the Turkish side was never blamed for or pressed to change its attitude. On the contrary, the American administration stated that the present deadlock would result in the abandonment of any US initiative on Cyprus' peace efforts. As a result, the G/Cs found once again themselves with their back to the wall, compelled to find efficient strategy.[441]

President Clerides' vision was about the creation of a Cypriot state with single sovereignty and international personality. The new state will be in concert with the acquis communautaire and the fundamental human rights and the UN resolutions.

The G/C leadership saw the EU as a prospect that would promote their interest. There were many positive EU resolutions on Cyprus' applications for membership: from the "Common Resolution 12 June 1995" to the triumphal "Resolution 12 July 1995", when the European Parliament confirmed Cyprus' eligibility for membership. The Parliament pointed out "that the Union Considers the island to be a single entity with a legitimate and internationally

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[441] Βανέζης, pp.63-72.

recognised government, and that the status quo is unacceptable...".[442] It should not go unnoticed the mention of the Secretary General on his report of May 30th, 1994, where he makes point of the deadlock in the intercommunal talks: "For the present, the Security Council finds itself faced with an already familiar scenario: the absence of agreement due essentially to a lack of political will on the Turkish Cypriot side."[443] Finally the case 432/92 of July 5th, 1994, the Court decisively gave the judgment that:

"(a) The Republic of Cyprus is a sovereign State, recognized by all the Member States of the European Community. Its Constitution was adopted in 1960 and its territory comprises the whole of the island of Cyprus, apart from the sovereign base areas.

(b) The United Kingdom and the other Member States do not recognize a 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'."[444]

The road to the EU membership was not paved with roses. The EU is comprised by ethnic-states that pursue via the EU their interests. Thus, for many member-states retaining good relations with Turkey was an obstacle for the Cypriot foreign policy goals. This is why despite Turkey's non-compliance with the EU resolutions, the EU kept supporting Turkey's European perspective since the Anglo-Americans assured the EU that Turkey was willing to compromise on the Cyprus issue.[445] Hence, the EU believed that Turkey's custom union would normalize many problems as the peace efforts on Cyprus, the Kurdish issue and the Turkish (twice) invasion in northern Iraq and the democratization process of Turkey. In sum, Turkey found in the EU a benevolent friend without respecting and obeying to basic EU principles and human rights as well.

Concluding the decade of 90s, two important episodes should be mentioned: the Greco-Turkish crisis over Imia, two Greek islets that the Turks mobilized armed forces to dominate the islets and contest the Greek sovereignty, and the purchase of the Russian anti-

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[442] PIO, "Resolution of 12 July 1995", p.83
[443] Republic of Cyprus, MFA, Excerpts From the Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council S/1994/629, 30 May 1994, at:
http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2016.nsf/7AC7348E7EB47711C2257F9C0035767E/$file/Confidence-Building%20Measures%20_30%20May%201994_.pdf
[444] Judgment of the Court of 5 July 1994.The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte S. P. Anastasiou (Pissouri) Ltd and others. Reference for a preliminary ruling: High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division - United Kingdom. EEC-Cyprus Association Agreement - Directive 77/93/EEC - Non-recognition of movement and phytosanitary certificates originating from the part of Cyprus to the north of the United Nations Buffer Zone. Case C-432/92. http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-432/92
[445] Βανέζης, p.76

missile system S-300 by the Cypriot administration.[446] In 1997, Greece's Prime Minister, Costas Simitis and President Clerides objected strongly to the US proposal on a flight "Moratorium" that according to the US would improve the relations of Greece with Turkey and Cyprus with Turkey. Cyprus and Greece questioned the US stance on weapons sales to Turkey at a period where Turkey was violating the FIR of both states. The outcome of this US-Greek disagreement and the British support on a solution as a precondition to EU accession led the Cypriot leadership to the decision to buy the surface to air missile defense system S-300 from the Russians, thus provoking Western outrage.[447]

The aforementioned incidents led to the reevaluation of the "Joint Defense Area" doctrine, Greece's strategic doctrine that was "extended" in 1993 to align the military and diplomatic aspects of Greek strategy to the just solution of the Cyprus issue.[448] Cyprus remained rigid on fundamental principles of demilitarization, guarantees, security, single sovereignty, and a solution anchored in the EU Acquis communautaire.

The Cypriot strategic move to purchase the Russian missiles was entirely a matter of Clerides' decision-making. His decision was known to the Greek Government and the Hellenic Ministry of Defense, despite Simitis' late objection.[449] Clerides' aim: the S-300 to become an efficient diplomatic weapon-warning to the US and not a threat to Turkey. After all, the greatest reactions came from the Americans and the British and less from the Turks.

Clerides never believed that the solution to the Cyprus problem would be an armed conflict initiated by the Greek side. Having devoted his life to the struggle of the Hellenes in Cyprus, the President was disappointed not only by Turkish intransigence, but also by the

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[446] The EU backed the Greek side on the Imia dispute, and warned the EU-candidate country Turkey to refrain from any kind of threat or action directed against the sovereignty of EU member state Greece. The US kept a neutral stance that outraged the Greeks. The US sought to prevent a military confrontation between its two NATO allies and to restore the status quo ante. C Migdalovitz, "Congressional Research Service Report 96-140 Greece and Turkey: The Rocky Islet Crisis", Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division ,Updated March 7, 1996, available at: https://file.wikileaks.org/file/crs/96-140.pdf
European Commission: Turkey must respect EU member states' sovereignty, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-96-132_en.htm,
[447] Cyprus Pio, "US will continue to push for flight moratorium", http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/cypio/1997/97-01-23.cypio.html, FAS, "Testimony by George J. Tenet", 5 February 1997, https://fas.org/asmp/profiles/turkey_greece.htm
[448] "The revisionist policy of Turkey towards Greece, as demonstrated in the Aegean, Cyprus, and Thrace, causes serious concern and is considered as the most significant threat against Greek Security", hence the "Joint Defense Area" is still important to deter Turkish aggression. "Greece. White Paper for the Armed Forces." p.5, available at: http://stratobs.eu/profile-europe-29.php
[449] Κ Βενιζέλος,"Οι βαριές κουβέντες μεταξύ Σημίτη και Κληρίδη για τους S-300: Δεν ήταν το άθλιο σχέδιο Ανάν, HellasJournal, https://hellasjournal.com/2019/04/o-apisteytos-dialogos-simiti-kai-kliridi-gia-toys-s-300-den-itan-mono-to-athlio-schedio-anan/

continued breach of faith in Washington and London. That period was intense. Clerides was pressed domestically by his coalition as well as by the foreigners. The assignment of Holbrooke as the special envoy to Cyprus was indicative of the American interest to reach a solution and bring regional stability. After intense pressures by the US, the UK, Clerides used the non-installation of the S-300 as a bargaining chip to negotiate the demilitarization of the island.[450] For the President, accomplishing the EU accession and having the EU acquis communautaire as a compass for a future solution was a priority.

When Glafkos Clerides came into power he undertook the responsibility to make over what he inherited as the preconditions for the peace process. He promised to the electorates that he would fix the harmful Gali ideas and that he would disengage the RoC from any proposal that would have detrimental effect. He followed the strategy of constant negotiations but also informal meetings and secret diplomacy aiming at amending the context of the Gali ideas. The outcome, he endorsed even more damaging proposals that resulted in more concessions and he accepted the implementation of CBM that most of them had negative aspects for the RoC. As Lord Hannay put it "I see that the Greek Cypriot side is displaying a serious flexibility. I do not want to categorize the Greek Cypriot side. I have been disappointed by the Turkish side on a number of occasions lately."[451]

Throughout this process, the Hellenic Republic's Prime Minister, Costas Simitis, aided Clerides. He put effort on enhancing Cyprus' negotiating position by engaging the USA and the EU and by restrengthening the Greek and Cypriot deterrence. Nevertheless, the pressure of the great powers was heavy. When Kofi Annan was appointed Secretary General of the UN, direct talks seemed the finest path to solve the Cyprus conundrum. The Gali Ideas, that were based on a racist approach on bi-zonality, freedom of movement and property, would lay the foundation to restart the dialogue. The main actors: the UN, the US, the UK were in favor of this starting point.

The Annan Plan had 5 phases. The path to phase 5 that was submitted to the two communities as a referendum, was diligently shaped years ago. First of all, it kept too many provisions of the Gali "Set of Ideas". Second, it was moving toward the dissolution of the RoC.

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[450] Α Χατζηκυριάκος, «Το μεγάλο δίλημμα του Κληρίδη», *Το ΒΗΜΑ,* 23 Αυγούστου 1998, https://www.tovima.gr/2008/11/24/archive/to-megalo-dilimma-toy-k-kliridi/

[451] Cyprus PIO: Turkish Press and Other Media, "Lord David Hannay was interviewed by Mehmet Ali Birand on CNN TURK. He described the Cyprus problem as the biggest wound of Europe", 02-06-13, http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/tcpr/2002/02-06-13.tcpr.html

It did not place the Cyprus issue in the context of an invasion and occupation thus disregarding the UN resolutions and fundamental civil and human rights. Diego Cordovez, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Cyprus beyond 30 April 1997, showed the UN's intentions: "a sustained process of open-ended negotiations".[452] The T/Cs via its leadership were the first that rejected the Annan Plan even before its final form.[453] This act is indicative of the Turkish and T/C intentions that a solution especially when it comes to federation or confederation is not in their plans.

On May 15th, the EU-Turkey Association Council reviewed the state of EU-Turkey bilateral relations. Turkey did not meet the criteria because of its posture toward Cyprus which was inconsistent with either the UN resolutions or the European Union's position and thus had a negative impact on Euro-Mediterranean partnerships. Turkey maintained a tensed situation over the Aegean. Finally, it had to continue its efforts to harmonize its legislation with that of the European Union.[454]

The outcome of this decision brought about outrage and Turkish threats to integrate Cyprus to Turkey, if Cyprus was to be accepted as an EU member. The UN took seriously the Turkish threats and thus it equalized the RoC with the illegal entity. The international environment also aided Turkish designations. The eminent Iraq war (2003), domestic politics in Turkey that was heading to elections, Denktash's illness, all these parameters were significant on why great powers appeased Turkey thus resulting in more pressure on the Hellenes.

On November 11th, 2002, Alvaro de Soto handed to President Clerides the final edition of the Annan Plan after 4 years of intense negotiations. This plan was endorsed by the EU, the UNSC and the great powers as well. The Annan V was covered with fog. Blind spots on critical issues as the dissolution of the RoC; the creation of a confederation instead of a federation; the existence of two component states that exercise sovereign rights; the right of residency to

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[452] United Nations, "Press Briefing by Special Adviser on Cyprus", 14 July 1997, https://www.un.org/press/en/1997/19970714.cordovez.html

[453] Ε Δ. Καρανασοπούλου, «Απειλεί με βέτο ο Σημίτης», *Τα ΝΕΑ,* 21 Νοεμβρίου 2002, https://www.tanea.gr/2002/11/21/greece/apeilei-me-beto-o-simitis/

[454] Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο, Γραμματεία Ομάδα Εργασίας, «Διεύρυνση», «Θεματικό Δελτίο Αριθ.7. Η Τουρκία και οι Σχέσεις με την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση», Τρίτη αναθεώρηση, Λουξεμβούργο, 10 Φεβρουαρίου 2000, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/pdf/7a1_el.pdf

settlers, thus violating the article 49 of the Geneva Convention.[455] The catch was the "take it or leave it" policy, a form of blackmailing the two interlocutors.

The Annan Plan was purely racist. It aimed to establish a non-viable state without averting the consequences of the 1974 Turkish invasion. It was actually legalizing Turkish invasion due to its provisions and to the fact that it was overlooking the UN resolutions. The statehood and the governance model that it was establishing were not viable due to legal and constitutional generalities. The economic burden was unbearable. Consequently, the state was not viable. The prohibition of refugees' repatriation and the forced expropriation or property exchange were against the EU acquis communautaire. Furthermore, Turkey's right to intervene was renewed and extended while the National Guard, the Cypriot armed forces, would be dissolved. Meanwhile, a number of Turkish troops would remain on the island. Most important, Cyprus could be excluded from the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU because it was given to Turkey the right to veto any European or other military activity in the area. Obviously, the RoC after the Annan Plan would be transformed to a Turkish protectorate.

Every T/C demand was met in this plan. "The Turkish side believes that most of its demands are satisfied."[456] Hence, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the Annan Plan was designed by the West to satisfy the Turks. There were no more war crimes or violation of the UN Charter since the Turkish invasion was obliterated. The newly established state would be under the custody of Turkey and Britain. Turkey would still be the guarantor and Britain would consolidate its sovereignty over the Bases. The dissolution of the RoC was followed by the creation of a state a part of which would be inhabited by T/C thus having the right to self-determination. The road to demographic change and alteration of Cyprus' history by enhancing the Turkish presence was paved.

On February 28th, 2003, Tassos Papadopoulos was elected President of the RoC. Clerides' negotiations on the Annan Plan was the legacy that Papadopoulos had to deal with meticulously. Papadopoulos was about to receive the third revised Annan Plan. Every revision of this plan was getting worse for the G/Cs. Tassos Papadopoulos stated his willingness to hold a referendum should there be a legal framework that ensures a workable and durable

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[455] International Committee of the Red Cross, "Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949. Deportation, Transfers, Evacuations". Article 49, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/380-600056

[456] "Mehmet Ali Birand in Turkish newspaper Posta on the proposed Annan Plan, March 2004",Lobby for Cyprus, http://www.lobbyforcyprus.org/quotations.aspx?type=tk

settlement. The main concern was the security aspects of the plan between Greece and Turkey that should had been were resolved before the referendum. However, despite the "generous" provisions of the revised Annan for the T/Cs, both Denktash and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish elected Prime Minister (2003), remained adamant and refused to submit it to a referendum. The talks collapsed not once but twice because of the Turks and despite the G/Cs' endeavors to reach an agreement before May 1st, 2004, so that a reunited Cyprus would accede to the European Union. Due to Turkish intransigence no substantial negotiations took place either in Cyprus or Bürgenstock. Turkish demands once again were contrary to the fundamental principles of the UN plan and previously agreed trade-offs.

