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Immigration, the ultimate wedge issue... how Radical right-wing parties are influencing mainstream parties' in Western and Eastern Europe to shift immigration positions to the right.

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Abstract

This thesis aimed to identify the conditions that lead to mainstream political parties shifting their positions on immigration to the right as a result of Radical Right-Wing party success. First, the study reports the outcome of three QCA analyses that compare the results of the Chapel Hill expert surveys from 2014 and 2017 for 28 mainstream parties in 10 Western and Eastern European countries. Second, using the conditions of Radical Right-Wing party success, anti-immigration public opinion, party institutionalization, and Purple Grand Coalitions which were identified in the QCA process, an in-depth case comparison was conducted by examining Sweden, Poland, Estonia, and the Netherlands. Overall, the results show that anti-immigration attitudes and Radical Right-Wing party success have a significant association with mainstream parties shifting immigration positions to the right. However, mainstream parties in Grand Coalitions— specifically, Purple Grand Coalitions experience minimal shifting to the right. This is the crucial finding of this thesis and helps explain why Germany, the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent Estonia did not shift to the right despite experiencing high anti-immigration attitudes and significant Radical Right-Wing party success. This finding has implications on future research concerning the constraining effect Purple Grand Coalitions can have on a political party's propensity to change ideology.

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List of Abbreviations

General Abbreviations

ALDE	The Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
AltV	Volatility by Alteration
CBS	Central Bureau voor de Statistiek- Statistics Netherlands
CIA	Catholic Information Agency
CHES	Chapel Hill Expert Survey
CMP	Comparative Manifesto Project
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
csQCA	Crisp Set QCA
CZ	Czech Republic
DE	Germany
EE	Estonia
EED	Norwegian Centre for Research Data-European Election Database
ENEP	Effective Number of Elective Parties
ENLP	Effective Number of Legislative Parties
ESS	European Social Surveys
EST	Estonian Television
EU	European Union
FB	Facebook
FR	France
fsQCA	Fuzzy Set QCA
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HU	Hungary
INUS	Insufficient but Necessary and Unnecessary but Sufficient
KRRIT	Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji-National Broadcasting Council Poland
LISS	Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences
LSq	Least Squares Index
LMPs	Center-Left Mainstream Parties
MAPP	Members & Activists of Political Parties
MIP	Most Important Issue/Problem
MPs	Member of Parliament
MSPs	Mainstream Parties
mvQCA	Multivalued QCA
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NOS	Nederlandse Omroep Stichting- Netherlands Public Broadcaster
NUT	National Security Survey
NL	Netherlands
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFF	Office for Foreigners-Poland
PGC	Purple Grand Coalitions
PL	Poland
PM	Prime Minister
PO	Public Opinion
PPDP	Political Party Database Project
RegV	Volatility by Regeneration
RMPs	Center-Right Mainstream Parties
RRW	Radical Right-Wing

QCA	Qualitative Comparison Analysis
SBS	Scandinavian Broadcast Systems
SD	Social Democrats
SE	Sweden
SK	Slovakia
SKE	Swedish Krona
SM	Social Media
SOM	Society, Opinion and Media Institute
TT	Truth Table
ToV	Total Volatility
TV	Television
TVP	Telewizja Polska-TV Poland
UK	United Kingdom
V4	Visegrád Four
WWII	World War Two

Party Name Abbreviations

Czech Republic	
ANO	Action of Dissatisfied Citizens
CSSD	Czech Social Democratic Party
DSSS	Workers' Party of Social Justice
LIDEM	Order of the Nation
ODS	Civic Democratic Party
PB	Right Bloc
Realist	Realist Party
SNCR	Independent Party
SPD	Freedom and Direct Democracy
SPR-RSC	Rally for the Republic
SSO	Party of Free Citizens
SSZR	Common Sense
USVIT	Dawn of Direct Democracy
Estonia	
EIP	Estonia Independence Party
EK	Estonian Centre Party
EKRE	Conservative People's Party
ER	Estonian Reform Party
IRL	Pro Patria Union
SDE	Social Democratic Party
France	
DLF	Debout la France
LR/UMP	The Republicans/Union for a Popular Movement
PS	Socialist Party
REM	En Marche
RN	National Rally- National Front
Germany	
AfD	Alternative for Germany
CDU	Christian Democratic Union
CSU	Christian Social Union
FDP	Free Democratic Party
NPD	National Democratic Party
SPD	Social Democratic Party
Hungary	
DK	Democrat Coalition
Fidesz	Hungarian Civic Party
Jobbik	Movement for a Better Hungary
KDNP	Christian Democratic People's Party
MHM	Movement for Our Homeland
MIEP	Hungarian Justice and Life Party
MSzPL	Hungarian Socialist Party
Netherlands	
CD	Center Democrats
CDA	Christian Democratic Appeal
CP	Center Party
D66	Democrats 66
DENK	Think
DPK	Democratic Political Turning Point

FvD	Forum for Democracy
GL	GreenLeft
GP	GeenPeil
LPF	Pim Fortuyn List
PvdA	Labour Party
PVV	Party for Freedom
TON	Proud of the Netherlands
VVD	People's Party for Freedom & Democracy
Poland	
K15	Kukiz'15
LP	Libertas Poland (KORWIN)
LPR	League of Polish Families
PIS	Law and Justice Party
PO	Civic Platform
PR	Right Wing of the Republic
PRZP	Poland Together
SLD	Democratic Left Alliance
SP	United Poland
SRP	Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland
Slovakia	
KDH	Christian Democratic Movement
L'sNS	People's Party Our Slovakia
NaS-NS-	Nation and Justice -- Our Party
SaS	Freedom and Solidarity
SDKU	Slovak Democratic and Christian Union
SEM	We are Family
Smer	Direction- Social Dem.
SNS	Slovak National Party
Sweden	
AfS	Alternative for Sweden
KD	Christian Democrats
KrVP	Christian Values Party
M	Moderate Party
MED	Citizens Coalition
ND	National Democrats
NMR	Nordic Resistance Movement
SAP	Social Democrats
SD	Sweden Democrats
SVP	Party of the Swedes
United Kingdom	
BNP	British National Party
Cons	Conservative Party
Lab	Labour Party
UKIP	UK Independence Party

Introduction

In the wake of the 2015 European migration crisis, immigration has emerged as an overriding and contentious issue in European politics, allowing anti-immigration Radical Right-Wing (RRW) parties to gain relevance (Van Spanje, 2010, p. 563). Despite the anti-immigration rhetoric reverberating from European capitals, immigrants still dream of migrating to the European Union (EU). Esipova, et al. (2018) wrote that the Gallup World Poll surveys conducted between 2015 and 2017 indicate that more than 750 million people (15% of the world's adult population) would move to another country if possible. They report how this is up from 14% between 2013 and 2016, 13% between 2010 and 2012, but just lower than the 16% between 2007 and 2009 (Esipova, et al., 2018). Additionally, the desire to migrate from sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, North Africa, and non-EU member states significantly increased during this period. Worldwide the United States is still the top destination with Germany, France, and the UK all in a close race for second place.

Arguably, the influx of migrants and the debate on immigration policy has impacted competition between political parties more than any other issue since 2015, and it has become one of the main wedge issues RRW parties have used to attract supporters and increase their vote share in national elections (Pardos-Prado, 2015, p. 352). The empirical evidence from European elections indicate that this strategy may be working (Karolewski & Benedikter, 2017). However, this thesis will examine how the newfound RRW party success is affecting mainstream parties (MSPs) by attempting to answer the following questions:

Have European mainstream political parties shifted to the right on immigration issues? If so, what are the determinants of this shift?

The electoral success of RRW parties combined with the turbulence the immigration issue has caused between parties within countries, as well as between states across the EU, has made this a paramount question for scholars (Schmid, 2016). While this is not a new question, most studies exploring the effect of immigration on RRW party relevance and MSPs 'contamination' only cover the 1990s or early 2000s. A lack of available data is most likely the main reason scholars are yet to thoroughly investigate how the 2015/16 migrant crisis impacted political party competition in Europe (Dancygier & Margalit, 2018).

This thesis compared the results of the Chapel Hill expert survey (CHES) from 2014 and 2017 for 10 center-left mainstream parties (LMPs) and 18 center-right mainstream parties (RMPs) in 10 Western and Eastern European countries (see Table A2 in Appendix). By using two questions that were on both surveys concerning immigration and multiculturalism, it identified which MSPs shifted their positions to the right. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) was the chosen method for this research project as QCA is suitable for comparing a small number of cases and assumes that different combinations of conditions can result in the same outcome (Ragin, 1987). This is particularly relevant to this study, since a variety of contexts and issues affect party competition differently within each country (Bale, 2008, p. 325).

The first section discusses some of the existing literature on immigration and RRW parties, as well as general definitions and theories impacting this topic including, RRW parties, mainstream parties (MSPs), spatial theories, party competition, and “contamination”. Also, this section highlights the supply-side (internal) and demand-side (external) factors necessary for RRW party success. Furthermore, the first section posits three hypotheses that this paper explored.

Then Section two explains the QCA method in more detail, along with the calibration process before section three turns to examine all 28 cases. This section highlights key aspects of all 10 electoral systems, as well as essential facts about each party (case), and the main RRW parties in each country.

To adequately explore several different conditions scholars have identified that impact party competition; this thesis conducted three separate QCA’s using the same CHES results (see Table 1.1 below). First, in order to get a bird’s eye view of what conditions might be affecting country-wide electoral systems, section four includes a QCA comparing country level electoral systems exploring countries as a whole and not individual parties. It examines conditions such as RRW vote, anti-immigration public opinion, and Purple Grand Coalition (PGC) membership.

Next, a ‘proximate’ QCA was conducted comparing all 28 individual parties by examining conditions such as RRW vote, anti-immigration public opinion, mainstream parties relative vote change, and grand coalition membership. These are conditions that have been highlighted in the literature and were tested in the small pilot project this author completed for Professor Javier Martínez-Cantó in his Rise and Fall of Social Democracy class that used the same CHES survey results.

In order to address the limited diversity issue in the second QCA and overcome the complexity found in electoral systems in general, the third QCA follows Schneider & Wagemann's (2006) recommendation on utilizing a two-step QCA approach (Schneider & Wagemann, 2006). This more 'remote' QCA analysis permits further testing of four additional conditions that augment the conditions tested in the second QCA. It includes conditions such as electoral system volatility, party size, government participation, and party institutionalization.

The three QCA's above are covered in sections four, five, and six, respectively. Each section shows the operationalization of the conditions and outcome of interest, calibration decisions, along with the results of each analysis. Additionally, they will highlight what Ragin (1987) describes as the dialogue between ideas (theory) and evidence (data) by reviewing the back and forth that took place between ideas and evidence during the analysis (Ragin, 1987, p. 49). Section seven evaluates the results and provides an overall conclusion to the QCA process.

The final aspect of this evaluation is four in-depth case studies. These four sections focus on the most relevant conditions identified in the QCA analyses such as anti-immigration attitudes and RRW party success, as well as immigration issue ownership, migration numbers, and electoral competition between the parties. Two Western and two post-Communist European countries were chosen to provide a comparison between East and West. One key finding mentioned above was PGC's. For this reason, comparing the parties and electoral systems in Sweden and the Netherlands for the West along with Estonia and Poland for the East will allow a deeper examination of this condition, as well as the other associations identified in the QCA process. Finally, the discussion and conclusion summarize the main findings and highlight any concerns.

Table 1.1 – Details on all Three QCA's

Type of QCA	Outcome of Interest	Conditions Analyzed
10 Case, country wide analysis examining whole electoral systems.	Parties shifting immigration issues to the right as determined by comparing the 2014 Chapel Hill expert survey results with the 2017 results.	1. RRW vote totals in each country 2. Anti-immigrant public opinion in each country 3. Purple Grand Coalition with LMP and RMP
28 case, proximate analysis examining more electorate centered (external) conditions.	Parties shifting immigration issues to the right as determined by comparing the 2014 Chapel Hill expert survey results with the 2017 results.	1. RRW vote totals in each country 2. Anti-immigrant public opinion in each country 3. Purple Grand Coalition with LMP and RMP 4. Each party's relative vote change
28 case, remote analysis examining more internal party centered (internal) conditions.	Parties shifting immigration issues to the right as determined by comparing the 2014 Chapel Hill expert survey results with the 2017 results.	1. Volatility in each country 2. Governing status - opposition or coalition 3. Party size 4. Party Institutionalization

Section 1 - Literature Review & Theory

There have been countless scholarly studies on what factors lead to RRW party success with many exploring how RRW parties' impact political party competition, but most only include Western European countries (Han, 2015; Mudde, 2017). Typical papers that do tackle this topic rarely look at the center-left, with Bale et al. (2010) discussion on how the RRW has impacted the social Democratic party being one exception. Furthermore, cross country studies on how RRW party success impacts party competition regarding immigration policy are sorely lacking (Carvalho, 2014, p. 7), and research examining this topic post-2015 migrant crisis, is almost nonexistent and only beginning to be published. The papers that have explored the RRW party's 'contamination' effect on MSPs immigration positions mostly rely on data from before the migration crisis and have drawn differing conclusions (Akkerman, 2012; Dancygier & Margalit, 2018).

Without going into an exhaustive review of all these studies, this thesis will briefly discuss a few selected papers (see Table 1.2) that make the key arguments found in most of the research. An excellent study to start with is Dancygier & Margalit's (2018) comprehensive recoding of party manifestos for immigration issues in 12 Western European countries from 1960 to 2013. They found that even though the economic dimension was more important than the cultural dimension, RRW parties did not shape centrist parties' positions on immigration. In Cas Mudde's (2014) and (2013) assessments of RRW parties' effect on Western European party systems (Mudde, 2014), he came to the conclusion that their impact had been minimal, but he added that their influence could increase in the future and provided three reasons:

“the tabloidisation of political discourse; the aftermath of the economic crisis; and the learning curve of populist radical right parties (PRRPs)” (Mudde, 2013, p. 15).

Meyer & Rosenberger (2015) analyzed the effect of public debate on immigration in the media in six Western European countries between 1995 and 2009 and determined that RRW parties' impact on the politicization of immigration was overrated (Meyer & Rosenberger, 2015). Furthermore, Mudde (2014) and Meyer and Rosenberger (2015) add that MSPs contribution to increasing the profile of the immigration issue has been underestimated (Pardos-Prado, 2015, p. 365; Mudde, 2014, p. 12; Meyer & Rosenberger, 2015, p. 2).

Other scholars conclude, however, that the success of these RRW parties *is* affecting MSPs immigration positions. Exploring 16 Western European countries from 1981 to 2008 Han (2015), used party manifestos to determine if MSPs shifted positions on multiculturalism and immigration to the right and found that as RRW parties experienced electoral success, the MSPs did change their issue stances (Han, 2015). Abou-Chadi & Krause (2018), also used party manifestos and discovered that RRW parties played a fundamental role in politicizing the immigration issue and once parliamentary representation was achieved, RRW parties exerted a substantive impact on MSPs positions (Abou-Chadi & Krause, 2018). Van Spanje (2010) found that RRW parties had a significant contagion effect on entire party systems in 11 Western European countries and added that the effect was more pronounced on opposition parties compared to parties in government (Van Spanje, 2010, p. 578). Finally, Carvalho's (2014) mixed-method study showed that RRW parties in France, Italy and the UK had a contagion effect on MSPs in each country in the 2000s, although he noted the impact in the UK was weakest (Carvalho, 2014). Of note is Akkerman's (2018) change of opinion from her 2012 Western Europe Politics article, when she describes the PVV as being 'influential' on immigration policies in the Netherlands despite being ostracized by the MSPs (Akkerman, 2018).

These disagreements could stem from varying methodologies, definitions, data used, and time periods considered, or even the reasons identified for parties changing or not changing positions (Dancygier & Margalit, 2018, p. 10). Party systems are unique and complex, making exact conclusions difficult. Fagerholm (2016) offers a helpful and current review of the most top researched explanations on why parties shift positions, but their review is not exhaustive (Fagerholm, 2016). For example, how a party is organized can discourage shifting positions (Schumacher, et al., 2013, p. 465; Han, 2015, pp. 560-61), or government status and coalition partner agreements sometimes limit shifts (Van Spanje, 2010, pp. 578-79; Moury & Ferguson, 2013; Akkerman, et al., 2016, p. 45). Also, party family, party size and party type have been shown to play a role (Kluver & Spoon, 2014, p. 650; Wagner & Meyer, 2014, pp. 1,024-26). Additionally, large vote shifts (volatility) after elections and the time lag that is necessary for parties to assess results and agree to change positions can make measuring the impact of RRW party success problematic (Kluver & Spoon, 2014, p. 636; Budge, 1994, p. 452; Spoon & Kluver, 2015; Abou-Chadi & Orłowski, 2016; Dassonneville, 2018, p. 808). Other factors include shifting public opinion (Sommer-Topcu, 2009; Adams, et al., 2004, p. 590), other parties'

electoral success (Meijers, 2015), and external influences such as an economic or migration crises (Adams, et al., 2009). Lastly, and possibly hardest to measure, are the effects of issue ownership and the ideological shifts of other parties (Wagner & Meyer, 2014, pp. 1,025; Williams & Whitten, 2015; Janda, 1990, p. 14; Budge, 1994).

One last paper that must be mentioned is Kenneth Janda's, "Toward A Performance Theory of Change in Political Parties". In it he stresses that defeat is the mother of all change and boils his theory down to:

"The poorer the party's performance, the greater the pressure for party change" (Janda, 1990, p. 9).

While his theory is supported by other organizational theorists such as Hannan & Freeman's (1989) examination of labor unions or Manns & March's (1978) review of university curriculum changes (Hannan & Freeman, 1989; Manns & March, 1978), political party scholars such as Mair (1989), Wolinetz (1988) and Panebianco (1988) also favor this concept in their writings (Mair, 1989; Wolinetz, 1988; Panebianco, 1988).

Janda points out that the sporadic nature of elections and the volunteer aspect of the party management slows the process of change for political parties even after they experience poor performance. He also lists six areas where a party could make changes after a poor electoral performance. They include campaign tactics, organizational structure, issue orientation, basic strategies, organizational identity, and organizational death (Janda, 1990, p. 16). His point about the pace of change is a crucial aspect in many of the cases in this study and the outcome used in these QCA's will focus solely on 'issue orientation change,' i.e., immigration issues.

While the existing literature offers conflicting findings on the impact of RRW parties' success on MSPs immigration positions, it does provide a guide to several factors or conditions that this thesis will examine to help answer this question.


Table 1.2- Recent Studies Concerning Immigrations' Effect on Mainstream Political Parties

Study	Method	Conclusion
Dancygier & Margalit (2018) examine immigration issues in party manifestos of 12 Western European countries from 1960 to 2013.	Quantitative	RRW parties' did not shape centrist parties positions on immigration.
Meyer & Rosenberger (2015) examine the public debate on immigration in 6 Western European countries from 1995 and 2009.	Quantitative	Radical right parties' impact on politicizing immigration is overrated.
Cas Mudde's (2013) assessments of RRW parties' effect on Western European party systems.	Qualitative	RRW parties "are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the introduction of stricter immigration policies" (Mudde, 2013, p. 1).
Akkerman (2012) comparing immigration policy outputs from 27 governments in 9 Countries from 1996–2010.	Quantitative	The impact of RRW parties on immigration issues in government is overrated, with the exception of the SVP in Switzerland.
Akkerman (2015) examine immigration issues in party manifestos in seven Western European countries from 1989 to 2011.	Quantitative	MLPs are not impacted by RRW parties, but MRPs have shifted their positions.
Bale, Green-Pedersen, Krouwel, Luther, & Sitter (2010) case comparison between Norway, Denmark, Austria, and the Netherlands.	Qualitative	RRW parties had little impact in Norway, but they had some impact on MLPs in the Netherlands, Denmark, and Austria.
Han (2015) examined immigration issues in party manifesto data from 1981 to 2008.	Quantitative	As RRW parties experienced electoral success, the MSPs did change their issue stances.
Abou-Chadi & Krause (2018) examine immigration issues in party manifestos of 23 European countries from 1980 to 2014	Quantitative	RRW parties play a role in politicizing the immigration issue, and once in parliament, RRW parties substantially impact MSPs positions.
Van Spanje (2010) compared the CHES results of 75 parties in 11 Western European countries from 1990-2004.	Quantitative	RRW parties had a significant contagion effect on entire party systems, and the effect was more pronounced on opposition parties.
Carvalho's (2014) case comparison of three countries from 2000-2010.	Mixed method	RRW parties in France, Italy, and the UK had a contagion effect on MSPs in each country.
(Green-Pedersen & Odsmalm, 2008) case comparison between Denmark and Sweden from 1990-2006.	Qualitative	RRW parties had a significant impact on MSPs in Denmark but less of an impact in Sweden.
Akkerman's (2018) analysis of RRW parties' impact on immigration policy in the Netherlands. From 2010-2017.	Qualitative	The PVV has exerted considerable influence on immigration policies in the Netherlands.

Section 1.1 – Radical Right-Wing Party Relevance

Exploring the impact of RRW party's success on MSPs immigration positions requires a clear review of the key factors that lead to RRW relevance, as well as assessing their recent growth and electoral results. An excellent place to begin any attempt to explain immigration and RRW success is with Matt Golder's (2016) demand-side and supply-side factors which are summarized in Figure 1.1 below (Golder, 2016; Mudde, 2017).

Figure 1.1- Demand and Supply Side factors for RRW Party Success



Most of the factors identified in the research from the literature review above, fall into either the demand-side or supply-side explanations. Demand-side factors are separated into three main categories: (1) modernization, e.g globalization creates “losers” and liberal moral values clash with traditional values: (2) economics, e.g. scarcity concerns arise as mainstream political officials cater social programs to immigrant needs: (3) cultural, e.g. differences in language or religion can lead to clashes over a loss of social identity. There are also three main supply-side categories: (1) political opportunity structure, e.g. electoral rules, party competition, media coverage and realigning political cleavages: (2) party organization, e.g. charismatic leader, strong party organization, and not being stigmatized by media: (3) winning ideology, e.g. pro-market policies, anti-establishment rhetoric and ethnonationalism without becoming racist or anti-democratic and authoritarian cultural views (Golder, 2016).

One factor implied in Golder’s demand-side explanations has to do with the different dimensions of the immigration issue. In his analysis of how the euro crisis impacted public opinion on immigration, Hatton (2016) articulated the debate between scholars on whether the economic or cultural dimension of immigration affects public attitudes the most. This debate has been explored by numerous political scientists, including Golder (2003), Pardos-Prado (2015) and Mudde (2017). However, Lahav and Courtemanche (2011), make the case that after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, along with the other attacks in Europe, security has become the most salient

dimension of the immigration issue. They argue that the ‘securitization of migration’ has moved immigration from the ‘low politics’ of economics and culture to the ‘high politics’ of personal safety and security (Lahav & Courtemanche, 2012). Perhaps how the RRW parties articulate these three dimensions can best be illustrated by Dutch RRW leader Geert Welders’ statement in the 2010 PVV manifesto which proclaimed mass immigration:

“economically it is a disaster, it damages the quality of our education, it increases insecurity on the streets, causes an exodus out of our cities, drives out Jews and gay people, and flushes the century-long emancipation of women down the toilet” (PVV, 2010).

This thesis accepts this multi-dimensional aspect of the immigration issue, which logically results in even more electoral avenues for RRW parties to assault MSPs positions. The ability for RRW parties to use the different dimensions of the immigration issue to wedge both LMPs and RMPs on cultural, economic and security issues seems to be a major reason many political leaders are scrambling to develop immigration policies that can defend them from the RRW onslaught (Mudde, 2019).

Mudde (2010) points out that most scholars only focus on the demand-side explanations undergirded by what he calls a “normal pathology” thesis. He takes exception to this thesis, which includes the following characteristics:

“(1) populist radical right values are alien to western democracies; (2) a small potential continues to exist in all societies; and (3) support for populist radical right parties is explained by ‘structurally determined pathologies’, which are triggered by ‘extreme conditions’ (i.e., crises)” (Mudde, 2010, pp. 1,171).

He points out that this leads researchers to discount mainstream concepts and theories when examining the success of RRW parties. This, in turn, leads to solely demand-side explanations based on the belief that in ‘normal’ times, RRW parties would be unpopular and that only in an ‘abnormal’ crisis would voters turn to them. Mudde states that these normal pathology studies invariably pick a crisis caused by the modernization or globalization process that creates ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ and the losers are the only voters willing to support these RRW parties. The problem with this tactic is that it excludes any consideration of supply-side factors. Mudde also stresses that the only role researchers using this approach are willing to assign to supply-side

explanations is the charismatic leadership factor (Mudde, 2010, pp. 1,172). For these reasons, this thesis will explore both demand-side and supply-side factors to explain RRW parties' impact on MSPs immigration positions.

Mudde asserts this omission of the role RRW parties and the political actors within them play in the electoral process ignores the empirical evidence questioning the validity of the normal pathology thesis. Next, he convincingly disproves the thesis by showing how the ideology of the RRW overlaps with western democratic values and how that ideology is shared by a significant proportion of the European population (Mudde, 2010, pp. 1,173; Abou-Chadi & Krause, 2018, p. 4; Pardos-Prado, 2015, p. 353).

The key ideological tenets of the populist radical right include nativism, authoritarianism, and populism (Mudde, 2016, p. 296). Mudde argues that western democratic values also share the idea of separate nation-states with rules that provide the authority to keep society ordered. These values have been supported by both conservatives, socialist, and liberals, as well as religious and secular institutions. Mudde also adds that the 'elite-driven' process of democratization that took place in Western Europe has created a 'government of the people, by the people, for the people' mentality that lends itself to populist, anti-establishment tendencies (Mudde, 2010, pp. 1,173-1,175).

Using polling data from various Eurobarometer surveys, as well as European Social Surveys (EES), Mudde (2010) showed that mainstream public attitudes and RRW ideology in these three areas considerably overlap. For example, considering nativism, *Special Barometer 113* from December 1997, covering racism, immigration, and the populist radical right in the European Union surprisingly showed that 66 percent of respondents believed that "all *illegal* immigrants should be sent back to their country of origin without exception and just over 80% favored repatriation for *illegal* immigrants convicted of serious offenses". Even more astonishing was the 20 percent who agreed with 'wholesale repatriation', defined as sending "*all* immigrants, whether legal or illegal, from outside the European Union and their children, even those born here, should be sent back to their country of origin" (European Commission, 1997, pp. 7, italics by author). Wholesale repatriation is a more radical position than most RRW parties have adopted themselves and its sobering to consider that 20 percent of voters in most countries would

place an RRW party holding this opinion in second or third place in the majority of Parliamentary elections (Mudde, 2010, pp. 1,175 - 1,176).

Mudde (2010) referenced *Special Barometer 181* May 2003 on public safety and crime to exhibit the close connection between public attitudes and RRW views on authoritarianism. An extraordinarily high 78 percent of respondents felt that “young people would commit less crime if they were taught better discipline by their parents or at school” (European Commission, 2003, p. 9). Also, *Eurobarometer 66* December 2006 displayed an astonishing authoritarian attitude with 85 percent of respondents approving of the statement “Nowadays there is too much tolerance. Criminals should be punished more severely” (European Commission, 2006).

Regarding populism, *Eurobarometer 66* (2006) indicated that citizens trust in democratic institutions was low. The three institutions trusted least were national parliaments, national governments, and political parties at 33 percent, 30 percent, and a low 17 percent, respectively (European Commission, 2006).

Furthermore, Mudde stresses that corruption is another issue that fuels populist attitudes. *Special Eurobarometer 291* (2008) found that 75 percent of respondents either ‘totally agree or tend to agree’ that corruption is a major problem in their country, although Northern Europe had a more positive view on corruption compared to Southern Europe. Additionally, this survey found that RRW views on the EU being a corrupt institution were shared by 66 percent of the population, with the highest results coming from Germany (81%) and Sweden (80%) (European Commission, 2008).

This is just a sampling of some of the data Mudde (2010) used to show the overlap between mainstream western democratic ideologies and the views of RRW parties. He posits that the main difference in these two ideologies is how the RRW parties offer a more radical version of the same ideologies and suggests instead of a normal pathology, the RRW should be studied as a pathological normalcy. This change in perspective puts an emphasis on supply-side factors and can help answer why some RRW parties succeed, and others do not (Mudde, 2010, pp. 1,178). Mudde points out that an RRW party’s success is dependent on internal factors that display their ability to organize and compete in the electoral environment. This places a premium on issue saliency and ownership, which is also stressed by Meguid (2005). This battle over what issues

are debated is paramount — with RRW parties often leaving the socio-economic issues to the MSPs and steering the debate towards socio-cultural or post-materialistic issues such as immigration, corruption, and security that they typically own (Mudde, 2010, pp. 1,179).

Mudde concludes by suggesting this conflict over issue ownership of the immigration, corruption, and security issues helps explain why RRW parties in some countries have taken considerable votes from MSPs, while MSPs in other countries have remained strong. In fact, he asks, “Why have so few parties been successful, given the generally fertile breeding ground” (Mudde, 2010, p. 1181)? He answers by pointing out that the successful RRW parties are the result of their leadership, organization, and communication abilities. Furthermore, Mudde says these questions can only be answered by looking harder at supply-side factors (Mudde, 2010).

Agreeing with Mudde’s (2010) “pathological normalcy” theory, of how mainstream western democratic ideologies and the views of RRW parties are somewhat aligned concerning immigration issues, should focus our attention on the ongoing battle over issue saliency and ownership between MSPs and RRW parties. Considerable research regarding party competition on immigration issues between parties only uses public opinion surveys or party positions as articulated in their manifestos to determine issue saliency, e.g. (Dancygier & Margalit, 2018; Abou-Chadi & Krause, 2018). While public opinion surveys can be good indicators of citizen attitudes, caution should be used before giving too much credit into a political party’s ability to drive the public discourse. This is especially true when only using party manifestos, which can provide an indication of a party’s positions but is not a document that most citizens examine carefully (Franzmann & Kaiser, 2006, p. 164; Janda, et al., 1995, pp. 177-178; Adams, et al., 2014, p. 968).

Lahav and Guiraudon’s (2006) review of migration study literature found that scholars had identified several actors who influenced the discourse and policy outcomes on immigration issues. They encompassed organized interest groups, courts, ethnic groups, trade unions, law and order bureaucracies, police and security agencies, local actors, street-level bureaucrats, and private actors’ (Lahav & Guiraudon, 2006, p. 207). Interestingly, political parties were missing from their review, which contrasts with the influence Meguid (2005) credits political parties having on the salience of an issue (Meguid, 2005, p. 349). Bale (2008) also speaks to the impact

political parties can have in shaping the discourse on this issue, but clearly, there is another major actor missing from the list — namely, media outlets (Bale, 2008, p. 324; Eberl, et al., 2018).

Clearly, parties can impact the public discourse by choosing which issues and policies they want to advance and debate (Eberl, et al., 2018). In Berry, et al.'s (2016) report prepared for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, they found that domestic political elites were typically one of the top sources used in stories on immigration. Furthermore, they identified governing parties as another key source when covering immigration issues (Berry, et al., 2016, p. 7). This shows that parties and their leaders play an essential role in steering public discourse in a country. However, terrorist attacks, economic downturns, and migration crisis's along with the media and other actors can quickly turn the debate in a completely different direction (Meyer & Rosenberger, 2015, p. 4), particularly in light of Mudde's attitudinal evidence on the economic, cultural and security dimensions of the immigration issue (Mudde, 2010).

A comprehensive literature review of the media's effect on immigration issues was conducted by Eberl, et al. (2018). Overall, it indicated that the media framed migrants as either an 'economic, cultural, or criminal threat' (Eberl, et al., 2018, p. 11). The authors reviewed 89 journal articles from January 2000 and June 2018 that had studied immigration news coverage in the EU. They noted a heavy imbalance towards Western European studies (only 19 papers investigated Eastern European countries) and a total lack of cross-country comparative research on the salience of immigration-related issues (Eberl, et al., 2018, p. 2).

Their review showed that real-world events, i.e., terrorist attacks or migration crisis increased discourse on immigration issues. They also found that tabloids and TV coverage were more negative towards migrants compared to broadsheet news outlets. However, the majority of all news coverage of immigration issues were negatively slanted. They attributed this to the accepted theory that humans are drawn more to negative information and reporters, who want their stories read, can be biased toward producing a more negative or crisis themed story, i. e. framing a news story as a problem or emergency rather than an accomplishment or advantage (Eberl, et al., 2018, p. 7).

Perhaps the most striking theme they identified throughout the 89 studies was — as news media reporting on immigration issues increased in quantity (regardless if the stories were negative or positive), anti-immigrant sentiments grew and support for anti-immigrant political parties increased (Eberl, et al., 2018, pp. 4-5). This is in line with the strategy of Meguid's, (2005) modified spatial theory that predicts increased issue salience helps niche parties (Meguid, 2005).

Unfortunately, the lack of existing media analysis in the ten countries in this study prohibits including a condition for media saliency in the QCA analysis, but we can consider this aspect of issue ownership in the countries where information is available in the case comparison approach section of this thesis. Suffice it to say that the research that was reviewed by Eberl, et al. (2018) indicated that all across Europe, citizens have been exposed to a predominantly negative view of migrants in all three dimensions (economic, cultural and security) of the immigration issue.

Another aspect of media that must be mentioned is the expanding use of online social media communication or “new” media. According to Khosravini (2017), drawbacks of social media include how fluid, changeable, and circular it is, which allows users to be producers, consumers, and distributors of information all at the same time. This tool limits normal debate and inspires echo chambers of like-minded followers and prohibits meaningful interactions outside their group. These features promote like-mindedness with little or no critical examination. He points out that social media platforms are commercially designed so that:

“all forms of interactions on social media function as a form of promotion of that content. Whether it is ‘liking,’ ‘commenting,’ ‘sharing,’ or ‘tagging,’ they all help that content to become more important and get more exposure” (Khosravini, 2017, pp. 63-64).

Close to 75 percent of EU citizens are on at least one social networking site (such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Instagram, Redditt, and WhatsApp), and Europeans spend about four hours a day online, with scholars indicating that the populist radical right has used this communication tool best (Stier, et al., 2017, p. 5; Bartlett, 2014, p. 100). Engesser et al. (2016) stress how RRW parties can use social media to speak directly to those who might support their positions without being filtered by the mainstream or “old” media gatekeepers (Engesser, et al., 2017, pp. 1,110). Smaller niche and RRW parties now have a “new” communication tool that

can rival the “old” mainstream mass media that MSPs have traditionally relied on. This has allowed for new voices of discourse that were rarely heard in the past (Khosravinik, 2017, p. 62).

Section 1.2 - Spatial Theory

The spatial theoretical framework this research will be based on includes Anthony Downs (1957) pioneering spatial theory, Bonnie Meguid’s (2005) modified spatial theory and Oesch & Rennwald (2018) tripolar political space model. Most of the studies mentioned in the literature review above reference Anthony Downs (1957) pioneering spatial theory that declared, “parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies” (Downs, 1957, p. 28). This theory was based on a basic notion of rationality for both voters and parties which Downs explained as:

“Our approach to elections illustrates how this narrow definition of rationality works. The political function of elections in a democracy, we assume, is to select a government. Therefore, rational behavior in connection with elections is behavior orientated towards this end and no other.” (Downs, 1957, p. 7)

While some scholars call this a weakness in his approach, it goes to the heart of what this thesis is attempting to answer by avoiding the psychology of voter’s decisions and instead examining how MSPs react to other RRW parties based on voters’ decisions. Spoon (2011) points out another weakness of Downs theory is how it is more applicable to MSPs than to smaller niche parties (Spoon, 2011, p. 26). While Meguid (2005) argues that Downs theory concentrated on how opposition or new parties could gain votes from MSPs back when electoral systems were more frozen, but today, in a more volatile political environment, examining how MSPs prevent new parties from gaining electoral support is more applicable (Meguid, 2005, p. 348).

This brings us to Bonnie Meguid’s more recent niche party theory which modifies Downs framework and fittingly applies to this thesis’ examination of RRW parties — particularly since we are not just looking at the center-right parties but also include the center-left ‘non-proximal’ parties (Meguid, 2005, p. 356). She argues that the strategies MSPs deploy in dealing with new niche parties play a significant role in the success of the new party. Meguid calls Downs policy convergence approach an ‘accommodating strategy’ and his policy divergence approach an

‘adversarial strategy’. Additionally, she adds a third dismissive strategy option and because of their greater resources and high name identification places a heavy emphasis on MSPs ability to manipulate the salience and perceived ‘ownership’ of a given issue (Meguid, 2005, p. 349). She also points out that the window of opportunity for an MSP to gain issue ownership over a niche party is limited. Once the niche party experiences an electoral breakthrough and establishes credibility on an issue, late coming MSPs will be judged “less credible” (Meguid, 2008, pp. 37-38). Hence, Meguid somewhat contrasts with Downs rationality premise as it relates to his ideological proximity approach, in that Meguid posits voters will choose the most ‘credible’ party that is closest to their ideology (Meguid, 2005, p. 349).

Figure 1.2- Meguid’s Niche Party Strategy

Predicted Effects of Mainstream Party Strategies (in Isolation)				
Strategies	Mechanism			Niche Party Electoral Support
	Issue Salience	Issue Position	Issue Ownership	
Dismissive (DI)	Decreases	No movement	No effect	Decreases
Accommodative (AC)	Increases	Converges	Transfers to mainstream party	Decreases
Adversarial (AD)	Increases	Diverges	Reinforces niche party’s ownership	Increases

Source: Meguid 2005, p. 350

Figure 1.2 above shows the projected outcomes of her three strategies (issue salience, ownership, and position) for MSPs to use. Meguid proposes that issue salience either ‘decreases’ or ‘increases’ and issue ownership, either ‘converges’ or ‘diverges’ in relation to niche parties (Meguid, 2005, p. 350). Although she adds that:


“additional data on voter perceptions of the salience and ownership of the niche parties’ issues are needed to examine the micro-level mechanism behind party tactics” (Meguid, 2005, p. 357)

Downs spatial theory provides a straightforward framework that will be used in this research including the rationality of how voters and parties pick a government, while Meguid modifies his framework and applies it to current political situations by suggesting an innovative approach for examining recent RRW parties’ success. Her niche party theory reveals how their supporters are disrupting partisan alignments as voters become disgruntled with existing party choices, which is highly applicable to some of the shifts currently taking place between MSPs and RRW parties’ (Meguid, 2008, p. 23).

The new political cleavages that RRW parties are exploiting merit a reevaluation of the long-accepted two-axis structure of voters' preference. Kitchner (1994) described these axis's as an economic dimension that splits the mainstream left from the mainstream right (socialist from the capitalist), and a cultural dimension separates the libertarian from the authoritarian/traditionalist and creates a battle between the RRW and center MSPs (Kitschelt, 1994, pp. 26-28). See Figure 1.3 below for an example of the two-dimensional space. Oesch & Rennwald (2018) argue that this two-dimensional axis made up by the left and right pole now has a new pole made up of the RRW shifting political competition from bi-polar to tri-polar. Once the LMP, RMP, and RRW parties all exceed 12 percent of the vote, they consider that political space to be tri-polar (Oesch & Rennwald, 2018, p. 784). Vranceanu (2017) points out that this is more pronounced for parties on the left.

In this study, with the exception of the UK and Estonia, all other countries saw RRW parties vote totals exceeded 12% in the last election. However, in the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Poland, the social democrat parties experienced significant drops in electoral support in the last election, and each received less than 12 percent (NSD, 2019).

Figure 1.3- Kitschelt's Two-dimensional Political Space




The RRW's opposition to immigration, multiculturalism, and European integration challenge MSPs and Oesch & Rennwald, 2018 argue this creates a third pole (Oesch & Rennwald, 2018, p. 785). They disagree with other scholars' assertion that class voting is a thing of the past and say, "class voting in the tripolar political space is very much alive and kicking," by outlining three types of relationships that link classes to the party poles:

"(1) some classes are the preserve of one particular pole; (2) some classes are the contested stronghold of two different poles; and 3) all three poles are in open competition over some classes" (Oesch & Rennwald, 2018, p. 786)

They count sociocultural professionals (professionals in health care, education, social welfare, and the media) as solidly in the center-left camp,¹ while the center-right has business leaders (large employers, managers, and liberal professionals) solidly in their camp. The new dynamic is how the RRW has been effectively competing for working-class voters with the center-left and small business, middle-class voters with the center-right. These two groups have traditionally been the 'preserves' of the left and right, respectively. The changing workforce has enlarged the number of technical specialists that include technical professionals, secretaries, and receptionists. It is this group of voters that Oesch & Rennwald claim are being contested by all three poles. Their model can be seen in Figure 1.4 below.

¹ Vranceanu (2017) points out that this is more pronounced for parties on the left (Vranceanu, 2017, p. 2).

Figure 1.4- Oesch & Rennwald's Party Poles Model



According to Oesch & Rennwald, the new post-materialist world has broken down the ‘frozen’ electoral systems and created new cleavages that the RRW parties have been able to exploit. By defending traditional cultural values while supporting more generous welfare policies these RRW parties have entered into competition for working-class voters with the center-left. They are also appealing to middle-class and small business owners with the center-right, as well as fighting both for the growing group of technical specialists (Oesch & Rennwald, 2018, pp. 800-801).

Section 1.3 - Definitions

Another key concept used in this paper is “contamination” or “contagion,” which can be described as the process where an MSP makes an ideological shift to the right in order to gain

votes (Meijers, 2015, p. 414; Rooduijn 2016). This concept goes to the heart of the outcome of interest chosen for this study, e.g., MSPs shifting immigration policy to the right in response to RRW party success. Along with the concept of contagion is the definition of impact. Carvalho (2014) states:

“Political impact is understood as the ability to promote an outcome that would have not been observed in the absence of the selected political actor” (Carvalho, 2014, p. 9)

Additionally, as already mentioned, parties are slow to change positions and must overcome their ‘inertia’ which Bale, et al. (2010) calls a ‘default setting’ (Dassonneville, 2018, p. 810; Adams, et al., 2004; Janda, 1990, p. 14).

In this paper, MSPs will have experienced electoral success by consistently winning seats in parliament and participating in coalition governments (Meguid, 2005, pp. 347-348). They typically encompass a wider range of issues allowing them to adjust their ideology to public opinion (Wagner 2011). The CHES survey has identified the parties included in this study as either a member of the Socialist, Liberal, Conservative, or Christian Democrat party families and in the case of ANO, no family. The study will also use Mudde's (2016) definition of radical right-wing parties, which includes an authoritarian, nativist, and populist agenda. This is an inclusive definition that takes in radical-right, far-right, and extreme-right parties (Mudde 2016, p. 296). In addition to Mudde, numerous researchers stress that immigration is one of the core issues for RRW parties (Han, 2015; Pardos-Prado, 2015, p.352), and while there is no way to measure issue ownership conclusively, many scholars point out that RRW parties in most countries effectively own the anti-immigration position (Bale, et al., 2010, p. 412; Vranceanu, 2017, p. 2; Van Spanje, 2010, p. 567; Krouwel, 2012, p. 283).

Section 1.4 - Hypotheses

This theoretical background will be the basis for how all conditions are operationalized and calibrated, as well as how cases were selected and analyzed to answer the following three hypotheses:

Public opinion hypothesis: MSPs tend to shift positions on immigration to the right, particularly when public opinion on immigration becomes more negative.

RRW relevance hypothesis: MSPs tend to shift positions on immigration to the right, particularly when RRW parties increase their vote share over previous elections.

Vote change hypothesis: MSPs tend to shift positions on immigration to the right, particularly when they experience a significant change (up or down) in the number of votes in a previous election.

Section 1.5 – Theoretical Framework Summary

Despite the conflicting conclusions on what factors impact political parties ideological positioning, one theme reverberated through much of the research. Namely — issue salience and ownership play a major role in how political parties compete. Mudde (2010) suggests that supply factors related to internal party abilities impact both salience and ownership and Meguid’s (2005) modified spatial theory supports his opinion. However, the evidence also shows that outside events such as terrorist attacks, economic downturns, and migration crises in combination with the media reports can quickly wrest control of the narrative from parties and decidedly influence public opinion (Berning, et al., 2019, pp. 103-104). Furthermore, it was surprising to learn that as media reporting on immigration issues increased in quantity (regardless of the stories were negative or positive), support for anti-immigrant political parties also increased (Eberl, et al., 2018, pp. 4-5).

Another key point made by several scholars was that parties resist change, and *if* they do change — it is usually only incrementally over time (Bale, et al., 2010; Adams, et al., 2004; Janda, 1990). This point most likely explains many of the discrepancies in the literature concerning political party’s ideology changes.

The outcome of shifting positions on immigration policy as measured by CHES will be an indicator on whether the MSPs took a dismissive, accommodative, or adversarial strategy in dealing with the success of RRW parties. The economic, cultural, and security dimensions allow RRW parties to develop numerous campaign messages around the immigration issue. Mudde’s (2010) warning that “the tabloidisation of political discourse; the aftermath of the economic crisis; and the learning curve of populist radical right parties” could increase the influence of RRW parties, seems to be coming true (Mudde, 2013, p. 15). Eberl, et al.’s (2018) review showed that tabloids provided an anti-immigrant slant to the news and were typically one of the top

media outlets in most European countries, while the migrant crisis of 2015/16 dramatically increased the salience of the immigration issue and finally, election results seem to indicate that RRW political leaders are overcoming the ‘learning curve’.

Section 2 – Methodology - QCA

This thesis will analyze 28 party’s immigration positions in ten countries by conducting three separate QCA’s to better understand the associations and connections between a variety of conditions, including:

- RRW Party Relevance
- Public Opinion on Immigration
- Relative Vote Change for MSPs
- Electoral System Volatility
- Governing Status
- Party Institutionalization
- Party Size
- Participation in a Purple Grand Coalition (PGC)

The QCA technique is an excellent method for identifying how these conditions, or combinations of them, impact the outcome of shifting immigration positions to the right (See Table A1 in Appendix). The QCA method is a middle ground between case-oriented (qualitative) and variable-oriented (quantitative) approaches, which allow a more general look at how conditions impact a case without losing the complexity in each case (Ragin, 1987, pp. x-xi). While quantitative methods analyze variables in isolation, the QCA method retains and considers the complex collaboration between variables that can be lost in pure statistical approaches. Gerrits & Verweij (2018) stress:

“In QCA, we are dealing with *conditions* and not variables, with *outcomes* and not dependent variables, with *conjunctions* and not interactions, with *implications* and not correlations, and with *solution formulas* and not equations” (Gerrits & Verweij, 2018, p. 83; italics by authors).

The QCA technique requires the selection of conditions that are expected to produce an outcome that is being examined. The conditions are then reviewed using an organized procedure

that allocates data scores to each condition and outcome, resulting in a raw data matrix. Once calibrated, this data matrix becomes a condition-outcome truth table (TT) where Boolean logic is applied in the QCA minimization process. The relevance of RRW parties and a resulting policy shift of MSPs immigration policies could be caused by more than one condition or combinations of conditions (Budge, 1994, p. 452). These multiple paths to an outcome concept are termed “equifinality” (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). The variety of ideologies espoused, and the electoral strategies used by MSPs, along with the differences in the challenger RRW parties, as well as the assorted political environments in these 10 European countries mean equifinality is a critical concept for explaining positional MSPs shifts on immigration policy (Bale, 2008; Van Kessel 2015).

There is a tremendous amount of spatial modeling research concerning political party competition, but most of it is of a quantitative nature. Of course, these studies have helped identify conditions impacting party ideological shifts, but the QCA method is an excellent way to compare these identified conditions within a complex party competition environment. For example, shifting public opinion on an issue has been shown to have a significant effect on typical MSPs moving their positions towards the median voter’s opinion (Adams, et al., 2004, p. 590; Budge, 1994). However, even though many researchers agree that political parties respond to public opinion shifts, their findings offer several caveats that affect when and if those shifts occur (Adams, et al., 2014; Adams, et al., 2004; Dassonneville, 2018, p. 811). For instance, Adams (2004) found that only if the shifts were ‘harmful’ (moving away from parties’ position) did parties shift their position and others point out that MSPs respond to public opinion and that RMPs shifted more than LMPs (Adams, et al., 2004). While Kluver & Spoon (2014) showed that MSPs were willing to shift, but niche parties stuck more to the ideological views of their supporters despite public opinion (Kluver & Spoon, 2014). Adding even more complexity to the question is Schumacher et al.’s (2013) argument that how parties are organized is another important factor. One of the best aspects of the QCA method is its ability to consider these qualifications/caveats when analyzing one condition. While the statistical impact of one variable (such as public opinion) on an outcome can be enlightening, the QCA process allows a more complete view of how public opinion interacting with other conditions is associated with MSPs shifting immigration positions.

The QCA approach also allows for a methodical comparison of smaller to intermediate data sets (between 8 and 30 cases), which help keep complexity intact while identifying obscure associations between variables (Ragin, 1987; Delhi, et al., 2012). This method is appropriate for this project, as there are a limited number of MSPs available to compare in these countries. This limits the ability to execute more quantitative statistical analysis, but QCA offers an inviting middle ground for these types of parties. Another technique within the QCA method is a two-step approach that separately considers ‘proximate’ and ‘remote’ conditions. Proximate conditions tend to fluctuate over time and are likely to be changed by actors. They typically include recent activity and are the result of actions of human decisions. While remote conditions tend to be more stable over time and not as likely to be impacted by human actors (Schneider & Wagemann, 2006, pp. 759-760). Of course, the nature of political competition makes it almost impossible to find conditions that do not change each election cycle or are not impacted by human actors. Therefore, this analysis will use the two-step technique by performing a ‘proximate’ QCA that will include conditions that are more electoral centered (external) and subject to voters’ choices and opinions, while the second ‘remote’ QCA will contain conditions that are more party-centered (internal) and subject to political actors’ decisions.

