



**A methodological framework for Risk Assessment and analysis of  
Land Borders. Case study: Region of Kilkis, Greece.**

**By**

Christina Kalogianni

**Supervised by**

Prof. Nikolaos Zaikos

Master's Degree in Politics and Economics of Contemporary Eastern and  
Southeastern Europe

2020

«I hereby declare, that all the data used in this work, have been obtained and processed according to the rules of the academic ethics as well as the laws that govern research and intellectual property. I also declare that, according to the above-mentioned rules, I quote and refer to the sources of all the data used and not constituting the product of my own original work».

Kalogianni Christina

## **Acknowledgements**

The preparation of the research and the writing of this thesis have in recent months been a painstaking and demanding task but at the same time, a fascinating journey. At the end of this process, I feel the need to thank some people who have helped me, each of them in his way.

First of all, I would like to thank the professor of International Law, Zaiko Nikolao for his valuable guidance, suggestions for improvement and the excellent climate in our cooperation. I would also like to thank all the teachers who provided me with the necessary equipment, bringing me in touch with knowledge in the field of political science and international relations during my postgraduate studies.

Next, it is worth noting the substantial help and acceptance of all the competent bodies and organizations to which I have applied in order to gather the information necessary for my work. Special mention is made of the police officers of Kilkis Police Department, the constructive exchanges of views and experiences that inspired them and an essential part of the investigation.

Finally, I have to express my gratitude and the most excellent thanks to my family for the great support, understanding and patience shown during my studies, as they always do in every challenge in my life.

## **Abstract**

Migration is an international, timeless, and multidimensional phenomenon. Its complexity is due to the fact that it is a phenomenon inherent in human evolution, society, economy, politics, and culture. Immigration is the movement of people to a destination country, where they do not have the nationality, in order to establish either as permanent residents or as future citizens of the country. It also brings about economic, social, political, cultural and psychological changes- impact on the host country.

In 2014, an enormous migrant wave towards Europe, commonly known as the refugee crisis, occurred. Greece, being one of the main gates for third-country nationals to enter Europe, has experienced a significant migratory phenomenon, which has been incalculable in the Eastern Aegean islands where over one million asylum seekers mostly from Syria, but also from other countries followed the Balkan Route to Europe. Under these circumstances, it was considered important to explore and develop a general risk assessment framework (analysis & management) for better surveillance of sea and land borders, in accordance with the concept of integrated management of border, covering any threat that calls into question security.

The operational activities of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX) reflect the EU's efforts to integrate the Schengen area external border management and the establishment of CIRAM provide EU member states with the human resources and the infrastructure, taking into consideration current needs, to protect their borders adequately. To conclude, in this dissertation, the CIRAM method has been employed to identify and manage the risks likely to arise when patrols participate in the Joint Operational Activities. The analysis process data relative to irregular immigration and the cross-border crime occurred in the northern borderline of Greece with N. Macedonia.

*Key-words: immigration, refugee crisis, security, cross-border crime, border surveillance, management and risk analysis, FRONTEX,*

### Schematic outline

The thesis has been tiled in 8 chapters. In particular, each chapter describes the following:

Chapter One: refers to the importance of research and research problem and structure of the thesis.

Chapter two: describes the conceptual and historical context of migration, the most important theories, and its implications. Migration flows to and from Greece, with an emphasis on refugee and migration flows in the region of Kilkis.

Chapter three: analyses the theoretical framework of migration policies and more specifically European and Greek migration policy.

Chapter four: analyses the conceptual approach to cross-border organised crime, its fields of action, the concept of cross-border cooperation and its response mechanisms.

Chapter five: analyses Operational Cooperation in the external borders of E.U., the cooperation in the context of IBM, the establishment of the FRONTEX and the Operational Activities in Greece and third-countries.

Chapter Six: describes, in summary, the CIRAM risk analysis model implemented by FRONTEX, based on the results of which the agency's operations are to the external borders

Chapter seven: describes the Purpose of the Research hypothesis, the description of the sample, the difficulties encountered and the results.

Chapter Eight: describes the conclusions resulting from the thesis and the proposals for future research.

## Table of Contents

Table of Contents .....	6
Abbreviations List .....	8
Table of Images .....	9
Table of graphs .....	10
Table of Tables.....	10
1. Introduction .....	11
2. Migration and Refugees phenomenon.....	13
2.1 Theoretical framework.....	13
2.2 The migration and refugee crisis.....	17
2.2.1 The crisis in Europe.....	17
2.2.2 The migrant refugee flows in Greece .....	20
2.3 The region of Kilgis .....	27
3. Migration policies and security (E.U and Greek).....	38
3.1 European treaties for migration.....	38
3.1.1 Geneva Convention .....	38
3.1.2 The Schengen Agreement .....	39
3.1.3 The Treaty of Maastricht .....	41
3.1.4 The Treaty of Lisbon .....	44
3.2 European Councils for migration.....	45
3.2.1 The Tampere Council.....	45
3.2.3. The Stockholm Council. ....	48
3.3 Institutional framework of the Hellenic Migration Policy.....	49
3.4 The process of Asylum in Europe and Greece.....	56
3.4.1 The process of Asylum in Europe .....	58
3.4.2 The process of Asylum in Greece .....	61
4. Organised Crime .....	67
4.1 Conceptual Framework .....	67
4.2 Scope of Action.....	71
4.3 Cross Border Crime.....	72
4.4 European Police Cooperation.....	74
4.4.1 European Police Cooperation at E.U Level.....	76

4.4.2 European Police Cooperation in Regional Level.....	79
4.5 Bilateral Agreement Greece-N. Macedonia .....	79
4.5.2 Readmission Agreements .....	85
4.5.3 The Prespes Agreement (or Prespa Accord, or Treaty of Prespes) .....	87
5. The Operational Cooperation in the External Borders of the E.U.....	90
5.1 The Operational Cooperation in the External Borders of the E.U.....	90
5.2 The Integrated Management of the Borders .....	93
5.3 The European Organisation of FRONTEX.....	96
5.3.1 Creation of the European Coastguard and Border Patrol .....	99
5.4 The Hellenic Participation in the Organisation.....	103
5.4.1 Strengthening the Frontex force in Greece.....	104
5.4.2 Joint Operations. ....	105
5.4.3 POSEIDON Operation. ....	108
5.4.4 FRONTEX cooperation with third countries. ....	111
6. Risk Analysis Model- Theoretical Background.....	114
6.1 The first Common Risk Analysis Model in the E.U.....	114
6.2 FRONTEX ant the Common Risk Analysis Model.....	116
6.2.1. Intelligence cycle .....	121
6.2.2 Threat levels .....	122
6.3 Analysis of Border Risks with CIRAM Methodological Framework.....	126
7. Data Collection .....	128
7.1 Purpose - Research hypothesis .....	128
7.2 Description of the sample. ....	129
7.3 Difficulties encountered. ....	130
7.4 Processing of survey results. ....	131
7.5 Explanatory analysis. ....	131
7.6 Further investigation.....	162
8. Conclusion .....	165
9. References.....	169

## Abbreviations List

EMN: European Migration Network  
UN : United Nations  
UNCHR : United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  
ZAP : (army security zone of pre-cover)  
FRC : First Reception Centres  
MO : Modus Operandi  
GAMM : Global Approach to Migration and Mobility' (GAMM)  
OLAF : The European Anti-Fraud Office  
RSD : Refugee Status Determination  
CBC : Cross-border cooperation (CBC)  
CEAS : Common European Asylum System  
SOCTA : Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment  
ICT : Information and Communication Technologies  
CIRAM : Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model  
FRONTEX : Frontières extérieures for "external borders"  
SIENA : Secure Information Exchange Network Application  
EIS : Europol Information System  
EPE : Europol Platform for Experts  
IBM : Integrated Border Management  
EUROSUR : European Border Surveillance system  
RaBIT : Rapid Border Intervention Teams  
O.C: Organised Crime  
TFEU : Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union



## Table of Images

<a href="#"><u>Image 1 Pull and Push factors of migration</u></a> .....	15
<a href="#"><u>Image 2 Migratory routes map</u></a> .....	18
<a href="#"><u>Image 3 Migration arrivals, Source: European Parliament. The Western Balkans Frontline of the migrant crisis, January 2016</u></a> .....	23
<a href="#"><u>Image 4 Migration routes in the Balkans, 2017 Credit: Free map downloaded from d-maps.com, arrows added by AAN</u></a> .....	25
<a href="#"><u>Image 5 Prefecture of the region of Kilkis</u></a> .....	27
<a href="#"><u>Image 6 Road network of Kilkis Prefecture</u></a> .....	28
<a href="#"><u>Image 7 Railway Station of Idomeni</u></a> .....	29
<a href="#"><u>Image 8 Railway wagon in Idomeni Railway Station</u></a> .....	30
<a href="#"><u>Image 9 Hiding places migrants are using</u></a> .....	32
<a href="#"><u>Image 10 Means of transportation migrants were using</u></a> .....	32
<a href="#"><u>Image 11 Structure of Kilkis Police Directorate</u></a> .....	33
<a href="#"><u>Image 12 Open refugee’s camps in Kilkis region. Source: Google maps</u></a> .....	35
<a href="#"><u>Image 13 Schengen countries</u></a> .....	39
<a href="#"><u>Image 14 Intra-service Cooperation</u></a> .....	96
<a href="#"><u>Image 15 Inter-Agency Cooperation</u></a> .....	96
<a href="#"><u>Image 16 International Cooperation</u></a> .....	97
<a href="#"><u>Image 17 CIRAM diagram (CIRAM Comprehensive Update, 2012:4)</u></a> .....	118
<a href="#"><u>Image 18 Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model, Summary booklet, version 2.0, Source: Frontex (2012, p. 14)</u></a> .....	119
<a href="#"><u>Image 19 Four-tier access control model. (CIRAM Comprehensive Update, 2012:4)</u></a> .....	120
<a href="#"><u>Image 20 Example of assessment of level of threat combining a three-level scale for magnitude and likelihood</u></a> .....	121
<a href="#"><u>Image 21 Example of qualitative estimates of level of threats</u></a> .....	121
<a href="#"><u>Image 22 Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model, Summary booklet, version 2.0</u></a> .....	124
<a href="#"><u>Image 23 Map of Doirani area</u></a> .....	148
<a href="#"><u>Image 24 Places where irregular migrants are hiding</u></a> .....	153
<a href="#"><u>Image 25 The Balkan route E.U. Drug Markets Report 2019 EMCDDA, Europol, Lisbon, November 2019</u></a> .....	160
<a href="#"><u>Image 26 Seized vehicle which was used for drug trafficking</u></a> .....	163

## Table of graphs

<a href="#">Graph 1 Asylum applicant and final decision on appeal.....</a>	63
<a href="#">Graph 2 Number of facilitators per year,2000-2019, BCU Paionias.....</a>	135
<a href="#">Graph 3 Number of third-country nationals apprehended per year, 2000-2019.BCU Paionias.....</a>	138
<a href="#">Graph 4 Number of forged or false travel documents per year in BCU Paionias.....</a>	141
<a href="#">Graph 5 Facilitators 'nationalities.BCU Doiranis.....</a>	144
<a href="#">Graph 6 Third country national apprehended per year in BC Doiranis.....</a>	147
<a href="#">Graph 7 Nationalities of apprehended immigrants.BCU Doiranis.....</a>	147
<a href="#">Graph 8 Number of forged Documents per year , 2011-2017.BCP Evzonoï.....</a>	155
<a href="#">Graph 9 Nationalities of third-country nationals apprehended when crossing or attempting to cross the external borders illegally.BCP Evzonoï.....</a>	156
<a href="#">Graph 10 Drug traffickers 'nationalities.....</a>	162

## Table of Tables

<a href="#">Table 1 FRONTEX threat levels by land border sections.....</a>	127
<a href="#">Table 2 Number of facilitators intercepted who have intentionally assisted the unauthorized entry of third-country nationals.BCU Paionias.....</a>	134
<a href="#">Table 3 Number of third-country nationals apprehended when crossing or attempting to cross the external borders illegally.BCU Paionias.....</a>	138
<a href="#">Table 4 Number of forged or false travel documents and the number of travel documents and visas issued on false grounds which have been detected at BCPs in accordance with the Schengen Borders Code.BCU Paionias.....</a>	140
<a href="#">Table 5 Number of facilitators intercepted who have intentionally assisted the unauthorized entry of third-country nationals. BCU Doiranis.....</a>	143
<a href="#">Table 6 Number of third-country nationals apprehended when crossing or attempting to cross the external borders illegally.BCU Doiranis.....</a>	146
<a href="#">Table 7 Number of people checked in BCP Evzonoï per year, 2011-2019.....</a>	150
<a href="#">Table 8 Number of third-country nationals refused entry at the external borders.BCP Evzonoï.....</a>	152
<a href="#">Table 9 Facilitators 'nationalities .BCP Evzonoï.....</a>	152
<a href="#">Table 10 Arrests for possession and use of counterfeit travel documents. BCP Evzonoï.....</a>	155
<a href="#">Table 11 Number of third-country nationals apprehended when crossing or attempting to cross the external borders illegally. BCP Evzonoï.....</a>	156
<a href="#">Table 12, Number of people who entered Greece. BCP Doiranis.....</a>	157
<a href="#">Table 14 Drug traffickers 'nationalities per year.2014-2019.....</a>	162

## 1. Introduction

The Refugee -migration issue that concerns not only Greece but also the European area in general. This is an issue which, as early as the early 1990s, had occupied countries such as Greece and Italy, when there was a massive wave of economic migrants from Albania. Along the way, however, there had begun to emerge an increasing and more intense migration flow particularly from geographical areas such as those in the Middle East and Central Asia, especially since 2011 with the start of the Syrian war. The 2015 migration and refugee crisis found the E.U. and Greece unprepared to manage the total estates of migration flows and the resulting cross-border organised crime at the external borders.

The E.U and Greek Government were unable to meet the challenges of rapid and tragic developments, and it was considered necessary to intervene an effective mechanism that had the resources and staff to respond to this humanitarian crisis and to strengthen the services that required assistance.

At this crucial time, E.U. has taken a package of social, humanitarian and economic measures, through legislation, to tackle the crisis. These include trying to address the root causes of the crisis and help people in need of humanitarian aid, whether they are in the E.U. On the other hand, the E.U., in addition to its humanitarian and social measures, emphasises in security. In particular, it improves border security with European border and coastguard agency, fighting human smuggling and providing safe ways of legally entering the EU.

Thus, the E.U. has significantly increased the operational capacity to conduct search and rescue operations at both the country's sea and land borders with the cooperation of FRONTEX, and the fight against cross-border crime linked to the irregular (illegal) migration

In this context, this thesis discusses the analysis of the risks that may occur during Frontex's operational activities in dealing with irregular migration flows in Greek-N.

Macedonia Land Borders (Region of Kilkis). In particular, this analysis emphasises the dangers associated with the apprehensions of immigrants, cases of human trafficking, smuggling networks and cross-border organised crimes, with the main aim of protecting human life, as well as performing effective border management, with the availability of vehicles and their capabilities in identifying irregular third-country nationals, facilitators and smugglers.

The collection of data, which were used, comes from multifaceted sources and places such as the legal framework for foreigners and ministerial decisions on migrants and refugees. Moreover, the empirical material is based on the Greek language and foreign-language literature (printed and electronic press), the statistics of specific Greek law enforcement authorities, newsletters and press releases of the Greek authorities' law enforcement and FRONTEX, the reports of International Organizations and Greek Ministries and finally, open sources of information, such as publications in the national and international press. The personal occupation of the author with the illegal migration which observed in the area of Idomeni in the years 2013 until today, and in the hot-spots of Central Macedonia is an essential part of the empirical material. Also, a significant part of the material comes from the author's participation in various training seminars of the Hellenic Police, the European Police Academy (CEPOL-European Police Colleague) and official conferences of the European organisation such as FRONTEX and UNCHR.

## 2. Migration and Refugees phenomenon.

### 2.1 Theoretical framework

Migration is an international, timeless, and multidimensional phenomenon. Its complexity is due to the fact that it is a phenomenon inherent in human evolution, society, economy, politics, and culture.<sup>1</sup> According to the International Law, immigration is the movement of people to a destination country, where they do not have the nationality, in order to establish either as permanent residents or as future citizens of the country.

The problem of migration is one of the world's challenges of the 21st century. The heart of this global problem is in Europe and Greece due to its geographical location as a gateway to Europe by Asia, the Middle East, and Africa are exposed to immigration pressures.

According to the European Migration Network (EMN)<sup>2</sup>, the definition of migration involves the change in the place of residence of a person either in another State (international migration) or within a State (internal migration) for more than a year regardless of causes, voluntary or non-movement, means used to realisation the legal or irregular transit. At the E.U. level, immigration is an act relating to the change in the place of establishment of a person (who previously resided in another Member State or a third country) on the territory of a State Member for a period not less than 12 months.<sup>3</sup>

Migration, based on the status of entry and residence in the host country, is divided into legal and Illegal Immigration. Legal immigrants are persons who have entered

---

<sup>1</sup> Μπάγκαβος Χ, (2008) ΜΕΤΑΝΑΣΤΕΥΣΗ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΡΟΧΗ ΥΠΗΡΕΣΙΩΝ ΣΕ ΜΕΤΑΝΑΣΤΕΣ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΛΛΑΔΑ, 16 Φεβρουαρίου 2008 ΚΕΝΤΡΟ ΕΠΑΓΓΕΛΜΑΤΙΚΗΣ ΚΑΤΑΡΤΙΣΗΣ ΤΟΥ ΙΝΣΤΙΤΟΥΤΟΥ ΕΡΓΑΣΙΑΣ ΤΗΣ ΓΣΕΕ.

<sup>2</sup> The European Migration Network (EMN) is an EU funded network, set up with the aim of providing up-to-date, objective, reliable and comparable information on migration and asylum for Institutions of the European Union, plus authorities and institutions of the Member States of the European Union, in order to inform policymaking. The EMN also serves to provide the wider public with such information. The EMN was established by the Council of the European Union Decision 2008/381/EC adopted on 14 May 2008.

<sup>3</sup>[http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/homeaffairs/whatwedo/networks/european\\_migration\\_network/glossary/index\\_m\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/homeaffairs/whatwedo/networks/european_migration_network/glossary/index_m_en.htm)

and remain legally in the country; their presence has been recorded by the competent authorities and equipped with the required residence and work permit. Illegal migrants are those who either entered the country, without legal travel documents, so they are classified as "illegal immigrants", or legally entered, in some capacity (tourism, studies, legal work, etc.) but then remain illegally in the country, as irregular immigrants.<sup>4</sup>

The movement is often over long distances and from one country to another, but internal migration is also possible; indeed, this is the dominant form globally. People may migrate as individuals, in family units or large groups. A person who moves from their home to another place because of a natural disaster or civil disturbance may be described as a refugee or, especially, within the same country, a displaced person. A person seeking refuge from political, religious, or other forms of persecution is usually described as an asylum seeker.

Concerning the refugee issue, the Geneva Convention of 1951 is the cornerstone of the international legal regime for the protection of refugees. According to this, the term 'refugee' is considered to be "any person who is outside their country of origin and who has a "well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion and is therefore unable or unwilling to return to that country".<sup>5</sup>

Therefore, the difference between a refugee and an irregular immigrant is that, while the refugee can be found at the border without the necessary documents certifying his identity, he does not seek illegal entry into the country from unattended crossings, but the legal entrance and securing asylum. Instead, the pursuit of an irregular immigrant is to enter the country in a non-legal way, regardless of the reasons that lead to such an act. Furthermore, the distinction between the economic migrant and the refugee is often unclear, with the result that asylum is being invoked by third-country nationals who are not refugees, thereby burdening the asylum-related procedure.

---

<sup>4</sup> Καρύδης Β.Χ.(1996) ,Η εγκληματικότητα των μεταναστών στην Ελλάδα, Εκδόσεις Παπαζήση.

<sup>5</sup>Article 1 of 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (The Refugee Convention).

If we want to understand global migration thoroughly, we must examine the root causes of migration. A root cause is a fundamental reason for the occurrence of an event, in this case, migration. Often, in the migration context, there are both push and pull factors with *push factors* being reasons why people would want to leave their home country and *pull factors* being reasons why people would want to come to a new country. In migration, push and pull factors can be economic, environmental, social and political.<sup>6</sup>

The classification of factors that cause migration according to their external and undeniably identifiable characteristics is more appropriate, and they can, therefore, be distinguished in the following categories:

Economic reasons: Imbalances in labour markets and wage differentials at the macro level, and individual cost-benefit analysis of expected wages at the micro-level have been presented as two economic models of migration.<sup>7</sup> Due to the prevailing conditions of the present day, more and more people are leaving their homeland and migrating to countries more developed and financially robust, in wages are higher and more job prospects.

Social: Access to family, social or other networks facilitate migration by migrants, while limited family and other ties also explain a lack of migration by others. Significant numbers of people migrate individually in pursuit of education. The lack of access to education generally increases the ability and aspiration to migrate, and however, there are also cases in which the need for education is negatively correlated with migratory aspirations and drives to the so-called brain drain. As knowledge and information circulate between the countries may shift migratory aspirations.<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> <https://justiceforimmigrants.org/what-we-are-working-on/immigration/root-causes-of-migration/>

<sup>7</sup> Kumar J, Chandan & Gupta, Vijaya & Chattopadhyay, Utpal & Amarayil Sreeraman, Binilkumar. (2017). Migration as adaptation strategy to cope with climate change: A study of farmers' migration in rural India. International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management. 10. 10.1108/IJCCSM-03-2017-0059.

<sup>8</sup> United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Global Education Monitoring Report (2017) Think piece prepared for the 2019 Global Education Monitoring Report Consultation, Migration and education.

Environmental reasons: The emergence and feeding of migratory movements are strictly related to environmental causes.<sup>9</sup> In one country there may be environmental difficulties and phenomena such as natural disasters, earthquakes, floods, droughts or even human intervention that can exacerbate environmental conditions, to the detriment of the inhabitants of a country, such as Water pollution, the dismantling of forests, which can cause climate change (increase in temperature). Nuclear disasters also lead populations to move to other countries.<sup>10</sup>

Political reasons: Migration, for political reasons, have risen mainly in recent years, and many migrate in order to survive. One of the most important factors, which forces migrants and refugees to flee to another country away from theirs, is the political instability that can prevail in their homeland and the war conflicts that can threaten their own lives. More than 12 million people- over half of the country's pre-war population — have been killed or forced to flee their homes since the beginning of the Syrian conflict, one of the worst humanitarian crises of our time.

Demographic reasons: Traditionally, theories of migration have drawn from the idea that 'population pressures' are major determinants or even 'root causes' of human movement. This is based on the notion that, as populations grow, pressures are exerted on natural and agricultural resources, ultimately leading to outmigration. The increase in population, in Asia and Africa, plays a vital role in the emigration of populations because there are other reasons mentioned above, weak populations of these countries to cover basic biotic needs. So the increased number of births creates demographic pressures, as the growing population is experiencing severe survival problems, resulting in better conditions in another country.<sup>11</sup>

---

<sup>9</sup> Black R, Adger WN, Arnell NW, Dercon S, Geddes A, Thomas D. (2011) The effect of environmental change on human migration. *Glob Environ Chang*.

<sup>10</sup> Λώλης, Βασίλης & Ξυπολυτάς, Νικόλαος. (2016). Ήρα Έμκε Πουλοπούλου, Η Μεταναστευτική πρόκληση Εκδόσεις Παπαζήση, Αθήνα, 2007 - Κατερίνα Βασιλικού, Γυναικεία μετανάστευση και ανθρώπινα δικαιώματα: Μια βιογραφική έρευνα για τις οικιακές βοηθούς από τα Βαλκάνια.... Ακαδημία Αθηνών, Αθήνα, 2007. *SocialCohesionandDevelopment*. 4. 10.12681/scad.9547.

<sup>11</sup> Γαβρόγλου, Θ. Χλέτσος, Μ, Ντόκος, Θ. Π.(2001) Μετανάστες και μετανάστευση, Οικονομικές, πολιτικές και κοινωνικές πτυχές, Εκδόσεις Πατάκη 2001






Image 1: Pull and Push factors of migration.

It is, therefore noted that the reasons that push people into immigration are many and different. The European Union is called upon to address effectively the causes which significantly increase migration rates so that it can develop further.

## 2.2 The migration and refugee crisis

### 2.2.1 The crisis in Europe

Europe is one of the essential migrant destination places - and more than 22.3 million third-country nationals live in European Union countries. Countries such as Greece, Spain, Portugal, formerly considered countries for sending migrants, have in recent years been converted into host-destination countries of migrants, which has begun to influence the implementation of social policy strategies.<sup>12</sup>

---

<sup>12</sup> Migration and migrant population statistics. Accessed 1 March 2020, [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php?title=Migration\\_and\\_migrant\\_population\\_statistics/el](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php?title=Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics/el).

In recent years, resulting in the economic crisis, these countries have been the most common transit countries for migrants. Their destination is advanced economic, social and politically northern European countries, such as Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom, in search of better living conditions.<sup>13</sup>

Conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa were the primary roots of the refugee crisis. The United Nations reported that war in Syria and Iraq, but also the continuing violence and instability in Afghanistan and Eritrea, have driven the crisis.<sup>14</sup> Economic migrants account for the majority of those arriving; in reality, the majority are refugees fleeing Syria, Eritrea and Afghanistan.

The Syrian civil war that has exploded since 2011 has displaced more than 4 million people, according to the U.N. refugee agency. "This is the biggest refugee population from a single conflict in a generation," António Guterres, the U.N.'s high commissioner for refugees, said.<sup>15</sup> Neighbouring countries such as Turkey, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon have taken in Syrian refugees, but camps there remain overpopulated, forcing those people to continue their journey to Europe.

In particular, according to FRONTEX, there are the following eight critical routes of entry into the E.U., where there are massive irregular border crossings.

- The Eastern Mediterranean route (sea border between Greece and Cyprus – the land border between Greece and Bulgaria with Turkey).
- The Central Mediterranean route (Italy-Malta sea border).
- The Western Mediterranean route (sea and the land border of Spain).
- The route of the Canary Islands (west African and Canary Islands sea borders).

---

<sup>13</sup>McAuliffe, M. (2016) Migrant Smuggling Data and Research: A global review of the emerging evidence base. International Organization for Migration: [https://publications.iom.int/system/files/smuggling\\_report.pdf](https://publications.iom.int/system/files/smuggling_report.pdf)

<sup>14</sup>Berry, M, Garcia-Blanco, I, and Moore, K. 2016. Press coverage of the refugee and migrant crisis in the EU: a content analysis of five European countries. [Project Report]. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.p.47.

<sup>15</sup>UNHCR, (2015), Total number of Syrian refugees exceeds four million for first time.

- The route to Puglia and Calabria (dangerous route on the high seas to these Italian peninsulas).
- The western Balkans route (land border of Balkan states from Greece to Hungary).
- The eastern border route (land border between Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and Russia with the E.U.'s eastern member states).
- The Albania-Greece route (land border between these countries, circular migration).

The terms "European Migration Crisis" and "European Refugee Crisis" began to be widely used in April 2015, when five ships carrying almost 2,000 migrants to Europe sank in the Mediterranean, near the Italian island Lampedusa, with a total death toll estimated at over 1,200.<sup>16</sup>

---

<sup>16</sup>[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European\\_migrant\\_crisis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_migrant_crisis)




Image 2: Migratory routes map.<sup>17</sup>

### 2.2.2 The migrant refugee flows in Greece

After the destruction of Smyrni in 1922, Greece, in its modern history, has received enormous refugee flows and proceeded to exchange populations. These refugees who came to the state had Greek ancestry, common culture, common customs and morals and common religion with the Greeks, but their acceptance and assimilation from the country were difficult. Great efforts were made, and it took a long time for these people to be accepted, to enter the production process and to contribute significantly to the development of the country's political, social and cultural life.

After the Second World War and in a state of civil strife until the decade of 1980, the Greek state became a place of mission for migrants and refugees. Social insecurity, poverty and unemployment were the reasons which led Greek citizens to immigrate to

---

<sup>17</sup>FRONTEX Migratory Map, 2018. Accessed 1 March 2020, [https://www.planetek.gr/news\\_events/news\\_archive/2017/07/planetek\\_awarded\\_contract\\_by\\_eu\\_satcen\\_to\\_support\\_frontex\\_border\\_surveillance\\_activities](https://www.planetek.gr/news_events/news_archive/2017/07/planetek_awarded_contract_by_eu_satcen_to_support_frontex_border_surveillance_activities)

wealthy states primarily in the German state as a Greek-German agreement on "Employment of Greek workers in Germany" and Australia were signed. , Canada, America, and Belgium were also reception centres for Greek immigrants.<sup>18</sup>

As regards the countries of destination of Greek immigrants during the post-war period, we see the following:<sup>19</sup>

- During the period 1955-1959, overseas immigration prevails, with the USA, Australia, and Canada attracting an enormous mass of migrants. The migration of this period is directed towards Europe and especially in Belgium.
- Contrary to the period 1960-1966, European migration takes precedence over the main country of destination in Germany, while the migration of secondary importance to other European countries (e.g. Italy) is also manifested. The migratory flow to Mediterranean countries felt in the previous period is minimised.
- In the period 1967-1968, the overseas migration is once again dominated, while in the period 1969-1972 intra-European migration is being flared.
- At the end of the 1973-1977 period, a downturn in migration occurs, balancing intra-European and overseas migratory flows.

Since 1980, however, it has been transformed into a state of admission of irregular migrants and refugees. Greece, in the decade of 1990, was a financially developed state with high wages as well as political and social stability. Its geographic position allowed easy access to neighbouring peoples by Land and sea.<sup>20</sup>

Moreover, the political and economic liberalisation of the Eastern and Central European states caused a massive rise in the immigrant population, especially

---

<sup>18</sup> Τρουμπέτα, Σ. (2012) Το προσφυγικό και μεταναστευτικό ζήτημα: διαβάσεις και μελέτες συνόρων, Αθήνα: Παπαζήση.

<sup>19</sup> Παπαδάκης Μ., Τσίμπος Κ. (1990): Δημογραφικές επιδράσεις εξωτερικής μετανάστευσης κατά τη μεταπολεμική περίοδο (1955-1985) , στο Πρόγραμμα Ερευνών Αποδημίας Παλινοόστησης του Ελληνικού πληθυσμού, Εισαγωγική προσέγγιση, Τόμος Α΄. Εκδόσεις Γ. Γ. Απόδημου Ελληνισμού.

<sup>20</sup> UNCHR, (2016) EUROPEAN COMMISSION Directorate-General for Research and Innovation Open and inclusive Societies 2016 Research on Migration: Facing Realities and Maximising Opportunities. APolicyReview\*

Albanians (the Greek state accepted 150,000 Albanians in 1993), Romanians, Bulgarians, Ukrainians, Georgian and a small number of Chinese nationals.<sup>21</sup>

The main aim of migrants was to seek employment, to compete with unskilled workers and low-income indigenous people, and often to receive jobs that Greeks did not choose. The Greek state accepted those immigrants who contributed in their turn to the development of the state and the national balance of payments. They increased consumption, reduced prices and created a competitive climate in Greek companies and Greek products. In addition, they managed to legitimise themselves through the first programme for the legalisation of immigrants. Albanians correspond to the most significant part of migrants, followed by immigrants from Pakistan, Russia and Romania.

In the same period, Greece becomes a host of a notable number of immigrants from citizens of the former Socialist Republic of the Soviet Union. These individuals were Greek Pontians, who declared Greek ethnic origin and thus were able to acquire Greek citizenship. Those individuals, although they had high education, were not well aware of the Greek language and the state had not recognised their educational training so that they could not succeed despite cultural ties with Greece to penetrate a high working environment and work mostly as unskilled workers.

In the last few years, the continuing civil strife in the African and Middle East states are intensifying the refugee and migratory waves of people who have different attitudes and different religious cultures in need of particular troubleshooting. Given the political and social changes that take place both at European and global levels, in 2015, Greece was called upon to face massive refugee and migratory waves, resulting in the Greek islands not being able to cope with the phenomenon.

The choice of the Balkan route by the thousands of immigrants is not at all accidental. The Balkan corridor is a combination of two distinct routes, the Western Balkan route (from Greece and Bulgaria into N.Macedonia and Serbia eventually to Hungary) and

---

<sup>21</sup> Σπυροπούλου Γ. και Χριστόπουλος Δ. (2016). Προσφυγικό: Θα τα καταφέρουμε»; Ένας απολογισμός διαχείρισης και προτάσεις διεξόδου, Σειρά: Δοκίμια για την Πολιτική και το Σύνταγμα, Αθήνα: ΠΑΠΑΖΗΣΗ ΑΕΒΕ

the Eastern Mediterranean route (from Turkey into Bulgaria and Greece). Migrants using the Balkan corridor are usually targeting to cross from Turkey by boat to Greece or from Turkey into Bulgaria by Land, only to continue on foot through the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, into Serbia for Hungary, from where they desire to reach Germany, Austria, France, and other countries. The cause why migrants choose to reach Hungary is because it is a part of the "Schengen Area" of the E.U., an area in which 26 E.U. members states have unrestricted travel, meaning no borders or passports needed. That makes Hungary the gateway to the E.U. for migrants. Countries within the Balkans do not attract the majority of the migrants mostly because of the recession and the economic problems that plague Greece, Bulgaria and the former Yugoslav countries.

Migrant movements opened new routes across the borders of Europe, from the Turkish coasts and Greek islands over the Balkans to Northern Europe, during the first half of 2015. In October 2015 the so-called 'humanitarian corridor', which was shaped by the interaction of the new passages generated by autonomous movements and governmental responses, began channelling refugees on a state-controlled route across the Balkans. The paradoxical 'humanitarian corridor' became a temporary passageway of free movement on the one hand but developed to a heavy state and police controlled on the other. After a short time of relatively free passage, the Balkan corridor developed to a more and more restricted path to a continuously reduced number of nationalities. Conclusively, on the 8th of March, officials from the countries along the route declared the definitive closure of the Balkan route, signifying that only those with valid visas could cross the borders. In the following weeks and months, Idomeni changed into an obvious and visible symbol of the inhumane consequences of the European border regime. On the 24th of May, after much speculation about how long the camp would be tolerated, those who remained in Idomeni were expelled by mass police forces.

In September 2015, the first significant constraint of movement on the Balkan Route was the closure of the Serbian-Hungarian border. The decision to re-establish border controls forced refugees coming up from Serbia to swerve west, creating a politically

manufactured humanitarian crisis at the Serbo-Croatian border. Croatian government responded gradually, and for the first few days, refugees had to traverse the border by foot, without sufficient infrastructure to meet essential needs on either side of the border. However, the ongoing strength of the refugee movement forged another passage across the borders of Europe. Regardless of the increasingly strict control system, thousands of refugees could travel to their desirable destinations by train through Croatia and Slovenia, between October and November 2015.<sup>22</sup>

After a few months, even more, political decisions were taken to restrict movement along the Balkan Route. On the 18th of November 2015, Slovenia sealed its borders for refugees who could not prove that they were coming from Afghanistan, Iraq or Syria. This fact generated a domino effect in Croatia, Serbia and FYROM, by which each state was implementing some form of segregation. From that moment onwards, officially only people with Greek registration papers stating Syria, Afghanistan or Iraq as a country of origin were permitted to cross the Greek-FYROM border in Idomeni, the entry point to the corridor. The people who were forbidden to cross the border, protested for several days, requiring the reopening of the border. While a group of refugees went on hunger strike and sewed their lips together, the militarisation of the border increased; military from FYROM and Greek police officers were deployed at the border, a new barbed wire fence was constructed, and Frontex created an operational unit. On Wednesday the 9th of December, the unofficial camp of Idomeni was evacuated, and the migrants were transferred safely to organised camps.

For a few weeks after the partial closure of the corridor, an endless number of people were still allowed to pass through Idomeni. The reduced number of people allowed through lasted a couple of weeks until finally, on the 8th of March 2016, officials of the Balkan Route states announced the reintroduction of Schengen and from that time on the closure of the humanitarian corridor.

---

<sup>22</sup>Bez nec.B, Speer M, Stojić Mitrović. M,(2016) Governing the Balkan Route: Macedonia, Serbia and the European Border Regime, Research Paper Series of Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Southeast Europe.



The final closure of the Balkan Route at the Greek-FYROM border generated another humanitarian depreciation, shaping Idomeni to a symbol of the inhumane consequences of E.U. border policies. On the 14th of March, people gathered in Idomeni and started walking towards FYROM, crossing a river, and eventually the border into FYROM. In FYROM, refugees were divided from journalists and independent viewers. Two thousand refugees, who had entered the country, were pushed back to Greece through holes in the fence, group by group, without consideration of their circumstances or the potentiality to request for international protection.<sup>23</sup>

In late May of 2016, for the second time, the refugees in Idomeni were evicted again. The corridor remains a historical event initiated by the movement of people, which allowed more than a million of them, to reach central Europe in a relatively quick and safe manner.<sup>24</sup>The state received an outcry internationally for incidents such as that of the year 2016, where the largest informal refugee camp in the Balkans was developed, which in the peak period hosted almost 15,000 people.

---

<sup>23</sup> Bbc.com Migrant crisis: Hundreds cross from Greece into Macedonia, 14 March 2016, Accessed 1 March 2020. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35805010>

<sup>24</sup>Moving Europe, (2016), The Balkan corridor: a retrospective on migration struggles and state repression.