Despite the T/C impediments on the negotiations of the Annan Plan, the UN Secretary became wary on the fact that the Annan Plan was widely presented and analyzed on the RoC's media. Furthermore, the electorate rejected the Annan plan by majority before it was submitted to referendum. That concern was translated into generous charitable activities on behalf of the US' and various NGOs. The manipulation of public opinion was combined with directed international criticism at President Papadopoulos whose rejection of the Annan V plan was not only known but on a televised message he expressed his anxiety on the negative aspects should "Yes" to the Annan Plan prevailed.[457]

"There was indeed one major attempt to manipulate public opinion in Cyprus. That attempt was by the Secretariat."[458] On April 24th, 2004, a clear majority of 75,8% of the G/Cs rejected the plan by a vote while the 64,9% of the T/Cs approved it.

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[457] C Palley, *An International Relations Debacle, The UN Secretary-General's Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999–2004,* Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2005, pp.200-15.
[458] Palley, p. 214.

Conclusion

Cyprus' belief that by bringing in the spotlight of its foreign policy the Turkish invasion would force Turkey to admit its crimes and would comply with International law and every resolution against the 1974 Turkish aggression was Cyprus' biggest strategic mistake during this period. Since independence and till the EU accession, the Republic of Cyprus was engaging in intercommunal talks to prove to the involved great powers and to the UN its goodwill. The fear that if Cyprus would reasonably retreat from the negotiations unless fundamental principles as the 1977-79 agreements, would remain unalterable, backlashed. The legal owner of the island, the RoC was being pressed to concede to significant issues that would not contribute to the creation of a viable Republic in order to bring the intransigent but agenda-setters T/Cs and Turks back to the negotiation table. From the 1992 Gali "Set of Ideas" to the "Annan Plan" Cyprus paid a high price. Certain leadership choices downgraded the Republic as it happened when President Vassiliou conceded to Denktash's demands not to bear the flag of the RoC during the intercommunal talks. The Republic was trapped and downgraded itself from a Republic to a community.

Cyprus firmly believed that it should adhere to the continuation of the procedure via the intercommunal dialogue and to cooperate closely with the Secretary General. A breakdown should never occur. The latter resulted in accepting almost every idea that was put on the table as the starting point to resume the dialogue.

The USA's main interest was focused on calming the tensions above the Aegean and in Cyprus. It looked at the problem from afar and thoroughly calculated its interests. The Americans were seeing the Cyprus problem as one that had to be solved the sooner the better even if they had to turn a blind eye to UN resolutions or violations of human rights.

Britain's policy was predictable. British perceptions on who is to blame for the deadlock are portrayed at Sir David Hannay's words: "that the Greek Cypriots, usually the Olympic champions at that game, <blame game> have been on the receiving end of most of the blame, while the Turkish Cypriots have occupied the high ground."[459] Britain diplomats were favoring a "give and take" negotiation tactic rather than compliance with the international law. The judgment of the Court of July 5th, 1994, on the non-recognition of movement and

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[459] D Hannay*, "Cyprus: Lessons from the debacle of 2004 and the way ahead" *The Round Table* 95.383, 95-100., 2006

phytosanitary certificates that originated from the part of Cyprus to the north of the United Nations Buffer Zone, is indicative of the British hostile policy towards the RoC. Despite the TRNC's defeat, the case showed that the secessionist state can do business, if third parts wished to do so with an illegal entity and in violation of the international law.

Greece's posture changed over time, too. The intense Greco-Turkish relations and the fear of a war break out led the Greek leadership to reach a compromise with Turkey. The communique that was brokered by the United States and was signed on July 8th, 1997, by the Prime Minister Costas Simitis of Greece and the President Suleyman Demirel of Turkey had many repercussions.[460] By creating peaceful environment via appeasement and by adjusting a state's strategy to the archenemy's will, especially when the latter is a revisionist power, lessons learned as of the Munich Agreement of 1938 show "the futility of appeasing expansionist totalitarian states."[461]

The RoC found itself trapped in its own proposals that were not supposed to be negotiated until a final agreement was reached and the occupant Turkish troops withdrew from the north. These non-negotiable issues were on fundamental human rights; on security; constitution and the usurped properties. Meanwhile, Turkey after the illegal invasion systematically aimed at legalizing the fait accompli. The Cypriot strategy was based on appeasement and on more concessions. Cyprus was sitting on the table without preconditions; without ensuring any sign of good-will on behalf of the T/Cs and Turkey. The outcome, an array of agreements and plans: the 1977-79 High-Level Agreements; the Set of Ideas of de Cuellar and Galli, followed by secret diplomacy and American plans of Clifford; Beattie; Holbrooke, and the proposed Annan Plan. All the above enhanced Turkey's position who instead of being addressed as the problem was perceived as part of the solution. Turkey during the decade of 90s promoted firmly a confederation, a rotating presidency, two states, two peoples. To that end, it mobilized the EU and the Western powers that never punished Turkish behavior but desperately needed Turkey to be present not only at the Cyprus talks but also at the Kurdish issue.

[460] C Bohlen, "At Long Last, Greece and Turkey Tiptoe Toward Reconciliation", 21 July 1997, *The New York Times,* https://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/21/world/at-long-last-greece-and-turkey-tiptoe-toward-reconciliation.html
[461] Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Munich Agreement", https://www.britannica.com/event/Munich-Agreement

A change in Cypriot foreign policy occurred when it became a member of the EU with the critical help of the Hellenic Republic. Cyprus' decision was based on security grounds and on the belief that the EU would contribute significantly to reach a solution that will avert the consequences of the Turkish invasion. However, the EU due to conflicting interests of its member-states, had different posture over the equation "Cyprus solution first and then accession."

The RoC paid a heavy burden because of its EU accession. There is no single thing that the G/Cs did not concede: rotating presidency; settlers; demilitarization; non-fully repatriation of the refugees to their properties; the slippery slop of political equality, and many preconditions that paved the way to confederation. The T/C intransigence was rewarded in order to resume the dialogue because of its outrage of not being included as a separate entity in the EU accession talks. For example, Denktash during the 1997-98 talks was never accused for blowing off the talks. In contrary, Richard Holbrooke proposed a compromise solution to the T/C demand for recognition (May 1998). He envisaged that the legal government of the RoC should "acknowledge" the existence of a T/C political entity and that this entity should represented the T/C community through legitimate procedures and institutions. Later, the State Department's spokesperson stated that, despite the US support on the 1977-79 agreements, it was also considering the proposal of "two sovereign states" thus endorsing Cem-Denktash proposals.[462]

This period is marked by blatant and rushed Western proposals to appease the T/Cs. If the RoC ever finds itself accepting a de facto recognition like Holbrooke suggested, then the green light for initiating bilateral relations, political, economic, diplomatic between the TRNC and the RoC, it will mark the end of the RoC as it was established in 1960.

The Annan Plan as a solution to the problem of the Turkish invasion portray at its best the aforementioned. The Annan Plan was no different than the previous plans, beginning from the 1964 George Ball. The difference was that the division appeared to be the best alternative in comparison to the Annan Plan's alarming provisions since the plan itself institutionalized the division between a Greek and a Turkish state and created a status of condominium. The Annan Plan was not designed only by the interference of the great powers and in favor of the T/Cs. Both Athens and Nicosia are to be blamed for their negotiation; the agenda that accepted or

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[462] Coufoudakis, "Cyprus-The Referendum and its Aftermath", p.69, Βανέζης, p.188.

set on the table; the informal meetings and dinners and the successive concessions. Finally, the G/C rejection by no means was a rejection of reunification. The Annan Plan did not meet fundamental concerns on the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cyprus and the elimination of the right of foreign powers to unilaterally intervene in Cyprus. It failed to address adequately guarantees; to ensure that commitments undertaken by the parties involved will be carried out; to remove all Turkish settlers from Cyprus. Instead, it legitimized this international crime and the permanent inflow of Turkish nationals. Also, the issues of a functional government without deadlocks or voting restrictions based on ethnicity; the right of all Cypriots to acquire property and to settle where they choose without restrictive quotas; the Cypriots' anxiety on a property recovery system that would appropriately recognized the rights and interests of displaced Greek Cypriots who were forced from their homes in 1974 and a property compensation arrangement that did not require Greek Cypriots to fund their own restitution, remained ill-considered.[463]

All these decades the legal authority, the Republic of Cyprus, is fighting for a viable solution to the Cyprus problem. The Annan plan did not provide the framework that would establish a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation based on fair, democratic, workable provisions that would accommodate the needs of the whole population of the island. Any future proposed plan should be compatible with EU principles, laws, democratic norms, and of course with the Convention on Human Rights and key UN resolutions.

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[463] Republic of Cyprus, MFA, "The Cyprus Question", available at:
http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2016.nsf/mfa09_en/mfa09_en?OpenDocument

3.3. Cyprus' strategic U-turn. From the post-Annan plan impasse to the formation of its strategic cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond

After the rejection of the Annan Plan, exploratory talks with the UN occurred in 2005, aiming at the resumption of the peace process. In 2008, President Papadopoulos and the Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat, reached an agreement on setting the principles to renew the dialogue and to continue the negotiations on common ground. That agreement fell into void. These efforts were continued by successive Presidents Dimitrios Christofias and today's President, Nicos Anastasiades. The Cyprus' reunification Talks in Crans Montana collapsed. Turkey's and the T/C's intransigence prevailed, despite significant concessions on behalf of Cyprus.

This under examination period is not about the ongoing occupation of Cyprus, although, as it will be highlighted, Cyprus' predicament is dealing with averting the legitimization of the secessionist state in the non-controlled areas. In 2003, the Republic concluded bilateral demarcation agreements for the maritime border of its EEZ, based on the "Middle Line" principle and in accordance with the provisions of the International Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS '82), with the Arab Republic of Egypt (2003), the Republic of Lebanon (2007), and the State of Israel (2010). The delimitation of the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone with its neighboring countries shields Cyprus' interests and attracts great powers' interest as well. A new era in the Eastern Mediterranean is rising.

Greater developments in the region as the Arab spring and the Syrian civil war added value to the strategic location of the island. Since the administration decided to change its foreign policy agenda, the Republic of Cyprus comprehends its capabilities and adopts to the new environment that demands a proactive role to safeguard its national interest.

This unit aims to explore the Republic of Cyprus' strategy in the post- "Annan Plan" era and its position as an integrated member in the European family. The goal is to exhibit the capabilities as well as the impediments upon the strategy formation of a small state that struggles to prevent the legalization of the secessionist state in its northern occupied territories. Thus, it provides an overview of the Republic's strategic environment; it accentuates the balance of power as new collaborations emerged in the region after significant changes in old and new friendships. Accordingly, it stresses Turkey's posture and its revisionism against Greece and Cyprus.

3.3.1. Cyprus' U-turn. The end of illusions

For decades, Cyprus' strategy was focused on internationalizing the Cyprus Problem while it was committed to the talks under the UN auspices. Cyprus' leaders believed that the international community will acknowledge the Turkish crimes and will force Turkey to obey to the UN resolutions and to the international law. The outcomes of the negotiations proved a different reality. The great powers were not willing to make Turkey to comply. Meanwhile, the Republic of Cyprus that was consistent to the UN procedures was the one that paid the price of its commitment to the intercommunal dialogue. Cyprus did concede to so many of her initial positions. It believed that if the dialogue would stop, Cyprus would pay the price for the Turkish intransigence. The de facto state may be recognized internationally thus abandoning forever the goal of the reunification of the island and the repatriation of the refugees in the occupied territories.

When Mehmet Ali Talat elected as the "Prime Minister" of the secessionist state he was considered as a "moderate politician". After an array of meetings, on July 8th, 2006, an agreement was reached between the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Tassos Papadopoulos and the T/C leader, Mehmet Ali Talat. In the set of principles of July 8th, both committed themselves to the reunification of Cyprus based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation and political equality. Despite the "Commitment to ensure that the 'right atmosphere' prevails for this process to be successful",[464] the "moderate" Talat's posture reminded the reason behind the collapse of all peace efforts.

Turkey and the T/Cs coordinated their positions to sabotage any peace effort because of the EU warnings to Turkey regarding the latter's obligations to open the Turkish ports to Cypriots vessels as well as its airports. When the report of Camiel Eurlings, a Dutch member of the European Parliament, was adopted by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament (2006), a race commenced to avert the "EU tough position against Turkey". Both Turkey and the T/Cs played the card of the so-called T/C isolation resulting in breaking the

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[464] MFA Cyprus, "Statement read out by Under-Secretary-General Ibrahim Gambari following the meeting with H.E. Tassos Papadopoulos and H.E. Mehmet Ali Talat on 8 July 2006", available at: http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2016.nsf/FB80B3D87DE5A915C2257F95002BE30E/$file/8%20July%202006%20Agreement%20-%20Set%20of%20Principles.pdf

principles of the Papadopoulos-Talat agreement.[465] The notion of a de facto recognition of the occupied areas was in the air since the rejection of the Annan V. The US and the UK aided scenarios to upgrade the status of the T/Cs and break their economic isolation, despite Turkeys' noncompliance with its EU obligations. Turkey should had been blamed for the situation in the TRNC and the stalemate in the peace talks.[466] That said, Turkey's negative stance is reported in the European Commission's 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 Progress Reports on Turkey, where it is clearly referred to Turkey's no compliance with the Additional Protocol and the obligations that it bears toward the Republic of Cyprus.

On February 24th, 2008, Demetris Christofias was elected to a five-year term as president of the Republic having secured the back of two other center-left wing parties. In his inaugural address he set the goals of his Presidency:

> "The aim of our Presidency is to achieve a just, viable and functional solution to end the occupation and settlement. A solution that would make clear the existent of sovereignty, independence, ecological integrity and unity of the Republic of Cyprus and it will exclude any right of military intervention in the internal affairs of our country by foreign forces. A solution that will reunite land, people, institutions and our economy within a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation."[467]

On 21[st]March, 2008, President Christofias and M.A. Talat on their very first meeting decided to proceed with the setting up of a number of Working Groups and Technical Committees. On their second (May 23rd, 2008), in the presence of the UN Secretary General's Special Representative to Cyprus, Mr. Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, the two leaders "reaffirmed their commitment to bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality, as defined by relevant UN Security Council resolutions. This partnership will have a Federal Government with a single international personality …".[468] It was also agreed that CBM should be adopted and implemented.