Additionally, as mentioned above, QCA is ideally matched for identifying basic patterns from an array of actors networking in the multi-level political party environment, by systematically analyzing all probable combinations of conditions that could result in a possible outcome (Gerrits & Verweij, 2018; Bale, 2008). The ability of the QCA method to account for multiple conditions with multiple paths to an outcome is why it is well suited for analyzing the complex nature of political party competition in this study, as many factors typically combine to produce a possible result (Budge, 1994, p. 452; Van Kessel 2015, p. 29-30). For this study, the QCA method will help determine which of the conditions or any combination of the conditions could be necessary or sufficient for the outcome of interest.

Section 2.1 - Calibration Procedure

Merriam-Webster defines calibration as “a set of graduations to indicate values or positions—usually used in plural” (Merriam-Webster, 2019). This describes exactly what the QCA calibration process entails. Just as physical scientists must calibrate their measuring instruments before conducting experiments, political scientists using QCA must ‘create standards against

which data measurements become interpretable' (Gerrits & Verweij, 2018, p. 52). There are three types of calibration in QCA. Crisp sets (csQCA), fuzzy sets (fsQCA) and multi-value (mvQCA) (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012; Gerrits & Verweij, 2018). This study will utilize both csQCA and fsQCA with details on how they will be applied for each QCA will be detailed in sections four, five, and six, respectively.

Additionally, there are two methods of calibration: first, the direct method, which is more quantitative and is used by researchers when they have scalable data or detailed statistics available to them. Secondly, the indirect method, which is more qualitative and used when researchers apply the appropriate crisp or fuzzy set scale to measure the variation in the data (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). This thesis will use both approaches as fine-grained scalable data was available for most of the conditions.

Calibration involves taking raw qualitative data and turning it into either a 0.0 or 1.0 score in two necessary steps. The first step includes setting 'anchor points,' which define the boundaries for when a condition in a case is either in, or out of the set (Gerrits & Verweij, 2018). These anchor points are based on theoretical knowledge of the subject, with 1.0 indicating full membership in the set and 0.0 indicating no membership, while 0.5 is the crossover point (Ragin, 2000). The second step is to assign each condition in all cases a value that will be either above 0.5 and indicate membership, or below 0.5 and indicate no membership. In most of the conditions, the data was scalable, so this study further refined the differences beyond the initial three anchor points. By adding 'additional thresholds' this research differentiated the cases so that they could be 'more in than out' or 'more out than in' (Gerrits & Verweij, 2018). Once the anchor points were selected, as well as any additional thresholds each case was 'measured according to their fit within the boundaries of a set' (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 24). This explains the calibration process and is how set 'membership scores are assigned to cases' (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 322; Gerrits & Verweij, 2018, p. 56).

The literature also points out two other key points to remember in this process. First, selecting anchor points and additional thresholds should always be based on either case-driven knowledge or theory-based information. Using the average or mean as a cross over point or allowing a software program to determine them is discouraged (Ragin, 1987; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012; Gerrits & Verweij, 2018). However, while keeping theoretical concepts in mind, it is wise

to look for significant ‘gaps’ in the data between cases that can indicate membership or non-membership in a set (Van Kessel, 2015). Secondly, because of limited diversity or logical contradiction issues, recalibration is allowed and recommended (Gerrits & Verweij, 2018). Limited diversity and logical contradictions can be a problem and should cause the researcher to re-examine the case details, conditions selected, and underlying theory to ensure all details of the cases have been accounted for, as well as if the cases and conditions selected are in line with the underlying theory (Gerrits & Verweij, 2018). After double-checking all information, researchers should drop, add, or change a condition, as well as drop, add, or change a case based on what best supports the theory.

Additionally, they should ‘re-examine the conceptualization, operationalization, and the calibration of the conditions or outcome’ (Gerrits & Verweij, 2018, p. 103). This review of all the details of the cases, conditions, and underlying theories, allows the researcher to develop an even deeper understanding of the subject and is one of the positive attributes of the QCA comparison method. In this study, the logical contradictions and the subsequent re-examination was helpful in identifying key explanatory conditions of the outcome (Rihoux & Meur, 2009, p. 48). Ragin (1987) argues this back and forth between ideas (theory) and evidence (data), creates a flexible process that retains case complexity and encourages researchers to fully consider all aspects of their study (Ragin, 1987, p. 49).

Section 2.2 – Case Comparison

The final method used in this study will include four in-depth case studies focused on the conditions identified in the QCA analyses above. Particular emphasis will be placed on the electoral success of the MSPs, as well as their governing status and internal leadership decisions. These chapters will also seek to explain and compare the cross-country migrant numbers, media reporting, and RRW party relevance. The selected cases will comprise Sweden, the Netherlands, Estonia, and Poland. The case selection is based on the need to have two Western and two Eastern European countries to compare with an emphasis on countries that include MSPs that are both in and not in a PGC.

Sweden and Poland’s MSPs each experienced a significant shift with neither having a PGC, plus they represent both Eastern and Western Europe. While the Netherlands and post-

communist Estonia's MSPs did not experience significant shifts, but both included PGC's. Focusing on the PCG aspect will be important in these studies as its impact on shifting was one of the most interesting findings from the QCA process above. Exploring it in greater depth is a key reason for conducting this mixed-methods approach.

Having detailed the methodology to be used in this thesis, the next section will proceed to detail the ten countries and 28 MSPs under consideration.

Section 3 - [Case Selection](#)

This section includes the sources used to track down the details on the electoral systems and other factors impacting the political environment in all ten countries included in this thesis, as well as specifics on the 28 cases and the main RRW parties. Additionally, it will provide a summary of recent election outcomes.

There are a number of data sources containing election results, and this study has primarily used the Norwegian Centre for Research Data-European Election Database, as well as ParlGov database and Party Facts to track down party details and election results (NSD, 2019; Holger & Manow, 2019; Party Facts, 2019). Party membership numbers were primarily obtained through the Members & Activists of Political Parties (MAPP) project data archive figures (Van Haute, et al., 2015). The MAPP dataset only compiled data up to 2014 and was augmented with several country-specific sources, including news reports, country websites, and published studies. The average volatility numbers were taken from Emanuele, Chiamonte, and Soare's (2018) comparison of Western and Eastern Europe electoral systems (Emanuele, et al., 2018). The corruption perception scores were taken from Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International, 2019). Facebook and Twitter numbers were taken from each parties' respective pages. Economic indicators were taken from the World Bank/OECD national accounts data files (The World Bank, 2019).

The data for the effective number of elective parties (ENEP) and the effective number of legislative parties (ENLP) was taken from Michael Gallagher's electoral indices (Gallagher, 2018). Michael Gallagher devised the least-squares index (LSq), (sometimes called Gallagher Index) in the summer of 1989. It takes its inspiration from a 1911 article written by the French

mathematician Jean André Sainte-Laguë and measures disproportionality between the vote distribution and the seat distribution. Gallagher explains the formula in his 1991 paper titled, *Proportionality, Disproportionality, and Electoral Systems*. He points out that any indices used must account for at least four factors that can lead to disproportionality: votes between parties, district magnitude, minimum thresholds, and allocation formulas. The Gallagher index is computed by taking the square root of half the sum of the squares of the difference between the percentage of votes (V_i) and the percent of seats (S_i) for each of the political parties ($i=1, n$) (Gallagher and Mitchell 2008).

$$LSq = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n (V_i - S_i)^2}$$

Section 3.1 - Czech Republic

Table 3.1. Czech Republic Case Details

Czech Republic								
Party	Birth	Members	Election results	MP Seats	Social Media			
CSSD	1989	2010-24,497	2010-22.1%	56/200	FB- 26,222			
		2014-23,202	2013-20.5%	50/200	Twitter- 12,600			
		2017-17,863*	2017-7.3%	15/200				
ODS	1991	2010-33,965	2010- 20.2%	53/200	FB- 55,921			
		2014-21,473	2013-7.7%	16/200	Twitter- 21,100			
			2017-11.3%	25/200				
ANO	2012	2011-4,189	2013-18.65%	47/200	FB-97,232			
		2014-3,751	2017-29.64%	78/200	Twitter-unknown			
Year	ENEP	ENLP	LSq	Economic Indicators				CPI
2010	6.75	4.51	8.76	Year	GDP	Unemployment	Inflation	Score
2013	7.61	6.12	6.12	2012	-0.8%	6.98%	3.29%	49
2017	6.92	4.81	7.21	2013	-0.48%	6.95%	1.44%	48
Volatility 1990-2009		Volatility 2010-16		2014	2.72%	6.11%	0.34%	51
20.2		37.9		2015	5.31%	5.05%	0.31%	56
Thresholds				2016	2.59%	3.95%	0.68%	55
5%				2017	4.29%	2.89%	2.45%	57
*CSSD 2017 membership (Bronicčková, 2018)				2018	N/A	2.07%	N/A	59
Source: (Van Haute, et al., 2018; Emanuele, et al., 2018; Transparency International, 2019; Gallagher, 2018; NSD, 2019; Holger & Manow, 2019; Party Facts, 2019).								

Recent Election Summary- Party politics in the Czech Republic have become more fragmented since 2010. The electoral system was beginning to stabilize in this new democracy during the first decade of the new millennium, but after 2010, the turbulence increased. The country experienced a snap election in 2013 after the PM was forced to resign over corruption charges. Billionaire Andrej Babiš founded his new party and garnered the second most votes and joined the CSSD in a coalition. After the 2013 elections, ANO won significant victories in

municipal, regional, and EU elections before winning the most seats in the 2017 Chamber of Deputies. The controversy around Babiš's finances made forming a government difficult, but after eight months a minority coalition consisting of an ANO/CSSD partnership was formed with support from the communist party. The 2013 and even more so the 2017 elections have been marked by increasing success of anti-establishment themes and RRW parties. A record nine parties won seats in the 2017 election (Kudrnac & Petrusek, 2018).

MSPs- The three mainstream parties in the Czech Republic are the CSSD, ODS, and ANO.

- CSSD- Until 2017, CSSD has been one of the top two parties in all national elections since 1996 and spent the majority of those years in government. Their poor showing in 2017 put them in opposition until the successful no-confidence vote of Andrej Babiš minority coalition. Under the guidance of their new leader, Jan Hamáček, CSSD then joined the new government coalition. They have had four different leaders since 2010. They were in opposition until 2013, then were apart of government until 2017. Then moved back to the opposition in 2018 but joined the ANO government coalition again at the end of 2018. They are a center party that holds views on the left and right and have been coalition partners with both center-left and center-right parties (Stauber, 2015).
- ODS- This RMP has had two leaders since 2010 with Petr Fialain taking over in 2014. Their best result was 35.3% in 2006 with 2013 being the first election they fell below 20%. They are a conservative party with liberal economic positions, but they oppose multiculturalism and are somewhat anti-immigrant. They also share strong Eurosceptic views and have been in opposition since 2013. (Havlík & Voda, 2016)
- ANO- Andrej Babiš founded and is still leading the party. They started with an anti-establishment, anti-corruption message focused on a better business environment and improving infrastructure. They strive to be a catch-all center party and hold strong left-leaning welfare state positions but shifted somewhat rightward towards Euroscepticism and anti-immigration views before the 2017 election. They have been in government since their first election in 2013 and displayed great ideological variety by partnering with the CSSD and KDH. Currently, ANO is the biggest party in Parliament and have the CSSD as partners (Havlík, 2016; Havlík & Voda, 2016).

RRW Parties- The number of RRW parties receiving votes in parliament elections and the share of their vote has steadily increased since 2010. The Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) is currently the biggest vote gatherer with 10.64%. The party was founded in 2015 by Tomio Okamura after a split from the RRW Dawn of Democracy who received the most RRW votes in 2013. Despite the founder being Japanese, the party adopted a strong anti-immigration stance in 2017. The SPD currently has 22 MPs, and no other RRW party has any seats in the Chamber of Deputies (Kudrnac and Petrusek 2018). The RRW space in the CZ has been noted by splits and mergers since 2010.

3.2 – Estonia

Table- 3.2 Estonia Case Details

Estonia								
Party	Birth	Members		Election results		MP Seats	Social Media	
SDE	1990	2014-6,199		2011- 17.1%		19/101	FB- 8,089	
		2019-5,570		2015-15.2%		15/101	Twitter- 1,752	
ER	1994	2014-6,199		2011- 28.6%		33/101	FB-11.620	
		2019-5,570		2015-27.7%		30/101	Twitter-1,821	
EK	2012	2011-4,189		2011-23.3%		26/101	FB-4,114	
		2019-14,826		2015-24.8%		27/101	Twitter-unknown	
EKRE	2012	2019- 8,674*		2015- 8.1% %		7/101	FB-16,483	
							Twitter-unknown	
Year	ENEP	ENLP	LSq	Economic Indicators				CPI
2011	4.78	3.84	5.09	Year	GDP	Unemployment	Inflation	Score
2015	5.14	4.72	2.34	2012	4.31%	10.02%	3.93%	64
				2013	1.94%	8.63%	2.78%	68
Volatility 1990-2009		Volatility 2010-16		2014	2.89%	7.35%	-0.11%	69
29.7		15.1		2015	5.31%	6.19%	-0.49%	70
Thresholds				2016	2.59%	6.67%	0.15%	70
5%				2017	4.85%	5.76%	3.42%	71
*EKRE Membership (RIK, 2019)				2018	N/A	5.59%	N/A	73
Source: (Van Haute, et al., 2018; Emanuele, et al., 2018; Transparency International, 2019; Gallagher, 2018; NSD, 2019; Holger & Manow, 2019; Party Facts, 2019).								

Recent Election Summary- Estonia has enjoyed a dependably stable electoral system since 2000 with the ER, EK and SDE consistently finishing as the top three parties. SDE has been behind the ER and EK but joined a coalition with ER in 2011 that lasted until the SDE leader Jevgeni Ossinovski led a successful no-confidence vote against Prime Minister Taavi Rõivas. In 2016 SDE then joined a new coalition with the EK marked the first time ER has not been in the coalition government since 1999. Unlike other European countries, immigration issues have not been as salient of a topic by the main parties as disagreements from the opposition ER to the

EK's income tax changes and higher liquor taxes have been major issues in recent years (Molder, 2016; Molder, 2018).

MSPs- The three mainstream parties in Estonia are the SDE, EK, and ER.

- SDE- They have had three leaders this decade with Jevgeni Ossinovski currently in charge. In 2011 they joined the ER led coalition government but switched to a partnership with the EK after a no-confidence vote in 2016. Although the 2019 elections were not considered in this study, they lost seats and had their lowest vote total since 2003, leaving them in opposition (Auers & Kasekamp, 2015).
- ER- They have had four different leaders since 2010 and three since 2017. In April 2018 Kaja Kallas was elected the newest leader. They were the largest vote-getter in the last two elections, but in 2014 Andrus Ansip had to step down over party funding scandals, then new leader Taavi Rõivas could not keep the coalition together and lost a no-confidence vote in 2016. He stepped down after that. With a more liberal market ideology, their top issues are cutting taxes. The ER has been in government since 1999 but now find themselves in the opposition (Molder, 2018).
- EK- In 2016, Jüri Ratas took over from Edgar Savisaar, the longtime leader and one of the founders of the Center Party. They support both more left-leaning welfare policies and right-leaning cultural positions, making them a true center party. The party was in opposition from 1999 until 2016; the no-confidence vote allowed them to form a coalition government with SDE and IRL (Molder, 2018).

RRW Parties- The high structural barriers to entry for new parties has limited the success of the RRW in Estonia. In the early 2000s, the EIP competed in elections but fell far short of the minimum 5% threshold. The new EKRE experienced an electoral breakthrough in the 2015 elections by receiving 8.1% of the vote and entering the Riigikogu with 7 MPs. It remains to be seen if this new RRW success will have an impact on the other mainstream parties² (Molder, 2016; Auers & Kasekamp, 2015).

² Although the results were interesting, the March 3, 2019 election is not included in this study as it goes too far past the 2017 CHES scores. While the ER (28.9%) and EK (23.1%) maintained their past vote totals the SDE (9.8%) experienced a significant drop of support. Ironically, the EKRE's 17.8% almost doubled their support from 2015.

Section 3.3- France

Table- 3.3 France Case Details

France								
Party	Birth	Members		Election results		MP Seats	Social Media	
PS	1905	2012-173,286		2012-24.9%		297/577	FB-133,602	
		2016-42,300*		2017-7.5%		30/577	Twitter-209,000	
LR/ UMP	1958	2010-247,138		2012-37.95%		194/577	FB-186,924	
		2013-251,347		2017-22.23%		112/577	Twitter-209,000	
NR	1972	2017- 52,000		2012-		7/577	FB-430,359	
				2017- 13.2%			Twitter-226,000	
Year	ENEP	ENLP	LSq	Economic Indicators				CPI
2012	5.27	2.83	17.66	Year	GDP	Unemployment	Inflation	Score
2017	6.82	3.00	21.12	2012	0.18%	9.4%	1.95%	71
Volatility 1990-2009		Volatility 2010-16		2013	0.58%	9.92%	0.86%	71
19.8		15.1		2014	0.95%	10.3%	0.51%	69
Thresholds				2015	1.07%	10.36%	0.04%	70
Two-round				2016	1.19%	10.06%	0.18%	69
*PS membership (Galtier, 2016) †LR/UMP membership (Herreros, 2017)				2017	1.82%	9.4%	1.03%	70
				2018	N/A	8.81%	N/A	72
Source: (Van Haute, et al., 2018; Emanuele, et al., 2018; Transparency International, 2019; Gallagher, 2018; NSD, 2019; Holger & Manow, 2019; Party Facts, 2019).								

Recent Election Summary- Despite having a two-tier elector system with high disproportionality, France has one of the highest volatility scores. This was highlighted in the last election as France saw new parties entering parliament and old parties losing vote share resulting in significant political change. Notwithstanding all the turbulence, the National Rally (former National Front) has consistently pulled between 11 and 15 percent of the vote since 2010. Their reliable 13.6% and 13.2% over the last two elections along with their strong Presidential showing in 2017 indicate they will not be going anywhere soon. Macron has faced opposition to his proposed reforms, and it looks as if the political party competition volatility may continue into the next election (Faucher & Garcia, 2018).

MSPs- The three mainstream parties in France are the PS, LR/UMP, and REM.

- PS- As one of the two main parties in the French electoral system, the sudden fall into irrelevance after the 2017 elections was a surprise inside and outside France. The new party En March and its charismatic leader Emmanuel Macron seemed to have a major impact on PS's support. Going from winning the presidency and leading a parliamentary coalition in 2012 to finishing fifth in the presidential election and

becoming a small opposition party in the National Assembly is a shocking swing (Sawicki, 2013; Faucher & Garcia, 2018).

- LR/UMP- In the 1st decade of the new century, the UMP (which was a merger of three center-right parties) won France's Presidency and strong majorities in the National Assembly but lost both in 2012. First to the socialist coalition and then in 2017 to the new REM party. They have had five different leaders including former President Nicolas Sarkozy with Laurent Wauquiez currently in charge. It displays a typical center-right ideology with a Gaullist tradition (Global Security, 2019; Haegel, 2013).
- REM- En Marche is a new centrist liberal party founded by President Macron and is not included in this study as the REM did not have a CHES score from 2014 and was formed by members from several French parties i.e., REM- received 22 parliament candidates from LR, 90 from PS, 80 from MOD, 22 socialist and 30 from UDI, (Faucher & Garcia, 2018).

RRW Parties- The two-tier system has been a significant hurdle to the RRW parties of France, but that has not stopped them from consistently receiving votes. The FN who recently changed its name to National Rally (RN) is one of the oldest RRW parties in Western Europe. Despite several splits and a turbulent leadership change from Jean-Marie Le Pen to his daughter Marine Le Pen, the RN has survived and occasionally thrived. In 2017 they obtained 13.2% of the first-round vote and 8.8% in the second. This gave them 8 MP's in the National Assembly and the most since their strong showing in 1985 before the electoral rules were changed. Additionally, Marine Le Pen made it into the Presidential runoff election between Macron and received 33.9% of the nationwide vote. Marine Le Pen's efforts to tone down the racist rhetoric and focus on immigration and economic issues have boosted the parties appeal (Reungoat, 2015; Faucher & Garcia, 2018; Ivaldi, 2016).

Section 3.4 – Germany

Table- 3.4 German Case Details

Germany								
Party	Birth	Members		Election results		MP Seats	Social Media	
SPD	1863	2010-502,062		2013-25.7%		193/630	FB-188,347	
		2013-473,662		2017-20.5%		153/709	Twitter-355,000	
CDU	1945	2010-505,314		2013-34.1%		254/630	FB-211,140	
		2013-467,076		2017-26.8%		200/709	Twitter-275,000	
		2017-425,910						
CSU	1945	2010-153,890		2013- 7.4%		56/630	FB-215,207	
		2013-148,380		2017- 6.2%		46/709	Twitter-186,000	
		2017-140,983						
FDP	1948	2010-68,541		2013- 4.8%		0/630	FB-164,707	
		2013-57,263		2017- 10.7%		80/709	Twitter-331,000	
		2017-56,000						
AfD	2013	2013-17, 687		2013-4.7%		0/577	FB-463,772	
		2017-27,621*		2017- 12.6.2%		94/577	Twitter-131,000	
Year	ENEP	ENLP	LSq	Economic Indicators				CPI
2013	4.81	3.51	7.83	Year	GDP	Unemployment	Inflation	Score
2017	6.18	5.58	1.95	2012	0.49%	5.38%	2%	79
				2013	0.49%	5.23%	1.51%	78
Volatility 1990-2009		Volatility 2010-16		2014	1.93%	4.98%	0.91%	79
9.1		16.8		2015	1.74%	4.62%	0.23%	81
Thresholds				2016	1.94%	4.12%	0.48%	81
5%				2017	2.22%	3.75%	1.74%	81
* Current Membership (Statista, 2018)				2018	N/A	3.72%	N/A	80
Source: (Van Haute, et al., 2018; Emanuele, et al., 2018; Transparency International, 2019; Gallagher, 2018; NSD, 2019; Holger & Manow, 2019; Party Facts, 2019).								

Recent Election Summary- The new decade has surprisingly ushered in a successful RRW party in Germany. While most Western European countries have already experienced RRW parties successfully reaching parliament, Germany has never had an RRW party experience parliamentary breakthrough until 2017 (Berbair, et al., 2015). The AfD just missed parliament in 2013 and then added an anti-immigration plank to their anti-euro positions during the migrant crisis. This message attracted more voters, giving them the strong showing in 2017. The other parties resisted a move to the right until the AfD started winning more seats in regional elections in 2018. The CSU was most threatened and pushed the CDU to restrict immigration after the 2017 elections (Poguntke & Kinski, 2018). Forming a government was a problem, and recently Chancellor Merkel has stepped down and new CDU party leader, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer held meetings with top party leaders (except for Merkel) to discuss “migration, integration, and

security.” Additionally, they have proposed closing the borders in case of another migration crisis and speeding deportation of criminal immigrants (Roberts, 2016; Broning, 2019).

MSPs - The four mainstream parties in Germany are the SPD, CDU, CSU, and FDP.

- SPD- As one of the oldest Social Democrat (SD) parties in Europe, the SPD has been able to avoid the freefall that many of the other SD parties in Western Europe have experienced. They are a classic SD party, but the emergence of Die Linke in 2007 along with a resurgent Green party has increased competition on their left flank and Merkel has done a great job of moving towards the center while the AfD also appears to have poached a few votes from some of the traditional working-class SPD voters. After hesitating to join another grand coalition with the CDU, they have turned to the left by putting forward policies to increase the minimum wage, expand welfare benefits, and increase pension payments (Broning, 2019). They are still the second biggest party in the Bundestag, but their share of the vote has taken a tumble. From 1990 to 2005, they averaged 36.3% of the vote, but since 2009, that has dropped to 23.06% (Roberts, 2016; Poguntke & Kinski, 2018).
- CDU- They have been the dominant party in Germany for the last two decades. With their partner CSU, and a Grand Coalition with the SPD (one term with FDP), they have remained at the head of government. Angela Merkel has been the leader since 2002, and they share a basic center-right ideology, although their CSU partner pulls them a bit to the right from time to time. Although their vote share dropped in 2017, they remained the largest party (Roberts, 2016).
- CSU- The CSU is a regional party from Bavaria and partner with the CDU, which has allowed them to share in the spoils of victory. Horst Seehofer has been the leader since 2008, but Markus Söder just took over. They are a more conservative member of the coalition and have more traditional Christian Democrat opinions and recently have expressed more concern about immigration (Roberts, 2016).
- FDP- The FDP started the decade in a government coalition with the CDU but did not cross the 5% threshold in the 2013 election. Finding themselves out of parliament, Philipp Rösler resigned as leader and Christian Lindner took over. They dramatically improved their performance in 2017 and became the 4th largest party in the

Bundestag. They have stressed a liberal free-market economic ideology and in recent elections have taken a more anti-immigration stance (Roberts, 2016).

RRW Parties- The RRW story in Germany is the AfD. After obtaining 4.7% of the vote and just missing parliament in 2013, they continued to pick up seats in regional elections and experienced an electoral breakthrough in 2017, by winning 12.3% of the vote and gaining 94 MPs. The party was founded by former CDU members and academic elites, who opposed the Greek bailout by Germany. Soon after the 2013 election, they adopted strong anti-immigration positions and went through a few turbulent leadership changes but have continued to win more seats in regional elections. Their current leaders are Jörg Meuthen and Alexander Gauland (Berbair, et al., 2015; Lees, 2018). Since 2015, the party has had to deal with several splits, and in 2017, former leader Frauke Petry, split from the AfD and formed the new Blue Party (Party Facts, 2019).

Section 3.5 – Hungary

Table- 3.5 Hungary Case Details

Hungary								
Party	Birth	Members		Election results		MP Seats	Social Media	
MSzPL	1989	2010-33,000		2010-19.3%		59/386	FB-208,357	
		2014-30,000		2014-25.57%		29/199	Twitter-11,900	
		2016-22,300		2018-11.91%		17/199		
Fidesz	1988	2010-40,320		2010-52.7%		112/386	FB-271,663	
		2014-40,000		2014-44.87%		117/199	Twitter-27,700	
				2018-49.27%		117/199		
Jobbik	2003	2010-11,000		2010- 16.67%		47/386	FB-5,119	
		2014-12,000		2014- 20.22%		23/199	Twitter-8,301	
		2016-17,927*		2018-19.26%		26/199		
Year	ENEP	ENLP	LSq	Economic Indicators				CPI
2010	2.82	2.00	11.67	Year	GDP	Unemployment	Inflation	Score
2014	3.22	3.20	17.80	2012	-1.64%	11%	5.65%	55
2017	3.31	2.09	14.38	2013	2.1%	10.18%	1.73%	54
Volatility 1990-2009 22.3		Volatility 2010-16 24.3		2014	4.23%	7.73%	-0.23%	54
Thresholds 5% and 10% for Coalitions				2015	3.37%	6.81%	-0.06%	51
				2016	2.21%	5.11%	0.4%	48
* Current Membership (Attila, 2016)				2017	3.99%	4.16%	2.35%	45
				2018	N/A	3.65%	N/A	46
Source: (Van Haute, et al., 2018; Emanuele, et al., 2018; Transparency International, 2019; Gallagher, 2018; NSD, 2019; Holger & Manow, 2019; Party Facts, 2019).								

Recent Election Summary- Since 2010, Fidesz has dominated party politics in Hungary. They started the decade in opposition but shifted to the right in 2010 and won in a landslide. This was the same year that Jobbik enjoyed its electoral breakthrough (Batory, 2010). A new Constitution was passed in 2012 and in 2014 which shrunk the National Assembly from 386 to 199 seats. Both Fidesz and Jobbik improved on their 2010 results while MSzPL lost almost half of their seats. Orban and Fidesz emphasis on immigration issues in 2014 looked prophetic once the migrants marched through Hungary in 2015. Their party continued to move to the right, as well as adopt government changes that helped consolidate their power. The SDs were caught flat-footed while Jobbik tried to move to the center on some issues in an effort to pick up voters that Fidesz might be leaving behind. The 2018 elections were another huge victory for Fidesz, and the other parties were left scrambling in Fidesz's wake. Jobbik now has competitors to their right, and MSzPL also faces a challenge from the Democrat Coalition (DK) on their left (Varnagy, 2018).

MSPs- The two mainstream parties in Hungary are the MSzPL and Fidesz.

- The MSzPL has been one of the leading parties in Hungary since the fall of communism. In the 2002 and 2009 elections, they received over 40% of the vote and was the top party in parliament. Immigration has been one of the dominant issues in the country since 2010, and that was the year Fidesz began its rise, and MSzPL started its downward slide. In 2014, they formed the Unity alliance with four other parties but could not keep Fidesz from taking an outright majority. An effort to reinvent itself under leader László Botka by attempting to organize all opposition parties to work together to defeat Fidesz in 2018 failed. This resulted in their worst showing since their first election in 1990 (Varnagy, 2018).
- Victor Orban has been the leader of Fidesz since 1988, and the party changed from an anti-communist classical liberal movement to a more traditional conservative party in the early 2000s. After the 2010 election, the party has continued to drift right on a number of issues including immigration causing some observers to classify them as RRW. They have had an outright majority since 2014, with their alliance partner KDNP (Krekó & Mayer, 2015).

RRW Parties- Jobbik was founded in 2003 and by 2010 had taken over the mantle of top RRW party from the MIEP. They did not reach parliament in their first election, but in 2010 they

received 16.67% of the vote and elected 47 MPs. In 2014, they improved that to 20.22%, but in the smaller National Assembly, it was only 23 MPs. In 2018, despite participating in a coordinated ‘tactical voting’ effort against Fidesz (by mostly left-leaning parties), they received 19.26% (26 MPs), becoming the 2nd largest party after Fidesz even though their leader Gabor Vona, lost his seat. Before the 2018 election, the far-right Force and Determination split from Jobbik, and they also had 3 MPs defect to Movement of Our Homeland (MHM) party after the 2018 election. During this time, the MIEP has struggled to survive. Its highpoint was 14 MPs in 1998, to just 0.15% of the vote in 2018 (Varnagy, 2018; Krekó & Mayer, 2015).

Section 3.6 – Netherlands

Table- 3.6 Netherlands Case Details

Netherlands								
Party	Birth	Members		Election results		MP Seats	Social Media	
PvdA	1894	2010-54,504		2010-19.63%		30/150	FB-45,291	
		2014-52,317		2012-24.84%		38/150	Twitter-141,000	
		2019-45,040		2017-5.7%		9/150		
VVD	1948	2010-36,371		2010-20.5%		41/150	FB-88,598	
		2014-33,498		2012-26.6%		41/150	Twitter-228,000	
		2019-25,557		2017-21.3%		33/150		
CDA	1980	2010-67,592		2010-13.6%		21/150	FB-49,306	
		2014-56,310		2012- 8.5%		13/150	Twitter-unknown	
		2019-43,133		2017-12.4%		19/150		
PVV	2006	Unknown		2010- 15.45%		24/150	FB-430,359	
				2012- 10.08%		15/150	Twitter-226,000	
				2017- 13.1%		20/150		
FvD	2016	2018-22,884		2017-1.8%		2/150	FB-170,917	
		2019-30,674					Twitter-41,800	
Year	ENEP	ENLP	LSq	Economic Indicators				CPI
2010	6.97	6.74	0.81	Year	GDP	Unemployment	Inflation	Score
2012	5.94	5.70	0.99	2012	-1.06%	5.82%	2.46%	84
2017	8,56	8.12	0.96	2013	-0.19%	7.24%	2.51%	83
Volatility 1990-2009		Volatility 2010-16		2014	1.42%	7.42%	0.98%	83
21.4		19.7		2015	2.26%	6.87%	0.6%	84
Thresholds				2016	2.21%	6.01%	0.32%	83
0.7%				2017	3.16%	4.84%	1.38%	82
Membership (Van den Dool, 2019)				2018	N/A	3.79%	N/A	82
Source: (Van Haute, et al., 2018; Emanuele, et al., 2018; Transparency International, 2019; Gallagher, 2018; NSD, 2019; Holger & Manow, 2019; Party Facts, 2019).								

Recent Election Summary- With no minimum threshold to enter Parliament, the Netherlands is one of the easiest European countries for a party to win a mandate in the House of Representatives. Dutch RRW parties have become consistent competitors in the new millennium, and they have remained particularly relevant since 2010. The VVD took over for the CDA/PvdA

coalition government after the 2010 elections and struggled to form a government but settled on the CDA with informal support from the new RRW PVV. When the PVV abandoned the coalition, early elections were called in 2012, and the VVD increased their margins. With the PvdA as their new partner, they governed until scheduled elections in 2017. The VVD lost 20% of their seats in what would become the most fractionalized parliament in Dutch history where 25% of the seats changed hands. Healthcare and immigration were dominating issues with polls showing the PVV in first place prior to the election, but the VVD prohibited a Turkish official from campaigning on a Turkish referendum in the Netherlands and sent her out of the country. That, along with the CDA taking more rightward cultural positions and the entry of the FvD, helped keep the PVV out of first place. It took 225 days to form the new coalition government (Otjes & Voerman, 2018).

MSPs - The three mainstream parties in the Netherlands are the PvdA, VVD, and CDA.

- PvdA- The 2017 election was PvdA's worst showing in party history. While they were in a coalition government, they supported austerity measures and in 2017, faced with a worst-case scenario of competition to their left from the Socialist Party (SP) and GreenLeft (GL), all why needing to be concerned about the PVV poaching some of their traditional workers over cultural issues (Alonso & da Fonseca, 2011). Because of their poor showing, they declined to enter coalition talks after the 2017 elections (Otjes & Voerman, 2018).
- VVD- Mark Rutte has been the party leader since 2006 and Prime Minister since 2010. The party has switched coalition partners depending on the situation but has remained in control of the government (Otjes & Voerman, 2018). The party is considered a classic liberal party but has made compromises in supporting the welfare state. It is the main center-right party and takes a pro-EU stance (Ishii, 2018).
- CDA- The CDA began the decade in a coalition government with VVD but slipped into opposition after the 2012 election. Sybrand van Haersma took over as the leader, and after 2017, the party once again joined a coalition with the VVD (Otjes & Voerman, 2018). The CDA has continued to experience declining electoral support despite maintaining the largest party membership (Louwerse, 2017).

RRW Parties- The evolution of the RRW in the NL starts with Pim Fortuyn List (LPF), which took the establishment by surprise and captured 26 MP's and 17% of the vote in 2002. After Fortuyn's assassination, the party quickly faded from prominence, and the PVV founded by Geert Wilders started its rise, garnering 15.5% of the vote in 2010 and gaining 24 MPs, making them a key support party for the VVD led coalition that year. They have consistently performed well in elections and currently have 20 MPS in the House of Representatives. They have remained in opposition after the 2010 VVD led coalition government dissolved (Silva 2018; Van Kessel, 2015). In 2016, Thierry Baudet founded a new RRW party, Freedom for Democracy (FvD), and won two seats in parliament with 1.8% of the vote. Currently, they are the fastest-growing party in the Netherlands, as referenced by party membership (Akkerman, 2018; Van den Dool, 2019).

Section 3.7 – Poland

Table- 3.7 Poland Case Details

Poland								
Party	Birth	Members		Election results		MP Seats	Social Media	
SLD	1999	2009-67,200		2011- 8.2%		27/460	FB- 64,766	
		2012-36,329		2015- 7.6%		0/460	Twitter- 24,400	
PO	2001	2009-45,800		2011- 39.2%		207/460	FB- 171,453	
		2013-41,833		2015- 24.1%		138/460	Twitter- 98,500	
PiS	2001	2011-21,000		2011- 29.9%		157/460	FB- 204,467	
		2013-22,000		2015- 37.6%		234/460	Twitter- 161,000	
K15	2015	Unknown		2015- 8.81% %		42/460	FB-291,203	
							Twitter-34,900	
KORWiN	2015	Unknown		2015-4.67%		2/460	FB-201,748	
							Twitter-unknown	
Year	ENEP	ENLP	LSq	Economic Indicators				CPI
2011	3.74	3.00	5.95	Year	GDP	Unemployment	Inflation	Score
2015	4.45	2.75	12.56	2012	1.61%	10.09%	3.56%	58
				2013	1.39%	10.33%	0.99%	60
Volatility 1990-2009		Volatility 2010-16		2014	3.32%	8.99%	0.05%	61
28.8		22.7		2015	3.84%	7.5%	-0.87%	63
Thresholds				2016	3.06%	6.16%	0.67%	62
5% or 8% for Coalitions				2017	4.81%	4.89%	2.08%	60
				2018	N/A	4.37%	N/A	60
Source: (Van Haute, et al., 2018; Emanuele, et al., 2018; Transparency International, 2019; Gallagher, 2018; NSD, 2019; Holger & Manow, 2019; Party Facts, 2019).								

Recent Election Summary- PO started the decade holding the presidency and was the biggest party in Parliament. Poland was one of the few European countries to be only slightly impacted

by the 2009 economic crisis, and it quickly saw GDP rebound, unemployment drop, and inflation remain healthy. These conditions indicated that PO was destined for an easy re-election, but surprisingly PiS won the presidency in May 2015 and then a majority of the Sejm that October. It was a hugely disproportionate election as the Gallagher LSq index average from 2001-2011 was 5.98 but doubled to 12.56 in 2015. Overall, because of the 8% coalition and 5% single party thresholds, 16% of the vote went to parties that never entered the Sejm and 12% of that amount went to weak parties on the left. For the first time since the end of communism, Poland had no representation from the left in the Sejm. PiS picked up new voters in the rural areas from the collapse of the once-powerful Polish People's Party (PLS), and PO was hurt by the emergence of the liberal Modern party in the cities. Also, new emerging RRW parties took a significant 21.22% of the vote (Markowski, 2016).

MSPs- The three mainstream parties in Poland are the SLD, PO, and PiS.

- SLD- While the SLD was a key party in Poland after communism fell, it hit its high point in 2001 by winning 41% and leading the government. Once in government, a large bribery scandal involving party leaders led to their downward slide. They have joined several electoral alliances with the latest being the United Left which missed the 8% threshold in the 2015 election keeping the SLD out of the Sejm for the first time since communism ended. Several new center-left parties have given the SLD competition on the left including Your Movement (TR), Labor Union (UP), Razem, Greens (PZ), and Polish Socialist Party (PPS) (De Waele & Soare, 2011).
- PO- The party has had four leaders since 2001 and two since their loss in 2015, with Grzegorz Schetyna taking over in 2016. From 2006 to 2014, they beat PiS eight straight times in local and national elections. After being in government from 2007-2015, PO has been the loyal opposition. They are a liberal, conservative, center-right party, that is pro-European. The new liberal Modern (N) party which is ideologically similar to PO probably hurt PO by getting 7.6% of the vote in 2015. Donald Tusk was a past leader and the only Polish leader to win a second term (Fomina & Kucharczyk, 2016).
- PiS- Jarosław Kaczyński has been the leader since 2003. With the exception of a short-lived (2005-2007) minority government, the party was in opposition until 2015 when they won the first outright majority in Polish history. They started as an economic free-market party but have switched to supporting more left-leaning welfare policies (a Razem

candidate ran on their list in 2015), while stressing traditional cultural and anti-immigrant issues. They are considered soft Eurosceptic, and some scholars are now classifying them as an RRW party (Fomina & Kucharczyk, 2016).

RRW Parties- The League of Polish Families (LPR) had been the most consistently successful RRW party in Poland after 2000, but by 2010, it had faded, and in the 2015 election several new competitors arrived on the scene. KUKIZ15 (K15) led the way by obtaining 8.81% of the vote and 42 MPs in the Sejm, while KORWiN garnered 4.67%. Together Poland (PRZP) and Solidarity for Poland (SP), joined the PiS lists and each received 3.62% and 4% respectively. In 2017, PRZP and SP merged into the new Alliance party. K15 is in opposition, but PRZP and SP have been part of the PiS led government coalition since 2015 (Kasprowicz, 2015; Jasiewicz & Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz, 2016).

Section 3.8 – Slovakia

Table- 3.8 Slovakia Case Details

Slovakia								
Party	Birth	Members		Election results		MP Seats	Social Media	
Smer	1999	2010-16,869		2010-34.79%		62/150	FB-42,632	
		2014-16,167		2012-44.41%		83/150	Twitter-unknown	
		2016-9,087		2016-28.28%		49/150		
KDH	1990	2010-15,360		2010-8.52%		15/150	FB-12,128	
		2014-11,704		2012-8.82%		16/150	Twitter-512	
		2016-11,704		2016-4.94%		0/150		
SaS	2009	2010-271		2010-12.14%		22/150	FB-116,830	
		2014-166		2012-5.88%		11/150	Twitter-unknown	
				2016-12.10%		21/150		
SNS	2015	2010-1,839		2010-5.07%		9/150	FB-71,828	
		2014-3,884		2012-4.55%		0/150	Twitter-unknown	
		2015-6,155		2016-8.64%		15/150		
LSNS	2010	2015-96		2010-1.33%		0/150	FB-13,622	
				2012-1.58%		0/150	Twitter-unknown	
				2016-8.04%		14/150		
SME	2015	2015-70		2016-6.6%		14/150	FB-82,181	
							Twitter-unknown	
Year	ENEP	ENLP	LSq	Economic Indicators				CPI
2010	5.53	4.01	7.46	Year	GDP	Unemployment	Inflation	Score
2012	4.36	2.85	9.77	2012	1.66%	13.96%	3.61%	46
2016	7.31	5.67	6.10	2013	1.49%	14.22%	1.4%	47
Volatility 1990-2009		Volatility 2010-16		2014	2.75%	13.18%	-0.08%	50
24.7		30.6		2015	3.85%	11.48%	-0.33%	51
Thresholds				2016	3.33%	9.67%	-0.52%	51
5% or 7% or 10% for Coalitions				2017	3.4%	8.13%	1.31%	50
Membership (Kysel, 2016)				2018	N/A	7.27%	N/A	50
Source: (Van Haute, et al., 2018; Emanuele, et al., 2018; Transparency International, 2019; Gallagher, 2018; NSD, 2019; Holger & Manow, 2019; Party Facts, 2019).								

Recent Election Summary- Of all the SD parties included in this thesis, Smer has dominated its countries elections the most this decade. They are also the only SD party partnering with an RRW party and one of the few to take a more populist, anti-immigrant position. Until 2016, no other party received over 10% of the vote including the former strong competitors Slovak Democratic Christian Union (SDKU), and KDH since 2010. Smer reached their highpoint in 2012 but has slowly lost support since then. Despite being the largest party in 2012, they had difficulty in finding coalition partners as many parties had pledged not join them in a coalition over corruption allegations. The 2016 election ushered in the most parties into the Slovakian National Council since the 1989 elections. Additionally, 2016 resulted in a significant increase for RRW parties. After extensive negotiations, Smer formed a government with three other parties including, the SNS (Just, 2019).

MSPs- The three mainstream parties in Slovakia are the Smear, KDH, and SaS.

- Smear- Under Robert Fico's leadership, Smear quickly became the top party in Slovakia. From 2006 till today, it has always finished in first place. The high point was 2012 when it won an outright majority with 83 seats. They have shown a willingness to partner with both left and right parties when building coalitions. They included the RRW SNS in both their 2006 and 2016 governments. In 2018 Fico had to resign over his linkage to the murder of journalist Ján Kuciak (Just, 2019).
- KDH- The 2016 election marked the first time the KDH failed to reach the 5% threshold and was not represented in Parliament. They share the typical Christian Democrat ideology, but the fragmented nature of Slovakia's electoral system has siphoned off many of their traditional supporters. The poor election results have also coincided with five leadership changes in this decade. Since 2016, Alojz Hlina has been the leader (Gyarfasova & Meseznikov, 2015; Just, 2019).
- SaS- Economist Richard Sulík founded and has led the party since 2009. They were in the coalition government from 2010 to 2012, but had a poor showing and moved to the opposition where they have stayed despite rebounding in the 2016 elections. Sulik was an advisor to the SDKÚ-DS and designed Slovakia's flat tax before founding the party. It is a classic liberal party focused mostly on economic issues. This liberal ideology puts them at odds with many EU programs, and observers have labeled them somewhat Eurosceptic. Surprisingly, they also encompass a libertarian-leaning

ideology and are open to same-sex-marriage, contrasting with most conservative, traditional positions (Gyarfasova & Meseznikov, 2015; Just, 2019).

RRW Parties- The Slovak National Party (SNS) is Slovakia’s oldest and most successful RRW party. They have won seats in Parliament in all but two elections since 1990, and they were part of the government from 2006-2010 and from 2016 till today. In 2016, they received 8.64% of the vote and 15 MPs. In 2010, another even farther right party, Kotleba (LSNS) was founded but did not experience any significant success until 2016 when it garnered 8.04% of the vote and 14 MPs. The most recent RRW party entrant was, We Are Family (SME), founded by Boris Kollár. With a strong populist, anti-corruption platform it is a bit less radical than LSNS, although they still articulate an anti-immigration message. They obtained 6.63% of the vote and 11 MPs in the National Council. The RRW parties vote totals in 2016 were the highest since the 1990 return of democracy (Just, 2019; Kluknavska & Smolík, 2016).

Section 3.9 – Sweden

Table- Sweden Case Details

Sweden								
Party	Birth	Members		Election results		MP Seats	Social Media	
SAP	1889	2010-105,626		2010-30.7%		112/349	FB-245,237	
		2014-101,674		2014-31%		113/349	Twitter-83,500	
				2018-28.3%		100/349		
M	1904	2010-47,338		2010-30.1%		107/349	FB-111,244	
		2013-39,998		2014-23.2%		84/349	Twitter-104,000	
				2018-19.8%		70/349		
KD	1964	2010-22,382		2010-5.6%		19/349	FB-33,170	
		2014-21,148		2014-4.6%		16/349	Twitter-47,200	
				2018-6.32		22/349		
SD	1988	2010-5,846		2010-5.7%		20/349	FB-280,211	
		2014-15,876		2014-12.49%		49/349	Twitter-73,000	
		2017-28,340		2018-17.5%		62/349		
Year	ENEP	ENLP	LSq	Economic Indicators				CPI
2010	4.79	4.54	1.25	Year	GDP	Unemployment	Inflation	Score
2014	5.41	4.99	2.64	2012	-0.29%	7.96%	.89%	88
2018	5.79	5.63	0.63	2013	1.24%	8.01%	-0.04%	89
Volatility 1990-2009		Volatility 2010-16		2014	2.6%	7.92%	-0.18%	87
14.6		9.8		2015	4.52%	7.4%	-0.05%	89
Threshold				2016	3.24%	6.99%	0.98%	88
4%				2017	2.29%	6.72%	1.8%	84
				2018	N/A	6.32%	N/A	85
Source: (Van Haute, et al., 2018; Emanuele, et al., 2018; Transparency International, 2019; Gallagher, 2018; NSD, 2019; Holger & Manow, 2019; Party Facts, 2019).								

Recent Election Summary- Much like the Netherlands, Sweden's growing RRW parties and the 'cordon sanitaire' around them are making it much more challenging to form coalition governments. The M party is steadily losing votes, as has the KD, Center Party, Liberals, and Left. Even the Green party has dropped from its 7.3% high point in 2010 to 4.4% in 2018. The only party to experience a significant increase has been the RRW SD (1.4% in 2002 to 17.5% in 2018). Immigration issues dominated the 2018 campaign with pension reform also being discussed. While the euro crisis hurt the economy, Sweden still has somewhat high unemployment, but overall Sweden has recovered, and the economy is growing. They enjoyed another surplus in 2017, and the national debt has continued to decline (Widfelt, 2018). The fragile coalition government could have a hard time implementing new policies as the Left has a clear veto. Elgenius and Wennerhag (2018) stress that the traditional left-right ideology scale is being challenged by cultural issues (Elgenius & Wennerhag, 2018).

MSPs- The three mainstream parties in Sweden are the SAP, M, and KD.

- SAP- This SD party has won every parliamentary election in Sweden since 1917. Throughout the 80s, 90s, and 2000s they consistently received in the high 30's to high 40's percent range. In 2010, they could not form a government despite getting the most votes as they dropped to 30.7%, which had not happened since 1920. In 2014, they finished with 31% and were able to form a coalition government. Before the 2018 election, Sweden experienced its first major terrorist attack by a rejected asylum seeker along with a scandal on how the government handled secure information. Several SAP cabinet ministers resigned, and there were two failed no-confidence votes against Prime Minister Löfven and Defense Minister Peter Hultqvist. This led to the lowest SAP vote total since 1911, but after four months they formed a precarious minority government including the Greens, Center Party, and Liberals with the Left agreeing to abstain from voting against the government (Widfelt, 2018).
- M- The Moderates have come in second in every Swedish election since 1979. They have had three different leaders in this decade, with Peter Danielsson currently in charge. It has maintained its leading center-right status by supporting both an economic liberal policy while holding onto more conservative cultural positions. Since 2010, they have moved more to the right on immigration and military issues (Back & Bergman, 2016; Stromback, 2016).

- **KD-** The Christian Democrats did not reach the Riksdag until 1991 and experienced their most success in 1998 with 11.76% of the vote. They were the junior coalition partner in the government until the from 2006-2014 but are now only the sixth-largest party. Since then, they have remained in opposition and have had two leaders this decade, with Ebba Busch Thor taking over in 2015 (Elgenius & Wennerhag, 2018).