Image 3: Migration arrivals, Source: European Parliament. The Western Balkans Frontline of the migrant crisis, January 2016.<sup>25</sup>

The arrivals of refugees and migrants in Greece in the first nine months of 2019, as recorded by the UNHCR in its report on "desperate Journeys," noted a significant increase. The new arrivals of refugees and migrants have created further pressures on the already overcrowded reception centres of the Greek islands, especially in Samos and Lesbos, the International organisation notes. By the 30th of September 2019, almost 30,700 refugees and migrants were in the islands, of which 25,900 in the five reception and Identification centres (FRC), almost five times the maximum capacity (5.400).<sup>26</sup>

Refugees and migrants who come to Europe have often faced war, persecution and extremely unfavourable conditions in their countries of origin. Many experienced forced displacement and difficulties in transit countries and carried out dangerous journeys. The psychological stress that they have endured in combination with the unfavourable living conditions in the overcrowded reception centres and the painful

<sup>25</sup>[https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/573949/EPRS\\_BRI\(2016\)573949\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/573949/EPRS_BRI(2016)573949_EN.pdf)

<sup>26</sup>UNREPORT, "ΤΑΞΙΔΙΑ ΑΠΕΛΠΙΣΙΑΣ" ΙΑΝΟΥΑΡΙΟΣ – ΣΕΠΤΕΜΒΡΙΟΣ 2019

experience of irreversible entrapment is the increasingly intolerable everyday life, resulting in multiplying and the effects on their mental health are becoming more serious. Suicide attempts are becoming more and more, as are the situations of severe depressive disorders and psychotic episodes, while hospitalisations have thickened in psychiatric units, often with the involuntary hospitalisation process. Just last December, two refugees, the first from Afghanistan and the second from Iraq, committed suicide while they were hosted in a hotel in the area of the Mouries region of Kilgis. The same hotel hosts more than 350 with 400 refugees, several of whom were transported to Kilgis from Lesbos Island (Moria camp).<sup>27</sup>

### 2.3 The region of Kilgis

In August of 2015, all the media, Internet, the news and the newspapers referred to a small village in the border prefecture of Kilgis. The caravans of immigrants and refugees in their effort to reach Europe have a common meeting point, Idomeni.

Idomeni is a small village located in the northern part of Kilgis Prefecture (picture), northwest of the city of Kilgis; The Village is built at an elevation of 65 meters. It is 24 km from Polykastro, which is the seat of the municipality of Paionias, where Idomeni belongs, 51 km from Kilgis, and 80 km from Thessaloniki. In this small village with about 154 inhabitants,<sup>28</sup> the last act of drama for the enormous migratory wave after World War II<sup>29</sup> The peculiarity that is presented in the border village of Kilgis is that, while there are dozens of entrances of immigrants in Greece, the islands of the Aegean, Evros only one is the exit, the Idomeni, and for that reason, Idomeni named as the 'bottleneck 'of Europe. So, long before the end of August 2015, when all the media started to view images from the area, arrived in Idomeni, daily many immigrants in order to pass to FYROM and from there to continue their journey. One can then consider the size of the number of people if they add the number of immigrants who arrived in Evros and all the islands, even the smallest ones.

---

<sup>27</sup><https://www.cnn.gr/news/ellada/story/202049/dyo-aytoktonies-prosfygon-sto-kilkis>

<sup>28</sup><http://idomeni.gr/apografi/index.html>

<sup>29</sup>[Idomeni.gr Ειδομενη, τοπογραφικα στοιχεία, availableathttp://www.idomeni.gr/](http://www.idomeni.gr/)



Image 4: Migration routes in the Balkans, 2017 Credit: Free map downloaded from d-maps.com, arrows added by AAN.<sup>30</sup>

The geographical location of Kilkis is a junction with the Thessaloniki urban Complex, which is the navel of Macedonia while its proximity with countries of neighbouring geographic regions such as Balkan countries and the countries of Europe It is another essential asset and is considered as the main gateway and output in Southeast Europe.<sup>31</sup>

The Balkan route is not a new phenomenon. It has a long history, marked by successive transformations in scope and visibility. However, the unique development of a formalised corridor, established in early summer 2015, constituted an unprecedented and significant rupture in its long existence.<sup>32</sup> The choice of Idomeni as an exit point, as mentioned above, was not accidental. The most common means of

<sup>30</sup> <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/the-aftermath-of-an-exodus-the-balkans-old-smuggling-routes-and-europes-closed-borders.pdf>

<sup>31</sup> Τσιουλιανος Χ, (2008), Στρατηγικό Σχέδιο Ανάπτυξης Νομού Κιλκίς, Πανεπιστήμιο Θεσσαλίας.

<sup>32</sup> ibid Bezec.B, Speer M, Stojić Mitrović. M.(2016) Governing the Balkan Route: Macedonia, Serbia and the European Border Regime, Research Paper Series of Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Southeast Europe.

the movement of immigrants arriving in Greece were the train tracks, a train leading Europe. Thus, immigrants who arrived in Evros and, more recently, in the islands and chose to move, without smugglers, followed the train lines and in combination with the high-tech mobile phones, which most of them they have installed a GPS route, reaching Idomeni. Also, the River Axios<sup>33</sup>, which originates from Mount Skardos, on the Albanian - Kosovo border, crosses the valley of Northern Macedonia, enters Greek territory, crosses Macedonia and flows into the Thermaic Gulf, it functioned as a compass for immigrants, following him, knew that they would reach the borders of Greece with the neighbouring country.



Image 5: Prefecture of the region of Kilikis.<sup>34</sup>

It is also characteristic that the area is easily accessible due to the national high-way (E-75) and the existence of secondary roads, provincial and rural roads, which are in good condition and are preferred by traffickers and migrants. Exceptionally easy to pass several kilometres, this border region has always been a transit point between

---

<sup>33</sup>Axios or Vardaris ( Slavic-Macedonian : Вардар ( [help](#) ; [multimedia](#) ) ) is the largest river crossing Macedonia and the second largest in the Balkans (after Evros ), with a length of 380 km, of which only 76 are in Greek territory. Its width ranges from 50 - 600 m and its depth reaches 4 m. It originates from Mount Skardos ( Sar ), on the Albanian - Kosovo border, crosses the valley of Northern Macedonia , enters Greek territory, crosses Macedonia and flows into the Thermaic Gulf .

<sup>34</sup>“Kilikis (Regional Unit).” Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, March 1, 2020. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kilikis\\_\(regional\\_unit\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kilikis_(regional_unit)).

Greece and other Balkan countries, up to Europe. The prefecture of Kilikis has about 81 km of land borders and 6 km of water borders with the Republic of North Macedonia.



Image 6: Road network of Kilikis Prefecture.<sup>35</sup>

At the other point – kilometres of the frontier line – the borders are indiscreet. The only markings are "pyramids," concrete cones placed per 100 or 500 meters on the borderline. These cones create an imaginary line between the arable areas of the two countries, which the river Axios or other smaller streams as a natural frontier repays per point. On either side of this line, there is a zone, which is called a ZAP (army security zone of pre-cover) and is forbidden to enter without special permission. Previously, the competent authority for the guarding and surveillance of borders, was the Greek Army with the battalions of the pre-cover and the fully manned outposts, the area at a distance of five hundred meters from the boundary line was characterised supervised area (and in No case of a neutral zone), and entry was allowed only with written permission, which is formally valid until today.<sup>36</sup>

---

<sup>35</sup><https://www.anki.gr/>

<sup>36</sup>Μεζαρηλη Χ ,(2016) ΤΟ ΠΡΟΦΙΛ ΤΩΝ ΑΛΛΟΔΑΠΩΝ ΠΟΥ ΦΤΑΝΟΥΝ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΙΔΟΜΕΝΗ ΑΠΟ ΤΟ ΣΕΠΤΕΜΒΡΙΟ 2013 ΕΩΣ ΤΟΝ ΙΟΥΛΙΟ 2015: ΜΙΑ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΛΟΓΙΚΗ ΠΡΟΣΕΓΓΙΣΗ. Πανεπιστήμιο Μακεδονίας.





Image 7: Railway Station of Idomeni

The railway line of Skopje-Thessaloniki, also known as Idomenis-Thessaloniki, is a transnational railway line uniting Skopje, the capital of northern Macedonia, with Thessaloniki in Greece, with a length of about 240 Km. It is used for passenger (long-distance) and commercial traffic. The Skopje-Thessaloniki line is part of the historical network of the Eastern Railways ('Chemins de Fer'-C.O.) whose construction began in 1873 from the then Ottoman Empire in order to union Thessaloniki with Belgrade and by extension with the European States. Today, the line has been degraded in terms of passenger work without offering national, interregional or suburban services, but only serves connections with other European countries and for specific periods of the year (summer tourist Period).<sup>37</sup>

As mentioned above, the immigrants followed the train lines, as a guide, in order to reach the border with the neighbouring country, but their presence in the passenger trains during the summer period was intense. The pictures of the passenger trains filled with migrants that were trying in every way to get to northern Europe, through the Balkan Corridor, were characteristic. Migrants, who were not holders of travel

---

<sup>37</sup>[https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/Σιδηροδρομική\\_γραμμή\\_Σκοπίων\\_-\\_Θεσσαλονίκης](https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/Σιδηροδρομική_γραμμή_Σκοπίων_-_Θεσσαλονίκης)

documents, paid the full price of the ticket with the final destination in Belgrade, but their journey ended unexpectedly in the railway station of Idomeni.

In the prefecture of Kilkis also operates the railway line of Thessaloniki-Alexandroupolis<sup>38</sup> which is a long-distance railway line connecting the Thessaloniki City with Alexandroupoli, with a stopover in the railway station of Mouries. In the last two years, there has been a dramatic increase in the arrivals of the immigrants in the area by train, as it is being used as an alternative route to cross the border and continue their journey to the countries of Europe.



Image 8: Railway wagon in Idomeni Railway Station.

In 2015, rumours of open borders and free passage of immigrants from the northern borders of Greece caused an explosion of the movement of the immigrant in Idomeni, who arrived with every mean, cars, trains, buses, even with rented bicycles. Police officers witnessed imaginative and hazardous ways used by refugees and migrants, in order to flee from Greece, and not hesitate to climb the ceilings of the commercial trains that are directed to Europe. Passenger vehicles with specially designed crypts

---

<sup>38</sup>“Thessaloniki–Alexandroupoli Railway.” Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, November 28, 2019. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thessaloniki–Alexandroupoli\\_railway](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thessaloniki–Alexandroupoli_railway).



were used by traffickers to transport immigrants. The phenomenon of vehicle intrusion by migrants into trucks or cars, ignoring drivers, was also frequent, when they were trying to cross the Department of passport control in Evzonoi. Impressive were the findings from the interviews carried out by experts in the detection of nationality police officers, (screeners), during the operation SARISA,<sup>39</sup> which began in August 2013 in Region of Kilkis due to the migration problem. Immigrants from 57 different countries and stateless persons were interviewed and identified, but the most significant findings were about the travelling "modus operandi"<sup>40</sup>, which was transformed, adjusted to the police measures.

---

<sup>39</sup> <https://www.zougla.gr/greece/article/epixirisi-sarisa-gia-tous-metanastes>

<sup>40</sup> A modus operandi (often shortened to M.O.) is someone's habits of working, particularly in the context of business or criminal investigations, but also more generally. It is a Latin phrase, approximately translated as mode of operating. The term is often used in police work when discussing crime and addressing the methods employed by criminals. It is also used in criminal profiling, where it can help in finding clues to the offender's psychology. It largely consists of examining the actions used by the individuals to execute the crime, prevent its detection and facilitate escape. A suspect's modus operandi can assist in their identification, apprehension, or repression, and can also be used to determine links between crimes.



Image 9: Hiding places migrants are using.



Image 10: Means of transportation migrants were using.

In the prefecture of Kilikis, operates two Police Departments, Kilikis and Paionias, two divisions of Border Control Units, Paionias (Idomeni), and Doiranis, two Border

Crossing Points, Evzonon and Doiranis and Department of Security and Traffic police in Kilkis. In the Police Units they are serving 634 police officers, and this number was strengthened in 2015-2016, during the refugee crisis by other units in Greece. At the same time, they strengthened the problematic task with specialised Police Units from other prefectures of Central Macedonia with vehicles and special technical equipment.




Image 11: Structure of Kilkis Police Directorate.<sup>41</sup>

Also in the prefecture of Kilkis, there are two customs units, in Evzonoi and Doirani, which are responsible for the passport control and for the application of the provisions of the National Customs Code (Law 2960/2001 as currently applicable), the Community Customs Code, national and Community legislation on the monitoring of products subject to excise duties and precursors, the attestation and collection of duties, taxes and other Charges imposed in accordance with the above legislation, the management of the Integrated Customs Information System (OAC), As well as the exchange and management of information get into in it, through information systems

<sup>41</sup><https://www.HellenicPolice.gr>

or in any other way concerning matters of its competence. The Customs department is also responsible for defending public health and protecting society, controlling persons, baggage, goods, and means of transportation, for the detection of illicit drug trafficking, psychotropic or Toxic substances, weapons, explosives, nuclear material, derived from funds from criminal financial activities, cultural goods, pirated products, counterfeit or counterfeit goods, and other irregularities relating to Transport, fisheries, illegal immigration, protection of the environment, movement of intellectual property, wild Fauna and flora, precursor substances, and irregularities not specified in this paragraph and recorded in the controls, which have been entrusted to it, With specific community-national provisions, international treaties and agreements for the protection of the national interests and interests of the European Union (E.U.).<sup>42</sup>

Today, the borderline is supervised by Hellenic Police and specifically by the Border Control Unit of Paionia and Doirani, and the official entry and exit points between Greece and North Macedonia in the region of Kilkis are the Border crossing Point of Evzonoï and Doirani. Until December 2012, it also operated in Idomeni, the police station of Idomeni, which was in charge of the railway station and the control of passengers travelling with passenger trains.<sup>43</sup>

Moreover, in the area of Kilkis Prefecture, in 2016, two hot spots were operated, one in Nea Kavala and one in Herso. Now the reception centre of Herso has been closed, and about 400 migrants are accommodated in the hotel "THEA DIMITRA", in Mouries Kilkis, at the railway train station and about 7 km from the Greek – North Macedonian border. In the open reception centre in Nea Kavala, close to Polykastro, there are about 1000 migrants. Within the city of Polykastro are accommodated in a hotel, unaccompanied minors, mainly from African countries. The reception centre operates close to the border, and they locate no more than 15 km from the Greek–North Macedonian border. The proximity of the border allows migrants to reach it,

---

<sup>42</sup> Community Customs Code Council Regulation (EEC) No [2913/92](#) of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code

<sup>43</sup> [https://www.policemagazine.gr/sites/default/files/pdf/%CE%95%CE%91\\_1991-02-0000.pdf](https://www.policemagazine.gr/sites/default/files/pdf/%CE%95%CE%91_1991-02-0000.pdf)

with some assisted by people smugglers quickly. In addition, some migrants often make multiple attempts to cross from Greece to North Macedonia illegally.




Image 12: Open refugee's camps in Kilkis region.

Source: Google maps

## 3. Migration policies and security (E.U and Greek)

### 3.1 European treaties for migration

#### 3.1.1 Geneva Convention

The Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees was signed in the homonymous city of Switzerland on 28 July 1951 and was ratified by Greece with the Legal Decree of 3989/1959. The Convention states the definition of the refugee and the type of legal protection or other provision and the social rights which they must obtain from the signatory States. Specifically, a refugee is a person who is outside his or her home country, has a justifiable fear of persecution on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, participation in a specific social group or political beliefs and because of this fear Prosecution fails or does not wish to enjoy the protection of this country or the return to it.

A few years later, the contract was supplemented by the Protocol of 1967, which was ratified by Greece with the P.D 389/1968<sup>44</sup> and extended the mandate of the High Commissioner as the problem of displaced populations spread throughout the world. It was the first international agreement that covered the essential aspects of the life of a refugee. It set out a series of fundamental human rights. More specifically, the refugees' rights should be at least equal to the ones enjoyed by foreign nationals of a country or, in some cases, the citizens of the country themselves. Additionally, it recognizes the international scope of refugee crises and the importance of international cooperation, including the association of States in resolving the refugee problem. It also cites the refugee rights, including freedoms such as religion, movement, freedom, education, occupation of travel documents, employability, and stresses its obligations or refugee to the Host country.

---

<sup>44</sup> Αναγκαστικός Νόμος 389/1968.” Lawspot, January 29, 2018. <https://www.lawspot.gr/nomikes-plirofories/nomothesia/anagkastikos-nomos-389-1968>.

A necessary provision defines the non-return of the refugee in a country where there is a persecution of fear. At the same time, it defines the obligations in the host countries and finally clarifies and describes specific groups of people, such as terrorists or persons who have committed crimes against peace, war crimes, crimes against humanity, or any serious non-political crime outside the country of asylum. The protocol removes the geographic and temporal constraints laid down in the original convention whereby only persons involved in the events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951 could apply for asylum.<sup>45</sup>

The Geneva Conventions, which are universally ratified, constitute the core of international humanitarian law and represent a unique commitment to common humanity. Over the past seven decades, millions of lives have been saved in hundreds of conflicts around the world. Seventy years later, they remain as relevant as ever to protect victims from the harmful effects of contemporary armed conflicts.

Nowadays, the Geneva Conventions have been ratified by all States and thus are among the most universally accepted instruments of international law – a real success story of multilateralism! However, there are still some violations that occur, underlining the crucial role that these Geneva Conventions continue to play today.<sup>46</sup>

### 3.1.2 The Schengen Agreement

The Schengen Agreement<sup>47</sup> led to the creation of Europe's Schengen Area, where internal border checks have largely been abolished. It was signed on 14 June 1985 by five of the ten member states of the European Economic Community. It proposed the abolition of controls in its internal frontiers that allowed millions of persons to

---

<sup>45</sup> “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.” Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, January 29, 2020. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convention\\_Relating\\_to\\_the\\_Status\\_of\\_Refugees](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convention_Relating_to_the_Status_of_Refugees).

<sup>46</sup> “70 Years of the 1949 Geneva Conventions – a Success Story of Multilateralism.” House of Switzerland, September 9, 2019. <https://www.houseofswitzerland.org/swissstories/history/70-years-1949-geneva-conventions-success-story-multilateralism>.

<sup>47</sup> “Lex Access to European Union Law.” EUR. The Schengen acquis - Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders Accessed February 28, 2020. [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:42000A0922\(02\)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:42000A0922(02))

immigrate, to wit travel, work, and settle in other Member-States of the theretofore European Communities.

In 1990, the Agreement was supplemented by the Schengen Convention, which proposed the complete abolition of systematic internal border controls and common visa policy. The Schengen Area operates very much like a single state for international travel purposes with external border controls for travellers entering and exiting the area, and common visas, but with no internal border controls. It currently consists of 26 European countries. This intergovernmental agreement inter alia provided for the creation of a single external border, a common set of rules on border checks, shared entry conditions for third-country nationals and information database, enhanced police and judicial cooperation to ensure order in the crossing of the external borderline of the Union.<sup>48</sup>

However, not all Member States of the Schengen area, which are involved in Schengen cooperation, have abolished border controls with the other 28 countries. This is due to the fact that some of them do not yet meet the conditions required for the application of the Schengen acquis.<sup>49</sup>

During the refugee crisis in 2015-2016, many EU Member states have threatened with their exit from the Schengen area, and some have even proposed forcing Greece out of the Schengen area. Schengen is facing challenges that might endanger its very existence. This phenomenon is due to the objective difficulty of the country to control its borders in an absolute way. Nevertheless, no country can seal its borders even more so a country such as with the eighteen thousand kilometres of coastline and the highly increased migratory pressures.<sup>50</sup>

---

<sup>48</sup> Peers, Steve. "The Future of the Schengen System." Academia.edu - Share research. Accessed February 28, 2020. [https://www.academia.edu/14966170/The\\_Future\\_of\\_the\\_Schengen\\_System](https://www.academia.edu/14966170/The_Future_of_the_Schengen_System).

<sup>49</sup> Coelho, Carlos. "Schengen: What Issues Affect the Border-Free Zone?: News: European Parliament." Schengen: what issues affect the border-free zone? | News | European Parliament, May 29, 2018. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/eu-affairs/20180525STO04311/schengen-what-issues-affect-the-border-free-zone>.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid Coelho, Carlos. "Schengen: What Issues Affect the Border-Free Zone?: News: European Parliament." Schengen: what issues affect the border-free zone? | News | European Parliament, May 29, 2018.






Image 13: Schengen countries.<sup>51</sup>

### 3.1.3 The Treaty of Maastricht

The Treaty of Maastricht (1992)<sup>52</sup> brought the issues of third national’s migration and refugee protection under the third pillar of the new institutional structure of the Union, where states were called upon to take joint action by intergovernmental methods to ensure higher levels of safety for their citizens in an area of freedom, security, and justice. The Member-States, although still responsible for the national legislation implemented on the issues of regular migration and asylum, were now bound to treat problems such as “matters of common interest” and promote policies that would be the outcome of the consultation and coordinated action among them.

<sup>51</sup> “Map of the Schengen Area, Europe’s Border-Free Travel Zone.” Political Geography Now. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://www.polgeonow.com/2016/03/what-is-schengen-list-countries-map.html>.

<sup>52</sup> “Lex Access to European Union Law.” EUR. Treaty of Maastricht on European Union February 28, 2020. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:xy0026>

Although not granted a binding legal effect, the adoption of joint actions and positions evinced the Union's intention to bring such matters under its competence incrementally.

The Union's objective was to develop joint action in these areas by intergovernmental methods to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security, and justice. It covered the following areas:

- rules and the exercise of controls on crossing the Community's external borders
- combating terrorism, serious crime, drug trafficking, and international fraud
- judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters
- creation of a European Police Office (Europol) with a system for exchanging information between national police forces
- controlling illegal immigration
- common asylum policy<sup>53</sup>

The Maastricht Treaty has embedded security statements about immigration and asylum into the formal working structures and policies of the EU and the creation of EUROPOL. The idea of co-operation in policing has begun to be cultivated by the TREVI group<sup>54</sup>, whose main concerns were the fight against terrorism and cross-border crime.<sup>55</sup> The creation of Europol nowadays is closely linked to immigration.

As the creation of the Schengen area transferred the problem of irregular migration to the external borders of the Union, the need for the European institutions to take on a

---

<sup>53</sup> "Lex Access to European Union Law." EUR. THE MAASTRICHT AND AMSTERDAM TREATIES February 28, 2020. [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU\\_1.1.3.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_1.1.3.pdf)

<sup>54</sup> TREVI was an intergovernmental network, or forum, of national officials from ministries of justice and the interior outside the European Community framework, created during the European Council meeting in Rome, 1–2 December 1975. It ceased to exist when it was integrated into the so-called Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillar of the European Union (EU) upon the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993.

<sup>55</sup> According to FRONTEX, Cross-border crime is understood as 'any serious crime with a cross-border dimension committed at or along, or which is related to, the external borders'.

more active role in the legislative process arose. In this light, the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997)<sup>56</sup> institutionalised the third pillar, and along with that, the formulation of the immigration policy pertained to the Union's shared competences. The integration of the Schengen acquits into the institutional framework of the European Union enhanced the legal basis of several decisions and rules adopted theretofore and ensured their direct applicability to all the signatory Member-States.

The reference to combating discrimination arising from gender, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, age, sexual orientation and disability 'is essentially a novelty of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which Directive 2000/43/EC<sup>57</sup> adopted, providing that the Union prohibits discrimination which is due not only to citizenship but to the difference between sex, religion, age, and disability, taking measures to treat all persons who are in the territory of the Member States, equally without any discrimination. Directive 2000/43/EC is a fundamental legislative act which forms the basis for the protection of persons against discrimination, irrespective of their nationality in the territory of the Member States of Union. Racism is not "compatible" with the principles of the European Union. For this reason, the Union is rejecting the use of the term of racial origin and any theory defining the existence of separate human races.<sup>58</sup>

This directive states, first, that the prohibition of discrimination should also apply to third-country nationals, but, on the other hand, ' does not cover differences of treatment based on nationality and is without prejudice to provisions governing the

---

<sup>56</sup> "Lex Access to European Union Law." EUR. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:11997D/TXT>.

<sup>57</sup> "Lex Access to European Union Law." EUR. ΟΔΗΓΙΑ 2000/43/EK ΤΟΥ ΣΥΜΒΟΥΛΙΟΥ της 29ης Ιουνίου 2000 περί εφαρμογής της αρχής της ίσης μεταχείρισης προσώπων ασχέτως φυλετικής ή εθνοτικής τους καταγωγής February 28, 2020. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EL/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32000L0043&from=EN>

<sup>58</sup> "Lex Access to European Union Law." EUR. ΕΚΘΕΣΗ σχετικά με την εφαρμογή της οδηγίας 2000/43/EK της 29ης Ιουνίου 2000 περί εφαρμογής της αρχής της ίσης μεταχείρισης προσώπων ασχέτως φυλετικής ή εθνοτικής τους καταγωγής (6.7.2007) February 28, 2020. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A6-2007-0278+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EL>

entry and residence of third-country nationals and their access to employment and to the occupation.<sup>59</sup>

#### 3.1.4 The Treaty of Lisbon

The Treaty of Lisbon (2009), while re-iterating in Title V the need for the creation of an area of freedom and security without internal borders, goes one step further and calls upon states to not just conform to minimum standards on asylum and immigration but frame common policies on the issues. Indeed, the Treaty of Lisbon introduced a new landscape that could support a Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) aligned with the European Neighborhood Policy and complementary to the EU's foreign policy.

The GAMM, which was adopted by the Commission in 2011, establishes a general framework for the EU's relations with third countries in the field of migration. It is based on the following four pillars:<sup>60</sup>

- regular immigration and mobility
- irregular immigration and trafficking in human beings
- international protection
- asylum policy
- maximising the impact of migration and mobility on development.

The human rights of migrants are a cross-cutting issue in the context of this approach.<sup>61</sup> In the context of the Europeanisation of asylum and immigration policies

---

<sup>59</sup> “Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment between Persons Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin.” Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eudr/2000/43/adopted>.

<sup>60</sup>“Global Approach to Migration and Mobility.” Migration and Home Affairs - European Commission, December 6, 2016. [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/global-approach-to-migration\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/global-approach-to-migration_en).

and the increasing influence of the EU in these matters, decision-making has moved in the province of the EU's supranational institutions, while to a large extent action has remained within the national authorities.

## 3.2 European Councils for migration

### 3.2.1 The Tampere Council

The European Council held a special meeting on 15 and 16 October 1999 in Tampere on the creation of an area of freedom, security, and justice in the European Union. The European Council is determined to develop the Union as an area of freedom, security, and justice by making full use of the possibilities offered by the Treaty of Amsterdam. The European Council sends a strong political message to reaffirm the importance of this objective and has agreed on a number of policy orientations and priorities, which will speedily make this area a reality.<sup>62</sup>

It was decided to cooperate with the countries of origin of migrants, a common European asylum system, fair treatment of third-country nationals, and a legal migration framework and measures against illegal.<sup>63</sup>

To strengthen the fight against serious organised crime, the European Council agreed to set up a unit (EUROJUST) consisting of prosecutors, judges, police officers with similar powers, Seconded Officers by each Member State in accordance with its legislative system.. EUROJUST's task will be to facilitate the proper coordination of the national prosecution authorities and to support criminal investigations in organised crime cases, in particular on the basis of Europol analyses, as well as close

---

<sup>61</sup>The Treaty of Lisbon: Fact Sheets on the European Union: European Parliament.” Fact Sheets on the European Union | European Parliament. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/5/the-treaty-of-lisbon>.

<sup>62</sup> Tampere European Council 15-16.10.1999: Conclusions of the Presidency - European Council Tampere 15-16.10.1999: Conclusions of the Presidency, November 16, 1999. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam\\_en.html](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.html).

<sup>63</sup> Καλοφωλιάς, Κωνσταντίνος Π. *Το Μεταναστευτικό Ζήτημα Στη Μεσόγειο: Ισπανία, Ιταλία, Ελλάδα*. Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Μιχάη Σιδέρη, 2011.

cooperation with the European Judicial Network, to simplify the enforcement of requests for legal aid.<sup>64</sup>

As the millennium change had already prevailed in the European Union, the perception of common immigration policy, through the Seville Council, confirmed the EU's willingness to remain an area of security, justice, and freedom, where the integration of migrants and respect for human rights, migrants and refugees will be promoted. In the same session, the positions of Greece, which had become a place for the reception of a large number of migrants, were also expressed. Greece, through its representatives, pointed out the necessity of guarding the maritime borders and the fair sharing of financial requirements to address the acute problem of migrants and refugees. Also, it proposed the creation of a European Migration Observatory / Agency<sup>65</sup> for the exchange and processing of information and data on migration.<sup>66</sup>

The multiannual programme of The Hague, adopted at the European Council on 4 and 5 November 2004, contains ten union priorities for strengthening the area of freedom, security, and justice over the next five years.<sup>67</sup>

The Commission focused on the following ten priorities:

1. strengthening fundamental rights and citizenship. The Union plans to monitor and promote the observance of fundamental rights in European policies. Also will devote special attention to children's rights and to continuing its efforts to combat violence against women
2. anti-terrorist measures. The Commission emphasises the need for terrorism prevention and exchanging information

---

<sup>64</sup> Ibid "Lex Access to European Union Law." EUR. ΟΔΗΓΙΑ 2000/43/ΕΚ ΤΟΥ ΣΥΜΒΟΥΛΙΟΥ της 29ης Ιουνίου 2000 περί εφαρμογής της αρχής της ίσης μεταχείρισης προσώπων ασχέτως φυλετικής ή εθνοτικής τους καταγωγής

<sup>65</sup> "Parliamentary Assembly. A European Migration Observatory / Agency." PACE - Doc. 10108 (2004) - A European Migration Observatory / Agency. Accessed March 1, 2020. <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-DocDetails-EN.asp?FileID=10470&lang=EN>.

<sup>66</sup> Συλλογικό έργο, Πολιτικές Μετανάστευσης Και Στρατηγικές Ένταξης Η Περίπτωση Των Αλβανών Και Πολωνών Μεταναστών. Αθήνα: Πολιτικές μετανάστευσης και στρατηγικές ένταξης Η περίπτωση των Αλβανών και Πολωνών μεταναστών, 2003: 274 –276

<sup>67</sup> The Hague Programme: 10 priorities for the next five years. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=LEGISSUM:I16002&from=EL>.

3. defining a balanced approach to migration. The Commission intends to come up with a new, balanced approach to dealing with legal and illegal immigration
4. the proper management of migration flows also involves greater cooperation with non E.U. countries in all fields, including the readmission and return of migrants
5. developing integrated management of the Union's external borders. Within the Union, the removal of internal border controls made possible the free movement of persons. This requires greater efforts to strengthen the integrated management of external borders. The FRONTEX-Agency<sup>68</sup> has been set up to manage external borders and may be given additional tasks in the future. One of the short-term priorities is to make identity and travel documents more secure by equipping them with biometric identifiers<sup>69</sup>
6. setting up a common asylum procedure. The Commission aims to set up a harmonised and effective asylum procedure Operational cooperation in the field of asylum will be continued and maintained, notably by way of the European Refugee Fund
7. maximising the positive impact of immigration. Immigrant communities must be integrated if they do not want to become isolated and excluded from society. The Commission encourages the Member States to push ahead with their integration policies in order to help improve mutual understanding and dialogue between religions and cultures
8. striking the right balance between privacy and security while sharing information. Law-enforcement authorities must be able to share information if

---

<sup>68</sup> European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union.

<sup>69</sup> "Lex.europa.eu Integration of Biometric Features in Passports and Travel Documents. SUMMARY OF: Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 on Standards for Security Features and Biometrics in Passports and Travel Documents Issued by EU Countries ." EUR. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:114154>.

they are to fight terrorism and investigate cross-border crime effectively. The European Police Office (Europol)<sup>70</sup> has a central role in this context

9. developing a strategic concept on tackling organised crime. Cooperation between Member States' law enforcement authorities, such as the police or customs, must be improved in the fight against organised crime
10. sharing responsibility and solidarity. The Hague Programme was adopted at a time when the Commission was preparing its proposals for the financial perspective 2007-13; this made it possible to ensure that the objectives of the Hague Programme were in line with the financial means available for them over the same period.

The Hague Council uses for the first time the term Biometry in contrast with the previous councils, which, while stressing the necessity of biometric systems in the context of measures to manage illegal immigration but without using the exact words “biometry” and “biometric systems”.

### 3.2.3. The Stockholm Council.

The Stockholm Council (2010)<sup>71</sup> defined the priorities of the European Union in the area of justice, freedom, and security and developed an action plan for its implementation. The priorities of the project were the transfer of European Citizenship, the facilitation of citizens' access to justice, the development of an internal security strategy for the EU, the development of policies for border management and Visas, ensuring the security of EU citizens and combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime.

The role of EU agencies and bodies, such as FRONTEX, Europol and Eurojust, as well as OLAF, will further improve their cooperation and acquire the powers and

---

<sup>70</sup> “Home.” Europol. Accessed March 2, 2020. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/>.

<sup>71</sup> “Lex Access to European Union Law.” COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Delivering an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice for Europe's Citizens Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme.” EUR.



resources necessary to achieve their objectives under a clearly defined mandate. It also emphasises the intelligent use of modern technologies in the field of border management as complementary to existing tools in the context of a risk management process.

Intending to protect borders from refugees, the Stockholm Programme provided the provision of access to security services in European databases, which previously used exclusively by the police.

### 3.3 Institutional framework of the Hellenic Migration Policy.

The first law enacted by Greece concerning immigration was Law 4310/1929, about the establishment and movement of foreign nationals, police control, passports, expulsions, and deportations, which applied for more than sixty years. Initially, few immigrants and refugees were coming from Africa, Asia, and Turkey, but in the early '90s with the emergence of the first mass migratory flows from neighboring countries, it was clear that new legislation was needed and the Greek state decides to revise the legal framework.<sup>72</sup>

Law 1975/1991 was Greece's first attempt to deal with the massive influx of immigration.<sup>73</sup> This law was exclusively concerned with restricting migration into Greece. The law's title was: 'Entry-exit, vacation, employment, the deportation of aliens, and procedure for the recognition of alien refugees and other provisions and discouraging the entrance of foreigners into Greece'. The only way a foreigner could work in Greece was to obtain a residence and work permit before arrival. Any attempt to enter the country illegally under Law 1975/1991 could be punished with imprisonment ranging from three months to five years.

Additionally, migrants were not eligible for any welfare schemes or first aid, apart from in the case of an emergency, unless they have a residence permit. This law was

---

<sup>72</sup> Batziou, Athanasia. *Picturing Immigration: Photojournalistic Representation of Immigrants in Greek and Spanish Press*. Bristol: Intellect, 2011 p39

<sup>73</sup> Kiprianos, Pandelis. "Greek Policy towards Immigration and Immigrants." *Social Policy and Administration*. Accessed February 29, 2020 : 148–164.  
[https://www.academia.edu/16726532/Greek\\_Policy\\_towards\\_Immigration](https://www.academia.edu/16726532/Greek_Policy_towards_Immigration)

criticized and did succeed to curb illegal immigration and resulted only in the expulsion of massive numbers of illegal immigrants throughout the 1990s, particularly of Albanian migrants.<sup>74</sup> This law harmonized Greece with its European partners, co-signatories of the 1990 Dublin convention (ratified by Greece by law 1996/1991), and members of the 1990 Schengen treaty, to which Greece was accorded observer status at the time.<sup>75</sup>

This incapacity of the Greek Government to harmonize with the EU Directives was reflected in the numerous Presidential Decrees issued in an effort to reform the national asylum system. These legislative initiatives, instead of guaranteeing efficiency and fairness in the refugee status determination procedure, elaborate criticism against Greece.

Presidential decrees 358/1997 and 359/1997, initiated the first regularization programme in Greece and laid the first foundations for an institutional framework but were ill-designed, mismanaged, and made it difficult for migrants to be successfully regularized.<sup>76</sup>

Academics and labour unions criticized the Presidential Decrees and the way they were implemented for failing to combine control with integration, but also because they allowed the development of informal economic activities at the expense of the immigrants.<sup>77</sup>

---

<sup>74</sup> Ibid Kiprianos, Pandelis. "Greek Policy towards Immigration and Immigrants." *Social Policy and Administration*. 148–164.

<sup>75</sup> Triandafyllidou, Anna. "Greek Immigration Policy at the Turn of the 21st Century. Lack of Political Will or Purposeful Mismanagement?" *European Journal of Migration and Law* 11, no. 2 (2009): 159–77. <https://doi.org/10.1163/157181609x440013>.

<sup>76</sup> Only 212,860 undocumented foreigners managed to submit an application for a green card. The main reason for this was that while this first regularisation programme was ambitious in its conception and rather open in its conditions, it met with insurmountable organisational and practical difficulties. For one, the state services responsible for managing the programme were hardly prepared to receive and process the hundreds of thousands of applications. In addition, proof of legal employment for a minimum number of days was an important prerequisite; the reluctance of many employers to pay social insurance contributions made it very difficult for many applicants to meet this requirement. As a result, a significant number of applications were unsuccessful in passing to the second but necessary phase of the green card application phase and despite the repeated extensions of the deadlines, presumably fell back into undocumented status. <http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/en/2008/10/migration.pdf>

<sup>77</sup> Ibid .70 Years of the 1949 Geneva Conventions – a Success Story of Multilateralism." House of Switzerland.