Following the March 21st agreement and the Joint Statement of May 23rd, 2008, on the joint statement of Christofias and Talat (July 1st, 2008) both leaders agreed in principle on issues

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[465] Cyprus PIO: Turkish Press and Other Media, 06-09-06, "EP Report on Turkey-Reactions in Turkey and occupied Cyprus "EP Report on Turkey-Reactions in Turkey and occupied Cyprus", available at: http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/tcpr/2006/06-09-06.tcpr.html, Coufoudakis,
[466] Coufoudakis, p.79.
[467] Η Καθημερινή, «Απεβίωσε ο Δημήτρης Χριστόφιας», (in Greek), available at: https://www.kathimerini.gr/1030153/gallery/epikairothta/kosmos/apeviwse-o-dhmhtrhs-Xristofias
[468] Coufoudakis, p.30

of citizenship and single sovereignty thus deciding that it was time to start full-fledged negotiations on September 3rd, 2008.[469] However, this attempt did not bear fruits. The T/C side reiterated its intransigence on guarantees and Turkey's intervention rights on Cyprus. They brought for discussion the solution on "partnership of the two communities," the "right to self-determination", and "political equality" defined in sharp contrast with the UN resolution.[470]

Despite the good faith of President Christofias and his aim for a resumption of the talks, the process failed. When Eroglu came to power after the "election" in 2010, his positions had even strongest effect on the negotiations. His hardline stance was similar to Denktash's. The newly elected T/C leader retracted from previous agreements and convergences.[471] Meanwhile, as Cyprus' designations on exploitation of its gas reserves strategy were fruitful, Turkey continued its illegal actions by concluding an "agreement" with its "muppet-state", the TRNC, to illegally pursue exploration activities within the Republic's EEZ.

In 2012, the Republic of Cyprus undertook the EU Presidency. The T/C side suspended the talks. The UN having understood the sincerity of the stalemate that could not overcome, officially suspended the talks.

In 2013, today's President Nicos Anastasiades, took the office. When Anastasiades came to power he had to tackle a major fiscal crisis that turned the interest in domestic politics. Nevertheless, the T/C side was not reluctant to move forward since it had not propose any significant compromise or new ideas that would move the talks forward. The T/C intransigence signaled the future of the negotiations. While Foreign Minister Kasoulides proposed the returning of Varosha to its legal owners as a CMB in exchange with other benefits to the T/C community, the T/Cs

"rejected the return of Verosha and began speaking more publicly and more often of "the realities on the island," referring to two separate coequal states as well as timetables for concluding the talks. Eroglu had stated that 'while there is a Greek Cypriot administration in the South, there is the TRNC state in the North.' Ankara,

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[469] PIO, "Joint statement by the G/C leader, Mr Demetris Christofias, and the T/C leader, Mr Mehmet Ali Talat (1 July 2008)", https://www.pio.gov.cy/en/joint-statement-by-the-g/c-leader,-mr-demetris-christofias,-and-the-t/c-leader,-mr-mehmet-ali-talat-(1-july-2008).html, "Joint statement by the G/C leader, Mr Demetris Christofias, and the T/C leader, Mr Mehmet Ali Talat (25 July 2008)", https://www.pio.gov.cy/en/joint-statement-by-the-g/c-leader,-mr-demetris-christofias,-and-the-t/c-leader,-mr-mehmet-ali-talat-(25-july-2008).html
[470] Mehmet Ali Talat, letter to the editor, *Financial Times*, March 5, 2008.
[471] Coufoudakis, p.38.

for its part, had already suggested that while it was ready to say 'yes' to a negotiated solution, a two-state option was viable if talks could not restart and produce a solution in a timely fashion."[472]

The two sides, after American interference, managed to outstrip their differences and on February 11, 2014, they issued a Joint Declaration in which they

"expressed their determination to resume structured negotiations in a results-oriented manner. ...The settlement will be based on a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation with political equality, ... The united Cyprus, as a member of the United Nations and of the European Union, shall have a single international legal personality and a single sovereignty, ... There will be a single united Cyprus citizenship, regulated by federal law. All citizens of the united Cyprus shall also be citizens of either the Greek-Cypriot constituent state or the Turkish-Cypriot constituent state. This status shall be internal and shall complement, and not substitute in any way, the united Cyprus citizenship."[473]

From now on the Cyprus problem is interrelated with the Republic of Cyprus' exploration activities in its EEZ.

When Turkey realized Cyprus' potentials and perspectives; the great powers' interest in Cypriot activities; Cyprus' empowerment in the region by forming alliances with neighbor littoral states; then Turkey reemerged its neo-ottoman hegemonic face. Since 2015, numerous illegal NAVTEX have been issued on behalf of Turkey and vessels have been send thus violating the Cypriot EEZ. President Anastasiades suspended the talks until mid-April 2015 when Turkey removed from Famagusta/Amochostos its vessel.

After "TRNC's elections" in 2015, Mustafa Akinci was elected "prime minister". His election promised a new start for the Cyprus' peace efforts since he was considered a moderate politician. Akinci was not Turkey's favorite child. Turkey's anxiety over Akinci's win resulted in Erdogan's visit in the secessionist state. Akinci is reportedly stated "It should be a relationship of brothers/sisters, not a relationship of a motherland and her child".[474]

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[472] Congressional Research Services, "Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive", Updated January 29, 2009, Congressional Research Service, available at: https://crsreports.congress.gov, R41136, p.10
[473] PIO, "Joint Declaration by the G/C leader, Mr Nicos Anastasiades, and the T/C leader, Mr Dervis Eroglu, on the re-launching of talks on the Cyprus problem (11 February 2014)", https://www.pio.gov.cy/en/joint-declaration-by-the-g/c-leader,-mr-nicos-anastasiades,-and-the-t/c-leader,-mr-dervis-eroglu,-on-the-re-launching-of-talks-on-the-cyprus-problem-(11-february-2014).html
[474] "Erdogan Engages in War of Words with New Turkish Cypriot Leader," *Hurriyet Daily News*, April 26, 2015.

During the first months, the peace efforts between the Republic of Cyprus and the T/C leader could be characterized fruitful. Progress had been made on issues as CBM's implementation; mutual commitment towards the opening of more crossing-points; on humanitarian issues etc.[475] However, political uprising in the non-controlled areas changed the political landscape. Akinci's coalition collapsed thus resulting in forming a new government in which many hard-liners participated. Anastasiades and Akinci agreed on accelerating the procedures until they reach a settlement. Two conferences took place that formed till today the political realities on the divided island: the Mont Pelerin conference (2018) and the Crans Montana (2018).

On November 8th the conference began and almost two weeks after the negotiations crushed. Disagreements and objections were raised on behalf of the Greek and the G/C side when issues on territory; the number of the displaced persons that would be allowed to return to their hometowns in the non-controlled areas; guarantees and the demand to hold a multi-party conference were put on the table.[476] The Geneva Conference (January 2017) hit an impasse on the same grounds. Once again, Turkey and the T/Cs did not move an inch from their maximalism.

The peace talks were suspended for months. Crans Montana is the last stop of the peace efforts under the UN auspices so far. The Crans Montana conference (June 28th, 2017) has nothing new to add to the reader. It resumed what started at Geneva II, after the collapse of the Mont Pelerin talks. The two interlocutors remained firm on their prerequisites with minor exceptions: Cyprus' firm posture on no guarantees, no Turkish troops; Mustafa Akinci insisted on securing political equality and rotating presidency, while Turkey insisted on preserving security guarantees. On July 7th, the UNSG announced the failure of the negotiations to reach an agreement.

After the collapse of the Crans Montana talks, the Secretary General presented the "Gutierrez Framework" aiming at the continuation of the talks.[477] Turkey insisted on the

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[475] PIO, "Joint Statement by the G/C leader, Mr Nicos Anastasiades, and the T/C leader, Mr Mustafa Akinci", 28 May 2015, https://www.pio.gov.cy/en/joint-statement-by-the-g/c-leader,-mr-nicos-anastasiades,-and-the-t/c-leader,-mr-mustafa-akinci-(28-may-2015).html

[476] Euractiv, "Cyprus talks hit impasse over territory", 22 November 2016, available at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/cyprus-talks-hit-impasse-over-territory/

[477] The Gutierrez package was comprised of six fundamental modules: security (guarantees - invasive rights), troops (retirement), territorial (side map), property (territories under territorial adjustment and areas without territorial adjustment) and effective participation (as promoted by the Turkish side, a positive vote, etc.).
Χρίστος Χαραλάμπους, «Διαβάστε αυτούσιο το έγγραφο - πρόταση Γκουτέρες», Sigmalive, 20 Σεπτεμβρίου

maintenance of guarantees and its invasive rights as well as on the continued presence of Turkish troops. All led not only to the conference's failure but also to the rejection of the package, which consisted a starting point to resume the talks. However, Turkey's stance that led to the collapse of the peace talks was not reported in the Commission's report on Turkey's accession negotiations something that aggravated Cyprus. [478]

In the fall of 2018, Anastasiades surprised when he put on the table the "decentralized federation." The G/Cs were surprised by this proposal; Akinci opposed while others in the "Turkish Cypriot government" spoke of a "confederation" or a "two-state" solution, the eternal goal of Turkey. Also, the dispute over the hydrocarbons heated up the negotiations causing uproar.[479]

Concluding, four issues must be highlighted: Cyprus' readiness to bring on the negotiating table the rotating presidency; the T/Cs' insistence on proposing two separate states; Turkey's approach for a confederation of two equal states, the permanent stationing of Turkish troops in the occupied territories and Turkish attempts to link the resumption of negotiations with the gas explorations in the Republic's EEZ. Turkey explicitly and unequivocally demands to engage the T/Cs and subsequently Turkey to the legal Cypriot explorations.

2017, available at: https://www.sigmalive.com/news/kypriako/456554/diavaste-aftousio-to-eggrafo-protasi-gkouteres?utm_source=SigmaliveNewsletter&utm_campaign=SigmaliveNewsletter20170921&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Newsletter20170921&utm_source=Sigmalive+Newsletter+List&utm_campaign=8cc30c47de-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_09_21&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_7a688bfa0e-8cc30c47de-220129713

[478] ΚΥΠΕ-Αθανάσιος Αθανασίου, «Οι προκλήσεις της Τουρκίας στην κυπριακή ΑΟΖ, στην Επιτροπή Εξωτερικών του ευρωκοινοβουλίου», 23 Απριλίου 2018, https://hellasjournal.com/2018/04/i-proklisis-tis-tourkias-stin-kypriaki-aoz-stin-epitropi-exoterikon-tou-evrokinovouliou/

[479] L Ioannidou, "Anastasiades Suggests Input from Experts on Notions of Federation and Confederation," *CyprusMail*, October 16, 2018, at https://cyprus-mail.com/2018/10/16/anastasiades-suggests-input-from-experts-on-notions-of-federation-and-confederation/.

3.3.1.a. Reinventing the Republic of Cyprus' foreign policy

The under examination period is characterized by intensive talks on building strong and robust bilateral and multilateral partnerships. The Republic of Cyprus has signed many treaties in areas of interest, as it will be presented in the following lines. Energy, defense, strengthening regional cooperation, military drills, all intend to empower the Republic. However, the issue of gas explorations in Republic's EEZ is yet another thorn not only in the peace talks considering that Turkey's accusations and threats go beyond Cyprus and Greece. When the Energy Ministers from the Republic of Cyprus, Israel, Greece and Italy unveiled their plans for an East Mediterranean pipeline running from Israel to Greece and to Italy (2017), Turkey reacted against any private company and threatened to take actions if the drilling commence before they reach an agreement on the Cyprus issue.

Energy

The decade of 2000 was determinant for the Republic's U-turn. Cyprus' Presidency and its Ministry of Foreign Affairs realized that the powerful actors of the international system, especially the P5, were reluctant to press for averting the consequences of the Turkish invasion and to achieve a viable and just solution as the Republic fervently pursued for decades.

Declassified documents of the Republic of Cyprus showed that successive governments had delayed the declaration and delimitation of the EEZ since 1987 when senior Foreign Ministry insisted on undertaking actions towards delimitation of the EEZ. Back in 1936, Petroleum Concessions Ltd (British company) applied to the British Government for the issue of a geological oil exploration permit in Cyprus. There was evidence on the existence of oilfields but at that time the interest was concentrated on land and not at sea as today. Clerides' presidency and later Papadopoulos' were essential in developing and implementing Cyprus' energy agenda.[480] The first discoveries were made between June 1999 and February 2000 offshore Israel. That led to drawing in oil companies as Shell (2003) that discovered gas offshore Egypt. Meanwhile, Cyprus concluded a Framework of Agreement with the Arab Republic of Egypt on the Development of Hydrocarbon Resources Extending Below the Middle Line (2003). In 2006, both agreed on Data

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[480] I Kouskouvelis, ''Smart' leadership in a small state: The case of Cyprus" in S N. Litsas & A Tziampiris, eds., *The Eastern Mediterranean in Transition: Multipolarity, Power and Politics*, London, Ashgate Publishing pp. 93-117, *Η ΣΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ,* 25/2/2007, σελ.18-19

Exchange and Non-Disclosure Agreement. Under negotiations is the Framework Agreement with the State of Israel on the Development of Hydrocarbons Extending Below the Middle Line. Both states have signed agreement on the Exchange and Non-Disclosure of Confidential Information (2014). Discussions have begun on Framework Agreement with the Republic of Lebanon on the Development of Hydrocarbons Extending Below the Middle Line.[481]

Cyprus announced the 1st Licensing Round Offshore Cyprus, for Blocks 1, 2, 4-12, in May, 2007. Noble Energy, an American based oil company, was granted a Hydrocarbon Exploration.[482] The US Geological Survey estimated a mean of 1.7 billion barrels of recoverable oil and a mean of 122 trillion cubic feet of recoverable gas in the Levant Basin Province.[483]

Cyprus' shift towards energy is not unusual for a small state. It is an opportunity to empower itself internally but mostly externally. As new collaborations in the Eastern Mediterranean emerged, Cyprus focused on its bilateral and trilateral partnerships with neighboring states.