RRW Parties- The Sweden Democrats (SD) were founded in 1988, but never received more than 2.9% of the vote until their electoral breakthrough in 2010. In that election, they won 20 seats in the Riksdag after obtaining 5.6% of the vote. In 2014, they more than doubled the 2010 results and garnered 12.9% of the vote and picked up 49 seats. They continued their upward trend by winning 17.5% of the 2018 vote and controlling 62 seats in the Riksdag (Elgenius & Wennerhag, 2018). This complicated the ability for the mainstream parties to form a government as there was a ‘cordon sanitaire’ against the SD. The government was not formed until January 2019 (Stromback, 2016).

Section 3.10 – United Kingdom

Table- 3.10 UK Case Details

United Kingdom								
Party	Birth	Members		Election results		Seats in Parl.	Social Media	
Lab	1900	2010-194,000		2010-29.1%		258/650	FB-1,033,819	
		2013-190,000		2015-30.5%		232/650	Twitter-657,000	
		2018-540,000		2017-40%		262/650		
Cons	1834	2010-177,000		2010-36.1%		306/650	FB-637,233	
		2014-149,800		2015-36.9%		330/650	Twitter-364,000	
		2018-124,000		2017-42.3%		317/650		
UKIP	1964	2010-16,000		2010-3.16%		0/650	FB-540,404	
		2016-34,249		2015-12.6%		1/650	Twitter-201,000	
		2018-23,600		2017-1.8%		0/650		
Year	ENEP	ENLP	LSq	Economic Indicators				CPI
2010	3.72	2.57	15.13	Year	GDP	Unemployment	Inflation	Score
2015	3.93	2.54	15.02	2012	1.48%	7.89%	2.57%	74
2017	2.89	2.48	6.47	2013	2.05%	7.53%	2.29%	76
Volatility 1990-2009 7.3		Volatility 2010-16 12.7		2014	3.05%	6.11%	1.45%	78
Thresholds				2015	2.35%	5.3%	0.37%	81
First past the post				2016	1.94%	4.81%	1.01%	81
				2017	1.79%	4.33%	2.56%	81
Party Membership (Audickas, et al., 2018)				2018	N/A	3.99%	N/A	80
Source: (Van Haute, et al., 2018; Emanuele, et al., 2018; Transparency International, 2019; Gallagher, 2018; NSD, 2019; Holger & Manow, 2019; Party Facts, 2019).								

Recent Election Summary- This decade in British politics will be defined by Conservative leader David Camron fracturing his party by calling for the Brexit vote. The Labour party was on the ropes, and this has given them a chance to regroup, reorganize, and make a credible case for an opportunity to govern. The RRW has struggled to gain ground in this first past the post electoral system, but each of the mainstream parties has members who share many of their views. Obviously, the Brexit vote showed how strong the nativist sentiment is in the country. Both parties are split with how to handle Brexit, but the Conservatives are in charge and have to develop a plan and get it passed, while Labour does not have to take a solid position and is still free to criticize the Conservatives plan and point out where they would do things a bit differently. Adding fuel to the fire, three terrorist attacks in 2017 killed 36 and injured hundreds. May's call for early elections was predicted to give them an easy win, but Labour's strong showing resulted in a hung parliament. Both parties improved on their 2015 totals, but Labour improved the most. It appears the 12.6% UKIP vote went more to Labour than to Conservatives (Temple, 2018).

MSPs- The two MSPs in the United Kingdom are the Labour Party and Conservative Party.

- Labour- Today's Labour party in the UK has been significantly impacted by economic and political developments since the 1980s. They have experienced declining union membership and endured 18 years in opposition. In response to these setbacks, Tony Blair's 'New Labour' party embraced the neo-liberal economic order from 1997 to 2010. Until the Great Recession hit Europe and devastated the British working class, this change was successful electorally. Gordon Brown continued the 'New Labor' messaging but led the party into the opposition in 2010. New leader Ed Miliband shifted back to a slightly more progressive message but saw no improvement in the 2015 elections (Cook, 2016). Jeremy Corbyn, who was a hard-left Labour MP, attracted thousands of new members to the party and won the leadership race with 59% of the vote (Seymour, 2017). His first task was to navigate the difficult Brexit issue, which he has done by mainly staying out of the way and allowing the conservatives to implode. This issue has fractured his party, but he managed to greatly improve Labour's share of the vote in the early elections of 2017 (Mellon, et al., 2018).

- Conservative- David Cameron was the party leader until Theresa May took over after the Brexit loss in 2016. This is a traditionally conservative party with a free-market economic agenda. A major wing of their party has become more Eurosceptic, but others are very pro-EU. Like most countries with only two dominant parties, there are significant divisions within the party on a variety of issues. After their losses in the 2017 election, they formed a minority government with the assistance of Northern Ireland's DUP party. This has added a remarkable amount of complexity to the Brexit debate, which has become the defining issue in British politics since 2016 (Mellon, et al., 2018).

RRW Parties- The first past the post electoral system, has made it hard for RRW parties to experience an electoral breakthrough. The British National Party (BNP) was the main RRW party after its leader split from the National Front (NF) in 1982, but it never achieved any success, and its best election showing came in 2009 with 1.9% of the vote. The UK Independence Party (UKIP) has enjoyed more success with a liberal economic platform and populist anti-EU message. They received a significant 12.6% of the vote and a noteworthy one seat in the House of Commons in 2015 before leading the charge on the successful 2016 Brexit vote. Unfortunately for them, Brexit success has not led to success in parliamentary elections. In 2017, they dropped down to only 1.8% of the vote (Mellon, et al., 2018).

Section 4 - QCA 1- Country Electoral System

The first QCA this thesis will conduct is a cross-country electoral analysis comparing all ten country's electoral systems (see Table 4.1 below and Table A1 in the appendix). This system-wide analysis can show which conditions may be associated with MSPs shift immigration positions to the right. Additionally, this section will provide more details on some of the theories supporting the outcome and conditions. The same outcome will be used in all QCA's, and some of the conditions will be the same in the first and second QCA's. In these cases, this paper will not repeat the same text and will only focus on the calibration for that QCA.

Table 4.1- QCA 1 Raw Data Matrix

Country	AVG. SHIFT 14 vs. 17†	RRW Vote°	Anti-Immigration Polling AVG.*	Purple Grand Coalition‡
CZ	16.38%	14.27%	59.67%	No
EE	-3.45%	8.30%	57.7%	Yes
FR	-0.08%	14.37%	48.67%	No
DE	7.72%	13.00%	66.00%	Yes
HU	19.94%	19.21%	64.67%	No
NL	5.47%	15.50%	55.00%	Yes
PL	18.31%	21.25%	50.67%	No
SK	20.1%	23.31%	55.00%	No
SW	38.78%	18.12%	58.33%	No
UK	0.69%	1.83%	37.33%	No

†Shift: Data was taken from Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk, et al., 2017).
 *Polling: Data was taken from special Eurobarometer 469 (European Commission, Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, 2018).
 °RRW Vote: Data was taken from last parliamentary election in each country (NSD, 2019).
 ‡Purple Grand Coalitions: Data was taken from Party Facts website (Party Facts, 2019).

Section 4.1 - Operationalization & Calibration

Outcome – MSPs Shift to Right

Finding a way to measure a political party’s shift in ideology typically requires comparing an information source between two time periods (Mair, 1999, p. 3). Ideally, this would entail at least two different elections using party manifestos, votes in parliament, mass surveys, campaign speeches, or newspaper reports, as well as Twitter and Facebook posts (Abou-Chadi & Orłowski, 2016, p. 874; Heath, 2016, pp. 1,059; Van Spanje, 2010, p. 570). Mair (1999) goes on to point out many of the strengths and weaknesses concerning these sources capability to judge party convergence or divergence (Mair, 1999, pp. 11-16). This thesis has chosen to use another popular comparison tool—the 10-point Left-Right CHES (Polk, et al., 2017; Adams, et al., 2014, pp. 968-69). While each source has its drawbacks, the author of this study felt country experts would be a reliable way to assess a political party’s shift in ideology. An expert can consider not only what the party includes in their manifestos, but also what they say in speeches, on the campaign trail and in press releases, as well as how they vote on issues in parliament (Mair, 1999, p. 16; Steenbergen & Marks, 2007, pp. 361-362). Mair (1999) along with Steenbergen & Marks (2007) stress the difficulty and importance of all experts judging the same aspect requested, as well as the need for a well-designed survey. Additionally, Jahn (2010) points out that one of the central concerns should be:

“they (experts) have no problem themselves defining what is Left and what is Right. Although in this perspective Left and Right are set a priori by the experts, we do not really know what the experts mean by these or whether they agree in their judgments” (Jahn 2010, p. 749).

Nevertheless, the CHES is a respected source for assessing party positions and despite the concerns already mentioned, the author of this thesis felt it would be an excellent outcome for this project (Han, 2015, p. 563; Adams, et al., 2014, pp. 968-969; Mudde, 2016). Furthermore, Dassonneville (2018) found that the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) and CHES left-right indicators were highly correlated in her electoral volatility study (Dassonneville, 2018, p. 813). Using the 2014 and 2017 scores on immigration policy and multiculturalism, this electoral system QCA examines if the conditions of RRW vote, polling results, and PGC status resulted in MSPs shifting their positions on immigration to the right. More details about the CHES survey, the wording of the questions and how the shift was computed between the 2014 and 2017 results can be seen in Table A4a, A4b, A4c and A4d in the Appendix.

Table 4.2 below shows the country with the biggest shift was Sweden’s 38.78 %, leaving France on the low end by shifting to the *left* by 3.86. For a country to display full membership in the outcome, they must have experienced a shift of over 15 points or 15%. A shift of this proportion indicates their MSPs have moved their positions on immigration significantly to the right. The crossover point is 7%, which means cases that have shifted more than 7% will be ‘more in than out’ of the group of countries that have seen their MSPs have shift their positions on immigration to the right. Cases below 7%, will be ‘more out than in,’ indicating insignificant policy shifts. This leaves six countries above the 7% threshold and four below 7%. Germany provided the most ambiguous case by shifting 7.72%. The bottom anchor point is no shift or 0%, and two countries (France and Estonia) shifted to the left and were below the bottom threshold.

Table 4.2 – Average Country Shift

Party	Party Name	AVG. SHIFT 14 vs. 17	AVG. % SHIFT 14 vs. 17	Country	AVG. Country SHIFT	AVG. % Country SHIFT
CSSD	Czech Social Dem. Party	2.3511903	23.51%	CZ	1.627976	16.38%
ODS	Civic Democratic Party	0.247024	2.47%			
ANO	Action of Diss. Citizens	2.285714	22.86%			
SDE	Social Democratic Party	0.2517045	-9.44%	EE	-0.3448	-3.45%
ER	Estonian Reform Party	0.032197	-5.72%			
EK	Estonian Centre Party	0.378977	4.81%			
PS	Socialist Party	2.425893	-7.37%	FR	-0.07745	-0.08%
LR/UMP	Rep. Union for Pop Mov.	-0.94357	5.96%			
SPD	Social Democratic Party	-0.57202	2.52%	DE	0.772193	7.72%
CDU	Christian Dem. Union	0.481192	0.32%			
CSU	Christian Social Union	-0.737166	3.89%			
FDP	Free Democratic Party	0.596257	24.26%			
MSzPL	Hungarian Socialist Party	0.0041936	0.04%	HU	1.993996	19.21%
Fidesz	Hungarian Civ. Union	1.989802	19.90%			
PvdA	Labour Party	0.2387822	2.39%	NL	0.54709	15.50%
VVD	People's Party for Freedom & Democracy	0.674603	6.75%			
CDA	Christian Dem. Appeal	0.727886	7.38%			
SLD	Democratic Left Alliance	1.1634505	11.64%	PL	1.830799	18.31%
PO	Civic Platform	0.814662	8.15%			
PiS	Law and Justice Party	2.309774	35.14%			
Smer	Direction- Social Dem.	2.2187927	22.19%	SK	2.009736	20.1%
KDH	Christian Dem. Movement	-0.16247	-1.63%			
SaS	Freedom and Solidarity	3.972887	39.73%			
SAP	Swedish Social Dem. Party	3.4809942	34.81%	SW	3.878014	38.78%
M	Moderate Party	4.396199	43.96%			
KD	Christian Dem.	3.756848	37.57%			
Lab	Labour Party	-0.092491	-0.92%	UK	0.06868	0.69%
Cons	Conservative Party	-0.04487	-0.45%			

Shift: Data taken from Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk, et al., 2017). *Polling: Data was taken from special Eurobarometer 469 (European Commission, 2018).

Condition 1 - RRW Vote Totals

In Western Europe, the share of RRW party votes has gone from 8% in the 1990s to 12.5% from 2010-2015, leading to RRW parties becoming coalition partners in 17 governments from 1990 to 2015 (Akkerman, et al., 2016, p. 1). The average RRW vote totals for the last election in

each of the counties in this study is 14.92%³ but only in Slovakia, with the RRW Slovak National Party (SNS), does an RRW party participate in a government coalition. Defining RRW party relevance or ‘success’ is a bit tricky. David Art (2011), defines ‘success’ as obtaining at least 5% of the vote for three straight elections, while Backes (2012), posts success is achieved only by reaching parliament (Art, 2011, p. 6; Backes, 2012, p. 149). Kris Deschouwer harkens back to Sartori (1976) and contends ‘success’ or relevance is achieved when a party has blackmail or governing potential (Deschouwer, 2008). Van Kessel maintains that once a populist party reaches 10%, they have a strong ability to impact party competition or join a coalition government (Van Kessel, 2015, p. 78).

There are a number of data sources containing election results, and this study has primarily used the Norwegian Centre for Research Data-European Election Database (EED), as well as ParlGov database and Party Facts to track down party details and election results (NSD, 2019; ParlGov database, 2019; Party Facts, 2019). As mentioned in Section 1.3, this paper will use Muddle's (2016) definition of radical right-wing parties.

Numerous studies have used RRW party election results in the research design. Some pick their cases based on RRW party ‘success’ or use it as a variable in their analysis including Rooduijn (2016), Van Kessel (2015), Abou-Chadi and Krause (2018), Moriconi, Peri and Turati (2018), and Dancygier and Margalit (2018). One issue these studies were in danger of encountering was selection bias (Pardos-Prado, 2015, p. 353). Choosing countries where RRW parties have experienced success without also including cases with little RRW impact can lead to skewed findings. Unfortunately, this is becoming a harder problem to overcome as RRW parties are experiencing electoral ‘success’ in most Northwestern and Northeastern European countries. From the available countries that are included in both the 2014 and 2017 CHES survey, only the UK, with 1.83% RRW vote does not have any Members of Parliament (MP's) from RRW parties. Estonia is also a country that has had limited RRW party success, although in their 2015

³ This average does not include Fidesz or PiS, as they will be considered Center-Right (CR) parties for this study. Most experts classified these parties as Conservative in 2010 but many have started classifying them as RRW parties today. The 2017 CHES used Derksen's classification and categorized Fidesz as conservative and PiS as RRW, while ParlGov still has both as Conservative (Holger & Manow, 2019; Polk, et al., 2017). Further explanation will be given on these parties' in the Case Selection section. Also not included is Estonia's 2019 election where EKRE received 17.8%, as it was too far past the CHES 2017 survey.

election the EKRE received 8.3% of the vote and sent 19 MSP's to the Riigikogu. This is a concern that will be considered in the overall analysis. Data on the vote totals of all RRW parties used for each country in this study can be seen in Table A6 of the Appendix.

Full membership for this condition is 23% or more of the vote. Once a party achieves over a fifth of a nation's vote, this thesis deems them to be highly relevant. The crossover point will be set at 16%, and the most ambiguous cases will be the Netherlands, where RRW vote totals were 15.5%. This analysis will consider it to be more 'out than in' despite the proximity to the threshold. The author of this paper moved the crossover points up from the 20% and 10% Van Kessel (2015) used in his populist study because RRW parties are often shunned by mainstream parties when forming governments. This is probably why only the Slovakian cases are in coalition with an RRW party despite the high vote share the RRW parties have received in many countries. All countries except the UK and Estonia have RRW vote totals above 10%, which deems a 16% threshold appropriate (NSD, 2019). There are four parties above the crossover point, and six are below it. The bottom anchor point of 5% was selected because several countries have a 5% threshold for entering parliament⁴ and only one case (the UK with 1.83%), falls below this anchor point. It should be noted that Fidesz and PiS are evolving parties, making them classic examples for the 'contamination' process, but their shifts do make classification more difficult.

Condition 2 – Polling Results

The scholarly interest in determining immigration's impact on RRW success has grown tremendously over the last decade. This is highlighted by the difficulty that Dancygier and Margalit (2018) expressed in the lack of data on political parties immigration stances for their study, *The Evolution of the Immigration Debate*. They pointed out that the CPM did not start coding for immigration separately until 2009 and then only in a few countries (Dancygier & Margalit, 2018, p. 3).

⁴ Germany, Slovakia, Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia and Poland all have 5% minimum thresholds for single parties. Sweden has a 4% threshold, Norway a 0.7% and France uses a two-tier system, while the UK uses first past the post (Spoon 2011; Cabada, Hlousek and Jurek 2014).

The author of this study struggled with deciding the best way to assess immigration's effect on MSPs shifting immigration policies in relation to RRW party success. Ultimately this paper ended up choosing the polling results over a change in migrant stock, as many of the included countries have low migrant levels (see Table A10 in Appendix). Frequent studies use polling data to assess public opinion on immigration views with several finding evidence that parties and politicians react to public opinion⁵ including (Pardos-Prado, 2015, p. 354; Meijers, 2015; Kluver & Spoon, 2014, p. 636; Adams, et al., 2009, p. 512). Adams (2004) adds the caveat that this is only observed when public opinion shifts against a party's position (Adams, et al., 2004, p. 590).


Three questions were selected from the special Eurobarometer 469 (2018) that focused on immigration issues (European Commission, 2018). Two questions asked if immigrants' worsened crime and if they were a burden on the welfare system, while the third asked how successful or unsuccessful integration efforts were in their country. All three were averaged to combine each country's results from all the questions into one result. The details on each country's public perception of immigration for all of the questions can be seen in Table A8 of the Appendix. Germany had the highest anti-immigrant perceptions at 66%, and the UK had the lowest numbers at 37.33%, which were consistent with Mudde's (2010) research. While there is no clear gap between the cases on this condition, 50% is a logical crossover point for determining when public opinion is favorable or unfavorable towards immigration. Of course, if a party received 30% of the vote in an election that would indicate significant support; however, in polling on this issue, 50% is appropriate. The point when a country reaches non-membership will be 40%. Only France and the UK were below that threshold and Poland is the most ambiguous case at 50.37% and would be 'more in than out' of the set of anti-immigrant public opinion.

To check the robustness of the special Eurobarometer 469, the most important problem/issue (MIP) question from the 2013 and 2017 Eurobarometer were reviewed. Except for the UK who ranked immigration as the second MIP, all the other countries ranked it sixth or lower, but in the 2017 survey, six countries had moved immigration into one of their top two MIP's, while France and the UK ranked it third, with Poland 5th, Estonia 7th, and Slovakia 8th. This is mostly in-line

⁵ Vranceanu (2017) showed that that public opinion only had an effect after the RRW party received more than 3% of the vote indicating these two conditions work in combination (Vranceanu, 2017, pp. 6-8).

with the Eurobarometer 469 (see Table A8 in the Appendix for full results), and they track with the EU as a whole (See Figure 4.1 below).

Figure 4.1- MIP Facing the EU



Condition 3 – Purple Grand Coalition

Selecting the third condition was difficult, as party size and government status were initially considered, but they were more suitable for a party specific QCA (Spoon & Klüver, 2014). Each of them was shown to be applicable conditions for MSPs shifts, but the strength of the QCA method is its ability to highlight deviant cases while maintaining overall context and complexity. The logical contradictions presented in the analysis of electoral system conditions facilitated a back and forth between theory and data that is so beneficial in the qualitative case comparison approach. The deviant cases in the Netherlands, Germany, and to a lesser extent, Estonia were puzzling. The first two both experienced significant RRW party success and anti-immigration public opinion but did not show the same shifts seen in other cases with similar RRW success and anti-immigrant public opinion (Van Spanje, 2010, pp. 578-79).

After re-examining the deviant cases to see what differences accounted for the dissimilar outcomes, the author of this thesis noticed that each of these countries had something none of the other cases had, i.e. the leading LMP and RMP were in a PGC. Reviewing existing literature revealed that PGC's in Germany were more constrained than a typical coalition (Moury &

Ferguson, 2013, p. 31). She went on to show that 60% of the cabinet decision in Merkel I (2005-2009), were based on the coalition agreement and described the process as ‘undoubtedly constrained.’ Saalfeld (2010) added that coalition bargaining has two stages, ‘pre-agreement stage’ and ‘post-agreement stage’ but he stressed that the bargaining is an ‘ongoing process’ that goes on throughout the life of the coalition (Saalfeld, 2010, p. 83). The Netherlands coalition process is described by Moury and Timmermans (2013) as ‘highly constrained’ (Moury & Timmermans, 2013, p. 88). While Marc Debus (2007) shows that the three main coalition partners since 1980 have been PvdA, VVD, and CDA, he points out that policy goals are the top focus of coalition bargaining in the Netherlands, and the policy agreements become the most important document of the coalition (Debus, 2007, p. 72).

A csQCA will be used to calibrate this condition and Germany, Estonia, and the Netherlands were assigned a 0.0⁶ as a member of the PGC set, indicating high constraint in shifting immigration policies. Cases that were *not* in a PGC were given a 1.0, indicating no constraint for shifting policies. The most unclear cases were in the Czech Republic, where ANO had been in a Grand Coalition with CSSD and KDH from 2013-17, but ANO is considered a center party with a broad left-right ideology. While the overall diversity of this condition is limited, PGCs reveal a key defining difference in the cases, making it an essential condition for this study (see Table A1 in the Appendix).

Section 4.2 - Dialogue of Theory & Data

Before examining how the author of this thesis calibrated and operationalized the conditions for this QCA, reviewing the back and forth that took place between ideas and evidence during the country-wide electoral system analysis will be helpful. For this QCA, seven possible conditions were considered. Needing to stick with country-wide conditions made party size and government participation problematic since they were individual party characteristics. That left the three conditions used, as well as district proportionality and electoral system volatility as possible conditions. With only ten cases using more than three conditions would create a significant logical contradiction problem, so PGC’s were chosen over volatility, although

⁶ This seems counter intuitive at first glance but assigning a 0.0 is the only way to code the condition in the ‘correct direction’ (Gerrits & Verweij, 2018, p. 94).

volatility proved to be a noteworthy condition. The details and diverse conditions on all the parties were coded as outlined in Table 4.3 below.

Table 4.3 *Conditions and Outcome calibration thresholds for QCA 1*

Outcome & Conditions	Description	Calibration
SHIFT	Change in Chapel Hill survey ratings on immigration policy and multiculturalism between 2014 and 2017.	1 = 15 percent 0.5 = 7 percent 0 = 0 percent
RRWVOTE	Vote share of the RRW parties in the latest national election.	1 = 23 percent 0.5 = 16 percent 0 = 0.5 percent
POLL	Anti-immigration public opinion attitudes.	1 = 60 percent 0.5 = 50 percent 0 = 40 percent
PGC	Member of a Purple Grand Coalition.	1 = Not member 0 = Member

After assigning each condition to a fsQCA or csQCA and calibrating the anchor points and additional thresholds, all the data was transferred into the final calibrated data matrix in Table 4.4 below (also see raw and calibrated data in Table A13 of the Appendix). The data matrix shows the scores each case received for all conditions and the outcome. This data matrix is the key step in developing the truth table. The back and forth between theory and data was not a linear process, and other researchers may take exception to these decisions, but once the author of this paper felt comfortable that the cases, conditions, and outcome were in line with the underlying theory, the analysis moved forward.

Table 4.4- QCA 1 Country Wide Raw and Calibrated Data Matrix

Country	AVG. SHIFT 14 vs. 17†		Anti-Immigration Polling AVG.*		RRW Vote°		Purple Grand Coalition‡
	raw	fuzzy	raw	fuzzy	raw	fuzzy	Crisp
CZ	16.38%	0.97	59.67%	0.95	14.27%	0.38	1
EE	-3.45%	0.01	57.7%	0.91	8.30%	0.11	0
FR	-0.08%	0.01	48.67%	0.4	14.37%	0.39	1
DE	7.72%	0.57	66.00%	0.99	13.00%	0.31	0
HU	19.94%	0.99	64.67%	0.99	19.21%	0.8	1
NL	5.47%	0.34	55.00%	0.82	15.50%	0.47	0
PL	18.31%	0.99	50.67%	0.55	21.25%	0.9	1
SK	20.1%	0.99	55.00%	0.82	23.31%	0.96	1
SW	38.78%	1	58.33%	0.92	18.12%	0.71	1
UK	0.69%	0.06	37.33%	0.02	1.83%	0.02	1

†Shift: Data was taken from Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk, et al., 2017). *Polling: Data was taken from special Eurobarometer 469 (European Commission, Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, 2018). °RRW Vote: Data was taken from last parliamentary election in each country (NSD, 2019). ‡Purple Grand Coalitions: Data was taken from Party Facts website (Party Facts, 2019).

Section 4.3 – Results

This section will present the truth table (TT) and provide an explanation on the three steps required in the comparative procedure, as well as details of the analysis including the necessity assessment, sufficiency assessment, minimization process, and negated assessment.

Section 4.3.1 - Necessity Assessment

Since the QCA technique is designed to identify necessary and sufficient conditions, the first step is to examine if a single condition was necessary to explain the rightward shift in a party’s position on immigration issues (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). A necessary condition is one that must be present in cases that show a significant shift to the right on immigration issues. Necessary conditions are rare when researching complex systems, as typically many different conditions combine to produce an outcome (Gerrits & Verweij, 2018, pp. 87-89). To determine if a condition is necessary, this paper will consider if a party shifted to the right as a subset of this condition. This means that when an outcome shifts right, or Y is present, we will see the condition X present as Y would not occur without X.

With the outcome of shifting immigration positions right, the analysis showed the following consistency scores for each of the conditions: POLL (0.874); RRWVOTE (0.75); PGCs (0.845). No necessary conditions were found when testing for the absence of any of the conditions leading to parties significantly shifting immigration positions to the right, as can be seen in Table

4.5. Also, in Table 4.5 we see that POLL was the condition with the highest consistency score, but this is still lower than the recommended .090 consistency score that would indicate a perfect subset relationship between the condition of anti-immigration public opinion (POLL) and the outcome of shifting immigration positions right (SHIFTR). Therefore, it cannot be considered a necessary condition (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 278).


Additionally, the XY graph in Figure 4.2 below shows the connection between anti-immigration public opinion and shifting immigration positions to the right which indicates that the POLL is more of a sufficient than necessary condition as the cases that showed membership in SHIFTR are mostly clustered into the upper right corner of the graph. All the cases with positive outcomes were a member of the anti-immigrant public opinion set with PL being the closest to falling out of the set with a 0.55 score.

The absence of parties shifting their immigration policies to the right was also assessed to determine if there were any necessary conditions, but the highest score for any condition was POLL at 0.609, which is not close to the 0.90 threshold. This confirms that high anti-immigration public opinion was not a necessary condition for parties shifting policies to the right, and low anti-immigration public opinion was not a necessary condition that leads to parties *not* shifting their policies to the right.

Table 4.5 QCA 1 Conditions tested for Necessity

	Consistency	Coverage
PGC	0.844857	0.715714
~PGC	0.155143	0.306667
RRWVOTE	0.748735	0.879208
~RRWVOTE	0.377740	0.452525
POLL	0.873524	0.702849
~POLL	0.175379	0.395437

Figure 4.2- QCA 1 XY Plot



Section 4.3.2 - Sufficiency Assessment

The results of the calibration analysis on all 10 cases, as presented in Table 4.1, were then entered onto the fs/QCA 3.0 software to develop a TT. This is the first step in the comparison process (Gerrits & Verweij, 2018, p. 89). In this step, this analysis will determine which conditions or combination of conditions, are sufficient to produce the outcome of interest. While checking for necessity focused on consistency—asking if Y required X to occur, sufficiency signifies that X leads to Y all by itself. When researching complex systems, the “equifinality” concept posits there will typically be more than one condition or combination of conditions leading to an outcome, so there could be more than one sufficient condition for Y (Gerrits & Verweij, 2018, p. 28).

In Table 4.6 below all the cases calibrated fuzzy set scores (for each condition and the outcome from Table 4.1) have been dichotomized and given either a 0.0 or 1.0 score. Table 4.6 shows, that out of the eight possible logical combinations, four are empirically present in the data, leaving rows (5 to 8) as logical reminders. Based on the set scores of the cases, the consistency column in Table 4.6 shows how strongly or to what degree a combination is a subset of the outcome of interest. This consistency level should be based on theory, but most scholars suggest anything below 0.75 should be a cause for concern (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p.

279). In this paper, a consistency of 0.76 was considered sufficient to produce a position shift. This makes sense empirically as there is a significant drop in consistency scores from row three to four (Van Kessel, 2015, p. 87; Gerrits & Verweij, 2018, p. 102). Therefore, our focus will be on the 5 cases in the first two rows as they show the strongest consistency scores for the outcome of interest.

Table 4.6- QCA 1 Country Electoral System Truth Table for SHIFTR


Conditions				Outcome	Consistency	Number	Cases
Row	POLL	RRWVOTE	PGC	SHIFTR			
#1	1	1	1	1	0.896458	4	HU, POL, SK, SW
#2	1	0	1	1	0.766467	1	CZ
#3	1	0	0	0	0.436019	3	EE, NL, DE*
#4	0	0	1	0	0.188172	2	FR, UK
#5/8	Empty truth table rows: no cases available						
*logical contradictions							

This TT presents one concern that needs to be considered. First, the four empty rows or logical reminders could indicate a limited diversity issue, but with only ten cases for this analysis, it was expected that not all combinations would be found, resulting in what is termed ‘arithmetic reminders’ (Gerrits & Verweij, 2018, pp. 99-100). Adding more cases would possibly reduce the logical reminders, but the CHES data made that impossible.

Figure 4.3 provides a visualization of the TT in Table 4.6 above. It shows the conditions and associated observations while color coding the intersections by outcome value.

- There are eight zones (configurations) that correspond to the eight rows of the TT above.
- The logical contradiction (DE) in zone 100 is highlighted by the diagonal lines as indicated by the “C” label. This zone also includes the EE and NL cases.
- Four cases (HU, PO, SK, SE), in zone 111 include all the conditions and lead to a [1] outcome.
- One configuration with a [1] outcome covers the CZ case.
- Two cases (FR, UK), include only one condition and have a [0] outcome.
- Logical remainders include the empty white zones and are designated by the “R” label indicating no cases for those zones. The 10 cases are observed in only four configurations.

Figure 4.3- Three-set Venn diagram showing results of TT.
 Venn diagram produced by the “visualizer” tool, in TOSMANA 1.52.



Section 4.3.3 – Minimization

The next step in the comparison process uses Boolean logic through pairwise comparison to simplify complex combinations of conditions and minimize them down to the ‘solution formula’ (Gerrits & Verweij, 2018; Ragin, 2008). This identifies the conditions that are irrelevant to the outcome of interest so that they can be discarded. What is left are the ‘prime implicants’ or ‘solution formula,’ which in the basic version allows for simpler statements about the necessity or sufficiency of conditions. Following best practices outlined by Schneider & Wagemann (2010) and to avoid transcribing errors, as mentioned above, I used the fsQCA 3.0 software to complete the minimalization process. The software presents three separate analyses which offer different levels of scrutiny (by how the logical reminders are handled): a complex, a parsimonious, and an intermediate, middle-ground solution.

The complex, parsimonious, and intermediate analysis produced the same results, showing the prime implicants of PGC*POLL was the only combination of conditions that helps explain the outcome, shifting immigration positions to the right. Encouragingly, PGC*POLL showed a strong 0.916 consistency score, which is well above the 0.75 recommended threshold (Gerrits & Verweij, 2018, p. 111). This solution formula is a conjunction written as PGC*POLL → SHIFTR⁷ with a solid consistency score of 0.916 and adequate coverage score of 0.718. Coverage measures the empirical relevance of how a ‘condition, configuration, or solution formula accounts for all the instances of an outcome’ (Gerrits & Verweij, 2018, p. 111).

Table 4.7 – QCA 1 Country Electoral System Sufficient Configurations for SHIFTR

No.	Minimized Configuration	Consistency	Coverage Raw	Coverage Unique	Cases
#1	PGC *POLL	0.916	0.718	0.718	HU (0.99,0.99), CZ (0.95,0.97), SW (0.92,1), SK (0.82,0.99), POL (0.55,0.99)
	Solution	0.916	0.718		

The configuration in Table 4.7 above identifies a ‘path’ or ‘recipe/formula’ with two conditions that lead to the outcome of the MSPs within a country shifting immigration policies to the right. This path covers five of the same cases with only the logical contradiction of Germany lowering the consistency score of this solution formula.

The hardest calibration decision in this first QCA was choosing 7% as the crossover point for the SHIFTR outcome. This had a big impact on the one logical contradiction because Germany would not have exhibited the outcome had the crossover point be placed at 10%. It should be pointed out that the 24.26% shift of the FDP (who were not a member of the PGC) brought Germany’s average up considerably. Another difficult decision of whether to place the crossover point for RRWVOTE change at either 14% or 16%, could make a significant impact on the solution result. The close RRW parties vote share in all the countries makes this small change a factor to consider, as it impacts the Czech Republic, French, and Netherlands cases, respectively.

Section 4.3.4 - Negated Assessment

It will be useful to review the negated outcome to identify what conditions may not lead to position shifting. By following the same steps outlined above for the first analysis using a 0.860

⁷ In Boolean algebra this symbol indicates: ‘*’ a logical ‘AND’.

consistency threshold, we see the complex solutions in the negated analysis had similar consistency scores of the five cases in the first two rows. Two solutions were identified, $PGC*\sim RRWVOTE*\sim POLL + \sim PGC*\sim RRWVOTE*POLL \rightarrow \sim SHIFT$. The parsimonious analysis simplified it down to $\sim POLL + \sim PGC \rightarrow \sim SHIFT$. The results point out that parties that do not shift immigration policies to the right are in countries with low anti-immigration attitudes, and the party participated in a PGC. Complex solution consistency is 0.848, and coverage is 0.869. In Table 4.8 below, the UK and French parties had low anti-immigration attitudes, and the German, Netherlands, and Estonia cases were in a PGCs. Asymmetry rarely occurs in complex systems, nor is it the goal of a QCA study (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 79). Of course, we can see an opposite result from the first analysis, but a closer examination of Table 4.8 below shows significant differences in both consistency and coverage, keeping the rows from being a mirror reflection. This negated analysis is informative and reinforces the first analysis.

Table 4.8 – QCA 1 Negated Country Electoral System Truth Table for $\sim SHIFTR$

Conditions				Outcome	Consistency	Number	Cases
Row	PGC	RRWVOTE	POLL	$\sim SHIFTR$			
#1	0	0	1	1	0.876777	3	EE, NL, DE*
#2	1	0	0	1	0.860215	2	FR, UK
#3	1	0	1	0	0.287425	1	CZ
#4	1	1	1	0	0.128065	4	HU, POL, SLK, SW
#5/8	Empty truth table rows: no cases available						
*logical contradiction							

4.3.5 Result Summary

These results show that participating in a PGC and high anti-immigration public opinion are significant conditions leading to the outcome of interest. This country electoral systems analysis was done to help understand the overall circumstances impacting party competition within these countries as a whole. This investigation has shed light on some of the conditions we should include in the next QCA analysis. More importantly, it identified how PGC's seem to provide an explanation for the deviate cases of the Netherlands, Germany, and Estonia. None of these cases experienced a significant shift to the right despite experiencing high anti-immigration public opinion.

These results (seen in Figure 4.4 below) seem to support the public opinion hypothesis as public opinion was shown to be a sufficient condition. The RRW relevance hypothesis appears in four cases, but again we see how calibration can impact results and the 16% cross over point was just over the CZ and NL cases which would have impacted their scores. Obviously, the vote change hypothesis is not applicable to this country-wide analysis.

Figure 4.4- Results of QCA 1

Conditions	QCA 1 - Solution Formula 1
RRW Vote Totals	
Anti-Immigration Public Opinion	●
Center-left, center-right Parties NOT being a Member of a Purple Grand Coalition.	●
Cases covered by the solution formula	Hungary; Czech Republic; Sweden; Slovakia; Poland

Section 5 - QCA 2- Proximate Conditions

Although the countrywide QCA above shed light on a few of the top associations for MSPs shifting ideological positions to the right, this second QCA digs deeper into the ten countries' electoral systems that were analyzed in the first QCA by examining the 28 individual MSPs (10 LMPs and 18 RMPs). Using the same outcome and three of the conditions from the countrywide analysis above, this QCA will add the condition of MSPs relative vote change. This should provide a more in-depth look at the party competition within each country (see Table 5.1 below and Table A2 the appendix). This proximate QCA will include conditions that are more electorally centered and subject to voters' choices and opinions.

Additionally, this section will provide details on some of the theories concerning MSPs relative vote change condition but will not repeat the theoretical aspects that were in Section 4 for MSPs shifting right as the outcome of interest, along with the conditions anti-immigrant public opinion, RRW vote totals, and PGC's. However, it will focus on the calibration process as it relates to individual parties and not countries. Please refer to Section 4 for the theoretical explanation for MSPs shifting right, anti-immigrant public opinion, RRW vote totals, and PGC's.

Table 5.1 - QCA 2 Raw Data Matrix

Party	Party Name	AVG. SHIFT 14 vs. 17 [†]	Anti-Immigration Polling AVG.*	RRW Vote [°]	MSPs Relative Vote Change [^]	Purple Grand Coalition [‡]
CSSD	Czech Social Dem. Party	23.51%	59.67%	14.27%	-68.85%	No
ODS	Civic Democratic Party	2.47%	59.67%	14.27%	-19.00%	No
ANO	Action of Diss. Citizens	22.86%	59.67%	14.27%	58.84%	No
SDE	Social Democratic Party	-9.44%	57.7%	8.3%	-9.75%	Yes
ER	Estonian Reform Party	-5.72%	57.7%	8.3%	-1.77%	Yes
EK	Estonian Centre Party	4.81%	57.7%	8.3%	0.40%	Yes
PS	Socialist Party	-7.37%	48.67%	14.37%	-72.49%	No
LR/UMP	Rep. Union for Pop Mov.	5.96%	48.67%	14.37%	-52.90%	No
SPD	Social Democratic Party	2.52%	66.00%	13.00%	-18%	Yes
CDU	Christian Dem. Union	0.32%	66.00%	13.00%	-12.70%	Yes
CSU	Christian Social Union	3.89%	66.00%	13.00%	-10.79%	Yes
FDP	Free Democratic Party	24.26%	66.00%	13.00%	10.31%	No
MSzPL	Hungarian Socialist Party	0.04%	64.67%	19.21%	-46.91%	No
Fidesz	Hungarian Civ. Union	19.90%	64.67%	19.21%	0.96%	No
PvdA	Labour Party	2.39%	55.00%	15.50%	-74.32%	Yes
VVD	People's Party Free & Dem	6.75%	55.00%	15.50%	-9.55%	Yes
CDA	Christian Dem. Appeal	7.38%	55.00%	15.50%	12.22%	No
SLD	Democratic Left Alliance	11.64%	50.67%	21.22%	-29.57%	No
PO	Civic Platform	8.15%	50.67%	21.22%	-40.28%	No
PiS	Law and Justice Party	35.14%	50.67%	21.22%	21.25%	No
Smer	Direction- Social Dem.	22.19%	55.00%	23.58%	-28.59%	No
KDH	Christian Dem. Movement	-1.63%	55.00%	23.58%	-40.91%	No
SaS	Freedom and Solidarity	39.73%	55.00%	23.58%	34.30%	No
SAP	Swedish Social Dem. Party	34.81%	58.33%	18.12%	-8.35%	No
M	Moderate Party	43.96%	58.33%	18.12%	-25.68%	No
KD	Christian Dem.	37.57%	58.33%	18.12%	24.29%	No
Lab	Labour Party	-0.92%	37.33%	1.83%	34.68%	No
Cons	Conservative Party	-0.45%	37.33%	1.83%	16.32%	No

[†]Shift: Data was taken from Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk, et al., 2017).
^{*}Polling: Data was taken from special Eurobarometer 469 (European Commission, 2018).
[°]RRW Vote: Data was taken from last parliamentary election in each country (NSD, 2019).
[^]MSPs Vote Change: Data was taken from the last parliamentary election in each country (NSD, 2019).
[‡]Purple Grand Coalitions: Data was taken from PartyFacts website (Party Facts, 2019).

Section 5.1 - Operationalization & Calibration

Outcome – MSPs Shift to Right

This is the same outcome that was used in the first countrywide QCA above. More details about the CHES survey, the wording of the questions and how the shift was computed between the 2014 and 2017 results can be seen in Table A4a, A4b, A4c and A4d in the Appendix.

The party with the biggest shift was the Moderate party's 44.06% in Sweden, leaving Estonia's Social Democrat Party on the low end and actually shifting to the left by 9.44%. Unsurprisingly, as predicted by Spoon & Kluver (2015), LMPs (7.93%) shifted far less than the RMPs (12.67%) despite Sweden's SAP, Slovakia's Smer and the Czech Republic's CSSD all shifting more than 20% (Spoon & Kluver, 2015). The liberal parties and ANO average shift was 14.53%, and the average shift for all parties was 11.22%. For a party to display full membership in the outcome, they must have experienced a shift of over 1.5 points or 15%. A shift of this proportion indicates they have moved their positions on immigration significantly to the right. The crossover point is 7%, which means cases that have shifted more than 7%, will be 'more in than out' of the group of parties that have shifted their positions on immigration to the right. Cases below 7%, will be 'more out than in,' indicating insignificant policy shifts. This leaves 13 parties above the 7% threshold and 15 below 7%. The Netherlands provided the two most ambiguous cases with the CDA shifting 7.38% and VVD 6.75%.

It should be noted that all RRW parties received nine or higher scores on both questions with the exception of Poland's K15's 8.7 on multiculturalism. The only three RRW parties to shift to the left on any of the questions were VVD's 4.4% and UKIP's 6.4% shift on immigration, as well as SNS's 0.3% and UKIP's 0.8% shift on multiculturalism. None of these shifts lowered their scores below nine (see Table A4d in Appendix).

Condition 1 - RRW Vote Totals

This exact condition was used in the first countrywide QCA above. Data on the vote totals of all RRW parties used for each country in this study can be seen in Table A6 of the Appendix. Full membership for this condition is 23% or more of the vote. Once a party achieves over a fifth of a nation's vote, this thesis deems them to be highly relevant. The crossover point will be set at 16%, and the most ambiguous cases will be the Netherlands, where RRW vote totals were 15.5%. This analysis will consider it to be more 'out than in' despite the proximity to the threshold. The author of this paper moved the crossover points up from the 20% and 10% that

Van Kessel (2015) used in his populist study because RRW parties are often shunned by mainstream parties when forming governments. This is probably why only the Slovakian MSPs are in coalition with an RRW party despite the high vote share the RRW parties have received in many countries. All countries except the UK and Estonia⁸ have RRW vote totals above 10%, which deems a 16% threshold appropriate (NSD, 2019). There are 16 parties above the crossover point, and 12 are below it. The bottom anchor point of 5% was selected because several countries have a 5% threshold for entering parliament⁹ and only one case (the UK with 1.83%), falls below this anchor point. It should be noted that Fidesz and PiS are evolving parties, making them classic examples for the ‘contamination’ process, but their shifts do make classification more difficult.

Condition 2 – Polling Results

A countries anti-immigration opinion is another of the conditions that were used in the first QCA. The details on each country’s public perception of immigration for all of the survey questions can be seen in Table A8 of the Appendix. Germany had the highest anti-immigrant perceptions at 66%, and the UK had the lowest numbers at 37.33%, which were consistent with Mudde’s (2010) research. While there is no clear gap between the cases on this condition, 50% is a logical crossover point for determining when public opinion is favorable or unfavorable towards immigration. Of course, parties that receive 30% of the vote in a typical election gain significant relevance; however, in polling on this issue, 50% is appropriate. The point when a country reaches non-membership will be 40%. Only France and the UK were below that threshold and Poland is the most ambiguous case at 50.37% and would be ‘more in than out’ of the set of anti-immigrant public opinion.

To check the robustness of the special Eurobarometer 469, this author looked at the MIP question from the 2013 and 2017 Eurobarometer. Except for the UK who ranked immigration as the second MIP, all the other countries ranked it sixth or lower, but in the 2017 survey, six

⁸ Estonia’s 2019 election where EKRE received 17.8%, is not included in this thesis as it was too far past the CHES 2017 survey.

⁹ Germany, Slovakia, Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia and Poland all have 5% minimum thresholds for single parties. Sweden has a 4% threshold, Norway a 0.7% and France uses a two-tier system, while the UK uses first past the post (Spoon 2011; Cabada, Hlousek and Jurek 2014).

countries had moved immigration into one of their top two MIP's, while France and the UK ranked it third, with Poland 5th, Estonia 7th, and Slovakia 8th. This is mostly in-line with the Eurobarometer 469 (see Table A8 in the Appendix for full results), and they track with the EU as a whole (See Figure 4.1 in Section 4 above).

Condition 3 – Purple Grand Coalition

This is the last condition that was used in the countrywide QCA above. A csQCA will be used to calibrate this condition, and eight LMPs or RMPs in Germany, Estonia, and the Netherlands were in a PGC for a significant period covered by this study. Germany included the CDU/CSU-SPD from 2013 to the present, Estonia included the ER-Pro Patria-SDE from 2010 - 2016, as well as the EK-SDE-IRL from 2016 to the present, and the Netherlands included VVD-PvdA from 2012 – 2016. Each of these parties was assigned a 0.0¹⁰ as a member of the PGC set, indicating high constraint in shifting immigration policies. Cases that were *not* in a PGC were given a 1.0, indicating no constraint for shifting policies. The most unclear cases were in the Czech Republic, where ANO had been in a Grand Coalition with CSSD and KDH from 2013-17, but ANO is considered a center party with a broad left-right ideology. While the overall diversity of this condition is limited, PGCs reveal a key defining difference in the cases, making it an essential condition for this study (see Table 5.2 below and A12 in the Appendix).

Table 5.2. Government Coalitions

Country	Parties	PGC	Years	Parties	Years	PGC
CZ	ANO-CSSD-KDH	No	2013-2017	ANO-CSSD	2017-today	No
DE	CDU/CSU-SPD	Yes	2013-2017	CDU/CSU-SPD	2017-today	Yes
EE	ER-Pro Patria-SDE	Yes	2014-2016	EK-SDE-IRL	2016-2019	Yes
FR	PS-EELV	No	2012-2017	REM-MOD	2017-today	No
HU	Fidesz-KNDP	No	2014-2018	Fidesz-KNDP	2018-today	No
NL	VVD-PvdA	Yes	2012-2017	VVD-D66-CDA-CU	2017-today	No
PL	PO-PSL	No	2011-2015	PiS	2015-today	No
SK	Smer	No	2012-2016	Smer-SNS-Most-Hid	2016-today	No
SE	SPL-MP	No	2014-2018	SPL-MP-C	2018-today	No
UK	Cons	No	2012-2016	Cons-DUP	2017-today	No

Source: (Party Facts, 2019)

¹⁰ This seems counter intuitive at first glance but assigning a 0.0 is the only way to code the condition in the correct direction (Gerrits & Verweij, 2018, p. 94).

Condition 4 – MSPs Relative Vote Change

Researchers have found that past election results impact a party's future policy positions (Budge, 1994, pp. 453-454). Han (2015), found that past electoral results affected MSPs positions on multiculturalism, particularly with RMPs and Abou-Chadi & Orłowski's (2016) study showed that past election results affected MSPs positions and that party size was also a factor. Although Adams, et al. (2004) found no evidence of parties adjusting positions based on past elections.

Dassonneville (2018) showed how higher volatility led to parties shifting positions, and Somer-Topcu (2009) found that losing votes had a bigger impact on party shifts than increasing vote share. This thesis will use these studies examples for this condition and use relative vote change for each party by taking each parties' percentage of votes won in their last election and subtracting that result from the average total of the two elections prior to the last one. The result is then divided by the difference from the two election average, which provides the relative vote change. This allows a more accurate comparison of how much a parties' vote changed regardless of how big or small the party is. For example- Slovakia's KDH had an average total from the 2009 and 2013 elections of 8.36%, but their 2016 results were only 4.94%, which was a -3.42% change. The -3.42% is divided by the 8.36% then multiplied by 100 showing a relative change of -40.91%. Smer had a larger change of -11.32% which was subtracted from their 39.60% two election average, resulting in a -28.59% relative change. KDH had a smaller actual vote loss than Smer, but it was a much bigger percentage loss in relative terms.

Setting the crossover point for this condition was a bit tricky, as the theory points out that both a vote loss and vote gain can cause parties to shift positions (Han, 2015, p. 560). All across Europe, MSPs have been losing votes, and in Hobolt & Tilley's (2016) post-Eurozone crisis study they describe this as voters 'fleeing the center' for challenger or niche parties, and the empirical results from these 28 countries back them up (Hobolt & Tilley, 2016). Eighteen MSPs in this study lost 139.34%, while ten MSPs gained 41.07%, for a total net vote loss of 98.27% and a relative change of -356.84%, with LMPs averaging a 9.46% vote loss and RMPs a 6.02% loss. The details of average vote gains and losses for LMPs and RMPs, as well as average relative changes, can be found in Table A11 in the Annex.