A New Law introduced in 2001 by the Greek Government, before the first regularisation programme had come to a close (Law 2910/2001)<sup>78</sup> entitled ‘Entry and sojourn of foreigners in the Greek territory, naturalisation and other measures’. This law had a twofold aim. Firstly, it included a second regularisation programme that aimed at attracting all the applicants who had not been able to benefit from the 1998 amnesty as well as the flows of new immigrants who had, in the meantime, arrived in Greece. Secondly, the law created the necessary policy framework to deal with immigration in the medium to long term. Thus, it in Greece provided not only for issues relating to border control but also enshrined fundamental rights of migrants and care. It also provided channels of legal entry to Greece for employment, family reunion, return to their country of origin, and even studies or asylum-seeking. It also laid down the conditions for naturalisation of migrants residing in the country.

Even though the implementation phase had been more carefully planned, organisational issues arose quickly; migrants were welcomed only as long as they had a job. If they became unemployed or the labour market no longer needed them, they were expected to leave. In addition to the cumbersome nature of the procedure, the costs (in money but also in time spent queuing) associated with this renewal process incurred by the migrants constituted a further hindrance in result the government decided to issue permits of two-year duration, thereby facilitating the task of both the administration and the immigrant applicants.<sup>79</sup>

In August 2005, the Greek Parliament adopted a new immigration Law on ‘Entry, stay and integration of third-country nationals in Greece’ that was enacted as of 1<sup>st</sup> January 2006. This Law has mainly been geared towards incorporating the EU Directives 2003/86 (on the right to family reunification) and 2003/109 (on the status of long term residents) into national law.

---

<sup>78</sup> “Law 2910/2001 Entry and Stay of Aliens in Greek Territory.” European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, December 6, 2019. <https://fra.europa.eu/en/law-reference/law-29102001-entry-and-stay-aliens-greek-territory>.

<sup>79</sup> Triandafyllidou, Anna. “Migration in Greece at a Glance.” EAIAMEII, October 9, 2005. <https://www.eliamep.gr/en/publication/migration-in-greece-at-a-glance/>.

The main objective of this new legislation is to rationalise the co-ordination of Greece's immigration policy and simplify procedures. The core innovative features include unifying residence and work permits into one document, clarifying family reunification conditions, addressing the status of victims of human trafficking and strengthening regional migration commissions.

According to Article 84 of Law 3386/05, the Greek public services, legal entities, organizations of local government, organizations of public utility and organizations of social security are prohibited from offering services to foreigners who are unable to prove that they have entered and are residing in the country legally. The only exception to this prohibition is hospitals in emergency cases and in cases of offering health care to minors (under 18 years of age). Children's access to the public education system was regulated by law 2910/2001 regardless of their parents' legal status.<sup>80</sup>

However, this bill has been criticised, ignoring the majority of the country's illegal migrant population and effectively hinders approximately 70% of these immigrants from obtaining residence permits.<sup>81</sup> The Greek Minister of Interior has reacted to these criticisms by noting that the necessary changes will be made if gaps or problems surface during the law's implementation.

Through Laws 3386/2005 and Law 3536/2007, new efforts are being made to formulate and establish an effective migration policy in Greece, where the efforts of Greek governments are now obvious to "tidy up" the open fronts in the field and to harmonise with existing European directives and policies. In practice, Law 3536/2007 acts as a second chance for illegally residents in Greece who, for reasons of

---

<sup>80</sup>"3386/2005.Είσοδος, Διαμονή Και Κοινωνική Ένταξη Υπηκόων Τρίτων Χωρών Στην Ελληνική Επικράτεια." Taxheaven. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://www.taxheaven.gr/law/3386/2005>.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid "Lex Access to European Union Law." EUR. Treaty of Maastricht on European Union.

bureaucracy or lack of the required conditions, failed to ensure their lawful residence with the previous Legal framework.<sup>82</sup>

Law 3838/2010 marks the first attempt to establish procedures for obtaining Greek citizenship, which could be considered as a more serious effort towards integration, but mainly the integration of legally residing Immigrants. It is worth noting that this legal provision was established in 2010, the peak year of the economic crisis in Greece.

Based on the aforementioned legal provision, the period of residence of the legally resident from the ten years to seven years is reduced, while the introduction of "examinations" in the Greek language and Greek history for applicants for the taking of Greek Nationality, a procedure that has been followed for several years in other European countries. At this point, it is worth highlighting, in particular, the fact that there seems to be provided for the second generation of immigrants, where parents-legally residents and workers necessarily-are invited to deposit documents for their children to acquire Greek citizenship.<sup>83</sup>

The above law was declared unconstitutional in 2011, with the result that all acts of citizenship were cancelled due to birth or attendance at a Greek school from 2010 onwards. With the annulment of the relevant ministerial decision, the nationalities given under the conditions of Law 3838/2010 are unconstitutional and had to be revoked. Consequently, Law 3838/2010 is one of the most problematic legislative initiatives and an indicative case of the overt constitutional compatibility of law in an obsessive approach.<sup>84</sup> With the annulment of the relevant ministerial decision, the

---

<sup>82</sup> Ευγενίου, Μαρία. "Παράτυποι Μετανάστες Και Κοινωνική Ενσωμάτωση: ο Ρόλος Των Κέντρων Υποδοχής Στην Πορεία Για Την Ένταξη Στην Ελληνική Κοινωνία." HandleProxy. Πάντειο Πανεπιστήμιο Κοινωνικών και Πολιτικών Επιστημών. Σχολή Πολιτικών.

<sup>83</sup> Law 3838/2010 'Current Provisions for Greek Citizenship and Political Participation of Repatriated Greeks and Lawfully Resident Immigrants and Other Adjustments'." European Web Site on Integration. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/law-3838/2010-current-provisions-for-greek-citizenship-and-political-participation-of-repatriated-greeks-and-lawfully-resident-immigrants-and-other-adjustments>

<sup>84</sup> Κοτούλας, Ι. "Η Αντισυνταγματικότητα Του Ν. 3838/2010 Για Την Ιθαγένεια Και Το Νέο Πλαίσιο." Ειδήσεις - νέα - Το Βήμα Online, February 18, 2013. <https://www.tovima.gr/2013/02/18/opinions/i-antisynagmatikotita-toy-n-3838-2010-gia-tin-ithageneia-kai-to-neo-plaisio/>.

citizenships granted under the terms of Law 3838/2010 were considered as unconstitutional and were revoked.

Auxiliary to Law 3838/2010 follows law 4018/2011 by simplifying the processes of the first edition system and renewal of residence permits and the creation of the "One Stop Shop." At the same time, in the same period, public information and electronic services websites are created, which are mainly aimed at informing and servicing legally residing migrants and asylum seekers.<sup>85</sup> The Law 3907/2011 established the first reception service for immigrants and refugees, which belongs to the Ministry of Citizen Protection.<sup>86</sup> The objective of the First Reception Service is the reception of third-country nationals who are arrested due to illegal entry or stay in Greece, under conditions that guarantee human dignity and their rights, in accordance with the international obligations of the country. This reception, complementary to the need of ensuring the immediate vital needs of the third-country nationals, includes specific procedures, such as identification, registration, medical screening, and socio-psychological support, provision of information on their rights and obligations, and the referral of vulnerable persons such as unaccompanied minors and victims of torture.

When an application for asylum or another form of international protection is made, the third-country nationals will be referred to the Asylum Service, which will decide upon the applications. Third-country citizens who do not meet the criteria for remaining legally in the country will be referred to the Hellenic Police. These procedures will be undertaken by the regional First Reception Services, which have been created throughout the territory of Greece in accordance with the provisions of the above- mentioned law. The smooth operation of the First Reception Services will result in improvement of security sense of Greek citizens and public order since

---

<sup>85</sup> "Law 4018/2011 'Re-Organisation of the Permit System Regarding the Stay of Aliens in the Country under Conditions of Increased Security...". European Web Site on Integration. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/law-4018/2011-re-organisation-of-the-permit-system-regarding-the-stay-of-aliens-in-the-country-under-conditions-of-increased-security>.

<sup>86</sup>United Nations. "Greece: Law No. 3907 of 2011 on the Establishment of an Asylum Service and a First Reception Service, Transposition into Greek Legislation of Directive 2008/115/EC' on Common Standards and Procedures in Member States for Returning Illegally Staying Third Country Nationals' and Other Provisions." Refworld. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4da6ee7e2.html>.

migration flows will be managed more efficiently, as well as respecting the rights of third-country nationals.<sup>87</sup>

According to Article 21 of Law 3907/2011 in case, an application to grant or renew a residence permit is rejected, as well as in case of revocation of a valid residence permit, and the competent authority shall issue a return decision of the third-country national. In addition to the previously stated, return decisions postponed of expulsion to Syrian, Somali, Eritrean, Myanmar, Mauritanian, Iraq, and Palestinian nationals for humanitarian reasons.

Law 4251/2014<sup>88</sup> is the Code of Immigration and Social Inclusion, which does not apply to citizens of the European Union, to those applying for international protection, to persons granted subsidiary protection, to officials in diplomatic authorities and consulates and to persons who are allowed to remain in temporary protection. Article 7 defines that a third-country national who has been granted a visa to enter Greece for one of the reasons provided by the provisions of the law must apply for a residence permit upon entry for the same reason. Paragraph 6 of Article 15 establishes that holders of stay permits also have the right to employment, while Paragraph 7 establishes the acquisition of a long-term residence permit as a condition to self-employment rights.

Article 21 of the Law refers to the common rights of citizens, while Article 22 on their obligations. Third-country citizens, legally residing in Greece, have freedom of movement and establishment in the country. They are insured with the insurance organizations concerned and have the same rights as nationals. Their obligations are to state any change in his address of residence, his / her personal situation and the loss of his / her residence permit. Article 23 refers to sanctions for third-country nationals (GG80 / A / 1.4.2014).<sup>89</sup>

---

<sup>87</sup>Ibid.minocp.gov.gr.[http://www.minocp.gov.gr/asylo.php?option=ozo\\_content&perform=view&id=3780&Itemid=465&lang=EN](http://www.minocp.gov.gr/asylo.php?option=ozo_content&perform=view&id=3780&Itemid=465&lang=EN).

<sup>88</sup> The Law no 4251 published in the Official Gazette on 1 April 2014 introduces important reforms in the field of residence permits for third country nationals as well as new organisational arrangements for their social integration in the Hellenic Republic.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid “Νόμος 4251/2014 - ΦΕΚ 80/Α/1-4-2014 (Κωδικοποιημένος).”

When a third-country national has a residence permit of at least two years entitling him to a permanent residence, he/she may apply for family reunification under (Article 6) Council Directive 2003/86 / EC of 22 September 2003.<sup>90</sup> The same law refers to the status of third-country national's long-term residents and is extended to beneficiaries of international protection. It is a prerequisite for the citizen to reside continuously for the last five years from the date of applying. He must have income sufficient for the needs of himself and his family and have full insurance. In addition, it must meet the conditions of integration into Greek society, such as adequate knowledge of the Greek language. In the title of the permit which is described as "Longstanding E.U" and for beneficiaries of international protection in the field of remarks the residence permit is written, has been granted international protection by the Hellenic Republic. The license is valid for five years and has the right to renew. A long-term resident enjoys equal treatment with nationals, such as access to paid employment, education and vocational training, recognition of qualifications, social security, tax incentives. Adult, third-country nationals, who have been born in Greece or have completed six years in Greek school, and legally reside in Greece have the right to five-year residence permission. (GG80 / A / 1.4.2014).<sup>91</sup>

### 3.4 The process of Asylum in Europe and Greece

Asylum is a fundamental right and is provided to people who are trying to avoid persecution or serious harm. Its grant constitutes an international obligation under the Geneva Convention of 1951 on the protection of refugees. The Member States of the Union since 1999 has made considerable efforts towards a common policy on immigration and asylum, taking into account both the interests of the Union and the Member States themselves. The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum (2008) is the basis for a common policy in these areas. In an area with open borders and free movement, we must apply a common approach to asylum across the EU.

---

<sup>90</sup> "Lex Access to European Union Law.Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the Right to Family Reunification." EUR. Accessed February 28, 2020. <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2003/86/oj>.

<sup>91</sup>Ibid Καλοφωλιάς, Κωνσταντίνος Π. Το Μεταναστευτικό Ζήτημα Στη Μεσόγειο: Ισπανία, Ιταλία, Ελλάδα.



Member States are obliged to keep directives on asylum procedures, such as fair, rapid, and better decision-making on the granting or not of asylum. Also, asylum seekers with special needs will receive the necessary support to explain their request and, in particular, there will be greater protection for unaccompanied minors and victims of torture.<sup>92</sup>

The need for a common approach to asylum policy, the crucial issue was on what grounds to define the state eligible for concluding on the asylum claims raised. The international character of the status of a refugee<sup>93</sup> was identified as the problem at the time since the Member-States had to deal with phenomena of applicants succeeding in getting a visa from one Member-State and then while travelling within the Schengen area submitting multiple applications to different countries in order to increase their chances for getting refugee protection. Hence, the rationale behind the EC's initiatives was to limit the responsibility to the state that was liable for the entry of the third-country national to the Union's territory.

The basis for a single European asylum system is common legislation or a set of common rules, defining what asylum procedures are, which state will be responsible each time for examining an application (Dublin III Regulation), and Minimum conditions for the reception of refugees. The Dublin I and Dublin III, provide the Member States with some guidelines for common treatment of migrants, who are illegally entering the territory of the Member States and those who need protection.

---

<sup>92</sup> European Commission “Common European Asylum System.” Migration and Home Affairs - European Commission, December 6, 2016. [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum_en).

<sup>93</sup> Refugee Status Determination, or RSD, is the legal or administrative process by which governments or UNHCR determine whether a person seeking international protection is considered a refugee under international, regional or national law. RSD is often a vital process in helping refugees realize their rights under international law.

### 3.4.1 The process of Asylum in Europe

The 1990 Dublin Convention was a product of the Single European Act, which created the objective of an area without internal frontiers for the movement of persons. The main parameters of the Convention were the following:

- a) ensure that only one state will examine the application according to its national alien's legislation
- b) eliminate phenomena such as multiple applications
- c) lodged simultaneously or successively and refugees being “in orbit”<sup>94</sup> define the state responsible for considering the asylum application through an array of hierarchically formulated criteria

Schilde points out that “the Dublin Convention was the first serious attempt of the Member-States to coordinate asylum policy within the European Union”.<sup>95</sup> Apparently, the Dublin Convention did not solve the asylum problem within the European Communities.

More than a decade after The Council Regulation 343/2003, colloquially known as Dublin II, adopted within the framework of the Tampere program<sup>96</sup> was directed at providing a set of hierarchical criteria and mechanisms that would render a state competent for adjudicating on asylum requests. Tackling the issues of “asylum shopping”<sup>97</sup> and “refugees in orbit” remained at the very centre of the new legal framework, while one of its most exceptional contributions was the acceleration of the procedures concerning the determination of the competent state, as well as the submission examination, acceptance or rejection of the asylum claim.

---

<sup>94</sup> “Refugee in Orbit.” Migration and Home Affairs - European Commission, July 12, 2019. [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/content/refugee-orbit\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/content/refugee-orbit_en).

<sup>95</sup>Schilde, Kaija. 2017. *The Political Economy of European Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108182492.

<sup>96</sup> The Tampere Programme was the first programme adopted by the European Council aimed at the creation of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. It laid the groundwork for common asylum and immigration policies and established the first phase of the CEAS.

<sup>97</sup> “Asylum Shopping.” Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, October 11, 2019. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asylum\\_shopping](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asylum_shopping).

The Dublin Regulation, though, became a source of disappointment and immense criticism about not succeeding in resolving the issue of the duplicate application, neither in ensuring clarity and efficiency in the assessment of state responsibility.

The aforementioned shortcomings of the Dublin II System and the slow process of converging asylum policies opened the discourse for replacing the Regulation 343/2003 with new provisions aiming at rectifying previous deficiencies

The Regulation 604/2013 –colloquially known as Dublin III entered into force on July 19th, 2013, ten years after the first attempt of Member-States to adopt common rules towards the issue of asylum with Regulation 343/2003 and its contradictory implementation. One of the most significant new provisions of the recent instrument is article 3.2,<sup>98</sup> introducing a state's right to suspend an applicant's transfer to the responsible Member-State when there is evidence that severe operational flaws may result in their inhuman or degrading treatment.

In Dublin III, the Council, instead of reconsidering responsibility-allocation rules decided to adopt a new mechanism called “early warning”.<sup>99</sup>The Regulation further includes a number of provisions designed to eliminate human rights abuses and ensure better access of applicants to the statutory procedures recasting, thus, previous legal defaults. The Dublin III is a step ahead in terms of enhancing safeguards for applicants for international protection, yet it fails once again to eliminate concerns over the unfair and ineffective function of the asylum system in Europe resulting in lower standards of protection, less credibility of mechanisms and far less solidarity among Member-States. While completing its first year of implementation, it still

---

<sup>98</sup> By way of derogation from paragraph 1, each Member State may examine an application for asylum lodged with it by a third-country national, even if such examination is not its responsibility under the criteria laid down in this Regulation. In such an event, that Member State shall become the Member State responsible within the meaning of this Regulation and shall assume the obligations associated with that responsibility. Where appropriate, it shall inform the Member State previously responsible, the Member State conducting a procedure for determining the Member State responsible or the Member State which has been requested to take charge of or take back the applicant.

<sup>99</sup> “Early Warning Europe Provides Free, Impartial and Confidential Counselling to Companies in Distress.” Early warning. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://www.earlywarningeurope.eu/>.

remains to be seen whether the new Regulation will in the future manage to address the challenges created by its predecessors.

The migration crisis highlighted the need to reform EU asylum rules. So in 2017, The Council examined seven legislative proposals made by the European Commission to improve EU asylum rules.

The reform of the common European asylum system aims to:

- make the system more efficient and more resistant to migratory pressure
- eliminate pull factors as well as secondary movements
- fight abuse and better support the most affected member states

Furthermore, the Commission presented seven legislative proposals aiming to:<sup>100</sup>

- reform the Dublin system to allocate asylum applications among member states better and to guarantee the timely processing of applications
- reinforce the Eurodac regulation to improve the EU fingerprint database for asylum seekers
- establish a fully-fledged EU asylum agency
- replace the asylum procedure directive with a regulation to harmonise EU procedures and reduce differences in recognition rates among member states.
- replace the qualification directive with a regulation to harmonise protection standards and rights for asylum seekers
- reform the reception conditions directive to ensure that asylum seekers benefit from harmonised and dignified reception standards
- create a permanent EU resettlement framework

According to Eurostat the number of asylum applicants having peaked in 1992 (672 thousand applications within the EU-15) once the EU Member States received several asylum candidates from a former European country and once more in 2001 (424

---

<sup>100</sup> “EU Asylum Reform.” Consilium, April 15, 2019. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/migratory-pressures/ceas-reform/>.

thousand applications in the EU-27), the number of asylum applications within the EU-27 fell to just below 200 thousand by 2006.

#### 3.4.2 The process of Asylum in Greece

Greece, a traditionally immigrant-exporting country transformed into the main gateway of third-country nationals to Europe and into a host-country for millions of irregular immigrants and asylum seekers who seek a new home in the old continent.

The geopolitical position of the country, in tandem with an insufficient migration and asylum policy, minus infrastructure, and incompetent national services found the country unprepared against the flow of unauthorised immigrants and asylum seekers that reached or tried to reach its land and sea borders the past decades. This dramatic phenomenon in conjunction with the recent economic crisis of the country and the administrative inability to deal with such massive influx, providing NGO's full access to the migration management, created challenges for both Greece and the EU and put the implementation of the CEAS and migration policies to the test.

The Dublin Convention led to the creation into the 1975/2001 Greek legal order but in an amateur way while the competent authorities were stifled by inertia, creating a number of practices that have continued to haunt the Greek asylum system until recently.

The Europeanisation of asylum policy and consequently, the establishment of common standards and safeguards for refugee protection as well as the alleged strengthening of cooperation and solidarity among Member-States was expected to bring along more comprehensive solutions to a country encountered with severe strains caused by the massive applications for asylum.<sup>101</sup>

---

<sup>101</sup> Papageorgiou, Ioannis. "The Europeanization of Immigration and Asylum in Greece (1990-2012)." *International Journal of Sociology* 43, no. 3 (2013): 72–90. <https://doi.org/10.2753/ijso020-7659430304>.

Nevertheless, the Dublin criterion defining the states of first entry as the ones responsible for examining the asylum claims raised, coupled with the obligation of Member-States to send back to the country of first entry those ending up in their territory without permission put enormous strains on a country poorly equipped to address the issue according to the standards set at a European level.

This incapacity of the Greek Government to harmonise with the EU Directives was reflected in the numerous Presidential Decrees issued to reform the national asylum system. These legislative initiatives, instead of guaranteeing efficiency and fairness in the refugee status determination procedure, elaborate criticism against Greece.

Before 2011, the Hellenic Police was the sole authority competent with receiving and examining asylum applications at first instance. The lack of proper training in asylum law and procedures of the personnel and the backlog of applications, the vast majority of first instance decisions were harmful, but also defective for not providing a consistent justification on the reasons for the rejection. Hence, Greece remained at the bottom of the recognition rates list among EU Member-States. The Presidential Decree 81/2009<sup>102</sup> in line with the new provisions asylum applications, was assessed only once by Police officers throughout the country assisted by advisory committees. UNHCR refused to participate in the Advisory Refugee Committee, stating that under these circumstances, “protection in Greece had become even more elusive.”

The humanitarian crisis burst brought the Greek asylum system on the verge of collapse and called the CEAS into question. Eventually, Law 3907/2011<sup>103</sup> conformed with European standards, establishing new independent authorities specialised in asylum procedures, namely the Asylum Service, responsible for examining asylum

---

<sup>102</sup>“The Presidential Decree 81/2009 Amending the Asylum Procedure ” The new Presidential Decree 81/2009 amending the asylum procedure. Accessed February 29, 2020. [https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:ZACPfXby\\_gkJ:https://www.amnesty.gr/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/Greek-Asylum-Procedure.doc+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=gr&client=firefox-b-e](https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:ZACPfXby_gkJ:https://www.amnesty.gr/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/Greek-Asylum-Procedure.doc+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=gr&client=firefox-b-e).


<sup>103</sup> United Nations. “Greece: Law No. 3907 of 2011 on the Establishment of an Asylum Service and a First Reception Service, Transposition into Greek Legislation of Directive 2008/115/EC ‘on Common Standards and Procedures in Member States for Returning Illegally Staying Third Country Nationals’ and Other Provisions.” Refworld. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4da6ee7e2.html>.

claims at first instance; the Appeal Authority as the second instance authority; the First Reception Service, tasked with the identification, registration, medical support and other reception services; thus making amends for past legislative and operational deficiencies. The massive and simultaneous arrival of immigrants and asylum seekers with the main gate of entry the eastern Aegean exerted pressure both in Greece and in the common European asylum system and highlighted the pre-existing weaknesses. These days, after the climax of the Refugee crisis in 2015, there are now ten regional offices (Lesvos, Thrace, Rhodes, Samos, Leros, Chios, etc.) and 12 independent asylum echelons in Kos, Xanthi, Piraeus, Corinth, etc. Greece has paid all its attention to the management of the irregular immigration in order to limit as much as possible entry illegal immigrants so that it remains inactive on the issue of social integrating the remainder migrant population.

According to Eurostat, 2015, the peak year for asylum applicants in Greece, almost 13.000 applications were reported. Despite the EU-Turkey agreement, the flows rose in 2016, and until the end of 2018, the number of applicants exploded to 67.000 applicants (see Graph 1). Greece's insufficient migration and asylum policy are reflected in the final decision on appeal<sup>104</sup> where only 175 asylum applicants fulfilled the criteria.

---

<sup>104</sup> Final decision on appeal means a decision granted at the final instance of administrative/judicial asylum procedure and which results from the appeal lodged by the asylum seeker rejected in the preceding stage of the procedure.



Graph 1: Asylum applicant and final decision on appeal.<sup>105</sup>

In October 2019, a public consultation was launched by the Ministry of Citizen Protection on the draft International Protection Act, with the government's primary objective of establishing sensible policies of secure borders and conversion into a welfare state. The final text of Law 4636/2019 "on international protection and other provisions" was published in the Official Gazette 01.11.2019. (GOVERNMENT GAZETTE A 169/1.11.2019).<sup>106</sup>

According to the explanatory memorandum, the new law seeks a significant incision in the legislative framework governing the provision of international protection, as it is systematized and adapted to single legislation all the regulations governing the Recognition and status of citizens of third countries or stateless persons, as beneficiaries of international protection, the status of Refugees or those entitled to subsidiary protection, the reception of the above applicants, the procedure for granting and withdrawing the International protection regime and the procedure for providing judicial protection.

<sup>105</sup> www.eurostat.com

<sup>106</sup> “Νόμος 4636/2019 - ΦΕΚ 169/Α/1-11-2019.” e. Accessed March 2, 2020. <https://www.e-nomothesia.gr/kat-allodapoi/prosphuges-politiko-asulo/nomos-4636-2019-phek-169a-1-11-2019.html>.



The concentration in single legislation of national regulations incorporating the directives which constitute, in the main, the common European asylum system, was imposed as a necessity for two reasons. The first reason is that a Legal framework for the implementers of law, judicial officers and lawyers. They will now have legislation, which will regulate all issues relating to international protection in general, without forced to refer to scattered Legislative texts. The second plea, which is largely concluded from the first, concerns the substance of the arrangements. The legislative documents which have been scattered to date, which had transposed the relevant directives into Greek law, included, on the one hand, provisions not consistent with the purpose, spirit, and wording of the directives, and, on the other, provisions which in recent years have been, It has undergone successive modifications, resulting in a patchwork of provisions, which are far from clearly lending to the law. Any introduction of new provisions and the modification of existing ones would lead to a legal monstrosity, which would simply make it impossible to implement in practice, and would be a repetition of the bad legislative practice so far.

As stated in the explanatory memorandum, the new law aims to:

- To introduce in Greek legal order a clear legal framework
- To correct the inherent design errors of the currently unstructured, largely, Greek asylum system
- Redesign a new system that is in harmony with the requirements of the Union legislature and which actually respects the rights of asylum seekers in practice and does not merely proclaim their respect.
- Lay down rules, clear and specific, by putting an end to the ambiguity so far as to what is actually applicable at a legislative level, ambiguity affecting both the functioning of the administrative services and the applicants themselves, who, in view And the difficult position in which, unclearly, they find themselves unable to understand substantially, what exactly is the procedure in which they will be submitted and what are the rights and obligations which are

self-explanatory They must respect, as in general, any citizen or resident in a state obliged to observe,

- Eliminate the consequences of a legislating which has led to a number of applicants who are in fact not protected by being left in a system of unclear, dysfunctional, slow-paced, complex procedures, and substantially ineffective; Consistently in fact trapped in a situation in limbo for long periods of time,
- Eliminate the consequences of a legislating that was unaware that the law of international protection is qualitatively and substantially other than the broad meaning Immigration law. A legislating, which ignored that international protection law is intended to protect only "beggars" as the highest act of humanism, and not to broaden the boundaries of the concept and to include persons deprived of these qualitative characteristics of Refugee status
- Eliminate the consequences of a legislating, which has led to an unspecified number of third-country nationals who remain in the land without a legitimate cause, which are not protected but left in circuits exploiting them, not detected by Authorities and are therefore not reimbursed to their countries of origin.

At the same time, the draft law includes all these qualitative features, which will allow the Greek asylum system to address the current reality, in which it is also called to function: closed borders, increased flows, Lack of carrying capacity of Greece, to welcome all third-country nationals or stateless persons who wish, for reasons not concluded with the spirit and purpose of international protection, to enter and remain in the Greek Territory.

## 4. Organised Crime

### 4.1 Conceptual Framework

Modern society has to face a new form of crime, organised crime. Organised criminal offences, the high effectiveness of the methods applied, the use through corruption, and the parallel appearance of well-structured groups of criminal action, which are possessed by a spirit of cooperation in the future to commit crimes, are the hallmarks of modern crime. Various scholars see cross-border crime as a criminal activity that occurs in more than one State and likewise violates the laws of the States involved. In particular, international cross-border organised crime expresses a significant threat to the global economy and social peace of all countries, and this requires worldwide cooperation between States.

The conceptual framework for the Organised Crime is not strictly defined because of the diversity it presents and the multitude of sectors in which the existence of the phenomenon is observed. Academics, legal and prosecution authorities disagree on the Cross-border crime definition.

One early attempt to provide an official definition was made by the US Federal (Wickersham) Commission set up by President Herbert Hoover in 1929.<sup>107</sup> The members of this Commission put together crimes of legitimate business, commercialised fraud, and racketeering under the heading “organised crime.” They accused police, judges, and politicians and various actors in the United States. Their definition provided the basis for the depiction of “organised crime as a business”.<sup>108</sup>

Another early US definition of organised crime is found in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968<sup>109</sup> (Public Law 90–351). According to this Law,

---

<sup>107</sup> Smith, Cindy J., Sheldon X. Zhang, and Rosemary Barberet. “Routledge Handbook of International Criminology.” Taylor & Francis. Taylor & Francis, May 3, 2011. p 212 <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203864708>

<sup>108</sup>Smith, Dwight C. “Wickersham to Sutherland to Katzenbach: Evolving an ‘Official’ Definition for Organized Crime.” *Crime, Law and Social Change*. Kluwer Academic Publishers, September 1, 1991.p 135–154. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00227546>.

<sup>109</sup>The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Pub.L. 90–351, 82 Stat. 197, enacted June 19, 1968, codified at 34 U.S.C. § 10101 et seq.) was legislation passed by the Congress of the United States and signed into law by President Lyndon B. Johnson that established the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA).

“organised crime means the unlawful activities of members of a highly organised, disciplined association engaged in supplying illegal goods and services, including but not limited to gambling, prostitution, loan sharking, narcotics, labour racketeering, and other unlawful activities of members of such associations.”

In Germany, the following definition of organised crime is used: « Organised crime is the planned commission of criminal offences determined by the pursuit of profit and power which, individually or as a whole, are of considerable importance and involve more than two persons, each with his/her own assigned tasks, who collaborate for a prolonged or indefinite period:<sup>110</sup>

- by using commercial or business-like structures
- by using force or other means of intimidation by exerting influence on politics, the media, public administration, judicial authorities, or the business sector.

In the European Union, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs of the European Parliament has drafted a joint action plan, and according to article 1 the definition of 'criminal organisation' referred to « the established for some time and a structured union more than two persons acting together to perform offences punishable by deprivation of liberty or a security measure deprivation of liberty for a maximum of at least four years or a heavier sentence». <sup>111</sup>

Still, the INTERPOL <sup>112</sup>, adopted by decision in 1988 in the context of the first "Organised Crime" symposium in Lyon, France, the following definition: "Organised crime" is any business or group of individuals involved in ongoing illegal activity,

---

Title III of the Act set rules for obtaining wiretap orders in the United States. It had been started shortly after November 22, 1963 when evidence in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy increased public alertness to the relative lack of control over the sale and possession of guns in the United States. The act was a major accomplishment of Johnson's war on crime.

<sup>110</sup> Bundeskriminalamt, Organised Crime Situation Report 2003 Federal Republic of Germany: Summary, Wiesbaden, GER: Bundeskriminalamt, 2004.

<sup>111</sup> European Parliament, Report on the Proposal of a Council Framework Decision on the Fight against Organised Crime. Accessed February 29, 2020 <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201206/20120627ATT47779/20120627ATT47779EN.pdf>

<sup>112</sup> INTERPOL is an international organization that facilitates worldwide police cooperation and crime control? Headquartered in Lyon, France, it was founded in 1923 as the International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC).

which its primary purpose the acquisition of profits, irrespective of national boundaries'.

In any case, the majority of experts agree on the following four elements of "organised crime»:

- the existence of an organised, stable hierarchy
- profit from the crime
- the use of force and intimidation
- the use of corruption as a means of maintaining impunity <sup>113</sup>

In December 2000, in Palermo, Italy, the United Nations developed its first legally Organised Crime binding instrument in the field of crime: the UN Convention on Transnational Organised Crime (also known as the Palermo Convention). According to the Article 2 of the Convention “Organised criminal group” shall mean a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more severe crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefits.<sup>114</sup>

In 2001, the European Commission and Europol, in cooperation with the Council of Europe, developed a working definition, according to which 11 characteristics of criminal organisations are associated with the label of organised crime.

The mandatory criteria are:<sup>115</sup>

---

<sup>113</sup>Alessandro,Politi, .The Threat of Organised Crime in the Balkans. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, May 2001, pp. 39-63

<sup>114</sup> UNODC, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME AND THE PROTOCOLS THERETO, 2004 p 5 Accessed February 29, 2020 [https://www.unodc.org/documents/middleeastandnorthafrica/organised-crime/UNITED\\_NATIONS\\_CONVENTION\\_AGAINST\\_TRANSNATIONAL\\_ORGANIZED\\_CRIME\\_AND\\_THE\\_PROTOCOLS\\_THERETO.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/middleeastandnorthafrica/organised-crime/UNITED_NATIONS_CONVENTION_AGAINST_TRANSNATIONAL_ORGANIZED_CRIME_AND_THE_PROTOCOLS_THERETO.pdf)

<sup>115</sup>“Lex Access to European Union Law. The prevention and control of organised crime: a European Union strategy for the beginning of the new millennium”.OJ C 124, 3.5.2000, p. 1–33 *EUR*. Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32000F0503>.

- collaboration among more than two people
- extending over a prolonged or indefinite period
- suspected of committing serious criminal offences, punishable by imprisonment for at least four years or a more severe penalty
- the central goal of profit and/or power

The optional criteria are:

- a specialised division of labour
- exercising measures of discipline and control
- employing violence or other means of intimidation
- employing commercial business-like structures
- participating in money laundering
- operational across national borders
- exerting influence over the legitimate social institution.

The EU definition requires the presence of a minimum of six characteristics: four mandatory criteria and two optional, to be drawn from a list of criteria.

In the same vein, Article 187 of the Greek Penal Code, as amended by Greek Law 2928/2001, refers to the “Criminal Organisation”, which defines a group with a structured and lasting action consisting of three or more persons, which seeks to commit more felonies listed for which it is envisaged imprisonment up to ten years.<sup>116</sup>

Greek Law 2928/2001 has made serious innovations in national law to tackle organised crime. Made essential amendments to the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure.

---

<sup>116</sup>“Νόμος 2928/2001 - ΦΕΚ 141/Α/27-6-2001 (Κωδικοποιημένος).” e. Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://www.e-nomothesia.gr/kat-egklema-organomeno/n-2928-2001.html>.

In particular, the main amendments made to article 87 of law 3386/2005, as replaced by Law 4251/2014<sup>117</sup> "Facilitating the illegal entry of a third-country national, by speculation acted by three or more persons who have been set up or joined a group for sustained action to that end, as well as more felonies provided for in the legislation on drugs, weapons, explosives and protection from materials emitting harmful human radiation, "as well as more felonies foreseen and punished by legislation for the protection of antiquities and in general Heritage».

Accordance with the provision of article 187, paragraph 1, and the conditions to be fulfilled for the offence of the criminal organisation are the following:

- setting up or joining a group
- the group must be structured
- participation in the group of three or more persons
- The group shall have a duration of action
- to pursue more than one of the foreseen felonies.

The assembly of the criminal group, as shown above, is based on three criteria:

- qualitative (structured group)
- quantitative (three or more persons) and
- time (duration of action).

## 4.2 Scope of Action

As mentioned above, "Organised crime" is a multidimensional concept and difficult to interpret even in today's times. However, international organisations have decided

---

<sup>117</sup>“Νόμος 4251/2014 - ΦΕΚ 80/Α/1-4-2014 (Κωδικοποιημένος).” e. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://www.e-nomothesia.gr/kat-allodapoi/n-4251-2014.html>.  
[https://www.mfa.gr/images/docs/ethnikes\\_theoriseis/2015/metanast.pdf](https://www.mfa.gr/images/docs/ethnikes_theoriseis/2015/metanast.pdf)

that a criminal act will be part of ' organised crime 'since it gathers specific characteristics, which have been defined by the individual countries. In particular, with regard to the Member States of the EU, national authorities have identified eleven inconsistencies, leading to illegal action organised crime.<sup>118</sup>

Europe is a crucial target for ' organised crime.' This internal threat to our security also has an essential external dimension: cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal immigrants, and arms is a large part of the activities of criminal gangs and may have tied to terrorism. Such criminal activities are often associated with powerless or weakened states. Drug revenues trigger the weakening of State structures in many producing countries. Revenues from the trade-in precious stones, timber, and small arms are fuelling conflicts in other parts of the world. All these activities undermine both the rule of law and the social order itself. In extreme cases, the state reaches the point of being dominated by organised crime.

Examining the usual ways of activities, it follows that the criminal groups have now become flexible, both in terms of the goods they are moving and the activities they are dealing with. This is the case since ' organised crime ' has the potential to take new, dominant forms of the socio-economic fabric because of the increased mobility of criminal groups, as well as the use of modern information technology.<sup>119</sup>

#### 4.3 Cross Border Crime

A distinctive feature of organised crime is that it can be carried out both on the territory of a State and more, so it is transnational organised crime. Cross-border and transnational crime, linked to organised crime, with a common element of both concepts, national boundaries, and the role they play in the way, the type and quality of the criminal act :<sup>120</sup>

A crime is characterised «transnational» when:

---

<sup>118</sup> Ibid "Lex Access to European Union Law. The prevention and control of organised crime: a European Union strategy for the beginning of the new millennium". *OJ C 124*, 3.5.2000, p.

<sup>119</sup> "Exploring Tomorrow's Organised Crime." Europol, October 18, 2016. Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/exploring-tomorrow's-organised-crime>.