The exploration activities have brought in major players from multinational oil and gas companies from the USA, Italy, France, Qatar, South Korea, Israel, Holland.[484] Cyprus' location at this point, turns to be its asset. Being the southeastern part of the EU, close to Suez Canal, and adjacent to large oil and gas fields, Cyprus is suited to be a hub. The exploitation activities are a tool of Cyprus' foreign policy. It is not only the economic factor that is being affected but also implicates its relations with Eastern Mediterranean countries and beyond. Once again resources and location are proving to be vital for the survival of a small state. Its role as a reliable partner in the region, the creation of a friendly environment for international companies as well as Cyprus' efforts to build political and defense relations basing on its energy cooperation turns

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[481] Υπουργείο Ενέργειας, Εμπορίου και Υδρογονανθράκων, «Ερευνητικές Δραστηριότητες», http://www.mcit.gov.cy/mcit/hydrocarbon.nsf/page17_gr/page17_gr?OpenDocument, «Οριοθέτηση ΑΟΖ», http://www.mcit.gov.cy/mcit/hydrocarbon.nsf/page23_gr/page23_gr?OpenDocument

[482] *Η ΣΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ,* 4/12/2008, σελ.15

[483] USGS, "Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Levant Basin Province, Eastern Mediterranean", 10 March 2012, https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2010/3014/

[484] The 2nd Licensing Round was launched on February, 11th,2012. The Republic of Cyprus granted to ENI Cyprus Limited and KOGAS Cyprus Limited three licenses, for Items 2, 3 and 9, on January 24th, 2013, and to TOTAL E&P Cyprus B.V., two licenses, for Pieces 10 and 11, on February 6th, 2013. In August, 2015, the biggest to-date discovery, the Zohr gas field, was found within the EEZ of Egypt, by ENI, six kilometers away from the Republic of Cyprus' EEZ. In 2016, the Minister issued the third Round Licensing Round. Υπουργείο Ενέργειας, Εμπορίου και Υδρογονανθράκων, «Γύροι αδειοδοτησεων», http://www.mcit.gov.cy/mcit/hydrocarbon.nsf/All/EFCD315C63D1D2B2C2257FA2002794F4?OpenDocument, M Kontos & G Bitsis, "Power Games in the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Republic of Cyprus: The Trouble with Turkey's Coercive Diplomacy", *The Cyprus Review.* 30(1): 51–70, 2018.

the island of Aphrodite into an important partner for the EU, the USA and the region of Eastern Mediterranean.[485]

Defense

The Ministry of Defense has invested in bilateral and trilateral agreements. It has established firm and robust relations with states in areas of common interest as Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan France, Greece, the USA, the UK, Italy, and other states in Europe and the Balkans. Every year significant multilateral and bilateral drills occur in Cyprus' sovereignty. The Republic of Cyprus' goal is "to strengthen existing trilateral co-operation, but also to establish new ones with the participation of regional and EU Member States that have a particular interest and involvement in our region".[486] Hence, it has succeeded to sign bilateral and trilateral agreements as the Cyprus-Greece-Egypt, in the areas of energy, gas exploration and defense. The Joint Declaration following the 5th Cyprus-Egypt-Greece Trilateral Summit is considered to be a milestone.[487] The 5th trilateral Summit that took place in Beersheba, Israel, among Israel-Cyprus-Greece, recognized "the importance of mutual benefits deriving from our cooperation in all sectors of economic activity, [...]continued our common efforts to promote, facilitate, improve and strengthen our economic growth interconnection. We reiterate the importance we attach to promoting investment, innovation, and research between our nations."[488]

Finally, the first trilateral meeting of Greece-Cyprus-Jordan in Nicosia on January 16th, 2018, laid the foundations for strategic cooperation. Furthermore, having at heart of the Cypriot defense policy the strengthening of its role as a factor of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus not only did expand its regional cooperation but succeeded in engaging strong EU actors, many of which are also involved in the Cyprus' exploration activities. In this

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[485] Cyprus profile, "Energy: Oil and Gas. Exploration Race", July 2019, https://www.cyprusprofile.com/en/sectors/energy-and-environment/
[486] Κ. Βενιζέλος, "Χριστοδουλίδης: Ο σχεδιασμός σε σχέση με τους υδρογονάνθρακες συνεχίζεται και ενισχύεται", Mignatiou.com, 27 Δεκεμβρίου 2015, http://wp.me/p3kVLZ-p2U.
[487] United Nations, General Assembly, "Letter dated 13 February 2018 from the Permanent Representatives of Cyprus, Egypt and Greece to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General", 23 February 2018, https://undocs.org/A/72/760
[488] Embassy of Israel in Greece, "5th Trilateral Summit Declaration, Israel-Cyprus-Greece| Beersheba December 20th,2018",https://embassies.gov.il/athens/NewsAndEvents/Pages/IsraelCyprusGreece5thTrilateralSummitDeclaration.aspx

frame, French and Italian Defense Ministers have paid visits to support Cyprus' activities. Finally, the State Department has issued strong statements to condemn Turkey's provocative behavior.

In sum, Cyprus is moving towards strengthening its ties with the UN member states most of which are involved in its EEZ and puts efforts to expand its relations with the Gulf states. Also, via defense agreements that it has signed "with all the neighboring countries, but also with a number of European states, and not only ... it is upgrading its geopolitical role as a factor of stability and security contributor".[489]

3.3.2. The Strategic environment

The Cyprus problem until 2018 was in the front-line of the USA. The United States historically has promoted an "honest broker" approach. The type of solution does not concern the Americans at all as long as the problem is solved. The Americans see a justified need to pressure both sides to preserve a certain balance between them. However, some observers have noted an altered stance. The US Administration and Congress support on Cyprus's energy activities and the lifting of restrictions on arms sales to Cyprus is seen "as an admission by the U.S. that an equitable solution has become more difficult."[490] These moves highlight the US' strong interests in security and energy in the Eastern Mediterranean that has prioritized the strengthening of the US relations with Cyprus. Also, the USA publicly supports the trilateral cooperation between Greece-Cyprus with Israel, Egypt and other regional countries. In the shadow of the Turkish provocative and illegal activities in the Cypriot EEZ, the USA strongly support Cyprus' right to exploit its natural resources. The US do wish to further deepen their military relations with Cyprus. Hence, from lifting the arms embargo to maintaining UNFICYP in its current form, the USA do walk the line between Turkey and Cyprus-Greece.

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[489] "Έχει ξεκινήσει η ενίσχυση του πυροβολικού της Εθνικής Φρουράς, λέει ο Φωκαΐδης"
http://mignatiou.com/2017/12/echi-xekinisi-i-enischisi-tou-pirovolikou-tis-ethnikis-frouras-lei-o-fokaidis/
[490] Congressional Research Services, "Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive", Updated January 29, 2009, Congressional Research Service, available at: https://crsreports.congress.gov, R41137

Apart from the USA, great powers' posture toward the Cyprus peace talks, its EEZ activities and the Turkish illegal actions in Cypriot territories diverge. In late October 2014, when negotiations were suspended, the former British foreign secretary stated that "the international community should accept the reality that there is division and that you have partition."[491] Britain and Turkey remain fully aligned on the "Solution" as it was evidently acknowledged by Yildirim-Mei meeting, but also through the "TRNC Inter-Parliamentary Committee" of the House of Lords.[492]

The main developments that take place at that period are: Turkey's gunboat diplomacy; an intense diplomatic backdrop and interference from and to EU officials; attempts by the UN, the Foreign Office and the State Department to press Cyprus to put on the negotiating table its resources as a parameter that would aid to the final solution. To that, the Republic of Cyprus, as an EU member state, makes an effort to use all of its available diplomatic means to deter Turkish aggression.

Finally, the ongoing Syrian civil war places Cyprus' location into prominence. The Syrian war denotes both the positive and the negative aspect of location. On the one hand, Nicosia's FIR Area Control Center manages a large part of the Eastern Mediterranean and thus is important for Western activities, on the other hand, British bases on Cyprus were used against the Syrian which could endanger the island in case of retaliation. The British bases on the island are of utmost importance for Great Britain, given that the British Prime Minister briefed President Anastasiadis hours after the operation on operational and security grounds.[493]

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[491] "Straw Calls for Acceptance of Cyprus Division," reported by the *Famagusta Gazette*, from an interview between former British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and the Anadolu Agency, November 26, 2014.

[492] Ανδρέας Πιμπίσης, «Στην ίδια ευθεία κινούνται Λονδίνο και Άγκυρα», Philenews, 28 Νοεμβρίου 2017, http://www.philenews.com/eidiseis/politiki/article/458990/stin-idia-eftheia-kinoyntai-londino-kai-aggyra

[493] Η Καθημερινή, «Μάθιου Κιντ: Το Κυπριακό δεν αποτελεί δευτερεύον ζήτημα», 18 Απριλίου 2018, http://www.kathimerini.com.cy/gr/politiki/mathioy-kint-to-kypriako-den-apotelei-deytereyon-zitima

3.3.3. Turkey. The Revisionist interlocutor

"Actually, there is no problem in Cyprus for Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. The Cyprus issue is resolved in terms of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots because there has been continual peace, development, democracy, and freedom in Cyprus for the past 25 years. Everybody who knows the importance Turkey attaches to independence and security knows very well that Turkey cannot take a step back from this situation. Everybody knows that not only the Turkish Cypriots but Turkey also will not take a step back. The already under way integration process between Turkey and the TRNC will accelerate if no agreement is reached on confederation."[494]

The Annan Plan and the Cyprus' accession to the EU were the catalysts for the Turkish and the T/C foreign policy in post-2004 era. A propaganda was launched targeting the G/Cs on grounds of isolating the T/Cs, due to the imposed embargo. No state other than Turkey recognizes the secessionist state, TRNC. Economic disparity between the Republic and the occupied areas was also played to move the international community and the lifting or the ending of the so-called isolation. Widespread disinformation on the conditions that allegedly the T/Cs were living had one goal; not only to get the T/Cs out of their unjust "isolation" but also to blame the Republic's administration as the responsible for the political and economic impasse in the TRNC. Furthermore, Turkey aimed at diverting the EU from the ongoing military aggression against Cyprus, one of the main impediments that kept the EU-Turkey talks freeze. Turkey's final act is to upgrade the secessionist state in the non-controlled areas. [495]

This section will present Turkey's policies on the Cyprus' gas exploration activities, the T/C stance toward the peace talks and the T/C strategy which is in concert with its patron, Turkey. Finally, it will be demonstrated how Turkey is seeking to upgrade the secessionist entity to *a de jure* state.

Turkey's aggression towards the Republic of Cyprus' EEZ exploration activities has its starting point in the agreement on demarcation of the EEZ between the Republic of Cyprus and the Republic of Lebanon. Turkey protested to the Lebanese government over the agreement with the "Greek Cypriot administration" as Turkey call the Republic of Cyprus. On

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[494] TRT Television network (8:00 hours, 25.7.99) broadcast a live interview with Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit by Cem Kircak and Mustafa Balbay in the studio for the "Sunday Panorama" program, with correspondent Nur Batur in Athens. "Ecevit admits occupation of Cyprus", http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/tcpr/1999/99-08-02.tcpr.html#01
[495] Coufoudakis,. pp.23-25

January 29th, 2007, Mehmet Ali Talat warned of tensions in relations with the Republic of Cyprus over potential offshore oil and gas reserves should these not being shared in the two communities.[496] Turkey accelerated its hostile posture after the signing of the agreements between the Republic of Cyprus and the states that agreed on the delimitation and exploration of the gas findings, followed by 3 Licensing Rounds. Numerous times since 2007 warships appeared in the waters of Cyprus as a part of its strategy to expresses its determination to end Cyprus' legal right to explore its EEZ. Several times Turkey harassed research vessels that were conducting investigations within the Cypriot EEZ and has sent submarines and ships to monitor the exploration activities.[497] Turkey did not hesitate to send a drilling vessel "Porthitis" under the presence of the Turkish Air Force and the Navy.[498] In general, Turkey's provocations have been accompanied by violations of Cyprus' air and maritime space by the Turkish armed forces, whereas it explicitly refers to these areas as areas that fall entirely within the Turkish shelf. Turkey till today issues illegal NAVTEX while Cyprus reports these violations and formally protests in the UN. [499]

Turkish and the T/C strategy toward the RoC's energy strategy can be summarized in the following lines:

"If the Greek Cypriot side starts drilling in the Eastern Mediterranean, so will do the Turkish Cypriot side ... if the Greek Cypriot side tries to block the Turkish Cypriot side then crisis will break out." as stated by Kudret Özersay, "MFA", March 2018[500], and

"We will not back down from claiming to the Aegean and Cypriot EEZs", as stated byRecep Tayyip Erdogan, March 2018.[501]

[496] "Turkey protests Lebanese-Greek Cyprus accord", *Hurriyet daily news*, 23 Jan 2007: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=turkey-protests-lebanese-greek-cyprus-accord-2007-01-23, "Talat objects to Greek Cyprus' oil plans", *Hurriyet Daily News,* 29 Jan 2007 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=talat-objects-to-greek-cyprus8217-oil-plans-2007-01-29,

[497] Η ΣΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, 25/11/2008, σελ.5, *Η ΣΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ,* 10/1/2009, σελ.7, "A Turkish seismic ship arrives in one gas zones off Cyprus as Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan vows to defend Turkey's maritime interest", *Hurriyet daily news*, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-to-defend-its-sea-interests-says-pm.aspx?pageID=438&n=turkey-to-defend-its-sea-interests-says-pm-2011-09-27,

[498] Ο Φιλελεύθερος, «Ερντογάν: Ο «Πορθητής» συμπλήρωσε μία έλλειψή μας» 13 June 2018, http://private.philenews.com/eidiseis/politiki/article/539423/erntogn-o-porthitis-symplirose-mia-elleipsi-mas

[499] "Letter dated 29 February 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General", *United Nations, General Assembly-Security Council,* 1 March 2016,

[500] PhileNews, "Οζερσάι: Αν εμποδίσετε γεωτρήσεις μας, θα ξεσπάσει κρίση", 30 March 2018, http://www.philenews.com/eidiseis/politiki/article/506630/ozersai-an-empodisete-gotriseis-mas-tha-xespasei-krisi

[501] NewsBeast, "Ερντογάν: Δεν υποχωρούμε από τις διεκδικήσεις μας σε Αιγαίο και κυπριακή ΑΟΖ,«Η Ελλάδα δεν τηρεί τους κανόνες καλής γειτονίας», 28 March 2018,

3.3.4 The Republic of Cyprus' strategy. An assessment

Cyprus intractable conflict carries out a great danger for military confrontation capable to endanger the already fragile situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. The liable has a name: Turkey. Turkey's revisionism from Syria to Cyprus shakes the whole region.