Membership in the set of significant vote change was determined by using a csQCA and considering any vote loss greater than -20%, or any gain over 10% for the crossover point. The party with the biggest relative loss was the PvdA's -74.32% in the Netherlands, and the biggest relative gain was ANO's 58.84% in the Czech Republic. Both of these cases would be considered more in than out of the set and receive a calibrated score of 1.0, indicating significant relative change. While the lowest relative loss was the ER's 1.77% in Estonia and the EK's 0.4% also in Estonia indicating little relative change and a calibrated score of 0.0. The cases closest to the cutoff point were Germany's FDP with a 10.3% on the positive side, putting them more in than out of the set for significant relative change and Czech Republic's ODS 19% on the loss side, keeping them more out than in of the significant relative change group of parties.

Section 5.2 - Dialogue of Theory & Data

Reviewing the back and forth that took place between ideas and evidence during the calibration and operationalization process for this QCA before examining the results will be helpful. A variety of possible country and party specific conditions were originally considered for this thesis. They included RRW vote totals, anti-immigration public opinion, migrant stock numbers, PGC's, MSPs relative vote change, government or opposition status, party size, party leader change, party family type, volatility in the electoral system, party institutionalism, district magnitude, and government history. After finishing the literature and theory reviews, as well as the countrywide QCA in Section 4, this second QCA settled on the four conditions identified above. The third remote QCA will allow four additional conditions to be analyzed next.

It is important to review how helpful the deviant cases in the first QCA were in illuminating PGC's as a key condition for the outcome of interest. It was hard to understand why Germany and the Netherlands did not have bigger ideological shifts as they both had high anti-immigration polling numbers and an increasing RRW vote. This led to a reexamination of these cases to identify anything that would indicate why those two countries and Estonia to a lesser extent, were deviating from the norm. Upon closer examination, the author of this thesis found what appeared to be the key difference — Grand Coalitions — specifically, PGC with the LMPs and RMPs. Germany, the Netherlands, and Estonia were the only cases that had PGC's, and once that condition was added to the countrywide analysis, the associations were revealed (Gerrits & Verweij, 2018, p. 99).

With this new information, this proximate QCA settled on RRW vote, polling results, relative vote change of parties, and PGC status as conditions for the QCA analysis. Of course, the identical decisions faced in the first QCA when calibrating the thresholds for party shift, RRW vote totals, and anti-immigration public opinion were handled the same in this second QCA. For party shift, 15%, 7%, and 0% were used, and with RRW vote 23%, 16%, and 5% were chosen, although the struggle between 14% and 16% mentioned in the first QCA impacted eight party's membership scores in this set. Additionally, this QCA considered using the change in RRW vote in the last election from the average of the previous two elections but ended up sticking with the basic RRW vote total in the last election. Another decision point included using a four-value fuzzy set vs. crisp set for calibrating relative vote change. A crisp set was selected as this author felt that once a party's vote change reached the +10% or -20% range, the fine grading would not have made a real impact. Also, +10% and -20% were selected as the crossover point because most all the MSPs are losing votes with very few gaining, so a higher number on the negative side reflected the current situation more accurately (Hobolt & Tilley, 2016). The details and diverse conditions on all the parties were coded as outlined in Table 5.3 below.

Table 5.3. Conditions and Outcome calibration thresholds for QCA 2

Outcome & Conditions	Description	Calibration
SHIFT	Change in Chapel Hill survey ratings on immigration policy and multiculturalism between 2014 and 2017.	1 = 15 percent 0.5 = 7 percent 0 = 0 percent
RRWVOTE	Vote share of the RRW parties in the latest national election.	1 = 23 percent 0.5 = 14 percent 0 = 0.5 percent
POLL	Anti-immigration public opinion attitudes.	1 = 60 percent 0.5 = 50 percent 0 = 40 percent
RELCHANG	The MSPs relative change in vote totals from last election compared to the two previous elections average.	1 = over +10 or -20 percent 0 = +9.9 to -19.9 percent
PGC	Member of a Purple Grand Coalition.	1 = Not member 0 = Member

After assigning each condition to a fsQCA or csQCA and calibrating the anchor points and additional thresholds, all the data was transferred into the final calibrated data matrix in Table 5.4 below (also see raw and calibrated data in Table A14 of the Appendix). The data matrix shows the scores each case received for all conditions and the outcome. This data matrix is the key step in developing the truth table. The back and forth between theory and data was not a linear process, and other researchers may take exception to these decisions, but once the author of this paper felt comfortable that the cases, conditions, and outcome were in line with the underlying theory, the author moved forward with the analysis.

Table 5.4. Raw and Calibrated Data for the QCA 2

Case	Conditions							Outcome	
	RRWVOTE°		POLL*		RELCHANGE^		PGC‡	SHIFT†	
	raw	fuzzy	raw	fuzzy	raw	crisp	crisp	raw	fuzzy
CZ-ANO	14.27	0.39	59.67	0.98	58.84	1	1	22.86	1
CZ-CSSD	14.27	0.39	59.67	0.98	-68.85	1	1	23.51	1
CZ-ODS	14.27	0.39	59.67	0.98	-19	0	1	2.47	0.13
DE-CDU	13	0.32	66	1	-12.7	0	0	0.32	0.05
DE-CSU	13	0.32	66	1	-10.79	0	0	3.89	0.21
DE-FDP	13	0.32	66	1	10.31	0	1	24.26	0.13
DE-SPD	13	0.32	66	1	-18	1	0	2.52	1
EE-EK	8.3	0.12	57.7	0.91	0.4	0	0	4.81	0.28
EE-ER	8.3	0.12	57.7	0.91	-1.77	0	0	-5.72	0
EE-SDE	8.3	0.12	57.7	0.91	-9.75	0	0	-9.44	0
FR-LR/UMP	14.37	0.4	48.67	0.4	-52.9	1	1	5.96	0.4
FR-PS	14.37	0.4	48.67	0.4	-72.49	1	1	-7.37	0
HU-Fidesz	19.21	0.75	64.67	1	0.96	0	1	19.9	1
HU-MSzPL	19.21	0.75	64.67	1	-46.91	1	1	0.04	0.02
NL-CDA	15.5	0.47	55	0.82	12.22	1	1	7.38	0.54
NL-PvdA	15.5	0.47	55	0.82	-74.32	1	0	2.39	0.12
NL-VVD	15.5	0.47	55	0.82	-9.55	0	0	6.75	0.47
PL-PiS	21.22	0.88	50.67	0.55	21.25	1	1	35.14	1
PL-PO	21.22	0.88	50.67	0.55	-40.28	1	1	8.15	0.61
PL-SLD	21.22	0.88	50.67	0.55	-29.57	1	1	11.64	0.85
SE-KD	18.12	0.69	58.33	0.93	24.29	1	1	37.57	1
SE-M	18.12	0.69	58.33	0.93	-25.68	1	1	43.96	1
SE-SAP	18.12	0.69	58.33	0.93	-8.35	0	1	34.81	1
SK-KDH	23.58	1	55	0.55	-40.91	1	1	-1.63	0
SK-SaS	23.58	1	55	0.55	34.3	1	1	39.73	1
SK-Smer	23.58	1	55	0.55	-28.59	1	1	22.19	1
UK-Cons	1.83	0	37.33	0	16.32	1	1	-0.45	0
UK-Labour	1.83	0	37.33	0	34.68	1	1	-0.92	0

†SHIFT: Data was taken from Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk, et al., 2017).
 *POLL: Data was taken from special Eurobarometer 469 (European Commission, Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, 2018).
 °RRWVOTE: Data was taken from last parliamentary election in each country (NSD, 2019).
 ^RELCHANGE: Data was taken from the UN (United Nations Population Division, 2017).
 ‡Purple Grand Coalitions: Data was taken from PartyFacts website (Party Facts, 2019).

Section 5.3 – Results

This section will present the TT and provide an explanation on the three steps required in the comparative procedure, as well as details of the analysis including the necessity assessment, sufficiency assessment, minimization process, and negated assessment.

Section 5.3.1 - Necessity Assessment

As mentioned in the first QCA, the first step was to examine if a single condition was necessary to explain the rightward shift in a party's position on immigration issues (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). With the outcome of shifting immigration positions right, the analysis showed the following consistency scores for each of the conditions: POLL (0.858); RRWVOTE (0.75); RELCHANGE (0.763); PGCs (0.908). No necessary conditions were found when testing for the absence of any of the conditions leading to parties significantly shifting immigration positions to the right, as can be seen in Table 5.5. Also, in Table 5.5 we see that not being in a PGC was the condition with the highest consistency score. This shows that it just meets the recommended 0.90 consistency score for a condition to be considered a necessary condition (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 278). The coverage measure for this necessary condition gives some pause in making this judgment as it is a somewhat low 0.627, leaving this condition a borderline necessary condition for shifting immigration policies.


Additionally, the XY graph in Figure 5.1 below shows that the cases are skewed towards high membership, as most cases are clustered into the upper right corner of the graph indicating not being in a PGC is a trivial necessity (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 235). All the cases with positive outcomes were not in a PGC, which leads to the high necessity score. However, the SK-KDH and HU-MSzPL were not in a PGC, but also did not shift policies to the right, while CZ-ODS and FR-LR/UMP were in a PCG and had negative outcomes, highlighting the concerns on calling PGC a relevant necessary condition.

The absence of parties shifting their immigration policies to the right was also assessed to determine if there were any necessary conditions, but the highest score for any condition was POLL at 0.780, which is not close to the 0.90 threshold. This shows that even though *not* participating in a PGC is a borderline necessary condition for parties shifting policies to the right participating in a PGC is not a necessary condition that leads to parties *not* shifting their policies to the right.

Table 5.5 QCA 2 Conditions tested for Necessity

	Consistency	Coverage
POLL	0.858074	0.563749
~POLL	0.252715	0.500000
RRWVOTE	0.751629	0.729445
~RRWVOTE	0.418537	0.419753
RELCHANGE	0.763215	0.585556
~RELCHANGE	0.236785	0.327000
PGC	0.908762	0.627500
~PGC	0.091238	0.157500

Figure 5.1 -QCA 2 XY Plot



Section 5.3.2 - Sufficiency Assessment

The results of the calibration analysis on all 28 cases, as presented in Table 5.4, were then entered onto the fs/QCA 3.0 software to develop a TT. In Table 5.6 below all the cases calibrated fuzzy set scores (for each condition and the outcome from Table 5.4) have been dichotomized and given either a 0.0 or 1.0 score. Table 5.6 shows, that out of the 16 possible logical

combinations, seven are empirically present in the data, leaving rows (8 to 16) as logical reminders. Based on the set scores of the cases, the consistency column in Table 5.6 shows how strongly or to what degree a combination is a subset of the outcome of interest. This consistency level should be based on theory, but most scholars suggest anything below 0.75 should be a cause for concern (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 279). In this paper, a consistency of 0.78 was considered sufficient to produce a position shift. This makes sense empirically as there is a significant drop in consistency scores from row three to four (Gerrits & Verweij, 2018, p. 102). Therefore, our focus will be on the 15 cases in the first three rows as they show the strongest consistency scores for the outcome of interest.

Table 5.6- QCA 2 Truth Table for SHIFT

Conditions					Outcome	Consistency	Number	Cases
Row	POLL	RRWVOTE	RELCHANGE	PGC				
#1	1	0	1	1	1	0.858744	4	CZ-ANO, CZ-CSSD, DE-FDP, NL-CDA
#2	1	1	0	1	1	0.857924	2	HU-Fidesz, SE-SAP
#3	1	1	1	1	1	0.784615	9	PL-PiS, PL-PO, PL-SLD, SE-KD, SE-M, SK-SaS, SK-Smer, SK-KDH* , HU-MSzPL*
#4	1	0	0	1	0	0.589744	1	CZ-ODS
#5	0	0	1	1	0	0.285714	4	FR-LR/UMP, FR-PS, UK-Lab, UK-Con
#6	1	0	1	0	0	0.226415	1	NL-PvdA
#7	1	0	0	0	0	0.21881	7	NL-VVD, DE-CDU, DE-CSU, DE-SPD, EE-ER, EE-EK, EE-SDE
#8-16	Empty truth table rows: no cases available							
*logical contradictions								

There are two possible points for concern in this TT. First, the nine empty rows or logical reminders could indicate a limited diversity issue. With 28 cases and four conditions, it is not uncommon that not all logical combinations are found, while these empty rows are a concern this author feels it does not jeopardize the results. This will be addressed by testing more conditions in QCA 3. However, row three with nine cases and row seven with seven cases could be indicating a ‘clustered reminders’ issue (Gerrits & Verweij, 2018, p. 99). Adding more cases


would possibly reduce the logical reminders, but the CHES data made that impossible. More concerning are the two logical contradictions in row three. This occurs because these cases have different outcomes, even though they shared the same conditions. This author decided to include this row and its combinations in the minimalization process, as the other seven cases in that row make perfect logical sense for the outcome. Even though these two are drastic contradictions because their outcome scores are so low, they share all four conditions that should lead to a party shifting positions. Both SK-KDH (-40.91%) and CZ-ODS (-46.91%) are small parties that have experienced significant vote losses, and there must be other conditions at play in these cases. A possible explanation would be—since their loss has come in the last election for both parties, they are following the predicted time-lag theory for parties making policy changes after election losses (Budge, 1994, p. 452; Spoon & Kluver, 2015, p.632). Also, a closer look at how the party is organized may be another factor.

Figure 5.2 provides a visualization of the TT in Table 5.6 above. It shows the conditions and associated observations while color coding the intersections by outcome value.

- There are 16 zones (configurations) that correspond to the 16 rows of the TT above.
- The logical contradictions (HU-MSzPL, SK-KDE) in zone 1111 are highlighted by the diagonal lines as indicated by the “C” label. This zone also includes five other cases that include this configuration and do lead to an [1] outcome.
- Four cases (CZ-ANO, CZ-CSSD, DE-FDP, NL-CDA), in zone 0111 also lead to a [1] outcome.
- One configuration (1101) with a [1] outcome covers the HU-Fidesz, SE-SAP cases.
- Four cases (FR-LR/UMP, FR-PS, UK-Lab, UK-Con), include two conditions but have a [0] outcome in zone 0011.
- Seven cases (NL-VVD, DE-CDU, DE-CSU, DE-SPD, EE-ER, EE-EK, EE-SDE), include only one condition and have a [0] outcome in zone 0100.
- Two cases (NL-PvdA, CZ-ODS), found in zones 0110 and 0101 respectively, include two conditions and have a [0] outcome.
- Logical reminders include the empty white zones and are designated by the “R” label indicating no cases for those zones. The 28 cases are observed in seven configurations leaving nine configurations as logical reminders. As mentioned above this issue will be

addressed by conducting the remote QCA with four new conditions and a qualitative case comparison examining the key conditions more closely.

Figure 5.2- Four-set Venn diagram showing results of TT.
 Venn diagram produced by the “visualizer” tool, in TOSMANA 1.52.



Section 5.3.3 – Minimization

Following the same process outlined in the first QCA and again using the fsQCA 3.0 software to complete the minimalization process, three separate analyses were done. The complex and intermediate analysis produced the same results, showing the prime implicants of $POLL*RRWVOTE*PGC$ and $POLL*RELCHANGE*PGC$ were the only combinations of causal conditions for the outcome, shifting immigration positions to the right. Encouragingly, $POLL*RRWVOTE*PGC$ showed a 0.809 consistency score, and $POLL*RELCHANGE*PGC$ had an acceptable 0.794, which is safely above the 0.75 recommended threshold (Gerrits & Verweij, 2018, p. 111). This solution formula is a disjunction which includes two conjunctions

written as $POLL*RRWVOTE*PGC + POLL*RELCHANGE*PGC \rightarrow SHIFT^{11}$ with a consistency of 0.804 and coverage of 0.731.

The parsimonious analysis showed the prime implicants of $RRWVOTE$ and $POLL*RELCHANGE*PGC$ as conditions for the outcome, shifting immigration positions to the right. $RRWVOTE$ showed a low 0.730 consistency score. While $POLL*RELCHANGE*PGC$ had the same 0.809 consistency as the complex solution $PROP*RRWVOTE*\sim MIGRANT$. This disjunction formula is written as $RRWVOTE + POLL*RELCHANGE*PGC \rightarrow SHIFT$. This solution formula has a bit lower consistency at 0.750 but solid coverage of 0.930. Coverage measures the empirical relevance of how a ‘condition, configuration, or solution formula accounts for all the instances of an outcome’ (Gerrits & Verweij, 2018, p. 111).

Table 5.7 – QCA 2 Sufficient Configurations

No.	Minimized Configuration	Consistency	Coverage Raw	Coverage Unique	Cases
#1	$POLL*RRWVOTE*PGC$	0.809	0.557	0.114	HU-Fidesz (0.75,1), SE-KD (0.69,1), SE-M (0.69,1), SE-SAP (0.69,1), PL-PiS (0.55,1), PL-PO (0.55,0.61), PL-SLD (0.55,0.85), SK-SaS (0.55,1), SK-Smer (0.55,1), HU-MSzPL* (0.75,0.02), SK-KDH* (0.55,0)
#2	$POLL*RELCHANGE*PGC$	0.794	0.618	0.175	DE-FDP (1,1), CZ-ANO (0.98,1), CZ-CSSD (0.98,1), SE-KD (0.93,1), SE-M (0.93,1), NL-CDA (0.82,0.54), PL-PiS (0.55,1), PL-PO (0.55,0.61), PL-SLD (0.55,0.85), SK-SaS (0.55,1), SK-Smer (0.55,1), HU-MSzPL* (1,0.02), SK-KDH* (0.55,0)
#3	$RRWVOTE$	0.730	0.752	0.308	SK-SaS (1,1), SK-Smer (1,1), PL-PiS (0.88,1), PL-PO (0.88,0.61), PL-SLD (0.88,0.85), HU-Fidesz (0.75,1), SE-KD (0.69,1), SE-M (0.69,1), SE-SAP (0.69,1), HU-MSzPL* (0.75,0.02), SK-KDH* (1,0)
* These two cases were the logical contradictions-cases with membership in configuration > 0.5 and outcome < 0.5.					

The three configurations in Table 5.7 above identify the separate ‘paths’ or ‘recipes/formulas’ that lead to the outcome of parties shifting immigration policies to the right. The first and second

¹¹ In Boolean algebra these symbols indicate: ‘~’ the absence of a condition or outcome, ‘*’ a logical ‘AND’, ‘+’ a logical ‘OR’.

path have solid consistency scores of around 0.80. Equifinality is at play in these two paths, as the raw coverage shows different paths to the same outcome. These paths do overlap, as they both include POLL * PGC and are covered by eleven of the same cases. Two of these cases were the logical contradictions that bring down the consistency score for each of the solution formulas. The unique coverage is low for each of these solutions, but that is typical and indicates what part of the outcome this solution covers by itself. Path three contains only one condition, and while the 0.730 is just below the recommended 0.75 threshold, it is clear that RRWVOTE is a key condition leading to the outcome of interest. Again, the two logical contradictions hurt the consistency results, but the higher 0.308 unique coverage score, indicates how important it is to the outcome of interest.

Actually, the first two paths are very similar, and path three contains the exact same cases as path one. The large relative vote change for DE-FDP NL-CDA, CZ-ANO and CZ-CSSD show up in path two while HU-Fidesz and SE-SAP minimal vote change kept them out of path two. The difficult decision of whether to place the crossover point for RRWVOTE change at either 14% or 16%, could make a significant impact on the solution result. The close RRW parties vote share in all the countries makes this small change a factor to consider, as it impacts the Czech Republic, French, and Netherlands cases, respectively.

These results show that RRWVOTE and RELCHANGE are significant conditions leading to the outcome of interest, but public opinion (POLL) appears to have an even bigger impact on these parties. Also, as we noticed in the necessity test, *not* participating in a PGC allows parties to shift immigration policies much more than the parties who are constrained by participating in a PGC. Clearly, when these conditions are combined, the first two solution formulas are sufficient for the outcome of interest. Furthermore, the complex solution showed two configurations that are sufficient by themselves and also unnecessary. Within those sufficient but unnecessary conjunctions, the individual conditions are necessary, and within each sufficient but unnecessary conjunction, individual conditions are insufficient. This makes our complex solution an insufficient but necessary part of a condition, which is itself unnecessary but sufficient (INUS) for the outcome of interest.

Going back to our conditions and cases will help in understanding this. PGCs are the closest to a necessary condition, but not all parties who did *not* participate in a PGC shifted their

immigration policies (CZ-ODS, FR-PS & LR/UMP, HU-MSzPL, SK-KDH, UK-Cons, UK-Lab). Likewise, while RRWVOTE is another dominant condition, a few parties with lower RRWVOTE did shift policies (CZ-ANO, CZ-CSSD, NL-CDA)¹². Public opinion (POLL) was a dominant condition in both conjunctions (it also received a 0.86 necessity score). Thus, if we only considered France and the UK, we would think it totally answers our question, yet the main parties in Germany, Estonia, and the Netherlands had high anti-immigration public opinion but still did not shift immigration policies to the right. Also, significant relative vote change (RELCHANGE) was experienced by both French and UK parties, and they did not shift policies. Additionally, the two logical contradictions HU-MSzPL, SK-KDH, as well as NL-PvdA, did not shift policies despite experiencing massive vote losses. Notwithstanding these deviations, this analysis shows that parties in countries who have higher RRW vote totals and an anti-immigration public attitude, while also experiencing a significant vote change and are not in a PGC, are more likely to shift towards more restrictive immigration policies.

Section 5.3.4 - Negated Assessment

It will be useful to review the negated outcome to identify what conditions may not lead to position shifting. Following the same steps outlined above for the first analysis but using a 0.92 consistency threshold, we see the complex solutions in the negated analysis had much higher consistency, with 12 cases in the first three rows. Again, two solutions were identified, $POLL * \sim RRWVOTE * \sim PGC + \sim POLL * \sim RRWVOTE * RELCHANGE * PGC \rightarrow \sim SHIFT$. The parsimonious analysis simplified it down to $\sim PGC + \sim POLL \rightarrow \sim SHIFT$. The results point out that parties that do not shift immigration policies to the right are in countries with low anti-immigration attitudes, and the party participated in a PGC. Complex solution consistency is 0.952, and coverage is 0.648. In Table 5.8 below, the UK and French parties had low anti-immigration attitudes, and the German, Netherlands, and Estonia cases were in a PGC. Asymmetry rarely occurs in complex systems, nor is it the goal of a QCA study (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 79). Of course, we can see an opposite result from the first analysis, but a closer examination of Table 5.8 below shows significant differences in both consistency and

¹² Although these parties were on the edge of the threshold, this reinforces how important thoughtful calibration is to the QCA process and why mechanical interpretation is frowned upon (Gerrits & Verweij, 2018, p. 113).

coverage, keeping the rows from being a mirror reflection. This negated analysis is informative and reinforces the first analysis.

Table 5.8 QCA 2 Negated Truth Table for ~SHIFT

Conditions					Outcome	Consistency	Number	Cases
Row	POLL	RRWVOTE	RELCHANGE	PGC				
#1	1	0	1	0	1	1	4	NL-PvdA
#2	1	0	0	0	1	0.96929	7	NL-VVD, DE-CDU, DE-CSU, DE-SPD, EE-ER, EE-EK, EE-SDE
#3	0	0	1	1	1	0.923469	4	FR-LR/UMP, FR-PS, UK-Lab, UK-Con
#4	1	0	0	1	0	0.521367	1	CZ-ODS
#5	1	1	1	1	0	0.397436	9	PL-PiS, PL-PO, PL-SLD, SE-KD, SE-M, SK-SaS, SK-Smer, SK-KDH, HU-MSzPL
#6	1	0	1	1	0	0.392377	4	HU-Fidesz, SE-SAP, CZ-ANO, CZ-CSSD, DE-FDP, NL-CDA
#7	1	1	0	1	0	0.213115	2	HU-Fidesz, SE-SAP
#8/16	Empty truth table rows: no cases available							

Section 5.3.5 - Result Summary

Comparing these results to the public opinion hypothesis, RRW relevance hypothesis, and party competition hypothesis presented at the beginning of this paper shows the associations identified in the formula appear to confirm two propositions, while the third offers mixed results. Additionally, the added condition of PGC's answers the deviate cases that were identified during the QCA process (See table 5.9 below). Clearly, public attitudes (POLL) was the dominate condition with RRW relevance (RRWVOTE) also playing a significant role. Relative vote change (RELCHANGE) was not as impactful as the first two conditions but showed its importance when combines with the other conditions. The key finding was the constraining effect of PGC's. Its ability to explain why parties in the Netherlands and Germany did not shift to the right was illuminating. The confidence in its explanatory power is even more confirmed when we consider DE-FDP and NL-CDA who were not in the PGC's in those countries did shift to the right (24.26%) and (7.38) respectively.

Of course, putting too much confidence in these results should be tempered. MSPs adopt a variety of ideologies and changing electoral strategies, while the RRW parties within each country also employ varying tactics and ideologies. Furthermore, the unique political environment that this competition takes place in requires a tailor-made strategy to succeed (Bale, 2008; Budge, 1994, p. 452 Van Kessel 2015, p. 29-30), which is one reason why there are so few cross country studies on individual parties covering this topic (Carvalho, 2014, p. 7).

Table 5.9- Results of QCA 2

Conditions	Minimized Solution Formulas		
	Solution Formula 1	Solution Formula 2	Solution Formula 3
RRW Vote Totals	●		●
Anti-Immigration Public Opinion	●	●	
Center-left, center-right Parties <i>NOT</i> being a Member of a Purple Grand Coalition.	●	●	
MSPs Relative Vote Change		●	
Cases covered by the solution formula	HU-Civic Union; SE-Christian Democrats; SE-Moderates; SE-Social Democrats; PL-Law and Justice; PL-Civic progress; PL-Democratic Left Alliance; SK-Freedom and Solidarity; SK-Direction; HU-Socialist Party*; SK-Christian Democrat Movement*	DE-Free Democratic Party; CZ-Action of Dissatisfied Citizens; CZ-Social Democrat Party; SE-Christian Democrats; SE-Moderates; NL-Christian Democrat Appeal; PL-Law and Justice; PL-Civic progress; PL-Democratic Left Alliance; SK-Freedom and Solidarity; SK-Direction; HU-Socialist Party*; SK-Christian Democrat Movement*	HU-Civic Union; SE-Christian Democrats; SE-Moderates; SE-Social Democrats; PL-Law and Justice; PL-Civic progress; PL-Democratic Left Alliance; SK-Freedom and Solidarity; SK-Direction; HU-Socialist Party*; SK-Christian Democrat Movement*
*Logical Contradictions			

Section 6- QCA 3 – ‘Remote’ Conditions

Having already examined four ‘proximate’ conditions, this remote QCA will examine four additional conditions using Schneider & Wagemann’s (2006) two-step technique. This second QCA will contain conditions that are more party-centered and subject to political actors’ decisions, by analyzing the same 28 MSPs (10 LMPs and 18 RMPs). Using other conditions such as electoral system volatility, government status, party size, and party institutionalization will hopefully reveal additional aspects of party competition in each of these countries (see Table 6.1 below and Table A15 the appendix). Additionally, this section will provide more details on some of the theories supporting these four conditions.

Table 6.1 - QCA 3 Remote Raw Data Matrix

Party	Party Name	AVG. SHIFT 14 vs. 17†	Volatility 2010-2016*	Opposition°	Party Size^	Party Institutionalization‡
CSSD	Czech Social Dem. Party	23.51%	20.5	Gov.	Small	1
ODS	Civic Democratic Party	2.47%	20.5	Opp.	Small	0
ANO	Action of Diss. Citizens	22.86%	20.5	Gov.	Large	1
SDE	Social Democratic Party	-9.44%	3.5	Gov.	Small	0
ER	Estonian Reform Party	-5.72%	3.5	Gov.	Large	0
EK	Estonian Centre Party	4.81%	3.5	Opp.	Large	0
PS	Socialist Party	-7.37%	0.7	Gov.	Small	1
LR/UMP	Rep. Union for Pop Mov.	5.96%	0.7	Opp.	Small	1
SPD	Social Democratic Party	2.52%	2.9	Gov.	Large	0
CDU	Christian Dem. Union	0.32%	2.9	Gov.	Large	0
CSU	Christian Social Union	3.89%	2.9	Gov.	Small	0
FDP	Free Democratic Party	24.26%	2.9	Opp.	Small	1
MSzPL	Hungarian Socialist Party	0.04%	8.8	Opp.	Small	0
Fidesz	Hungarian Civ. Union	19.90%	8.8	Gov.	Large	0
PvdA	Labour Party	2.39%	0.5	Gov.	Small	1
VVD	People’s Party Free & Dem	6.75%	0.5	Gov.	Large	0
CDA	Christian Dem. Appeal	7.38%	0.5	Opp.	Small	1
SLD	Democratic Left Alliance	11.64%	10.5	Opp.	Small	1
PO	Civic Platform	8.15%	10.5	Gov.	Large	1
PiS	Law and Justice Party	35.14%	10.5	Opp.	Large	1
Smer	Direction- Social Dem.	22.19%	11.9	Gov.	Large	1
KDH	Christian Dem. Movement	-1.63%	11.9	Opp.	Small	0
SaS	Freedom and Solidarity	39.73%	11.9	Opp.	Small	1
SAP	Swedish Social Dem. Party	34.81%	0.7	Gov.	Large	0
M	Moderate Party	43.96%	0.7	Opp.	Small	1
KD	Christian Dem.	37.57%	0.7	Opp.	Small	1
Lab	Labour Party	-0.92%	1.6	Opp.	Large	0
Cons	Conservative Party	-0.45%	1.6	Gov.	Large	0

†Shift: Data from Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk, et al., 2017). *Volatility: Data from (Emanuele, et al., 2018).
°Opposition: Data from (Party Facts, 2019; Holger & Manow, 2019). ^Party size: Authors own calculations using election returns (NSD, 2019). ‡ Party Institutionalization: Authors own calculations using several sources. See Table A17 for details.

Section 6.1 - Operationalization & Calibration

Outcome – MSPs Shift to Right

This is the same outcome that was used in all the QCA's above. More details on the CHES survey, the wording of the questions and how the shift was computed between the 2014 and 2017 results can be seen in Table A4a, A4b, A4c and A4d in the Appendix. Also, the calibration process for this outcome is the same as was explained in Section 5.1 concerning QCA 2.

Condition 1- Volatility from 2010-2016

Several studies have shown that increased volatility in an electoral system creates uncertainty and can produce an environment where ideological shifts are more likely to occur including Bértoa, et al. (2016), Dassonneville (2018) Powell & Tucker (2013) and Janda (1990). Pedersen's (1979) index of electoral volatility has gained near-universal acceptance by political scientists when examining electoral systems (Pedersen, 1979; Casal Bértoa, et al., 2016, p. 5). Pedersen's index examines the changes in party vote share over time. Basically, it calculates the total amount of vote change experienced by all individual parties in the electoral system and between two time periods (Casal Bértoa, et al., 2016, p. 8).

Electoral volatility can be caused by new parties entering an electoral system, old parties exiting that system or vote shares switching between parties in an electoral system (Emanuele, et al., 2018, p. 4). Powell & Tucker (2013) modified Pedersen's index by breaking down total volatility (ToV) into Type A (measures parties entering and exiting the arena) and Type B (measures vote shares switching between parties). They stress that Type B is a normal healthy aspect of electoral competition, but Type A can be more dangerous and lead to instability (Powell & Tucker, 2013, p. 124). Furthermore, Dassonneville & Hooghe (2011) point out that volatility could be an 'indicator' or 'signal' of a shift in society or the behavior of voters. They stress how most scholars believe some volatility is healthy in an electoral system; however too much can be destabilizing (Dassonneville & Hooghe, 2011, p. 4)

Cabada, et al.'s (2014) study of Eastern European party systems shows that their volatility is high but has begun to decline recently (Cabada, et al., 2014, pp. 117-120). Along this same line, Emanuele, et al. (2018) argues that instability within electoral systems in both Western and Eastern European countries is converging; however, they attribute this convergence more to

increasing western volatility (Emanuele, et al., 2018, p. 2). The authors identify three problems in the way researchers compare Western European and Eastern European electoral system volatility: case selection, time period to cover and how to measurement party mergers and splits (Emanuele, et al., 2018, p. 5). In an effort to overcome the first two problems their recent study compared 31 European countries from 1990 to 2016 and they handle splits the same as Pendersen outlined for Western European countries. In their study, Type A volatility is called ‘Volatility by Regeneration’ (RegV), and Type B volatility is ‘Volatility by Alteration’ (AltV) (Emanuele, et al., 2018, pp. 2-5).

This thesis will use Emanuele et al.’s (2018) index as it averages 2010 to 2016 volatility in all the countries in this study (Emanuele, et al., 2018, p. Annex p. 2). Furthermore, following Powell & Tucker’s recommendation this paper will only compare the RegV volatility between the separate countries as they pointed out how comparing “ToV in post-communist countries to ToV in established democracies is essentially comparing apples to oranges” (Powell & Tucker, 2013, p. 141). The author of this study believes RegV more accurately reflects the impact these RRW parties are having on the electoral systems across Europe. Table 6.2 below shows the change in ToV and RegV for each country in this study. The Czech Republic had the highest score with 20.5, and the Netherlands enjoyed the lowest with a 0.05 total. The mean for all 31 countries was 6.2, which was extremely close to the 6.16 average of the ten countries in this study.

Table 6.2 – ToV & RegVol Averages

Country	ToV 2010-2016	ToV 1990-2009	RegVol 2010- 2016	RegVol 1990-2009
CZ	37.9	20.2	20.5	5.4
EST	15.1	29.7	3.5	9.8
FR	23.6	19.8	0.7	4.4
DE	16.8	9.1	2.9	0.9
HU	24.3	22.3	8.8	4.0
NL	19.7	21.4	0.5	4.3
POL	22.7	28.8	10.5	7.3
SLK	30.6	24.7	11.9	8.0
SW	9.8	14.6	0.7	1.0
UK	12.7	7.3	1.6	0.9
Source: (Emanuele, et al., 2018)				

One vital piece of information that seemed to be missing from all of these volatility studies was a theory on what level of volatility in an electoral system was unhealthy. There were numerous tests on factors that cause volatility and arguments on how to best measure volatility, but none of them offered any recommendation on what level of volatility led to dangerous instability. Therefore, the distribution of cases was used to determine where best to place the calibration thresholds. Since the Czech Republic was a high outlier, dropping down to 12 for full membership in the set was deemed appropriate with a bottom anchor point of 0. The mean for these ten countries and all 31 in Emanuele et al.'s (2018) index was 6.2, indicating a cross over point of 6 seemed logical. Also, the cases showed that a substantial number of elections where RRW parties received over 10% of the vote included six or more parties (Gallagher, 2018). While ENEP is not the same as volatility, the number of parties is a significant aspect of the RegV calculation. Additionally, the significant gap between Estonia's 3.5 score and Hungary's 8.8 score and the fact that the cases below and above the cross over point make sense, reinforce placing it at six. Using a fsQCA with these anchor points places 17 parties out of the membership set and 11 parties in the high volatility membership set.

Condition 2 – Governing Status

Researchers have shown that governing status can impact a party's willingness to change policy positions. Parties in opposition are freer to shift policies as they are not tied to coalition agreements or government laws they have adopted. Governing parties receive much more media attention, allowing all policy shifts to be noticed and scrutinized. They focus more on policy implantation and avoid any sudden shifts (Budge, 1994, p. 452; Van Spanje, 2010, pp. 577-578; Kluver & Spoon, 2014, p. 637; Han, 2015, p. 559). The difference governing status made on party ideological shifting in these studies makes this an ideal condition to include in this QCA.

This condition will be calibrated with a csQCA by assigning each party with a 1.0 for opposition status indicating a willingness to shift or a 0.0 for governing status indicating no shift. There were 15 governing parties and 13 parties in opposition shown in Table 6.1 above. This process was not as straight forward as it may seem because several parties were in both opposition and government during the time period covered in this study. One of the most ambiguous cases was the Czech Republic's ODS, who were in a majority coalition until 2013 but

have been in opposition since then. ODS is considered to be in opposition and was given a 1.0 score. Another complicated situation occurred in Poland where PiS who were in opposition until 2015 but are now leading the government and PO was in government until 2015 but are now in opposition. PiS was considered to have been in opposition primarily and was assigned a 1.0 while PO was allocated a 0.0 as they were in government the majority of the time.

Condition 3 – Party Size

One leading aspect of political party research has been party size. Numerous political scientists consistently include size in studies on party competition including Kluver & Spoon (2014), Abou-Chadi & Orłowski (2016), Dancygier & Margalit (2018), and Wagner & Meyer (2014). With the exception of Abou-Chadi & Orłowski (2016) above all these studies showed that large parties were more willing to shift positions on issues compared to smaller parties. Large parties tend to be ‘catch-all’ parties and ‘office-seeking’ actors who seek to maximize their votes in an effort to gain and keep office, making them more willing to shift policies in order to appeal to the median or most voters possible (Kluver & Spoon, 2014, pp. 635-637; Dassonneville, 2018, p. 811). Although, Kluver & Spoon offer the caveat that once a large party gets into government, it can be constrained by coalition agreements and thus less able to shift positions.

The reason Abou-Chadi & Orłowski’s (2016) study came to a different conclusion was that they researched a bit different question. They asked if increasing competitiveness within an electoral system would cause parties to moderate their positions in an effort to reach the median voter and maximize votes (Abou-Chadi & Orłowski, 2016). Their research is more applicable to this thesis for two reasons. First, as the relevance of RRW parties has grown in the ten countries included in this thesis, electoral competitiveness has also increased (Emanuele, et al., 2018). Secondly, immigration issues have become more polarized, causing shifts to the right on this issue to be considered a more extreme position (Alonso & da Fonseca, 2011, p. 880).

Abou-Chadi & Orłowski’s (2016) finding that small parties were more likely to move towards an extreme position while large parties would move to the center is why this thesis will use a csQCA to calibrate party size. Small parties will be assigned a 1.0 score indicating a willingness to shift, and large parties will be given a 0.0 indicating no shift. There were nine small parties

and 19 large parties shown in Table 6.3 below. Party size was determined by adding the percentage vote totals in the last three elections for each party together and finding an average. Any party obtaining over 15% was considered large, and all parties under 15% were deemed small. The three most borderline cases were the LMPs of CZ-CSSD, NL-PvdA, and EE-SPD with 16.63%, 16.70%, and 14.30% respectively. One aspect that complicated the operationalization of this condition, which can be seen in Table 6.3 was the dramatic decline of many of the LMPs in their last elections.

Table 6.3- Party Size

Party	3 rd Election	2 nd Election	Last Election	Last 3 Avg.	15%
CZ-CSSD	22.1	20.5	7.3	16.63	large
CZ-ODS	20.2	7.7	11.3	13.07	small
CZ-ANO	N/A	18.65	29.64	24.15	large
EE-SDE	10.6	17.1	15.2	14.30	small
EE-ER	27.8	28.6	27.7	28.03	large
EE-EK	26.1	23.3	24.8	24.73	large
FR-PS	24.9	29.4	7.5	20.60	large
FR-LR/UMP	39.54	27.12	15.77	27.48	large
DE-SPD	23	25.7	20.5	23.07	large
DE-CDU	27.3	34.1	26.8	29.40	large
DE-CSU	6.5	7.4	6.2	6.70	small
DE-FDP	14.6	4.8	10.7	10.03	small
HU-MSzPL	19.3	25.6	11.9	18.93	large
HU-Fidesz	52.7	44.9	49.3	48.97	large
NL-PvdA	19.6	24.8	5.7	16.70	large
NL-VVD	20.5	26.6	21.3	22.80	large
NL-CDA	13.6	8.5	12.4	11.50	small
PL-SLD	13.2	8.2	7.6	9.67	small
PL-PO	41.5	39.2	24.1	34.93	large
PL-PiS	32.1	29.9	37.6	33.20	large
SK-Smer	34.8	44.4	28.3	35.83	large
SK-KDH	8.5	8.8	4.9	7.40	small
SK-SaS	12.1	5.9	12.1	10.03	small
SE-SAP	30.7	31	28.3	30.00	large
SE-M	30.1	23.2	19.8	24.37	large
SE-KD	5.60	4.60	6.32	5.51	small
UK-Labour	29.1	30.5	40	33.20	large
UK-Cons	36.1	36.9	42.3	38.43	large

Source: Data was taken from last parliamentary elections in each country (NSD, 2019)

Condition 4 – Party Institutionalization

Any scholarly discussion on party institutionalization invariably begins with Samuel Huntington's definition:

"the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability" (Huntington, 1968, p. 12).

Panebianco (1988) argues that party institutionalization has a negative effect on party change and in line with Huntington's 'stability' describes it as "the way the organization solidifies" (Panebianco, 1988, p. 49). In *Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey*, Janda (1980) provides one of the most comprehensive studies on political parties and party institutionalization ever conducted. In it, he empirically measured party institutionalization with six variables: party age, name changes (i.e., splits and mergers), organizational discontinuity, leadership competition, legislative ability and electoral instability (Janda, 1980, pp. 12-28). Like Panebianco, he agrees that higher levels of institutionalization have a depressing effect on party change (Janda, 1990, p. 12).

Harmel et al. (2019) point out that Janda's measurement variables appropriately take into account the internal and external dimensions of party institutionalization with Basedau & Stroh (2008) agreeing that any meaningful measurement of party institutionalization must include both the internal and external dimensions. In addition to the external and internal dimensions, Harmel and Svåsand add a third dimension named objective durability (Harmel, et al., 2019, pp. 12-13; Basedau & Stroh, 2008, pp. 8-9). Janda (1990), Harmel et al. (2019) and Basedau & Stroh (2008) all point out that the concept of party institutionalization is mostly agreed on and accepted within the political science community but measuring it for individual parties is more controversial. Basedau & Stroh provide three main reasons for the disagreement. First, most study's focus on only party systems and avoid individual parties. Second, theoretical approaches and empirical operationalization are not in alignment resulting in poor measurements. Third, a lack of quantitative and qualitative data particularly as it relates to party identification or trust in parties, as well as organizational strength or coherence that can only be ascertained through costly surveys or in-depth field research (Basedau & Stroh, 2008, pp. 6-11). Using extensive fieldwork

and detailed party member surveys, they developed an index to measure party institutionalization for 28 African political parties that encompassed four dimensions and 15 indicators.

Despite the data difficulties mentioned above, the author of this thesis combined Janda’s (1980) variables with Basedau & Stroh’s (2008) more complex framework to develop a somewhat basic index that can measure party institutionalization for the 28 parties in this study. It includes three indicators from the internal, external, and objective durability dimensions of party institutionalization, i.e., relevant party age, party membership to electorate ratio, and relative vote change. See Table A17 in the Appendix for details on each parties’ score, and Table 6.4 below shows how the coding was organized.

Table 6.4- Party Institutionalization Coding

Dimension	Criteria	Indicators/Operationalization	Sources	Coding
Objective Durability	Party age (relative to most recent reintroduction of multiparty system). The ability to withstand electoral shocks.	Party age in years (founding date to 2019) as percentage of period in years since the most recent introduction of multiparty elections.	(Holger & Manow, 2019), individual country websites, (Caeamani, 2000).	0 = < 50% 1 = 50%-90% 2 = >90%
Internal	Party membership relative to how many voters were in the election closest to the year membership number were counted.	Membership as a percentage of voters in the electorate.	(Van Haute, et al., 2018), numerous sources from each country, (NSD, 2019).	0 = < 50% 1 = 50%-90% 2 = >90%
External	Steady electoral support.	Vote change in the last election as a percentage of the average vote share of the two prior elections.	(NSD, 2019)	-1= > 51% 0= 50%-21% 1=20%-11% 2=<10%

First, relevant party age was obtained by subtracting the age of a party from the year since that country has been conducting competitive multi-party free elections. This allowed for a more realist comparison between eastern post-communist countries and western democracies. The difficult part of this process was how to handle splits and mergers when determining a parties age, as well as identifying an accurate start date for competitive multi-party free elections in the western democracies. This ratio was then converted into a three-scale coding system from 0 to 2 with 0= <50%, 1=51%-90%, and 2=>90%.

For example, one of the more complicated parties was the LR/UMP in France. The current LR was the former UMP which was the former Rally for the Republic (RPR) which was the former Union for the Defense of the Republic which was the former Union for the New Republic

(UNR) that was founded by Charles de Gaulle in 1958 (Holger & Manow, 2019). Hence using Janda's (1980) criteria for handling splits and mergers the current LR can be said to basically be the same party as the UNR. Several parties in this study (particularly the western SD parties) had similar histories. Picking a date for the start of competitive multi-party free elections in France was also subjective as elections technically took place after the revolution in 1789 but not until the Third Republic in 1870 did France see consistent competitive multi-party free elections without major interruption (Caeamani, 2000, pp. 291-302). This example shows the LR/UMP receiving a 41% ratio, which was less than 50% resulting in a score of 0, indicating a low level of institutionalization.

Secondly, the party membership to electoral ratio was determined by taking the number of members a party had and dividing it by the number of voters in the election closest to the membership year used. This ratio was then converted into a three-scale coding system from 0 to 2 with 0 = <0.25%, 1 = 0.26%-0.99%, 2 = >1%. As seen in Table A17 in the Appendix, party membership ratios are low, with only six parties having a ratio over 1%, seven below 0.25% and 15 parties between 0.26 and 0.99%. Looking at the Labour party in the UK shows their 540,000 members was 1.68% of the 32.2 million voters in the 2017 election. This is above the 1% level resulting in a score of 2, indicating a high level of institutionalization.

Thirdly, relative vote change (which was also a condition in the proximate QCA) was found by collecting each parties' percentage of votes won in their last election and subtracting that result from the average total of the two elections prior to the last one. The result is then divided by the difference from the two election average, which provides the relative vote change. Using a four-scale coding system the result was converted into score from -1 to 2 with -1 = > 51%, 0 = 50%-21%, 1 = 20%-11%, 2 = <10%. And change either positive or negative over 51% would be a -1 and a positive or negative changes between 21% and 50% would be a 0.0, while a change between 11% and 20% would be a 1.0 with any positive or negative change less than 10% indicating the highest score of 2 and a higher level of institutionalization.

The scores from these three indicators are combined into a total score, which is translated into a csQCA score of either 0.0 for low institutionalization or 1.0 for high party institutionalization. Unsurprisingly, the lowest score (-1) was received by ANO which is a young, entrepreneur type

party, with few members and a high relative vote change. Only Estonia's SDE and ER received the highest score of 6, while Slovakia's SaS and France's PS were the only parties to score a 0. The cross over point for this condition was set at 2.5. This places 14 parties with a score above 2.5 indicating higher levels of institutionalization and a less likelihood of shifting positions on immigration issues to the right, with another 14 parties falling below 2.5 and displaying low levels of institutionalization making them more likely to shift immigration policies to the right. To better understand this scoring process, we can examine Germany's SPD results. This is an old party with a 100% ratio for party age resulting in a high score of 2. Their party membership has fallen but still was a high .0094% which was just under the 1% top scale resulting in a score of 1 for this indicator. The relative change for the SDP was -18% translating into another score of 1. By adding the 2 for party age, 1 for party membership and 1 for relative vote change the SPD receives a total score of 4. This score is above the 2.5 cross over point, resulting in a calibrated score of 0.0, indicating high institutionalization.

Section 6.2 - Dialogue of Theory & Data

Before examining how the author of this thesis calibrated and operationalized the conditions for this remote QCA, this study will review the back and forth that took place between ideas and theory. The first consideration for this last QCA was which conditions to include. Many studies examining political competition and RRW influence consider the impact of factors such as economic indicators, corruption perception, or political party family. While all these were considered, a close look at the cases showed they would not provide any useful insight for this study. Also, the theoretical disagreement on whether large or small parties shift positions, along with the severe vote declines for many of the MSPs in their last election caused second thoughts about including this condition. For the first condition of volatility using RegV instead of ToV was an easy decision based on Powell & Tucker's recommendation but with no theory available to guide placing the cross over point resulted in utilizing the distribution of cases to determine that point. Governing status was the most straightforward condition in this QCA, but party size was complicated by the dramatic drop off in electoral support a number of MSPs experienced in their last election. This lowered their average vote totals and deciding between 10%, 15% or 20% on what would best represent large and small parties was a bit murky. Some scholars used 10% and under to define small parties in their studies, and others use 20% or above for large

parties. This author settled on 15%, as this size usually allows a party to become a significant player in most parliamentary systems.

The last condition of party institutionalization offered several points where a decision was necessary. First, determining the percentage of the three-scale score for party age required closely examining the cases to see the age of the parties and how their scores translated into the ratio. The <50% for 0 made good empirical sense and made setting the other scores easier. Setting the scale for party membership was guided by Wagner and Meyer’s (2014) study, and the results of the cases in this study were in line with their research. Relative vote change was scored by considering the distribution of cases despite how the recent drop in support for parties such as FR-PS and CZ-CSSD made them seem much less institutionalized than they probably are, however, the index provided reliable results that compared positively with overall case knowledge. The most ambiguous aspect of calibrating this condition was setting the cross over point. Again, case distribution was a significant factor in this decision, and the mean score for all parties was 2.57, which was not the reason 2.5 was chosen but also reinforced it was not a random decision. The details and diverse causal conditions on all the parties were coded as outlined in Table 6.5 below.