<sup>120</sup> Χλούπης, Γ. (2005) Διασυνοριακό & υπερεθνικό οργανωμένο έγκλημα. Αθήνα: Νομική Βιβλιοθήκη



- it is committed in more than one Member State
- it is held in a country, but a significant part of the preparation of its design, management or control takes place in another State
- is committed in a state but regarding the act is involved in an organised criminal group which indulging in illegal activity in more than one Member State
- is committed in a state but has substantial consequences in another

Finally, if the countries involved are neighbouring, i.e., countries with shared borders such as the Balkan countries, then we are speaking of “cross-border crime”. The main feature of cross-border crime is the more specific form of activity of the transnational organised crime in which its economic character is paramount. The type of criminal activity to be dealt with is either the pursuit of illegal commercial activities through the common borders (such as drug trafficking, illicit firearms trafficking) or the common borders illegal movement of potential legal goods (such as smuggling, non-payment of duties).

In Greece, the competent "cross-border authorities" for the prevention and Suppression of the cross-border crime are the customs, coast- guard and police authorities in accordance with law 2865/2000.<sup>121</sup> Before this law on tackling transnational crime, according to Law 2622/1988 "Border Guard Services»<sup>122</sup>, The Ministry of Public Order established central (Directorate for the Prosecution of Organised Crime) and regional "Police Border Guard Units," staffed by police and civilian personnel. Their sole mission was to prevent illegal entry of aliens into the country, the Identification and arrest thereof and their return to their country of origin, and the identification and arrest of persons who organise or facilitate the above offence.

---

<sup>121</sup> Νόμος 2865/2000 - ΦΕΚ 271/Α/19-12-2000.” e. Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://www.e-nomothesia.gr/kat-egklema-organomeno/nomos-2865-2000-phek-271-a-19-12-2000.html>.

<sup>122</sup> “Νόμος 2622/1998 - ΦΕΚ 138/Α/25-6-1998 (Κωδικοποιημένος).” e. Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://www.e-nomothesia.gr/kat-astynomikos-astynomia/kat-astyn-eidikoi-frouroi-synoriakoi-fylakes/n-2622-1998.html>.

Greece is facing a significant problem of cross-border crime, particularly intense from the decade of 1990 until today. One of the essential features of the organised scene is that there are no borders and geographic boundaries. Instead, Europe is treated as a single area of action. Clearly, in the case of the non-existent border, it could be said that in the case of irregular migration, a characteristic example of cross-border crime, the phenomenon would be part of social research, as a shift of parts of the world's population from one place to another if the element of the law violation was lacking.

#### 4.4 European Police Cooperation

Organised crime is considered to be a changing and flexible phenomenon. Although the benefits of globalisation, such as more accessible and faster communication, movement of finances and international travel have also allowed transnational organised criminal groups to develop rapidly, diversify, and extend their activities. Traditionally territorial-based criminal groups have been replaced by smaller and more flexible networks across several jurisdictions. In the course of an investigation, organised crime affects all States and victims, suspects, organised criminal groups, and proceeds of crime may be located in many States, whether as countries of supply, transit, or demand.<sup>123</sup> The states in the current era do not have the opportunity to respond without cooperation, to the demands of the fight against organised crime and, in particular, cross-border organised crime, in order to halt the course of criminal groups operating globally.

Border Protection has always been a vital concern of the States since it was related to their national security and sovereignty. Cross-border cooperation (CBC) is one of the primary forms of cooperation developed between neighbouring States that have understood that it was feasible to turn their mutual problems into mutual benefits. This is a form of cooperation between neighbouring national authorities along

---

<sup>123</sup> Antoaneta.seitz. "United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime." UNODC and Organized Crime. Accessed March 1, 2020. <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/intro.html>.

national borders. In most cases, the participating authorities are local authorities, although in other cases, regional or district authorities are involved.<sup>124</sup>

The fight against cross-border crime is one of the most critical areas where States choose to develop cross-border cooperation. Bearing in mind that the cross-border crime knows no boundaries, fighting it is a highly complex task, due to the use of new technologies available to criminal organisations in order to escape conception. Therefore, ensuring effective cooperation between the State authorities of different States must be an integral part of any planned strategy that aims to provide solutions to such a complex problem.

However, it should be noted that within the current globalised situation, the notion of cross-border cooperation does not only concern countries bordering, but also includes states connected to the modern technological environment (Internet), Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) have consolidated.<sup>125</sup>

Cross-border cooperation in combating organised crime is characterised as multidimensional and polymorphic. The forms it receives, vary and aim not only at suppressing the offending activities but in preventing them. Prevention is intended to prevent crimes from being committed and to reduce opportunities that may be exploited by criminal organisations.<sup>126</sup> As regards repressive interventions to combat such phenomena, they mainly include dismantling illicit networks of OC, seizure, and destruction of illegal goods and rescue of victims. This dual role of forms of cross-border cooperation requires organised multilevel action by security authorities in the field of prevention and repression, as a guarantee of their effectiveness.<sup>127</sup>

---

<sup>124</sup> Perkmann,, Markus. "Cross-Border Regions in Europe." *European Urban and Regional Studies* 10, no. 2 (2003): 153–71. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0969776403010002004>.

<sup>125</sup> EUROPEAN COMMISSION Directorate-General for Research and Innovation Open and inclusive Societies 2016 research on Migration: Facing Realities and Maximising Opportunities. APolicyReview\*[http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/pdf/policy\\_reviews/ki-04-15-841\\_en\\_n.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/pdf/policy_reviews/ki-04-15-841_en_n.pdf).

<sup>126</sup> Αντωνοπούλου, Αθανασία. Σύγχρονες τάσεις αντεγκληματικής πολιτικής: η πολιτική της μηδενικής ανοχής και τα μέτρα διαχείρισης κρίσεων, Εκδόσεις Σακκουλα. σ 27-31

<sup>127</sup> Ibid. European Parliament, Report on the Proposal of a Council Framework Decision on the Fight against Organised Crime.

The Maastricht Treaty had a significant contribution to the development of police cooperation in the European area by adding the Third Pillar -Cooperation on the field of Justice and Home Affairs, designed to facilitate and secure the free movement of persons across the European Union territory. Title VI of the TEU-Provisions on cooperation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs -extends the scope of cross-border law, the primary concern of this chapter of the Treaty on European Union being the internal security of the European Union.<sup>128</sup>

The Union, in accordance with articles 33 (customs cooperation), 87, 88 and 89 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), develops police cooperation involving all the competent authorities (police, customs, other law enforcement authorities) of the Member States, which are specialised in the field of prevention or verification Criminal offences or investigating them. For the attainment of police cooperation objectives, they shall be taken into consideration: (a) The collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of relevant information, (b) the provision of support for the training staff, as well as cooperation on exchanges of personnel, equipment and forensic research, (c) Common investigative techniques for the identification of severe forms of organised crime, by the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure<sup>129</sup>.

The mechanisms for dealing with transnational organised crime are developed at international EU, regional, and national levels. Further, a brief description of the essential organisations established in the framework of the E. E and at the regional level<sup>130</sup> will be attempted.

#### 4.4.1 European Police Cooperation at E.U Level

---

<sup>128</sup>PĂTRU Alina Daniela, Spiru Haret ” Considerations regarding cross-border crime and institutional cooperation Journal of Law and Administrative Sciences University of Bucharest, Romania.2015

<sup>129</sup>“Police Cooperation: Fact Sheets on the European Union: European Parliament.” Fact Sheets on the European Union | European Parliament. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/156/police-cooperation>.

<sup>130</sup> We refer to the region of SE and Eastern Europe.

Police cooperation has been identified with the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) as it is at the centre of the European security architecture. It was established in 1995 with the signing of the Europol Convention, based on the article. K. 3 of the Treaty on EU 71 and started on 1/7/1999 based in The Hague. EUROPOL is the law enforcement agency of the European Union, and its mission in accordance with the article. Two of the Europol convention it is to improve the effectiveness of Member States ' police authorities and their cooperation, to prevent and combat dangerous forms of international crime, bearing evidence of a criminal structure or organisation and provided that they affect two or more States to such an extent that the joint action of all Member States is obligatory. It is actively involved in the adoption of new technologies for the management and exploitation of information Organised crime through the SIENA, EIS & EPE systems. Of significant gravity is the SOCTA report<sup>131</sup>, drafted by the Agency for Serious and organised crime in the EU.<sup>132</sup>

Eurojust is the European Judicial cooperation Office and was established on 28/2/2002, to reinforce the fight against serious crime and, in particular, organised crime by establishing effective cooperation between the judicial authorities of the EU Member States. In particular, it focuses on the following:

- on promoting and improving coordination between legal jurisdictions
- improving cooperation between national authorities to facilitate the implementation of international judicial assistance and the execution of extradition requests
- supporting national authorities in the effective conduct of investigations and prosecutions<sup>133</sup>

---

<sup>131</sup> SOCTA :Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment

<sup>132</sup> Europol's current SOCTA, published in 2017, identifies the following eight priority crime threats: cybercrime, drug production trafficking and distribution, migrant smuggling, organised property crime, trafficking in human beings, criminal finances and money laundering, document fraud, online trade in illicit goods and services.

<sup>133</sup> "Lex Access to European Union Law.Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust), and Replacing and Repealing Council Decision 2002/187/JHA." EUR. Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32018R1727>.

Schengen Information System (SIS I & II): It is a high-performance and wide-ranging information system that supports the control of external borders and the cooperation of security authorities in the Member States of the Schengen area. The SIS facilitates the provision of information among its members on persons or objects, helping to strengthen police, judicial, and customs cooperation in the EU. The original SIS I system was based on technology from the '90' and was subsequently renewed with SIS II. SIS II provides Europol and Eurojust with access to its data where it is necessary for the fulfilment of their competences.

In June 2018, the co-legislators reached a political agreement on the new SIS package, and the new functionalities in SIS will be implemented by 2021. The changes will lead to improvements in the following areas:<sup>134</sup>

- Biometrics: SIS will contain palm prints, fingerprints, facial images, and DNA concerning, for example, missing persons to confirm their identity.
- Counter-terrorism: More information will be shared on persons and objects involved in terrorism-related activities, allowing the authorities of the Member States to pursue better and prevent serious crimes and terrorism.
- Vulnerable persons: Competent authorities will have the possibility of entering preventive alerts in the system to protect specific categories of vulnerable persons (missing persons, children at risk of abduction or potential victims of trafficking in human beings or gender-based violence).
- Irregular migration: Return decisions and entry bans will be part of the information shared in the system to enhance their effective enforcement.
- Enhanced access for EU Agencies: Europol will now have access to all alert categories in the SIS while the European Border and Coast Guard Agency operational teams will be able to access SIS to carry out their tasks in the hotspots.

---

<sup>134</sup> European Commission, Anonymous. "Schengen Information System." Migration and Home Affairs - European Commission, December 6, 2016. [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen-information-system\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen-information-system_en).

FRONTEX is the European Agency for the management of operational cooperation at the external borders of the EU Member States and an extensive analysis of the agency and its mission in Chapter 5.

#### 4.4.2 European Police Cooperation in Regional Level

SELEC is the Southeast European Law Enforcement Center and is an essential initiative of cross-border cooperation in the broader area of southeast Europe in the fight against organised crime, involving 11 countries. Its core competencies are: (a) coordination of local businesses and support for research and preventive actions against cross-border crime, (b) Exchange of information, data and provision of operational assistance, (c) collection, analysis, processing and dissemination of crime-related information, (d) providing strategic analysis and assessments of threats concerning it and (e) supervisory function of good practice in law enforcement methods and techniques. Finally, SELEC cooperates with Interpol, Europol, and World Customs Organisation, on security and customs cooperation issues.

#### 4.5 Bilateral Agreement Greece-N. Macedonia

Extremely worrying proportions have taken organised crime in the Balkan region and, more broadly, into Europe. Illegal cross-border trafficking in goods and persons, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, trafficking in stolen vehicles, and money laundering are the most widespread practices. This conclusion was exported during the two-day conference in November 2008 (weekend, 15-16/11/2008) on the cross-border crime organised by the Greek Association of Prosecutors, with the participation of representatives of judicial authorities of Balkan countries (such as Serbia, Albania, Skopje, Turkey) in cooperation with the International Organization for Migration – in Volos, Magnesia on "Cross-Border Crime in the Balkans. A common finding has been that in our country over the last ten years, new conditions have been created with regard to the development of cross-border crime and the Balkans described as the "Crossroads of Crime". The central finding of the participants was that organised

crime has taken on extremely worrying proportions in the Balkan region and more broadly in South-East Europe, particularly in the areas of trafficking in human beings, drug trafficking and money laundering. According to reports by Greek police liaison, the main treaty contributing to the development of organised crime in the region is the economic poverty and the low level of development of the Western Balkan countries. A key weapon in the fight against organised crime is the identification and seizure of proceeds from criminal activities, as well as the strict control of the "whence" state officials. Organised crime is linked to corruption at the level of state officials in the countries. In dealing with it, there is a need for close cooperation between all the prosecution authorities of the Balkan countries and the relevant EU bodies.<sup>135</sup>

Today, Greece is a significant transit country for specific types of organised crime, such as drugs, cigarettes, and illegal immigrants entering the EU. Also, a number of illegal domestic markets (prostitution, oil, consumer goods) exist. The main organised criminal activities include:<sup>136</sup>

- Illegal immigration – immigrants from Balkan neighbours, Asia or Africa, are trafficked by organised trafficking networks originating in Greece, Turkey, Albania, Bulgaria, and the Middle East.
- Trafficking in human beings– Greek, Albanian, Bulgarian, Russian, and Turkish groups are involved in this type of criminal activity.
- Trafficking in drugs – Greece lies on both the Balkan heroin route and the Atlantic route cocaine route. Links exist between foreign OC groups (Colombian, Nigerian, Spanish, Dutch) and Greek groups having as key members merchants involved in the shipping business, with the know-how and means to transport large quantities of drugs by sea. Vehicles are also stolen in the interior of the country and resold in the domestic market or are forwarded to Albania.

---

<sup>135</sup>Ενωση Εισαγγελέων, and Ενωσή Εισαγγελέων. "Ενωσή Εισαγγελέων, Πορίσματα Συνεδρίου ." Ενωσή Εισαγγελέων, November 18, 2008. <http://enosieisaggeleon.gr/πορίσματα-συνεδρίου/>.

<sup>136</sup>"Examining the Links between Organised Crime and Corruption." Trends in Organized Crime 13, no. 4 (July 2010): 326–59. Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-010-9113-x>.



- **Smuggling of excise tax goods:** Greece is mainly a transit country of smuggled cigarettes. Alcohol and fuel are the other two large illegal markets. This kind of organised crime concerns Customs Services.

#### 4.5.1 Historical Background

The name issue arose in 1991 when the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia broke away from Federal Yugoslavia and declared its independence under the name "Republic of Macedonia. Historically, the term "Macedonia," which is, of course, a Greek word, refers to the Kingdom and the culture of the ancient Macedonians, who belong to the Greek nation and form a specific part of the Greek historical and cultural heritage.

Geographically, this term refers to a broader area extending into the present territory of various Balkan countries, with most of it located in Greece and other smaller parts of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bulgaria, and Albania. The main trunk of historic Macedonia lies within the present-day Greek borders and occupies the northern part of the Greek territory that has long been called Macedonia.

The roots of the name issue go back to the aftermath of World War II when General Tito separated from Serbia what was then called Vardar Banovina (that is, today's Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), granting the then-new status the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and renaming it initially into the "People's Republic of Macedonia" and then into "Socialist Republic of Macedonia." At the same time, he began to cultivate the idea of a separate and distinct "Macedonian nation."

General Tito certainly had many reasons for doing so, most notably his intention to lay the groundwork for future territorial claims of Yugoslavia in the broader area of Macedonia and to secure an exit to the Aegean. General Tito's aspirations of a wider Macedonia had already been confirmed by 1944 when he publicly announced that he aimed to reunite "all parts of Macedonia that were divided by the Balkan imperialists in 1912 and 1913".

In December 1944, a State Department telegram to the US authorities, signed by then-US Secretary of State Stettinius, wrote, among other things, that: "The (US)

Government considers references to the Macedonian" nation "type, the Macedonian" Motherland "or Macedonian "national consciousness" is an unjustified demagogue that does not reflect any political reality and sees in them the rebirth of a possible cloak that will conceal aggressive intentions against Greece."

Against this historical background, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia declared its independence in 1991, basing its existence as an independent state on the artificial and falsified notion of the "Macedonian nation," this state cultivated systematically through the fabrication of its history and ancient Macedonia, for reasons of pure political expediency.

Greece reacted strongly to the seizure of its historical and cultural heritage and the creeping territorial and alienated aspirations of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the matter came to the UN Security Council, which by its two decisions (817 (1993) and 845 (1993). (1993) recommends finding a speedy settlement for the benefit of peaceful relations and good neighbourly relations in the region.

In 1993, following the recommendation of the Security Council, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was admitted, by a decision of the General Assembly, to the United Nations under this provisional name until an agreed solution was found.<sup>137</sup>

The following period until the signing of the Interim Agreement of New York is a period of strained relations between Greece and FYROM. Greece refused to recognise the latter under its constitutional name and its efforts also to block its international recognition and the constitutional name. In February 1994, Greece imposed a trade embargo against FYROM and generated serious security with the tremendous increase of the illegal smuggling of various products from Greece towards FYROM.<sup>138</sup>

---

<sup>137</sup>"The Issue of the Name of North Macedonia Historical Background." mfa.gr. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://www.mfa.gr/en/the-question-of-the-name-of-the-republic-of-north/>.

<sup>138</sup>Christidis, Yorgos, and Panagiotis Paschalidis. "ELIAMEP's Research on the Bilateral Cooperation between Athens and Skopje in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs (Police)." ΕΛΙΑΜΕΠ, January 22, 2019. <https://www.eliamep.gr/en/publication/ερευνα-του-ελαμεπ-για-τη-διμερή-συνεργ/>.

On September 3, 1995, the Interim agreement was signed in New York by Greek Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias and FYROMs counterpart Stevo Crvenkowski, which has since been regulated by a large part of the bilateral relations between the two countries. In the text of the Interim Agreement, which entered into force on 13 October 1995, the international originality of the Parties (Greece-FYROM) should be mentioned in the terms "first" and "second" Contracting Party.<sup>139</sup> With the interim agreement, FYROM was recognised by Greece as an independent and sovereign State, a particularly important activity for the country's internal and external stability. Greece ceased to be part of a Balkan problem and, with this agreement, contributed substantially in its solution providing the legal and political status for FYROM's accession to the international scene.

The agreement was signed by the principles of democracy, respect of the fundamental freedoms and respect for human rights and dignity, according to the Charter of the United Nations.<sup>140</sup> Undoubtedly Interim Agreement was based on the principles of the inviolable boundaries and territorial integrity of States, but on the obligation of States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Under the guidance. The members of the Member States have also ratified their existing frontier as permanent international frontiers. In particular, according to article 3<sup>141</sup> of the Agreement states that each Party undertakes to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of the other party. None of the Parties shall support third-party actions directed against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the other party.

---

<sup>139</sup> Ζάικος, Νικόλαος «Οι σχέσεις της Ελλάδας με την πρώην Γιουγκοσλαβική Δημοκρατία της Μακεδονίας από την άποψη του διεθνούς δικαίου», Η διασυνοριακή συνεργασία Ελλάδας – ΠΓΔΜ ως ζητούμενο, Γ. Κολιόπουλος – Κ. Χατζηκωνσταντίνου – Β. Γούναρης (Επιμ.), Θεσσαλονίκη: Επίκεντρο, 2008, σ. 245-299.

<sup>140</sup> "Universal Declaration of Human Rights." United Nations. United Nations. Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/>.

<sup>141</sup> Interim Accord between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia | UN Peacemaker." United Nations. United Nations. Article 3 . Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://peacemaker.un.org/greecefyrom-interimaccord95>.

As Kofos <sup>142</sup> notes, "the Interim Agreement has succeeded in creating operational bases for the development of cooperation at governmental and not only level, promoting significant constitutional changes and changes in political choices, with the necessary widespread acceptance in both countries". The interim agreement was undoubtedly the first step towards normalising the relations of the two countries, mainly for the commercial and Economic co-operation of the two countries, but it has set the foundations for concluding subsequent agreements in other areas such as the safety of borders, combating cross-border crime and approach illegal immigration.

On July 8, 1998, The Agreement for Police Cooperation was signed by the Greek Minister for Public Order, Georgios Romaios, and the Minister of Internal Affairs of the FYROM, Tomislav Cokrevski, in Ohrid. The Greek Parliament has not yet ratified this Agreement, and more than 20 bilateral agreements, protocols, or memoranda of understanding have been signed between the two countries but without ratification by the Greek Parliament.

In the five-page document are described specific areas of cooperation against international terrorism, trafficking illegal drugs, weapons, cultural items, and valuables and other good, money laundering, illegal immigration and human trafficking, false documents and currency, any crime against human life physical integrity and health freedom, dignity and property, the pursuit of persons prosecuted or indicted for crimes.<sup>143</sup>

During the period 2000-2005 Police Cooperation between the two countries evolved mainly in the context of multilateral frameworks of cooperation. The lack of a ratified bilateral framework was set by regional, European, and international frameworks,

---

<sup>142</sup> Κωφός, Ευάγγελος, Η εκκρεμότητα για τη διαφορά στην ονομασία . Στο: Ε. Κωφός & Β. Βλασίδης, επιμ. Αθήνα -Σκόπια: Η Επτάχρονη Συμβίωση (1995-2002). Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Παπαζήση,2003

<sup>143</sup>Ibid Ζάικος, Νικόλαος , «Οι σχέσεις της Ελλάδας με την πρώην Γιουγκοσλαβική Δημοκρατία της Μακεδονίας από την άποψη του διεθνούς δικαίου», Η διασυνοριακή συνεργασία Ελλάδας – ΠΓΔΜ ως ζητούμενο, Γ. Κολιόπουλος – Κ. Χατζηκωνσταντίνου – Β. Γούναρης (Επιμ.), Θεσσαλονίκη: Επίκεντρο, 2008, σ. 245-299.

which facilitated the exchange and transfer of expertise related to combating organised and other types of crime.<sup>144</sup>

#### 4.5.2 Readmission Agreements

Readmission agreements are a mechanism of the European Union and the Member States to manage migratory flows on their territory effectively. This is an essential tool in the context of immigration policy, as it facilitates the rapid removal of irregular migrants and their return to the country of origin or transit. A readmission agreement defined as the "agreement defining the reciprocal obligations of the Contracting Parties as well as the detailed practical and operational procedures to facilitate the return and transit of persons who do not meet or no longer fulfil the conditions for entry, presence or residence in the requesting State,» Whereas readmission is defined as the ' act of a State with which it accepts the re-entry of a person (the same national, third-country nationals or stateless persons) who have illegally entered, resides in or reside in another state».<sup>145</sup>

The abolition of domestic control over borders among the EU Member States through the Schengen Agreement has triggered a need to export border control and measures to combat irregular migration to third countries.

With the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in May 1999, the Union has acquired competence in the field of readmission and has since been able to conclude readmission agreements with third States at Union level. Until today the union has concluded 17 readmission agreements. On 8 November 2007 European Community

---

<sup>144</sup>Ibid Christidis, Yorgos, and Panagiotis Paschalidis. "ELIAMEP's Research on the Bilateral Cooperation between Athens and Skopje in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs (Police)." ELIAMEP, January 22, 2019. <https://www.eliamep.gr/en/publication/έρευνα-του-ελαμεπ-για-τη-διμερή-συνεπ/>.

<sup>145</sup>Interim Accord between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia | UN Peacemaker." United Nations. United Nations. Article 2 . Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://peacemaker.un.org/greecefyrom-interimaccord95>.

and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia signed an Agreement on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation.<sup>146</sup>

Readmission agreements help to ensure cooperation with these countries on the acceptance of applicants for international protection in their territory. On the other hand, incentives and facilities are provided to the third contracting States. There is, in other words, an element of reciprocity in these agreements, which does not necessarily mean that there are no difficulties in implementing them<sup>147</sup>. The conclusion, then, of a special agreement to simplify the entry of citizens from one of North Macedonia and on the other of the European Union was deemed necessary, since Greece did not seem willing to negotiate the country's entry into the EU before the name issue was resolved. While, at the same time, movements of persons and economic activities between the two as well as the whole of the EU are widespread. At the same time, however, achieving a commonly agreed line is also a significant diplomatic gesture of cooperation between stakeholders and further intensifies the country's EU integration process.<sup>148</sup>

The recent refugee crisis that brought to the borders of the neighbouring country groups of refugees and migrants stranded in late 2015, somewhere between the borders of Greece, Bulgaria, North Macedonia, and Turkey, was an essential test for its relations North Macedonia with the EU, NATO and the neighbouring states. Allegations of violations of fundamental provisions of international law, notably as regards human rights, but even respect for territorial sovereignty, when North Macedonia's policemen entered into the Greek area to enforce order and incidents of violence, created a new diplomatic crisis. The Greek side was paradoxically quite modest and did not exploit the situation to its advantage. On the contrary, both the

---

<sup>146</sup>“Lex Access to European Union Law.Council Decision of 8 November 2007 on the Conclusion of the Agreement between the European Community and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the Readmission of Persons Residing without Authorisation.” EUR. Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32007D0817>

<sup>147</sup> Press Corner.” European Commission - European Commission. Accessed February 28, 2020. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO\\_05\\_351](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_05_351).

<sup>148</sup>Tziampiris, Aristotle. “The Macedonian Name Dispute and European Union Accession.” *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 12, no. 1 (2012): 153–71. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2012.661225>

embassy in Skopje and the Foreign Ministry dismissed the complaints. The opposition, however, blamed the government for apathy and condemned the incidents of lawlessness in Idomeni<sup>149</sup> North Macedonia's inability to manage the situation that has exacerbated the problems that already existed with the EU. The management of the refugee crisis has, after all, brought the union's leaders into a challenging position, particularly in terms of diplomatic initiatives and effective action with respect for human rights<sup>150</sup>.

Soon after, on 21–22 April 2016, Greece conducted a quadrilateral meeting in Thessaloniki with three of its Balkan neighbours—Albania, Bulgaria, and FYROM, to exchange opinions and resolve common issues they face concerning the refugee crisis. It was a chance for the Foreign Ministers of Greece and FYROM to alleviate the tensions and restore relations to a certain extent. In an official announcement, Foreign Ministers of Greece and FYROM emphasised that, although in 2015, the two sides dealt with the refugee crisis without any coordination and cooperation; however, there has been a development in bilateral relations during 2016. The Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias stated that the quadrilateral meeting of the foreign and interior ministers of the four Balkan countries eliminated “suspicion of one another” and contributed to establishing relations with “sincerity and trust”.<sup>151</sup>

#### 4.5.3 The Prespes Agreement (or Prespa Accord, or Treaty of Prespes)

The Prespes Agreement is an intergovernmental agreement concluded on 12 June 2018 between the Hellenic Republic and the Republic of Northern Macedonia, which was renamed in this way with the entry into force of the Agreement on 12 February 2019 and was made under the auspices of the United Nations in order to resolve the

---

<sup>149</sup>Eidomeni is a village in Greece near the border with Northern Macedonia . As of 2014, Syrian refugees, Iraqi and Afghan refugees and immigrants, as well as Moroccans , Pakistanis and other nationalities, have flocked to Idomeni in order to cross the border and enter North Macedonia .

<sup>150</sup>Kaitatzi-Whitlock, Sophia, and Clio, Kenterelidou. (2017) "The Greek Paradigm on the Migrant and Refugee Crisis." *The Migrant Crisis: European Perspectives and National Discourses 2017*: 126 -137

<sup>151</sup>Press conference at the conclusion of the Quadrilateral Meeting of Greece, Albania, Bulgaria and FYROM, in Thessaloniki, on cross-border cooperation (22 April 2016). Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/top-story/press-conference-at-the-conclusion-of-the-quadrilateral-meeting-of-greece-albania-bulgaria-and-fyrom-in-thessaloniki-on-cross-border-cooperation-22-april-2016.html>.

issue of the latter's name.<sup>152</sup> The agreement has countersigned the 1995 Interim Agreement and abolished the constitutional name Republic of Macedonia and the temporary designation of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, renaming and universally recognising the country as the Republic of Northern Macedonia. On 20 June 2018, the Prespes Agreement was ratified by the Parliament of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.<sup>153</sup>

The agreement provides for the resolution of the so-called name-dispute, but at the same time, the European perspective and stability are strengthened in the neighbouring country and thus limited the risk of influence of third forces with alienation on the northern border of Greece, its role in the region is strengthened as a European pillar of peace and security, for the first time the neighbouring country recognises that it has nothing to do with "Ancient Greek culture, history, culture and the clergy" of Macedonia.<sup>154</sup> The agreement bounds the neighbouring country and the amendment of its Constitution to eliminate any form of irredentism and revisionism (by public or private bodies).<sup>155</sup>

The Prespes Agreement enhances bilateral cooperation on sensitive areas like police and defence cooperation. Article 9, paragraph two, stipulates "that the existing Confidence Building Measures shall be incorporated...".<sup>156</sup> In particular, in accordance with article 16, paragraph 1, the Agreement establishes cooperation between the two countries in the prevention and suppression of organised cross-border crime, terrorism, economic crimes, such as trafficking in human beings, crimes linked to

---

<sup>152</sup>"Personal Envoy Greece - the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia | Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs." United Nations. United Nations. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://dppa.un.org/en/mission/personal-envoy-greece-former-yugoslav-republic-of-macedonia>.

<sup>153</sup> "Macedonia Naming Dispute." Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, Accessed February 22, 2020. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macedonia\\_naming\\_dispute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macedonia_naming_dispute).

<sup>154</sup>Final Agreement for the Settlement of the Differences as Described in the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 817 (1993) and 845 (1993), the Termination of the Interim Accord of 1995, and the Establishment of a Strategic Partnership Between the Parties, June 17, 2018, Accessed February 22, 2020. <https://www.un.org/pga/73/wp-content/uploads/sites/53/2019/02/14-February-Letter-dated-14-February-2019.pdf> [hereinafter Prespa Agreement].

<sup>155</sup>Ibid .Articles 3,4,6 and 49 of the Prespa Agreement .

<sup>156</sup> Ibid Christidis, Yorgos, and Panagiotis Paschalidis. "ELIAMEP's Research on the Bilateral Cooperation between Athens and Skopje in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs (Police)." ELIAMEP, January 22, 2019. <https://www.eliamep.gr/en/publication/έρευνα-του-ελιαμεπ-για-τη-διμερή-συνερ/>.



illicit trafficking and/or trafficking in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, illegal manufacture and trafficking of firearms, parts and components and ammunition, the illegal importation, export and transfer of cultural Goods, offences relating to the transport of civil aviation and the crime associated with forgery or smuggling of cigarettes, alcohol, fuel, among other illegal activities.<sup>157</sup>

Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras in his speech at the Delphi Economic Forum, referring to the agreement, stated that «a milestone in the history of not only the two countries but overall for the Balkans as it is the first time that in a bilateral issue, nationalism has been defeated «his government, and that of Zoran Zaev, was faced with a historic opportunity, and that for the first time, there were two governments on both sides of the border determined to seize this opportunity. To discuss, to consult, to negotiate hard but in a sincere and forward-looking manner and, of course, most importantly, with full respect for the history that has been so troubled for three decades.<sup>158</sup>

It has also been extensively concerned with deepening cooperation between the two countries in areas of common interest from trade, economic exchanges, tourism, energy, culture, to military and police cooperation.<sup>159</sup>

The Prespes Agreement is an accord that is deeply unpopular in both North Macedonia and Greece, and many authors believe that, contrary to what its supporters say, it will not improve relations between the two countries. Following the European Union's "veto" on opening accession negotiations, our neighbour entered a period of political instability, following objections from France, the Netherlands, and Denmark, to give Skopje and Tirana the "green light." The decision of the Prime Minister of northern Macedonia Zoran Zaev to launch early elections on 12 April 2020 will undoubtedly have an impact on the implementation of the Prespes agreement. The

---

<sup>157</sup>Ibid. Article 16,1 of the Prespa Agreement.

<sup>158</sup>Newsroom. "Τσίπρας Στο Οικονομικό Φόρουμ Δελφών: Η Συμφωνία Των Πρεσπών Ορόσημο Για Τα Βαλκάνια." Έθνος, March 1, 2019. [https://www.ethnos.gr/politiki/24520\\_tsipras-sto-oikonomiko-foroym-delfon-i-symfonia-ton-prespon-orosimo-gia-ta-balkania](https://www.ethnos.gr/politiki/24520_tsipras-sto-oikonomiko-foroym-delfon-i-symfonia-ton-prespon-orosimo-gia-ta-balkania)

<sup>159</sup>Voria.gr. "ΤΣΙΠΡΑΣ ΑΠΟ ΔΕΛΦΟΥΣ: ΙΔΡΥΕΤΑΙ ΑΝΩΤΑΤΟ ΣΥΜΒΟΥΛΙΟ ΕΛΛΑΔΑΣ-Β. ΜΑΚΕΔΟΝΙΑΣ." Τσίπρας από Δελφούς: Ιδρύεται Ανώτατο Συμβούλιο Ελλάδας-Β. Μακεδονίας, March 1, 2019. <https://www.voria.gr/article/tsipras-apo-delfous-idriete-anotato-simvouliao-elladas-v-makedonias>.

decision of the European Council to reject the opening of the accession negotiations of northern Macedonia caused concern and severe questions in Athens, causing a fuse to be made, putting the neighbouring country in an extended period of instability and strengthening nationalist tendencies, shaping a foggy landscape for the Prespes Agreement. Pending the Parliament, until the election in the neighbour country part of the Prespes Agreement will be frozen after Zoran Zaev said in an interview with "We will try to implement some provisions, but the two are interlinked...".<sup>160</sup>

## 5. The Operational Cooperation in the External Borders of the E.U

### 5.1 The Operational Cooperation in the External Borders of the E.U

As mentioned in Chapter 3, the Amsterdam Treaty<sup>161</sup> set out the initial and primary orientations of the EU immigration policy, which were set up by the European Council in Tampere in 1999, highlighting the problem of illegal immigration as a cross-border risk, for which control of external borders was a key deterrent. In 2008, Integrated Border Management was referred to in the Lisbon Treaty, which called for the adoption of any measure necessary for the gradual establishment of an integrated management system for external borders concerning the movement of persons. The Union, therefore, defined the problem of illegal immigration, notably as a cross-border threat.<sup>162</sup>

---

<sup>160</sup>Newsroom. "Záεφ: Παγώνει Τη Συμφωνία Των Πρεσπών Μετά Το 'Όχι' Της ΕΕ." Economistas.gr. Accessed February 28, 2020. [https://www.economistas.gr/diethni/20935\\_zaef-pagonei-ti-symfonia-ton-prespon-meta-ohi-tis-ee](https://www.economistas.gr/diethni/20935_zaef-pagonei-ti-symfonia-ton-prespon-meta-ohi-tis-ee).

<sup>161</sup>Ibid. "Lex Access to European Union Law." EUR. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts.

<sup>162</sup>Dijk, Dominique van. "Is the EU policy on illegal immigration securitized? YesOf Course! A study into the dynamics of institutionalized securitization," Paper presented at the 3rdPan-European Conference on EU Politics, Istanbul, September 21-23, 2006

This is illustrated in the Council's conclusions in Laeken <sup>163</sup> in 2001, in the light of the September 11th terrorist attack, which states that "better management of the Union's external borders will help in the fight against terrorism, Networks of illegal immigration and human trafficking."

At this point, it should be noted that the integrity of the Schengen area, in which the internal border controls of persons have been abolished, is one of the priorities of the European Union. Strengthening the integrated management of external borders and developing border control policies in conjunction with the policies of customs controls and prevention against other security and civil protection threats is essential in this direction (commission of the European Communities 2008).

The Justice and Home Affairs Council of the EU, in its meeting on 4-5 December 2006, concluded that Integrated Border Management (within the EU) is a concept that consists of the following dimensions,<sup>164</sup>

1. Border control (checks and surveillance) as defined in the Schengen Borders Code, including relevant risk analysis and crime intelligence
2. Detection and investigation of cross-border crime in coordination with all competent law enforcement authorities
3. Coordination and coherence of the activities of the Member States and Institutions and other bodies of the EU
4. Inter-agency cooperation for border management (border guards, customs, police, national security, and other relevant authorities) and international cooperation

---

Raphael, Beverly; Wilson, John Psychological Debriefing: Theory, Practice and Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (2003). p. 1.

<sup>163</sup>"Press Corner." European Commission - European Commission. Presidency Conclusions European Council meeting in Laeken 14 and 15 december 2001. Accessed March 5, 2020. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/DOC\\_01\\_18](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/DOC_01_18).

<sup>164</sup>"Press Corner." European Commission - European Commission. 2768th Council Meeting Justice and Home Affairs Brussels, 4-5 December 2006. Accessed February 29, 2020. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES\\_06\\_341](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_06_341).

5. The four-tier access control model (measures in third countries, cooperation with neighbouring countries, border control, control measures within the area of free movement, including return)<sup>165</sup>
6. Border management must meet three objectives, which are equally indispensable and fully compatible with each other
7. Protection of internal security and management of migration flows to pre-vent irregular migration, related crime, and other cross-border crime
8. Smooth and fast border crossings for the vast majority of travellers who do meet the conditions laid down in relevant Regulations
9. Full respect of fundamental rights, including treating each individual with full respect for human dignity and allowing access to international protection to those in need

In addition, the Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting of December 2006 recognised the following three components as part of the IBM: 1) A common corpus of legislation; 2) Operational cooperation between the Member States, including cooperation as coordinated by FRONTEX; and 3) The principle of solidarity.