Cyprus' strategy since the invasion and occupation is based on: single sovereignty; international personality; troops withdrawal and guarantees. From Archbishop Makarios to President Clerides/Anastasiades all promised to fight for the repatriation of the refugees, for a Cyprus free from the Turkish troops and the illegal settlers that usurped the G/C property in the secessionist state. All were elected because they promised to be committed to the UN and to the EU resolutions to reach a viable if not a just solution.

A milestone in Cyprus' history is the 2004 proposed Annan Plan that was rejected by the majority after referendum. On May 1st, 2004, the entire island joined the European Union however the EU acquis applies only to the areas under the internationally recognized government. Today Cyprus is trying to make the most of the recent proved gas reserves.[502] In other words, Cyprus attempts to empower itself by exploiting its strategic position, its resources and its collaborations in the turbulent East Mediterranean. Unfortunately, Cyprus has to deal with a much more powerful revisionist state, Turkey, who is not only struggling to achieve a de jure recognition of the TRNC but also bullies Cyprus' exploration efforts and strives to annex the occupied territories and thus transform it into the 82nd province of Turkey.[503]

After 45 years of occupation the government of the Cyprus is engaged in intercommunal talks showing to the involved great powers and to the UN its goodwill. Painful concessions on behalf of the G/Cs and despite the UN's affirmations that will safeguard fundamental rights, the aforementioned did not alter Turkish intransigence. Nevertheless, new developments shape today's politics in the Eastern Mediterranean and most likely will prevail for years to come. The gas explorations and the delimitation of the EEZ of the littoral states flare on and re-arrange the regional politics.

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https://www.newsbeast.gr/world/arthro/3453824/erntogan-den-ipochoroume-apo-tis-diekdikisis-mas-se-egeo-ke-kipriaki-aoz
[502] CIA the World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cy.html
[503] T Eroglu, "Erdogan adviser wants to annex north Cyprus (updated)", *Cyprus Mail Online*, 26 April 2017, http://cyprus-mail.com/2017/04/26/erdogan-adviser-wants-annex-north-cyprus/

Cyprus is currently actively engaged and promotes partnerships of geopolitical value with friendly states such as Greece, Israel, Egypt, Lebanon. These bilateral and trilateral partnerships aim at collectively addressing common challenges in security, terrorism, defense, energy and other fields as well as in creating shared interests and opportunities with tangible benefits that provide a competitive advantage and highlight its role as a credible security provider, a geopolitical bridge and a pillar of stability in the very volatile region of the Eastern Mediterranean. Through such partnerships the government of Cyprus empowers itself to deal with the revisionist appetite of neo-ottoman Turkey and its crave for geostrategic hegemony while not leaving aside its prime goal which is none else than to reunify the island and its people, the G/Cs and the T/Cs in the context of a viable, independent and functional, bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with one sovereignty, one international personality and one citizenship.

3.3.3.4.a. Cyprus negotiations. United Nations' double standards; is there an alternative?

"No one is likely to be saved by a UN resolution, and no one is likely to be deterred by one. To the contrary, in the debate over the war in Iraq, enthusiasm for the UN 's "essential role" was the strongest among those governments most anxious to preserve Saddam's regime — precisely because the UN was understood to be incapable of enforcing its own resolutions. When the United States does not provide a strategic guarantee, it loses credibility in dangerous ways if it appears to back off."[504]

The analysis over how the UN handled the crisis of these two small states is indicative of the fallacy of collective security. History has proven that not all states view threats in the same way, especially if their vital interests are not at stake or even worst, if there are interests in both belligerents.[505] For example, collective security failed to stop the Nazis; the Turkish invasion of Cyprus was not treated as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait where the UN's coordination

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[504] J A Rabkin, "The Case for Sovereignty: Why the World Should Welcome American Independence", Washington, D.C., AEI Press, 182–84., 2004
[505] See H A Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1994

coalition was unprecedented. It seems that the case of Kuwait was the exception to the rule considering critical failures in war crimes as in Haiti, Cambodia, East Timor and Rwanda.

The London-Zurich agreements created a sui generis republic. Its unique constitution was composed by provisions that made the Republic incapable to govern and imposed the law upon its population, thus resulting in a non-viable and dysfunctional unitary state. The G/Cs desiring to avoid any adoption of Turkish provisions as the creation of a federation and accepted the aforementioned dysfunctionalities. However, the article that by no means could had had been misinterpreted was the IV. As British solicitors and parliamentary agents opined: "For the aforementioned reasons, in my opinion, the in question Article IV of the Treaty, even if it could be said that under any circumstances they permit unilateral military intervention, under the existing circumstances, they do not leave room for any Turkish action, only if this was approved by the Security Council."[506]

After two invasions the UNGA and the UNSC issued statements and resolutions with which they expressed their concern "about the situation which has led to a serious threat to international peace and security" and demanded "an immediate end to foreign military intervention in the Republic of Cyprus…"[507]. However, Turkey was not mentioned as the invading state despite the fact that its actions violated the UN Charter.

A numerus but critical resolutions were adopted to state the UN's concern over the developments in Cyprus before and after the invasion and to raise awareness over the significance of a peaceful solution that engages all parts, Guarantees included. However, in the case of Kuwait, the UNSC clearly states that it is "alarmed by the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 by the military forces of Iraq" and thus acts under Chapter VII of the Charter.[508] Resolution 678 was the catalyst to undertake actions under Article VI for "the maintenance and preservation of international peace and security".[509] Despite the fact that the UNSC considered both cases as a threat to international peace and security, the case of Kuwait was the only case that actions were undertaken under Chapter VII. Consequently, two issues are

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[506] Frank Soscice, "Consultation" in Clerides, p.495. (translated by me)
[507] UNSCR, Resolution 353 (1974) of 20 July 1974, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/353 (accessed 17 July 2019), UNSCR, Resolution 358 (1974) of 15 August 1974, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/358, UN General Assembly Resolution 3212 (XXIX) http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2016.nsf/F87C92F69F15F20BC2257F9C00387EAD/$file/Resolution%201974%20%20(3212).pdf
[508] UNSCR, Resolution 660 (1990), http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/660
[509] UNSCR, Resolution 678 (1990), http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/678

being raised; how and why the UN acted disinterestedly in the case of Cyprus in comparison to the case of Kuwait? Was the military action against Kuwait justified adequately? Furthermore, in the second Iraqi war; were the military actions legal to attack Iraq and overthrow Saddam? Why in the case of Cyprus Turkey remains till today unpunished despite its war crimes as well as its violations of human rights?

To understand the bias of the UN, one should bear in mind that international law is mostly being composed by treaties, in majority inter-state treaties, and custom law. To be more specific, international law "can be found in written treaties, decisions of international tribunals, general principles of law emanating from national legal systems (and therefore positive in nature) and customary international law with its relatively clear definition of what counts as custom".[510] Hence, states are the main actors that form international law as well as supervise its implementation. The UNSC is responsible for maintaining international peace and security. However, its resolutions are not binding. The UNSC's resolutions wording as "requests", "demands" "calls upon" seem to be binding for all member-states. Nevertheless, the case of Cyprus showcases this fallacy and proves that the UNSC's character is mostly political.

As it has been underlined, both cases have been identified as a threat to international peace and security. "The Charter of the United Nations leaves intact the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in case of armed attack against a member of the United Nations until the Security Council takes action."[511] The UN acted under Chapter VII in both cases however authorized the restoration of order only in the case of Kuwait. The latter was purely a political decision because of the Western interests that were at stake when Iraq invaded Kuwait. Concluding, to comprehend the intentions of the UNSC the reader should pay attention to the wording of the resolutions. In the under-examination cases the Resolutions 353 and 678 on Turkish invasion (Turkey is not named) and Iraqi invasion respectively, the UNSC's resolution and determination to restore the order is evident in the case of Kuwait.

Under Article 3, par.2 Turkey's acts can be defined as a war of aggression since, till today, the Republic of Cyprus remains divided because of the Turkish invasion as well as of the fact that still is heavily militarized, since more than 40.000 occupying troops are stationed on the

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[510] United Nations, Chapter VII: Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression, https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/, p.123.
[511] L Oppenheim, *International Law: A Treatise*, ch. V, § 129, Hersch Lauterpacht, 7th ed., 1948, § 130, at 267.

island. In that light, the Republic of Cyprus having been occupying for 45 years legally meets the requirements of the Charter to exercise its right of self-defense. The international law of self-defense is governed by Article 51.[512] The UN as an international organization gives the right of all member-states to engage in legitimate defense, unilaterally or collectively, meaning drawing a third part, to secure not only the integrity of the state under threat but also to safeguard the UN Charter's security regime. That said, since the Charter refers to the inherent right of self-defense, exercising that right can trigger a third party's right to intervene on its behalf.[513] This occurred in the cases of Kosovo,[514] Korea, Falkland's and in Kuwait.

The decision to take military measures is purely a decision of political will. Comparing the cases of Cyprus and Kuwait, in the former, the UNSC uses the words "calls upon", "requests" and "Demands an immediate end to foreign military intervention in the Republic of Cyprus". The primary goal of this decision was to prevent an aggravation of the situation, as article 40 puts it. Hence, when the invasion occurred, the UNSC aimed at keeping "the situation under constant review and asks the Secretary-General to report as appropriate with a view to adopting further measures in order to ensure that peaceful conditions are restored as soon as possible".[515] In other words, it adopted non-military measures to control the conflict. Furthermore, the establishment of the UNFICYP in 1964 was also of that purpose.[516] In the case of the Iraqi invasion, the phrasing is indicative of the political will of the UNSC not only to contain Iraq but also to make use of force under Chapter VII. Resolution 660 not only states that there is a breach of international peace and security but also names and "Condemns the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait;".

After the illegally established TRNC, the UN and the Secretary General himself firmly called upon Turkey to refrain from any action regarding the creation of the secessionist state, the TRNC. Despite all the calls, condemnations, resolutions, proximity talks, high-level meetings, the UN procedure fell into void. Turkey neither withdrew from any further illegal act nor did it and implement UN resolutions and CBMs, nor did it transfer Varosha to the UN, as it

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[512] NATO's intervention in Kosovo was a lawful exercise of legitimate defense, consistent with Article 51.
[513] J D Ohlin, "The Doctrine of Legitimate Defense," 91 *International Law Studies*, 2015
[514] The justification on the Kosovo operation lies within the words of Article 51 itself. Jens David Ohlin, p.148-150, "Because the Kosovars have the right to defend themselves against an unjust and unlawful attack, third-parties have the right to come to their aid through the exercise of defense of others." p.150
[515] Resolution 353
[516] UNFICYP's role was similar to UNICOM's role (United Nations Observer Unit) that was established by adopting Resolution 678 after the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty.

was agreed in the T/C proposals of 5th August 1981. The 1977-79 agreements to establish a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, independent, non-aligned, demilitarized were deliberately ignored by the T/Cs and Turkey. The territorial issue that since the Vienna 1984 Working Points recognized an 82% of the territory that should be handed back to the G/Cs as the legal owners is still under question and the status quo is being undermined by the T/C "authorities".[517]

To understand the differences in the way the UNSC handled two similar cases and on the one hand it ordered military means and liberated Kuwait while on the other, non-military means were mobilized to prevent the expansion of the crisis. Thus, one should shed light on the regional and international developments of the time that the invasion took place.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait occurred in an era when the US was the omnipotent power. The Turkish invasion occurred at a turbulent time when critical developments in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East prompted the antagonism of the two superpowers amidst the heat of the Cold War. Hence, the West did not prioritize the opprobrious violation of the UN Charter and the breach of human rights during and after the Turkish invasion that took place in two waves. In the case of Cyprus, the UNSC implemented the Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter while in the case of Kuwait the UNSC ordered the implementation of Article 42, 51; the provisions of Chapter VII in general. Obviously, Turkey was too critical to be punished as the Iraqi threat needed to be tackled. Needless to mention that the Kuwaiti crisis' resolutions were adopted almost unanimously by the P5 something that was impossible to be achieved during the Cold War given the mutual mistrust between the US and the USSR.