Table 6.5. *Conditions and Outcome calibration thresholds for QCA 3*

Outcome & Conditions	Description	Calibration
SHIFT	Change in Chapel Hill survey ratings on immigration policy and multiculturalism between 2014 and 2017.	1 = 15 percent 0.5 = 7 percent 0 = 0 percent
VOL	Volatility average from 2010 - 2016.	1 = 12 0.5 = 6 0 = 0
GOV/OPP	Member of governing coalition or in opposition.	1 = Opposition 0 = Government
SIZE	Party size based on average of last three elections.	1 = Small 0 = Large
INST	Party institutionalization	1 = Not member 0 = Member

After assigning each condition to a fsQCA or csQCA and calibrating the anchor points and additional thresholds, all the data was transferred into the final calibrated data matrix in Table A15 of the Appendix. The back and forth between theory and data was not a linear process, and other researchers may take exception to these decisions but once the author of this paper felt comfortable that the cases, conditions, and outcome were in line with the underlying theory this study moved forward with the analysis.

Section 6.3 – Results

This section will present the TT and provide an explanation on the three steps required in the comparative procedure, as well as details of the analysis including the necessity assessment, sufficiency assessment, minimization process, and negated assessment.

Section 6.3.1 - Necessity Assessment

Just as was done in the QCA's above, the first step will include checking to see if a single condition was necessary to explain the rightward shift in a party's position on immigration issues (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). With the outcome of shifting immigration positions right, the analysis showed the following consistency scores for each of the conditions: VOL (0.615); GOV/OPP (0.496); SIZE (0.341); INST (0.756). No necessary conditions were found when testing for the absence of any of the conditions leading to parties significantly shifting immigration positions to the right, as can be seen in Table 6.6. Also, in Table 6.6 we see that not being in a INST was the condition with the highest consistency score but still far below the recommended 0.90 consistency score for a condition to be considered a necessary condition (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 278).

The absence of parties shifting their immigration policies to the right was also assessed to determine if there were any necessary conditions, but the highest score for any condition was SIZE at 0.659, which is not close to the 0.90 threshold.

Table 6.6 *QC 3 Conditions tested for Necessity*

	Consistency	Coverage
VOL	0.614666	0.697390
~VOL	0.470165	0.415502
GOV/OPP	0.496046	0.530769
~GOV/OPP	0.503954	0.467333
SIZE	0.341481	0.527778
~SIZE	0.658519	0.482105
INST	0.755572	0.750714
~INST	0.244428	0.242857

Section 6.3.2 - Sufficiency Assessment

Following the exact same procedures as the first two QCA's, a TT was developed. In Table 6.7 below all the cases calibrated fuzzy set scores (for each condition and the outcome from Table 6.1) have been dichotomized and given either a 0.0 or 1.0 score. Table 6.7 shows, that out of the 16 possible logical combinations, twelve are empirically present in the data, leaving rows (13 to 16) as logical reminders. Based on the set scores of the cases, the consistency column in Table 6.7 shows how strongly or to what degree a combination is a subset of the outcome of interest. This consistency level should be based on theory, but most scholars suggest anything below 0.75 should be a cause for concern (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 279). In this paper, a consistency of 0.71 was considered sufficient to produce a position shift. This makes sense empirically as there is a significant drop in consistency scores from row six to seven (Gerrits & Verweij, 2018, p. 102). Therefore, our focus will be on the 13 cases in the first six rows as they show the strongest consistency scores for the outcome of interest.

Table 6.7- QCA 3 Truth Table for SHIFT

Conditions					Outcome	Consistency	Number	Cases
Row	VOL	GOV/OPP	SIZE	INST				
#1	1	0	0	1	1	0.982412	4	CZ-ANO, CZ-CSSD, SK-Smer, PL-PiS
#2	1	1	1	1	1	0.976852	2	PL-SLD, SK-SaS
#3	0	1	1	1	1	0.859155	3	DE-FDP, NL-CDA, SE-KD
#4	0	1	0	1	1	0.72449	2	FR-LR/UMP* , SE-M
#5	1	1	0	1	1	0.721154	1	PL-PO
#6	1	0	0	0	1	0.714286	1	HU-Fidesz
#7	0	0	0	0	0	0.337662	6	NL-VVD, DE-CDU, DE-SPD, EE-ER, UK-Con, SE-SAP*
#8	1	1	0	0	0	0.267857	1	HU-MSzPL
#9	0	1	0	0	0	0.191489	2	EE-EK, UK-Lab
#10	0	0	0	1	0	0.133663	2	FR-PS, NL-PvdA
#11	0	0	1	0	0	0.13125	2	EE-SDE, DE-CSU
#12	1	1	1	0	0	0.0769231	2	CZ-ODS, SK-KDH
#13-16	Empty truth table rows: no cases available							
*logical contradictions								


Unlike the proximate QCA above, this TT has only four empty rows indicating very little concern for a limited diversity issue. Again, as in the second QCA, we have two logical contradictions. One in row #4 and another down in row#6. This occurs because these cases have different outcomes, even though they shared the same conditions. This row and its combinations were included in the minimalization process, as the FR-LR/UMP case is an example where the dramatic vote loss in the last election caused its institutionalization score to be pulled down impacting its overall score in the TT. The other logical contradiction is in a row with an outcome score of 0, but the SE-SAP case in row #7 is a drastic contradiction from the other five cases. Despite sharing all four conditions that should lead to non-shifting, the SE-SAP still shifted immigration positions. The SE-SAP and Sweden case could be reinforcing Van Spanje’s research that showed the contagion effect of the immigration issue could cause all parties in an electoral system to shift (Van Spanje, 2010, p. 579).

Figure 6.1 provides a visualization of the TT in Table 6.7 above. It shows the conditions and associated observations while color coding the intersections by outcome value.

- There are 16 zones (configurations) that correspond to the 16 rows of the TT above.

- The logical contradictions (SE-SAP, FR-LR/UMP) in zones 0000 and 0101 are highlighted by the diagonal lines as indicated by the “C” label. Zone 0000 includes five other cases that have an outcome of [0] and zone 0101 has one other case with a [1] outcome.
- Four cases (CZ-ANO, CZ-CSSD, SK-Smer, PO-PiS), in zone 1001 lead to a [1] outcome.
- One configuration (1111) with a [1] outcome covers the PL-SLD and SK-SaS cases.
- Two cases (PL-PO, HU-Fidesz), found in zones 1101 and 1100 respectively, include three and two conditions with a [1] outcome.
- Four cases (DE-FDP, NL-CDA, SE-KD), in zone 0111 lead to a [1] outcome.
- Two cases (CZ-ODS, SK-KDH), include three conditions but have a [0] outcome in zone 1110.
- Five cases (NL-VVD, DE-CDU, DE-SPD, EE-ER, UK-Con), include no conditions and have a [0] outcome in zone 0000.
- Two cases (EE-SDE, DE-CSU), found in zones 0010, include one condition and have a [0] outcome.
- Two cases (EE-EK, UK-Lab), found in zones 0100, include one condition and have a [0] outcome.
- One case (HU-MSzPL), found in zone 1010, has only one condition and a [0] outcome.
- Logical remainders include the empty white zones and are designated by the “R” label indicating no cases for those zones. The 28 cases are observed in 12 configurations leaving only four configurations as logical remainders.

Figure 6.1- Four-set Venn diagram showing results of TT.
 Venn diagram produced by the “visualizer” tool, in TOSMANA 1.52.



Section 6.3.3 – Minimization

The minimalization process will follow the same steps as outlined in the first QCA. The parsimonious, and intermediate analysis produced the same results, showing the prime implicants of GOV/OPP*INST and VOL*~GOV/OPP were the only combinations of causal conditions for the outcome, shifting immigration positions to the right. The first conjunction GOV/OPP*INST showed an acceptable 0.80 consistency score and VOL*~GOV/OPP had a strong 0.875 which is safely above the 0.75 recommended threshold (Gerrits & Verweij, 2018, p. 111). This solution formula is a disjunction which includes two conjunctions written as $GOV/OPP*INST + VOL*~GOV/OPP \rightarrow SHIFT$ with a consistency of 0.831 and coverage of 0.836.

The complex analysis showed the prime implicants of GOV/OPP*INST and VOL*~GOV/OPP*~SIZE as conditions for the outcome, shifting immigration positions to the

right. The first conjunction in the complex formula was the same as in the parsimonious, and intermediate analysis, so GOV/OPP*INST again showed a 0.80 consistency score. While VOL*~GOV/OPP*~SIZE had a strong 0.905 consistency score. This disjunction formula is written as GOV/OPP*INST + VOL*~GOV/OPP*~SIZE → SHIFT. This solution formula has a slightly higher consistency score at 0.843 and similar coverage of 0.823.

Table 6.8 – QCA 3 Sufficient Configurations

No.	Minimized Configuration	Consistency	Coverage Raw	Coverage Unique	Cases
#1	GOV/OPP*INST	0.79875	0.459382	0.459382	DE-FDP (1,1), NL-CDA (1,0.54), PL-SLD (1,0.85), PL-PO (1,0.61), SK-SaS (1,1), SE-M (1,1), SE-KD (1,1), FR-LR/UMP (1,0.39) *
#2	VOL*~GOV/OPP	0.874791	0.376707	0.376707	CZ-CSSD (1,1), CZ-ANO (1,1), SK-Smer (0.95,1), PL-PiS (0.9,1), HU-Fidesz (0.8,0.99)
#3	VOL*~GOV/OPP*~SIZE	0.905188	0.363767	0.363767	CZ-CSSD (1,1), CZ-ANO (1,1), SK-Smer (0.95,1), PL-PiS (0.9,1), HU-Fidesz (0.8,0.99)

* This case was a logical contradiction-case with membership in configuration > 0.5 and outcome < 0.5.

These three paths from Table 6.8 above all have acceptable consistency scores of over 0.80. Equifinality is at play as two of the formulas show different paths to the same outcome. The first path that was included in all three analyses contains two conditions that are not in the other formulas and contain totally different cases. It also includes the logical contradiction which brings down the consistency score for that solution. Path two and three are basically the same as the simplifying assumptions concerning the logical remainders streamline the solution.

The first path indicated the significance of party institutionalization and the cases back that up particularly considering the FR_LR/UMP's severe vote loss created the logical contradiction. These results show that SIZE was not a particularly reliable condition, and the fact that ~GOV/OPP was in the other two paths indicates GOV/OPP was not a dominant condition either. However, VOL and INST appear to be the driving conditions in each path that lead to the outcome of interest.

The two main solution formulas of GOV/OPP*INST + VOL*~GOV/OPP that were found in the three analyses are each sufficient for the outcome of interest. Each is sufficient by itself and also unnecessary. Within those sufficient but unnecessary conjunctions, the individual conditions are necessary, and within each sufficient but unnecessary conjunction, individual conditions are

insufficient. This makes our complex solution an insufficient but necessary part of a condition, which is itself unnecessary but sufficient (INUS) for the outcome of interest.

Going back to our conditions and cases will help in understanding this. Despite none of the conditions having high necessity scores, the results show the combination of GOV/OPP * INST was a driving force in seven cases. The cases that were in opposition and were not institutionalized showed a high likelihood to shift. Also, the combination of VOL*~GOV/OPP explains five cases with the first four sharing all the conditions giving pause to how much being in opposition explains parties shifting, while the HU-Fidesz case in this group reinforces the importance of volatility as a condition for shifting.

Unlike the proximate QCA above these results indicate that none of the conditions by themselves can be considered strong gauges of shifting positions, but when combined, they do reveal some helpful insights on what possible associations may be present between these conditions and the outcome of interest.

Section 6.3.4 - Negated Assessment

It will be useful to review the negated outcome to identify what conditions may not lead to position shifting. Following the same steps outlined above for the other analyses and using a similar 0.716 consistency threshold shows the complex solutions in the negated analysis have comparable consistency, with 15 cases in the first six rows. Four solutions were identified including, $\sim\text{VOL}*\sim\text{GOV/OPP}*\sim\text{INST} + \sim\text{VOL}*\sim\text{GOV/OPP}*\sim\text{SIZE} + \text{VOL}*\text{GOV/OPP}*\sim\text{INST} + \sim\text{VOL}*\sim\text{SIZE}*\sim\text{INST} \rightarrow \sim\text{SHIFT}$. The parsimonious analysis simplified it down to $\sim\text{VOL}*\text{GOV/OPP} + \text{GOV/OPP}*\sim\text{INST} \rightarrow \sim\text{SHIFT}$. The results point out that parties with low levels of institutionalization in countries with low volatility do not shift immigration policies to the right. Complex solution consistency is 0.854, and coverage is 0.815. In Table 6.9 below, the four parties in rows four and five once again point out how the severe vote drop in their last election caused them to score lower on this study's basic institutionalization index. Without their recent dismal electoral results, those cases would have only strengthened the association between institutionalization and parties shifting policies to the right. This negated analysis is informative and reinforces the results in the SHIFT analysis.

Table 6.9- QCA 3 Truth Table for ~SHIFT

Conditions					Outcome	Consistency	Number	Cases
Row	VOL	GOV/OPP	SIZE	INST				
#1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	HU-MSzPL
#2	0	0	1	0	1	0.98125	2	EE-SDE, DE-CSU
#3	0	1	0	0	1	0.968085	2	EE-EK, UK-Lab
#4	0	1	0	1	0	0.933333	2	CZ-ODS, SK-KDH
#5	0	0	0	1	0	0.89604	2	FR-PS, NL-PvdA
#6	0	0	0	0	0	0.716141	6	NL-VVD, DE-CDU, DE-SPD, EE-ER, UK-Con, SE-SAP*
#7	1	0	0	0	0	0.465839	1	HU-Fidesz
#8	1	1	0	1	0	0.442308	1	PL-PO
#9	0	1	0	1	0	0.362245	2	FR-LR/UMP* , SE-M
#10	0	1	1	1	0	0.197183	3	DE-FDP, NL-CDA, SE-KD
#11	1	1	1	1	0	0.0972222	2	PL-SLD, SK-SaS
#12	1	0	0	1	0	0.0326633	4	CZ-ANO, CZ-CSSD, SK-Smer, PL-PiS,
#13-16	Empty truth table rows: no cases available							
*logical contradictions								

Section 6.3.5 - Result Summary

These results show that the conditions in this remote QCA are not as critical to shifting immigration position to the right as we found in the first two QCA's. Although, the connection between parties in countries with high volatility that are *not* intensely institutionalized who shifted immigration positions to the right is informative for this study (See Table 6.10 below). This remote QCA also indicates that governing status and party size are not the significant factors that other studies have found. Although, governing status showed a stronger association with shifting positions than party size did. Overall, this third analysis has helped better illuminate the paths that lead towards political parties shifting immigration positions to the right.

Table 6.10 – Results of QCA 3

Conditions	Minimized Solution Formulas		
	Solution Formula 1	Solution Formula 2	Solution Formula 3
Electoral System Volatility		●	●
Governing Status- being in the Opposition	●	○	○
Party Size- Small Party			○
Party Institutionalization – Low Levels	●		
Cases covered by the solution formula	DE-Free Democratic Party; NL-Christian Democrat Appeal; PL-Democratic Left Alliance; PL- Civic progress; SK- Freedom and Solidarity; SE-Moderates; SE-Christian Democrats; FR-The Rep. Union for Pop Movement*	CZ-Social Democrat Party; CZ-Action of Dissatisfied Citizens; SK- Direction; PL- Law and Justice; HU-Civic Union	CZ-Social Democrat Party; CZ-Action of Dissatisfied Citizens; SK- Direction; PL- Law and Justice; HU-Civic Union
*Logical Contradiction			

Section 7 - [Overall QCA’s Discussion](#)

While conducting three separate QCA’s on this topic was an arduous process, the results from each one have continued to sharpen the focus and improve the view as to some of the explanations for political parties shifting immigration policies to the right. It was not planned to conduct the countrywide QCA first, but after attempting to analysis individual parties, it looked as if only a party system evaluation would be possible. Fortunately, the results of the countrywide QCA helped identify one of the key findings in this research, namely — PGC’s. Additionally, the back and forth between theory and ideas in the QCA process for that first analysis illuminated other conditions that made attempting an individual party examination possible.

The proximate (2nd) QCA lends strong credibility to the association between anti-immigration public opinion and party’s shifting positions on immigration, but it indicated that high RRW vote totals also played a role. Moreover, PGC’s were shown to exhibit a strong influence on parties

not shifting positions to the right on immigration issues, while those parties not in a PGC, but in countries with high RRW vote totals and strong anti-immigration attitudes, did shift position to the right. This was shown by how parties in Germany, the Netherlands, and Estonia did not shift their ideological position on immigration to the right in the CHES results from 2014-2017. What makes this observation even more compelling is the fact that the DE-FDP and NL-CDA who were not in the PGC's in those countries did shift (24.26%) and (7.38), respectively¹³.

At the same time, almost all the parties in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Sweden shifted their immigration positions to the right. Notable exceptions were CZ-ODS, HU-MSzPL, and SL-KDH. The remote (3rd) QCA's more internal party conditions helped shed light on these deviant cases. We should recall that both MSzPL and SL-KDH were logical contradictions in the proximate (2nd) QCA but in the remote (3rd) QCA the results showed that their high institutionalization score (despite each serving in opposition to the government) offered an explanation as to why they may not have shifted. Furthermore, country volatility as a condition in the remote (3rd) QCA, provided more context as to why some of the parties showed such strong shifts to the right on immigration issues in both QCA's.

The last two countries we must mention are France and the UK. None of the parties from these two countries shifted positions to the right. One possible explanation is that both countries had the lowest levels of anti-immigration public opinion in the study (with France at 48.67% and the UK an 37.33%). Additionally, both countries experienced RRW votes totals below the 16% cross over point in the proximate (2nd) QCA. France was just under at 14.37%, but the UK only saw RRW parties garner 1.83% of the vote. Together, these facts, along with France's two tired election system and the UK's first past the post system help explain the lack of shifting by parties in these countries.

This challenging three-step QCA process has been both useful and informative. It has illuminated some practical associations between several combinations of conditions and the outcome of interest. However, caution should be used before drawing absolute conclusions from these results. Political party competition takes place within unique and separate systems. The

¹³ Note that the EE-EK party shifted the most of any Estonia party but still only 4.56%. The EE-ER was in a PGC from 2010-2016 and the EE-EK replaced ER in the PGC in 2016. Estonia further validates the constraining effect identified in Germany and the Netherlands.

actors within each system have to respond to the actions of other actors within *that* system. Van Spanje's research showed that the contagion effect of anti-immigration parties tends to affect 'entire party systems' (Van Spanje, 2010, p. 579). The results from these QCA's tends to support his findings. Most all the MLPs and MRPs¹⁴ in the Czech Republic (16.38%), Hungary (19.94%), Poland (18.31%), Slovakia (20.1%) and Sweden (38.78%) experienced significant shifts to the right on their immigration positions*. While most all the parties¹⁵ in Germany (7.72%), the Netherlands (5.47%), and Estonia (-3.45%) resisted shifting to the right°. Also, parties in France (-0.08%) and the UK (0.69%) solidly resisting shifting^ . It is interesting to see how similar the averages of these three groups are:

Group 1* - 22.70%

Group 2° - 3.24%

Group 3^ - 0.30%

The individual aspect of each country is one of the major reasons drawing concrete conclusions from this or any other cross-country political party competition study should be tempered. The assortment of calculations that political actors make within in each country is best illustrated by Tim Bale's assessment of the considerations center-right parties deliberate on the immigration issue:

“We also know that, however much we are convinced that we can sort individual organizations in each country into cross-national ‘party families’, the differences between them often occur, and are due in no small part to their being the products of places as much as ideas...on whether the center-right parties in question operate in traditionally sender or receiver countries; on their welfare state regimes; on the vulnerability of their physical borders; on their traditions of assimilation or multiculturalism; on other national traditions like Commonwealth or republican solidarity, or self-definition as an asylum country; on the extent to which security from, for example, terrorist attack is an issue; and, of course, on their attitude to EU enlargement, actual and potential” (Bale, 2008, p. 325).

The complexity exemplified in this thought is why the next section of this thesis will delve deeper into four of the cases to unravel the broad associations illuminated in the QCA process.

¹⁴ With the exception of three deviant parties mentioned above (CZ-ODS, HU-MSzPL, and SL-KDH).

¹⁵ With the exception of the DE-FDP and NL-CDA mentioned above.

This mixed-methods approach should help improve the reliability of the QCA results by focusing on the electoral success of the MSPs as it relates to public opinion, RRW vote relevance, migration numbers, and their participation in a PGC. Additionally, these sections will attempt to assess which parties have ownership of the immigration issue and the overall saliency of the issues by focusing on the media discourse in each country. Sweden, the Netherlands, Estonia, and Poland will offer helpful contrasts between parties that did and did not experience shifts from both Western and post-communist countries that both included and did not include a PGC.

Section 8 – [RRW Contagion in Sweden](#)

Swedish Prime Minister and leader of the Moderate Party, Fredrik Reinfeldt, while campaigning for the 2014 parliamentary elections urged Swedes to "open their hearts" to asylum seekers just before the migration crisis hit Europe (Roden, 2018). His party was subsequently defeated in those elections and lost 23 seats in the Riksdag, causing him to resign as party leader. This was an abrupt turn around for a popular leader who had successfully guided Sweden through the euro crisis and had been the longest-serving (2006-2014) non-Social Democratic prime minister in Sweden's history (Holger & Manow, 2019). During the peak of the migrant crisis from 2015-17, Sweden took in 441,734 new immigrants, which was more per capita than any other country in the EU. By the end of 2018, 19.1% of the Swedish population was foreign-born (Statistics Swede, 2019), and finding a politician in any of the MSPs in Sweden who would make a pro-asylum comment like Reinfeldt's would be nigh impossible. In fact, Stefan Löfven, the new prime minister and leader of the SAP along with the support of the four main opposition parties led an effort in 2015 to dramatically restrict migrant entry into Sweden (The Local, 2015).

This stark reversal in how Sweden's MSP's welcomed immigrants is reflected in the CHES survey results that show Sweden's MSPs shifting more to the right than any other country in this study. Overall the parties shifted 38.78% with the SAP, M and KD moving right by 34.81%, 43.96%, and 37.57% respectively (Polk, et al., 2017). The Moderate party (which had the largest shift of any party in this study) has gone from urging Swedes to "open their hearts" in 2014, to the new leader, Ulf Kristersson, speaking about fixing the Swedish "problem" and limiting immigrants ability to receive welfare support (The Local, 2017). However, the ruling SAP party

has strived to stay at the front of the anti-immigrant charge by pledging before the 2018 elections to half the number of asylum seekers in their “A safe Migration Policy for a New Era” (The Swedish Social Democratic Party, 2018). Causing Dr. Isabel Schoultz, a professor at the University of Lund in Sweden, to describe the treatment of asylum seekers in Sweden as:

“where border controls have intensified, immigration has become criminalized and where many applicants have to experience the considerable force of what has been referred to as the European deportation machine” (Schoultz, 2017, p. 29)

This section will seek to identify what has caused one of the freest and most generous welfare states in the world to change its attitude towards immigrants. Hopefully, examining the following aspects of Sweden will answer why its MSPs shifted their positions on immigration issues so sharply to the right.

- Sweden’s business environment
- Past election results and MSPs competition
- RRW party relevance
- Migration trends and immigration laws
- Public opinion attitudes
- Media landscape
- Coalition Constraints

Business Environment

The Heritage Foundation’s 2019 index of economic freedom gave Sweden a 75.2 score making it the 19th freest nation in the world. They say:

“Sweden’s long tradition of politically stable minority governments promotes consensus-building. Enviably living standards result from an economy that performs optimally because of open-market policies that enhance flexibility, competitiveness, and large flows of trade and investment” (Heritage Foundation, 2019).

Additionally, Sweden consistently receives top scores in the Transparency Corruption Perception index and ranked as the third least corrupt nation out of 180 countries in 2018 (Transparency International, 2018). Furthermore, Sweden has a vibrant economy with its highest unemployment rate topping out at an acceptable 8.6% in 2010 during the peak of the euro crisis

(The World Bank, 2019). In 2017, Sweden was ranked as the number one country on Forbes' annual list of the Best Countries for Business (Forbes, 2018). This ranking was given despite Sweden's high taxes, illustrated by its 50.8% tax to GDP ratio, which is the fifth-highest in the OECD (OECD Data, 2018). Like other northern European countries, Sweden's 10.2 million people thrive in an export-driven economy. Timber and iron ore are two of the top exported materials and international companies such as IKEA, Volvo, and H&M are some of Sweden's most recognized businesses across Europe (Datantify, 2019). Clearly, Sweden's economy is successfully supporting a generous welfare state, and its public debt has gone down from 50.7% of GDP in 2000 to 38.8% of GDP in 2018 (Eurostat, 2018).

Electoral System & Recent Elections


With a Gallagher (2018) LSq average index in the last three elections of 1.41, Sweden has one of the most proportional electoral systems in the EU. There are 349 seats in the Riksdag with 310 elected from 29 districts and the remaining 39 distributed to ensure proportionality. There is a minimum four percent threshold for a party to enter parliament, but if a party receives over 12 percent in one district, they will receive part of the distribution of that district.

Sweden is one of the few countries in Western Europe that has experienced electoral volatility going down in recent years. According to Emanuele, et al.' (2018) calculations ToV in Sweden averaged 14.6 from 1990 to 2009 but dropped to 9.8 from 2010 to 2016. Furthermore, RegV dropped from 1.0 to 0.7 and AltV dropped from 13.1 to 8.5 over this same time period. However, Sweden saw the number of parties competing in election increase from 4.79 in 2010 to 5.79 in 2018, and the effective number of parties in the Riksdag grew from 4.54 in 2010 to 5.63 in 2018.

Despite this sense of stability and calm—the old norms of party competition are being overturned by the rise of the SDP. Without repeating the summary from Section 3.9, there are a few key events that have contributed to the current changes. The first was the already mentioned unprecedented increase in asylum requests and immigrant arrivals in Sweden from 2015-2017. Next, sexual assaults took an alarming uptick starting in 2015 just as the migrants arrived. These assaults held mostly steady from 2006 to 2014 (as can be seen in Figure 8.1 below) but went from 2% in 2014 to 6.4% in 2017 (National Security Survey a, 2018). This upswing was amplified by online and even traditional media reporting on immigrant crime against Swedish women at the same time these increases took place (Nilsson, 2018, pp. 12-13; Törnberg &

Törnberg, 2016, p. 137). Another factor includes Sweden’s first terrorist attack in 2017 when a failed asylum seeker from Uzbekistan drove a truck into a crowded Stockholm street, killing five people (Widfelt, 2018, p. 281). The last major event shaping the 2018 elections involved a scandal over the outsourcing of secure information to foreign entities. This ‘data breach’ on the heels of the terrorist attack caused several SAP cabinet ministers to resign and led to failed no-confidence votes against Prime Minister Löfven and Defense Minister Peter Hultqvist (Widfelt, 2018, p. 277). All these events increased the saliency of the immigration issue, which seriously benefited the RRW SDP.

Figure 8.1 – Sexual Assaults in Sweden



Source: (National Security Survey a, 2018)

Lina Erikson’s (2019) update of the 2018 election stressed that the Sweden Democrats’ core issues of immigration, integration, as well as law and order were front and center in most debates (Eriksson, 2019, p. 85). Reviewing a 2018 election proposal by the Moderate Party that was quickly copied by the SAP will illustrate how the MSPs have shifted to the right on immigration issues. In November of 2018, Sweden had a record 68 percent of eligible workers participating in

its workforce despite having one of the highest unemployment rates (6.6%) in northern Europe (Lindeberg, 2018). For native Swedes, the unemployment rate was a low 3.7 percent, but for newer non-native workers, it was 20.5% (New Europe, 2018). In late 2017, Moderate Party leader, Ulf Kristersson, proposed making learning Swedish a requirement for obtaining benefits and pledged to “help people integrate into society, but we also need to make clear demands that someone who has just arrived in Sweden learns the language. It should not be possible to live off benefits year in and year out, without doing one’s utmost to learn Swedish and get a job” (Ismail, 2018). In early 2018, the SAP proposed a new law linking eligibility for social benefits with proficiency in the Swedish language, with SAP employment and integration minister Ylva Johansson stating, “we want to make it obligatory to take part in language learning” (The Local, 2018). The new law was designed to stop benefits for asylum seekers and immigrants that did not join in the state’s Swedish language instruction program (New Europe, 2018). It should be noted that the Center Party and Greens (the SAP’s coalition partners) publicly refused to campaign on this proposal. This proposal by the Moderate Party exemplifies the shift by Sweden’s MSPs as regards to immigration policy.

RRW Relevance

The noticeable breakthrough of the RRW in Sweden began in 2010 when the Social Democrats (SD) garnered 5.6 percent of the vote and controlled 20 MPs in the Riksdag. Although they had competed in elections since 1988, the 2010 election was their breakthrough year, and in 2014, they more than doubled the 2010 results and garnered 12.9% of the vote and picked up 49 MP seats. They continued their upward trend by winning 17.5% of the 2018 vote and controlling 62 seats in the Riksdag (Elgenius & Wennerhag, 2018). The May 2018, political party preference survey showed that the SDP vote increases came mostly from the SAP and M parties vote loses (Statistics Sweden, 2018). The SDP performed best in the town of Malmo in southern Sweden, but they also performed well in the rural areas, as well as the economically disadvantaged areas in Stockholm (Lindeberg, et al., 2018; Dagens Nyheter, 2018). It is interesting to compare the geographical vote of Sweden’s political parties in Figure 8.2 with a map of where immigrants have been resettled in Sweden. Figure 8.3 from the Nordregio Center shows the percentage of refugees in Sweden’s municipalities and how many asylum seekers were settled in each of municipalities (NordregioA, 2017; NordregioB, 2017).

Figure 8.2 – Map of Sweden’s Election Results






Figure 8.3 – Asylum Seekers Total Population and Location in Sweden



While the SDP was not the first RRW party to compete in elections, they have been the most successful. With the exception of the New Democracy garnering 6.7 percent of the vote in 1991, no RRW party had come close to winning a parliamentary seat in Sweden until the SDP's in 2010. One of the driving issues fueling the SDP's rise has been immigration (Rydgren & van der Meiden, 2018, p. 13). At the start of the new millennium Jens Rydgren (2002) offered four reasons why no successful RRW party had emerged in Sweden: (1) social class voting was still in place and voter loyalty to the Social Democratic party was still strong; (2) socioeconomic issues still dominated politics in Sweden with the immigration issue having a low saliency; (3) limited levels of convergence between MSPs; and (4) the RRW Sweden Democrats were perceived as being too extreme (Rydgren, 2002).

In his 2016 re-evaluation of RRW party relevance in Sweden, he and co-author Sara van der Meiden found that class loyalty had declined, immigration was a highly salient issue, the MSPs had converged opening up political space on the right, and the SDP has successfully redefined themselves as a less extreme political party with a responsible reform agenda (Rydgren & van der Meiden, 2018, p. 23). These changes have contributed towards the increasing and steady electoral success of the SDP, which can be seen in Figure 8.4 below. Their success and the 62 Riksdag seats they hold have complicated the ability for the mainstream parties to form a government as there was a 'cordon sanitaire' against the SDP. The government was not formed until January 2019 which was 313 days after the election (Stromback, 2016).

Figure 8.4- MSPs and RRW party Election Results




Source: (NSD, 2019)

Migration Facts

Sweden is considered a traditional destination country for migrants (Messina & Williamson, 2017). Figure 8.5 below shows the historic numbers of immigrants arriving in Sweden and number of asylum requests, as well as how many new citizens were added each year (Statistics Swede, 2019). Much of the immigration in the later part of the 20th century included citizens from other European countries (the former Yugoslavia countries were a major source after its breakup) but since 2000 the top five destination countries have been Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and stateless (Migrationsverket, 2019).

Figure 8.5 shows the extraordinary increase in immigration arrivals and asylum requests in 2014/15, but the sharp drop in asylum requests in 2016 was a result of The Temporary Law taking effect that July (Riksdag, 2016). This law immediately decreased the number of asylum requests Sweden received as it strictly limited the ability of asylum seekers to obtain a resident permit and lowered Sweden's asylum rules to the minimum level required by EU law and international agreements (the temporary classification made it Schengen-compliant). It was set to expire in July 2019 but the new coalition agreement between the Social Democrats, the Center Party, the Liberals, and the Green Party, extended the law until July 2021 (Migrationsinfo.se, 2019).

Figure 8.5 – Asylum Requests and New Citizens in Sweden



Source: (Statistics Swede, 2019)

Two other aspects of migration that have impacted political competition in Sweden are crime and migrant costs. While sexual assault was mentioned above, according to the NUT, overall, criminal incidents went from 6.4% in 2006, to 8.3% in 2017 (National Security Survey b, 2018). Furthermore, the costs of accepting and integrating refugees are noteworthy. The Swedish Migration Agency's annual budget has gone from 6.7 billion kroner (709 million US dollars) in 2007, to 58.8 billion kroner (6.8 billion US dollars) in 2016 (Affärsvärlden, 2017) (Migrationsverket.se, 2017). Additionally, Aldén & Hammarstedt (2016) showed that one year after a refugee arrived in Sweden, the average cost per refugee was 109,000 SEK (\$12,629 US dollars). They stressed this cost went down the longer the refugee was in Sweden with the year seven cost estimated to be between 37,000 SKE and 125,000 SKE (\$4,287 to \$14,483 US dollars). The authors also found that refugees with a university education only cost 60,000 SKE (\$6,952 US dollars) in year seven while less-educated refugees cost 107,000 SKE's (\$14,483 US dollars) in year seven (Aldén & Hammarstedt, 2016, p. 14). The authors pointed out that these figures do not include first-year costs, while the refugee's asylum application is being processed. The Swedish Migration Agency pays these expenses. Both crime issues and refugee costs are significant factors impacting public opinion and competition between the parties.

Underscoring all these facts concerning immigration in Sweden is the projection that by 2065:

“a majority of the population is projected to be Muslim or of non-native descent” (De Coninck, et al., 2019, p. 44)

Public Opinion

This thesis used results from the Special Eurobarometer 469 to gauge attitudes in the QCA analysis, which showed that 58.33% of Swedes had negative attitudes towards immigration. Although David, et al. (2019), found that Swedes had more positive views of immigrants compared to the Netherlands, Belgium, and France (De Coninck, et al., 2019, p. 49). Probably the most comprehensive survey on politics in Sweden is conducted each Fall by the Society, Opinion and Media (SOM) Institute at the University of Gothenburg. Since 1986 they have been conducting a detailed survey of Swedes opinions on a variety of political questions. Their most important issue question shows that immigration was the third biggest issue in 2014, but jumped to number one in 2015, 2016, 2017, and in 2018, it only slipped to the number two issue behind

healthcare (Martinsson & Andersson, 2018, p. 41). These results are contrasted with its eighth-place ranking in 2011. Additionally, the pro-immigration attitude prior to the 2015 migrant crisis was confirmed in Masso's (2009) study of 23 European countries readiness to accept non-European immigrants and Sweden received the second-highest score behind only Ireland (Masso, 2009, p. 263).

In the Fall of 2015, Swedes were asked if accepting *fewer* refugees into Sweden was a good proposal, with 40% indicating good, 37% indicating bad and 23% having no opinion. However, in 2018, those feeling it was a good proposal had shot up to 53%, while those who felt it was a bad proposal had fallen to 23%, with 24% having no opinion (Martinsson & Andersson, 2018, p. 47). Additionally, those worrying about the number of refugees in Sweden jumped from 19% in 2011, to 29% in 2015, to 36% in 2018 (Martinsson & Andersson, 2018, p. 23).

During this same time period, the number of Swedes liking the SDP best went from 4% in 2010, to 15% in 2015 and was at 13% in 2018. The SAP and M were at 27% and 33% in 2010, then 26% and 22% in 2015, and settled at 29% and 18% respectively in 2018 (Martinsson & Andersson, 2018, p. 26). These results show increasing concern over Sweden's welcoming refugee policies and explain both the rise of the RRW SDP party and the willingness for the MSPs to shift positions to the right on immigration issues. This also reinforces the association between public opinion and shifting positions identified in the QCA analyses.

Media Overview

David, et al.'s (2019) study on immigration attitudes and media consumption showed that Swedes had the highest level of trust in their media compared to Belgium, France, and the Netherlands. Although they reported that Swedes had the most confidence in radio (De Coninck, et al., 2019, p. 44). This thesis has already mentioned how Alonso & da Fonseca (2011) showed that the immigration issues had been polarized in Europe, but in Sweden's case, Michał Krzyżanowski (2018) points out that:

“unlike in many other countries, the policy-related politicization in Sweden preceded the one based on public sphere articulation and, hence, was at the foundation of, to a large extent, reverse overall politicization logic than has usually been encountered elsewhere” (Krzyżanowski, 2018, p. 98)

Krzyżanowski goes on to say that the Sweden Democrats have ‘normalized’ a more anti-immigrant discourse and shows how the MSPs have advanced these anti-immigrant policies. This would support Meguid’s (2005) accommodative strategy outlined in her niche party theory.

When it comes to press freedom, Sweden received an extremely high score of 11 (with 0 being best and 100 being worst) from the Freedom House press freedom ranking. Their ranking included two negative comments concerning the increasing number of threats to journalist, as well as how several news outlets omitted any coverage of the 2015 sexual assaults of Swedish women by Afghanistan refugees in an attempt to avoid stoking anti-immigrant feelings (Freedom House, 2018). Additionally, newspapers in Sweden receive subsidies from the government if they have over 2,000 subscribers, and over 50% of their content is original (Ots, 2009, p. 380).

Berry, et al. (2016) included three of Sweden’s biggest newspapers in their study of press coverage of the immigration issue. *Dagens Nyheter* a morning broadsheet with a 282,000 circulation, *Sydvenska Dagbladet* a daily broadsheet in Southern Sweden with 100,000 readers, and *Aftonbladet* a daily evening tabloid (Berry, et al., 2016, p. 123). While these may be the biggest newspapers, overall Sweden has approximately 150 newspapers and most all have an online version available. About 90 of these papers are dailies and most offer home delivery. Like other countries, Sweden has seen newspaper readership decline but it is still relatively high compared to other countries. In addition to the above papers, there are almost 100 free ad sheets and newspapers distributed across Sweden. Of course, tabloids play a major role within the print media of Sweden and the biggest paper is the tabloid *Aftonbladet* with *Expressen* being another large tabloid printing local editions in Göteborg and Malmö (Wadbring & Ohlsson, 2019).

Consolidation within the print press has been a huge factor in Sweden with the Bonnier Group leading newspaper revenue collections by owning five of the largest newspapers in the country. The second biggest is Mittmedia, who owns 22 local newspapers, and third is the Norwegian Schibsted Group, with two titles, including the top tabloid *Aftonbladet*. Additionally, a high 55% of Swedes read a paper each day with 44% only reading the printed edition, 7% reading the digital edition, and 4% reading a mix of both. For tabloids, online readership is higher with 27% reading a tabloid each day but 20% reading online, 6% reading the print version and 1% looking at both (Wadbring & Ohlsson, 2019).

In 2018 the most utilized source for news was public TV at 47% followed closely by tabloids at 44%. Next was commercial TV at 36%, morning online papers at 33%, print morning papers at 30%, then public radio at 28% followed by a print evening tabloid at 5% (Martinsson & Andersson, 2018, p. 53). Close to 80% of all Swedes watch television daily with viewing time averaging about 120 minutes per day, which is much lower than other European countries. Public service broadcasting is still a big draw in Sweden, with a daily audience of almost 1/3 of the TV viewers and 3/4 of the radio listeners (Wadbring & Ohlsson, 2019). Almost 95% of the population has access to the internet, and 90% have used it in the last twelve months. Ownership of digital devices is widespread with 90% owning a computer, 75% having a smartphone and 60% using a tablet (Martinsson & Andersson, 2018, p. 59) (Wadbring & Ohlsson, 2019). Additionally, 72% of Swedes have used the internet to access social media sites with Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube being the most popular sites with half of the population having an account on Facebook. Young people state that Facebook is their main supplier of news, although Instagram is the favorite platform for children between 9 and 16 years of age. However, Facebook dominates with the older crowd (Martinsson & Andersson, 2018, p. 60; Wadbring & Ohlsson, 2019).

When considering online media, it must be noted that the RRW has used this new medium effectively to amplify mainstream stories that align with their anti-immigrant views, as well as bypassing the mainstream media to communicate stories they do not cover. One of the biggest online forums in Sweden is the right-leaning Flashback, which Törnberg & Törnberg (2016) found had 1,025,264 registered users and 2.3 million unique visitors per week dwarfing any of the newspaper circulations in Sweden. Their investigation showed:

“that Muslims are portrayed in the forum as a homogeneous out group, embroiled in conflict, violence and extremism: characteristics that are described as emanating from Islam as a religion” (Törnberg & Törnberg, 2016, p. 133).

Additionally, Ekman (2014) analyzed 223 video clips from five far-right Swedish groups. In 2013 the five channels had less than 5,000 subscribers, but their videos had been viewed approximately 2.65 million times. By producing and distributing these videos through YouTube, these groups have gained enormous exposure, and their clips are shared on social media sites, in blog posts, and on various websites (Ekman, 2014, p. 85).

Eberl, et al.'s (2018) review of media studies showed that the majority of media reporting on immigration issues was negative but that TV and tabloid reports were the most slanted against immigrants. With 80% of Swedes watching 120 minutes of TV each day and the largest papers being tabloids, it is safe to assume the average Swede is likely receiving more negative than positive news concerning immigration in Sweden. Berry showed that even though Sweden had the most positive coverage of the five countries in their study overall, Sweden's media reported slightly more negative stories than positive stories on immigration from August 2014 to April 2015. In the 303 stories reviewed, the three top themes were policy response, immigration figures, and humanitarian aspect, respectively. Furthermore, the authors found that the anti-immigrant SD party leaders were prominently featured in anti-immigrant stories (this contributed towards these parties gaining ownership of the issue) and the conservative M party leaders also received more attention than the SAP and Greens party leaders, causing them to conclude:

“Mainstream political voices who advocate more negative or hostile positions towards immigration tend to get more coverage across the Swedish press in comparison to those who adopt a more liberal stance” (Berry, et al., 2016, p. 130).

De Cock, et al.'s (2019) more recent 2015-2017 study of Swedish and Belgium newspapers found that the news media is more ‘problem orientated’ and writes from the point-of-view of the authorities with negative themes dominating the 977 articles analyzed in Swedish newspaper coverage of the migrant crisis. They showed how Swedish articles were longer and more prevalent than Belgium coverage, and they peaked in the Fall of 2015 when the refugee influx hit its peak. Another interesting aspect they identified in their research was the impact external events such as the New Year's Eve sexual assaults in Cologne, German, or European leaders voting to mandate the settlement of refugees in all EU member states, or the Hungarian referendum where 98% of the voters opposed the settlement of refugees in their country all had on the news coverage in Sweden and Belgium. They noted that these types of international activities led to longer stories connecting them to internal events in the home country (De Cock, et al., 2019, p. 49).

Overall, media reporting in Sweden increased the saliency of the immigration issue and contributed to the anti-immigrant attitudes held by the public, although this was somewhat driven by the rhetoric of the political elites from all the MSPs. Furthermore, the prominence given to

anti-immigrant SDP leaders in stories on immigration issues increased their ‘ownership’ of the issue. Another critical point that has relevance for all the cases in this study is the fact that external or international events can impact the saliency of the immigration issue within that country. De Cock, et al. (2019) pointed this fact out, and Lindell & Hovden (2018) added that online media and the social networks made international news more available to all citizens (Lindell & Hovden, 2018, p. 649).

Coalition Constraints

Last but certainly not least, this section will examine coalition formations in Sweden. It seems there has been a clear left-right divide when forming coalitions in the Riksdag. From 2006 to 2014 the Moderates (conservatives in Sweden) led a government coalition called the Alliance for Sweden, which was a center-right, liberal, conservative political alliance in Sweden made up of the Moderate Party, Center Party, Christian Democrats, and Liberal Party. The left bloc included the Swedish Social Democrat Party and Green Party with the Left Party offering informal support (Holger & Manow, 2019). The Alliance received 48.24% of the vote, and the Red-Green bloc garnered 46.08% of the vote in 2006. In 2010, the Alliance slightly improved their share of the vote to 49.27%, and the Red-Green bloc dropped to 43.6% of the vote (NSD, 2019).

The rise of the SDP in the 2014 election complicated government formation as the Alliance dropped to 39.42% while the Red-Green bloc held steady at 43.62%. After the SAP’s overtures to the Center Party and Liberals were rebuffed, they formed a minority government with the Greens as the Alliance stuck together in the opposition. In 2018, the continuing electoral rise of the SDP made it even harder for the Red-Green bloc to form a government. With the ‘cordon sanitaire’ in place and both blocs receiving around 40% of the vote, neither bloc controlled enough seats to form a government. After a successful no-confidence vote against Löfven and Ulf Kristersson's Moderate Party failing in their effort to organize a government, the Center Party and Liberals agreed to support Löfven in order to break the deadlock and avoid working with the RRW SDP party. This minority coalition was only able to succeed with the abstention of the Left Party in the vote. After 313 days, these negotiations resulted in an extremely weakened government with basically the same parties as before (Eriksson, 2019, pp. 87-88).

Without the constraining effects of a PGC, Sweden displays the contagion effect on whole party systems. First, the SDP increased the salience of the immigration issue. Next, the opposition Moderate Party leapt rightward on immigration policies, while the Left and Green parties have not been able to muster much of a threat to the SAP's left flank. These competitive moves can partly explain why a Western European country with an exceptional liberal human rights legacy has seen all of its top MSPs shift to the right on immigration issues.

Sweden Summary

By looking closer into Sweden's case, we can see the QCA results offer some helpful hints as to what conditions may be associated with MSPs shifting policies to the right on immigration. This examination of Sweden confirmed what Mudde (2010), Meguid (2005), Janda (1990) and Budge (1994) all stated about the importance of saliency and issue ownership in an electoral system's party competition. We also see how all three dimensions (cultural, economic, and security) of the immigration issue have played a role in this struggle but it seems the security threat is making the biggest impact on the public. In Sweden's case, the combination of a new RRW party entering parliament, along with the media's reporting on the significant increase in refugees entering the country and the 2017 terrorist attack, as well as crimes committed by immigrants, increase the salience of the immigration issue with all voters. The negative nature of these media reports, along with the extreme rhetoric of the SDP and other MSPs, combined with those parties losing vote share, created an environment where office seeking parties saw an opportunity in moving to the right. No PGC was in place to constrain issue shifting by the top MSPs. This case seems to reinforce what the QCA results showed — high anti-immigrant attitudes and high RRW relevance with no PGC lead to MSPs shifting immigration policies to the right.

Section 9 – [RRW Contagion in Estonia](#)

With 1.3 million people, Estonia is the smallest country in this thesis. The lack of successful RRW parties in the Riigikogu is one of the reasons Estonia was included in this study. It is also one of the few countries that was not on the frontlines of the Middle East and African refugee crisis of 2015/16. Most all the other countries in this study either accepted a significant increase in asylum seekers (UK, France, Germany, Sweden, Netherlands) or had asylum seekers coming

through their country (Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic). Poland and Estonia are the only two countries in this study that did not have to deal directly with this crisis and Estonia never received more than 250 asylum requests throughout the crisis (UNHCR, Eurostat, 2018).

The low number of refugees entering Estonia and the average shift to the *left* on immigration issues by two of Estonia's top MSPs despite high anti-immigrant public opinion is puzzling. The CHES survey results that show Estonia's MSPs average shift to the *left* was more than any other country in this study. Overall, the parties shifted -3.45% with the SDE and ER moving *left* by -9.44%, and -5.72% respectively, while EK shifted right by 4.81% (Polk, et al., 2017). The logical conclusion from these results would seem to indicate low levels of immigration lead to low salience of the immigration issue with parties seeing no need to cater to the right-wing voter.

Including a case in this thesis where the immigration crisis was not a front, and center issue or where RRW parties had limited success will provide needed contrasts for comparison. This section will explore the following aspects of Estonia to understand better how one of the smallest EU countries is handling the thorny EU immigration issue and the rising tide of RRW populism that is spreading across Europe.

- Estonia's business environment
- Past election results and MSPs competition
- RRW party relevance
- Migration trends and immigration laws
- Public opinion attitudes
- Media landscape
- Coalition Constraints

Business Environment

The Heritage Foundation's 2019 index of economic freedom gave Estonia a 76.6 score making it the 15th freest nation in the world. They say:

“The current government continues to pursue its predecessors' free-market, pro-business economic agenda and sound fiscal policies, which have led to balanced budgets, low public debt, and greater economic freedom. A simplified tax system with flat rates and low indirect taxation,

openness to foreign investment, and a liberal trade regime support a resilient and well-functioning economy. Management of public finance has been notably prudent and sound” (Heritage Foundation, 2019).

Additionally, Estonia has received a respectable 73 score in the Transparency Corruption Perception index and was ranked the 18th least corrupt nation out of 180 countries in 2018, and the top-ranked former European communist country (Transparency International, 2018). Furthermore, Estonia has a strong economy with a dropping unemployment rate of 5.59% in 2018 (The World Bank, 2019). In 2017, Estonia’s low taxes and strong economic growth led to it being ranked 28th on Forbes’ annual list of the Best Countries for Business (Forbes, 2018). For several years Estonia led post-communist Europe in Foreign Direct Investment (Wrobel, 2107, p. 29). Furthermore, Estonia’s ability to quickly establish democratic institutions and adopt a stable free-market economy included it in the first round of EU enlargement. Estonia also was accepted into the Eurozone in 2011.