At the same time, the development of the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)<sup>166</sup> is also necessary, notably through improved procedures within the Member States and coordination between them, in the context of policies Surveillance and maintenance of internal security.

---

<sup>165</sup> Two of these dimensions describe what should be done (border control, risk analysis, crime intelligence, detection and investigation of cross-border crime), whereas the following two dimensions describe how this should be done (through coordination, coherence, inter-agency cooperation and international cooperation), and the last dimension states where it should be done. GUIDELINES FOR INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT IN THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION EXTERNAL COOPERATION Ministry Of Interior Hungary, International Centre of Migration Policy March 2015 [available at https://www.pragueprocess.eu/documents/repo/173/Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in the EC External Cooperation - Extracted Version.pdf](https://www.pragueprocess.eu/documents/repo/173/Guidelines%20for%20Integrated%20Border%20Management%20in%20the%20EC%20External%20Cooperation%20-%20Extracted%20Version.pdf)

<sup>166</sup> The European Border Surveillance system (EUROSUR) is a multipurpose system for cooperation between the EU Member States and Frontex in order to improve situational awareness and increase reaction capability at external borders. The aim is to prevent cross-border crime and irregular migration and contribute to protecting migrants' lives.

The principle of IBM can be summarised as National and international coordination and cooperation among all the relevant authorities and agencies involved in border security and trade facilitation to establish effective, efficient, and integrated border management systems in order to reach the objective of open, but well-controlled and secure borders.<sup>167</sup>

Border security and efficient border management real and are essential for individual countries and, in a globalised world, also for the EU itself. The EU is committed to working with all countries to achieve the core objectives of IBM. The establishment of well -functioning IBM systems is an essential element for the candidate and potential candidate countries for their alignment with EU acquis and good practices, which leads the countries in the Western Balkan region towards European integration.

## 5.2 The Integrated Management of the Borders

Borders must be open for trade and the movement of persons. They have also to be open for regional cooperation, a cornerstone of future integration, and membership in the EU. They have to be accessible both within the region and also between the region and the EU. The facilitation of regular cross-border flows enhances the economic development of the whole region. Free trade and the movement of persons are key elements of the stabilisation and association agreements (SAA). Borders must be closed to criminal activities and any other activity that endangers stability in the region. Smuggling and trafficking of all kinds, illegal migration, terrorism, and organised crime have to be tackled throughout the region and especially at the border crossing points (BCPs). Closed borders help to prevent the extension of crime abroad, to deny impunity to criminals and to reduce their profits. The fight against crime, strengthening of justice and home affairs institutions, and the establishment of the rule of law are fundamental to the countries' progress towards European integration. The

---

<sup>167</sup>Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in the Western Balkans 2006. Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://shtetiweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/L2-National-Strategy-on-Integrated-Border-Management-its-Action-Plan-2006-2010.pdf>

EU has moved the control of internal flows of goods and persons from internal BCPs to services within the territory of each EU Member State. The lifting of internal border controls does not, however, affect the normal police control in the territory of the Member States. At the same time, the EU has defined the rules and standards that should govern the crossing of the Union's external borders. The still-developing system for managing the EU external borders consists of rules, good practices, and recommendations. These are relevant for the countries of the stabilisation and association process (SAP) in so far as they make provisions for ways to address their operational needs and at the same time to ensure the countries' further integration into the EU. The recent enlargement of the EU brought the external borders of the Union directly towards the state borders of the region, and all countries in the region (except Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro) are now directly confronted with neighbours implementing EU rules with regard to the flow of goods and persons.

The critical aspects of the IBM concept are cooperation and coordination. Both are taking place at different levels:

- Intra-service cooperation describes the efficient internal cooperation and management of processes, information, and resources within a ministry or agency responsible for specific tasks: (a) Between local, regional and central levels (vertical cooperation)
- Between different units of the same levels (horizontal cooperation).
- Inter-agency cooperation, therefore, describes the cooperation at the border (local level) - at the regional and central level - between ministries or state bodies with different tasks related to border management.
- International cooperation: - At the local level between officials on both sides of the border - Between neighbouring states (covering various issues, e.g. from border limitation and border management to the organisation of patrols and the organisation of common contact offices) - At the multinational level to better approach common fields of work such as

trans-border crime, irregular migration, trafficking in human beings, terrorism and smuggling of goods.<sup>168</sup>




Image 14: Intra-service cooperation




Image 15: Inter-Agency Cooperation

---

<sup>168</sup> Ibid "Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in the Western Balkans ," January 2007.




Image 16: International Cooperation

The delegation of a leading role to FRONTEX for the control of implementation measures by the countries concerned, as well as the creation of a common database for the exchange of information could be an important step in controlling illegal migration and trafficking in human beings.

### 5.3 The European Organisation of FRONTEX

FRONTEX is the European Agency for the management of operational cooperation at the external borders of the European Agency for External Border Management and started to operate in 2005.<sup>169</sup> It is a strategic level the guiding lever where it coordinates operational cooperation between the Member States in the field of surveillance (surveillance) of external borders and has a pivotal role in the training of national Border guards and the establishment of common training standards.

---

<sup>169</sup> As decided by Council Decision of 26 April 2005 designating the seat of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (2005/358/EC).



In the light of excellence in border controls and the consolidation of the sense of security among the citizens of the Union, it promotes the cooperation between the member states in order to protect the European edifice. This is a significant change in the security structures that the Union has had until the creation of the agency. Through the administrative staffing, it is an operational group, with logistical equipment allocated by the member states and its headquarters in Warsaw, Poland.<sup>170</sup> The central and dominant competence of Frontex is the ability to directly develop border guards in any part of a European demarcation line identified, following a risk analysis or speculated crisis event.

Each Member State shall also appoint an alternate while the Commission appoints two alternates. The Council is responsible for shaping the budget, monitoring its implementation, establishing appropriate budgetary rules, establishing Transparent working procedures for decision-making by the agency, and the appointment of an Executive Director and deputy, with a term of five years. The agency's revenue derives from an EU subsidy, a contribution from the participating countries, fees Collected for services provided, and by voluntary contributions from the Member States.

Among the areas of activity of the Organization is the extraction of conclusions through thorough study and research of official statistics, submitted daily by the competent national offices – National Coordination Centre.

In Greece operates a FRONTEX operational centre and there is clearly a competent department for the handling of issues of the Organization, which is located in the Hellenic Police headquarters and in particular the Directorate of Border Protection of the Aliens and Border Protection Branch.<sup>171</sup> Similar planning for issues of the Organization operates in the headquarters of the Hellenic Coastguard, with primary responsibility the protection of the sea borders of the EU. Both Greek services work

---

<sup>170</sup>ΟργανόγραμμαΕλληνικήςΑστυνομίας, Photograph. Astynomia.gr. HELLENIC POLICE. Accessed February 29, 2020. [http://www.astynomia.gr/images/stories//2015/organogramma\\_en.png](http://www.astynomia.gr/images/stories//2015/organogramma_en.png).

closely together daily as they jointly participate in the implementation of various enterprises in the Greek territory, which are held under the auspices and supervision of the FRONTEX Agency.

The main tasks of the Agency are: <sup>172</sup>

- coordinates operational cooperation between the Member States in the field of external border management, on the control of persons
- Assists Member States in educating national border guards on a wide range of Police issues, including by establishing common training standards
- Carries out annual and monthly risk analyses
- Monitors developments in investigations into the control and surveillance of external borders
- Assists member States in cases requiring increased technical and operational assistance at the external borders and the creation of friendly " Information platform» Exchange of data on the collection of statistics and conclusions concerning emerging risks and the current situation at the external borders
- Provides the Member States with the necessary support for the organisation of Joint repatriation operations
- Based on the readiness and willingness of the Member States and associated countries within Schengen to participate actively in operational cooperation.
- Assists member States facing emergencies, for example, a mass influx of illegal immigrants, with the dispatch of Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT)

---

<sup>172</sup>“Lex Access to European Union Law.” EUR. Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC. Accessed March 5, 2020. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016R1624>.

Frontex's main activity is to plan, coordinate, implement –also with a newly introduced co-leading role –and evaluate joint operations at the external borders of the EU. These operations are carried out by Member States' staff and equipment, whose liability for illegal actions arises before their national Court. More than half of the total amount of Frontex resources are devoted to these operations, and these are the biggest concern of NGOs that monitor Frontex activity. There are three types of joint operations, according to the type of external border involved :

- sea border checks and surveillance—the European Patrols Network is the networked structure, created by Frontex to help the Member States' in this activity
- Land border checks and surveillance –that involves cooperation with other agencies for the fight against human trafficking and terrorism
- joint operations are carried out also at airports, and include not only passports' controls but also and notably “prevention, detection, deterrence”.<sup>173</sup>

Joint operations, moreover, are carried out also outside the territory of the Union, even though the legal basis for this kind of operation is debated, and these include “patrols on the high seas as well as the territorial waters of third states.”<sup>174</sup>

### 5.3.1 Creation of the European Coastguard and Border Patrol

In 2015, the European Union, at its external borders, witnessed extraordinary pressures with an estimated 1.5 million persons having crossed the borders illegally. With the increasing tendency to enter irregular aliens into the European area, it becomes necessary to seek new methods to de-escalation the phenomenon. Tackling trafficking and trafficking in human beings taking place through the refugee crisis is a collective responsibility.

---

<sup>173</sup> Frontex` Single Programming Document 2016 -2019 Accessed February 29, 2020.

<https://euagenda.eu/upload/publications/untitled-6302-ea.pdf>

<sup>174</sup> Fink, Melanie. “Frontex Working Arrangements: Legitimacy and Human Rights Concerns Regarding ‘Technical Relationships.’” *Utrecht Journal of International and European Law* 28, no. 75 (2012): 22. <https://doi.org/10.5334/ujiel.be>.

This is a European issue whose interconnections have a global impact. The European partners are required to learn from the Greek national strategy, particularly in terms of tackling the refugee issue and the issue of illegal immigration, which unfortunately is inflated by the region of northern African or Greek-Turkish coasts.

Despite significant advances in the prosecution of illegal immigration since the establishment of the agency, the staff of the main EU institutions is continually processing new methods of total protection of community borders that will lead to an outlet Refugee – migration crisis. The proposal is to establish a single European border and Coast Guard to replace the Frontex agency and the competent national authorities in managing Borders and will have exclusive jurisdiction of the Union's external borders.<sup>175</sup>

Today, having carried out in the fourteen years of its operation a wide range of missions related to the EU's maritime, land and air borders, Frontex is considered a necessary EU mechanism to protect its external borders.<sup>176</sup> The European Parliament has adopted extended competences, as well as more considerable financial assistance so that it continues to fulfil its objectives.

This ambitious step is in line with the long-term plans of European integration, but at the same time, it raises serious issues of delegating state authority to an organisation, causing scepticism and security dilemmas in pro-Europeans.<sup>177</sup> The question raised is whether the Member States are ready to grant sovereign rights in the sensitive field of defence and security to a supranational organisation, knowing in advance that they will lose the respectable right to and implementation of national defence and security

---

<sup>175</sup>Lex Access to European Union Law.Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and Amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC.” EUR. Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016R1624>.

<sup>176</sup> It should be noted that illegal immigration is not Frontex's only occupation. On the contrary, it reports and investigates cases of cross-border crime, such as smuggling of goods, illicit drug trafficking, stolen vehicles, as well as cases of environmental pollution and illegal fishing.

<sup>177</sup> Pro-Europeanism, sometimes called European Unionism, is a political position that favours European integration and membership of the European Union (EU). It includes the more radical European federalists, who seek to create a single superstate known informally as a United States of Europe.

policies. The abovementioned proposal for the development of the FRONTEX agency in a flexible and fast-growing European coastal and border Guard is aimed exclusively at managing migratory flows and protecting the European edifice, Excluding any suspicion of foreign policy in the inter-political arena. The transformation of the FRONTEX agency into a new reshaped operational force is imposed at the same time by the Pact on Immigration and Asylum, which is the basis for the general migration policy in Europe, in a spirit Mutual responsibility and solidarity between the Member States and a renewed partnership with third countries. In addition, it presents the possible conversion of FRONTEX into a new operational form.<sup>178</sup>

Operational activities are considered to be optimal and effective for FRONTEX to operate with similar status as Europol, coupled with increased operational capabilities and the ability to deploy police forces seamlessly directly.

A possible agreement on the creation of the European Coastguard and Border Patrol signals that Europe is ready to go beyond its capabilities and increase its competitiveness in the international system, marginal the heterogeneous interests of the major European powers and to acquire a common voice and a common stride in the paths of international relations To take action directly and decisively in the management of common challenges and threats, which tend to destabilise the safety foundations of the EU's edifice to promote the newly established organisation as an essential step of the European Completion of Sovereignty or fears of the granting of sovereignty to transnational bodies on the part of the Member States must not, as the borders of the European Union, be the borders of the Member States, as defined by international conventions. Consequently, each Member State defines its borders as their sovereign, and these are the borders of the European Union.

---

<sup>178</sup>The European Union: Ongoing Challenges and Future Prospects, Congressional Research Service. Accessed February 29, 2020 <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44249.pdf>

Each Contracting Party to the Agency must take initiatives, actions, and responsibilities with regard to the surveillance of community borders and wriggle practices, which refer to the creation of situations capable of being the cause of armed conflict and degradation of the European Union project.

The degree of difficulty of the project is extremely high due to the reluctance of some countries to accept operational forces from other countries in their zone of responsibility and the objections they are projecting on the conditions in the co-management of the phenomenon. However, all Member States members must be taken into account of the importance of EU cohesion, and the continuous supervision and monitoring of migration flow to and within the EU.

On 1 April 2019 the Council green-lighted the political agreement to reinforce the European Border and Coast Guard, giving it the right level of ambition to respond to the common challenges Europe is facing in managing migration and borders. The centrepiece of the reinforced Agency will be a standing corps of 10,000 border guards – will be set up by 2027 and will be ready to support the Member States at any time.<sup>179</sup> In October 2019, FRONTEX announced for the first time that the European Union would have its own uniformed service – the European Border and Coast Guard standing corps. This new border corps, composed of Frontex and EU Member States’ officers, will at any time be able to support the Member States facing challenges at their external borders.<sup>180</sup> On December 4, the new European Border and Coast Guard regulation come into force, and the Organization is gaining new responsibilities and tools to more effectively support the EU Member States and Schengen Associated Countries in managing their external borders to provide a high level of security for all their citizens.

---

<sup>179</sup> Press Corner.” European Commission - European Commission. European Border and Coast Guard: The Commission welcomes agreement on a standing corps of 10,000 border guards by 2027\* Accessed February 28, 2020. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP\\_19\\_1929](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_1929).

<sup>180</sup> “Press Corner EU Delivers on Stronger European Border and Coast Guard to Support Member States.” European Commission - European Commission. Accessed February 28, 2020. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement\\_19\\_6237](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_19_6237).

#### 5.4 The Hellenic Participation in the Organisation

Due to the geopolitical position presented by our country in conjunction with the fact that it is one of the main portals of irregular migrants was founded on the initiative of the organization operational office in our country, based in Piraeus.<sup>181</sup> The main task of this office, which was inaugurated on 1 August 2010, is the supervision of the south-eastern borders of Europe in which Malta, Greece, Italy, and Cyprus are located. Through the establishment of the agency FRONTEX, It demonstrates in practice the importance it gives to the establishment of capable defensive standards in the vital region of the Aegean and the Mediterranean. It places our country at the centre of events and observers of the interethnic developments that are taking place in this sensitive area. It is evident that the Greek law enforcement authorities, in cooperation with the agency, can now develop Of the Business Bureau to exchange more fluently and in a broader range of operational information. At the same time, it is advertising and promotion for our country in the international-political situation, on the other hand, and it is armed with more powers and duties. In conclusion, it is the highest honour for the Greek state to choose our country from the organisation in order to build and develop a flexible business centre with multiple possibilities, which will frame the Greek foreign policy in issues of national security and advocacy of sovereign rights in the Aegean from the comprehensive Turkish strategy.

Greece is actively involved in FRONTEX operations with human and logistical resources in order to respond successfully to the role assigned to it at the European level, in particular with regard to its national borders that accept increased Migratory flows. In this context, it supports:

The participation and contribution of instruments by all Member States for more effective control of European maritime and land borders, FRONTEX Joint operations which should be carried out permanently. Of particular interest is the operation Poseidon, the largest ever coordinated by FRONTEX. It takes place at the maritime

---

<sup>181</sup> “Νόμος 3902/2010 - ΦΕΚ 216/Α/23-12-2010.” e. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://www.e-nomothesia.gr/diethneis-sunthekeis/n-3902-2010.html>.

Greek-Turkish border and the Greek-Albanian, Greek-Turkish and Bulgarian-Turkish borders and assist aerial, floating and terrestrial instruments, technical equipment, and Guests officers from the 26 Member States of the EU and the Schengen area.

In conclusion, the role of the FRONTEX agency is significant, and its contribution to defending community borders should be recognised through the manifestation of all the actions it has taken.

The flexibility to send and install human forces and logistical equipment is now given and effective. The appeal and satisfaction of the European citizens from the action of the Agency in conjunction with the proposals which derive from the European political elite, to modernise and upgrade its competences, make it at the top of the pyramid of European operational organisations to combat irregular migration. The capabilities of the Agency should be upgraded for the benefit of the European Community in order to gain greater leeway in the European defence and security area as there is no EU-wide organization, autonomous and meaningful action, particularly in cases where NATO is unable to engage operationally.

#### 5.4.1 Strengthening the Frontex force in Greece

As it was referred previously, Greece is facing a massive wave of irregular migrants, the response of which is a national challenge. In this light, Greek governments sought to support the EU by seeking all Member States to act in accordance with the principle of solidarity and to share the burden of illegal immigration in a fairway. This is how they highlighted the European nature of the issue of illegal immigration that affects all Member States, whether they have external borders or not.<sup>182</sup>

In addition, with the EU's active involvement in illegal immigration, the Greek side sought to resolve co-operation problems arise with the bordering third countries, such as Turkey, Albania, and FYROM. In 2006, Greece, along with seven other southern

---

<sup>182</sup> Nordic Council of Ministers, and Unesda. "Eight Member States Urge EU Action on Migration." EUobserver. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://euobserver.com/justice/22503>.



European states, drafted a letter to Finland that had taken over the EU presidency to call for more mobilization on the issue of illegal immigration. Thus, bilateral disputes could be traced to a European framework and resolved with the EU's participation.<sup>183</sup>

The Greek pursuit for a more active role of the EU in matters of illegal immigration became evident during the Greek Presidency in 2003, where the Greek government raised immigration as its main priority. In this context, an informal Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers took place on 28-29 March in Veria, while for the first time in the conclusions of the European Council it was mentioned in matters of illegal immigration.<sup>184</sup>

Another step in this direction was taken at the Conference of Interior Ministers in Groningen in 2004, where eleven common basic principles for managing migratory flows were adopted. The Greek contribution to this was quite substantial in this way, setting the foundations for the operation of Frontex and the EU's substantial commitment to the articulation of policy and the elaboration of actions in the field of illegal immigration.<sup>185</sup>

#### 5.4.2 Joint Operations.

With the main aim of reducing migratory flows in Evros Greece in the autumn of 2010 requested the European Union's assistance and the development of the joint operation "Rabit 2010"<sup>186</sup>. The operation "Rabit 2010" is a rapid intervention mechanism with the possibility of direct deployment of border guards for a short

---

<sup>183</sup> "Απάντηση Υπουργού Εξωτερικού," n.d. <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/67715b2c-ec81-4f0c-ad6a-476a34d732bd/8134194.pdf>.

<sup>184</sup> Συζητήσεις - Τρίτη 1 Ιουλίου 2003 - Ελληνική Προεδρία. Accessed February 28, 2020. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20030701+ITEM-001+DOC+XML+V0//EL>.

<sup>185</sup> "ΟΙ ΠΕΡΙΠΕΤΕΙΕΣ ΤΗΣ ΜΕΤΑΝΑΣΤΕΥΤΙΚΗΣ ΜΑΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗΣ (Περιοδικό ΕΠΙΚΑΙΡΑ, Τ.18, 18/2/2010)." Προκόπης Παυλόπουλος. Accessed February 28, 2020. [http://ppavlopoulos.gr/index3aea.html?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=84:2010-02-18-18&catid=36:2010-05-06-13-06-22&Itemid=61](http://ppavlopoulos.gr/index3aea.html?option=com_content&view=article&id=84:2010-02-18-18&catid=36:2010-05-06-13-06-22&Itemid=61).

<sup>186</sup> The creation of the Rapid Border Intervention Teams dates back to July 2007 with the adoption by Council of Regulation 863/2007, which amended the previous Regulation 2007/2004 establishing Frontex by outlining the tasks and powers of guest border guards in a requesting EU member state

period of time and in case a country requests assistance to deal with urgent and massive illegal Migratory pressures at its external borders.<sup>187</sup>

The operation consists of 175 ‘border control-experts’ from the 26 member states and Schengen-associated countries. They include “experts in false documents, clandestine entry, first and second-line border checks and stolen vehicles as well as dog handlers and specialist interviewers, debriefers and interpreters”.<sup>188</sup>

The assets made available from member states’ commitments to Frontex’s Centralised Record of Available Technical Equipment (CRATE)<sup>189</sup> include:

- 1 Helicopter (Romania)
- 1 Bus (Romania)
- 5 Minibuses (1 Romania, 2 Austria, 1 Bulgaria, 1 Hungary)
- Patrol cars (7 Romania, 3 Austria, 2 Slovakia, 7 Germany)
- 9 Thermo-Vision Vans (2 Austria, 2 Bulgaria, 4 Germany, 1 Hungary)
- 3 Schengen buses (1 Austria, 2 Hungary)
- 3 office units in Denmark

Since the establishment of the agency in 2004 is the first time that Frontex has been performing operations in Evros. This operation was described as effective, as there was a gradual reduction in illegal migratory flows, but this mechanism raises various doubts about its operational value. In particular, its provisional nature makes it a temporary measure that should be accompanied by other actions with longer-term features and results. Also, in the operation field, the heterogeneity of groups, whose

---

<sup>187</sup> Press Corner.Cecilia Malmström, European Commissioner for Home Affairs, Announces the Deployment of the Frontex RABIT Teams in Greece as of 2 November.” European Commission - European Commission. Accessed February 28, 2020. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO\\_10\\_531](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_10_531).

<sup>188</sup> Frontex to Deploy 175 Specialist Border Personnel to Greece.” News Release. Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-to-deploy-175-specialist-border-personnel-to-greece-9neidF>.

<sup>189</sup> By 1 January 2008, CRATE contained 18 aircraft, 20 helicopters and 91 vessels, and in 2009 the number of member states contributed increased from 8 to 13. Commission Impact Assessment accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation amending Council Regulation No 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX), SEC(2010) 149, 24.2.2010, page 12.

people come not only from a different country but perhaps from a different agency, can create severe problems in the field of operations.<sup>190</sup>

On April 2012, a memorandum of cooperation signed between Greece and Frontex with the main purpose of the tackling of illegal migratory flows and border surveillance. Finland's full support for Greece's efforts to tackle illegal immigration was won by the Minister of Citizen Protection, Michalis Chrysoidis, during his meeting with the Finnish Minister of Interior, Päivi Räsänen and the executive director of Frontex Ilkka Laitinen. At the meeting, a memorandum of cooperation between Greece and Frontex was signed, which upgrades close cooperation between the two sides, confirming European support for the surveillance of the Greek border. According to statements by Minister Michalis Chrysoidis, who says, "with the establishment of this hub in our country's coordinating centre, the information will be exchanged in real-time together with Frontex and the corresponding coordinating centres of all Countries participating in the programme. Such as Finland, Poland, France, Spain, Malta, Italy, and Cyprus.<sup>191</sup> The European Commission and Frontex aim to implement this, around 2013, to apply from all European countries".<sup>192</sup> Also, Greece agreed to Participate in the system "Eurosur.

Also on 15/01/2014, a formal visit was made by Deputy Executive Director FRONTEX to the Port Authority headquarters.-Greek Coastguard According to a press release issued by the Ministry of Shipping and the Aegean during their talks, the two sides confirmed the close links between FRONTEX and Hellenic Coastguard, where the two sides agreed on the need to further strengthen the Greek authorities by

---

<sup>190</sup> "(PDF) Joint Operation RABIT 2010 – 'Joint Operation RABIT 2010' – FRONTEX Assistance to Greece's Border with Turkey: Revealing the Deficiencies of Europe's Dublin Asylum System. CEPSLibertyandSecurityinEurope, November 2010 ...". Accessed February 29, 2020.

<sup>191</sup> "Μνημόνιο Συνεργασίας Ελλάδας - Frontex, Για Την Αντιμετώπιση Των Παράνομων Μεταναστευτικών Ροών Και Την Επιτήρηση Των Συνόρων." Under construction. Accessed February 29, 2020.  
<http://www.hcg.gr/node/2517>

<sup>192</sup> Web-Administrator. "26-04-2012.Στήριξη Από Ευρ. Επιτροπή, Φρόντεξ Και Ευρ. Γραφείο Ασύλου Στην Ελληνική Πολιτική Για Την Παράνομη Μετανάστευση, Στο Σημερινό Συμβούλιο Υπουργών Δικαιοσύνης Και Εσωτερικών Υποθέσεων Στο Λουξεμβούργο ." minocr.gov.gr. Accessed February 28, 2020.  
[http://www.minocr.gov.gr/index.php?option=ozo\\_content&perform=view&id=4237&Itemid=540&lang=.](http://www.minocr.gov.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&perform=view&id=4237&Itemid=540&lang=)

FRONTEX and other EU member States, through FRONTEX, to try to address the challenges posed by this phenomenon.

#### 5.4.3 POSEIDON Operation.

From 2011 Greece hosts the Poseidon joint venture. Poseidon operations are carried out by FRONTEX at the external borders (land, sea, and air) of the EU Member States. The aim of Operation POSEIDON 2011 is to continue the increasing presence of FRONTEX forces to strengthen efforts to tackle illegal immigration and will be held at the Greek-Turkish and Bulgarian-Turkish border, as and at the maritime Greek-Turkish border, with the participation of personnel and technical equipment (air, sea and land), to be made available by the Member States of the European Union under the auspices, financing and coordination of the FRONTEX Agency.<sup>193</sup>

Regarding the technical means of support for the work of POSEIDON LAND 2011, there are patrol cars, transport vehicles for police dogs, and vehicles with integrated thermal imaging systems, as well as mobile coordination centres. Due to the increased migratory pressure recorded in the region of Evros, Operation Poseidon was decided to take place without any time gaps for constant border surveillance. According to Hellenic Police, Operation Poseidon began in 2011, and in 2015 this operation was replaced by Poseidon Rapid Intervention.<sup>194</sup>

On 16-17 December 2015 the annual meeting for the evaluation of the joint European Operation "POSEIDON-Maritime border" of the year 2015 was held in Athens with the participation of representatives of the European Agency for the management of operational cooperation at the external borders of the EU Member States (FRONTEX), the Coast Guard – Hellenic Coastguard, the Greek police, the Ministry

---

<sup>193</sup>Anonymous. "EU Support to Greece: 'Operation POSEIDON' Follows up on the RABIT Mission." Migration and Home Affairs - European Commission, December 6, 2016. [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/2011/20110302\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/2011/20110302_en).

<sup>194</sup> News Release. Frontex and Greece agree on operational plan for Poseidon Rapid Intervention, Accessed March 5, 2020. <https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-and-greece-agree-on-operational-plan-for-poseidon-rapid-intervention-yiSxga>.

of Foreign Affairs, Of the Civil Aviation Service, as well as authorities guarding the border of twenty E.U member states and a single Schengen area.<sup>195</sup>

However, the effectiveness of the undertaking concerned may be challenged as increased flows of illegal immigrants continue to be recorded in the region. On the other hand, at sea borders, there is a significant reduction in the rate of illegal immigration, and this, to some extent, is due to the presence and work of Frontex.

In August of 2015, all the media, on the Internet, in the news, the newspapers referred to the name of a small village in the border prefecture of Kilkis. The caravans of immigrants and refugees in their effort to reach Europe have a common meeting point, Idomeni. One can then consider the size of the number of people if they add the number of immigrants who arrived in Evros and all the islands, even the smallest ones.

In September 2015, the first significant constraint of movement on the Balkan Route was the closure of the Serbian-Hungarian border. The decision to re-establish border controls forced refugees coming up from Serbia to swerve west, creating a politically manufactured humanitarian crisis at the Serbo-Croatian border.

On Wednesday 21 October 2015, European Commission President Juncker called for a Leaders' Meeting on refugee flows along the Western Balkans route to address the emergency unfolding along this route. At this meeting, leaders agreed that Greece, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Albania would strengthen the management of the external land border. In this respect, it was agreed that Frontex would assist Greece in the registration of refugees and migrants who have not yet been registered in the country.<sup>196</sup>

---

<sup>195</sup> “Συνάντηση Αξιολόγησης Και Προγραμματισμού Της Μικτής Ευρωπαϊκής Επιχείρησης " ΠΟΣΕΙΔΩΝ - Θαλάσσια Σύνορα ".” Under construction. Accessed March 5, 2020. <http://www.hcg.gr/node/11722>.

<sup>196</sup>Commission, European. “Refugee Crisis: Greece Activates EU Civil Protection Mechanism, Agrees Frontex Operation at Border with Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Triggers RABIT Mechanism.” New Europe, December 3, 2015. <https://www.neweurope.eu/wires/refugee-crisis-greece-activates-eu-civil-protection-mechanism-agrees-frontex-operation-at-border-with-former-yugoslav-republic-of-macedonia-and-triggers-rabit-mechanism/>.

A Member State and third countries may trigger the EU Civil Protection Mechanism if they feel overwhelmed by a crisis.<sup>197</sup> The Mechanism can mobilise various types of in-kind support, including modules (teams and equipment), shelters, medical supplies, and other non-food items, as well as expertise. The Participating States assist, and the Commission can also co-finance the transport of relief items and experts to the country in question. In the case of the refugee crisis, the co-financing has been increased from 55% to 85%. To respond to the urgent needs caused by an immense refugee and migrant influx, the EU Civil Protection Mechanism has now been activated by five countries ( Hungary, Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia) in 2015.

On the 18th of November 2015, Slovenia sealed its borders for refugees who could not prove that they were coming from Afghanistan, Iraq or Syria. This fact generated a domino effect in Croatia, Serbia and FYROM, by which each state was implementing some form of segregation. The final closure of the Balkan Route at the Greek-FYROM border generated another humanitarian depreciation, shaping Idomeni to a symbol of the inhumane consequences of EU border policies. The state received an outcry internationally for incidents such as that of the year 2016, where the largest informal refugee camp in the Balkans was developed, which in the peak period hosted almost 15,000 people. As a result, the EU border agency Frontex announced on December 2015 that European guards would help Greeks manage their frontier with N.Macedonia, after a deal that addresses concerns in the bloc over Athens' commitment to control migration.<sup>198</sup>

Frontex developed at the borders of Greece-North Macedonia on 1 February 2017 in order-according to its press office-to assist the Greek authorities concerning border control and document control. The development is part of the Frontex operations "Flexible Operational Activities 2017 Land on Border Surveillance and Focal Points 2017 Land" with a duration of one year. These are the continuing movement of

---

<sup>197</sup> EU Civil Protection Mechanism." European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations - European Commission, February 21, 2020. [https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/civil-protection/mechanism\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/civil-protection/mechanism_en).

<sup>198</sup>EU's Frontex Agency to Help Guard Greece-Macedonia Border." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, December 3, 2015. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-greece-frontex/eus-frontex-agency-to-help-guard-greece-macedonia-border-idUSKBN0TM2B120151203>.

refugees, and the use of the Road was an important factor for the continuation of this operation for the year 2020. This operation was extended to 2018 and at the borders of Greece Albania due to the increase of refugee flows in the region as an alternative way of exiting these from Greece to EU countries.<sup>199</sup> However, it should be noted that the cooperation and participation of Greece in the Frontex agency does not apply to Poseidon operations, but includes a wide range of operational activities at the land, sea and air borders, for example, the joint operations "Focal Points Land" and "Focal Points Air".

Greece has also today agreed on an operational plan with Frontex for a new operation at the Greek border with the N. Macedonia, where the agency will assist with the registration of migrants. The deployment of additional officers will begin in 2020.<sup>200</sup>

#### 5.4.4 FRONTEX cooperation with third countries.

Cooperation with non-EU countries is an integral part of the Frontex mandate to make sure implementation of the European integrated border management (IBM) and one of the strategic priorities for the agency's work.<sup>201</sup> The aim of the cooperation between Frontex and third countries is mainly to undertake to minimise the number of people arriving at the EU's borders by extending the use of EU "border management" policies, techniques, and technologies to those countries as starting in article 4 of the 2016 Regulation.<sup>202</sup>

---

<sup>199</sup>"Situation at External Border." Situation at External Border. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://frontex.europa.eu/faq/situation-at-external-border/>.

<sup>200</sup>"Press Corner.Refugee Crisis: Greece Activates EU Civil Protection Mechanism, Agrees Frontex Operation at Border with Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Triggers RABIT Mechanism." European Commission - European Commission. Accessed February 28, 2020. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP\\_15\\_6249](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_15_6249).

<sup>201</sup> Measures in third countries" make up the first step of the "four-tier access control model

<sup>202</sup> Ibid "Lex Access to European Union Law.Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and Amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC." EUR.

The closure of the Balkan route that crosses Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Hungary has enlarged the wave of refugees passing through the Greek-Albanian border. Albanian Interior Minister Sander Leshi recently stated that in 2018 the number of immigrants was six times higher than in 2017, and this phenomenon, although less pronounced, still exists.<sup>203</sup>

In the presence of the Commissioner for Migration, Home affairs and citizenship of the European Union, Dimitris Avramopoulos, as well as the prime minister of Albania, Edi Rama, was signed in Tirana, an agreement where it was decided to launch the first common European border and Coast Guard operation in a neighbouring country outside the European Union, which will mark new cross-border cooperation between the EU and its partners in the Western Balkans.

Dimitris Avramopoulos, Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs, and Citizenship, said: "With the first-ever deployment of European Border and Coast Guard teams outside of the EU, we are opening an entirely new chapter in our cooperation on migration and border management with Albania and with the whole Western Balkan region. This is a real game-changer and a truly historical step, bringing this region closer to the EU by working together in a coordinated and mutually supportive way on shared challenges such as better managing migration and protecting our common borders".<sup>204</sup>

After Albania and Montenegro, the EU Commission has concluded a Frontex status agreement with Serbia, to be followed by Northern Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The co-operation agreement with N.Macedonia will allow Frontex to deploy teams to the country, and carry out joint operations, which could prove vital to the EU's ongoing strategy to address the challenges of irregular migration.

The Commission intends for the new agreement with N.Macedonia to strengthen its capacity to protect Europe's external borders and increase the role of the European

---

<sup>203</sup> "Croatia Discusses Illegal Migration with Albania and Montenegro ." Total Croatia News, January 23, 2019. <https://www.total-croatia-news.com/politics/33716-illegal-migration>.

<sup>204</sup> Frontex News Release. Frontex launches first operation in Western Balkans Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-launches-first-operation-in-western-balkans-znTNWM>.



Border and Coast Guard Agency's role by facilitating co-operation with Europe's neighbours and partner countries.

According to the Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Dimitris Avramopoulos, the agreement marks vital progress in the EU's relationship with N.Macedonia and might serve as a framework for future agreements with other partner countries that are still under negotiation.<sup>205</sup>

Since 2016 till these days thirty Hungarian border guards serving in the southern borders of N. Macedonia, as a part of a bilateral agreement between the neighbouring country and the Government of Viktor Orban, in cooperation with other countries of the Western Balkans, such as Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even on the border with Bulgaria, which is a border area between EU member countries, Boyko Borisov has predicted the mobilisation of police and military forces if necessary.<sup>206</sup>

Frontex currently has plans to sign operating arrangements with eight other countries, according to the 'Single Programming Document 2016-19'. These are Brazil, Egypt, Kosovo, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal, and Tunisia. The agency's Management Board had issued a decision approving the signing of working arrangements with those countries, although it is not currently known when that decision was taken nor whether it contains specific requirements for agreements with any of the countries in question.<sup>207</sup>

---

<sup>205</sup> Ibid Noden, Aran. "Frontex Signs Border Security Co-Operation Agreement with Macedonia." Government Europa, July 19, 2018. <https://www.governmenteuropa.eu/frontex-co-operation-agreement-with-macedonia/89487/>.

<sup>206</sup> During a conference in Prague on (15 February)2016, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic (VISEGRAD countries)held off on plans to help N.Macedonia and Bulgaria seal their borders with Greece to stem the flow of migrants and activate a migration 'plan B' to secure their borders. Nordic Council of Ministers, and Unesda. "Eastern EU States Want Migration 'Plan B'." EUobserver. Accessed March 5, 2020. <https://euobserver.com/migration/132277>.

<sup>207</sup>"Statewatch Briefing - Frontex: Cooperation with Non-EU States." Frontexit. Accessed February 29, 2020. <http://www.frontexit.org/en/news/item/851-statewatch-briefing-frontex-cooperation-with-non-eu-states>.

## 6. Risk Analysis Model- Theoretical Background

### 6.1 The first Common Risk Analysis Model in the E.U.

In June 2002, the EU member states expressed their views on the external borders in the Council publication Plan for the management of the external borders of the member states of the EU and among others concluded that Common integrated risk analysis is also a vital component in the joint discussion of protection at external borders.