The UN blasted the Iraqi invasion and annexation of Kuwait. The UNSC called upon "all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize that annexation,

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[517] Suffice to mention the words:
"Recalling its resolutions 365 (1974). 367 (1975), 541 (1983) and 544 (1983),
Deeply regretting the non-implementation of its resolutions, in particular resolution 541 (1983),
Gravely concerned about the further secessionist acts in the occupied part of the Republic of Cyprus which are in violation of resolution 541 (1983), namely, the purported exchange of ambassadors between Turkey and the legally invalid "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" and the contemplated holding of a "constitutional referendum" and "elections", as well as by other actions or threats of actions aimed al further consolidating the purported
independent State and the division of Cyprus,
Deeply concerned about recent threats for settlement of Varosha by people other than its inhabitants,
…..
1. Reaffirms its resolution 541 (1983) and calls for its urgent and effective implementation;
2. Condemns all secessionist actions, including the purported exchange of ambassadors between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, declares them illegal and invalid and calls for their immediate withdrawal;"
UNSCR, "Resolution 550 (1984) of 11 May 1984", http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/550

and to refrain from any action or dealing that might be interpreted as an indirect recognition of the annexation;"[518]. In the case of Cyprus, Resolutions 541 and 550 safeguard the Republic's sovereignty and condemn every secessionist act and "calls upon them not to facilitate or in any way assist the aforesaid secessionist entity;".[519] So far so good. However, the UNSC 678 Resolution clearly indicates the differences in the handling of both cases. In Resolution 678 the UNSC "Authorizes Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the above-mentioned resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and.... Requests all States to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken in pursuance of paragraph 2 above;".[520] The Western determination to eliminate Saddam's actions over Kuwait with the use of military force was apparent.[521]

The aforementioned pictures a strategy that was never planned to end to the restoration of Kuwait. When the operation to liberate Kuwait was initiated in January 1991, the operation for Saddam's annihilation was also initiated. The plan was complicated: Saddam must had had been stripped off its military capabilities. He must also had been internationally isolated so that no other actor could empower him. However, the challenge ahead about to overthrow Saddam; to keep Iraq together; to prevent its collapse and consequently the creation of a vacuum of power that would further implicate the situation.

The fear of a possible vacuum of power forced the decision-makers to limit the operations up to the point of disempowering Saddam.[522] President Bush's ingeniously handled

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[518] UNSCR, Resolution 662, Iraq-Kuwait 9 August (1990), http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/662, (accessed 17 July 2019).

[519] UNSCR, "Resolution 550 (1984) of 11 May 1984", available at: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/550, (accessed 17 July 2019).

[520] UNSCR, "Resolution 678 Iraq-Kuwait 29 November (1990)," available at: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/678 (accessed 17 July 2019).

[521] Ι Παπαγιάννης, *Η Επιβολή του Νόμου και ο Χάρτης των Ηνωμένων Εθνών. Οι κρίσεις της Κύπρου (1974) και του Κουβέιτ (1991)*, Αθήνα, Παπαζήση, 1994, p.110-11.

[522] Resolution 678 brings about the issue of the limits that had been set, if any, regarding the military action and the purpose of the Western actions. Was it only the restoration of the sovereignty of Kuwait or the decision was beyond that, including the annihilation of the Iraqi army, hence the overthrown of the Saddam's regime once and for all? The words that had been chosen to express the resoluteness of the UNSC to act against Iraq did not include any phrasing as "military actions" or similar wording. Any veto on behalf the USSR's and China needed to be avoided. Hence any statement that would signify the adoption of military action against Iraq to proceed to further actions after the economic sanctions, was omitted. The aforementioned explains the absence of wording that would request and demand all members to participate or consent to military actions. Resolution 678 was the outcome of a compromise between the P5 so that the operations against Iraq would proceed as scheduled without being vetoed by any member of the UNSC. Resolutions 687 expresses the intentions of the West that goes beyond the restoration of the Kuwaiti sovereignty. The "unlawful invasion" of Kuwait raises concerns on the future of the peace and stability in the region since the UNSC expresses its concern over "the

the whole issue, especially the Resolutions of the UNSC so that none of the P5 would veto the critical Resolution 660. In order to avoid any intra-Arab solution behind the back of the USA, meaning a settlement among the Saudis-Kuwaitis-Iraqis, and fearing of an earlier withdrawing of Saddam from Kuwait, "the end-purpose of the military operation being prepared by Washington was more than a reversal of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait: it was to destroy Iraq's military and economic infrastructure, and overthrow Saddam Hussein."[523]

The success of the operation should be attributed to President Bush. The Vietnam "syndrome" did not occur. The human losses were limited than they were estimated. The expected oil price rise did not happen. In sum, President Bush focused on undertaking military action by using cutting-edge technology than being engaged in endless negotiations.[524]

Despite similarities in the cases of Kuwait and Cyprus, the UNSC tackled the issues of invasion and occupation in a different manner due to great powers' calculations and the type of the international system at each period that the events occurred.[525]

The first Gulf War occurred after the end of the Cold War. The omnipotent USA and the diminution of the USSR's power made possible the cooperation of the P5. Subsequently, the war was conducted under the Chapter VII. The UNSC led by the Western powers achieved to demand from all of the UN members involved in this war to comply with its resolutions. In other words, it adopted sanctions and significant mandatory measures. It was the first time after the Korea war that the UNSC authorized the use of force to tackle Iraq.

In the case of Cyprus, an array of regional and international developments in conjunction with the unwillingness of the great powers to punish Turkey resulted in conflict resolution

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statements by Iraq threatening to use weapons in violation of its obligations under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1952, 59 and of its prior use of chemical weapons, and affirming that grave consequences would follow any further use by Iraq of such weapons,". The UNSC expresses its awareness over "the use by Iraq of ballistic missiles in unprovoked attacks and therefore of the need to take specific measures in regard to such missiles located in Iraq," as well as on "the use by Iraq of ballistic missiles in unprovoked attacks and therefore of the need to take specific measures in regard to such missiles located in Iraq," UNSCR, "Resolution 687 Iraq-Kuwait 3 April (1991)," available at: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/687 (accessed 17 July 2019)., Παπαγιάννης, pp.98-105.
[523] Hiro, pp.439-440.
[524]"The end-purpose of winning military battles is to re-arrange the distribution of political power." Hiro, p.443 and Hiro, pp.441-2.
[525] In a complex area, as the Gulf-Middle East, the future of a regional conflict is depended upon an array of factors. In this conflict Saddam's regime survival, the Arab-Israeli relations, the Iranian attitude towards the Gulf states, the Israeli-Syrian relations, and the Saudi-Iranian power race, shaped the post 1991 era. Many incidents aimed at destabilizing the region and were created by the Arab competition or by Iran. The decade of 60s highlights an important lesson regarding the handling of the regional conflicts: the internal security of the Gulf states, especially those that are not oil-rich, the wealth sharing and civil rights.

based on article 40. The geopolitical importance of Turkey as a strategic ally of the West and the fact that the Kuwaiti crisis took place after the end of the Cold War, where there was no support or interference on behalf of the USSR to Saddam, is a critical explanation, among others, to clarify adequately the significant differences in the management of the two conflicts. In the case of Kuwait, the UNSC "determined to bring the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end and to restore the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait".[526] The Resolution 661, as it was phrased, was clearly giving to Kuwait its right to exercise self-defense. Furthermore, disappointed as it was from Iraqi intransigence, the UNSC called upon all the cooperating members "to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping".[527] All in all, it ordered the minimum use of military force to halt Iraqi actions. Thus, the UNSC immediately imposed economic sanctions by abiding all member-states and non, and it was actually the fastest implementation of sanctions in the UN history. In the case of Cyprus, the mandatory measures that the UNSC adopted were of dealing with the ceasefire and to that end, UNFICYP's role was considered critical.

3.3.3.4.b. Cyprus' predicament. Averting the legitimization of a secessionist state in its north

The 1974 Turkish invasion resulted in the division of the Republic of Cyprus and the declaration of an independent state in the north, in 1983. The self-proclaimed "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus", celebrates its establishment only with its patron-state, Turkey, since it is recognized only by the latter. It operates fully dependent from its patron, while internationally it pursues its recognition and the "right" to exist next to what the Turks call the "Greek Cypriot Administration". Till today the area is under Turkish control while Turkey is striving to succeed in achieving its recognition internationally. Despite being a secessionist state, it fully functions as a state; a flag and a national anthem symbolize the "existence" of the "state"; there is a government and armed forces as well as fully functioning universities and a

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[526] UNSCR, Resolution 661, Iraq-Kuwait 6 August (1990), http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/661
[527] UNSCR, Resolution 665, Iraq-Kuwait 25 August (1990), http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/665.

municipality of the occupied Nicosia. The head of the TRNC is the leader of the T/C community that negotiates on behalf of it at the UN as an equal partner to the G/C leader that is the President of the Republic. What challenges arise for the Republic of Cyprus from the secessionist state in its northern territories? How Turkey, the revisionist power uses "TRNC" as a means to secure its national interest? This section focuses on how Turkey created and perfectly exploits the TRNC to further influence the island. The revelation of a Turkish strategy as well as of its "muppet state" will provide insightful evidence of the Turkish strategy to upgrade the status of the illegal entity.

The TRNC is a Turkish accomplishment. It is a "state" within a sovereign state that lives in "isolation", entirely dependent- politically, economically, militarily-, on Turkey. On the one hand, the TRNC strives for its existence since its patron-client relation has many benefits as well as disadvantages; on the other hand, Turkey till nowadays thrives to promote the statehood of its muppet-state in the international arena. Constructing water pipeline and promoting constructions in non-controlled areas is one aspect of the attempts to upgrade the secessionist entity. Turkey speeds up the islamization of the secessionist state by transferring Turkish settlers. Although the population in the occupied territories cannot be estimated accurately, is approximately being calculated up to 351,000 residents of which settlers are estimated at 230,000. Also, the construction of mosques; the imminent transfer of imams and settlers from Turkey; the continued dependence on Turkey via the water transport project; the energy dependence and the financial protocol between Turkey-TRNC (estimated 2019-20) and the repatriation of the T/Cs that leave abroad are indicative of the Turkish and T/C designations to alternate the non-control areas' demography.[528]

No one denies the effective control of the so-called TRNC authorities over the population and territory of northern Cyprus. Yet, Turkey pushed for the entity's military and economic dependency as well as from vital resources such as water and energy since the latter's establishment. The so-called de facto regime grew demands for legitimization of a separate territory that is already illegally "governed" and started profiting from tourism and

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[528] Κώστας Βενιζέλος, «Κατεχόμενα: Πλάνο δημογραφικής αλλοίωσης», *Philenews,* 25 Μαρτίου 2018 http://www.philenews.com/eidiseis/politiki/article/504640/katechomena-plano-dimogafikis-alloiosis, Η Καθημερινή, "Το «υπεξ» αρχίζει καταμέτρηση των Τ/κ στο εξωτερικό, ανακοίνωσε ο Οζερσάι", 15 Μαρτίου 2018, http://www.kathimerini.com.cy/gr/kypros/to-ypex-arxizei-katametrisi-ton-t-k-sto-exoteriko-anakoinose-o-ozersai,

education.[529] Denktash and successive leaders focused at establishing "a new partnership state in Cyprus, based on the political equality of the two peoples and the equal status of two constituent states".[530] When it comes to the T/C residents in the occupied territories, the T/Cs consist a minority. However, Denktash fought fiercely, especially during the final phase of the Annan Talks, to achieve the recognition of two "peoples". The recognition of the existence of two peoples is far from legal. Legally to recognize a minority as "people", apart from inhabitants and space the term of legitimacy must be fulfilled to complement the "people" where they live. The T/Cs never lived isolated in the areas of northern Cyprus. This happened by force during the 1974 invasion.

"Hungry neighbors always pose trouble. Unfortunately, poverty is often cynically employed by authoritarian regimes... as a foreign policy tool to gain attention and financial aid."[531] Any modification of the agreed process to resolve the Cyprus conflict under the auspices of the UNSG by reaching a just and viable solution with the format of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation based on agreed parameters, relevant Security Council Resolutions, European norms and relevant EU Council should not be accommodated.

Turkey and the T/C leadership are to be blamed for the so-called isolation, exclusion, or economic inequality in the breakaway entity. States do not come into existence by simply being granted de facto recognition by other states. International law prevails based on fundamental principles such as the right of self-determination, territorial integrity and most importantly sufficing legal justification. In the case of TRNC none of the above is a point in case. Consequently, the right to "self-determination" fades. When it comes to territorial integrity, the TRNC is the outcome of an illegal invasion and ongoing occupation of the one third of the Republic of Cyprus. Expatriation of the G/Cs and the systemic influx of illegal settlers from Turkey brought to completion the ethnic division, the internal displacement and the demographic change of a significant part of the island.

In sum, Turkey's expansionist policy via providing water, electricity, economic, political and military support to an illegal entity violates Turkish obligations under public international law.

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[529] J R Smith "Northern Cyprus: Visiting a country that doesn't exist", *CNN*, 25 March 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/travel/amp/northern-cyprus-travel/index.html?fbclid=IwAR1UcXw5OM4_kQu6NxLuJGP72UyDX6vkDUMv1rQcrinUXHWIwvLYV0yOGko
[530] Financial Times Mehmet Ali Talat, "Letter to the editor", 5 March 2008
[531] E Inbar, "No reason to fear PA economic collapse", *The Jerusalem Post*, 2 May 2019 https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/No-reason-to-fear-PA-economic-collapse-588565

Any international agreement between Turkey and TRNC is also in violation of the international law since every activity between these two constitutes a serious violation and could be viewed as an effort to annex the occupied territories of the Republic of Cyprus.[532]

Concluding Remarks

"In geography and in tactical considerations, the Turks have the stronger claim in Cyprus; in race and language, the Greeks; in strategy, the British, so long as their industrial life depends on the oil supplies from the Persian Gulf."[533]

The Cyprus conundrum is not only a foreign policy issue of Greece and Cyprus but also a matter of regional peace and stability as well as an international issue since the UN has condemned the illegal Turkish invasion and occupation of Cyprus. Thus, it must be approached threefold: as the outcome of the Turkish aggression and expansionism that led to invade and to occupy the island since 1974; as a result of the British politics in the region in the frame of the Eastern Question and the repercussion of British decline in the Middle East; as an outcome of the independence of the British former colonies. The inexistence of a coherent, consistent and efficient policy on behalf of Cyprus resulted in waning of all of its rights based on the international law, the Human Rights and the UNSC resolutions.

In order to answer this study's main questions, the international system, the perceptions and perspectives of its main actors in every period under examination and Cyprus' domestic variables where taken into consideration. Hence,

What is the impact of the international system and the great powers' involvement on a small state's security when a territorial dispute occurs?