Estonia took advantage of its natural harbors and geographic location as a bridge between the East and West by adopting foreign trade policies (low tariffs) that were some of the most liberal in the world. This led to a dramatic increase in trade for the new democracy and attracted a vast amount of foreign capital to Estonia. Many of these investment funds went into the technology sector (Wrobel, 2107). This contributed towards Estonia’s rapid technological advancement exemplified by the Tiger Leap Project, that helped deploy free Wi-Fi to all schools, libraries, businesses, and citizens (Opermann, 2014, p. 26). The economy is driven by its vibrant electronics and telecommunication sectors, as well as its dependable trade ties with Finland, Sweden, Germany, and Russia. Also, it has considerable natural resources including, timber, sea mud, and oil shale, which the latter provides approximately 90% of Estonia’s power needs (Worldatlas, 2019). One interesting challenge facing Estonia is a shortage of both skilled and unskilled workers. Recently, the immigration laws were amended to allow for easier hiring of qualified foreign workers (Forbes, 2018). Estonia has the lowest public debt of any EU country at only 8.4% of GDP in 2018 (Eurostat, 2018).

Electoral System & Recent Elections

With a Gallagher (2018) LSq average index that dropped from 5.09 to 2.34 in the last two elections Estonia has one of the most proportional electoral systems in post-communist Europe.

There are 101 seats in the Riigikogu with all 101 elected from 12 multi-member districts. There is a minimum five percent threshold for a party to enter parliament. Turnout in the last two elections has been 63.5% in 2011 and 64.2% in 2015. Estonia also allows online voting, and the use of this option increased from 24.3% of the voters in 2011 to 30.5% in 2015 (Molder, 2016, p. 84).

Estonia has experienced significant consolidation in their elections after 2000, with electoral volatility declining in recent years (Saarts, 2015, p. 3). According to Emanuele, et al.'s (2018) calculations ToV in Estonia averaged 29.7 from 1990 to 2009 but dropped to 15.1 from 2010 to 2016. Furthermore, RegV dropped from 9.8 to 3.5, and AltV dropped from 18.6 to 9.8 over this same time period. However, Estonia saw the number of parties competing in elections slightly increase from 4.78 in 2011 to 5.14 in 2015, and the effective number of parties in the Riigikogu grew from 3.84 in 2011 to 4.72 in 2015 (Gallagher, 2018).

The most noteworthy factor impacting Estonia's consolidating electoral system is the arrival of the EKRE as a relevant party in the Riigikogu. Without repeating the summary from Section 3.2, there are a few key events that have contributed to the current changes. The first was a 2014 controversial vote to legalize same-sex partnerships. The bill narrowly passed with 40 votes for and 38 members in opposition. The vote broke down mostly along party lines with ER and SDE voting in favor and EK and IRL voting against (Sikk, 2015, p. 100). The opposition this issue generated was one of the driving factors leading to the 2015 electoral breakthrough of the EKRE (Kasekamp, et al., 2018, p. 7).

Ironically, the two biggest parties in Estonia are both from the liberal party family. Both the ER and EK are a part of ALDE in the EU parliament (Sikk, 2015, p. 95). ER is a typical economic liberal party with the EK party mixing both left-wing populism and social liberalism into their ideology (Saarts, 2015, p. 7; Auers, 2019, p. 243). While these parties sometimes disagree over tax and budget issues, the major divide has to do with Russia. The EK is a more Russian friendly party, and after the 2014 conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the security threat from Russia became a major issue to many Estonians (Auers, 2019, p. 248). Russians who arrived in Estonia during the communist years, make up the largest ethnic minority in Estonia at 25% or 330,206 of the population in 2017 (Statistics Estonia, 2019), with 29.6% of the population having Russian as their mother tongue (Jõesaar, 2015, p. 45). Even though Estonia

only received 206 refugees through the EU quota system, the EKRE effectively used the immigrant crisis and European terrorist attacks to gain support in Estonia (Molder, 2016, pp. 89-90; Vahtla, 2018). However, the threat from Russia seems to be a bigger issue impacting competition between Estonia's MSPs (Makarychev & Sazonov, 2019, p. 4).

A major political shift took place in 2016 when the EK dropped its founder and charismatic, yet controversial leader Edgar Savisaar. New leader Jüri Ratas, led a successful no-confidence vote with the ER's coalition partners. The ER had held the office of prime minister since 2005 and had been in the coalition government since 1995. With Edgar Savisaar gone (other parties refused to cooperate with him) the EK quickly formed a new government with the Reform party's old coalition partners SDE and IRL (Molder, 2016, pp. 86-87).

RRW Relevance

The success of the EKRE in the 2015 Riigikogu elections took most political observers by surprise. The only real RRW party success in Estonia had taken place in the early years after communism fell, and by 1995, those parties had ceased to function (Auers & Kasekamp, 2015, p. 144). After the 2011 election, there were only four parties in the Riigikogu, resulting in a stable political environment. Other RRW parties had attempted to compete, but the 5% threshold seemed to hold them back.

It is surprising how the EKRE used the 2014 Civil Partnership Act to gain traction because surveys show religion has very little significance for a large majority of Estonians.¹⁶ The 2011 housing and population census data showed that only 19% of ethnic Estonians had a religious affiliation. For the first time, Orthodox Christianity, which is mostly practiced by the Russian minority, was the top religion (16%) in Estonia. Lutherans were the second most practiced religion at 10%, but the vast majority of the population did not have a religious affiliation (EER News, 2013). These results have been confirmed in other surveys and present questions as to why the EKRE could gain so much traction using the same-sex issue in a country where strong

¹⁶ Their opposition was probably seen as a victory for them as subsequent parliaments never adopted the rules and procedures required for the Civil Partnership Act to take effect. In 2016 it was removed from the agenda (Molder, 2016, p. 91)

religious views (most opposition to same-sex partnerships typically stems from religious groups) seem to be unimportant.

This issue and an anti-establishment populism before the 2015 elections, along with the EU refugee quotas after the 2015 elections have allowed the EKRE to garner support from the Russian minority. This is another surprise as the EKRE's nativist attitude against the Russian minority and the security threat from Putin's aggression have traditionally kept most Russian speakers in the EK party (Wierenga, 2017, p. 4). Wierenga goes on to point out that Russians and EKRE members share an opposition to accepting refugees through the EU quota system. He adds the Russian speaking minority:

“are white, historically Christian and, to a large extent, share many of the socially conservative values of the EKRE” (Wierenga, 2017, p. 4).


Polling data from June of 2017 shows that the ERKE has continued to increase their 8.1% share of the vote in the 2015 election, to 16.2% in 2017 (Braghiroli & Petsinis, 2019, p. 10). Wierenga attributes some of this increase to the EKRE's ability to attract more of these Russian voters from the Center party (Wierenga, 2017, p. 14).¹⁷

The EKRE is the successor to the more rural People's Union party (Saarts, 2015, p. 2). Looking at the map of the 2015 election results in Figure 9.1 below, we see the EKRE only came in first place in a few rural areas but looking at the 2017 local election results in Figure 9.2 below we can see their success was more pronounced in the rural areas. Even though the 2019 election is not included in this study, it is still informative to look at the results map from that election in Figure 9.3 below. We can see the EKRE is expanding its support and the Center party does best in Russian speaking areas. One last map that helps us better understand politics in Estonia is the Russian speaking minority map in Figure 9.4. This shows why the Center Party performs best in these areas.

¹⁷ This thesis did not consider the March 2019 election in Estonia as it was too far past the 2017 CHES survey results to reflect an accurate shift but it should be noted that the EKRE received 17.8% of the vote and was the third largest party in the Riigikogu. Furthermore, they joined the EK in a coalition government confirming the 2015-2017 trends that were noted in this study (Holger & Manow, 2019). It also reinforces how the refugee issue resonated with voters.

Figure 9.1-2015 Estonia Election Results

Estonian Legislative Election 2015




Source: <https://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/countries/e/estonia/estonia-legislative-election-2015.html>

Figure 9.2 – 2017 Estonia Municipal Election Results

Vote shares for the five major national parties in the 2017 local elections


Municipalities in which a party did not field candidates are in gray, red boundary indicates plurality vote share



Source: Estonia National Electoral Committee, Estonian Land Board


Figure 9.3 – 2019 Estonia Election Results

Estonian Legislative Election 2019



Source: <https://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/countries/e/estonia/estonia-legislative-election-2019.html>

Figure 9.4 – Distribution of the Russian language from the 2000 Estonian census




Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Russophone_population_in_Estonia.png

Examining recent election results in Figure 9.5 below shows how the SDE and IRL parties (who were coalition partners with the ER and EK since 2010) have seen their share of the vote drop substantially. We also see a slight drop-off in the Center parties' totals. Even though the 2019 election results were not included in this study, they do confirm the electoral trends that were identified in this thesis.

The anti-establishment nativism articulated by the EKRE is best summarized by the opening statement in their 2015 program.

“Estonia is our home and our country must belong to our people. The state is a dignified and just state only if its laws are dignified, value local traditions, are fair and understandable. Our goal is a just country where politicians are facing the people. Estonia needs political reform” (EKRE, 2015)!

Figure 9.5 – Estonian Election Results 2007-2019



Source: (NSD, 2019)


Migration Facts

Estonia is one of the least desired countries for refugees to request asylum to as they have always had conservative immigration policies because of the Russian minority (Islam, 2017, p.

292). While Estonia agreed to take their quota of 550 asylum seekers the ER leader Taavi Rõivas' said, "the EC had made an error in its calculation and even if Estonia did welcome the refugees, the quota should be much lower." Coalition partner SDE, who typically takes more pro-immigrant positions, also raised reservations about the EU quotas and the opposition Centre Party, attempted to file a petition for a referendum over how many refugees Estonia would accept (Braghiroli & Petsinis, 2019, p. 12).

In total, Estonia accepted 206 asylum seekers from 2015 to the end of 2017 (Pajumets, 2017, p. 7). Someone from Germany or Sweden may wonder how such a small amount of refugees could cause any political problems but Braghiroli & Petsinis (2019), point out that the EKRE took reports of terrorist attacks or other negative news about refugees and amplified them in their campaigns by adding warnings of what would happen in Estonia if asylum seekers were allowed into the country (Ojala, et al., 2019, p. 68). The United Nations Population Division (2017) shows that 14.7% of Estonia's population were immigrants. Clearly, these are not asylum seekers from the migrant crisis of 2015/16. Most of these immigrants are Russian citizens with approximately 7% (as of 2012) being stateless Russians (in Estonia they are called "grey passport holders") with another smaller contingent of laborers who have been recruited to Estonia by eliminating restrictions on foreign workers (Dougherty & Kaljurand, 2015, p. 8). Additionally, Estonia changed the rules so that international students can work while studying (Ingram, 2016, pp. 228-229). Estonia has changed its rules to attract workers because more people have been emigrating from Estonia than immigrating to Estonia. From 2000 to 2015, 69,900 Estonians left the country, yet only 49,900 immigrants arrived (Tammur, et al., 2017). Figure 9.6 below shows net migration numbers from 2000 to 2015.

Figure 9.6- Net Migration in Estonia 2000-2015



Source: Statistikaamet (Statistics Estonia) 2016; taken from (Tammur, et al., 2017)

While Estonia has a long history of immigration in their country, they have minimal experience with non-European refugees (Islam, 2017, p. 294). Despite the low numbers of refugees arriving in Estonia, the perceived ‘threat’ that non-European immigrants present to both native Estonians and ethnic Russians have allowed the EKRE to exploit this issue. Estonia is an excellent example of how an EU country that has not experienced high migration may still experience successful RRW parties and high anti-immigrant public opinion.

Public Opinion

The Special Eurobarometer 469 results used in the QCA analysis showed that 57.56% of Estonians had negative attitudes towards immigration, which was the fifth-highest in this study.

However, those results seem low compared to the Fall 2015 Eurobarometer 84. It showed that immigration was the top concern for 45% of Estonians with the economic situation coming in second by a distant 29% (European Commission, 2015, p. 17). Even more shocking was that 81% of Estonians had negative feelings about non-European immigrants (European Commission, 2015, p. 27).

This anti-immigration attitude was in place long before the 2015 migrant crisis. Masso (2009) examined 23 European countries readiness to accept non-European immigrants, and Estonia received the second-lowest score behind only Hungary (Masso, 2009, p. 263). Furthermore, immigration and terrorism were the major concerns for Estonians on the 2016 and 2018 Public Opinion and National Defense surveys. They showed that the top perceived threats were the activities of the Islamic State and terrorist networks, as well as the migration of refugees to Europe. Respondents were asked to evaluate how various factors impact peace and security in the world. The top three were listed in Table 9.1 below, but it should be noted that the issue ‘Russian activities in restoring its authority’ was seventh on the 2018 survey with 37% which was an eight-point increase from the October 2017 survey. This issue was the top-ranked concern by 46% of respondents prior to the migrant crisis on the March 2015 survey (Kivirähk, 2017; Kivirähk, 2018). When reviewing available polling data concerning immigration in Estonia, the security dimension seems to be much more salient than the cultural or economic dimensions.

Table 9.1- Estonia’s Public Opinion and National Defense survey

Issue	Date	Certainly	To Some Extent	Certainly Not	Don't Know
Activities of the Islamic State	March- 2018	56%	34%	5%	5%
	October- 2017	60%	31%	4%	5%
	March- 2017	64%	27%	4%	5%
	October- 2016	66%	27%	3%	4%
Activities of Terrorist Networks	March- 2018	53%	36%	6%	5%
	October- 2017	53%	37%	6%	4%
	March- 2017	61%	32%	4%	4%
	October- 2016	61%	33%	3%	3%
Migration of Refugees to Europe	March- 2018	50%	40%	6%	4%
	October- 2017	49%	40%	7%	4%
	March- 2017	57%	36%	4%	3%
	October- 2016	58%	36%	3%	3%
Source: (Kivirähk, 2018, p. 21; Kivirähk, 2017, p. 21)					

Media Overview

There are four main aspects of Estonia's news outlets that must be considered when examining media in Estonia. First, the fact that 29% of the population is a Russian speaking minority prohibits any news outlet from reaching the entire population (Jõesaar, 2015, p. 45). Secondly, Opermann (2014) argues that citizens access to the internet has caused fragmentation within Estonia's traditional media channels. This is not unique to Estonia, but no other small post-communist country has made the internet so freely available to its citizens so quickly. Thirdly, for the first 20 years after communism fell Nordic media companies, such as the already mentioned Swedish Bonnier Group, invested in and controlled Estonia's major media outlets. This added a more pro-western slant to the news (Opermann, 2014, p. 28). Lastly, with only 1.3 million people, Estonia is a tremendously small market, and the large Russian speaking segment splits this market even further. This makes investing in media outlets that can reach both native Estonians and the minority Russian population problematic (Lauk & Einmann, 2019, p. 5; Jõesaar, 2015, p. 46).

When it comes to press freedom, in 2015 Estonia received a high score of 16 (with 0 being best and 100 being worst) from the Freedom House press freedom ranking. (Freedom House, 2018). The Estonian-language newspapers comprise four major dailies—*Postimees*, *Eesti Päevaleht*, business tabloid *Äripäev*, and the tabloid *Õhtuleht*, along with two major weeklies—*Eesti Ekspress* and *maaleht*, as well as approximately 15 significant regional and local weekly papers, which almost all have versions available online. As of 2014, there were 132 papers in Estonia (Opermann, 2014, p. 87). A small group of private companies own most of these newspapers, although some small or cultural publications receive aid from regional or local governments. The print editions of the two Russian-language national newspapers, *Postimees na russkom yazyke* and *Den' za dnyom* were shuttered in 2017, but the *Rus Postimees* still has a Russian-language online version (Postimees Group, 2019). Additionally, the largest online platform is the tabloid *Delfi* and *Rus Delfi* produced in both Estonian and Russian. Both *Rus Postimees* and *Rus Delfi* are the most popular Estonian produced outlets used by Russians (Barthel, 2018, p. 41).


In 2018 the most utilized source for news was public TV for both Estonians and Russians, although, for the most part, they watched entirely different channels. Russians (71%) watch mostly Russian TV channels that put a pro-Russian slant on the news and Estonians (84%) watch the locally produced Estonian Television (ETV) channels (Barthel, 2018, pp. 36-39). Barthel goes on to point out that Russian media outlets seek to create dissension between Estonia, the EU, and NATO. She identifies three main Russian messages:

“i) Estonia as a fascist country; ii) Estonian Russian’s as part of a divided nation and iii) Russia’s claim to protect the rights of Russian-speaking minorities outside of Russia” (Barthel, 2018, p. 32).

After the 2007 Bronze riots,¹⁸ Russia media outlets were able to communicate this message to the Russian minority in Estonia effectively. Government officials realized more needed to be done to integrate the Russian minority, but little progress was made until after the 2014 Ukraine invasion (Dougherty & Kaljurand, 2015, p. 4). The stark difference of opinion on security issues was exhibited by the support of NATO membership in Ministry of Defense opinion polls at the end of 2016. About 92% of Estonians supported joining NATO, but Russian support was only at 33%. While 53% of Russian speakers believed a good relationship with Russia would strengthen Estonian security, only 18 % of ethnic Estonians felt the same (Barthel, 2018, p. 36). These differences led the Riigikogu to authorize funds for a Russian language TV station in 2015. While its success has received mixed results, it is indicative of the recent efforts to better integrate Estonia’s large Russian speaking minority (Barthel, 2018, pp. 43-47). Figure 9.7 below provides a helpful summary of the Estonian/Russian divide within the country’s media markets.

¹⁸ The Bronze soldier was a memorial to Russian soldiers who died fighting the Germans in WWII and its where many of those soldiers are buried. To Estonians it represents the occupation by the Soviets after WWII, but to Russians it represents the defeat of fascism. In 2006, the monument was vandalized and in 2007 the Riigikogu voted to move the memorial. This led to Russians protesting the removal and clashing with police and resulted in one death and negative feelings towards Estonia by the Russian minority (Cavegn, 2017).

Figure 9.7 - Media channels importance to Russians and Estonians by percentage



Source: Estonian Integration Monitoring (Eesti integratsiooni monitoriing) (2017)

Source: Taken from (Barthel, 2018, p. 40)

While these two parallel media tracts are vital to understanding politics in Estonia, this thesis is more concerned with how immigration has been portrayed in press reports. Ojala, et al.'s (2019) examination of President Toomas Hendrik Ilves's speeches on refugees and the newspaper coverage they received offers some insight. After reviewing 18 articles, along with 692 reader comments from the *Õhtuleht's* coverage, the authors found that Ilve's speeches were positive towards accepting refugees. However, the reader's on-line comments were strongly anti-immigrant and heavily slanted with an anti-elitism appeal. Ojala, et al, pointed out that these anti-immigrant and anti-elitism messages at the European level can shape the national immigration debate more than the real number of asylum seekers going to a country. They concluded by stating:

“the invocation of anger by online tabloid readers boiled down to a repudiation of elites and to an outcry that the government and the EU are not listening to the people” (Ojala, et al., 2019, p. 175).

Considering Estonia’s accessible and well used Wi-Fi network, it will be useful to review Kasekamp, et al.’s (2018) thematic content analysis of EKRE’s social media discourse in communicating their views. They identified numerous anti-immigrant blogs and social media groups that are active in Estonia such as the Facebook group *EI PAGULASSIDELE* which has over 20,000 followers (Kasekamp, et al., 2018, p. 2). The authors went on to identify four main themes in their messaging, which include, an anti-Russian stance, Euroscepticism, support of traditional family values, and opposition to accepting refugees.

Their study examined over 1,900 posts from EKRE’s official Facebook page and 300 posts from their youth group Blue Awakening, as well as key leaders and prominent party members social media activity between 2014 to 2016. They found that a high majority of the posts originated from EKRE’s news portal *Uued Uudised*, or in other Estonian media channels. The authors concluded that EKRE’s successful use of social media had been a major factor in its rise to power. While they acknowledged that there had not been a rightward shift within Estonia’s electoral system, they predicted it would happen if EKRE’s popularity continued to hold (Kasekamp, et al., 2018).

While the research on the discourse of Estonia media is limited, we can see that the availability of outside news reporting has a big impact on attitudes. Ironically, immigration and traditional value issues have closed the gap between the parallel Russian and Estonia media channel reporting. Like Sweden, we see that the RRW EKRE has claimed ‘ownership’ of the immigration issue. Also, like Sweden, external or international events concerning immigration impacted the saliency of the immigration issue within Estonia. This effect is particularly strong in Estonia because of the ease of online communications, outside Russian influence, and their small market size (Lauk & Einmann, 2019; Jõesaar, 2015; Kasekamp, et al., 2018).

Coalition Constraints

Estonia’s stable political environment and consistent dominance of the ER and EK parties in the new millennium led each party to partner with the left leaning SDE. The process of

negotiating these PGC's has led to compromise and moderation, but it has not always been an easy process, as illustrated by chairman of the IRL Urmas Reinsalu's description of the 38 day negotiations after the 2015 elections, as a long drawn out process where each party fought hard to include their top priorities in the agreement (Kangro, 2015).

In contrast to Sweden, one of the primary issues between the top two parties in Estonia has been the Russian security threat, although the gap between the parties on this issue has narrowed considerably in recent years. While there have been disagreements on tax issues, both the ER and EK have shown a willingness to partner with the SDE. Until the EKRE started using the refugee issue in late 2015, immigration (as it relates to non-European refugees) was not much of a salient issue between parties. The role of the PGC in constraining Estonia's MSPs from shifting to the right on immigration issues is not very clear in this case. While the literature shows that coalition agreements constrain parties ideologically, in Estonia's case, it does not seem to have played a major role.

Estonia Summary

The initial glance at Estonia seemed to confirm the connection between the conditions and outcome tested in the QCA results. Upon further examination, we can see that despite the high anti-immigration attitudes, this condition did not play a major role in party politics before 2016. Furthermore, the constraining effect of the PGC we observed in the Netherlands only had a mild impact on Estonia's MSPs sifting immigration positions, although, the lack of success for an RRW party supported the QCA results. It should be noted that the EK was the one party that did shift somewhat to the right, but undoubtedly, the EKRE has taken ownership of the immigration issue. The MSPs seem to have taken a dismissive strategy for dealing with the EKRE on the immigration issue, while the cultural and security dimensions, as it relates to non-Western Muslims seem to be most important in Estonia.

Clearly, the security threat from Russian was a critical issue prior to the 2015 elections. Ironically, it seems the immigration issue and the rise of the EKRE have 'helped' with the integration of the Russian minority. Of course, the 2019 election results indicate that things have changed in Estonia. The PGC has been discarded for a more right-leaning coalition between EK and EKRE. These events along with Kluver & Spoon's (2014) time lag theory (Bale, et al.,

2010), indicate that Kasekamp, et al.'s (2018) prediction about the EKRE's impact on the MSPs shifting to the right is most likely coming to pass.

Section 10 – RRW Contagion in Poland

Any examination of politics in Poland must recognize the prominent position faith and the Catholic Church play in Polish daily life. Dr. Kyriaki Topidi (2019) expressed this aspect of Polish society best when she wrote:

“In the most common representations of the Polish people, the Catholic Church is not simply considered as a part of the Polish nation; it is the Polish nation” (Topidi, 2019, p. 1).

Poland is the second post-communist country in the case comparison part of this thesis. As part of the Visegrád Four (V4) and the first EU country to be threatened with Article 7 sanctions, it was a relevant country to include in this part of the study (Schmidt, et al., 2018, p. 36). Other reasons that make it an important selection are its strong emphasis on the Christian faith, limited acceptance of non-European asylum seekers and most interesting—the ‘contamination’ effect of PiS. Only Sweden’s SAP and Hungary’s Fidesz offer similar examples of a leading government party adopting such strong RRW anti-immigrant positions.

While Poland shares a low number of non-European refugees with Estonia, unlike Estonia, Poland’s MSPs have all shifted their positions on immigration to the right. The CHES survey results show that Poland’s MSPs average shift to the right was the fourth highest in this study. Overall the parties shifted 18.31% with the PiS shifting the fourth-most in this study at 35.14% and the left leaning SLD moving 11.64%, while Donald Tusk’s center-right PO party only shifted 8.15%. (Polk, et al., 2017). These low levels of immigration raise questions as to why the MSPs shifted so much and why the citizens of Poland have such high anti-immigration attitudes.

Like the last two sections, this section will explore the following aspects of Poland to better understand how one of the most religious countries in the EU has responded to the migrant crisis.

- Poland’s business environment
- Past election results and MSPs competition
- RRW party relevance

- Migration trends and immigration laws
- Public opinion attitudes
- Media landscape
- Coalition constraints

Business Environment

The Heritage Foundation's 2019 Index of Economic Freedom gave Poland a 67.8 score making it the 46th freest nation in the world. They say:

“Poland’s positive economic reputation was earned through structural reforms: trade liberalization, low taxes, and business-friendly regulations. Enthusiasm for reform has waned in recent years amid political and policy uncertainty that has contributed to currency volatility and weakened rates of investment.” (Heritage Foundation, 2019).

Additionally, Poland received a solid 60 score in Transparency International’s CPI and ranked as the 36th least corrupt nation out of 180 countries in 2018, making them the second-ranked post-communist European country behind Estonia (Transparency International, 2018).

Furthermore, Poland has a vibrant economy with a falling unemployment rate of 4.37% in 2018 (The World Bank, 2019). As the sixth-largest economy in the EU, Poland ranks 34th on Forbes’ annual list of the Best Countries for Business. While Poland has been the biggest recipient of EU development funds, it was also the only EU country to avoid a recession during the 2008-09 great recession and subsequent Euro crisis (Kaczmarczyk, 2018, p. 91; Forbes, 2018).

Furthermore, from 1992 to 2013, GDP grew almost twice as fast as the other developed EU countries (Gomułka, 2016, p. 20). Poland was accepted into the EU in 2004 but has resisted joining the Eurozone and still uses the Polish Złoty as its currency.

Ernst & Young's 2016 European attractiveness survey showed that Poland was tied with Belgium as the sixth most attractive investment location in Europe and created the second most jobs from those investments (Ernst & Young, 2016, p. 4). Poland has the fourth lowest personal income tax in the EU at 5% and overall tax revenue, as a percentage of GDP, is eighth lowest at 33.9% (OECD Data, 2017). In 2017, the economy was well rounded with a large service sector accounting for 57.4% of GDP, industry 40.2%, and agriculture 2.4% (CIA, 2017). Poland’s harbors on the Baltic Sea and its geographical location in the heart of Europe facilitate a healthy

flow of both imports and exports. Poland is the world's 9th largest coal producer along with the 23rd largest vehicle manufacturer, and surprisingly, Poland was the 16th most popular tourist destination in the world in 2016 (Industry Europe, 2018). Like Estonia, Poland is facing a shortage of workers in industries such as construction and manufacturing. In 2012, the government prioritized certain types of migrants, including labor migrants from countries with close cultural and geographic similarities. These changes increased legal employment of foreign workers who were needed by Polish employers. Poland has also relaxed employment and certification procedures, extended the duration of temporary residence permits and signed a bilateral social security agreement with Ukraine which has provided the most foreign workers since 2014 (Brunarska, et al., 2017). Poland's public debt is just below the Netherlands and just higher than Sweden's at 68% of GDP in 2018 (Eurostat, 2018).

Electoral System & Recent Elections

The Gallagher (2018) LSq average index jumped from 5.95 to 12.56 in the last two elections indicating a considerable increase in disproportionality within Poland's electoral system. This was mostly because of the minimum party thresholds of 8% for coalitions and 5% for single parties and the d'Hondt method for allocating the winner bonus (Marcinkiewicz & Stegmaier, 2016, p. 3). In 2015, 16.6% of the vote went to parties that did not cross these thresholds, and of that amount, 12% went to parties on the left who never reached parliament.¹⁹ There are 460 deputies in the Sejm elected from 41 multi-member districts with 7 to 20 deputies elected from each district. Turnout in the last two elections has been 48.92% in 2011 and 50.92% in 2015 (NSD, 2019).

Additionally, Poland is considered a semi-presidential political system as the president is elected separately and has a veto that requires a three-fifths vote to override. While this framework was designed to foster cooperation, it has not worked in recent years. Since 2005, the instances where PiS or PO did not control both the presidency and Sejm, there has been significant conflict between these parties (Dudzinska & Betkiewicz, 2018, p. 172).

¹⁹ PiS only garnered 37.6% of the vote, yet the minimum thresholds allowed them to have the first outright majority in modern democratic Polish history. It takes 231 deputies for an outright majority and they won 235. In three past elections other parties received a higher share of the vote but did not win an outright majority—SLD-2001 (41.0%), PO-2007 (41.5%), and PO-2011 (39.18%) (Markowski, 2016, pp. 1,314; Jasiewicz & Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz, 2016, p. 207).

Poland has seen a modest decline in volatility in recent years, and according to Emanuele, et al.'s (2018) calculations ToV in Poland averaged 28.8 from 1990 to 2009 but dropped to 22.7 from 2010 to 2016. RegV which measures parties entering or exiting the arena, increased from 7.3 to 10.5 and AltV dropped from 19.3 to 11.3 over this same time period. However, Poland has had the number of parties competing in elections increase over the last three elections from their low point of 3.32 in 2007 to 3.74 in 2011 and 4.45 in 2015, but the effective number of parties in the Sejm fell from 2.82 in 2007 to 3.00 in 2011 and 2.75 in 2015 (Gallagher, 2018).


For the first time since communism's fall, Poland has no representation from the left in the Sejm. Without repeating the summary from Section 3.7, the 2015 elections ushered in a few dramatic changes on Poland's political landscape. In addition to the absence of a left-wing party in the Sejm, the entry of several new organic grassroots parties competing in elections was new. Parties such as Kukiz'15, Modern (Nowoczesna), and Left Together (Razem) did not start as a split or merger from another party, but were each original standalone organizations that built brand new grassroots support bases from scratch (Jasiewicz & Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz, 2016, p. 207). Also, the Presidency, a majority in the *Senat* and an outright majority in the Sejm were all held by the PiS after the 2015 election (Fomina & Kucharczyk, 2016, p. 59).

Typically, when a country experiences a major economic downturn the incumbent government is thrown out and the chief opposition party usually prospers. Poor economic conditions can also lead to new grassroots parties entering an electoral system. However, Poland's case is puzzling because they did not experience an economic downturn but did switch ruling parties and witness numerous new parties entering the political fray. Civic Platform had been leading Poland's government since 2007 and had an overall remarkable record of economic achievement. GDP had grown 24% from 2007 to 2015, unemployment dropped from 9.61% in 2007 to 7.5% in 2015 and inflation dropped from 2.5% in 2007 to -0.87% (OECD Data, 2018). In 2015, polling showed that 70% of Poles were happy with their job situation, and an even higher 80% were satisfied with their lives. Although, these positive attitudes were contrasted by 72% of the public who were dissatisfied with Poland's political system (Markowski, 2016, pp. 1,312; Szczerbiak, 2017, p. 410).

Nevertheless, the PO made mistakes and opened themselves up to damaging attacks from PiS and its new grassroots competitors. Figure 10.1 below shows the quarterly aggregated average of

Polish party support from 2014 to 2017. We can see that the PO's support started dropping right after the Presidential election and was just above 20% before the October election (Marcinkiewicz & Stegmaier, 2017).

Figure 10.1 - Polish party support from 2014 - 2017



Source: (Marcinkiewicz & Stegmaier, 2017)

PO lost their capable leader Donald Tusk to the EU Presidency in 2014, and just before he left the “waiter tape scandal” hit (Marcinkiewicz & Stegmaier, 2016, p. 1). This scandal stemmed from privately recorded conversations of PO leaders at expensive restaurants offering arrogant opinions with vulgar language. No laws were broken, but it led to an investigation resulting in several high-level resignations and negative press for the PO (Szczerbiak, 2017, p. 411; Markowski, 2016, pp. 1,313). PO also raised the retirement age, passed laws protecting transgender rights, alienated young urban voters with their Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, and upset rural voters with their education reform proposals (Marcinkiewicz & Stegmaier, 2016, pp. 1-2).

While the missteps above cost Civic Platform political capital and threatened their ruling status,²⁰ it was the immigration issue that ended any hope that they could salvage a winning campaign. In September 2015, at the worst possible time and only one month before the election, PO voted to accept 7,000 asylum seekers through the EU refugee quota system. They agreed to take 1,201 migrants from Italy and 3,881 from Greece in the first wave.²¹ (Szczerbiak, 2017, p. 413; Hodór & Kosińska, 2017, p. 246). PiS quickly jumped on this issue, and it became a critical part of their party's discourse. PO defended their decision and accused PiS of promoting xenophobia and warned that not accepting the refugees would hurt Poland's standing with the EU. PiS was joined by other RRW parties (KORWiN) who expressed fears of the security and cultural threat presented by refugees. Furthermore, polling data showed that 44% of Poles were negatively inclined towards Muslims, with only 23% holding positive views (Szczerbiak, 2017, p. 245). Overall Civic Platform's defense of their position in the closing weeks of the campaign hurt PO and is partially to blame for the 15% drop in their results from 2011 (Narkowicz, 2018, p. 358; Fomina & Kucharczyk, 2016, p. 62).

PiS's positions in this election are indicative of the move to the left on economic issues by many RRW parties across Europe. They proposed lowering the retirement age,²² a universal second child cash benefit (€120), free prescription drugs for seniors and a tax credit for low wage earners (Fomina & Kucharczyk, 2016, p. 61). These more left-leaning welfare proposals garnered significant support for PiS and contrasted with the more fiscally responsible but unpopular reforms advanced by PO.

Ironically, in early 2015, just five months before the election, Civic Platform was in a strong position with their Presidential candidate having approval ratings of over 70% (Markowski, 2016, pp. 1,313). Figure 10.2 below explores public opinion polls in the presidential race that show the dramatic reversal in the two parties' candidates, and Figure 10.3 below shows the final


²⁰ Another factor that hurt PO was former PO justice minister Jarosław Gowin, who Tusk had fired, broke away from PO and started a new party—Poland Together. This party ended up signing a cooperation agreement with PiS before the 2015 election (Szczerbiak, 2017, pp. 406-408).

²¹ The EU criteria for determining how many refugees each state would take was as follows: (1) the size of the population (40%), (2) total GDP (40%), (3) the average number of asylum applications and the number of accepted refugees per 1 million inhabitants from 2010–2014 (10%), and (4) the unemployment rate (10%) (Pachocka, 2016, p. 115).

²² With the exception of the .Modern party, all other parties campaigned on repealing the PO law change (Jasiewicz & Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz, 2016, p. 207).

results. This shows the rapid decline of Komorowski and the surprising rise of Kukiz in just the last two weeks. In the end, PiS's Duda just edged out Komorowski by 51.6% to 48.4% (Jasiewicz & Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz, 2016, p. 205).

Figure 10.2 -2015 Presidential polling results



Source: (Sobkowicz, 2016)

Figure 10.3- 2015 Presidential election results


2015 Polish Presidential Election Results (Second Round, 24 May)

Andrzej Duda wins with 51.6% over incumbent Bronisław Komorowski




% Komorowski

- 15.4 - 20.0
- 20.0 - 25.0
- 25.0 - 30.0
- 30.0 - 35.0
- 35.0 - 40.0
- 40.0 - 45.0
- 45.0 - 50.0
- 50.0 - 55.0
- 55.0 - 60.0
- 60.0 - 65.0
- 65.0 - 70.0
- 70.0 - 75.0



Approximate location of the boundary between Prussian and Russian territory set by the Congress of Vienna in 1815



Powiat size is proportional to number of votes

Source: (Donner, 2015)

This section has attempted to explain why the reasonably successful and popular Civic Platform experienced such a rapid drop of support in 2015 (Fomina & Kucharczyk, 2016, p. 59). Four factors combined to end their rule. First, the party was weakened by unpopular cultural and economic reforms. Second, the perception of corruption fueled an anti-establishment or change environment within the electorate. Third, the immigration issues and accepting asylum seekers through an EU mandate ended any chance for the PO to recover and change the narrative (Fomina & Kucharczyk, 2016, p. 62). Lastly, several scholars point out that the Polish Catholic Church was supportive of the Law and Justice party (Fomina & Kucharczyk, 2016, p. 61; Krotofil & Motak, 2018). In many cases, this was not an open endorsement, but in one survey, Poles indicated that 9 out of 10 priests had plainly advocated on behalf of PiS (Markowski, 2016, pp. 1,313).

RRW Relevance

The difficulty in determining which parties are RRW in Poland was addressed in Section 4.1. PiS was not considered to be an RRW party even though they have shifted far to the right during the time period considered in this study. That leaves several parties who experienced considerable electoral success despite PiS's shift to the right. In 2015, Kukiz'15 received 8.1% and was represented in the Sejm, while KORWiN received 4.76% and just missed the 5% threshold. PiS's informal partners United Poland garnered 4% of the vote and Poland Together received 3.62%, along with SRP trailing with just 0.03% of the vote. The total vote for all these RRW parties in 2015 was 21.22%. Most scholars only focus on PiS and overlook this substantial RRW vote in Poland. It is noteworthy that the combined vote of PO and PiS has declined substantially from 73.62% in 2007 to 61.67% in 2015 (Marcinkiewicz & Stegmaier, 2016, p. 3).


One of the key themes of these RRW newcomers is a strong anti-refugee discourse (Lipiński & Stępińska, 2019, p. 72). Mudde's (2010) suggestion that MSPs who moved quickly to claim ownership of the immigration issue were able to stifle new RRW party's success seems to be at work in Poland, as shown by PiS's shift to the right.

To get a better understanding of politics in Poland, we need to look at Figure 10.4, which shows the historical boundaries of Poland that still exert a great deal of influence on attitudes in this country. These former boundaries seem to have a significant impact on election returns even today. Figure 10.5 below shows that PiS performs better in the Southern and East Poland while

PO performs better in the former German territory of Western Poland. PO also seems to garner a few more votes in the cities of Warsaw and Katowice. The 2015 and 2011 results in Figure 10.5 below clearly confirm the importance of the old boundaries. Figure 10.5 also shows how PiS improved on their 2011 showing. Clearly, they strengthened their position in the East and made significant inroads in the West. They also improved their results in the cities of Warsaw, Katowice, Łódź, and Kraków, which can be seen in Figure 10.6, which shows how many deputies they elected from these cities.

When we look at where Kukiz'15 and KORWiN received their support in Figure 10.7 below it is interesting to see that these RRW parties seemed to do better in the West and big cities that are traditional bases for PO, while PiS's anti-immigration views likely limited votes for the other RRW parties in the East (Szczerbiak, 2017, p. 416). These results also show that the .Modern party more than likely hurt the PO in the cities with young urban voters, while the ZL coalition received most of its votes from the West and city enclaves.

Figure 10.4 - Administrative Divisions of Poland and Historical Regions



Source: (Zarycki, 2015, p. 109)

Figure 10.5- 2015 & 2011 Sejm Election Map Results




Figure 10.6- 2015 Election Map Results by Sejm District






Figure 10.7- Kukiz'15, KORWiN, ZL, and .Modern Party Election Map Results



These results show that the RRW parties are becoming much more relevant in Poland even without counting PiS as an RRW party. This is similar to the Hungarian situation where RRW Jobbik consistently garners over 20% of the vote. In both these countries, a MSP shifted considerably to the right to claim ownership of the immigration issue. Figure 10.8 shows the actual election results since 2007.

Figure 10.8 – Polish Election Results 2007-2015



Source: (NSD, 2019)

Migration Facts

Civic Platform's vote to accept asylum seekers just before the election in September of 2015 was quickly annulled by PiS once they took power²³ (Schmidt, et al., 2018, p. 47). To outsiders, this seems odd for two reasons. First, Poland's geography has historically made it a crossroads for various tribes, peoples, and cultures (Hodór & Kosińska, 2017, pp. 244-245). Second, since joining the EU in 2004, Poland has had many more people leaving the country than coming into the country, with the *emigration*²⁴ issue playing a role during the 2015 election (Hodór & Kosińska, 2017, p. 257; Jasiewicz & Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz, 2016, p. 209). The long-term trend of

²³ PiS did not immediately reverse PO's refugee decision until after the Brussels terrorist attacks in March 2016. Soon after this attack Prime Minister Beata Szydło announced that Poland would not accept any refugees under the EU relocation plan (Seges' Frelak, 2017, p. 91). Incidentally, Poland has never accepted any refugees under this program (Krzyżanowska & Krzyżanowski, 2018, p. 615; Wenzel & Żerkowska-Balas, 2019, p. 46).

²⁴ In 2017 remittances from Polish citizens working abroad amounted to 1.3% (€7.4 billion) of Polish GDP (Eurostat, 2019; World Bank, 2019).

Poland's population decline is worrisome and would seem to make Poland an ideal case for accepting new residents (Fihel, et al., 2018, pp. 1,303).

However, post-WWII Poland has become one of the most monoethnic countries in the EU. In the 2011 Polish Census 99.7% of surveyed Poles claimed to be Polish citizens with only 0.2% admitting foreign national status (Hodór & Kosińska, 2017, p. 244). This mindset is one of the reasons Poles are so against accepting refugees. Like Estonia, Poles have serious reservations about welcoming non-Europeans, and a 2017 survey showed that 74% of the Polish population opposed settling Muslims from the Middle East or Africa (Krotofil & Motak, 2018, p. 93).

Poland has three types of protection, it can grant asylum seekers: refugee status, subsidy protection, or a tolerated stay. The new PiS party's reversal on accepting asylum seekers from the EU quota program has allowed them to effectively keep the PO on the defense (Fomina & Kucharczyk, 2016, p. 65). To take the EU's focus off non-European immigrants, PiS prefers to draw attention to the large majority of Ukrainians Poland has accepted since the Russian/Ukraine conflict. Poland amended their Foreigners Act to make it easier for non-EU citizens who have jobs in Poland to stay longer and by 2017 over 1 million Ukrainians were residing in Poland either permanently or temporarily (Hodór & Kosińska, 2017, p. 249; Nurczyk, 2017). Most non-EU citizens entering Poland come from the former Soviet Union or the Caucasus region and include the already mentioned Ukrainians, as well as Russians, Tajikistanis, and Georgians. In 2015, there were over 10 million crossings at the Polish-Ukraine border. Most of those seeking protection were transient migrants entering Poland, but hoping to reach Germany, the Netherlands or other richer EU countries (Hodór & Kosińska, 2017, p. 249).

In 2015, there were 17,368 refugees or asylum seekers in Poland and its migrant stock totaled 611,855 or 1.6% of their overall population (United Nations Population Division, 2017). According to UNHCR Eurostat (2018), Poland received 37,560 asylum requests from 2014 to 2017. Poland's Head of the Office for Foreigners (OFF) reported that it received 12,325 requests for international protection in 2015, which was almost double their 2014 total. They granted 348 of these 12,325 requests refugee status, 167 subsidy protection, and 122 tolerated stays. Of the 348 refugees 203 were Syrians, 24 Iraqis, 21 Russians, 20 stateless, 15 Egyptians, 14 Belarusians and 12 Turkmenistanis (Hodór & Kosińska, 2017, pp. 249-250).

Poland has some similarities with Estonia, in that they both have concerns about the security threat that non-European refugees present (Hodór & Kosińska, 2017, p. 254). Also, emigration is a concern for them both, and they each have successful economies needing more quality workers. Each has accepted very few refugees, and the migration issues have become a significant wedge issue between the parties.

Public Opinion

The 2017 Special Eurobarometer 469 results used in the QCA analysis showed that 50.67% of Poles had negative attitudes towards immigration, which was right at the 50% cross over point and the third lowest above only France and the UK. While it was only third lowest out of these three countries, it still shows significant anti-immigrant attitudes, and when we examine other survey results, we see a consistent concern over immigration by the Polish people. Klaus (2017) reports that over two-thirds of the Polish people were against accepting any new asylum seekers in April 2016. Another survey from 2017 showed that 74 % of Poles were against settling Muslim refugees in Poland (Krotofil & Motak, 2018, p. 93). This was a significant change from the beginning of the refugee crisis and before the 2015 elections, when only 40% of Poles were skeptical of accepting refugees with 56% agreeing to admit them temporarily (Seges' Frelak, 2017, p. 88).

The International Republican Institute (2017) conducted a detailed survey in May of 2017 and found that immigration/foreigners were tied with unemployment and low salaries as the most urgent problem facing Poles (9). They also asked, "Who or what is the main threat to Polish identity?" and immigrants/foreigners was the top threat at 23% with Islam second at 14%. Incidentally, the government came in third with 9% (33). When asked, "Who or what is the greatest threat to Poland's independence?" the top three responses were; Russia (19%), the EU (15%), and immigrants/foreigners (14%) (40). While a substantial 83% of Poles believed the EU was good for Poland, they rated hosting refugees as the worst functioning aspect of the EU (44). 71% of Poles felt that Islam was a direct threat to European values with 31% agreeing strongly and 40% somewhat agreeing, while only 24% disagreed with 5% strongly disagreeing and 19% somewhat disagreeing (34) (IRI, 2017).

The above survey results show that the security dimension seems to be the top concern of Poles (Klaus, 2017). Hodór & Kosińska (2017) also stress that the terrorist attacks across Europe affected attitudes in Poland. However, Hodór & Kosińska (2017) and Krotofil & Motak (2018) point out how the cultural dimension is also a significant factor that shapes public attitudes on immigration (Schmidt, et al., 2018). It seems the economic dimension is not a significant concern for Polish citizens (Lipiński & Stępińska, 2019, p. 74; Markowski, 2016, pp. 1,312), and it should also be noted that before the 2015 migrant crisis/elections, the debate over accepting refugee's was not a significant political issue in Poland (Schmidt, et al., 2018, p. 58).

Media Overview

The Polish media framework includes private media groups (both domestic and foreign), state-owned (public) media, and media owned by social, educational (universities) or religious institutions (Catholic Church) (Klimkiewicz, 2017, p. 200). However, the media landscape in Poland has drastically changed since PiS regained power in October of 2015. This change is reflected in the World Press Freedom Index scores for Poland. They rank Poland free but offer several qualifications concerning PiS's reforms. Poland's ranking fell from 19th in 2014 to 47th in 2016 and 54th in 2017. This has left Poland behind most of the other European post-communist countries (Jedrzejewski, 2017, p. 380; Freedom House, 2018).

Once they won the election, PiS quickly moved to 'reform' the public media framework by introducing the "Small Media Act", which amended the 1992 Broadcasting Act. This Act founded the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT – Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji), which the constitution tasked with:

“safeguarding freedom of speech, the right to information as well as safeguarding public interest regarding radio and television broadcasting” (Klimkiewicz, 2017, p. 199).

PiS had complained about the 'politicization' of Poland's public media system and had attempted to 'depoliticize' it when they were in power from 2005-2007 (Surowiec, et al., 2019, p. 12). In 2011, a cross-country comparison seemed to support PiS's assessment by writing, “The media sector in Poland is still subject to a high degree of politicization, due to the influence of political parties” (González-Esteban, et al., 2011, p. 434). This view was also shared by the

Polish Journalists Association in 2016 when they told EU Secretary-General of Council of Europe, Thorbjorn Jagland, that “the public service media had not fulfilled their mission for a long time” (Klimkiewicz, 2017, p. 203).

While PiS may have said they were ‘depoliticizing’ the system, Surowiec, et al. (2019), along with the EU and numerous other observers disagrees with that assessment. In fact, scholars agree that the “Small Media Act” politicized Poland’s public media sector even more by allowing PiS to use those media outlets to shape public opinion and assist them in communicating the government’s message (Klimkiewicz, 2017, pp. 202-203; Fomina & Kucharczyk, 2016, p. 63; Surowiec, et al., 2019, p. 10; Jedrzejewski, 2017, pp. 379-380).

The Act’s key provisions took control away from the constitutional mandated KRRiT by terminating all board members for the various public media outlets and allowing the governing party to nominate their replacements (Klimkiewicz, 2017, p. 202). Another aspect of the Act that impacts the immigration issue is its nationalizing mission. Surowiec, et al., (2019) showed the first chapter of the Act says this mission should:

“preserve national traditions, patriotic and human values (...)” and “promotion of the Polish and world science and art” and “contributing to the spiritual needs of listeners and viewers” and that broadcasters should focus on the “culture of the Polish language” and “respect Christian value system and universal ethical values”(Surowiec, et al., 2019, p. 9).

PiS wasted no time in making the changes to the boards they now controlled. Placing Jacek Kurski, their parties communication specialist as the director of Telewizja Polska (TVP) was their first controversial change, but it was just the beginning (Surowiec, et al., 2019, p. 12). The purge that followed in 2016-17 saw 230 state-owned public media employees dismissed, including supervisory boards members, management personnel, and experienced journalists (Jedrzejewski, 2017, p. 379; Klimkiewicz, 2017, p. 202). This radical shakeup, along with PiS’s talk about a future De-concentration Act to regulate regional media and address ‘foreign ownership’ has private-owned broadcasters and newspapers worried (Jedrzejewski, 2017, pp. 379-380).

Despite the controversy over PiS’s reforms, Jedrzejewski (2017) reports that Poland has one of the most ‘dynamic’ media markets in Europe and the third biggest press sector. Although

newspapers sales have fallen, five million daily newspapers are printed by over 5,000 print entities including national, regional or weekly newspapers, as well as monthly magazines and specialized publications. These are read by 12 million devoted Polish readers. Additionally, Poland has a vibrant public and private broadcast market with over 300 TV and radio channels available to viewers and listeners. Like other post-communist countries, Poland's robust press sector is dominated by outside media companies, and in Poland, these are the German companies of Ringer, Springer Media, and the Bauer Media Group (Jedrzejewski, 2017, p. 381). Also, in line with the global trend of media consolidation, Poland's top four TV owners collected 93% of the revenue in 2014, and the top four radio owners took in 90% of the radio revenue. These top companies also dominated the audience markets, with TV owners garnering 70.2% of viewers in 2015 and the top four radio owners getting 82.2% of the listeners (Klimkiewicz, 2017, pp. 209-210). This concern is highlighted in the Media Pluralism Monitor index results. They rated the overall condition of media pluralism in Poland as satisfactory in 2015, but they judged Poland's market plurality as high risk because of the concentration of media ownership (Klimkiewicz, 2015).