Notably, it was expressed that the external borders of the EU play a significant role in defining and protecting the area of freedom, security, and justice. The surveillance of borders is significant for the control and the managing of persons entering and leaving that area and protect our citizens from threats to their security. Besides, they constitute a fundamental element within the fight against illegal immigration. In the Laeken European Council of 14 and 15 December, 2001 and specifically to the Conclusion, No. 42, “Better management of the Union’s external border controls will help within the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration networks and the trafficking in human beings. The European Council asks the Council and the Commission to work out arrangements for cooperation between services responsible for external border control and to examine the conditions in which a mechanism or common services to control external borders could be established (...).<sup>208</sup>” This European Council conclusion calls attention to the fact that coherent, effective common management of the external borders of the Member States of the Union will enhance security. It also serves to secure continuity in the action undertaken to combat terrorism, illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings as stated in the

---

<sup>208</sup> Press Corner.” European Commission - European Commission. Presidency Conclusions European Council meeting in Laeken 14 and 15 December 2001  
Accessed March 5, 2020. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/DOC\\_01\\_18](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/DOC_01_18).  
<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3433488/5285137/KS-SF-07-110-EN.PDF/c95cc2ce-b50c-498e-95fb-cd507ef29e27>

comprehensive plan to fight against illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings in the European Union.<sup>209</sup>

The management of external borders referred to as the central means to secure the area of 'Freedom, Security and Justice' from 'threats.' 'Illegal immigration' and framed within the threats together with the more specifically criminal activities such as terrorism and trafficking in human beings. Also, the Council, for the first time, introduced the concept of common integrated risk analysis's part of the border management strategy in its plan.<sup>210</sup>

The Council explained that the EU-level risk analysis was necessary, to adjust intelligence activities undertaken separately by member states and by introducing a single framework for data collection and analysis, national authorities would be able to 'treat their operational objectives on a hierarchic a Union terms'.<sup>211</sup>

Following on from the conclusions of the European Council in Seville of 22 July 2002, it was set out the main priorities and in particular taken decisive steps to strengthen the EU's external action against terrorism.<sup>212</sup> The Council's emphasis on risk analysis was further ensured in the Schengen Borders Code, the key legislation defining the guiding principles and rules for border management.<sup>213</sup> Border control is 'not only checks on persons at border crossing points and surveillance between these border crossing points, but also an analysis of the risks for internal security and analysis of the threats that may affect the security of external borders'(European Parliament and Council 2006, Recital). The biggest challenge for FRONTEX was

---

<sup>209</sup>United Nations. "Plan for the Management of the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union." Refworld. Accessed March 5, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3f4e3c51d.html>.

<sup>210</sup>Horii, Satoko. "The Effect of Frontex Risk Analysis on the European Border Controls." *European Politics and Society* 17, no. 2 (August 2016): 242–58. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2016.1121002>

<sup>211</sup> "European Union Action Plan to Combat Terrorism – Update of the Roadmap." COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, November 14, 2002. [https://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST\\_13909\\_2002\\_REV\\_1](https://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST_13909_2002_REV_1).

[https://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST\\_13909\\_2002\\_REV\\_1](https://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST_13909_2002_REV_1).

<sup>212</sup> "Press Corner. Presidency Conclusions Seville European Council 21 and 22 June 2002." European Commission - European Commission. Accessed March 9, 2020.

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/DOC\\_02\\_13](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/DOC_02_13).

<sup>213</sup> "Lex Access to European Union Law." EUR.Rregulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) Accessed March 5, 2020. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32006R0562>.

how the project of risk analysis should be implemented at the EU level. Finland, with nine member states (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the UK), launched a project with prospective of creating a common risk analysis model (CIRAM). The project developed the first version of CIRAM. Its feasibility was tested by the ad hoc risk analysis centre (RAC) established in Helsinki.<sup>214</sup>


Europol and the Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration (Cirefi) have closely cooperated with RAC (and later with Frontex) in order to identify ‘the type of information that is worth collecting at the external borders’.

## 6.2 FRONTEX ant the Common Risk Analysis Model.

---

<sup>214</sup> Union, Council Of The European. “Report on the Implementation of Programmes, Ad Hoc Centres, Pilot Projects and Joint Operations.” *Cultures & Conflits*, no. 50 (2003): 169–93. <https://doi.org/10.4000/conflits.952>.

In 2004 Frontex was mandated to develop and apply CIRAM and provide adequate information for appropriate measures to be taken or to tackle identified threats and risks. As it was mentioned, FRONTEX has developed and implements its risk analysis model, called CIRAM (Common model of integrated risk analysis), as



presented in the following illustration.

Image 17: CIRAM diagram (CIRAM Comprehensive Update, 2012:4)

This model is a legal imperative, as provided for in the FRONTEX regulation, and aims to create a clear methodological framework for risk analysis to improve the coordination and coherence of joint ventures in the context of Management of the EU's external borders. For this management, the risk is defined as the magnitude and potential occurrence of a threat at the external borders, affecting the internal security of the EU, security at the external borders, or bringing about humanitarian consequences.

Frontex defines this risk with three concepts: ‘threat,’ ‘vulnerability’ and ‘impact.’ Table .. is a diagram provided by Frontex, which shows a clear linkage between migration and risk.

<b>1. Name of risk</b>	<b>Normally taken from the threat</b>
<b>2. Threat</b>	Qualitative description of the events, their size, type, number and dependencies (taken from threat description)
<b>3. Vulnerability</b>	Primary means by which the risk is currently managed, levels of confidence in existing control, identification of protocols for monitoring and review
<b>4. Impact</b>	Potential impact of the threat on the security of the border, on internal security, as well as on humanitarian aspects and on the management of bona fide border crossing
<b>5. Measurement of risk</b>	Significance taking into account the threat, the vulnerability and the impact
<b>6. Potential action for improvement</b>	Recommendations

Image 18: Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model, Summary booklet, version 2.0, Source: Frontex (2012, p. 14).

Risk in external border management can be seen as having three components: (1) *the threat* to be evaluated in terms of magnitude and likelihood; (2) *the vulnerability* to the threat – that is, the extent and efficiency of the response to the threat; and (3) *the impacts* – that is, the impacts, should the threat emerge, on the internal security of the EU, on the defence of the EU, on the security of the external borders, as well as the humanitarian impacts and the impact on the effective management of the crossing of the border.

The “*threat*”, which is evaluated in terms of size and occurrence, is defined as a force or pressure acting on the external borders which is measured by its magnitude and likelihood of migration-related factors and more detailed the modus operandi of the irregular migrants, the characteristics of individual irregular migrants and the trends and predictions (pull and push factors). From this definition of risk, risk analysis is defined as the systematic examination of threats, vulnerabilities, and impacts, the outcome of which is recorded in the form of a risk assessment.

CIRAM uses the necessary information on cross-border organised crime and pursues the risk assessments resulting from the various cross-border threats. Its implementation is based on the close cooperation of FRONTEX with the EU Member States, as well as on a four-tier access control model.

The first-tier represents the measures taken in third countries, especially against illegal migration in countries of origin and transit Cooperation with neighbouring countries is the second tier. Agreements with neighbouring countries on cooperation

within the field of border management are an efficient tool for increasing border security.<sup>215</sup>

Border control, as the third-tier of the model, guarantees systematic border checks for every person entering or exiting the Schengen area. The fourth-tier requires control measures, including return, in the field of free movement. These measures prevent illegal immigration and cross-border crime inside the territory of the Schengen states through enhanced searches, checks, and surveillance measures based on national information, and in accordance with national law. Regarding illegal migration, the fourth-tier implies that the Member States, together with other relevant authorities, establish minimum standards for control measures in their jurisdiction in places recognised as vital for third-country nationals living illegally, cross-border traffic links.<sup>216</sup>



Image 19: Four-tier access control model. (CIRAM Comprehensive Update, 2012:4)

With regard to the risk assessment in border management, CIRAM recommends that analysts rely mainly on qualitative descriptions of risk levels, for example, low-medium-high. These descriptions are considered as the main result of the risk analysis and are of great importance for the decision-making process. Also, it is characteristic that this model implements a system of evaluation-ranking information, in which the information/data is evaluated based on the reliability of its source on the one hand and its validity on the other.

---

<sup>215</sup>Updated Schengen catalogue on External Borders Control, Readmission and Removal - 2nd draft - EU monitor. Accessed March 5, 2020. <https://www.eumonitor.nl/9353000/1/j9vvik7m1c3gyxp/vi869j18irzk>.

<sup>216</sup> Ibid European Union Action Plan to Combat Terrorism – Update of the Roadmap.” COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, November 14, 2002.

Level of threat		Magnitude		
		High	Medium	Low
Likelihood	Almost certain	High	High	Medium
	Possible	High	Medium	Low
	Unlikely	Medium	Low	Low

Image 20: Example of assessment of level of threat combining a three-level scale for magnitude and likelihood.

Level	Description	Indicators / Sources of information
High	High number of significant instances that exposed the borders to this threat	Indicator chosen from data collected regularly
Medium	More than one significant instance that exposed the external borders to this threat	Incident reports, reports from operational areas at the border
Low	No previous instances that exposed the external border to this threat	External indicator (to be described)

Image 21: Example of qualitative estimates of level of threats.

Finally, FRONTEX develops and issues the following key risk analysis products:<sup>217</sup>

1. annual risk analysis, presenting the situation of irregular migration in the previous year, gives forecasts and recommendations for the future and assists in the planning of operational activities for the following year.
2. semi-annual risk analysis includes revisions and optimal adjustments of recommendations.
3. quarterly risk analysis, providing feedback, and analysis of irregular migration trends according to the information exchanged within the FRONTEX risk analysis network.

<sup>217</sup> “Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model: a Comprehensive Update: Version 2.0.” CIRAM. Warsaw: FRONTEX, 2012. <https://frontex.europa.eu/intelligence/ciram/>.



4. the tailored risk analysis report focuses on a specific phenomenon or geographic area.
5. regular risk analysis report for the design of a specific joint operation
6. the weekly analytical report includes information collected during a specific joint operation

#### 6.2.1. Intelligence cycle

Forensic information is placed at the heart of the risk analysis, specifying it as any information received or generated and associated with one of the risk components, that is, related to a threat, vulnerability, or impact. Thus, a structured information process that includes the data collection, analysis, and distribution of relevant information will be the background to the assessment of threats, vulnerabilities, and impacts. The structured information process is referred to as the information cycle, a definable cycle that ensures the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies' activities through a system of controls and balances.

The intelligence cycle it is made up of eight connected functions. Each of the following steps is an essential contribution to the whole process:

- tasking
- collection
- evaluation
- collation
- analysis and interpretation
- reporting
- dissemination
- review

The following diagram shows how the intelligence process can be visualised as a flow chart to demonstrate the progression of activities more clearly.

The role of external actors in the process of data collection for FRONTEX is significant. The main actors are the border agencies of the EU member states, which provide key data to operationalise the risk mentioned above definition. More specifically, the national agencies provide Frontex of data on detections of illegal border crossing, refusals of entry; detections of illegal stay; asylum applications; detections of facilitators; detections of fraudulent documents, and return decisions and sufficient returns of illegally staying third-country nationals.

218



Image 22: Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model, Summary booklet, version 2.0

### 6.2.2 Threat levels

---

<sup>218</sup>“Risk Analysis for 2018.” Publications. Accessed March 5, 2020. <https://frontex.europa.eu/publications/risk-analysis-for-2018-aJ5nJu>.

Frontex's risk analysis has influenced the EU decision-making process on the matter of border management. In the case of the External Borders Fund, Frontex's risk analysis can be regarded as an explanatory factor of political decisions and that it has increased the legitimacy of EU political actors' decisions, especially the European Commission.

The External Borders Fund (EBF)<sup>219</sup> was a primary financial instrument for border management issues between 2007 and 2013 and set up with three other Funds within the more extensive financial Programme of Solidarity and management of migration flows. The fund aimed to address the issue of a fair share of responsibilities between Member States as concerns the financial burden arising from the introduction of integrated management of the Union's external borders and the implementation of common policies on asylum and immigration.

The Fund was responsible for the border crossing point's infrastructure by constructing buildings and integrating information technology. Equipment for the Visa Information System and the Schengen Information System and means of transport and communication were, for example, budgeted for by the Fund. It also provided the financial resources for relevant border guard training and secondment of border guards. The Fund was also allocated directly to the EU member states. Given the wide coverage of activities and the large budget, the External Borders Fund was considered necessary for the EU member states.

The funding and the criteria of the distribution was a significant concern for the EU member states. Frontex's risk analysis was utilized as the key to the determination of the funding. According to the Decision establishing the External Borders Fund <sup>220</sup>, 70% of the budget for land and sea border management was distributed according to 'the length of their external borders' of the member states. Nevertheless, the

---

<sup>219</sup>DECISION No 574/2007/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing the External Borders Fund for the period 2007 to 2013 as part of the General programme 'Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows'. Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2011/EN/1-2011-448-EN-F1-1.Pdf>

<sup>220</sup>Ibid DECISION No 574/2007/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing the External Borders Fund for the period 2007 to 2013 as part of the General programme 'Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows'.

distribution was based on a complex set of factors and more specifically by the size of the problem which was the migratory pressure, and ‘the level of the threat posed by it’.<sup>221</sup>

Frontex measured the migratory pressure, applying the same indicators as are used for its risk analysis by adding extra information (‘situational analysis’) on the political, social, and economic developments in third countries and the neighbouring countries.’ The allocation of the budgets to member states would better reflect the actual burdens of member states.<sup>222</sup> The combination of both analyses enabled Frontex to classify the threat level of member states’ external borders, which also integrated the size of the problem.

Table 1, ‘Classification of threat levels of the external land borders’ on the threat levels at land border sections shows that according to the risk analysis, the Greek borders have been subject to a considerable and constant migratory pressure. In particular, along the border section with Albania and Turkey, which were permanently assessed at high risk, is primarily the last one of the main entry points from irregular migrants from further East and South. Also, the borders with FYROM, as an exit point towards E.U, remain stable at the medium level until 2007, and it is interesting to examine the following years during the refugee crisis, as this borderline was the main exit for the refugees.

The Commission then proposes an escalating set of interventions proportional to the various risk levels:

- for low-risk sections, routine local border checks are put in place;

---

<sup>221</sup> COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Interim Evaluation of the Internal Security Fund - Police Accompanying the document Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on interim evaluation of the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund and the Internal Security Fund. Accessed March 5, 2020. [https://www.eu.dk/samling/20181/kommissionsforslag/kom\(2018\)0464/kommissionsforslag/1496963/1909127/index.htm](https://www.eu.dk/samling/20181/kommissionsforslag/kom(2018)0464/kommissionsforslag/1496963/1909127/index.htm).

<sup>222</sup>Ibid DECISION No 574/2007/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing the External Borders Fund for the period 2007 to 2013 as part of the General programme ‘Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows’.

- for medium-level risk sections, national priority setting is required to aid local border guards;
- for high-risk sections, the eligibility for Frontex joint operations and EU-level financial support is acknowledged (for example, via the Internal Security Fund).

Member State	Border section	budget year 2011	budget year 2010	budget year 2009	budget year 2008	budget year 2007
		threat level - 2009	threat level - 2008	threat level - 2007	threat level - 2006	threat level - 2005
Austria	Lichtenstein	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal
	Switzerland	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	Normal
Belgium	UK	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal
Bulgaria	FYROM	Normal	Normal	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
	Greece	Normal	Normal	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
	Serbia	Normal	Normal	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
	Turkey	Medium	Medium	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Cyprus	Green line	Medium	High	High	Normal	Normal
Estonia	Russia	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal
Finland	Russia	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal
France	Andorra	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal
	UK	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal
	Switzerland	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	Normal
Germany	Switzerland	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	Normal
Greece	Albania	High	High	High	High	High
	Bulgaria	Normal	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium
	FYROM	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium

	Turkey	High	High	High	High	High
Hungary	Croatia	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal
	Romania	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium
	Serbia	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Normal
	Ukraine	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium
Italy	Switzerland	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	Normal
Latvia	Belarus	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal
	Russia	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal
Lithuania	Belarus	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal
	Russia	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal
Norway	Russia	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal
	Belarus	Medium	Medium	Normal	Normal	Normal
Poland	Russia	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal
	Ukraine	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium
	Hungary	Medium	Medium	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Romania	Moldova	Normal	Medium	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
	Serbia	Normal	Normal	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
	Ukraine	Normal	Normal	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
	Slovakia	Ukraine	Normal	Medium	Medium	Medium
Slovenia	Croatia	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	High
	Andorra	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal
	Morocco	High	High	High	High	High
Spain	UK	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal

Table 1: FRONTEX threat levels by land border sections.<sup>223</sup>

The European Commission's need for the use of Frontex's analysis for the External Borders Fund was, therefore, notable. By using the risk analysis reports, the European

<sup>223</sup> Where the risk level increases from "Normal" to "Medium" to "High". The threat level is based on the number of events (irregular border crossing and detection of false travel documents, apprehended facilitators, refusals of entry). For more information on the threat levels, see chapter on methodology.

Commission justified its budget allocation. The European Commission has concluded that ‘Despite some difficulties’ it could make it ‘possible to collect the necessary data to apply the risk analysis criteria’ and so that more resources could be distributed to ‘the member states with the highest responsibility’.<sup>224</sup> The case of the External Borders Fund, overall, sheds light on an aspect of EU decision-making that has needed the back-up of Frontex’s risk analysis for its ‘valid and objective’ data.

### 6.3 Analysis of Border Risks with CIRAM Methodological Framework

While there is no clear rule that separates strategic and organisational threat assessment, strategic risk analysis would usually require a wide range of *modus operandi* and different border types. It will notify strategic decisions on the medium and long-term goals of an organisation are usually driven by higher volumes of quantitative data. Strategic decisions that are designed for several years tend to be highly unpredictable, while practical decisions that need to be made in a more specific period will be less uncertain.

As it was mentioned threat is defined as a force or pressure acting on the external borders. It is to be characterised by its magnitude and likelihood. The analyst should describe which processes or factors both inside and outside the EU affect the magnitude and the likelihood of the threat.<sup>225</sup>

A threat assessment is to identify, describe and measure the threat in terms of magnitude and likelihood. According to CIRAM, threats will be related to border areas or border types, although some threats can be associated with processes for checks and surveillance. Ideally, the threat assessment should be tailored to the area which is investigated, and based on detailed local intelligence, and cover specific time and assess the threat over a specified future period.

---

<sup>224</sup>Ibid DECISION No 574/2007/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing the External Borders Fund for the period 2007 to 2013 as part of the General programme ‘Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows’.

<sup>225</sup> Ibid“Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model: a Comprehensive Update: Version 2.0.” CIRAM. Warsaw: FRONTEX, 2012.

*Identifying threats* means being able to summarise, in the most appropriate form for decision-making, the incidents, data and information that have been communicated to or collected by the analysts.

*Describing the threat* will often involve references to historical data. Any limitation of the data should be described. Similarly, it is the responsibility of the analyst to check the accuracy of the information and convey his/her conclusion to decision-makers. The description of the threat typically includes the description of the modus operandi, the perpetrator's goals, motives, and capabilities (who, where, when, how many), the trends and predictions, and the push factors affecting its magnitude and likelihood. For illegal migration, references to routes and facilitation services should also be made. Two characteristics of the threats should be measured: magnitude and likelihood.

Threats should be measured so that they can be compared, and priorities can be established. Measuring the magnitude of a threat means first determining the unit of measurement for the threat. The choice of the unit will depend on the threat. For threats related to immigration, the units may be the number of migrants illegally crossing the border, or the number of persons refused entry.

Methods to measure the likelihood of threat can be quantitative, semi-quantitative, or qualitative depending on the availability of reliable data and decision-making needs.

Frontex's annual threat assessment for the External Borders Fund is based on data sent by the Member States, border control authorities to Frontex within the framework of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN).

The statistics concerned are as follows:<sup>226</sup>

- the number of third-country nationals refused entry at the external borders

---

<sup>226</sup> Ibid "Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model: a Comprehensive Update: Version 2.0." CIRAM. Warsaw: FRONTEX, 2012.

- the number of third-country nationals apprehended when crossing or attempting to cross the external borders illegally, i.e. detections between border crossing points (BCPs) at the green and blue border and detections at BCPs (clandestine entries such as persons hiding in lorries)
- the number of facilitators intercepted who have intentionally assisted the unauthorised entry of third-country nationals, a number of forged or false travel documents and
- the number of travel documents and visas issued on false grounds which have been detected at BCPs in accordance with the Schengen Borders Code.

## 7. Data Collection

### 7.1 Purpose - Research hypothesis



The purpose of the investigative effort is to capture cross-border crime data and more specific offenses that, under the common CIRAM risk analysis model of FRONTEX, constitute a threat indicator linked to illegal immigration.

Specifically, the data relating to the following cases:<sup>227</sup>

- a. the number of third-country nationals refused entry at the external borders.
- b. the number of third-country nationals apprehended when crossing or attempting to cross the external borders illegally.
- c. the number of intercepted facilitators who have intentionally assisted the unauthorized entry of third-country nationals.
- d. the number of cases of cross-border crime (e.g. import of drugs).

The data comparison was made per year, and it should be noted that during the refugee crisis in 2015-2016, the data cannot be considered reliable since the transit of migrants across the borders of Greece-North Macedonia has taken place without border controls, and there was no application of the legal framework by the police authorities on illegal migration.

## 7.2 Description of the sample.

The investigation was carried out in the police units of the prefecture of Kilkis and namely the Border Crossing Units of Paionias and Doiranis, in the Border Control Police of Evzanoi and Doiranis as well as the police Department of Paionias and Security Police Department of Kilkis.

Following the approval of the Hellenic Police headquarters for investigate and collect data for the prefecture of Kilkis, the following procedure was followed: Department of BCUs Paionias and Doiranis, permission from the head of the Office for the recording of incidents of trafficking in illegal immigrants and cases of movements of

---

<sup>227</sup> Ibid “Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model: a Comprehensive Update: Version 2.0.” CIRAM. Warsaw: FRONTEX, 2012.

illegal immigrants and the attempted exit-entry in the country with the possession of counterfeit documents.

BCPs Evzonon and Doiranis: the Head of the Unit was also authorised to investigate in order to access the archive of refusals of entry into the country as well as for the cases of human trafficking and cases of attempted exit-entry by the possession of counterfeits travel documents.

Concerning the collection of data in the police Department of Paionias and Security Police Department of Kilkis: an investigation took place concerning the books listing cases of drug trafficking into the country.

The survey, as mentioned above, was launched in October 2019 and completed in December 2019.

### 7.3 Difficulties encountered.

During the investigation into the incident logging, specific obstacles arose that complicated the procedure of data collection. One of the most important was the validity of the data due to the lack of computerization and the volume of data.

In addition, the labyrinthine legislation on migrants in force in Greece, as well as the ongoing amendments to the Laws and the Penal Code, lead to erroneous data generation. Specific cases of offences, such as breach of the conditions of residence pursuant to Article 182<sup>228</sup> of the Criminal Code is not supposed to be an offence of illegal immigration and was therefore not included in the recording of the dataset.

---

<sup>228</sup>Article 182 of the Penal Code . Imprisonment of up to six months shall be punishable by anyone who infringes the lawfully imposed restrictions on his freedom of residence and his related obligations. 2. An alien who has been extradited to court if he or she violates the prohibition on his or her return to the country shall be punished by imprisonment of at least two (2) years, which shall not be converted into a fine under any circumstances, nor for any reason, nor shall it be suspended in any manner whatsoever. Articles 99 to 104. There are no suspensive effects on the appeal. 3. The punishment referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be imposed on anyone who, by subjecting him to home restraint by electronic surveillance, infringes any restrictions which have been lawfully imposed on him on his freedom of residence and its related obligations. From July 1, 2019, the new Criminal Code has entered into force (Law 4619/2019) and this article has been removed.

The investigation and the recording of the dataset were made beyond the regular spork of service and to conduct this research. While it was initially planned to report incidents only from the BCUs of Paionias and Doiranis, and the BCPs of Evzonon and Doiranis, additionally the cross-border crime cases at the Paionias Police Department and the Kilkis Security Department was investigated.

#### 7.4 Processing of survey results.

The data were processed on a P.C. in the EXCEL program.

#### 7.5 Explanatory analysis.

Regarding BCU Paionias and Doiranis, the following offences have been investigated:

- the number of facilitators intercepted who have intentionally assisted the unauthorized entry of third-country nationals
- the number of third-country nationals apprehended when crossing or attempting to cross the external borders illegally
- number of forged or false travel documents and the number of travel documents and visas issued on false grounds which have been detected at BCPs in accordance with the Schengen Borders Code

BCU Paionias is placed in Idomeni and is built at an elevation of 65 meters, in the outskirts of Kouri Hill. It mounts in the west bank of Axios river, close to the border with the Republic of North Macedonia. The village is interwoven with a railway station, which is the first railway station that someone meets entering Greece from the north. The area became famous during the refugee crisis in 2015-2016 because of the unofficial makeshift camp where more than 15000 migrants stuck between Greece and North Macedonia. Idomeni was also known in the media as the "bottleneck" of Europe as it was the only route that migrants followed on their way to Europe.


Until June 2017, two BCU, Idomeni and Evzoni were operating in the area, following the restructuring of the Services of the Greek Police<sup>229</sup>, the two services merged into the BCU Paionias, based in Idomeni. The data of the two services have been merged and will be studied in aggregate.

<b>Year</b>	<b>Number of facilitators intercepted</b>
<b>2000</b>	86
<b>2001</b>	65
<b>2002</b>	36
<b>2003</b>	28
<b>2004</b>	59
<b>2005</b>	71
<b>2006</b>	22
<b>2007</b>	46
<b>2008</b>	19
<b>2009</b>	22
<b>2010</b>	10
<b>2011</b>	25
<b>2012</b>	34
<b>2013</b>	28
<b>2014</b>	40
<b>2015</b>	75
<b>2016</b>	38
<b>2017</b>	26
<b>2018</b>	40

<sup>229</sup> Προεδρικό Διάταγμα 17/2017 - ΦΕΚ 29/Α/6-3-2017.” e. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://www.e-nomothesia.gr/kat-ekklesia-thriskaia/proedriko-diatagma-17-2017-phek-29a-6-3-2017.html>.

2019	16
------	----

Table 2: Number of facilitators intercepted who have intentionally assisted the unauthorized entry of third-country nationals. BCU Paionias.



Graph 2: Number of facilitators per year, 2000-2019, BCU Paionias.

The human trafficking cases has fluctuated over the years; initially, arrests of traffickers increased due to the increased migration flows our country faced, as a host country, from countries. Greek nationals are the primary nationality of the traffickers, followed by the nationals of Albania, Bulgaria, North Macedonia and Serbia. In 2005 and later, cases of trafficking of Chinese nationals occurred with Chinese traffickers due to the bilateral agreement between FYROM where China nationals did not require a visa if their passports are endorsed "for public affairs".<sup>230</sup>

Of course, since 2011, there was an increase again due to migration flows the Middle East and Africa. The vehicles selected by traffickers are usually old-built and most of them from Bulgaria. The *modus operandi* usually is the same. More than 90% of the

<sup>230</sup> Visa Policy of North Macedonia." Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, January 29, 2020. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visa\\_policy\\_of\\_North\\_Macedonia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visa_policy_of_North_Macedonia).

migrants coming to the E.U. are facilitated, mostly by members of a criminal network. External factors like border controls and weather conditions influence migratory routes so smugglers adapt their services to increased controls and find new ways into the E.U.<sup>231</sup>

As Greece still remains to be one of the top European countries targeted by irregular migrants and smuggling networks from Turkey, cities of Thessaloniki and Athens are main gathering locations among them. Hubs offering transport infrastructure such as international train stations, airports and service stations for long-distance coaches are key locations for migrant smuggling activities both in and beyond the E.U. Smugglers, through social media, provide appointments in the area of the Thessaloniki's railway station and from there, begin their journey to Idomeni. This the main meeting point for those who want to be facilitated, for those who want to find any information about getting out from Greece, and of course for the facilitators. However, migrants face difficulties finding jobs here, and asylum procedures take too long, so they tend to continue travelling to other European countries. These reasons influence smuggling networks to operate in Greece and provide with all necessary assistance in transporting irregular migrants upcountry.

Payment of the smuggling fee can be paid beforehand, at each milestone of the journey or upon arrival at the destination, but there is no single pattern. Payment methods vary with but most common of which is in cash and Hawala.<sup>232</sup> Migrants tend to pay when they arrive at their preferred destination. Hawala is the most widely used payment method by criminal networks and is based in Turkey, Iraq or other parts of the Middle East and Asia. In some cases, migrants may have to spend several weeks or months in transit hubs or *safe houses*<sup>233</sup> in order to reimburse the facilitator for their travel or save money. The route is usually given to the driver with the use of smartphones and GPS coordinates. Also, the drivers are, most of the time, immigrants

---

<sup>231</sup> "INTERPOL Report on Migrant Smuggling Networks." Europol, October 5, 2016.

<https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/europol-interpol-report-migrant-smuggling-networks>.

<sup>232</sup> Hawala." Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, February 27, 2020. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hawala>.


<sup>233</sup> Safe House." Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, December 18, 2019. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Safe\\_house](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Safe_house).

who wish to leave the country and due to lack of money, choose to be the drivers of vehicles.

<b>Year</b>	<b>Third-country nationals apprehended</b>
<b>2000</b>	12933
<b>2001</b>	8056
<b>2002</b>	1596
<b>2003</b>	1042
<b>2004</b>	1337
<b>2005</b>	1986
<b>2006</b>	1228
<b>2007</b>	852
<b>2008</b>	777
<b>2009</b>	493
<b>2010</b>	328
<b>2011</b>	796
<b>2012</b>	967
<b>2013</b>	426
<b>2014</b>	419
<b>2015</b>	348
<b>2016</b>	207
<b>2017</b>	98
<b>2018</b>	249

<b>2019</b>	114
-------------	-----

Table 3: Number of third-country nationals apprehended when crossing or attempting to cross the external borders illegally. BCU Paionias.



Graph 3: Number of third-country nationals apprehended per year, 2000-2019. BCU Paionias.

According to table 4, the number of third-country nationals apprehended when crossing or attempting to cross the external borders illegally changes through the years. As it was mentioned in the first chapter Greece, in the decade of 1990, was a financially developed state with high wages as well as political and social stability. Its geographic position allowed easy access to neighbouring peoples by Land and sea. The political and economic liberalization of the Eastern and Central European states caused a massive rise in the immigrant population, especially Albanians (the Greek state accepted 150,000 Albanians in 1993), Romanians, Bulgarians, Ukrainians, Georgian, the former Socialist Republic of the Soviet Union, and a small number of Chinese. The civil strife in the African and Middle East states forced Greece to face massive refugee and migratory waves, resulting in the Greek islands not being able to cope with the phenomenon.



Syrians, during the year of 2015, the peak year of the refugee crisis, were the primary arrested citizenship, the following years, reduced significantly. On the contrary, the number of Afghan and Pakistani nationals increased. Among the other nationalities, there is an increase in Bangladesh and Somalia citizens. Immigrants from 57 different countries and stateless persons were interviewed and identified since 2013 in the region of Kilkis, during the operation “SARISA” was implemented. The Albanian nationals are considered to belong to the category of economic migrants and are usually workers due to the limitation of 90 days<sup>234</sup> residence in Greece and, for that reason, choose to enter and exit the country illegally. The same applies to the citizens of North Macedonia and is the result of so-called cyclical migration.<sup>235</sup>

Immigrants, in addition to smuggling networks, choose, as mentioned in the first chapter, to cross the border by themselves. The majority of the migrants arrive in Idomeni with the train or the bus, taking advantage of the train tracks, directed to the border with North Macedonia.

<b>Year</b>	<b>Number of forged or false travel documents</b>
<b>2000</b>	4
<b>2001</b>	1
<b>2002</b>	23
<b>2003</b>	2
<b>2004</b>	5


---

<sup>234</sup>Article 7 Issuance of a tour visa If the applicant holds a travel document recognized by one or more Member States, if not all, the travel visa shall apply to the territory of the Member States which recognize the travel document, provided that the period of stay does not exceed 90 days. within any period of 180 days in the territory of the Member States concerned .Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the establishment of a travel visa and amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement and Regulations (EC) No. And Regulation (EC) No. 767/2008 / \* COM / 2014/0163 final - 2014/0095 (COD)

<sup>235</sup> Circular migration or repeat migration is the temporary and usually repetitive movement of amigrant worker between home and host areas, typically for the purpose of employment. It represents an established pattern of population mobility, whether cross-country or rural-urban. There are several benefits associated with this migration pattern, including gains in financial capital, human capital, and social capital. There also costs associated with circular migration, such as brain drain, poor working conditions, forced labor, and the inability to transfer acquired skills to home economies. Socially, there are strong connections to gender, health outcomes, development, poverty, and global immigration policy. Wikipedia

<b>2005</b>	4
<b>2006</b>	4
<b>2007</b>	5
<b>2008</b>	11
<b>2009</b>	0
<b>2010</b>	7
<b>2011</b>	0
<b>2012</b>	14
<b>2013</b>	9
<b>2014</b>	7
<b>2015</b>	9
<b>2016</b>	33
<b>2017</b>	19
<b>2018</b>	45
<b>2019</b>	22

Table 4: Number of forged or false travel documents and the number of travel documents and visas issued on false grounds which have been detected at BCPs in accordance with the Schengen Borders Code.BCU Paionias.



Graph 4: Number of forged or false travel documents per year in BCU Paionias.

Document Fraud is the manufacture, falsification, alteration, sale or use of identification documents or other documents to circumvent immigration laws or other criminal activities. All types of documents submitted by beneficiaries as travel documents may be the subject of forgery. According to EUROPOL, forgery refers to the production of fake documents such as passports and other forms of identification, which are sometimes used as "breeder" documents—administrative documents such as birth certificates, marriage records, and work and residence permits, that can be used to obtain other identification documents fraudulently.<sup>236</sup>

Documents, which are the subject of counterfeiting, are the following:

- passports
- national I.D. cards
- Schengen Visa
- driver's licenses
- asylum seeker's registration cards

---

<sup>236</sup>“Forgery of Administrative Documents and Trafficking Therein.” Europol. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/crime-areas-and-trends/crime-areas/forgery-of-administrative-documents-and-trafficking-therein>.

- residence permits.

Networks of organized criminals, who supply illegal migrants with forged documents and identities or genuine, illegally held, in the event of external uniformity of immigrants with the original owner (impostor), are active in Greece.<sup>237</sup>

According to the table the number of persons arrested for having in their possession stolen documents, in the years 2000-2019, were mainly from Romania, Kosovo and Turkey. The crisis in the Countries of the Middle East, pursued nationals of Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria to use forged documents to cross the border with the neighbouring country. Also, citizens of other countries such as Mali, Morocco, Lebanon Algeria and India are trying to leave the country through BCP Evzonon. Documents of certain nationalities, such as Italy, Spain and Greece, are more attractive than others because they allow their holders to access services or benefits that would not otherwise be available.


BCU Doiranis, as mentioned in the first chapter, is placed in Doiranis Kilkis near the borders with North Macedonia. In the area is located in the eastern part of the homonymous valley Lake Doirani, which is formed at the southern foot of Mount Belles and an altitude of 150 m. It extends in an NW-shaped, oval shape, maintaining the largest width in its northern part. Its total surface area is 43.1 square kilometres. Given the boundary defined by a straight line from the southern edge of the lake to the top of Belles, this conceivably divides the lake to the west and east. Thus the west area of 27.3 sq. M. km belong to Northern Macedonia and 15.8 sq. M. Km east of Greece. The lake's length from North to South is 8.9 km while its width reaches 7.1 km, making it the third-largest lake in Skopje after Lake Ohrid and Great Prespa.

---

<sup>237</sup>Suspect Arrested in Greece for Large-Scale Document Forgery.” Europol, September 1, 2019. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/suspect-arrested-in-greece-for-large-scale-document-forgery>.

<b>BCU DOIRANIS</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>2018</b>	<b>2019</b>	
<b>ALBANIA</b>		1										1
<b>SYRIA</b>										1	1	2
<b>IRAQ</b>											1	1
<b>EGYPT</b>											2	2
<b>GREECE</b>							4		1	1		6
<b>N. MACEDONIA</b>			1					2	2	2		7
<b>TOTAL</b>		1	2				4	2	3	4	4	19

Table 5: Number of facilitators intercepted who have intentionally assisted the unauthorized entry of third-country nationals. BCU Doiranis



Graph 5: Facilitators' nationalities. BCU Doiranis.

According to the data, there is no evidence of variation; the only change that is observed is the citizenship of the facilitators. During the years 2015-2017, the traffickers were Greek or nationals and North Macedonia's, 32% and 37% of the total arrests. The following years, the smuggling networks changed the *modus operandi* and chose facilitators from the immigrants themselves, especially the holders of the asylum seeker's applicants, and this is obvious from chart., 11% are from Egypt and 10% from Syria. Thessaloniki serves as the central hub for immigrants before travelling onwards. The vehicles selected by traffickers, as it was mentioned, are usually old-built and as most of them from Bulgaria. Through debriefing<sup>238</sup> tasks, a standard action is observed, immigrants through social media provide appointments in the area of the Thessaloniki railway station and from there, begin their journey to

---

<sup>238</sup>, Raphael, Beverly; Wilson, John (2003). Psychological Debriefing: Theory, Practice and Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 1. Debriefing is a report of a mission or project or the information so obtained. It is a structured process following an exercise or event that reviews the actions taken. As a technical term, it implies a specific and active intervention process that has developed with more formal meanings such as operational debriefing. It is classified into different types, which include military, experiential, and psychological debriefing, among others

Police type of debriefing is used to receive information from immigrants to identify who is refugee and enables the systematic extraction of information for intelligence purposes from migrants willing to cooperate.