Regional challenges as the Arab-Israeli conflict, British supremacy and its oil interests in the region, the anti-colonial struggle, "EOKA", affected Cypriot politics. British diminution of power

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[532] I Kouskouvelis & K Chainoglou, "Against the Law: Turkey's Annexation Efforts in Occupied Cyprus*", Hague Yearbook of International Law/Annuaire de La Haye de Droit International*, Vol. 29 (2016). Brill Nijhoff, 2018. 55-102.

[533] At that period Makarios refused to give assurance to the British regarding securing bases for that latter after Cyprus' independence. "The Arabs and the USSR don't want those bases there, and we are going to need their help in the UN." *The Times,* 28.11.55 as quoted in O'Malley & Craig, p.44.

in the Middle East created a vacuum of power that had to be filled by the USA. Britain's interference to secure its military presence in the region and to preserve the Western national interests, in conjunction with critical issues as: the fear of Soviet expansion during the Cold War; regional events as the Six-Days War; the Soviet built-up of a nuclear arsenal; the closure of the Suez Canal and its implications on the losses of Middle East oi, deepened the crisis and impacted upon Cyprus' fate. Great powers' inertia before, during and after the invasion is quite an issue considering that Great Britain was also a guarantor and that the USA was aware of Turkey's intentions. Great powers' interests were the ones that dictated Turkey as the most favorable partner in the Turkey-Cyprus conflict resulting in the bloodshed of 1974.

The study of the proposed plans and the evolution of the Cyprus talks highlight the critical role of the international system and the regional sub-system as the main factors that formed the conditions within the Cyprus problem would be solved in every period. The solution to the Cyprus problem goes with the flow of the needs and interests of the great powers. In other words, it was the outcome of international and regional developments. In most of the times there was less room for maneuver for every Cyprus' leader to alter what was on the table. The Anglo-American positions were in concert with the Turkish needs, since Turkey was considered geopolitically a strategic ally for the Western interests.[534] Moreover, the West wished to downgrade the Cyprus issue from an international issue to an intra-alliance conflict, since Turkey and Greece are both NATO member-states. This also justifies the establishment of the intercommunal talks and the avoidance of internationalizing the issue via the UN involvement.

Does being non-aligned affect negative or positive a small state's strategy when compared to the type of the international system that it operates within?
The end of the Cold War brought changes to the status of the NAM which lost its significance. A while before the signing of Zurich-London agreements, Makarios pursued Cyprus's interest via UN hoping to muster support from the NAM and the Eastern Bloc. Cyprus did benefit by gaining votes in the UNGA.

In 1961, the RoC was one of the 25 participants in the Belgrade conference, where the movement was established formally. During the turbulent years of 1963-64 the NAM was used from the government of Cyprus as a channel to internationalize the issue and to seek for

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[534] Cf the Foot Plan, the Macmillan Plan and the Acheson plans that included provision for geographical partition.

support.[535] At the second conference of the Heads of State or Governments of Non-Aligned countries that took place in Cairo on October 5-10, 1964, Cyprus raised that issue within the framework of the NAM. In practice, Cyprus made use of the Movement to raise awareness and achieve the issue to be discussed. In its final Communiqué the NAM expressed its concern with the situation and called upon all states, "in conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, in particular under Article 2, paragraph 4, to respect the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and to refrain from any threat or use of force or intervention directed against Cyprus and from any efforts to impose upon Cyprus unjust solutions, unacceptable to the people of Cyprus."[536] This statement was reiterated in the Third Conference (Lusaka, September 1970).

Cyprus' decision to join the NAM was a part of its broad strategy after independence to further strengthen its position as an independent state and release the Cyprus Question from the highly competitive and fragile Greek-Turkish relations as well as from NATO. President Makarios was a leading figure of the Movement. He insisted on maintaining a "neutral" policy towards East states politically, economically and commercially. Before the invasion Cyprus' leadership based its strategy on the NAM. While this strategy bore fruits in the General Assembly, in the international arena it was not fruitful at all. Participation in the Movement offered to Cyprus a firm support and solidarity at the United Nations due to the UNGA voting majority.

Cyprus' accession to the European Union resulted in abandoning the NAM. Cyprus succeeded in entering the EU without having reached a solution, especially after the rejection of the Annan Plan. In 2012, Cyprus undertook the helm of the presidency of the EU Council for six months, an important milestone for the Republic. Furthermore, the signing on the participation in PESCO by member-states that wished to advance the first core of European integration in the field of defense and security (13.11.2017) is the most important initiative to promote the common European defense by EU member states. At the same time, PESCO

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[535] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cyprus Question", http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2016.nsf/All/570E9E4C6E7CDB80C2257F9C00370023?OpenDocument
[536] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries. Cairo, October 5 – 10, 1964 (Extract on Cyprus)", http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2016.nsf/894121F28CA94C24C2257F9C0038730D/$file/Second%20Conference%20of%20Heads%20of%20State%205-10.10.1964.pdf

shields the Republic as its borders are encompassed within the European borders, thus protecting them from outside interference. [537]

How domestic variables influence a state's strategy? Is there a continuity in a small state's strategy due to systemic limitations?

Independently of the type of the international system, various domestic reasons influence the decision for a great power to enter a peripheral war apart from international system's incentives. To intervene, a state must be internally empowered to respond efficiently to these external challenges.[538]

If the key findings should be summarized then location, strong leadership, resources and the governmental system are components of power that impact upon the strategy formation of Cyprus. Cyprus' location is simultaneously a bless and a curse. In the decade of 70s, crucial as events as the Yom Kippur war and the OPEC crisis impacted negatively on Cyprus. The subsequent oil crisis overturned the balance of power. The USA strives to constrain the Soviet influence in these regional subsystems. Therefore, Cyprus lost a strategic advantage of a small state that of balancing between two great powers, because of severe international developments. To this it should be added the international isolation of Greece due to the coup-d'état and Turkey's importance as a reliable partner for the Western interests.

Leadership is critical till today. Makarios as a leader enjoyed a good reputation among his fellows in Third World and the NAM and he actually made use both of his good relationship and reputation to gain support in the UN, in an effort to internationalize the Cyprus issue. He indeed achieved in gaining the support of the NAM at the UNGA.[539] Clerides was the mastermind behind the Cyprus' EU accession. Clerides' successor, Tassos Papadopoulos, is memorized as the "ethnarch" of the Hellenes in Greece and Cyprus. Throughout his career he remained stable, even stubborn, that Cyprus should not retreat from the UN resolutions and the EU legislation and should wait until a viable and working solution. When he was asked

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[537] Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο- Συμβούλιο της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, «Αμυντική συνεργασία: 23 κράτη μέλη υπογράφουν κοινή γνωστοποίηση σχετικά με τη μόνιμη διαρθρωμένη συνεργασία (PESCO)», 13 Νοεμβρίου 2017, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/el/press/press-releases/2017/11/13/defence-cooperation-23-member-states-sign-joint-notification-on-pesco/, Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο- Συμβούλιο της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, «Αμυντική συνεργασία: Το Συμβούλιο θεσμοθετεί μόνιμη διαρθρωμένη συνεργασία (PESCO) με 25 συμμετέχοντα κράτη μέλη», 11 Δεκεμβρίου 2017, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/el/press/press-releases/2017/12/11/defence-cooperation-pesco-25-member-states-participating/,
[538] Neoclassical Realism explains this tendency by giving prominence to domestic variables as leader perception, elite consensus, social cohesion. N M Ripsman et all., pp. 26-32.
[539] cf. Κρανιδιώτης Γ.Ν., Το Κυπριακό Πρόβλημα. Η ανάμειξη του ΟΗΕ και οι ξένες επεμβάσεις στην Κύπρο. 1960-1974, Αθήνα, Θεμέλιο, 1984, σελ.41

"what does it mean to you as just and viable solution" he replied "I have forgone the word just".[540] Finally, Cyprus' energy strategy since its first revelations during the Clerides' Presidency has been religiously pursued, expanded and used as a foreign policy tool by all the Cypriots presidents thus demonstrating the importance of an effective and farseeing leadership.

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[540] *Πολίτης,* 18 Φεβρουαρίου 2005, σελ.5, as quoted in Βανέζης, p.264

Conclusion

This thesis has investigated the strategies of small states in regional conflicts. By analyzing the strategies of the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Cyprus, this thesis has shown how a small state can draw, borrow and retain in its possession the strength of a great power to secure its survival.

The answers of the research questions ensued from the examination of the 70years strategy of two small states in turbulent times and in two different types of international system. To achieve that and to examine thoroughly regional conflicts, the analysis focused on each regions' external links. Each case study underlined the regional and international developments, the distribution of power internationally and regionally, structural restrictions, possible exploitation of regional environment as well as regional limitations. However, the examination of the strategic environment and the small states' strategic choices could not have been understood if domestic variants as leadership and decision-making that influenced the outcomes had not been explained. Here lies the importance of neoclassical realism that was the vehicle for explaining crisis decision-making, foreign policy, grand strategy, international outcomes, and structural changes in the international system.

The outstanding issues

Following the examination of the Republic of Cyprus in conjuction with the case of Kuwait this thesis provided adequate answers on:

How a small state can draw, borrow and retain in its possession the strength of a great power to secure its survival? What motivates the latter to come to the aid of a small state in need in a regional conflict and what are the components of power to motivate great powers' positive interference?

States conduct foreign policy by focusing first on their external environment. Domestic variables affect how they respond to international stimuli. A small state faces material, political, economic restrictions even domestic constraints that limit its capability to mobilize efficient and adequate domestic resources to respond well enough to threats or to exploit an opportunity. However, when it finds itself involved in a regional conflict is able and willing to

draw an extra-regional great power notably when the latter is capable to serve the former's needs.

A great power's permissive domestic structure, especially if it is an open democracy, can be used as a playfield from smaller powers. This explains why a great power may find itself involved in a war that is not in its interests. As this thesis proved, great powers do engage in regional conflicts especially in those that their interests are at stake, despite facing their electorate's disapproval and a heavy economic cost that these interventions bear as in the case of the war in Vietnam or the 2003 Iraqi invasion. Additionally, great powers' antagonism and a rival's attempt to penetrate a regional subsystem explains why a small state can exploit the former's power game and draw in a great power.

As the case of the Iraqi invasion in Kuwait showed, the ensuing US-UN decision to liberate Kuwait, the great powers' decision-making on the Turkish invasion in Cyprus and the way it was handled by the West and the UN, which was in sharp contrast with the case of Kuwait, all evidence conclude that convergence of interests between a small state and a great power is a prerequisite. Both cases also proved that location and resources are critical determinants that draw the interest of the great powers in the region. Location can transform a state into an apple of discord for the great powers. In the case of Kuwait, great powers' interest and their interference to its aid was obvious even before its independence. The same conclusion was drawn for the case of Cyprus.

This study thoroughly examined Cyprus' strategic importance. Its location as it was demonstrated, was an advantage that at times had dreadful impact. Cyprus became independent in 1960 after a prolonged insurgency. For long, Great Britain denied to Cyprus self-determination because it wanted to preserve British military interests on the island. The diminution of British power from the region, made the USA anxious on continuing having access to the American communications facilities, especially when the Cuba crisis erupted in the mid of a strong missile competition. All these strategic considerations were paramount in the British and American strategic planning 10 years before the invasion, when Turkey openly threatened to invade the island and subsequently create chaos into NATO.

Yet, the research noted the negative consequences of Cyprus' location. During and after the Turkish invasion, Turkey's strategic location was considered more important than that of Cyprus. Consequently, the great powers downgraded the bloodshed in Cyprus and left Turkey unpunished for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Nevertheless, when a small

state has stable governance, effective decision-making and crisis management then it can move the great power, should the former converge its interests with the latter. For example, in 2003, at the beginning of the second Gulf War, Cyprus allowed US jets to land for refueling, after Turkey's refusal to use Turkish soil. Finally, both cases demonstrated that by becoming valuable partner for the great power, i.e., when they fight together against global terrorism, then the small state gains value and becomes an important pivotal partner to a great power.

The oil rich Gulf area has many actors to be taken into account by the State of Kuwait apart from Iran and Iraq that still play a leading role in the Gulf politics. The six members of the GCC; Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the UAE and Bahrain, also must be taken into consideration either as a whole or as individuals. Hence, in order to drag a great power, a small state has to calculate not only the interest of the great power that desires to come to its aid but also the extra-regional actors' interests. During the Iraqi invasion, Kuwait had to balance the interests of the European powers, the US' as well as those of its Arab allies. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, France was reluctant, the US needed to secure its interests while the invasion provoked a division among the Arab states.[541] The time that Iraq empowered itself that much that the US' interests came under threat and Kuwait itself failed to ensure its existence since Iraq annexed it, the US came to the aid of the small state of Kuwait, because the US-UN operation for the liberation of Kuwait happened at a time that there was a transition from a bipolar to a unipolar international system. Consequently, when an external actor plans to balance against a regional threat, it also has to calculate that its actions will not contradict balancing against an actor at global level.

The study extensively pointed out at the oil factor and economic interdependence as two of the most critical factors for a great power to intervene to secure its interests. There were not just the US economic interests that were at stake but also the Western interests that were immediately affected. The US started to stock the Saudi oil not only for energy purposes but also to safeguard itself against Moscow whose troops where in the region for a long period after the end of the WWII.

Great powers throughout the ages are seeking to secure their interest at global and regional level. Resources and oil security were the key factor that drew in the great power in the Gulf. Location was determinant for both case studies. It attracted regional powers'

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[541] D Menos, *Arms over Diplomacy: Reflection on the Persian Gulf War*, Praeger, Westport, CT, 1992.pp1-7.

revisionism thus threatening small state's survival. Regional balance of power was significant for the great powers' strategic calculations. Kuwait was saved twice and still is under the US defense umbrella. Meanwhile Cyprus in the heat of the Cold War was not considered as important as the invader, Turkey. Nevertheless, a small state, as theory suggested and case studies concluded, can empower itself and draw a great power, should it employ an array of its assets. Shared security concerns, location, resources, energy security, the need to balance a regional power that is hostile to the extra-regional great power, reliable partners, are significant for the great power to aid a small one.