Jedrzejewski (2017) reports that in 2016 television was the top source for media consumption in Poland with the average Pole spending 4 hours and 22 minutes watching TV each day. The most popular stations in 2015 were TVP 1 (11.1%) and TVP 2 (8.3%) which are the public channels and the TV Polsat (11.5%) and TVN (10.4%) which are commercial channels. In 2015 twelve of the top public channels still drew 29.4% of viewers, but since the 'reforms' passed in 2016, the main public channels have lost 10% of their average daily viewership. Furthermore, TV Polsat passed TVP 1 as the number 1 station and privately owned TVN has taken over the public TVP as the top news channel (Jedrzejewski, 2017, pp. 380-381).

When it comes to radio, 72% of poles, listen to 4.5 hours a day with national programs much more popular than regional or local programs. Commercial broadcast stations are the most popular, and the public stations share of listeners is declining. In 2016 their share of the market had shrunk to only 23% of listeners (Jedrzejewski, 2017, p. 381).

Poles are avid readers, and in 2013 the top daily papers were *Gazeta Wyborcza* (271,944) and *Rzeczpospolita* (83,739), with the top tabloids being *Fakt* (450,970) and *Super Express* (253,577)

(Jedrzejewski, 2017, p. 381; Wirtualnemedi, 2013). In 2018 the two biggest weekly newsmagazines were *Polityka* (151,162) and *Newsweek* (142,107) (Kurdupski, 2019).

Just over 75% of households have broadband access, and nearly 80% of all households have at least basic internet access (Jedrzejewski, 2017, p. 381). The International Republican Institute's (2017) survey showed the second biggest source for political news behind TV was the websites/internet by 35% of the Poles. For those aged 18-35, 55% picked on-line sources next to 75% for TV. In 2014 trust in the media was at 31% in Poland, which seems low but was higher than the 20% average for Europe as a whole (Jedrzejewski, 2017, p. 381). Although 50% of Poles felt Polish media did not always provide accurate and unbiased information, 47% disagreed. Additionally, 38% felt that Polish media outlets were 'politically biased and controlled by rightist and conservative interests', while 21% felt that Polish media outlets were 'politically biased and controlled by leftist and liberal interests' (IRI, 2017).

Another key part of Poland's media landscape is the influential Polish Catholic Church's formal and informal communication outlets (Visvizi, 2017, p. 10). Approximately 90% of the Polish population is a member of the Catholic Church, and several scholars argue it played a substantial role in influencing attitudes on immigration (Hodór & Kosińska, 2017, p. 250). Krotofil & Motak's (2018) study on the Catholic Church's discourse concerning the migration crisis highlights its influence on this issue.

They point out that its unprecedented access to media enhances the Church's influence. Furthermore, they have several official and semi-affiliated outlets. The official outlets are the Polish Episcopate Conference website and publications produced by the Catholic Information Agency (CIA). The CIA writes press bulletins and articles that can be distributed through their website, Twitter, Facebook and the free-access magazine *ekai.pl*. The authors also report that these articles are redistributed by the mainstream media, along with sermons and statements from church leaders. The semi-affiliated outlets include 'Radio Maryja' which has a broad national audience (1.5 million in 2008) and has been a catalyst for organizing and communicating a strong nationalist message (Pytlas, 2016, p. 29). The Radio Maryja network is actually owned by a Catholic religious order and not directly controlled by the Church. Several large-circulation Catholic weekly magazines are popular throughout Poland. These publications have written

extensively on the migration issue but are not owned or directly controlled by the Church (Krotofil & Motak, 2018, pp. 94-95).

Krotofil & Motak found that church leaders were divided over how to respond to the migrant crisis resulting in a muddled message, but they pointed out that Bishop's frequently used an 'us' and 'them' context when they are talking about assisting migrants. The authors also found that the security threat regularly came up in articles. However, they found numerous instances where Bishops urged compassion and an openness to accepting those in need. The authors concluded by stressing how the Church actively used its media channels to participate in the debate, but its message was divided. While the Bishops vigorously defended the Catholic Church's image for Christlike compassion (particularly when dealing with non-Muslim refugees), they also wanted to protect the Polish Catholic Church's privileged position and advance its mission to 'restore Europe to Christianity' (Krotofil & Motak, 2018).

Two parties that increased the saliency of the immigration issues were Kukiz'15 and KORWiN. They both had very anti-refugee positions, and KORWiN greatly elevated the anti-Muslim aspect of the discourse (Lipiński & Stępińska, 2019, p. 72). In Poland, these two parties performed exceptionally well with younger voters, and overall the anti-refugee message seems to resonate with younger voters more than older voters (Visvizi, 2017, p. 8; Lipiński & Stępińska, 2019, p. 75).

This could be the result of Poland's emigration issue that White, et al. (2018) says was presented with a Eurosceptic and negative slant by Polish media. At the end of 2016, an estimated 2.52 million Polish residents had been living abroad for over three months. Surveys show that 22% of Poles now living in Poland have worked abroad at some point over the last ten years and when considering 25-34-year-old younger voters, that percentage goes up to 27% (White, et al., 2018, pp. 19-22).

Lipiński & Stępińska's (2019) study on right-wing populism in Poland argues that the traditional media, and in particularly TV coverage, provided the populist right-wing parties much more visibility in the 2015 elections. They also stressed that these populist parties (Kukiz'15 and KORWiN) effective use of social media amplified their message and that PiS adopted their

position on immigration, thus providing even more saliency and legitimacy for these views (Lipiński & Stępińska, 2019, p. 72).

The authors report that almost one-third of Poles get their information on political news from on-line sources and that this is highest amount younger voters. For 18-24-year-olds an amazing 96% use on-line sources, but that drops to 55% for those age 45-54. Over half of the younger voters report getting their political news from on-line media outlets and Lipiński & Stępińska, 2019 point out that the Kukiz'15 and KORWiN parties, along with Andrzej Duda's presidential campaign had some of the most effective on-line campaigns in 2015. These campaigns presented consistent anti-immigrant messages (Marcinkiewicz & Stegmaier, 2016, p. 2).

In her study on Polish responses to the refugee crisis Narkowicz (2018) reports that, "even the more balanced media outlets in Poland emphasized the otherness of the refugees" and that right-wing magazines such as *wSieci* and *DoRzeczy* contributed towards the anti-refugee attitudes (Narkowicz, 2018, p. 361). While Poland's largest web portal—Wirtualna Polska, has allowed some of the most hostile public comments concerning refugees imaginable the *Gazeta Wyborcza*, has had to disable their comments section on articles covering immigration because of the nasty nature of readers comments (Golebiowska, 2018, p. 796).

Joanna Szylo-Kwas's (2018) analysis of refugee photographs in Polish papers offer a clear glimpse of the way Polish media covered the migrant crisis after 2015. She chose three general interest newspapers offering both print and on-line versions based on their accessibility across Poland. They included *Gazeta Wyborcza* (GW), *Dziennik. Gazeta Prawna* (DGP), and *Gazeta Polska Codziennie* (GPC) from September 2015 to July 2017. Szylo-Kwas analyzed 199 articles and 88 photographs. She found that most photos showed refugees as a big wave of aliens coming into Poland and usually showed the trash and debris left behind in their wake. Second were photos of women and children, which were much more positive towards refugees. A third was the protester photos that showed refugees as angry activists fighting for entry and their rights. Overall, the photographs presented an image of refugees as a massive, unruly hoard descending on Europe with a bigger focus on the debate surrounding their entry rather than the reason they left their home countries (Szylo-Kwas, 2018, pp. 230-236).

One last aspect impacting privately owned media channels that were alluded to by Jedrzejewski (2017) is the hardball tactics PiS is using to gain favorable coverage of their policies (Przybylski, 2018, p. 60). These include:

- Limiting press access to parliamentary proceedings.
- Prohibiting government entities and public companies from purchasing advertising from unsupportive press outlets.
- Proposing the De-concentration Act that threatens foreign-owned outlets with possible buyouts by certified Polish owners.
- Fining Poland's largest TV station TVN24 \$400,000, which was owned by USA's Discovery channel (the fine was later rescinded).
- Using the public-owned TV stations to smear political opponents and other organizations critical of the government.

This review of Poland's media landscape shows that the ruling party has no reservations about using the public-owned media outlets to reward their supporters, punish their foes, and advance their agenda. Additionally, the influence and indecisiveness of the Catholic Church's mixed message on immigration, coupled with the threats to privately-owned press outlets have significantly impacted public perception of the refugee issues.

Coalition Constraints

Since 2010, the Polish case offers very few examples of cooperation and compromise between the top MSPs. The first aspect impacting coalitions in Poland is the demise of the left. They have gone from leading the government with 200 seats in the Sejm and garnering the most votes (41%) in 2001, then dropping to only 8.24% and 21 seats in 2011 and experiencing a disaster in 2015, by not even obtaining enough votes to be represented in the Sejm (NSD, 2019). One of the events that brought about the decline of the left and ushered in two new parties (PiS and PO) was the "Rywin Case" corruption scandal. Both PiS and PO started as somewhat similar parties. Both were center-right parties who made fighting corruption an essential aspect of their agenda. When PiS garnered the most votes in 2005 and formed the government, some observers would not have been surprised to see them form a coalition government with the PO (Van Kessel, 2015, p. 128). Of course, the rivalry between somewhat similar parties created an intense

competition making a coalition impossible. Furthermore, PO's support came from the urban centers and the Northwest regions of the country while PiS performed better in the rural areas and the Southeast regions of Poland (Przybylski, 2018, p. 55).

If there was ever any chance that these two center-right parties could ever team up, it ended in 2010 when the Tu-45 Polish plane carrying President Kaczyński crashed. He was leading a high-ranking delegation to Russia to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the Katyn massacre of Poles by the Soviets. President Kaczyński's twin brother, Jarosław Kaczyński, was the PiS party leader and he made unfounded claims that Donald Tusk and Civic Platform had something to do with the crash (Jasiewicz & Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz, 2011, pp. 1,092-1,096). Feelings between the parties became so contentious that two separate memorial services had to be conducted. Relations between the parties have been openly hostile since then, culminating with Poland being the only EU country to vote against Donald Tusk's re-election as European Council President in 2017 (Przybylski, 2018, p. 57).

This narrative is supported by the results of Dudzinska & Betkiewicz's (2018) examination of how many government bills the opposition supported in the Sejm and how many opposition bills the government allowed to pass. The highpoint for both occurred in 2006, when PiS controlled the government, and 89% of the government's bills were passed, while 49% of the opposition's legislation passed. In 2007 cooperation between PiS and PO started to decline and reached its lowest point in 2011 after the plane crash. Towards the end of 2011, 52% of the government's bills were passed, while only 10% of the opposition's legislation passed and the results hovered in that range until their study ended in 2015 (Dudzinska & Betkiewicz, 2018, p. 182).

Needless to say, there has been no cooperation between the center-right and almost extinct center-left, nor has the top MSPs cooperated on the immigration issue. In fact, PO has backed away from accepting refugees, and the left has been conspicuously quiet on the issue, with both PO and the SDL shifting significantly to the right on immigration issues (Polk, et al., 2017).

Poland Summary

Joanna Szylo-Kwas (2018) described the powerful photo of the drowned Syrian boy Alan Kurdi in September of 2015, as the moment when Europe realized that the arrival of immigrants

into Europe was a crisis that required action. If she is right, then the speech by the chairman of Law and Justice Party, Jarosław Kaczyński, during parliamentary debate later that same month was the moment when Poland became less hospitable and more fearful of the migrant threat. His words in 2015 have continued to drive the discourse on immigration in Poland until today:

“let’s look around Europe. Take Sweden, for example, where there are 54 areas of this country under Sharia law, where the state has no control [...] What is going on in Italy? Churches are taken over and at times are treated as toilets. What is going on in France? Non-stop fights, Sharia law introduced and even patrols checking whether this is observed. The same is the case in London and even in Germany, usually the toughest of places. Do you really want the same thing to happen in Poland: that we stop feeling at home in our own country? Is this what you want” (Krzyżanowska & Krzyżanowski, 2018, p. 615)?

In Poland the cultural dimension of immigration, particularly as it relates to the Catholic Church is significant, but the security dimension which has been predominantly pushed by Poland’s political elites has also dominated the media coverage. Clearly, the RRW relevance has dramatically increased, and PiS moved quickly to gain ownership of this issue. With no PGC in place, all parties have shifted to the right on immigration issues, and public attitudes have continued to become more anti-immigrant over the last three years. It appears the immigration issue and the election of 2015 have had a profound impact on party competition in Poland despite very few non-European immigrants settling in the country.

Section 11 – RRW Contagion in the Netherlands

In the 1980s, the Netherlands was one of the first European countries to develop a comprehensive policy for immigration. Their multicultural model garnered international praise for its emphasis on cultural diversity (Verbeek, et al., 2015, p. 213). After the assassinations of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh at the beginning of the new millennium the Dutch were also one of the first to switch from a strategy of multiculturalism to assimilation. This change took place quietly, below the radar during the PGC between VVD and PvdA from 2007-2010 but became more outspoken after the PVV supported the center-right majority in 2010 (Verbeek, et al., 2015, p. 217). That short-lived coalition fell apart in 2012, and a reliable PGC resumed. However, the migration crisis in 2015 came to a head that December when riots broke out in the

city of Geldermalsen over building a new center for migrants. The Nederlandse Omroep Stichting (NOS) the large Dutch public broadcaster wrote the following about this event:

“In Geldermalsen the council room was evacuated due to a violent protest against the opening of a center for asylum seekers. Dozens of rioters had broken through the gates outside the town hall. They screamed slogans and threw fireworks, stones and cans at the police. The meeting will not be resumed tonight. On the square before the town hall is still a grim atmosphere” (NOS, 2015).

Just over two years later, before the March 2017 elections, Prime Minister Mark Rutte published an open letter to all Dutch people that said ‘something was wrong’ with the Netherlands and seemed to insinuate that the refugees had not adequately adopted the core values of Dutch society (Lucassen, 2018, p. 384). Here is one of the eight paragraphs from his short letter:

“We feel a growing inconvenience when people abuse our freedom to kill things here, while they have just come to our country for that freedom. People who do not want to adapt, abandon our habits and reject our values. Harassing gays, cheering women in short skirts, or turning ordinary Dutch people into racists. I understand very well that people think: if you reject our country so fundamentally, I'd rather you leave. I also have that feeling. Do normal or leave” (Rutte, 2017).

These events, along with comments by the political elites and commentary in the media raise questions as to why Dutch parties were able to show a remarkable amount of restraint in shifting positions on immigration to the right. The CHES survey results indicate the Netherlands’ MSPs only shifted 5.47% to the right despite growing anti-immigrant attitudes and an increasingly relevant RRW party. PvdA, VVD, and the CDA moved right by a modest 2.39%, 6.75%, and 7.38% respectively (Polk, et al., 2017). Despite all three of these parties using more anti-immigrant rhetoric in their campaigns, along with placing several new hurdles in the citizenship and asylum-seeking process, these parties have still resisted the pull to the right by both the public and the PVV.

This section will seek to identify what has kept political parties in a progressive country with a human rights reputation similar to Sweden’s, as well as similar conditions concerning migration and refugee settlement from shifting their immigration positions farther to the right.

Hopefully, examining the following aspects of Dutch society will help answer why its MSPs did *not* shift their positions on immigration issues farther to the right.

- Netherland's business environment
- Past election results and MSPs competition
- RRW party relevance
- Migration trends and immigration laws
- Public opinion attitudes
- Media landscape
- Coalition Constraints

Business Environment

The Heritage Foundation's 2019 index of economic freedom gave the Netherlands a 76.8 score making it the 13th freest nation in the world. They say:

“The Netherlands' economy flourishes through openness to global trade and investment and an independent judicial system that provides strong protection of property rights and fosters the rule of law. The most recent government's priorities have been fiscal consolidation and implementation of some structural reforms, including reform of the labor market. The official retirement age will rise gradually by 2021. This will help to put public finances on a broadly sustainable medium-term to long-term path” (Heritage Foundation, 2019).

Additionally, the Netherlands consistently receives top scores in Transparency International's CPI and was ranked as the 8th least corrupt nation out of 180 countries in 2018 (Transparency International, 2018). Furthermore, the Netherlands has a vibrant economy with its highest unemployment rate topping out at an acceptable 7.42% in 2014 (The World Bank, 2019). In 2017, the Netherlands was ranked as the 4th best country on Forbes' annual list of the Best Countries for Business (Forbes, 2018). The Netherlands is the 6th largest economy in the EU and has continued the longstanding Dutch tradition as a major global trading country. Notwithstanding its small geographical size, it is the second biggest agricultural exporter in the world (Forbes, 2018). The hard-hit Dutch banking sector is an active player in the global economy and a major part of the Dutch economy, which resulted in Dutch businesses experiencing a steady but extremely slow recovery after the great recession and euro crisis (de

Best, 2019). With a population of 17.2 million, the Netherlands was a founding member of both the EU in 1957 and the Eurozone in 1999.

Furthermore, the Netherlands was one of the five founding states of the Schengen agreement, signed on 14 June, 1985 (SchengenVisaInfo.com, 2019). Exports and trade totaled \$723.3 billion in 2018 and accounted for almost 75% of the Dutch economy, with 75% of this trade taking place between other EU countries (Workman, 2019). Companies such as ING, Unilever, and Heineken are a few of the most recognized business across Europe (Forbes, 2018). In 2008, the Netherlands public debt exceeded 60% of its GDP and broke the Stability and Growth Pact's (SGP) 60% rules. It grew from 61.2% of GDP in 2008 to 82.4% of GDP in 2014, leading to controversial cuts to government programs. This and a continuing recovery lowered the debt to 69.8% of GDP by 2017 (OECD, 2018).

Electoral System & Recent Elections


With a Gallagher (2018) LSq average index in the last three elections of 0.92, the Netherlands had the most proportional electoral system in this study. The high proportionality of the Dutch system is because all 150 seats in the Tweede Kamer are elected from one district with any remaining seats being allocated using the d'Hondt method (Van Kessel, 2015, p. 79).

Like Sweden, the Netherlands has seen a slight decrease in overall electoral volatility since 2010. According to Emanuele, et al.' (2018) calculations, ToV in the Netherlands averaged 21.4 from 1990 to 2009 but dropped to 19.7 from 2010 to 2016. Furthermore, RegV dropped from 4.3 to 0.5; however, AltV increased from 15.9 to 18.4 over this same time period. The number of parties competing in Dutch elections increased from 6.97 in 2010 to 8.56 in 2017, and the effective number of parties in the Tweede Kamer grew from 6.74 in 2010 to 8.12 in 2017.

Similar to Sweden, the rise of the PVV has overturned the cooperative approach of the three MSPs who consistently garnered a mostly equal number of votes in elections. With none moving far below or above 25 to 40 parliamentary seats (see Figure 11.1 below). These three parties (VVD, PvdA, and CDA) along with an occasional newcomer readily partnered up in coalition governments, and before the rise of the PVV, an accommodative mindset tended to drive the legislative process (Moury & Timmermans, 2013, p. 70). Without repeating the summary from Section 3.6, there are a few key events that have contributed to the current changes. The first was

the already mentioned assassinations of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh that facilitated RRW parties entering the Tweede Kamer. Next, the loss of votes by the mainstream parties made forming coalitions and passing legislation much more difficult (Pellikaan, et al., 2016, p. 19; De Vries, 2018, pp. 1,544). The entry of these new RRW parties combined with the decline of electoral support for the three top MSPs seems to have constrained policy shifting by these same parties.

Figure 11.1- Tweede Kamer Election Returns Since 1977




The PVV has continued to consolidate the electoral gains made after Pim Fortuyn List's electoral breakthrough in 2002. Heading into 2017, opinion polls had them moving into first

place that January²⁵ as can be seen in Figure 11.2 below. In the final outcome, the VVD outperformed the polls and came in first place with 21.3% of the vote and 33 seats, while the PVV slipped into second with 13.1% of the vote and 20 seats. De Vries (2018) reported that future French President Emmanuel Macron’s assessment of the results was:

“The Netherlands is showing us that a breakthrough for the extreme right is not a foregone conclusion and that progressives are gaining momentum” (De Vries, 2018, pp. 1,542).

Describing the progressives as ‘gaining momentum’ after the VVD lost 8 seats, the PvdA lost 29 and the RRW VVD picked up 5 new seats (and obtained a record 1.4 million votes for an RRW party) may have been overly optimistic, nevertheless, the Dutch political elites breathed a sigh of relief (Faber, 2018; NSD, 2019).

Figure 11.2- 2017 Netherlands Party Preference Polling



Source: (Schaffrik & Kennedy, 2017)


Clearly, immigration and the ongoing refugee crisis dominated the 2017 election, but other issues also impacted the final results (Otjes & Voerman, 2018, p. 203; De Vries, 2018, pp.

²⁵ These polling results can also help explain Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s anti-immigrant open letter in January (De Vries, 2018, pp. 1,544)

1,560). One issue that brought disagreement between coalition partners was the contentious EU-Ukraine Association Agreement referendum in 2016. A VVD led group opposed the referendum while the PvdA, CDA and D66 parties supported it. The no campaign won and Prime Minister Rutte was able to negotiate an amendment at the EU level. However, by this time, the government no longer had a cooperative majority and was not able to get the amendment even voted on (Otjes & Voerman, 2017, p. 202). The budget cuts and welfare reforms proved to be detrimental to the Liberal-Labor coalition government, and since 2012 the PVV had continued to move further to the left on economic issues (Otjes & Voerman, 2018, p. 204; De Vries, 2018, pp. 1,552).

While the VVD lost one-fifth of its support, it still finished well ahead of the PVV. In addition to their rhetorical efforts, illustrated in Prime Minister Rutte's open letter to all voters, the VVD made another symbolic move that appeared to protect their right-wing. Otjes & Voerman (2018) report that one week before the election, two Turkish government ministers arrived in the Netherlands to campaign with Turkish nationals about an upcoming constitutional referendum in Turkey. To have Turkish government officials in the Netherlands campaigning to Dutch-Turkish citizens was a bad look for the Liberal-Labor coalition leaders. Especially, just one week before an election where immigration was a dominant issue. They banned the Turkish Foreign Ministers from entering Holland and made a spectacle of prohibiting one from landing at the Rotterdam Airport and had another escorted by the police back to Germany. Figure 11.3 shows that these actions helped the VVD turn their dismal polling numbers around, but the budget cuts that PvdA had supported benefited GL and D66, as well as newcomer DENK (Otjes & Voerman, 2018, pp. 203-205).

Figure 11.3- 2017 Dutch Election Results by Province and Top Four Parties



Source: (Carr, 2017)

The pressure MSPs are experiencing because of losing votes and seats has lessened the traditional Dutch cooperation between the MSPs. Having fewer seats has resulted in diverse ideological coalitions, making adopting policies difficult. Governing is much harder in the Netherlands. Obtaining consensus for passing budgets, referendums, or even changing immigration laws is problematic. Particularly when many of the MSPs refuse to work with the second biggest party in the Tweede Kamer.


RRW Relevance

While RRW parties such as the Center Democrats (CD) or Center Party (CP) were able to elect members to the Tweede Kamer in the 1980's and 90's (Akkerman, 2016, p. 145), the real

breakthrough for the RRW occurred when Lijst Pim Fortuyn rejected multiculturalism and garnered 17% of the vote by winning 26 seats in 2002 (Silva, 2018, p. 223). They joined the CDA and VVD in a government coalition, but after Fortuyn’s assassination, the party quickly faded from prominence (Van Kessel, 2015, pp. 59-60).

Geert Wilders was an MP for the VVD but broke away in 2004 over his growing opposition to Islam and Turkey’s membership in the EU. In 2006 he founded the PVV and proceeded to take 5.9% of the vote and win nine seats in the Tweede Kamer. The party started as a nationalistic, anti-immigrant, neo-conservative party (Van Kessel, 2015, pp. 104-105). In 2010, the PVV caught all the MSPs by surprise by coming in third place with 15.4% of the vote and 24 seats. Without being an official coalition partner, they agreed to provide crucial support to the VVD led coalition; however, they ended up disagreeing with the coalition over budget cuts to welfare programs, and the government collapsed in 2012 (Otjes & Voerman, 2013, p. 164). In the 2012 election, the PVV lost support and only 10.1% of the vote and 15 seats. Their time in opposition seemed to benefit them as they consistently polled as one of the top two parties throughout 2014, 2015, and 2016. Heading into the March 2017 election, many predicted they could end up as the top party. As already mentioned, they ended up finishing in second place with 13.1% of the vote and 20 seats in the Tweede Kamer (NSD, 2019). Table 11.4 below shows Dutch election results since 2006.

Figure 11.4- Dutch Election Results 2006-2017




Source: (NSD, 2019)

Akkerman (2016) breaks PVV's history into three eras: 'before office,' 'in office' and 'after office.' She describes their 'before office' ideology as tough on immigration, anti-establishment with an indication of support for more left-wing welfare programs. She also points out that they began to broaden their agenda and articulate position on more issues. During the 'in office' era, they had agreed not to support no-confidence motions and to support the government on immigration, crime, elderly care, and finance issues. They became a dependable partner to the coalition and began to work with other parties through compromise to advance their agenda. Although they still communicated an anti-establishment message and were strongly anti-Islam in foreign policy issues. They also took a hard-Eurosceptic turn and advocated leaving the EU. Akkerman found that in the 'after office' era, the PVV became more radical. Since they were in opposition, they did not have to support the VVD's proposed austerity measures to get the public debt under the SGP's 60% debt to GDP ratio guidelines. They moved further to the left on economic issues and became a more vocal supporter of welfare and pension programs. They were the top initiator of no-confidence motions against the government, and they also initiated another 52 specific policy motions (most of which dealt with immigration or Islam), of which they were the only supporter on 35 of them. This last era was dominated by a vote-seeking strategy designed to cement their ownership of the anti-immigration position (Akkerman, 2016, pp. 147-152).

This thesis has already shown that the PVV improved their electoral position and received the second most votes in the 2017 elections (see Figure 11.5). A key question concerning RRW relevance in the Netherlands is, "Has the PVV's legislative efforts and electoral success had any influence on immigration policy in the Netherlands?" Akkerman answers this question in her 2018 paper titled, *A Look at Populist Radical-Right Parties on Immigration Agendas: A look at the Netherlands*. Akkerman is one of the foremost international scholars on the radical right, and as a professor at the University of Amsterdam, she is an expert on the Netherlands. It is interesting to see the evolution of her research on how RRW parties have impacted the immigration debate. Akkerman's (2012) study of 27 parties in nine countries found that RRW parties impact on the government is overrated with the exception of the SVP in Switzerland (Akkerman, 2012). While her 2015 examination of immigration issues in party manifestos for seven Western European countries from 1989 to 2011, showed that MLP parties did not shift, but MRP parties did shift to the right on immigration issues (Akkerman, 2015). Finally, her 2018

qualitative look at the PVV's impact on immigration policy in the Netherlands indicated that the PVV had successfully impacted immigration policy even when outside the government (Akkerman, 2018). Obviously, the PVV has had an impact on Dutch's MSPs, but there is a newcomer who shows signs of being even more impactful.

Figure 11.5-2017 versus 2012 Dutch Election Results



Source: (Economist, 2017)

A new rapidly rising RRW party in the Netherlands is the FvD. It started as a Dutch think tank focused on the 2016 Dutch Ukraine–European Union Association Agreement referendum. However, its leader Thierry Baudet, turned it into a political party in late 2016 just before the 2017 election in March (Chaffin, 2017). The party gained a surprising 1.8% of the vote and won 2 seats in the Tweede Kamer (NSD, 2019). This initial success led to the FvD becoming the fastest-growing party in 2017 and 2018, with just under 31,000 members, making it the fourth-largest party in the Netherlands²⁶ (Van den Dool, 2019).

Baudet followed up this initial success by winning the 2019 Dutch provincial elections with 14.53% of the vote and controlling 86 of the 570 seats. These seats indirectly elect the Dutch Senate and the FvD now holds 12 Senate seats. The VVD also has 12 seats, but this complicates the legislative process in the Netherlands as the Senate has veto power over bills passed by the Tweede Kamer (Van Leeuwen, 2019). Many observers blame the FvD victory on the Utrecht terrorist attack that took place three days before the election. The attack resulted in three deaths from a Turkish gunman (Tobin, 2019). While the 2019 election goes beyond the timeframe of this study, it does show the trends identified from previous years and highlights how the continued success of Dutch RRW parties is muddling the legislative process.

Overall, it appears RRW party relevance is growing in the Netherlands as the MSPs continue to receive a smaller share of the votes. This complicates the governing process and new parties on both the left and right are creating new dynamics, which have upset the cooperative tradition of the Dutch party system (Jacobs, et al., 2018, p. 480).

Migration Facts

The trade and maritime nature of the Netherlands has long made it a destination country for migrants. This tradition explains why the Netherlands has been at the forefront of designing immigration policy. First, under their multiculturalism approach and then their later switch to an assimilation strategy. The multiculturalism approach is designed to ‘educate’ the native population

²⁶ This is an important point, as a major source of party funding in the Netherlands is party membership dues. Although the Dutch have increased public funding in recent years much of that funding is tied to party membership dues (May, 2018, p. 132).

about the culture of the newcomers, whereas the assimilation approach is focused on ‘educating’ the newcomers to learn about native values and culture (Thränhardt, 2016, pp. 15-16).

Recent Dutch migration history stems from the colony and guest worker wave of the 1960s and 70s. The largest groups from this wave include Turks and Moroccans from the guest worker program and the Surinamese who were formally apart of the Dutch colonial empire. Each of these minorities contains between 350,000 to 400,000 citizens (Verbeek, et al., 2015, p. 216). The next wave arrived after the Cold War ended and included mainly eastern Europeans, as well as those from the new EU member states in 2004 and 2007. Of course, the last wave stems from the 2015 migrant crisis concerning those fleeing war and poverty from Africa and the Middle East.

Table 11.1 below shows the annual number of asylum requests and the number of refugees in the Netherlands since 2013. We can see the 2015 increase in European migration also hit the Netherlands. In fact, out of all the EU countries, the Dutch received the 6th most asylum requests in 2015.²⁷ Table 11.2 below shows the top countries refugees originated from before arriving in the Netherlands. The Dutch were initially required to accept 9,000 of the EU wide 160,000 refugee quota; however, that number was later reduced to 5,947 for the Netherlands and 98,000 EU wide. Yet only 29,000 refugees had been relocated in the entire EU by the September 26, 2017 deadline, and the Netherlands had only accepted 2,442 of their required refugees (Harris, 2017). Overall, in 2015/16 the Netherlands received 65,915 asylum requests, which were 2.5% of the EU total and the 8th most in the EU. This was 3.59 asylum requests per 1,000 Dutch citizens, which was the 11th highest ratio in the EU (Zaun, 2018, p. 50).

²⁷ Thränhardt (2016) points out that in 2015 the number of positive asylum decision dropped dramatically from 6,400 in the first quarter to 3,055 in the second quarter and he suggests that the Dutch choose to make the Netherlands a less attractive asylum destination by implementing bureaucratic rule changes to slow down the process. Thränhardt contrasts’ this strategy to Denmark’s restrictive law changes however, understanding the Dutch political situation can explain why changing the law was not the first option in the Netherlands (Thränhardt, 2016, pp. 6-7).

Table 1.1- Asylum Requests 2014-2017

Year	Asylum Requests	Refugees
2013	13,060	74,707
2014	24,495	82,433
2015	44,970	88,536
2016	20,945	101,744
2017	18,212	103,860

Source: (UNHCR, Eurostat, 2018)

Table 1.2- Main Refugee Groups Country of Origin from 2014-2017

Year	Afghanistan	Iraq	Iran	Somalia	Eritrea	Syria
2013	314	-3	827	1,936	406	1,839
2014	35	313	486	820	2,042	8,461
2015	39	309	557	-426	3,266	20,623
2016	1,740	2,339	1,934	-669	3,125	27,506
2017	390	913	1,124	-398	2,965	16,083

Source: (CBS, 2019)

In 2010, the government passed the “Improved Asylum Procedure” in an effort to both speed up the process and be more diligent in vetting refugees. A primary goal of the new law was to stop rejected asylum seekers from resubmitting numerous requests and remaining in the Netherlands. These rejected refugees became a burden to local governments as they ended up living as homeless people in the Netherlands. Until 2014 the new law was deemed successful at speeding up the process, but it was less successful with encouraging the rejected asylum seekers to leave (Thränhardt, 2016, p. 3). One aspect of the program that encouraged longer stays was the ‘free’ food and shelter it provided to asylum seekers while they were being processed; however, these benefits were also available to rejected asylum seekers indefinitely. In April of 2015, the government passed new regulations reforming the asylum process. They shut down the 30 regional shelters where asylum seekers were being housed and consolidated them into six bigger reception centers. They also limited the amount of time a rejected asylum seeker could receive ‘free’ food and shelter to 28 days (Hess, 2016, pp. 1-2).

Despite these changes, the waiting time for an asylum decision understandably went from two months in early 2015, to six months by the end of 2015 (Thränhardt, 2016, p. 4). Furthermore, the rejected asylum seekers, by and large, did not leave. Once their 28-day stay was up, they


were forced to leave the centers and wound up living on the streets (Hess, 2016, p. 2). This created a severe homeless problem that was most visible in the bigger cities. In the Netherlands, the municipalities are responsible for administering welfare programs, so these cities developed emergency aid to respond to this new crisis. Of course, helping these asylum seekers was hotly debated by the public but after the highest administrative court in the Netherlands ruled that the cities did not have to provide rejected asylum seekers aid if they ignored the departure rule, most cities agreed to reduce the amount of assistance to these homeless people.

Statistics Netherlands (CBS, Central Bureau voor de Statistiek) reported that Dutch homelessness has doubled since 2009 with over 30,500 homeless people on the streets in 2016. The young and non-Western migrants are driving this increase, and the number of those two groups living on the streets has quadrupled between 2009 and 2016. Young people had increased from 4,000 in 2009 to 12,400 in 2016, and non-Western migrants went from 6,500 in 2009, to 14,900 in 2016 (CBS, 2016). Even though this is a considerable increase, CBS points out it only accounts for registered homeless people. Experts agree that there are most likely many more unregistered homeless but obtaining accurate numbers for this population is difficult (Thränhardt, 2016, p. 12; Perros, 2018). These higher homeless numbers have most likely been impacted by the overall number of illegal migrants residing in the Netherlands. Determining the exact number of illegal migrants in the Netherlands is impossible, but an agreed-on estimate is around 100,000 undocumented individuals (Hess, 2016, p. 16).

Two other aspects of migration that have impacted the public debate on immigration in the Netherlands are crime and welfare costs. Leerkes, et al. (2017) found that compared to naturalized citizens, those who were going through the asylum or citizenship process were more likely to be a crime suspect. Those with a residence permit were only 1.35 times more likely to be a crime suspect, and those 'in the procedure' were 1.94 times more likely to be a crime suspect. Unsurprisingly, 'unauthorized' migrants were 3.39 times more likely to be a crime suspect (Leerkes, et al., 2017, p. 57). This is similar to the 2016 CBS results shown in Figure 11.6 below. Native Dutch citizens have a 0.7% chance of becoming a crime suspect while migrants from the new EU countries, and non-Western migrants have a higher 1.5% and 2.48% chance respectively. This means that migrants from new EU countries are over 1.5 times more

likely than Dutch citizens to be a crime suspect, and non-Western migrants are over 3.5 times more likely (CBSb, 2019).

Figure 11.6 -Registered Crime Suspects in the Netherlands




Source: CBS, BVH

Source: <https://www.cbs.nl/en-gb/background/2018/47/crime#abd44291-bef8-4810-aa3f-75a41c4aacb1>

Additionally, in-donor refugee costs went up significantly during the migrant crisis. In 2013, the Dutch budget included €274.3 billion to cover the first-year costs of shelter, food, and education expenses for refugees. By 2016 these costs had increased to €1,173 billion (SEEK Development, 2017). The 2017 CBS analysis showed that over one-half of refugee households faced a poverty risk and that non-Western refugees were dramatically more dependent on government assistance compared to both native Dutch citizens and other EU refugees (See Figure 11.7 below). Not surprisingly, the new Syrian/Eritrean arrivals were the most dependent on government help, with 79% having incomes below the poverty level and a massive 95% relying on the Dutch income support program as the primary source of their revenue (CBS, 2018). These numbers were confirmed in Kok, et al.’s (2017) study showing welfare dependency as high as 70% amongst some refugee groups (Kok, et al., 2017, p. 28).

Ironically, in spite of this high level of dependence, the Dutch government attempts to charge refugees for the cost of these ‘free’ provisions. Those with high earnings (above €5,895) are required to pay, and the *Dutch News* reported that the government collected over 700,000 Euros from these asylum seekers from 2012-2016. Under the 2008 law, those who are earning more than €185 a week are required to pay €196 a month for their shelter (Hess, 2016, p. 20).

Figure 11.7- Income Source of Immigrants from Western and non-Western Countries in 2017



The Dutch people have been one of the most tolerant and immigrant-friendly countries in the EU. This is illustrated by the fact that from 2000 to 2013, the Netherlands consistently received between 10,000 and 20,000 immigrants each year (Klaver, 2016, p. 3). The dramatic immigrant increase in 2015 that strained the asylum process and led to more homelessness, along with increasing crime and public assistance costs have fostered a contentious debate that has contributed towards the success of RRW parties (Dennison, et al., 2017, p. 6).


Public Opinion

This thesis used results from the 2017 Special Eurobarometer 469 to gauge attitudes in the QCA analysis, which showed that 55% of the Dutch people had negative attitudes towards immigration. This contrasts with the early 2017 CBS survey of 3,339 Dutch citizens that showed much more positive attitudes towards refugees. It found that only one in five people felt refugees were a threat to safety in the Netherlands with 49% disagreeing. Opinions concerning refugees

maintaining their own cultures were less clear, with 32.8% feeling they should maintain their culture while 31.2% disagreed and 36% had neither agreed nor disagreed. Like most polls, it found that those with more education held more favorable opinions of refugees and men held slightly less favorable feelings towards refugees compared to women. While 77% of Dutch adults agreed that the Netherlands should admit those who were fleeing war and persecution, only 23.9% felt that non-EU economic refugees should be allowed to live and work in the Netherlands (CBSb, 2018).

Dennison, et al.(2017) showed how data from the 2014 European Social Survey (ESS) indicated that the Dutch people are less concerned with race or skills compared to other European countries however, they feel strongly that immigrants should speak the Dutch language and be committed to the Dutch way of life (See Figure 11.8 below). The authors also reported on an Ipsos agency study surveying 1,103 Dutch adults. It offers completely different results than the CBS poll already mentioned, even though it was conducted over the same time frame in February of 2017. The Ipsos study found over 80% of the population were somewhat or very concerned over immigration or asylum issues and about half considered the arrival of non-Western immigrants a threat to Dutch norms and values (Dennison, et al., 2017, p. 3).

Figure 11.8- 'How important is it that immigrants have the following traits?'



Source: ESS 2014- Taken from (Dennison, et al., 2017).

While the conflicting results from different polls are confusing, Gideon Bolt and Eva Weystijn's (2018) more detailed analysis of rounds 7 (September 2014-January 2015) and 8 (September 2016-April 2017) of the ESS help to clarify the situation. They attempted to determine what drove public opinion on asylum policy in the Netherlands. They ran a multiple regression analysis using the question: 'The government should be generous in judging people's applications for refugee status.' In round 7, 32% of Dutch respondents agreed with the statement, and 47% disagreed. The Netherlands had the third least support for this statement, and out of the Western European countries, they had the least support. Comparing round 7 to round 8 of the ESS survey, showed that opposition to the statement gained even more support in the Netherlands. In fact, of the 18 countries in the study, support for the statement 'The government should be generous in judging people's applications for refugee status', contracted the most in the Netherlands (See Figure 11.9 below). Bolt and Weystijn found that those with more education supported the statement, which is consistent with the other surveys. However, another

surprising finding that is similar to survey results in Poland, is the fact that younger people are less supportive of immigrants than older people. (Bolt & Wetsteijn, 2018, pp. 515-518).

Figure 11.9- Support for the statement ‘government should be generous in judging people’s applications for refugee status’ by ESS-country

	Agree 2016	Neither agree nor disagree 2016	Disagree 2016	Difference agree-disagree 2016	Difference agree-disagree 2014	Trend 2014-2016
Czech Republic	11.8	18.8	69.4	-57.6	-23.6	-34.0
Estonia	12.9	19.0	68.1	-55.2	-21.1	-34.1
Netherlands	16.7	16.0	67.3	-50.6	-15.2	-35.4
Russian Federation	15.7	31.7	52.6	-36.9	N.A.	N.A.
Israel	21.3	29.2	49.5	-28.2	-24.0	-4.2
Austria	27.3	23.1	49.6	-22.3	4.9	-27.2
Germany	27.2	23.8	49.0	-21.8	5.8	-27.6
Belgium	30.5	19.5	50.0	-19.5	-14.3	-5.2
Slovenia	27.2	28.9	43.8	-16.6	15.6	-32.2
Switzerland	36.4	28.7	35.0	1.4	0.5	0.9
Finland	38.1	32.1	29.8	8.3	27.5	-19.2
Poland	46.9	32.4	20.7	26.2	54.7	-28.5
France	54.3	18.8	27.0	27.3	40.6	-13.3
United Kingdom	50.9	25.8	23.3	27.6	19.5	8.1
Sweden	48.2	34.8	17.0	31.2	49.1	-17.9
Norway	55.5	24.5	20.0	35.5	39.1	-3.6
Ireland	60.3	18.8	20.8	39.5	35.9	3.6
Iceland	57.2	26.4	16.3	40.9	N.A.	N.A.

Sources: ESS Round 8: European Social Survey Round 8 Data (2016). Data file edition 1.0. NSD – Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC. Design weights (DWEIGHT) are used for the calculations of the percentages to adjust for different sample selection probabilities. ESS Round 7: European Social Survey Round 7 Data (2014). Data file edition 2.1. NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC. For the calculations of the percentages per country post-stratification weights (PSPWGHT) are used to reduce both sampling error and potential non-response bias. (PSPWGHT is not available for Round 8 yet).

Source: (Bolt & Wetsteijn, 2018)

Perhaps Creighton, et al.’s (2018) research can explain the difference in survey results. They pointed out that researchers tend to over-report tolerance towards immigrants when interpreting survey results. As an example, the authors show that only 35% of Dutch citizens have a negative view of Muslims when other European countries show between 65% and 72% harbor negative feelings about Muslims. This has been termed ‘social desirability bias’ and pollsters have worked hard to mitigate its effect on survey results. Creighton, et al.’s unique list experiment study was a way to offer participants guaranteed anonymity as they used the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences (LISS) drawn from a population of over 5,000 Dutch households in September 2014. These results were compared with round 7 of the traditional ESS survey that was also in the field from September 2014 to January 2015 (Creighton, et al., 2018, p. 254).

They found that attitudes towards immigrants in the Netherlands were ‘significantly masked’ and they argue that overt estimates of Dutch citizens tolerance towards immigrants is overestimated and that anonymous acts such as voting could support much more restrictive attitudes. They also found that economic attitudes were not impacted by anonymity nearly as much as racial characteristics were. In fact, they found that respondents only expressed racial partialities when anonymity was guaranteed. Creighton, et al suggest that an RRW party, like the PVV, is most likely more popular than polls would indicate. Moreover, the authors recommend avoiding direct overt questioning without anonymity on questions of race or religion (Creighton, et al., 2018).

The mixed results from this review of public opinion in the Netherlands indicates an open-minded and welcoming citizenry who are conflicted by the stark difference in values from many non-Western immigrants entering the Netherlands. This varying public opinion also partially explains the increasing relevance of RRW parties and the indecisiveness of the MSPs in the Netherlands (Vossen, 2011, p. 180).

Media Overview

When it comes to press freedom, the Netherlands received a tremendously high score of 11 (with 0 being best and 100 being worst) from the Freedom House press freedom ranking (Freedom House, 2018). A free cooperative environment is best articulated by Bakker’s (2019) description of the Dutch media landscape at the turn of the new millennium with the following words:

“A high circulation of newspapers and magazines, moderate TV viewing (compared to other countries), a dominant public broadcasting model that was protected by government and warm relations between political parties and dominant media” (Bakker, 2019).

He goes on to point out that massive changes have taken place in the last 15 years. Online media use has dramatically risen, TV viewership is down, and the use of video-on-demand services have increased. Mertens, et al. (2019) confirms these numbers in his study, indicating TV was the top outlet for daily media consumption and online outlets had become more important than print media. His survey showed Dutch citizens spent 50.22 minutes a day watching TV, 45.29

listening to Radio, 32.28 online, and only 21.13 minutes reading print publications. Furthermore, he showed that when it came to news consumption radio was the top medium (Mertens, et al., 2019). De Coninck, et al.'s (2019) study on immigration attitudes and media consumption showed that 73 percent of the Netherlands citizens believe the Dutch media outlets are trustworthy, with TV being the least trusted and radio garnering the most trust (De Coninck, et al., 2019, p. 44). A 2018 Pew survey assessing media perceptions showed that only 62 percent of those with populist views trusted the media, while 72 percent of non-populists trusted Dutch media outlets. It also showed that 50 percent of Dutch citizens trusted public news media more than private news media, and a high 89 percent trusted the public broadcaster with only 8 percent distrusting NOS. A significant 88 percent of the Dutch people feel the news media is important with 43 percent feeling it is very important and unlike several other Western European countries, Dutch populist use SM for a news source as much as non-populists (Pew Research Center, 2018).

One of the overall trends in the Netherlands includes print media losing market share with revenues dropping to less than 20% of the overall Dutch media market. The government has also reduced public broadcasting subsidies as it has become more open to commercial broadcasting expansion. This has resulted in Dutch MSPs losing influence, as the locally owned print media is on the decline, while predominantly foreign owned commercial broadcasting is expanding (Bakker, 2019, p. 2).


Similar to other countries, the print outlets in the Netherlands have been hardest hit by the change in customer preferences. While 48% (high compared to other countries) of Dutch citizens over the age of 13 still read a daily paper, paid subscriptions have declined 40% since 2000, which was down to only 2.5 million in 2015. When including free newspapers, the total daily print totals only go up to 3.2 million, as all but the *Metro* are still in business. Consolidation has taken a toll on newspaper publishers with the Netherlands dropping from 24 in 1985 to 8 in 2017. There are nine national daily newspapers and 40 regional non-daily papers accounting for 45% of the total circulation. The top papers are *De Telegraaf* (393,537), *AD/Algemeen Dagblad* (341,249), *De Volkskrant* (240,866), *NRC Handelsblad* (139,492), *Trouw* (98,967) and the free *Metro* (430,000) (Berning, et al., 2019, p. 100) (Bakker, 2019, pp. 3-5).

Two main Radio stations promote Dutch news in the Netherlands, public broadcaster Radio 1 and commercial station BNR. There are also 13 regional stations that cover national and local news stories. In 2016, listeners spent between 2.5 and three hours a day listening to the radio, but much of this airtime was devoted to music listening. While Radio is the most trusted medium TV is the most used. In 2016 Dutch citizens watched just over 3 hours of TV a day, with 92.6% of those over six years of age watching at least one minute a day. Over 80% of the Netherlands TV market is covered by the public broadcasting stations of NPO 1, 2 and 3, along with the international commercial RTL group channels 4, 5, 7, 8, Z and the former Scandinavian Broadcast Systems (SBS) channels, which include SBS6, Net5, Veronica, and SBS9 (Bakker, 2019, pp. 5-6).

There is a 94.8% penetration rate for internet access in the Netherlands, where all the broadcast stations and newspapers outlets have websites or online versions of their content (Bakker, 2019, p. 7). The trend for online news consumption is growing, but these online audiences primarily read text articles (97.5% of the time) and only use 2.5% of their time on videos (Powell, et al., 2018, p. 592). Invariably, this allows online versions of newspapers to remain influential in news reporting, even though many newspapers are requiring paywalls to access their content. The four biggest online media sites include online-only platform Nu.nl, online versions of newspapers Telegraaf.nl and Ad.nl, and public broadcaster Nos.nl.'s online platform (Bakker, 2019, p. 7).

Almost 80% of Dutch residents use mobile or smartphones to access the internet, followed by 38% who use laptops and 35% who use tablets (CBSc, 2018). A high 82% of all Dutch people over 12-years-old use mobile internet. In 2015, 92% of all residents went online at least once a month, and Social Media (SM) sites are some of the most visited. Facebook was the top monthly destination with 9.8 million visits, LinkedIn had 4.2 million, Twitter had 2.2 million, Instagram had 2.1 million, and Snapchat had just over 1 million users (Bakker, 2019, pp. 7-8). The 2018 CBS survey shown in Figure 11.10 below indicates that use of SM was rising quickly by older Dutch adults and almost 100% of the younger people had used SM in the last three months (CBSc, 2018).