Doirani. Payment of the relevant fee shall be paid at the end of the journey to a third party. The route is usually given to the driver with the use of smartphones and GPS coordinates. Also, the drivers are, most of the time, immigrants who wish to leave the country and due to lack of money, are chosen as drivers of vehicles.

	<i>2009</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>2012</i>	<i>2013</i>	<i>2014</i>	<i>2015</i>	<i>2016</i>	<i>2017</i>	<i>2018</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>TOTAL</i>
<i>ALBANIA</i>	126	88	7	9	16	14	1	10	23	16	12	322
<i>SYRIA</i>					4	58	41	4	8	7	3	125
<i>AFGHANI STAN</i>	10		4	5	9	24	8	2	17	12	1	92
<i>PAKISTA N</i>		1	6	2	11	4	2	0	3	35	16	80
<i>N. MACEDO NIA</i>	47	15	2			1	1	1	2	2	0	71
<i>SOMALIA</i>	1	1		2	11	7	3	0	0	1	16	42
<i>MOROCC O</i>					1				2	0	22	25
<i>BANGLAD ESH</i>						1	9	0	8	6	0	24
<i>IRAQ</i>							2	0	0	9	5	16
<i>ALGERIA</i>				8	4						4	16
<i>TURKEY</i>	1						3	1	3	0	0	7
<i>IRAN</i>					2	3					1	6
<i>EGYPT</i>										0	5	5
<i>GHANA</i>						3						3


<i>ETHIOPIA</i>						3							3
<i>GEORGIA</i>									0	1	1		2
<i>NEPAL</i>					1					1	0		2
<i>PALESTINE</i>										1	1		2
<i>INDIA</i>			1							1	0		2
<i>BULGARIA</i>				1						1	0		2
<i>LIBANON</i>						2							2
<i>CAMEROON</i>						2							2
<i>TOGO</i>							1	0	0	0	0		1
<i>NIGERIA</i>							1	0	0	0	0		1
<i>SENEGAL</i>							1	0	0	0	0		1
<i>LIBYA</i>										1	0		1
<i>SIERRA LEONE</i>						1							1
<i>ZIMBABWE</i>						1							1
<i>MALI</i>						1							1
<i>ERITREA</i>						1							1
<i>total</i>	184	105	20	27	59	126	73	18	66	94	87		859



Table 6: Number of third-country nationals apprehended when crossing or attempting to cross the external borders illegally. BCU Doiranis.



Graph 6: Third country national apprehended per year in BC Doiranis.



Graph 7: Nationalities of apprehended immigrants.BCU Doiranis.

According to Graph 4, as in the case of BCU Paionias, there is no differentiation in the number of third-country nationals apprehended when crossing or attempting to cross the external borders illegally. The nationalities vary according to the migratory flows Greece was facing.

Immigrants, in addition to smuggling networks, choose, as mentioned in the first chapter to cross the border by themselves. The majority of the migrants arrive in Doirani with the train. Taking advantage of the train that follows the route Thessaloniki-Serres, disembark at the railway station of Mouries and from there, pedestrians are directed to the border with North Macedonia.

Concerning crimes with the use of false documents, only one case organised in 2019 and a Pakistani national arrested.




Image 23: Map of Doirani area. BCP Evzonoï and BCP Doirani

According to the research BCP Evzonoï and Doirani, the offences relating to the Common Risk Analysis Model of FRONTEX risk indicators for border protection will be examined, as mentioned above:

- the number of third-country nationals refused entry at the external borders
- the number of third-country nationals apprehended when crossing or attempting to cross the external borders illegally, i.e. detections between border crossing points (BCPs) at the green and blue border and detections at BCPs (clandestine entries such as persons hiding in lorries)
- the number of facilitators intercepted who have intentionally assisted the unauthorised entry of third-country nationals
- number of forged or false travel documents

BCP Evzonoï is the second-largest entry point in Greece, after the Airport "Eleftherios Venizelos" from which more than 6 million passengers pass annually and ends up on the main motorway of the country, A1 (National Highway). The Customs Office of Evzonoï also operates in the same area, and joint checks are carried out on vehicles, people and counters. BCP Evzonoï is equipped with state-of-the-art

logistical equipment such as passport readers, carbon dioxide detector, radioactive detector, metal detector, drug detector.

In 2017, the Greek Police restructured its services, according to No. P.D 7/2017.<sup>239</sup> This also resulted in the transfer of the responsibilities of the Border Check Points to the Border Crossing Points, such as the transfer of offences of false travel documents, human trafficking and illegal entry and exit. This is illustrated by our data from 2017, and BCPs do not show such offences. According to the article 100 of P.D 7/2017, BCPs are responsible for the control of the legal movement of nationals and foreigners and the application of the legislation on the protection of the national currency and foreign exchange from the point or points of entry-exit from the country

As mentioned above, BCP Evzonoi is one of the main gateways of the entrance to Greece, due to the geographical location of the region and the fact that it is a pole of attraction for tourists from the Balkan countries and the E.U. Schengen rules abolish internal border controls while harmonizing and strengthening the protection of the region's external borders. Once they enter the Schengen area, people can travel from one country to another without undergoing border controls. However, national authorities may control people at the internal borders or near their internal borders if information and experience from the police warrant temporary surveillance. The functioning of Schengen rules was influenced by an increase in migration flows to the E.U. in 2015, and heightened security concerns, including terrorism and dangerous cross-border criminal activities, with Parliament, criticized the continuation of internal border controls in the Schengen area in a report adopted on 30 May 2018.<sup>240</sup> Temporary internal border controls within the Schengen area have been in force for three years.

Table 7 shows the number of people who entered and checked by BCP Evzonoi police officers according to Schengen Code. During the refugee crisis in 2015-2016,

---

<sup>239</sup>IbidΠροεδρικό Διάταγμα 17/2017 - ΦΕΚ 29/Α/6-3-2017.”

<sup>240</sup> Διαχείριση Των Εξωτερικών Συνόρων: Θεματολογικά Δελτία Για Την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση: Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο.” Θεματολογικά δελτία για την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση | Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/el/sheet/153>.

there was an increase in controls due to the E.U.'s and the Greek Government's concerns regarding security and the prevention of cross-border severe criminal activities.

<b>Year</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>2018</b>	<b>2019</b>
<b>Number of people checked in BCP Evzonoi</b>	28431	27979	34028	37270	40533	39572	37869	30892	28258

Table 7: Number of people checked in BCP Evzonoi per year, 2011-2019.

In the E.U.context, refusal of entry of a third-country national at the external E.U. border because they do not fulfil all the entry conditions laid down in Art. 5(1) of Regulation (E.U.) 2016/399 (Schengen Borders Code).As a general rule, a uniform visa shall be refused when the examination of the application leads to one or more of the following conclusions:<sup>241</sup>

- the applicant has presented a travel document which is false, counterfeit or forged
- the applicant does not justify the purpose and conditions of the intended stay

---

<sup>241</sup>European Commission. The Annex to Commission Decision No C(2010) 1620 establishing the Handbook for the processing of visa applications and the modification of issued visas. Accessed February 29, 2020, <https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/3/2010/EN/3-2010-1620-EN-F1-1.PDF>

- the applicant does not provide proof of sufficient means of subsistence, both for the duration of the intended stay and the return to his country of origin or residence, or for the transit to a third country into which he is certain to be admitted, or is not in a position to acquire such means lawfully
- the applicant has already stayed for 90 days during the current 180-day period on the territory of the Member States based on a uniform visa or a visa with limited territorial validity
- an applicant is a person for whom an alert has been issued in the SIS for the purpose of refusing entry
- the applicant is considered to be a threat to public policy, internal security or public health or to the international relations of any of the Member States, in particular where an alert has been issued in Member States' national databases to refuse entry on the same grounds
- does not provide proof of holding adequate and valid travel medical insurance, where applicable
- there are reasonable doubts as to the authenticity of the supporting documents submitted by the applicant or the veracity of their contents, the reliability of the statements made by the applicant or his intention to leave the territory of the Member States before the expiry of the visa applied for.

Year	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------

<b>Third-country nationals refused entry at the external borders</b>	1322	996	639	759	808	692	964	708	703
--	------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

Table 8: Number of third-country nationals refused entry at the external borders in BCP Evzanoi.

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	TOTAL
<b>HUNGARY</b>	1						1
<b>GREEK</b>		1	2				3
<b>BULGARIA</b>			1				1
<b>GERMANY</b>						1	1

Table 9: Facilitators' nationalities in BCP Evzanoi.

As land routes remain most prevalent, hiding in concealments of cars, vans or lorries remains the most common modus operandi. During the summer the amount of the travellers increases significantly, and police officers manage and control daily from

25,000 to 45,000 tourists both in the exit and entry the country, this affects the adequate controls in vehicles and persons.<sup>242</sup>



Image 24: Places where irregular migrants are hiding.

The number of arrests for having in their possession and use of counterfeit travel documents is reduced dramatically, and this is mainly due to the increase in checks on travel documents using appropriate logistical equipment, but mainly to its training police personnel in the new methods of forging documents. Until 2013, mainly Balkan nationals used forged travel documents - such as Kosovo, Serbia, Albania, Bulgaria and North Macedonia as a result of circular migration. With the refugee crisis, networks of organised criminals, who supply illegal migrants with forged documents and identities or genuinely held found solid ground to expand their activities to Middle Eastern (Syrian) nationals and Africa.

---


<sup>242</sup>“ΠΡΟΒΛΗΜΑΤΑ ΣΤΟ ΤΜΗΜΑ ΔΙΑΒΑΤΗΡΙΑΚΟΥ ΕΛΕΓΧΟΥ ΕΥΖΩΝΩΝ-ΚΙΛΚΙΣ, ΑΠΟ ΤΗΝ ΈΝΩΣΗ ΑΣΤΥΝΟΜΙΚΩΝ ΥΠΑΛΛΗΛΩΝ Ν.ΚΙΛΚΙΣ.” kilkis web tv. Accessed March 8, 2020. [http://kilkiswebtv.blogspot.com/2018/07/blog-post\\_61.html](http://kilkiswebtv.blogspot.com/2018/07/blog-post_61.html).



	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	total
<b>SYRIA</b>			14	5	8	1		28
<b>KOSOVO</b>	6	5		8				19
<b>SERBIA</b>	4	3	4	2	1		1	15
<b>ALBANIA</b>		1	1	2	2	2		8
<b>N. MACEDONIA</b>	6			2				8
<b>PALESTINE</b>	3		1	2				6
<b>AFGANISTAN</b>	2	2	0					4
<b>SENEGAL</b>				3				3
<b>GREEK</b>			2			1		3
<b>BULGARIA</b>	1			1				2
<b>TURKEY</b>	1				1			2
<b>TUNISIA</b>	2							2
<b>PAKISTAN</b>		1				1		2
<b>IRAN</b>			2					2
<b>NIGERIA</b>		1		1				2
<b>GEORGIA</b>			1				1	2
<b>MAURITANIA</b>				2				2
<b>POLAND</b>	1							1
<b>RUSSIA</b>	1							1
<b>MOROCCO</b>	1							1
<b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>			1					1
<b>ERITREA</b>	1							1
<b>GHANA</b>				1				1

<b>SOMALIA</b>					1			1
<b>SAINT DOMI</b>					1			1
<b>HUNGARY</b>								0
<b>CONGO</b>								0
<b>total</b>	29	13	26	29	14	5	2	118

Table 10: Arrests for possession and use of counterfeit travel documents. BCP Evzonoi.




Graph 8: Number of forged Documents per year, 2011-2017. BCP Evzonoi.

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
<b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>	1						
<b>IRAN</b>	1						
<b>RUSSIA</b>	1					2	

<b>ALBANIA</b>			1			1		
<b>KONGO</b>			2					
<b>FYROM</b>						1		
<b>ROUMANIA</b>						1		
<b>IRAQ</b>						1		
<b>ITALY</b>						2		
<b>TOTAL</b>	3	3	0	0		6	2	0

Table 11: Number of third-country nationals apprehended when crossing or attempting to cross the external borders illegally. BCP Evzonoi.



Graph 9: Nationalities of third-country nationals apprehended when crossing or attempting to cross the external borders illegally. BCP Evzonoi.

The arrests for illegal entry mainly involve nationals from Balkan countries. 15% are from Albania, 22% from Russia and 7% from North Macedonia and Romania, as reported on the perspective of circular migration. Arrests for illegal exit are mainly from Middle Eastern countries (Iran, Iraq) and African countries (Congo). The year 2015 presents an increase in the arrests as a result of the increased refugee flows facing our country.

BCP Doirani is placed in Doiranis Kilkis near the borders with North Macedonia in the same village BCU Doiranis operates. BCU Doiranis is the second entry point in the region of Kilkis with the neighbouring country, but due to the unsuitable road network, it is not widely known by travellers. The table below shows that compared to BCP Evzonoi, the number of people who entered the country from BCP Doiranis is significantly lower.

Year	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Number of people who entered Greece	339528	358827	446531	524816	627002	532460	566433

Table 12: Number of people who entered Greece. BCP Doiranis.

The cases of arresting people for the use of false travel documents are concerned, and in this case, the number of people arrested is relatively small. Only 2 N. Macedonian nationals were arrested in 2016 and 3 Turkish nationals in 2018.

The drug trafficking is an illegal criminal activity, but it is the most profitable and is the classic form of "Organized Crime".<sup>243</sup> Historically the Balkans served as a bridge between Europe and Asia. In this way, the Balkan Peninsula was also used by various

---

<sup>243</sup> Annual Report 2004." Europol, October 11, 2016. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/annual-report-2004>.

criminal groups as a transit country for trafficking and smuggling various goods to Europe.

Balkan Route is one of the main routes for drug trafficking from Turkey and other Asian countries to Europe. According to the international agencies for fighting organised crime such as Interpol and Europol, the "Balkan route" came more and more into use during the 1970s. Due to the geopolitical advantages on the Balkans, this route had become one of the most prestigious venues for human trafficking and drugs smuggling towards Europe after ten year.<sup>244</sup>

According to EUROPOL, Afghanistan, as the primary source of heroin present in the E.U., produced an estimated 4800 tonnes of opium in 2016, representing a 43% increase compared to 3300 tonnes in 2015.<sup>245</sup> The E.U. heroin market is estimated to be worth over EUR 6.8 billion. In recent years heroin trafficking routes into Europe have become more diversified, and new regions are used by criminal groups to get their consignments around those where tighter controls are in place.<sup>246</sup>

The main routes used to traffic heroin to the E.U. have remained mostly the same over recent years, although routes appear to change over time, depending on factors such as the state of transportation infrastructure, law enforcement activity and geopolitical stability. According to EUROPOL, main routes are generally recognised:<sup>247</sup>

- the Balkan route — the main trafficking route to Europe from Iran to Turkey and then through Bulgaria and Greece or the Mediterranean Sea. The Balkan route also operates diverse as the main route for drug trafficking in Greece from the Balkan countries (Albania, N.Macedonia).

---

<sup>244</sup>"United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime." Drug money and opiate trafficking on the Balkan route, focus of new UNODC report. Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2015/November/drug-money-and-opiate-trafficking-on-the-balkan-route--focus-of-new-unodc-report.html>.

<sup>245</sup> "Europol Review 2016 - 2017." Europol, January 31, 2018. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/europol-review-2016-2017>.

<sup>246</sup> Ibid "United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime." Drug money and opiate trafficking on the Balkan route, focus of new UNODC report.

<sup>247</sup>EU Drug Markets Report 2019, November 1, 2019. [http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/joint-publications/eu-drug-markets-report-2019\\_en](http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/joint-publications/eu-drug-markets-report-2019_en).

- The southern route, through Iran and Pakistan to several countries in Africa and the Arabian Peninsula to supply local markets or for onward shipment to Europe locally — the branch through the Arabian Sea, Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea to Europe have gained some importance recently.
- the Southern Caucasus route, going from Iran to Armenia or Azerbaijan to Georgia and then through the Black Sea to Ukraine or E.U. Member States
- the Northern route, from Afghanistan to Tajikistan and then through Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan to Kazakhstan, mainly destined for Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, E.U. Member States



- Balkan route
- Northern route
- Southern route
- Caucasus route

Image 25: The Balkan route E.U. Drug Markets Report 2019 EMCDDA, Europol, Lisbon, November 2019.<sup>248</sup>

Greece is described as a key portal of drug entry imported into Europe and also a country of transit and the destination of quantities for domestic consumption. The geographical location of Greece and its geomorphology make the work of the prosecuting authorities difficult. Greece is on one of the main routes of drug trafficking, a Balkan route, which unites the countries with the largest opiate production in the world (Central Asia) and the Middle East with the countries of Europe.

The existence of many international airports and ports combined with the extensive borders facilitate the import of shipments of drugs from Latin America. Greece is also close to Albania, which is the Balkan countries' leading supplier of cannabis. The individual is that in the last two years, seizures of drugs have increased sharply, mainly cannabis, which touched 232%, in Epirus. Albania's drug traffickers are channelling the most abundant quantities of cannabis they produce into our country so that we can head to the rest of the Balkans, Europe, via Italy or even Turkey. Due to increased controls as an alternative route for the transfer of cannabis to Greece, they choose the route from Albania to N. Macedonia and through the northern borders into Greece. During 2018, 691,241 kilos of raw cannabis were seized, with the leading country of origin, Albania, at 62% and North Macedonia at 2%.<sup>249</sup>

As mentioned in the first chapter, the prefecture of Kilikis is one of the main gateways of Europe, and it is also characteristic that the area is easily accessible due to the highway E-75 and the existence of secondary roads, provincial and rural roads, which are in good condition and are preferred by criminal networks.

---

<sup>248</sup>EU Drug Markets Report 2019, November 1, 2019. [http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/joint-publications/eu-drug-markets-report-2019\\_en](http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/joint-publications/eu-drug-markets-report-2019_en).

<sup>249</sup> “Εκθεση Συντονιστικού Οργάνου Δίωξης Ναρκωτικών (Σ.Ο.Δ.Ν.) Και Εθνικής Μονάδας Πληροφοριών (Ε.Μ.Π) Έτους 2018.” Accessed February 29, 2020. <http://www.hcg.gr/node/21657>.

Security Police Departments of Kilkis and Polykastro operating in Police Directorate of Kilkis and according to article 6, P.D 17/2017 <sup>250</sup> they are competent for the prevention and treatment of drug-related crimes, in particular:

- to control the trafficking of drugs and psychotropic substances, act in pre-interrogations and draw up the relevant proceedings;
- to monitor suspected drug trafficking suspects, nationals and foreigners, to prevent and suppress their related crimes;
- to control in cooperation with the competent bodies and services, the airports, ports, railway stations and car stations, suspected drug trafficking suspects;
- to monitor, in particular, public places suitable for the transport, trafficking and trafficking of drugs, as well as public centres suspected of carrying out transactions and/or drug use.

Cannabis has emerged as the most common illegal substance imported into our country. More rarely are addictive essentials such as heroin, amphetamine and ECSTACY pills. In 2017, 158 kg of cannabis was seized by the Greek Police units in the region of Kilkis, which were imported from the border with North Macedonia. Also, in one case, 50,000 ecstasy pills were confiscated. In 2108, an increase in the seized quantities of cannabis was observed, which reached 196 kg. In 2019, there was a slight decrease with the caps reaching 131 kg of raw cannabis and 1.2 kg of heroin.

The main nationality of the drug traffickers is from N. Macedonia and from Greece, but also we can see from the table.. that they were also from Albania, Serbia and Germany. Of course, networks prefer smugglers from Greece and N. Macedonia because of their knowledge of the area, the roads and the police's checking points.


---

<sup>250</sup> Ibid Προεδρικό Διάταγμα 17/2017 - ΦΕΚ 29/Α/6-3-2017.”



	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Greece	4	1	2	6	2	1
N.Macedonia	1		3	2	7	6
Albania	1			2		
Serbia				1		
Germany				1		

Table 13: Drug traffickers' nationalities per year.2014-2019.



Graph 10: Drug traffickers' nationalities

Drug traffickers usually entry into Greece with vehicles (cars, motorcycles) but there are also cases where pedestrians enter the country illegally until specific meeting points near the borderline where their accomplices were waiting.<sup>251</sup> There is no doubt that the consolidating controls at border crossing points and close to the border have acted as a deterrent to the drug trafficking from the neighbouring countries.



Image 26: A seized vehicle which was used for drug trafficking

## 7.6 Further investigation

As it was mentioned, CIRAM uses the necessary information on cross-border organised crime and pursues the risk assessments resulting from the various cross-border threats. Its implementation is based on the close cooperation of FRONTEX with the EU Member States, as well as on a four-tier access control model (Picture x)—reference.

---

<sup>251</sup>Publisher, Απο Aftodioikisi, and Aftodioikisi Publisher. “Κιλκίς: Μετέφερε Με Τρέιλερ Σάκουσ Γεμάτους Ναρκωτικά.” Aftodioikisi.gr, March 4, 2019. <https://www.aftodioikisi.gr/koinonia/kilkis-metefere-me-treiler-sakoys-gematoys-narkotika/>.

The first-tier represents the measures taken in third countries, especially against illegal migration in countries of origin and transit. Cooperation with neighbouring countries is the second tier. Agreements with neighbouring countries on cooperation within the field of border management are an efficient tool for increasing border security.<sup>252</sup>

Frontex developed at the borders of Greece-North Macedonia on 1 February 2017 in order-according to its press office-to assist the Greek authorities concerning border control and document control. The development is part of the Frontex operations "Flexible Operational Activities 2017 Land on Border Surveillance and Focal Points 2017 Land" with a duration of one year. These are the continuing movement of refugees, and the use of the Road was an important factor for the continuation of this operation for the year 2020. Greece has also today agreed on an operational plan with Frontex for a new operation at the Greek border with the N. Macedonia, where the agency will assist with the registration of migrants. The deployment of additional officers will begin in 2020

After Albania and Montenegro, the EU Commission has concluded a Frontex status agreement with Serbia, to be followed by Northern Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The co-operation agreement with N.Macedonia will allow Frontex to deploy teams to the country, and carry out joint operations, which could prove vital to the EU's ongoing strategy to address the challenges of irregular migration.

The Commission intends for the new agreement with N.Macedonia to strengthen its capacity to protect Europe's external borders and increase the role of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency's role by facilitating co-operation with Europe's neighbours and partner countries.<sup>253</sup>

The second tier represents agreements with neighbouring countries on cooperation within the field of border management are an efficient tool for increasing border

---

<sup>252</sup> Ibid "Updated Schengen Catalogue on External Borders Control, Readmission and Removal - 2nd Draft-EU monitor.

<sup>253</sup> Noden, Aran. "Frontex Signs Border Security Co-Operation Agreement with Macedonia." Government Europa, July 19, 2018. <https://www.governmenteuropa.eu/frontex-co-operation-agreement-with-macedonia/89487/>.

security. The Prespes Agreement provides for the resolution of the so-called name-dispute, but at the same time, the European perspective and stability are strengthened in the neighbouring country and thus limited the risk of influence of third forces with alienation on the northern border of Greece, its role in the region is strengthened as a European pillar of peace and security, for the first time the neighbouring country recognises that it has nothing to do with "Ancient Greek culture, history, culture and the clergy" of Macedonia. Additionally enhances bilateral cooperation on sensitive areas like police and defence cooperation. Article 9, paragraph two, stipulates "that the existing Confidence Building Measures shall be incorporated..."<sup>254</sup>

In particular, in accordance with article 16, paragraph 1, the Agreement establishes cooperation between the two countries in the prevention and suppression of organised cross-border crime, terrorism, economic crimes, such as trafficking in human beings, crimes linked to illicit trafficking and/or trafficking in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, illegal manufacture and trafficking of firearms, parts and components and ammunition, the illegal importation, export and transfer of cultural Goods, offences relating to the transport of civil aviation and the crime associated with forgery or smuggling of cigarettes, alcohol, fuel, among other illegal activities.<sup>255</sup>

Until today there is no formal cooperation between the two countries in the prevention of organised cross-border and crimes related to illegal migration. The results of the joint operations which will be carry out in N. Macedonia will be vital to the EU's ongoing strategy to address the challenges of irregular migration and will open channels for formal and productive cooperation between Greece and N. Macedonia. Future research is needed to evaluate the risks of the irregular migration effectively.

---

<sup>254</sup> Ibid Final Agreement for the Settlement of the Differences as Described in the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 817 (1993) and 845 (1993), the Termination of the Interim Accord of 1995, and the Establishment of a Strategic Partnership Between the Parties, June 17, 2018, article 9

<sup>255</sup> Ibid Final Agreement for the Settlement of the Differences as Described in the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 817 (1993) and 845 (1993), the Termination of the Interim Accord of 1995, and the Establishment of a Strategic Partnership Between the Parties, June 17, 2018, article 16

## 8. Conclusion

This thesis was summarised by the serious issue of the migration and refugee crisis experienced by Europe in 2015, focusing on the eastern Mediterranean migration route to Greece and the flow of which followed the Balkan Route. Kilikis prefecture was the main gateway to the Balkan Road over time, culminating in August of 2015, when all the media and international press referred to a small village in the prefecture of Kilikis, Idomeni, the bottleneck of Europe.

Then the detailed analyses of the theoretical framework of migration policies and more specifically of the European and Greek migration policy has been developed. There has been a significant problem in the procedures for integrating migrants into our country. The practice of imposing asylum seekers on the restriction of residence on the islands has caused the phenomenon of prolonged entrapment of asylum seekers on the islands and in conditions which in many cases are not only decent but endanger their physical integrity or even their lives. Furthermore, a conceptual approach to cross-border organised crime, its fields of action, the concept of cross-border cooperation and its response mechanisms have been developed. More specifically, the phenomenon of migration in relation to cross-border crime, security, and border surveillance was investigated

Integrated Border Management was referred to in the Lisbon Treaty, which called for the adoption of any measure necessary for the gradual establishment of an integrated management system for external borders concerning the movement of persons. The principle of IBM can be summarised as National and international coordination and cooperation among all the relevant authorities and agencies involved in border security and trade facilitation to establish effective, efficient, and integrated border management systems in order to reach the objective of open, but well-controlled and secure borders. With a view to integrated management of the EU's external borders, the responsibilities, operational action of FRONTEX and its cooperation with Greece, which has been established mainly by the conduct of joint operations at maritime and land borders, have been analysed, and more specifically in the region of Kilikis.

A brief description of the CIRAM risk analysis model used by FRONTEX and leads its operations in cooperation with the EU member states, which is based on the assessments of threats, vulnerabilities and impacts of the border. In the last chapter, there was an analysis of CIRAM risk analysis model of FRONTEX, a threat indicator linked to illegal immigration. An investigation of statistics from the Greek Police was carried out, namely by the services of the Police Directorate of Kilkis, which are engaged in illegal immigration and cross-border crime offences. The analysis of the data concludes that the number of third-country nationals apprehended when crossing or attempting to cross the external borders illegally changes through the years.

Until 1990 the political and economic liberalization of the Eastern and Central European states caused a massive rise in the immigrant population, primarily Albanians, Romanians, Bulgarians, Ukrainians, Georgian, the former Socialist Republic of the Soviet Union, and a small number of Chinese. The civil strife in the African and Middle East states forced Greece to face massive refugee and migratory waves, resulting in the Greek islands not being able to cope with the phenomenon. The region of Kilkis received the most considerable weight of the secondary-movement of the refugees and migrants mainly from Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Somalia. Increased migration flows and the migrants' attempt to leave the country fueled cross border smuggling networks, with domestic and third-country traffickers, in use or not of forged documents.

Finally, Greece is described as a critical portal of drug entry imported into Europe and also a country of transit and the destination of quantities for domestic consumption. The geographical location of Greece and its geomorphology make the work of the prosecuting authorities difficult. Greece is on one of the main routes of drug trafficking, a Balkan route, which unites the countries with the most significant opiate production in the world (Central Asia) and the Middle East with the countries of Europe. The prefecture of Kilkis is one of the main gateways of Europe, and it is also characteristic that the area is easily accessible and the existence of secondary roads, provincial and rural roads, which are in good condition and are preferred by criminal networks.

Intending to address irregular migration and cross-border threats effectively, it is imperative to maintain and strengthen the existing level of cross-border cooperation, both with relevant EU bodies (FRONTEX, Europol), as well as with similar services of the EU member states and third countries. At a national level, it is considered necessary to make comprehensive and multidimensional imprinting of the endogenous weaknesses of migration-related organisations, based on the CIRAM model in order to avoid the conversion of these weaknesses into vulnerabilities and coverage from FRONTEX of the gaps in operational requirements and the timely design of operational actions to address emerging trends. This thesis may be extended in the future to other FRONTEX operations at land borders, not only at a national level but also to a comparative study of FRONTEX business data in third countries.

## 9. References

1. Alessandro, Politi. The Threat of Organised Crime in the Balkans., Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, May 2001, pp. 39-63
2. Batziou, Athanasia. Picturing Immigration: Photojournalistic Representation of Immigrants in Greek and Spanish Press. Bristol: Intellect, 2011 p39
3. Berry, Mike & Garcia-Blanco, Inaki & Moore, Kerry & Morani, Marina & Gross, Bernard & Askanius, Tina & Linné, Tobias. Press Coverage of the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in the EU: A Content Analysis of Five European Countries, 2015, p47
4. Dijk, Dominique van. "Is the EU policy on illegal immigration securitized? Yes Of Course! A study into the dynamics of institutionalized securitization," Paper presented at the 3rd Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, Istanbul, September 21-23, 2006
5. Fink, Melanie. "Frontex Working Arrangements: Legitimacy and Human Rights Concerns Regarding 'Technical Relationships.'" *Utrecht Journal of International and European Law* 28, no. 75, (2012): 22. <https://doi.org/10.5334/ujiel.be>.
6. Horii, Satoko. "The Effect of Frontex Risk Analysis on the European Border Controls." *European Politics and Society* 17, no. 2 (August 2016): 242–58. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2016.1121002>.
7. Jha, Chandan Kumar, Vijaya Gupta, Utpal Chattopadhyay, and Binilkumar Amarayil Sreeraman. "Migration as Adaptation Strategy to Cope with Climate Change." *International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management* 10, no. 1 (August 2018): 121–41. <https://doi.org/10.1108/ijccsm-03-2017-0059>.
8. Kaitatzi-Whitlock, Sophia, and Clio, Kenterelidou. (2017) "The Greek Paradigm on the Migrant and Refugee Crisis." *The Migrant Crisis: European Perspectives and National Discourses 2017*: 126 -137
9. Kiprianos, Pandelis. "Greek Policy towards Immigration and Immigrants." *Social Policy and Administration*. Accessed February 29, 2020: 148–164.
10. PĂTRU Alina Daniela, Spiru Haret " Considerations regarding cross-border crime and institutional cooperation *Journal of Law and Administrative Sciences* University of Bucharest, Romania.2015
11. Papageorgiou, Ioannis. "The Europeanization of Immigration and Asylum in Greece (1990-2012)." *International Journal of Sociology* 43, no. 3 (2013): 72–90. <https://doi.org/10.2753/ijcs0020-7659430304>.
12. Perkmann, Markus. "Cross-Border Regions in Europe." *European Urban and Regional Studies* 10, no. 2 (2003): 153–71. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0969776403010002004>.
13. Raphael, Beverly, and John Wilson. "Psychological Debriefing: Theory, Practice and Evidence - PDF Free Download." *epdf.pub*. EPDF.PUB. p1 Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://epdf.pub/psychological-debriefing-theory-practice-and-evidence.html>.
14. Schilde, Kaija. 2017. *The Political Economy of European Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108182492.



15. Tziampiris, Aristotle. "The Macedonian Name Dispute and European Union Accession." *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 12, no. 1 (2012): 153–71. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2012.661225>.
16. Αντωνοπούλου, Αθανασία. Σύγχρονες τάσεις αντεγκληματικής πολιτικής: η πολιτική της μηδενικής ανοχής και τα μέτρα διαχείρισης κρίσεων, Εκδόσεις Σακκουλα. σ 27-31
17. Ζάικος, Νικόλαος «Οι σχέσεις της Ελλάδας με την πρώην Γιουγκοσλαβική Δημοκρατία της Μακεδονίας από την άποψη του διεθνούς δικαίου», Η διασυνοριακή συνεργασία Ελλάδα – ΠΓΔΜ ως ζητούμενο, Γ. Κολιόπουλος – Κ. Χατζηκωνσταντίνου – Β. Γούναρης (Επιμ.), Θεσσαλονίκη: Επίκεντρο, 2008, σ. 245-299
18. Καλοφωλιάς, Κωνσταντίνος Π. Το Μεταναστευτικό Ζήτημα Στη Μεσόγειο: Ισπανία, Ιταλία, Ελλάδα. Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Μιχαήλ Σιδέρη, 2011.
19. Καρύδης, Βασίλης. Η ΕΓΚΛΗΜΑΤΙΚΟΤΗΤΑ ΤΩΝ ΜΕΤΑΝΑΣΤΩΝ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΛΛΑΔΑ ΖΗΤΗΜΑΤΑ ΘΕΩΡΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΑΝΤΕΓΚΛΗΜΑΤΙΚΗΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗΣ. Αθήνα: Παπαζήση, 1996.
20. Κωφός, Ευάγγελος. Η εκκρεμότητα για τη διαφορά στην ονομασία . Στο: Ε. Κωφός & Β. Βλασίδης, επιμ. Αθήνα -Σκόπια: Η Επτάχρονη Συμβίωση (1995-2002). Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Παπαζήση.2003
21. Λώλης, Βασίλης, and Νικόλαος Ευπολυτάς. "Ηρα Έμκε Πουλοπούλου, Η Μεταναστευτική Πρόκληση Εκδόσεις Παπαζήση, Αθήνα, 2007 - Κατερίνα Βασιλικού, Γυναικεία Μετανάστευση Και Ανθρώπινα Δικαιώματα: Μια Βιογραφική Έρευνα Για Τις Οικιακές Βοηθούς Από Τα Βαλκάνια.... Ακαδημία Αθηνών, Αθήνα, 2007." *Social Cohesion and Development* 4, no. 2 (2016). <https://doi.org/10.12681/scad.9547>.
22. Μιχάλης Χλέτσος, Θάνος Ντόκος, Σταύρος Γαβρόγλου, κ.ά. Μετανάστες και μετανάστευση, Οικονομικές, πολιτικές και κοινωνικές πτυχές, Εκδόσεις Πατάκη 2001
23. Μπάγκαβος Χρήστος, ΜΕΤΑΝΑΣΤΕΥΣΗ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΡΟΧΗ ΥΠΗΡΕΣΙΩΝ ΣΕ ΜΕΤΑΝΑΣΤΕΣ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΛΛΑΔΑ, ΚΕΝΤΡΟ ΕΠΑΓΓΕΛΜΑΤΙΚΗΣ ΚΑΤΑΡΤΙΣΗΣ ΤΟΥ ΙΝΣΤΙΤΟΥΤΟΥ ΕΡΓΑΣΙΑΣ ΤΗΣ ΓΣΕΕ, 2008.
24. Παπαδάκης Μιχαήλ, Τσίμπος Κλέων. Δημογραφικές επιδράσεις εξωτερικής μετανάστευσης κατά τη μεταπολεμική περίοδο (1955-1985) , στο Πρόγραμμα Ερευνών Αποδημίας Παλινοστήσης του Ελληνικού πληθυσμού, Εισαγωγική προσέγγιση, Τόμος Α΄. Εκδόσεις Γ. Γ. Απόδημου Ελληνισμού. Αθήνα 1990
25. Σπυροπούλου Γεωργία. και Χριστόπουλος Δημήτριος. Προσφυγικό: Θα τα καταφέρουμε»; Ένας απολογισμός διαχείρισης και προτάσεις διεξόδου, Αθήνα: Παπαζήση 2016,
26. Συλλογικό έργο, Πολιτικές Μετανάστευσης Και Στρατηγικές Ένταξης Η Περίπτωση Των Αλβανών Και Πολωνών Μεταναστών. Αθήνα: Πολιτικές μετανάστευσης και στρατηγικές ένταξης Η περίπτωση των Αλβανών και Πολωνών μεταναστών, 2003: 274 –276
27. Τρουμπέτα, Σεβαστή. Το προσφυγικό και μεταναστευτικό ζήτημα: διαβάσεις και μελέτες συνόρων, Αθήνα: Παπαζήση ,2012.

28. Τσιουλιανος Χ, (2008), Στρατηγικό Σχέδιο Ανάπτυξης Νομού Κιλκίς, Πανεπιστήμιο Θεσσαλίας.
29. Χλούπης Γεώργιος. Διασυνοριακό & υπερεθνικό οργανωμένο έγκλημα. Αθήνα: Νομική Βιβλιοθήκη, 2005.
30. “ΕΙΔΟΜΕΝΗ ΤΟΠΟΓΡΑΦΙΚΑ ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΑ.” Ειδομένη. Accessed February 28, 2020. <http://www.idomeni.gr/>.
31. “70 Years of the 1949 Geneva Conventions – a Success Story of Multilateralism.” House of Switzerland, September 9, 2019. <https://www.houseofswitzerland.org/swissstories/history/70-years-1949-geneva-conventions-success-story-multilateralism>.
32. “Asylum Shopping.” Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, October 11, 2019. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asylum\\_shopping](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asylum_shopping).
33. “Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model: a Comprehensive Update: Version 2.0.” CIRAM. Warsaw: FRONTEX, 2012. <https://frontex.europa.eu/intelligence/ciram/>.
34. “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.” OHCHR. Article 1. Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/statusofrefugees.aspx>.
35. “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.” Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, January 29, 2020. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convention\\_Relating\\_to\\_the\\_Status\\_of\\_Refugees](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convention_Relating_to_the_Status_of_Refugees).
36. “Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment between Persons Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin.” Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eudr/2000/43/adopted>.