The study also stressed the importance of defense agreements. A small state, as the case of Kuwait presented, mobilized joint defense agreements to secure its survival in turbulent times. Furthermore, assets that were showcased to be crucial in both case studies are: shared concerns on threats on global and regional level, providing military bases, domestic stability, a strong economy and armed forces, diplomatic skills, acting as a mediator at a regional dispute on behalf of a great power thus safeguarding latter's interests, a strong leadership and administration skills, being supporter of human rights, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, and a strong advocate of international peace and security. These assets attracted the great powers and through them the small state related its interest with the great powers' interest. As it was highlighted, convergence of interests between a small state and a great power is a prerequisite. When Kuwait in 1991 engaged the great powers in its reconstruction, political and economic relations, trade, joint military drills, intelligence, combating terrorism were shared interests. Today similar conditions take place in the Cypriot EEZ and its 21st century foreign policy designations in general.

In the 21st century, great powers are still active in the Gulf and the Eastern Mediterranean. Regional stability, shared concerns and interests as well as energy security draw the great power to interfere. This thesis thoroughly explained every aspect of the two Gulf Wars and what dragged the US in the area. However, in the Eastern Mediterranean the case of Cyprus proved insightful for empowering this thesis' conclusions. Cyprus is transformed from a US' foreign policy thorn into a strategic partner since the "U.S. interests in the Eastern Mediterranean have moved on to security and energy concerns for which closer relations with

the Republic of Cyprus have become a higher priority", since Cyprus offers a significant alternative to US' allies over Russian energy.[542]

What is the impact of the international system and the great powers' involvement on a small state's security when a territorial dispute occurs?

The international system not only imposes limitations to states but also influences their foreign policy. Undoubtedly, great powers do effect on the outcomes and the international system's structure. A change in the balance of power has implications on many sub-regional systems something that is historically proven by the struggle of the great powers to fill the vacuum when a great power retreats or is defeated.

The type of the international system is of significance not only for great powers but also for the great powers-small powers relations, as well as for the impact of the international system on the strategy formation of the small power. Both case studies were examined under two types of international system; a bipolar and a multipolar. A functioning balance of power system implicates limited ability of small powers to achieve their goals. A bipolar system is less prone to major wars or a crisis that can escalate into a major war or a hegemonic war.[543] A bipolar, where the great powers are in intense competition, seems to be the ideal. So then, the rise of competition among great powers, as it happened during the Cold War, provides to smaller powers more chances to achieve their goal and exercise influence. A window of opportunity occurs when disagreement between great powers reaches high levels. When there is one hegemonic power, the room for maneuver for a small state is limited. Should balance of power disappears and great powers' power fluctuates then small states are subject to severe systemic pressure. Hence a bipolar international system is preferable and more beneficial since it gives more opportunities and room for maneuver.

In Iraq, the outcome of the 1991 invasion could have been entirely different should had not occurred in a bipolar international system. The Kuwaiti-Iraqi regional conflict did not serve as a proxy for a typical bipolar superpower confrontation. The loosening of bipolarity had serious repercussions in an important great powers' arena, the Middle East. It has been highlighted that this region had never been "under rigid bipolar control by the two

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[542] Congressional Research Services, "Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive", Updated January 29, 2009, Congressional Research Service, available at: https://crsreports.congress.gov, R41137
[543] see J W Taliaferro, *Balancing risks: Great power intervention in the periphery*, Cornell University Press, 2004.

superpowers."[544] Hence, by the dissolution of the USSR, Moscow showed signs of diminution over influencing its Arab allies thus giving floor to the Arab struggle for regional dominance.

In the case of Cyprus, since its inception, Cyprus is encircled by the intervention of various international and regional actors as well as by significant events that took place at that time and prompted superpowers' antagonism in the Cold War era. Cyprus found itself in the middle not only of the superpowers' confrontation but also amid severe regional developments that shook regional balance of power and threatened the power equilibrium of the two rivals, the USA and the USSR, in the important region of the East Mediterranean. The implications of international and regional developments resulted in the division of the island after the illegal invasion and occupation of Cyprus. As it has been showed through the presentation of the UN resolutions and various official state documents, Turkey's invasion was not treated in the same manner as the Iraqi. In the case of Cyprus, Realpolitik was merciless.

On the basis of the results of this research, it can be concluded that great powers' involvement in a regional conflict can prevent or cease an armed conflict or mediate to achieve a peace treaty. Their policies are not only system oriented but also regional. Strong in hard power and able to win a war, but also capable to exert political influence, they retain patron-client relations with local actors which is translated into arms supplies, financial aid, providing security, even retaining bases on allies territory.[545] Great powers do form strong alliances or counter-alliances to control an ill-behaved client state, especially if the latter hinders former's interests. Great powers are also capable of enhancing the assertiveness of a regional actor to act. They do interfere in regional actors' domestic politics in a way that can provoke internal upheaval driving to a regime change and to the establishment of a friendly one. Finally, interdependence is an impediment for a regional actor to act especially against its patron's will.

Does being non-aligned affect negative or positive a small state's strategy when compared to the type of the international system that it operates within?

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[544] A Bacevich & E Inbar, p.83.

[545] G L Sorokin, "Patrons, clients, and allies in the Arab-Israeli conflict." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 20.1, 1997, pp.46-71.C Carney, "International patron -client relationships: a conceptual framework", *Studies in Comparative International Development,* vol. 24, no.2,Summer 1989, pp. 42-55, C C. Shoemaker & J Spanier, P Ifestos, "Patron-Client Relations in the Emerging Security Environment", *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations,* Vol.14, No.2, 1992.

Both states after gaining independence joined the movement. As it has been shown, the leaders of both states preferred the NAM on security grounds given their vulnerability. Both mobilized the NAM for their own purposes. Makarios during the anti-colonial struggle sought for international support and especially for non-aligned countries' backing. Cyprus' decision to join the NAM was a part of its broad strategy after its independence to further strengthen its position as an independent state and release the Cyprus Question from the highly competitive and fragile Greek-Turkish relations as well as from NATO. When Cyprus became a member of the EU it abandoned the NAM but it gained more from its EU membership. At this point it should be reminded that a bipolar international system is beneficial for a non-aligned small state. Cyprus abandoned the NAM in a multipolar international system.

Regarding Kuwait this study showed that Kuwait has adopted an odd "neutral posture" in both types of international system. Kuwait's posture since state's establishment remains faithful in non-alignment. Kuwait tends to balance great powers. Every time that Kuwait failed to balance among great powers, it faced the consequences of its policy, as it happened in the last years of World War I. Mubarak's son, Selim, chose the side of the Ottomans and antagonized the Wahabis. Serious implications rose from this strategy when the Saudis imposed land blockade on Kuwait that lasted for fourteen years and the British settled the border dispute between the Saudis and Iraqis at Kuwait's expense, loosing that way two thirds of its territory. Consequently, "positive neutralism" is a strategy that in most of the times benefits Kuwait.[546] In order to ensure its security, successive leaders from 17th century and onwards adopted a neutral political approach, especially during 19th century when international competition in Gulf was heated up.[547] Kuwaiti resources enabled it to adopt a non-aligned posture not only during the Cold War but also in the multipolar international system. It followed an active foreign policy, mostly regionally.

In sum, the results did not draw any absolute conclusion on the question. Despite the fact that there is a strong correlation between the type of the international system and the non-aligned actor since a bipolar international system is more beneficial for the non-aligned,

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[546] "each time Kuwait adopted an attitude of 'positive neutralism', allying itself with one side without directly antagonizing the other and without totally renouncing its freedom of maneuver, the outcome proved positive, while each time the opposite course was undertaken (as in the case of Mubarak's military campaigns or Selim's alignment with the Ottomans against the 'infidels') the outcome was negative." Laura Guazzone (1989) Kuwait's national security policy and its influence on the Gulf region, The International Spectator, 24:2, 63-71, DOI: 10.1080/03932728908456670, p.64.
[547] See Alazemi

however a mix of variables must be considered carefully. The State of Kuwait has adopted an odd neutral posture in both types of the international system. Kuwait while being non-aligned, has a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement with the United States and has hosted US forces to launch operations from its soil during the 2003 war against Iraq as well as against the Islamic State since 2014. In the case of Cyprus, the Republic did not reap the fruits of the NAM during the Cold War as it was expected, apart from gaining support on the Cyprus issue mostly from the UNGA's resolutions and the NAM's declarations. Cyprus accession to the EU undoubtedly empowered its position. Apart from economic benefits it succeeded in entering the EU as a whole, meaning that the division did not stop Cyprus to be a functioning EU member-state or to undertake the EU Presidency in 2012.

Hence, a relative conclusion that can be reached is that the NAM, in conjunction with the type of the international system, are not adequate to lead to a conclusion on positive or negative outcomes regarding a small state's strategy formation. Critical variants as domestic, regional-strategic, decision-making/leadership, "material" and "ideational" factors are determinant and affect the outcomes of the small state's policies.

How domestic variables influence a state's strategy? Is there a continuity in a small state's strategy due to systemic limitations?

Addressing this question proved whether Kuwait's salvage had to do with how itself handled wisely and efficiently its components of power, in contrast with Cyprus' ongoing occupation. Did Kuwait formulate and implement a successful strategy by exploiting its assets or the interests of great powers and systemic structure were the catalysts for ensuring its sovereignty?

Domestic variables are determinants for explaining the foreign policy and the decision-making of an actor, the short-term or long-term strategic choices and their policy outcomes. However, Innenpolitik alone is inadequate to explain phenomena of foreign policy choices and grand strategies of states. Domestic factors interfere and influence a leader's perception, the decision-making process and of course a grand strategy on war and peace.

The examination of the 1991 Iraqi invasion showed that the Kuwaiti strategy before the invasion was a strategic failure. Nevertheless, its location, the interests of the great powers for the region, the dependence of Western economies on Gulf's oil were highlighted as the principal reasons for the US-UN led operations to liberate it. During the second Gulf War, Kuwait's role was more active as it was presented, thus showing that great powers may be the

driving power but regional and domestic parameters are equally important. Leadership, domestic cohesion, a strong economy and armed forces, regional and extra-regional co-operation are some of a small state's assets in its quiver.

David Vital stresses the difficulty of maintaining and developing effective defense for the unaligned state.[548] As materially powerful as a small state can be, by any means is not in the position of overthrowing a stronger opponent who has invaded its territory or challenges its sovereignty. Both case studies proved the aforementioned. However, here lies the importance of domestic variables. A small state needs to exhaust every non-material power to its possession as diplomacy, external aid, alliances, international organizations membership and its value in the great powers' power game. Given that, a small state that finds itself in a position that can attract a great power for various reason, whether it is balance of power, strategic location or resources, is able to exploit a great power's interest for its own benefit.

Leadership and decision-making were also highlighted as important factors. In both case studies, leadership, either of a great power or of a small power, was the catalyst for the outcomes of many developments. Great power's leadership holds a crucial role on the great power's involvement in an extra-regional conflict. When a great power is an open democracy, as the USA, the final choice is the outcome of possible bureaucracy as it happened during the Nixon presidency that favored the bureaucratic approach in decision-making.

From Kissinger to Denktash and their role in Turkish invasion, from Saddam and GW Bush's decision-making in annihilating the former, the role of leadership is determinant. Cyprus' occupation was a matter on fulfilling personal ambitions. Denktash's career was based on his intransigence, while an elite of Turkish politicians also have based their political existence on the perpetuation of the occupation and the division of the island. This was another factor that was pointed out. Turkish intransigence and Turkish and T/C leadership's attitude explained why the Turks and the T/Cs' leadership were highly opinionated and not interested in engaging in a dialogue that would promote peaceful coexistence. Another example from Cyprus is that during Vassiliou's presidency the Cyprus problem was the focal point not only of the Cyprus' foreign policy but it also dictated the whole life of Cyprus in both domestic and foreign affairs. In the case of Kuwait, one of the substantial reasons that Saddam was defeated in the first Gulf War was his strategic miscalculation of his capabilities in

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[548] See D Vital, *The inequality of states: a study of the small power in international relations*, p.58, 63-68, 75-6.

comparison with his opponents. The Iraqi war of 2003 was the outcome of Saddam's deception of possessing WMD. The latter was enough to mobilize the US government to take drastic measures especially after the 9/11 attacks.

Comparing the two cases and basing on the facts of the two case studies it was concluded that a systemic theory is not adequate to explain a small states' behavior. It is not just the international realm that impacts upon a small state so as to state crystal clear that it defines and predicts its behavior. As the cases of Kuwait and Cyprus demonstrated, especially the examination of the period after the collapse of the Cold War and the transition to a multipolar system, both systemic and domestic levels of analysis matter on the formation and implementation of a small state's strategy.

The question of this research emanated from the aspiration to contribute not only to the literature of small states, but also to explore challenges, capabilities, missed opportunities in small states' struggle to survive in regional conflicts. Through an extended analysis of the strategic environment and the great powers' interest, the regional actors' posture, and a presentation of the small state's strategy at every designated period of time, it aimed to address Cyprus' and Kuwait's literature lacuna in cumulative and coherent insights regarding the security challenges that these small states tackle from independence till 2018. Given the inexistence of an applicable and coherent theory on small states, it attempted to present strategies to empower a small state by drawing in the great power to its aid. The "how" and "under what circumstance" this can be achieved was presented by exploring the dynamics of the interactions between great and small powers, the importance of the international system and of domestic variables as well.

It is hoped that the findings of this study could provoke further research for future comparative studies on small states in regional conflicts either located in the same or different regional systems. Undoubtedly, the Gulf, since it is comprised of many small states, provides such an opportunity. Further research on: if small states project distinctive patterns of behavior in regional conflicts and how a small state can exploit its regional subsystem to empower itself and confront the rival power, such questions are important to draw conclusions on small states in regional conflicts. It is hoped that this thesis has laid the foundations for the aforementioned issue.

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