37. "Croatia Discusses Illegal Migration with Albania and Montenegro." Total Croatia News, January 23, 2019. <https://www.total-croatia-news.com/politics/33716-illegal-migration>.
38. "Early Warning Europe Provides Free, Impartial and Confidential Counselling to Companies in Distress." Early warning. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://www.earlywarningeurope.eu/>.
39. "Erstes Menü." Moving Europe, July 14, 1970. <http://moving-europe.org/the-balkan-corridor-a-retrospective-on-migration-struggles-and-state-repression/>.
40. "EU Civil Protection Mechanism." European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations - European Commission, February 21, 2020. [https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/civil-protection/mechanism\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/civil-protection/mechanism_en).
41. "EU Support to Greece: 'Operation POSEIDON' Follows up on the RABIT Mission." Migration and Home Affairs - European Commission, December 6, 2016. [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/2011/20110302\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/2011/20110302_en).
42. "European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX)." Migration and Home Affairs - European Commission, July 8, 2019. [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/e-library/glossary/european-agency-management\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/e-library/glossary/european-agency-management_en).
43. "European Migrant Crisis." Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, February 28, 2020. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European\\_migrant\\_crisis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_migrant_crisis).
44. "European Union Action Plan to Combat Terrorism – Update of the Roadmap." COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, November 14, 2002. [https://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST\\_13909\\_2002\\_REV\\_1](https://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST_13909_2002_REV_1).
45. "Europol Review, 2016 - 2017." Europol, January 31, 2018. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/europol-review-2016-2017>.
46. "EU's Frontex Agency to Help Guard Greece-Macedonia Border." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, December 3, 2015. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-greece-frontex/eus-frontex-agency-to-help-guard-greece-macedonia-border-idUSKBN0TM2B120151203>.
47. "Examining the Links between Organised Crime and Corruption." Trends in Organized Crime 13, no. 4 (July 2010): 326–59. Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-010-9113-x>.
48. "Exploring Tomorrow's Organised Crime." Europol, October 18, 2016. Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/exploring-tomorrow's-organised-crime>.
49. "Forgery of Administrative Documents and Trafficking Therein." Europol. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/crime-areas-and-trends/crime-areas/forgery-of-administrative-documents-and-trafficking-therein>.
50. "Frontex to Deploy 175 Specialist Border Personnel to Greece." News Release. Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-to-deploy-175-specialist-border-personnel-to-greece-9neidF>.
51. "Global Approach to Migration and Mobility." Migration and Home Affairs - European Commission, December 6, 2016. [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/global-approach-to-migration\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/global-approach-to-migration_en).

52. “Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in European Commission External Cooperation, European Commission, November 2010.” 1. Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in European Commission External Cooperation, European Commission, November 2010 | Capacity4dev. Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/ibm-eap/document/1-guidelines-integrated-border-management-european-commission-external-cooperation-european>.
53. “Hawala.” Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, February 27, 2020. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hawala>.
54. “Immigration Policy: Fact Sheets on the European Union: European Parliament.” Fact Sheets on the European Union | European Parliament. Accessed February 28, 2020. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/152/immigration-policy>.
55. “Immigration.” Migration and Home Affairs - European Commission, July 12, 2019. [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european\\_migration\\_network/glossary\\_search/immigration\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary_search/immigration_en).
56. “Interim Accord between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia | UN Peacemaker.” United Nations. United Nations. Article 3. Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://peacemaker.un.org/greecefyrom-interimaccord95>.
57. “INTERPOL Report on Migrant Smuggling Networks.” Europol, October 5, 2016. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/europol-interpol-report-migrant-smuggling-networks>.
58. “Joint Operation RABIT 2010 – ‘Joint Operation RABIT 2010’ – FRONTEX Assistance to Greece’s border with Turkey: Revealing the Deficiencies of Europe’s Dublin Asylum System. CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe, November 2010
59. “Law 2910/2001 Entry and Stay of Aliens in Greek Territory.” European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, December 6, 2019. <https://fra.europa.eu/en/law-reference/law-29102001-entry-and-stay-aliens-greek-territory>.
60. “Law 3838/2010 ‘Current Provisions for Greek Citizenship and Political Participation of Repatriated Greeks and Lawfully Resident Immigrants and Other Adjustments’.” European Web Site on Integration. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/law-3838/2010-current-provisions-for-greek-citizenship-and-political-participation-of-repatriated-greeks-and-lawfully-resident-immigrants-and-other-adjustments>.
61. “Lex Access to European Union Law. Establishing the Community Customs Code.” EUR. Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:31992R2913>.
62. “Lex Access to European Union Law. The prevention and control of organised crime: a European Union strategy for the beginning of the new millennium”. *OJ C 124, 3.5.2000, p. 1–33* EUR. Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32000F0503>.
63. “Lex Access to European Union Law.’ COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE

- COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Delivering an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice for Europe's Citizens Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme.” EUR. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0171:FIN:EN:PDF>.
64. “Lex Access to European Union Law.” EUR. Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC. Accessed March 5, 2020. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016R1624>.
65. “Lex Access to European Union Law.” EUR. THE MAASTRICHT AND AMSTERDAM TREATIES February 28, 2020. [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU\\_1.1.3.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_1.1.3.pdf)
66. “Lex Access to European Union Law.” EUR. The Schengen acquis - Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders Accessed February 28, 2020. [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:42000A0922\\_\(02\)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:42000A0922_(02)).
67. “Lex Access to European Union Law.” EUR. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts accessed February 28, 2020. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:11997D/TXT>.
68. “Lex Access to European Union Law.” EUR. Treaty of Maastricht on European Union February 28, 2020. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:xy0026>
69. “Lex Access to European Union Law.” EUR. ΕΚΘΕΣΗ σχετικά με την εφαρμογή της οδηγίας 2000/43/ΕΚ της 29ης Ιουνίου 2000 περί εφαρμογής της αρχής της ίσης μεταχείρισης προσώπων ασχέτως φυλετικής ή εθνοτικής τους καταγωγής (6.7.2007) February 28, 2020. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A6-2007-0278+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EL>
70. “Lex Access to European Union Law.” EUR. ΟΔΗΓΙΑ 2000/43/ΕΚ ΤΟΥ ΣΥΜΒΟΥΛΙΟΥ της 29ης Ιουνίου 2000 περί εφαρμογής της αρχής της ίσης μεταχείρισης προσώπων ασχέτως φυλετικής ή εθνοτικής τους καταγωγής February 28, 2020. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EL/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32000L0043&from=EN>
71. “Lex Access to European Union Law.” EUR. Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) Accessed March 5, 2020. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32006R0562>.
72. “Lex Access to European Union Law. Council Decision of 8 November 2007 on the Conclusion of the Agreement between the European Community and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the Readmission of Persons

- Residing without Authorisation.” EUR. Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32007D0817>.
73. “Lex Access to European Union Law.Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the Right to Family Reunification.” EUR. Accessed February 28, 2020. <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2003/86/oj>.
  74. “Lex Access to European Union Law.Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and Amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC.” EUR. Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016R1624>.
  75. “Lex Access to European Union Law.Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust), and Replacing and Repealing Council Decision 2002/187/JHA.” EUR. Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32018R1727>.
  76. “Lex.europa.EU Integration of Biometric Features in Passports and Travel Documents. SUMMARY OF: Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 on Standards for Security Features and Biometrics in Passports and Travel Documents Issued by EU Countries .” EUR. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:114154>.
  77. “Macedonia Naming Dispute.” Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, February 22, 2020. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macedonia\\_naming\\_dispute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macedonia_naming_dispute).
  78. “Map of the Schengen Area, Europe's Border-Free Travel Zone.” Political Geography Now. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://www.polgeonow.com/2016/03/what-is-schengen-list-countries-map.html>.
  79. “Parliamentary Assembly.A European Migration Observatory / Agency.” PACE - Doc. 10108 (2004) - A European Migration Observatory / Agency. Accessed March 1, 2020. <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-DocDetails-EN.asp?FileID=10470&lang=EN>.
  80. “Personal Envoy Greece - the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia | Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs.” United Nations. United Nations. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://dppa.un.org/en/mission/personal-envoy-greece-former-yugoslav-republic-of-macedonia>.
  81. “Police Cooperation: Fact Sheets on the European Union: European Parliament.” Fact Sheets on the European Union | European Parliament. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/156/police-cooperation>.
  82. “Press Corner EU Delivers on Stronger European Border and Coast Guard to Support Member States.” European Commission - European Commission. Accessed February 28, 2020. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement\\_19\\_6237](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_19_6237).
  83. “Press Corner. Presidency Conclusions Seville European Council 21 and 22 June 2002.” European Commission - European Commission. Accessed March 9, 2020. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/DOC\\_02\\_13](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/DOC_02_13).

84. "Press Corner. Refugee Crisis: Greece Activates EU Civil Protection Mechanism, Agrees on Frontex Operation at Border with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Triggers RABIT Mechanism." European Commission - European Commission. Accessed February 28, 2020. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP\\_15\\_6249](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_15_6249).
85. "Press Corner." European Commission - European Commission. European Border and Coast Guard: The Commission welcomes agreement on a standing corps of 10,000 border guards by 2027. Accessed February 28, 2020. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP\\_19\\_1929](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_1929)
86. "Press Corner." European Commission - European Commission. Presidency Conclusions European Council meeting in Laeken 14 and 15 December 2001
87. "Press Corner." European Commission - European Commission. Presidency Conclusions European Council meeting in Laeken 14 and 15 December 2001. Accessed March 5, 2020. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/DOC\\_01\\_18](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/DOC_01_18).
88. "Press Corner." European Commission - European Commission. 2768th Council Meeting Justice and Home Affairs Brussels, 4-5 December 2006. Accessed February 29, 2020. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES\\_06\\_341](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_06_341)
89. "Refugee in Orbit." Migration and Home Affairs - European Commission, July 12, 2019. [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/content/refugee-orbit\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/content/refugee-orbit_en).
90. "Risk Analysis for 2018." Publications. Accessed March 5, 2020. <https://frontex.europa.eu/publications/risk-analysis-for-2018-aJ5nJu>.
91. "Root Causes of Migration." Justice for Immigrants, March 15, 2017. <https://justiceforimmigrants.org/what-we-are-working-on/immigration/root-causes-of-migration/>.
92. "Safe House." Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, December 18, 2019. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Safe\\_house](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Safe_house).
93. "Situation at External Border." The situation at External Border. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://frontex.europa.eu/faq/situation-at-external-border/>.
94. "Statewatch Briefing - Frontex: Cooperation with the Non-EU States." Frontex. Accessed February 29, 2020. <http://www.frontexit.org/en/news/item/851-statewatch-briefing-frontex-cooperation-with-non-eu-states>.
95. "Suspect Arrested in Greece for Large-Scale Document Forgery." Europol, September 1, 2019. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/suspect-arrested-in-greece-for-large-scale-document-forgery>.
96. "The Hague Programme: 10 priorities for the next five years. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=LEGISSUM:116002&from=EL>.
97. "The Issue of the Name of North Macedonia Historical Background." mfa.gr. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://www.mfa.gr/en/the-question-of-the-name-of-the-republic-of-north/>.
98. "The Presidential Decree 81/2009 Amending the Asylum Procedure ." The new Presidential Decree 81/2009 amending the asylum procedure. Accessed February 29, 2020. [https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:ZACPfXby\\_gkJ:https://](https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:ZACPfXby_gkJ:https://)

- /www.amnesty.gr/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/Greek-Asylum Procedure.doc+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=gr&client=firefox-b-e.
99. “Thessaloniki–Alexandroupoli Railway.” Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, November 28, 2019. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thessaloniki–Alexandroupoli\\_railway](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thessaloniki–Alexandroupoli_railway).
  100. “United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.” Drug money and opiate trafficking on the Balkan route, the focus of the new UNODC report. Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2015/November/drug-money-and-opiate-trafficking-on-the-balkan-route--focus-of-new-unodc-report.html>.
  101. “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” United Nations. United Nations. Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/>.
  102. “Updated Schengen Catalogue on External Borders Control, Readmission and Removal - 2nd Draft.” Updated Schengen catalogue on External Borders Control, Readmission and Removal - 2nd draft - EU monitor. Accessed March 5, 2020. <https://www.eumonitor.nl/9353000/1/j9vvik7m1c3gyxp/vi869j18irzk>.
  103. “Updated Schengen Catalogue on External Borders Control, Readmission and Removal - 2nd Draft.” Updated Schengen catalogue on External Borders Control, Readmission and Removal - 2nd draft - EU monitor. Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://www.eumonitor.nl/9353000/1/j9vvik7m1c3gyxp/vi869j18irzk>.
  104. “Web-Administrator. “26-04-2012.Στήριξη Από Ευρ. Επιτροπή, Φρόντεξ Και Ευρ. Γραφείο Ασύλου Στην Ελληνική Πολιτική Για Την Παράνομη Μετανάστευση, Στο Σημερινό Συμβούλιο Υπουργών Δικαιοσύνης Και Εσωτερικών Υποθέσεων Στο Λουξεμβούργο .” Accessed February 28, 2020. [http://www.minocp.gov.gr/index.php?option=ozo\\_content&perform=view&id=4237&Itemid=540&lang=](http://www.minocp.gov.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&perform=view&id=4237&Itemid=540&lang=).
  105. “Απάντηση Υπουργού Εξωτερικού ,” n.d. <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/67715b2c-ec81-4f0c-ad6a-476a34d732bd/8134194.pdf>.
  106. “Διαχείριση Των Εξωτερικών Συνόρων: Θεματολογικά Δελτία Για Την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση: Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο.” Θεματολογικά δελτία για την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση | Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/el/sheet/153>.
  107. “Διαχείριση Των Εξωτερικών Συνόρων: Θεματολογικά Δελτία Για Την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση: Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο.” Θεματολογικά δελτία για την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση | Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/el/sheet/153>.
  108. “Εκθεση Συντονιστικού Οργάνου Δίωξης Ναρκωτικών (Σ.Ο.Δ.Ν.) Και Εθνικής Μονάδας Πληροφοριών (Ε.Μ.Π) Έτους 2018.” Accessed February 29, 2020. <http://www.hcg.gr/node/21657>.
  109. “Μνημόνιο Συνεργασίας Ελλάδας - Frontex, Για Την Αντιμετώπιση Των Παράνομων Μεταναστευτικών Ροών Και Την Επιτήρηση Των Συνόρων.” Under construction. Accessed February 29, 2020. <http://www.hcg.gr/node/2517>.
  110. “Νόμος 2622/1998 - ΦΕΚ 138/Α/25-6-1998 (Κωδικοποιημένος).” e. Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://www.e-nomothesia.gr/kat-astynomikos-astynomia/kat-astyn-eidikoi-frouoi-synoriakoi-fylakes/n-2622-1998.html>.



111. “Νόμος 2865/2000 - ΦΕΚ 271/Α/19-12-2000.” e. Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://www.e-nomothesia.gr/kat-egklema-organomeno/nomos-2865-2000-phek-271-a-19-12-2000.html>.
112. “Νόμος 2928/2001 - ΦΕΚ 141/Α/27-6-2001 (Κωδικοποιημένος).” e. Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://www.e-nomothesia.gr/kat-egklema-organomeno/n-2928-2001.html>.
113. “Νόμος 3386/2005.Είσοδος, Διαμονή Και Κοινωνική Ένταξη Υπηκόων Τρίτων Χωρών Στην Ελληνική Επικράτεια.” Taxheaven. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://www.taxheaven.gr/law/3386/2005>.
114. “Νόμος 3902/2010 - ΦΕΚ 216/Α/23-12-2010.” e. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://www.e-nomothesia.gr/diethneis-sunthekes/n-3902-2010.html>.
115. “Νόμος 4251/2014 - ΦΕΚ 80/Α/1-4-2014 (Κωδικοποιημένος).” e. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://www.e-nomothesia.gr/kat-allodapoi/n-4251-2014.html>.  
[https://www.mfa.gr/images/docs/ethnikes\\_theoriseis/2015/metanast.pdf](https://www.mfa.gr/images/docs/ethnikes_theoriseis/2015/metanast.pdf)
116. “Νόμος 4636/2019 - ΦΕΚ 169/Α/1-11-2019.” e. Accessed March 2, 2020. <https://www.e-nomothesia.gr/kat-allodapoi/prosphuges-politiko-asulo/nomos-4636-2019-phek-169a-1-11-2019.html>.
117. “ΟΙ ΠΕΡΙΠΕΤΕΙΕΣ ΤΗΣ ΜΕΤΑΝΑΣΤΕΥΤΙΚΗΣ ΜΑΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗΣ (Περιοδικό ΕΠΙΚΑΙΡΑ, Τ.18, 18/2/2010).” Προκόπης Παυλόπουλος. Accessed February 28, 2020. [http://ppavlopoulos.gr/index3aea.html?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=84:2010-02-18-18&catid=36:2010-05-06-13-06-22&Itemid=61](http://ppavlopoulos.gr/index3aea.html?option=com_content&view=article&id=84:2010-02-18-18&catid=36:2010-05-06-13-06-22&Itemid=61).
118. “Συνάντηση Αξιολόγησης Και Προγραμματισμού Της Μικτής Ευρωπαϊκής Επιχείρησης " ΠΟΣΕΙΔΩΝ - Θαλάσσια Σύνορα ".” Under construction. Accessed March 5, 2020. <http://www.hcg.gr/node/11722>.
119. “Τεύχος ΕΑ\_1991-02-0000.” Police magazine.gr. Made with Flipping Book, February 1991. [https://www.policemagazine.gr/sites/default/files/pdf/EA\\_1991-02-0000/index.html](https://www.policemagazine.gr/sites/default/files/pdf/EA_1991-02-0000/index.html).
120. ” Europol. Accessed March 2, 2020. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/>. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/top-story/press-conference-at-the-conclusion-of-the-quadrilateral-meeting-of-greece-albania-bulgaria-and-fyrom-in-thessaloniki-on-cross-border-cooperation-22-april-2016.html>.
121. Aftodioikisi, and Aftodioikisi Publisher. “Κιλκίς: Μετέφερε Με Τρέιλερ Σάκουσ Γεμάτους Ναρκωτικά.” Aftodioikisi.gr, March 4, 2019. <https://www.aftodioikisi.gr/koinonia/kilkis-metefere-me-treiler-sakoys-gematoys-narkotika/>.
122. Antoaneta.seitz. “United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.” UNODC and Organized Crime. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/intro.html>.
123. Bundeskriminalamt, Organised Crime Situation Report 2003 Federal Republic of Germany: Summary, Wiesbaden, GER: Bundeskriminalamt, 2004.
124. Christidis, Yorgos, and Panagiotis Paschalidis. “ELIAMEP's Research on the Bilateral Cooperation between Athens and Skopje in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs (Police).” ΕΛΙΑΜΕΠ, January 22, 2019.

- <https://www.eliamep.gr/en/publication/έρευνα-του-ελιαμεπ-για-τη-διμερή-συνερ/>.
125. Cnn. “Δύο Αυτοκτονίες Προσφύγων Στο Κιλκίς.” CNN.gr, December 26, 2019. <https://www.cnn.gr/news/ellada/story/202049/dyo-aytoktonies-prosfygonsto-kilkis>.
  126. Coelho, Carlos. “Schengen: What Issues Affect the Border-Free Zone?: News: European Parliament.” Schengen: what issues affect the border-free zone? | News | European Parliament, May 29, 2018. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/eu-affairs/20180525STO04311/schengen-what-issues-affect-the-border-free-zone>.
  127. Coelho, Carlos. “Schengen: What Issues Affect the Border-Free Zone?: News: European Parliament.” Schengen: what issues affect the border-free zone? | News | European Parliament, May 29, 2018. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/eu-affairs/20180525STO04311/schengen-what-issues-affect-the-border-free-zone>.
  128. Commission, European. “Refugee Crisis: Greece Activates EU Civil Protection Mechanism, Agrees Frontex Operation at Border with Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Triggers RABIT Mechanism.” New Europe, December 3, 2015. <https://www.neweurope.eu/wires/refugee-crisis-greece-activates-eu-civil-protection-mechanism-agrees-frontex-operation-at-border-with-former-yugoslav-republic-of-macedonia-and-triggers-rabit-mechanism/>.
  129. DECISION No 574/2007/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing the External Borders Fund for the period 2007 to 2013 as part of the General programme ‘Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows’. Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2011/EN/1-2011-448-EN-F1-1.Pdf>
  130. EU Asylum Reform.” Consilium, April 15, 2019. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/migratory-pressures/ceas-reform/>.
  131. EU Drug Markets Report 2019, November 1, 2019. [http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/joint-publications/eu-drug-markets-report-2019\\_en](http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/joint-publications/eu-drug-markets-report-2019_en).
  132. European Commission. The Annex to Commission Decision No C(2010) 1620 establishing the Handbook for the processing of visa applications and the modification of issued visas. Accessed February 29, 2020 <https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/3/2010/EN/3-2010-1620-EN-F1-1.PDF>
  133. European Commission. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The application of the criteria for the distribution of resources among the member states under the External Borders Fund, the European Fund for the Integration of third-country nationals and the European Return Fund. COM(2011) 448 final, 20 July.
  134. European Commission, “Schengen Information System.” Migration and Home Affairs - European Commission, December 6, 2016. [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen-information-system\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen-information-system_en).

135. European Commission “Common European Asylum System.” Migration and Home Affairs - European Commission, December 6, 2016.  
[https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum_en).
136. European Parliament, Report on the Proposal of a Council Framework Decision on the Fight against Organised Crime. Accessed February 29, 2020, <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201206/20120627ATT47779/20120627ATT47779EN.pdf>
137. Final Agreement for the Settlement of the Differences as Described in the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 817 (1993) and 845 (1993), the Termination of the Interim Accord of 1995, and the Establishment of a Strategic Partnership Between the Parties, June 17, 2018, Accessed February 22, 2020.  
<https://www.un.org/pga/73/wp-content/uploads/sites/53/2019/02/14-February-Letter-dated-14-February-2019.pdf> [hereinafter Prespa Agreement].
138. Frontex and Greece agree on an operational plan for Poseidon Rapid Intervention. Accessed March 5, 2020. <https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-and-greece-agree-on-operational-plan-for-poseidon-rapid-intervention-yiSxga>.
139. FRONTEX launches first operation in Western Balkans. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-launches-first-operation-in-western-balkans-znTNWM>.
140. FRONTEX Assistance to Greeces Border with Turkey Revealing the Deficiencies of Europes Dublin Asylum System CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe Accessed February 29, 2020. [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/48665031\\_Joint\\_Operation\\_RABIT\\_2010\\_-\\_FRONTEX\\_Assistance\\_to\\_Greeces\\_Border\\_with\\_Turkey\\_Revealing\\_the\\_Deficiencies\\_of\\_Europes\\_Dublin\\_Asylum\\_System\\_CEPS\\_Liberty\\_and\\_Security\\_in\\_Europe\\_November\\_2010](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/48665031_Joint_Operation_RABIT_2010_-_FRONTEX_Assistance_to_Greeces_Border_with_Turkey_Revealing_the_Deficiencies_of_Europes_Dublin_Asylum_System_CEPS_Liberty_and_Security_in_Europe_November_2010).
141. Frontex` Single Programming Document 2016 -2019 Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://euagenda.eu/upload/publications/untitled-6302-ea.pdf>
142. Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in the Western Balkans 2006. Accessed February 29, 2020. <https://shtetiweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/L2-National-Strategy-on-Integrated-Border-Management-its-Action-Plan-2006-2010.pdf>
143. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3433488/5285137/KS-SF-07-110-EN.PDF/c95cc2ce-b50c-498e-95fb-cd507ef29e27>
144. <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/67715b2c-ec81-4f0c-ad6a-476a34d732bd/10525986.pdf>
145. Kilkis (Regional Unit).” Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, March 1, 2020. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kilkis\\_\(regional\\_unit\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kilkis_(regional_unit)).
146. Lex Access to European Union Law.” EUR. Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC. Accessed February 28,

2020. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016R1624>.
147. Lex Access to European Union Law.” EUR. Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC. Accessed March 5, 2020. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016R1624>.
148. McAuliffe, M. (2016). Migrant Smuggling Data and Research: A global review of the emerging evidence base. International Organization for Migration: [https://publications.iom.int/system/files/smuggling\\_report.pdf](https://publications.iom.int/system/files/smuggling_report.pdf)[https://www.academia.edu/16726532/Greek\\_Policy\\_towards\\_Immigration\\_and\\_Immigrants](https://www.academia.edu/16726532/Greek_Policy_towards_Immigration_and_Immigrants).
149. McAuliffe, M. (2016). Migrant Smuggling Data and Research: A global review of the emerging evidence base. International Organization for Migration: [https://publications.iom.int/system/files/smuggling\\_report.pdf](https://publications.iom.int/system/files/smuggling_report.pdf)
150. minocp.gov.gr. Accessed February 28, 2020. [http://www.minocp.gov.gr/asylo.php?option=ozo\\_content&perform=view&id=3780&Itemid=465&lang=EN](http://www.minocp.gov.gr/asylo.php?option=ozo_content&perform=view&id=3780&Itemid=465&lang=EN).
151. News Release. Frontex and Greece agree on an operational plan for Poseidon Rapid Intervention, Accessed March 5, 2020. <https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-and-greece-agree-on-operational-plan-for-poseidon-rapid-intervention-yiSxga>.
152. Newsroom. “Ζάεφ: Παγώνει Τη Συμφωνία Των Πρεσπών Μετά Το ‘Όχι’ Της ΕΕ.” Economistas.gr. Accessed February 28, 2020. [https://www.economistas.gr/diethni/20935\\_zaef-pagonei-ti-symfonia-ton-prespon-meta-ohi-tis-ee](https://www.economistas.gr/diethni/20935_zaef-pagonei-ti-symfonia-ton-prespon-meta-ohi-tis-ee).
153. Newsroom. “Τσίπρας Στο Οικονομικό Φόρουμ Δελφών: Η Συμφωνία Των Πρεσπών Ορόσημο Για Τα Βαλκάνια.” Έθνος, March 1, 2019. [https://www.ethnos.gr/politiki/24520\\_tsipras-sto-oikonomiko-foroym-delfon-i-symfonia-ton-prespon-orosimo-gia-ta-balkania](https://www.ethnos.gr/politiki/24520_tsipras-sto-oikonomiko-foroym-delfon-i-symfonia-ton-prespon-orosimo-gia-ta-balkania).
154. Noden, Aran. “Frontex Signs Border Security Co-Operation Agreement with Macedonia.” Government Europa, July 19, 2018. <https://www.governmenteuropa.eu/frontex-co-operation-agreement-with-macedonia/89487/>.
155. Nordic Council of Ministers, and Unesda. “Eastern EU States Want Migration 'Plan B'.” EU observer. Accessed March 5, 2020. <https://euobserver.com/migration/132277>.
156. Nordic Council of Ministers, and Unesda. “Eight Member States Urge EU Action on Migration.” EU observer. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://euobserver.com/justice/22503>.
157. Peers, Steve. “The Future of the Schengen System.” Academia.edu - Share research. Accessed February 28, 2020. [https://www.academia.edu/14966170/The\\_Future\\_of\\_the\\_Schengen\\_System](https://www.academia.edu/14966170/The_Future_of_the_Schengen_System).

158. Press conference at the conclusion of the Quadrilateral Meeting of Greece, Albania, Bulgaria and FYROM, in Thessaloniki, on cross-border cooperation (22 April 2016)
159. Press Corner.Cecilia Malmström, European Commissioner for Home Affairs, Announces the Deployment of the Frontex RABIT Teams in Greece as of 2 November.” European Commission - European Commission. Accessed February 28, 2020.  
[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO\\_10\\_531](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_10_531).
160. Smith, Cindy J., Sheldon X. Zhang, and Rosemary Barberet. “Routledge Handbook of International Criminology.” Taylor & Francis. Taylor & Francis, May 3, 2011. p 212<https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203864708>.
161. Smith, Dwight C. “Wickersham to Sutherland to Katzenbach: Evolving an ‘Official’ Definition for Organized Crime.” Crime, Law and Social Change. Kluwer Academic Publishers, September 1, 1991.p 135–154.  
<https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00227546>.
162. STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Interim Evaluation of the Internal Security Fund - Police Accompanying the document Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on interim evaluation of the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund and the Internal Security Fund. Accessed March 5, 2020.  
[https://www.eu.dk/samling/20181/kommissionsforslag/kom\(2018,\)0464/kommissionsforslag/1496963/1909127/index.htm](https://www.eu.dk/samling/20181/kommissionsforslag/kom(2018,)0464/kommissionsforslag/1496963/1909127/index.htm).
163. Tampere European Council 15-16.10.1999: Conclusions of the Presidency - European Council Tampere 15-16.10.1999: Conclusions of the Presidency, November 16, 1999. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam\\_en.html](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.html).
164. The European Union: Ongoing Challenges and Future Prospects, Congressional Research Service. Accessed February 29, 2020, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44249.pdf>
165. The European Union: Ongoing Challenges and Future Prospects, Congressional Research Service. Accessed February 29, 2020
166. The Treaty of Lisbon: Fact Sheets on the European Union: European Parliament.” Fact Sheets on the European Union | European Parliament. Accessed February 28, 2020.  
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/5/the-treaty-of-lisbon>.
167. Triandafyllidou, Anna. “Greek Immigration Policy at the Turn of the 21st Century. Lack of Political Will or Purposeful Mismanagement?” European Journal of Migration and Law 11, no. 2 (2009): 159–77.  
<https://doi.org/10.1163/157181609x440013>.
168. Triandafyllidou, Anna. “Migration in Greece at a Glance.” EΛIAMEΠ, October 9, 2005. <https://www.eliamep.gr/en/publication/migration-in-greece-at-a-glance/>.
169. Union, Council Of The European. “Report on the Implementation of Programmes, Ad Hoc Centres, Pilot Projects and Joint Operations.” Cultures & Conflits, no. 50 (2003): 169–93. <https://doi.org/10.4000/conflits.952>.
170. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Global Education Monitoring Report (2017) Think piece prepared for the 2019 Global

- Education Monitoring Report. Accessed February 29, 2020 Consultation, Migration and education. <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000265866>
171. United Nations. “Greece: Law No. 3907 of 2011 on the Establishment of an Asylum Service and a First Reception Service, Transposition into Greek Legislation of Directive 2008/115/EC ‘on Common Standards and Procedures in Member States for Returning Illegally Staying Third Country Nationals’ and Other Provisions.” Refworld. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4da6ee7e2.html>.
172. United Nations. “Greece: Law No. 3907 of 2011 on the Establishment of an Asylum Service and a First Reception Service, Transposition into Greek Legislation of Directive 2008/115/EC ‘on Common Standards and Procedures in Member States for Returning Illegally Staying Third Country Nationals’ and Other Provisions.” Refworld. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4da6ee7e2.html>.
173. United Nations. “Plan for the Management of the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union.” Refworld. Accessed March 5, 2020. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3f4e3c51d.html>.
174. United Nations. “Total Number of Syrian Refugees Exceeds Four Million for First Time.” UNHCR. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2015/7/559d67d46/unhcr-total-number-syrian-refugees-exceeds-four-million-first-time.html>.
175. UNODC, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME AND THE PROTOCOLS THERETO, 2004 p 5 Accessed February 29, 2020 [https://www.unodc.org/documents/middleeastandnorthafrica/organised-crime/UNITED\\_NATIONS\\_CONVENTION\\_AGAINST\\_TRANSNATIONAL\\_ORGANIZED\\_CRIME\\_AND\\_THE\\_PROTOCOLS\\_THERETO.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/middleeastandnorthafrica/organised-crime/UNITED_NATIONS_CONVENTION_AGAINST_TRANSNATIONAL_ORGANIZED_CRIME_AND_THE_PROTOCOLS_THERETO.pdf)
176. Visa Policy of North Macedonia.” Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, January 29, 2020. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visa\\_policy\\_of\\_North\\_Macedonia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visa_policy_of_North_Macedonia).
177. Voria.gr. “ΤΣΙΠΡΑΣ ΑΠΟ ΔΕΛΦΟΥΣ: ΙΔΡΥΕΤΑΙ ΑΝΩΤΑΤΟ ΣΥΜΒΟΥΛΙΟ ΕΛΛΑΔΑΣ-Β. ΜΑΚΕΔΟΝΙΑΣ.” Τσίπρας από Δελφούς: Ιδρύεται Ανώτατο Συμβούλιο Ελλάδας-Β. Μακεδονίας, March 1, 2019. <https://www.voria.gr/article/tsipras-apo-delfous-idriete-anotato-simvoulio-elladas-v-makedonias>.
178. Αναγκαστικός Νόμος 389/1968.” Lawspot, January 29, 2018. <https://www.lawspot.gr/nomikes-plirofories/nomothesia/anagkastikos-nomos-389-1968>.
179. Απογραφή ενός Αιώνα. Accessed February 28, 2020. <http://idomeni.gr/apografi/index.html>.
180. Ένωση Εισαγγελέων, and Ένωση Εισαγγελέων. “Ένωση Εισαγγελέων, Πορίσματα Συνεδρίου .” Ένωση Εισαγγελέων, November 18, 2008. <http://enosieisaggeleon.gr/πορίσματα-συνεδρίου/>.
181. Επιχείρηση "Σάρισα". Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://www.zougla.gr/greece/article/epixirisi-sarisa-gia-tous-metanastes>.
182. Ευγενίου, Μαρία. “Παράτυποι Μετανάστες Και Κοινωνική Ενσωμάτωση: ο Ρόλος Των Κέντρων Υποδοχής Στην Πορεία Για Την Ένταξη Στην Ελληνική Κοινωνία.” Handle Proxy. Πάντειο Πανεπιστήμιο Κοινωνικών και Πολιτικών

- Επιστημών. Σχολή Πολιτικών Επιστημών. Τμήμα Κοινωνικής Πολιτικής, January 1, 1970. σ 6 <http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/44226>.
183. Κωτούλας, Ι “Η Αντισυνταγματικότητα Του Ν. 3838/2010 Για Την Ιθαγένεια Και Το Νέο Πλαίσιο.” Ειδήσεις - νέα - Το Βήμα Online, February 18, 2013. <https://www.tovima.gr/2013/02/18/opinions/i-antisynatmatikotita-toy-n-3838-2010-gia-tin-ithageneia-kai-to-neo-plaisio/>.
184. Μεζαρλή Χ “ΤΟ ΠΡΟΦΙΛ ΤΩΝ ΑΛΛΟΔΑΠΩΝ ΠΟΥ ΦΤΑΝΟΥΝ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΙΔΟΜΕΝΗ ΑΠΟ ΤΟ ΣΕΠΤΕΜΒΡΙΟ 2013 ΕΩΣ ΤΟΝ ΙΟΥΛΙΟ 2015: ΜΙΑ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΛΟΓΙΚΗ ΠΡΟΣΕΓΓΙΣΗ,” 2016. <https://dspace.lib.uom.gr/bitstream/2159/19461/6/MezarliCharikleiaMsc2016.pdf>.
185. Οργανογραμμα Ελληνικής Αστυνομίας. Photograph. Astynomia.gr. HELLENIC POLICE. Accessed February 29, 2020. [http://www.astynomia.gr/images/stories//2015/organogramma\\_en.png](http://www.astynomia.gr/images/stories//2015/organogramma_en.png).
186. Προεδρικό Διάταγμα 17/2017 - ΦΕΚ 29/Α/6-3-2017.” e. Accessed February 28, 2020. <https://www.e-nomothesia.gr/kat-ekklesia-thriskeia/proedriko-diatagma-17-2017-phek-29a-6-3-2017.html>.
187. Σιδηροδρομική Γραμμή Σκοπίων - Θεσσαλονίκης.” Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, April 13, 2019. [https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/Σιδηροδρομική\\_γραμμή\\_Σκοπίων\\_-\\_Θεσσαλονίκης](https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/Σιδηροδρομική_γραμμή_Σκοπίων_-_Θεσσαλονίκης).
188. Συζητήσεις - Τρίτη 1 Ιουλίου 2003 - Ελληνική Προεδρία. Accessed February 28, 2020. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20030701+ITEM-001+DOC+XML+V0//EL>.
189. ΤΑΞΙΔΙΑ ΑΠΕΛΠΙΣΙΑΣ ΙΑΝΟΥΑΡΙΟΣ – ΣΕΠΤΕΜΒΡΙΟΣ 2019 , UNHCR REPORT 2019. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/71726>
190. Bbc.com Migrant crisis: Hundreds cross from Greece into Macedonia, 14 March 2016, Accessed 1 March 2020. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35805010>
191. FRONTEX Migratory Map, 2018. Accessed 1 March 2020, [https://www.planetek.gr/news\\_events/news\\_archive/2017/07/planetek\\_awarded\\_contract\\_by\\_eu\\_satcen\\_to\\_support\\_frontex\\_border\\_surveillance\\_activities](https://www.planetek.gr/news_events/news_archive/2017/07/planetek_awarded_contract_by_eu_satcen_to_support_frontex_border_surveillance_activities)