Figure 11.10- Use of Social Media in the Netherlands




Much of the recent scholarly research concerning news reporting of immigration issues in the Netherlands has only analyzed the newspaper coverage. Berning, et al.(2019), Brouwer, et al. (2017), Jacobs, et al. (2018), van Klingeren, et al. (2015), and van der Pas (2014) all used three to five of the Netherlands top newspapers in their studies, with all indicating a slightly negative slant in their coverage of immigration issues. The key points in these studies were:

- As they gave more media attention to immigration issues or the statements of RRW parties (positive or negative), sympathy for RRW parties increased (Berning, et al., 2019, pp. 103-104).
- Events (such as terrorist attacks) outside the Netherlands had a significant impact on the domestic discourse (Jacobs, et al., 2018, p. 492).
- The biggest Dutch paper, *De Telegraaf*, produced more negative coverage than other papers (Brouwer, et al., 2017, p. 111).
- Jacobs, et al. (2018) noted that 33.6% of immigration stories in Dutch newspapers dealt with crime, 10.7% dealt with terrorism, and 25.7% dealt with socioeconomic issues.

An earlier study published in 2007 by Boomgaarden showed that coverage of immigration issues began to increase after 2001 in Dutch newspapers, as seen in Figure 11.11 below (Boomgaarden, 2007, pp. 111-112). Additionally, in van Praag & Adriaansen’s 2011 study of immigration and Dutch politics in the media, the authors argue that commercial broadcasters tended to depict ethnic minorities more often as a threat (van Praag & Adriaansen, 2011, p. 209).

Figure 11.11 – Increasing Coverage of Immigration Issues in Dutch Newspapers



Source: Boomgaarden (2007, pp. 111-12)

These results show that overall, the media reporting of immigration issues tend to lean toward a threat frame centered on crime and terrorism. While there is a lack of research on radio and TV coverage, if we consider that Eberl, et al.’s (2018) study showed TV is slanted against immigrants more than newspaper coverage, we can probably assume Dutch citizens have heard more negative messages about refugees and immigration than positive messages.

Coalition Constraints

Some of the words most frequently used by scholars when describing the coalition forming and legislative process in the Netherlands include: ‘cooperation,’ ‘consensus,’ ‘reconciliation,’ ‘depoliticized process,’ ‘compromise,’ ‘politics of accommodation,’ ‘business-like,’ and ‘institutionalized.’ Otjes, et al. (2018) calls the law-making process in the Netherlands, ‘Dutch consensus democracy’ (Otjes, et al., 2018, p. 68). It is surprising that a country with no minimum

threshold and a high number of new parties would have such a cordial and cooperative legislative process (Beyens, et al., 2016, p. 259). The cooperation between the three main parties of VVD, PvdA, and CDA also extended to smaller parties such as D66, GL, and CU. Coalition partners are expected to compromise and cooperate, but even opposition party leaders are consulted during major issue negotiations. Furthermore, government technocrats and parliamentary specialists from both coalition and opposition parties facilitate agreement by providing non-partisan analysis of policy and budget proposals (Otjes, et al., 2018, pp. 68-69).

This cooperative environment is effective and efficient when addressing mainstream issues, but on more divisive or extreme issues, it leads to constraint and inaction (Moury & Timmermans, 2013, p. 70). This is particularly the case when the main center-left and center-right parties form a PGC. Once the short-lived VVD/CDA coalition that was supported by the PVV collapsed in 2012, the VVD and PvdA formed a PGC that lasted until parliamentary elections in 2017 (Holger & Manow, 2019). The fact that they were leading a minority government along with their ideological differences made passing any significant legislation difficult — even annual budgets required negotiating with opposition parties to pass the budget. Additionally, the constraining nature of coalition agreements, ideological differences, and the cooperative nature of the process kept either party from advancing any extreme restrictive immigration policies (Otjes, 2016, p. 192).

Their most significant immigration move was the 2015 changes they made to the 2010 “Improved Asylum Procedure Act” (Hess, 2016, p. 1; Thränhardt, 2016, p. 3). Even though the PvdA favored less restrictive policies than the VVD, the dramatic increase in asylum seekers, along with riots and public outburst over the regional shelters forced each party to compromise and pass these changes (Otjes, 2016, pp. 192-193). The rise of the PVV has made government formation much more difficult and is one reason the PGC was a minority government (Pellikaan, et al., 2016, p. 19). This point was brought home even more forcefully when the PVV increased their seat share, and the major parties lost seat share. The PvdA lost 29 seats, becoming almost irrelevant and after 225 days of negotiations the VVD, CDA, D66, and CU formed a new coalition government (Otjes & Voerman, 2018, pp. 203-204). Even though these parties are mostly a center-right coalition government, negotiating with four parties will undoubtedly make adopting policy much harder in the future (De Vries, 2018, pp. 1,544).

Moury & Timmermans (2013) examination of the Dutch government formation process highlights the constraining nature of the Netherlands PGC's. They found that coalition agreements have gotten more comprehensive and longer in recent years. They also learned that government ministers felt very constrained by these agreements and that there were numerous mechanisms to ensure all parties complied with the agreements (Moury & Timmermans, 2013, p. 70). The main provisions were:

- The agreement document is public, and it must be ratified by the MP's of each party, and many times, these agreements even contain procedural rules on how to handle controversial issues (71).
- Civil servants and non-partisan technocrats are responsible for estimating costs and outcomes from the coalition proposals. Their findings are respected by all parties (73).
- Many times, ministers are also negotiators who understand the details of what compromises were agreed to (76).
- Parties are reluctant to offer new proposals. This is particularly the case if the coalition agreement clearly addresses the issue or it is a politically sensitive issue (75).
- Conflicts arise more frequently between government departments compared to between political parties. Once in government, ministers take a businesslike approach to implementing the agreement and standing up for their department (76).

When it comes to immigration, the constraining effects of a PGC in the Netherlands have severely constrained the main government party from shifting to the right. Just before the 2017 elections, Prime Minister Rutte and the VVD seemed to break free (at least rhetorically) from their left-leaning coalition partner PvdA. Despite the 'Dutch consensus democracy' it will be interesting to see if the new center-right government coalition moves Dutch immigration policies to the right.

Dutch Summary

The QCA method's ability to identify deviate cases was extremely helpful in understanding the constraint of Dutch political parties. This research has identified anti-immigrant attitudes and successful RRW parties as two key conditions associated with MSPs shifting their immigration positions to the right. However, the Netherlands case was extremely puzzling. It shared all the conditions that *should* have led to the outcome of interest, yet by in large, its parties only experienced modest shifts. Using the QCA results as a guide has allowed a further examination of the Dutch governing process, and it clearly shows a 'highly constrained' process where consensus rules and change is discouraged (Moury & Timmermans, 2013, p. 88).

While Dutch media reporting seems slightly less negative than our other cases, the salience of the immigration issue is still significant, allowing the PVV and rising FvD to become highly relevant RRW parties by effectively owning the immigration issue. Even though the Dutch people are highly tolerant of others, the anti-immigrant attitudes in the Netherlands offer fertile electoral ground to RRW parties. The security dimension appears to be the biggest threat in the Netherlands with some concern over the cultural dimension as it relates to language and values. Despite the high anti-immigrant attitudes and high RRW relevance, the PGC has constrained the MSPs from shifting immigration policies to the right.

Section 12 - Case Comparison Discussion

Considering the four cases in light of the three dimensions of the immigration issue we can see in Table 12.1 below that the security dimension has become the top threat in all four cases, while the economic dimension is almost an afterthought in all cases except Poland. In Sweden, the cultural dimension concerning non-European Muslim values has had some impact, but the security threat seems to have had the biggest influence on public attitudes and the political parties' response. Despite religion's low priority in Estonian's lives, they show strong opposition to non-European migrants, and are much more focused on the security threat. The Catholic Church's dominance in Poland has made the cultural and security threats seem real to Poles. However, their emigration situation keeps the economic threat in the forefront. This is particularly true for younger Poles. Another factor impacting both Estonia and Poland are the large number of Ukraine migrants entering their country. This mass influx has been

overshadowed by the non-European migrates and under reported by the international news. Their ‘generosity’ in accepting their European neighbors seems to make them even less hospitable to non-European migrants from Africa and the Middle East. The Netherlands was the most puzzling case to study. The economic dimension seems to have minimal impact in the Netherlands. The public assistance and overcrowded shelters do not seem to be a fiscal concern to the Dutch people; however, these issues seem to be manifested through the cultural dimension. The Dutch seem to believe that if the refugees would learn the language and accept Dutch values, they would find work and contribute to society. Of course, the terrorist attacks across Europe and in the Netherlands have greatly increased the perceived security threat. In the Netherlands, the polling and media discourse seem to show a significant minority who vehemently advocate more restrictive immigration policies, but there also appear to be a substantial majority who feel strongly about helping others and are in favor of more open immigration policies implemented with commonsense in mind.

Table 12.1- Three Dimensions Influence

Country	Cultural Dimension	Economic Dimension	Security Dimension
Sweden	√	—	√√√
Estonia	√	—	√√√
Poland	√√√	√	√√√
Netherlands	√	—	√√

The other aspect the case comparison process revealed was ownership of the immigration issue (see Table 12.2 below). In the Netherlands and Estonia, the RRW party has been able to gain ownership of the immigration issue. This is primarily because the MSPs in both these countries followed what Meguid (2005) described as a dismissive strategy, which is a typical first response by MSPs. This created a void on an issue that was important to a significant number of voters. The EKRE and PVV effectively filled that void, and once the 2015 migrant crisis hit — immigrations salience quickly increased with both the media and voters. This perfectly positioned the PVV and EKRE as the first choice for voters concerned about immigration in the Netherlands and Estonia.

Poland is a much different case as the PiS quickly moved to own the immigration issue during the campaign in 2015. The PO hesitated and wavered before succumbing to the pressure from the

EU, while the SLD took a dismissive approach. Once the PO announced they would accept the EU quotas PiS was already in the driver's seat on this issue. Ironically, public attitudes were not as strong against immigration at this time. However, the campaign and the media discourse that followed PiS's victory, greatly contributed to increasing the anti-immigrant sentiment in Poland and cemented PiS's ownership of the issue.

Sweden is the most ambiguous case, although the MSPs followed the classic path outlined by Meguid (2005). First, once the SDP experienced a significant electoral breakthrough, they adopted the dismissive strategy, but as the SDP gained relevance, they quickly moved to accommodative tactics. The massive shift rightward indicated by the 2014 to 2017 CHES results highlight their response to the rise of the SDP. She says for the accommodative tactic to be effective the MSP has to accomplish two things. First, the MSPs accommodative tactics must surpass what the niche party is doing to appeal to voters. Secondly, the MSP must establish issue ownership. Once voters identify the niche party as the owner of an issue, the MSPs opportunities to change their perception is limited (Meguid, 2005, pp. 353-356). Clearly, the SDP has achieved issue ownership on the immigration issue, but it remains to be seen if the MSPs accommodative efforts can surpass the SDP's and supplant their ownership of the issue.

Table 12.2- Issue Ownership and MSP Strategy

Country/ Party	Owner- ship	MSP 1st Response	MSP 2nd Response	Results
SE-SAP		Dis*	Acc†	Strong attempt to gain ownership- vote loss minimal
SE-M		Dis	Acc	Strong attempt to gain ownership- vote loss minimal
SE-KD		Dis	Acc	Strong attempt to gain ownership- no vote loss
SE-SDP	√			Significant vote gain
EE-ER		Dis	Dis	Avoided issue- vote loss minimal
EE-EK		Dis	Acc	Attempted to gain ownership- no vote loss
EE-SDE		Dis	Ad‡	Avoided issue- vote loss substantial
EE-EKRE	√			Significant vote gain
PL-PO		Ad	Dis	Ad then attempted to avoid issue- vote loss substantial
PL-PIŚ	√	Acc	Acc	Took ownership- substantial vote gain
PL-SLD		Dis	Dis	Weak attempt to gain ownership- vote loss substantial
PL-KORWiN		Acc	Acc	Strong attempt to gain ownership- respectable vote gain
NL-VVD		Dis	Acc	Weak attempt to gain ownership- some vote loss
NL-CDA		Dis	Acc	Late attempt to gain ownership- some vote loss
NL-PvdA		Dis	Dis	Avoided issue- serious vote loss
NL-PVV	√			Significant vote gain

*Dis= Dismissive, † Acc= Accommodative, ‡ Ad= Adversarial

The last discussion points in this section include a few interesting findings and one puzzling paradox. First, Eberl, et al. (2018) and Berning, et al. (2019) pointed out that as discourse and salience on the immigration issue increases, RRW parties benefit electorally. This logic is in line with Meguid's (2005) niche party theory and other researchers who found that when debate or discourse on the immigration issue is increased, RRW parties received more votes. Ironically, positive discourse had the same encouraging effect on RRW vote totals as negative discourse (Eberl, et al., 2018, pp. 4-5; Berning, et al., 2019, pp. 103-104).

This means that terrorist attacks, sudden migrant increases, the difficulty of a refugee's journey, EU decisions on asylum seekers, budget changes covering migrant costs or immigrant crimes anywhere in Europe can impact national media coverage and attitudes in the rest of Europe (De Cock, et al., 2019, p. 49; Jacobs, et al., 2018, p. 492; Berry, et al., 2016). Jacobs, et al. (2018) stressed that external international events are regularly covered by a country's internal media outlets (Eberl, et al., 2018, pp. 4-5). Furthermore, globalization of the news media has led to consolidating media landscapes with declining resources, making affordable external news stories more necessary. One of the biggest factors fostering these changes has been the internet, which has made geopolitical borders less relevant and led to 'citizenship journalism' allowing individuals and groups to share and amplify stories across national boundaries (Flew & Waisbord, 2015, pp. 10-11). When we consider that humans are drawn more to negative information and reporters are biased toward producing more negative or crisis themed stories, it is understandable how the media consolidation and globalization process has led to more negative coverage of the immigration issue (Eberl, et al., 2018, p. 7).

Bolt & Wetsteijn (2018) outlined a possible answer for a puzzling aspect found in our cases that have not accepted refugees. Poland and Estonia had no non-European immigration to speak of, yet their citizens harbor strong anti-immigration attitudes. While Sweden and the Netherlands have experienced some of the highest levels of non-European migration in Europe and hold *not* much more anti-immigration attitudes than either Poland or Estonia. In fact, many surveys show Swedes and Dutch people to be personally open to more immigration. The authors found that Dutch citizens typically overestimated the number of refugees in the Netherlands, and this led to stronger opposition towards more generous asylum policies.

Conversely, when Dutch residents had more contact with a refugee, their support for more generous asylum policies increased. They found that the more respondents were exposed to immigration news coverage the more likely they were to overestimate the number of refugees in the country (Bolt & Wetsteijn, 2018, p. 522). This would help us better understand how countries such as Poland, Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic could have such anti-immigrant opinions. They are exposed to mostly negative media coverage leading them to overestimate the problems immigrants may cause, and yet, they have no contact with immigrants to combat their perceptions.

When considering the three hypotheses in light of these case comparisons, we can see that the *Public opinion hypothesis* offers mixed results. Poland and Sweden's MSPs defiantly responded to anti-immigrant public opinion by shifting right. However, the constraining effect of the PGC shown in the QCA analysis, along with the cooperative approach towards consensus in the Netherlands has constrained shifting of their top governing parties. Explaining Estonia's lack of shift is a bit harder. While the QCA analysis seemed to indicate that the PGC was also at work in Estonia, a closer examination showed it had some influence, but did not fully explain Estonia's situation. Observing the post-CHES results in Estonia appear to confirm that a bigger factor was the time lag theory identified by Kluver & Spoon (2014).

The *RRW relevance hypothesis* again shows mixed results, as all cases experienced increasing RRW relevance. Poland may be the most interesting case in that the contagion theory seems to be at play with the top governing party, PiS, shifting dramatically to the right. Moreover, Poland had over 20% of its vote go to RRW parties in addition to PiS's 37.58%. Sweden and Estonia both confirm the hypothesis, in that Sweden had a successful RRW party and its MSPs shifted to the right — while Estonia's RRW party had not experienced significant success during this study, and they showed no substantial shift to the right. The Netherlands also did not shift, but the constraining effect of the PGC explains their deviation.

These results did not confirm the *vote changing hypothesis*. Vote change by itself does not seem to be a condition leading to MSPs shifting to the right. However, when combined with RRW success and anti-immigrant attitudes in the QCA analysis, it appears to contribute towards

shifting. The only major party to experience a significant loss or gain in these four case comparisons was the PvdA, and they did not shift.

Section 13 – Conclusion

This thesis aimed to identify the conditions that lead to MSPs shifting their positions on immigration to the right. This study adopted a research tactic that combined the systematic and transparent traits found in the qualitative QCA method with a case comparison approach offering even more in-depth analysis. Moreover, this detailed process is required when assessing why parties change ideology in complex electoral systems. This thesis has systematically demonstrated how the individual environments in each country profoundly influence party competition. This was done by conducting three separate QCA's testing eight separate conditions and then carrying out four in-depth case-comparison studies focused on the most relevant conditions identified in the QCA process. This comprehensive examination revealed several useful findings.

QCA Summary

The QCA analyses identified anti-immigration attitudes and RRW party relevance as conditions showing the strongest association to MSPs shifting positions on immigration. However, the most exciting finding was the constraining effect of PGC's on MSPs shifting their positions to the right. This condition helps explain why Germany, the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent, Estonia did not shift their positions. What makes this finding even more certain is the fact that the DE-FDP and NL-CDA who were not in the PGC's in those countries did shift (24.26%) and (7.38%) respectively. Moreover, the EE-EK party, who shifted the most of any Estonia party (4.56%) was also not a participant in Estonia's PGC.

The eight conditions that were systematically analyzed in the QCA analysis separated the MSPs into three basic groups (See Table 13.1 below). Group 1 included the parties in the Czech Republic (16.38%), Hungary (19.94%), Poland (18.31%), Slovakia (20.1%) and Sweden (38.78%). These parties experienced an average shift to the right on immigration issues of 22.7%. Group 2 included the MSP's that resisted shifting to the right such as Germany (7.72%), the Netherlands (5.47%), and Estonia (-3.45%). Their average shift was only 3.24%. Group 3

MSPs included France (-0.08%) and the UK (0.69%), who averaged a minuscule 0.3% shift. The consistent size of the shift within these three groups reinforces Van Spanje’s research showing that the contagion effect of anti-immigration parties tends to affect ‘entire party systems’ (Van Spanje, 2010, p. 579).

Table 13.1- Groups of Cases Based on QCA Analyses

	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Deviant Cases
	Shifted Right	No Shift	No Shift	No Shift
	- High RRW vote - High anti-immigr. PO	- In a Purple Grand Coalition	- Low RRW vote - Low anti-immigr. PO	- High RRW vote - High anti-immigr. PO - High institutionalization
	Average Shift/25.47%	Average Shift/0.69%	Average Shift/-0.91%	Average Shift/0.29%
1.	CSSD-Czech Social Dem. Party	SDE- Social Democratic Party	PS-Socialist Party	Civic Democratic Party*
2.	ANO-Action of Diss. Citizens	ER-Estonian Reform Party	LR/UMP-Rep./Union for Pop Mov.	MSzPL- Hungarian Socialist Party*
3.	FDP-Free Democratic Party‡	EK-Estonian Centre Party	Lab-Labour Party	KDH-Christian Dem. Movement
4.	Fidesz- Hungarian Civic Union	SDP-Social Democratic Party	Cons- Conservative Party	
5.	CDA-Christian Dem. Appeal‡	CDU-Christian Dem. Union		
6.	SDL-Democratic Left Alliance	CSU-Christian Social Union		
7.	PO-Civic Platform	PvdA- Labour Party		
8.	PiS-Law and Justice Party	VVD-People’s Party Free & Dem		
9.	Smer- Direction- Social Dem.			
10.	SaS-Freedom and Solidarity			
11.	SAP-Swedish Social Dem. Party			
12.	M- Moderate Party			
13.	KD- Christian Democrats			
‡=Not in a PGC and showed Shift, *=These cases were logical contradictions in the 2 nd QCA,				

Case Comparison Summary

The case comparison study confirmed the QCA results, which showed the association between parties shifting immigration positions to the right and the key conditions of RRW vote totals, anti-immigration public opinion, and the institutionalization of political parties. Sweden,

Poland, and the Netherlands each experienced high anti-immigration attitudes and successful RRW parties. Estonia also had high anti-immigration attitudes but only limited RRW party success before the 2019 elections. Of course, Sweden and Poland's MSPs shifted hard to the right, while the Netherlands MSPs experienced very modest shifts and only Estonia's EK had any shift to the right. The in-depth examination follows almost precisely what the QCA analysis found. The Netherlands MSPs *not* shifting is adequately explained by the constraints of the PGC. Moreover, the in-depth case study showed that the constraining effect of Estonia's PGC was limited; however, the QCA process also showed this was because of Estonia's low RRW party relevance level. Clearly, Sweden and Poland's MSP shifts were fully explained by the top two conditions identified in the QCA, and they did not have a PGC to restrain their shifting.

The case studies helped determine how the economic, cultural, and security dimensions of the immigration issue impacted each country. In all four cases, the security threat seemed to be the driving force that impacted public attitudes and party competition. The cultural threat was a significant factor in Poland while it did not carry as much weight in the other three cases. The economic threat was not a driving force in any of the countries, although in Poland, the emigration situation made the economic dimension somewhat relevant. This finding contrasts with what Mudde (2016) calls the "losers-of-globalization thesis" which holds:

"that globalization has interconnected the world economically, which has created insecurity for large parts of the population (the "losers"), which look for salvation in the populist radical right" (Mudde, 2016, pp. 298-299).

Mudde also disagrees with this thesis and puts less emphasis on how the economic dimension has helped RRW parties succeed.

Determining issue ownership and the saliency of the immigration issue was one of the focuses in the case comparison process. By examining the overall media landscape and news coverage of the immigration issue in each country, this author found that the amount of news coverage and saliency of the immigration issue significantly increased as the migrant crisis hit its peak in 2015 and has remained high in each country. Furthermore, issue ownership has been captured by the RRW parties in each country with the exception of Poland, where PiS's shift has given them ownership of the immigration issue and confirms the contagion theory. It should also be noted

that Sweden's MSPs have adopted an accommodative strategy and seem to be attempting to own the immigration issue.

Other findings worth noting from the case comparison study include: press coverage has been more negative than positive in all four countries, with the Netherlands having the most favorable coverage of immigration issues. This supports the old news maximum, "If it bleeds it leads". Also, the impact of international news events on individual countries across Europe should not be underrated. Terrorist attacks, sudden migration increases, or EU decisions on asylum seekers in one country seep into the dialog and debate in other countries. These events are reported by mainstream media in each country and shared through social media by RRW supporters. This amplifying process has significantly affected public opinion across Europe. Lastly, the RRW parties have increased their share of parliamentary seats in all four countries which has made forming governing coalitions much more difficult in Sweden, Estonia, and the Netherlands. The only case where this was not an issue was Poland, where PiS has an outright majority.

This research helps to understand better how the immigration issue is impacting party competition in EU countries across Northern Europe. It shows that RRW parties appear to be here to stay and have become capable opposition competitors. Most are far more than simple anti-immigration parties and have broadened their policy proposals to encompass a variety of the public's concerns. However, most of the RRW parties in this study have moved to the left on economic issues and are using the migration crisis to successfully wedge the MSPs through the economic, cultural and security dimensions of the immigration issue.

One limitation of this study was a lack of information on party structure and organization. Round 1 of the Political Party Database Project (PPDP) did not include all the countries in this study, but round 2 is scheduled to come out later this year and will add helpful information on political parties that should allow a much more effective look into party institutionalization. This condition was found to be impactful in the 3rd QCA, and a more refined examination should improve results. Additionally, the new CHES results will be released in 2020, which would provide the ability to add more countries to an analysis like this. Including Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Bulgaria, Croatia, as well as a few Southern European countries such as Spain or Italy would offer a better perspective on the overall European situation.

Future research should delve deeper into the constraining effects of PGC's. It would be interesting to examine if PGC's exert a constraining effect on center-left parties shifting to the left on welfare or tax policy in response to some of the newer populist left parties. To this authors knowledge, this research is the first to identify the constraining effect PGC's have on parties shifting immigration positions and investigating if this effect is the same on other issues would be beneficial to this field of study.

Overall, it is clear that RRW parties have used all three dimensions of the immigration issue to open new cleavages and wedge voters away from the traditional MSPs. This has made immigration the ultimate wedge issue and resulted in most MSPs in this study shifting their positions to the right on immigration.

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Appendix - Immigration, the ultimate wedge issue... how Radical right-wing parties are influencing mainstream parties' in Western and Eastern Europe to shift immigration positions to the right.

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Master Thesis

in Political Science at the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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Table A1- *QCA 1 Country Wide Raw Data Matrix*

Country	AVG. SHIFT 14 vs. 17[†]	Anti-Immigration Polling AVG.*	RRW Vote[°]	Purple Grand Coalition[‡]
CZ	16.38%	59.67%	14.27%	No
EE	-3.45%	57.7%	8.30%	Yes
FR	-0.08%	48.67%	14.37%	No
DE	7.72%	66.00%	13.00%	Yes
HU	19.94%	64.67%	19.21%	No
NL	5.47%	55.00%	15.50%	Yes
PL	18.31%	50.67%	21.25%	No
SK	20.1%	55.00%	23.31%	No
SW	38.78%	58.33%	18.12%	No
UK	0.69%	37.33%	1.83%	No

[†]Shift: Data was taken from Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk, et al., 2017).
^{*}Polling: Data was taken from special Eurobarometer 469 (European Commission, Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, 2018).
[°]RRW Vote: Data was taken from last parliamentary election in each country (NSD, 2019).
[‡]Purple Grand Coalitions: Data was taken from Party Facts website (Party Facts, 2019).

Table A2 - QCA 2 Proximate Raw Data Matrix

Party	Party Name	AVG. SHIFT 14 vs. 17 [†]	Anti-Immigration Polling AVG.*	RRW Vote [°]	MSPs Relative Vote Change [^]	Purple Grand Coalition [‡]
CSSD	Czech Social Dem. Party	23.51%	59.67%	14.27%	-68.85%	No
ODS	Civic Democratic Party	2.47%	59.67%	14.27%	-19.00%	No
ANO	Action of Diss. Citizens	22.86%	59.67%	14.27%	58.84%	No
SDE	Social Democratic Party	-9.44%	57.7%	8.3%	-9.75%	Yes
ER	Estonian Reform Party	-5.72%	57.7%	8.3%	-1.77%	Yes
EK	Estonian Centre Party	4.81%	57.7%	8.3%	0.40%	Yes
PS	Socialist Party	-7.37%	48.67%	14.37%	-72.49%	No
LR/UMP	Rep. Union for Pop Mov.	5.96%	48.67%	14.37%	-52.90%	No
DE-SPD	Social Democratic Party	2.52%	66.00%	13.00%	-18%	Yes
DE-CDU	Christian Dem. Union	0.32%	66.00%	13.00%	-12.70%	Yes
DE-CSU	Christian Social Union	3.89%	66.00%	13.00%	-10.79%	Yes
DE-FDP	Free Democratic Party	24.26%	66.00%	13.00%	10.31%	No
MSzPL	Hungarian Socialist Party	0.04%	64.67%	19.21%	-46.91%	No
Fidesz	Hungarian Civ. Union	19.90%	64.67%	19.21%	0.96%	No
PvdA	Labour Party	2.39%	55.00%	15.50%	-74.32%	Yes
VVD	People's Party Free & Dem	6.75%	55.00%	15.50%	-9.55%	Yes
CDA	Christian Dem. Appeal	7.38%	55.00%	15.50%	12.22%	No
SLD	Democratic Left Alliance	11.64%	50.67%	21.22%	-29.57%	No
PO	Civic Platform	8.15%	50.67%	21.22%	-40.28%	No
PiS	Law and Justice Party	35.14%	50.67%	21.22%	21.25%	No
Smer	Direction- Social Dem.	22.19%	55.00%	23.58%	-28.59%	No
KDH	Christian Dem. Movement	-1.63%	55.00%	23.58%	-40.91%	No
SaS	Freedom and Solidarity	39.73%	55.00%	23.58%	34.30%	No
SAP	Swedish Social Dem. Party	34.81%	58.33%	18.12%	-8.35%	No
M	Moderate Party	43.96%	58.33%	18.12%	-25.68%	No
KD	Christian Dem.	37.57%	58.33%	18.12%	24.29%	No
Lab	Labour Party	-0.92%	37.33%	1.83%	34.68%	No
Cons	Conservative Party	-0.45%	37.33%	1.83%	16.32%	No

[†]Shift: Data taken from Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk, et al., 2017). ^{*}Polling: Data was taken from special Eurobarometer 469 (European Commission, 2018).
[°]RRW Vote: Data taken from last election in each country (NSD, 2019). [^]MSPs Vote Change: Data taken from the last election in each country (NSD, 2019).
[‡]Purple Grand Coalitions: Data was taken from PartyFacts website (Party Facts, 2019; Holger & Manow, 2019).

Table A3 - QCA 3 Remote Raw Data Matrix

Party	Party Name	AVG. SHIFT 14 vs. 17†	Volatility 2010-2016*	Opposition°	Party Size^	Party Institutionalization‡
CSSD	Czech Social Dem. Party	23.51%	20.5	Gov.	Small	No
ODS	Civic Democratic Party	2.47%	20.5	Opp.	Small	Yes
ANO	Action of Diss. Citizens	22.86%	20.5	Gov.	Large	No
SDE	Social Democratic Party	-9.44%	3.5	Gov.	Small	Yes
ER	Estonian Reform Party	-5.72%	3.5	Gov.	Large	Yes
EK	Estonian Centre Party	4.81%	3.5	Opp.	Large	Yes
PS	Socialist Party	-7.37%	0.7	Gov.	Small	No
LR/UMP	Rep. Union for Pop Mov.	5.96%	0.7	Opp.	Small	No
SPD	Social Democratic Party	2.52%	2.9	Gov.	Large	Yes
CDU	Christian Dem. Union	0.32%	2.9	Gov.	Large	Yes
CSU	Christian Social Union	3.89%	2.9	Gov.	Small	Yes
FDP	Free Democratic Party	24.26%	2.9	Opp.	Small	No
MSzPL	Hungarian Socialist Party	0.04%	8.8	Opp.	Small	Yes
Fidesz	Hungarian Civ. Union	19.90%	8.8	Gov.	Large	Yes
PvdA	Labour Party	2.39%	0.5	Gov.	Small	No
VVD	People's Party Free & Dem	6.75%	0.5	Gov.	Large	Yes
CDA	Christian Dem. Appeal	7.38%	0.5	Opp.	Small	No
SLD	Democratic Left Alliance	11.64%	10.5	Opp.	Small	No
PO	Civic Platform	8.15%	10.5	Gov.	Large	No
PiS	Law and Justice Party	35.14%	10.5	Opp.	Large	No
Smer	Direction- Social Dem.	22.19%	11.9	Gov.	Large	No
KDH	Christian Dem. Movement	-1.63%	11.9	Opp.	Small	Yes
SaS	Freedom and Solidarity	39.73%	11.9	Opp.	Small	No
SAP	Swedish Social Dem. Party	34.81%	0.7	Gov.	Large	Yes
M	Moderate Party	43.96%	0.7	Opp.	Small	No
KD	Christian Dem.	37.57%	0.7	Opp.	Small	No
Lab	Labour Party	-0.92%	1.6	Opp.	Large	Yes
Cons	Conservative Party	-0.45%	1.6	Gov.	Large	Yes

†Shift: Data taken from Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk, et al., 2017). *Volatility: Data was taken from (Emanuele, et al., 2018).
°Opposition: Data taken from (Party Facts, 2019; Holger & Manow, 2019). ^Party size: Authors own calculations using election returns (NSD, 2019). ‡ Party Institutionalization: Authors own calculations using several sources. See Table A17 for details.

Outcome – Party's Shift to Right

The exact two same questions appeared in the policy dimensions section on both the 2014 and 2017 Chapel Hill expert survey. The respondents were asked to rank each party's position on a scale of 0 to 10. On the immigration policy question, 0 = Fully opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration and 10 = Fully in favor of a restrictive policy on immigration. On multiculturalism (multiculturalism vs. assimilation), 0 = Strongly favors multiculturalism, and 10 = Strongly favors assimilation. Each question also offered an option for 'don't know' (Polk, et al., 2017).

They then took those scores and aggregated them into a final score for each party on this issue. To come up with a final score this thesis followed the steps outlined below.

Step 1- Each party's CHES score were recorded on both questions from 2017 and 2014.

Step 2- The 2014 rating was subtracted from the 2017 rating.

Step 3- The differences between immigration policy change and multiculturalism change were averaged to determine the average shift for each party. Then divided by 100 to change the point shift into a percentage.

Step 4- Each countries MSPs average change was combined into the average shift for that country and divided by 100 to change the point shift into a percentage.

Table A4a. *Cases 2017 & 2014 CHES scores*

Party	Year	Experts	Year	Experts	Imm. Policy 2017	Imm. Policy 2014	Multicul. 2017	Multicul. 2014
CZ-CSSD	2017	14	2014	15	6.8571429	4.3333335	6.4285712	4.25
CZ-ODS	2017	14	2014	15	8	7.875	7.7857141	7.4166665
CZ-ANO	2017	14	2014	15	7.6428571	5.8571429	7.7857141	5
EE-SDE	2017	14	2014	15	3.1333334	4.625	2.4666667	2.8571429
EE-ER	2017	14	2014	15	4.5333333	5.125	5.7333331	6.2857141
EE-EK	2017	14	2014	15	4.8666668	5	4	2.7142856
FR-PS	2017	20	2014	14	3.5999999	4.6999998	4.352941	4.7272725
FR-LR/UMP	2017	20	2014	14	8.6000004	7.5999999	8.6470585	8.454545
DE-SPD	2017	16	2014	13	3.8125	3.909091	4.1999998	3.5999999
DE-CDU	2017	16	2014	13	5.625	5.7272725	6.6666665	6.5
DE-CSU	2017	16	2014	13	7.8125	7.4545455	8.6	8.1999998
DE-FDP	2017	16	2014	13	6.4375	3.5999999	5.7142859	3.7
HU-MSzPL	2017	22	2014	14	4.8095236	4.4545455	4.5625	4.909091
HU-Fidesz	2017	22	2014	14	9.909091	7.8333335	9.75	7.8461537
NL-PvdA	2017	15	2014	11	4.5	4.125	4.7692308	4.6666665
NL-VVD	2017	15	2014	11	8.0714283	7.5	8	7.2222223
NL-CDA	2017	15	2014	11	7.0714288	6.5	7.7692308	6.8888888
PL-SDL	2017	22	2014	17	4.3157897	3.3333333	3.9444444	2.5999999
PL-PO	2017	22	2014	17	4.5714288	4	5.1578946	4.0999999
PL-PiS	2017	22	2014	17	9.7142859	6.1999998	9.1052628	8
SK-Smer	2017	20	2014	14	8.4210529	6.4615383	8.8947372	6.4166665
SK-KDH	2017	20	2014	14	7.1875	7.6153846	8.3529415	8.25
SK-SaS	2017	20	2014	14	8.8947372	4.5454545	8.2631578	4.6666665
SE-SAP	2017	18	2014	22	6.6666665	2.3333333	4.9444447	2.3157895
SE-M	2017	18	2014	22	7.5555553	2.6111112	7.1111112	3.2631578
SE-KD	2017	18	2014	22	7.5555553	2.6111112	7.5294118	3.8421052
UK-Labour	2017	14	2014	7	5	5.4285712	4.0769229	3.8333333
UK-Cons	2017	14	2014	7	8	8	7.0769229	7.1666665

Source: CHES 2014 & 2017 results (Polk, et al., 2017)

Table A4b. *Cases difference between 2014 and 2017*

Country	Immigration Policy				Multiculturalism			
	Party	2017	2014	Difference	Party	2017	2014	Difference
CZ	CSSD	6.8571429	4.3333335	2.523809	CSSD	6.4285712	4.25	2.178571
CZ	ODS	8	7.875	0.125	ODS	7.7857141	7.4166665	0.369048
CZ	ANO2011	7.6428571	5.8571429	1.785714	ANO2011	7.7857141	5	2.785714
DE	SPD	3.8125	3.909091	-0.09659	SPD	4.1999998	3.5999999	0.6
DE	CDU	5.625	5.7272725	-0.10227	CDU	6.6666665	6.5	0.166667
DE	CSU	7.8125	7.4545455	0.357955	CSU	8.6	8.1999998	0.4
DE	FDP	6.4375	3.5999999	2.8375	FDP	5.7142859	3.7	2.014286
EE	SDE	3.1333334	4.625	-1.49667	SDE	2.4666667	2.8571429	-0.39048
EE	ER	4.5333333	5.125	-0.59167	ER	5.7333331	6.2857141	-0.55238
EE	EK	4.8666668	5	-0.32333	EK	4	2.7142856	1.285714
FR	PS	3.5999999	4.6999998	-1.1	PS	4.352941	4.7272725	-0.37433
FR	LR/UMP	8.6000004	7.5999999	1.000001	LR/UMP	8.6470585	8.454545	0.192514
HU	MSzPL	4.8095236	4.4545455	0.354978	MszPL	4.5625	4.909091	-0.34659
HU	Fidesz	9.909091	7.8333335	2.075758	Fidesz	9.75	7.8461537	1.903846
NL	PvdA	4.5	4.125	0.375	PvdA	4.7692308	4.6666665	0.102564
NL	VVD	8.0714283	7.5	0.571428	VVD	8	7.2222223	0.777778
NL	CDA	7.0714288	6.5	0.571429	CDA	7.7692308	6.8888888	0.884342
PL	SDL	4.3157897	3.3333333	0.982456	SDL	3.9444444	2.5999999	1.344445
PO	PQ	4.5714288	4	0.571429	PQ	5.1578946	4.0999999	1.057895
PO	PiS	9.7142859	6.1999998	3.514286	PiS	9.1052628	8	1.105263
SK	Smer	8.4210529	6.4615383	1.959515	Smer	8.8947372	6.4166665	2.478071
SK	KDH	7.1875	7.6153846	-0.42788	KDH	8.3529415	8.25	0.102942
SK	SaS	8.8947372	4.5454545	4.349283	SaS	8.2631578	4.6666665	3.596491
SE	SAP	6.6666665	2.3333333	4.333333	SAP	4.9444447	2.3157895	2.628655
SE	M	7.5555553	2.6111112	4.944444	M	7.1111112	3.2631578	3.847953
SE	KD	7.5555553	2.6111112	3.826389	KD	7.5294118	3.8421052	3.687307
UK	Lab	5	5.4285712	-0.42857	Lab	4.0769229	3.8333333	0.24359
UK	Cons	8	8	0	Cons	7.0769229	7.1666665	-0.08974

Source: CHES 2014 & 2017 results (Polk, et al., 2017)

Table A4c. Average score of party's overall shift from 2014 to 2017

Country	Party	Immigration Policy	Multiculturalism	Average Shift	Percentage Shift
CZ	CSSD	2.523809	2.178571	2.3511903	23.51%
CZ	ODS	0.125	0.369048	0.247024	2.50%
CZ	ANO	1.785714	2.785714	2.285714	22.95%
DE	SPD	-0.09659	0.6	0.2517045	2.52%
DE	CDU	-0.10227	0.166667	0.032197	0.32%
DE	CSU	0.357955	0.4	0.378977	3.89%
DE	FDP	2.8375	2.014286	2.425893	24.36%
EE	SDE	-1.49667	-0.39048	-0.94357	-9.44%
EE	ER	-0.59167	-0.55238	-0.57202	-5.72%
EE	EK	-0.32333	1.2857142	0.481192	4.81%
FR	PS	-1.1	-0.37433	-0.737166	-7.37%
FR	LR/UMP	1.000001	0.192514	0.596257	6.05%
HU	MSzPL	0.354978	-0.34659	0.0041936	0.04%
HU	Fidesz	2.075758	1.903846	1.989802	19.98%
NL	PvdA	0.375	0.102564	0.2387822	2.39%
NL	VVD	0.571428	0.777778	0.674603	6.75%
NL	CDA	0.571429	0.884342	0.727886	7.28%
PL	SDL	0.982456	1.344445	1.1634505	11.64%
PL	PD	0.571429	1.057895	0.814662	8.15%
PL	PiS	3.514286	1.105263	2.309774	23.11%
SK	Smer	1.959515	2.478071	2.2187927	22.19%
SK	KDH	-0.42788	0.102942	-0.16247	-1.63
SK	SaS	4.349283	3.596491	3.972887	39.73%
SE	SAP	4.333333	2.628655	3.4809942	34.81%
SE	M	4.944444	3.847953	4.396199	44.06%
SE	KD	3.826389	3.687307	3.756848	37.67%
UK	Lab	-0.42857	0.24359	-0.092491	-0.92%
UK	Cons	0	-0.08974	-0.04487	-0.45%

Source: CHES 2014 & 2017 results (Polk, et al., 2017)

It is helpful to explore the CHES scores for the top RRW parties in each country. This provides some perspective on how far some of the mainstream parties have moved since 2014. It is interesting to see that both Fidesz and PiS are now further to the right than either Jobbik or K15 on both the immigration and multicultural questions. As mentioned in the study, these parties display classic characteristics of the contamination process at work. This also shows the influence RRW parties in Sweden, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia appear to display while raising questions as to why Germany, Netherlands, Estonia, and the UK seem to be less susceptible to their influence.

Table A4d. *Scores of RRW Parties*

		Immigration			Multiculturalism		
Country	Party	2017	2014	Difference	2017	2014	Difference
CZ	SPD/USVIT	9.928572	9.4	0.528572	9.785714	9.666667	0.119047
EST	EKRE	9.80	N/A	N/A	9.56	N/A	N/A
FR	FN	9.85	9.8	0.05	9.833333	9.727273	0.10606
GER	AfD	9.3125	9.3	0.0125	9.866667	9.222222	0.644445
HUN	JOBBIK	9.636364	9.333333	0.303031	9.666667	9.538462	0.128205
NL	PVV	9.428572	9.875	-0.44643	9.923077	9.777778	0.145299
POL	K15	9.476191	N/A	N/A	8.789474	N/A	N/A
SLK	SNS	9.368421	9.307693	0.060728	9.631579	9.666667	-0.03509
SWE	SD	9.888889	9.777778	0.111112	9.944445	9.842105	0.10234
UK	UKIP	9.357142	10	-0.64286	9.714286	9.8	-0.08571

Source: CHES 2014 & 2017 results (Polk, et al., 2017)

Table A5 – Average Country Shift

Party	Party Name	AVG. SHIFT 14 vs. 17	AVG. % SHIFT 14 vs. 17	Country	AVG. Country SHIFT	AVG. % Country SHIFT
CSSD	Czech Social Dem. Party	2.3511903	23.51%	CZ	1.627976	16.38%
ODS	Civic Democratic Party	0.247024	2.47%			
ANO	Action of Diss. Citizens	2.285714	22.86%			
SDE	Social Democratic Party	0.2517045	-9.44%	EE	-0.3448	-3.45%
ER	Estonian Reform Party	0.032197	-5.72%			
EK	Estonian Centre Party	0.378977	4.81%			
PS	Socialist Party	2.425893	-7.37%	FR	-0.07745	-0.08%
LR/UMP	Rep. Union for Pop Mov.	-0.94357	5.96%			
SPD	Social Democratic Party	-0.57202	2.52%	DE	0.772193	7.72%
CDU	Christian Dem. Union	0.481192	0.32%			
CSU	Christian Social Union	-0.737166	3.89%			
FDP	Free Democratic Party	0.596257	24.26%			
MSzPL	Hungarian Socialist Party	0.0041936	0.04%	HU	1.993996	19.21%
Fidesz	Hungarian Civ. Union	1.989802	19.90%			
PvdA	Labour Party	0.2387822	2.39%	NL	0.54709	15.50%
VVD	People's Party Free & Dem	0.674603	6.75%			
CDA	Christian Dem. Appeal	0.727886	7.38%			
SLD	Democratic Left Alliance	1.1634505	11.64%	PL	1.830799	18.31%
PO	Civic Platform	0.814662	8.15%			
PiS	Law and Justice Party	2.309774	35.14%			
Smer	Direction- Social Dem.	2.2187927	22.19%	SK	2.009736	20.1%
KDH	Christian Dem. Movement	-0.16247	-1.63%			
SaS	Freedom and Solidarity	3.972887	39.73%			
SAP	Swedish Social Dem. Party	3.4809942	34.81%	SW	3.878014	38.78%
M	Moderate Party	4.396199	43.96%			
KD	Christian Dem.	3.756848	37.57%			
Lab	Labour Party	-0.092491	-0.92%	UK	0.06868	0.69%
Cons	Conservative Party	-0.04487	-0.45%			

Shift: Data taken from Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk, et al., 2017). *Polling: Data was taken from special Eurobarometer 469 (European Commission, 2018).

QCA 1 & 2 – RRW Election Results

Table A6. RRW Party Vote Totals between 2010 and 2018

	CZ	EST	FR	GER	HUN	NL	POL	SLK	SWE	UK
2007		EIP- 0.2% Total- 0.2%					SRP-1.5% LPR-1.3% P-0.08% Total- 2.88%			
2009			FN-4.29% Total- 4.29%	NDP-1.5% REP-0.4% DVU-0.1% CM-0.02% Total-2.02%						
2010	DSSS- 1.4% SSO- 0.74% PB- 0.47% SPR-RSC- 0.03% Total- 2.64%				Jobbik- 16.7% MIEP- 0.03% Total- 16.73%	PVV- 15.45% TON- 0.06% Total- 15.51%		SNS- 5.07% L'sNS- 1.33% Total- 6.4%	SD- 5.7% ND- 0.02% SVP- 0.01% Total- 5.73%	UKIP- 3.1% BPN-1.9% Total- 5%
2011		EIP- 0.4% Total- 0.4%					KNP- 1.06% PR- 0.24% SRP- 0.07% Total- 1.37%			
2012			RN-13.6% Total- 13.6%			PVV- 10.8% DPK- 0.01% Total- 10.81%		SNS 4.55% L'sNS- 1.58% NaS-NS- 0.63% Total- 6.76%		
2013	USVIT- 6.89% SSO- 2.47% DSSS- 0.86% SSZR- 0.27% PB- 0.02% Total- 10.51%			AfD- 4.7% NPD- 1.3% REP- 0.02% Total – 6.02%						
2014					Jobbik- 20.22% MIEP- 0.04% Total- 20.26%				SD- 12.86% SVP- 0.07% KrVP- 0.06% Total- 12.99%	
2015		EKRE- 8.1% EWIP- 0.2% Total- 8.3%					K15- 8.81% LP- 4.76% SP- 4% PRZP- 3.62% SPR- 0.03 Total- 21.22%			UKIP- 12.6% BNP- 0.01% Total- 12.61%

Table A6. <i>Continued</i>										
2016								SNS- 8.64% L'sNS- 8.04% SEM- 6.63% Total- 23.31%		
2017	SPD- 10.64% SSO- 1.56% SSZR- 0.72% Realist – 0.71% DSSS- 0.20% SPR-RSC- 0.19% LIDEM- 0.17% SNCR- 0.08% Total- 14.27		RN- 13.2% DLF- 1.17% Total- 14.37%	AfD- 12.6% NPD- 0.04% Total – 13%		PVV- 13.1% FvD- 1.8% GP- 0.1% OP- 0.1% VNL-0.4 Total- 15.5%				UKIP- 1.8% BNP- 0.03% Total- 1.83%
2018					Jobbik- 19.06% MIEP- 0.15% Total- 19.21%				SD- 17.53% Afs- 0.31% MED- 0.20% KrVP- 0.05% NMR- 0.03% Total- 18.12%	

Source: (NSD 2019; Global Elections Database 2019)

Table A7. *Countries RRW Vote change from the last election compared to their prior two elections average*

	1 st Election	2 nd Election	Average	Last Election	Change
CZ-RRW	2.64%	7.73%	5.19%	14.27%	9.09%
EST-RRW	0.20%	0.40%	0.30%	8.30%	8.00%
FR-RRW	4.29%	13.60%	8.95%	14.37%	5.43%
DE-RRW	2.02%	6.02%	4.02%	13.00%	8.98%
HU-RRW	16.73%	20.26%	18.50%	19.21%	0.71%
NL-RRWs	15.51%	10.81%	13.16%	15.50%	2.34%
POL-RRW	2.88%	1.37%	2.13%	21.25%	19.12%
SLK-RRW	6.40%	6.76%	6.58%	23.31%	16.73%
SW-RRW	5.73%	12.99%	9.36%	18.12%	8.76%
UK-RRW	5%	12.61%	9%	1.83%	-6.98%

Source: (NSD 2019; Global Elections Database 2019)

QCA 1 & 2 – Polling Results

The three questions below were selected from the special Eurobarometer 469 (2018) that focused on immigration issues (European Commission, 2018). The poll was conducted from 21/10/2017 to 31/10/2017. The results from all the questions were averaged together to provide each country an overall perception on immigration.

QA9.7- There are different views regarding the impact of immigrants on society in (OUR COUNTRY). To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? Overall immigrants... **Worsen the crime problems in (OUR COUNTRY)**

QA9.2- There are different views regarding the impact of immigrants on society in (OUR COUNTRY). To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? Overall immigrants... **are a burden on our country’s welfare system**

QA8.2- Generally speaking how successful or not is the integration effort of most immigrants living... in (OUR COUNTRY).

Table A8. *Public Opinion Country Perception*

Country	Worsen Crime	Welfare Burden	Unsuccessful Integration	Average	Number of Interviews
CZ	71.00%	65.00%	43.00%	59.67%	1,027
EE	52.00%	60.00%	61.00%	57.76%	1,004
FR	39.00%	43.00%	64.00%	48.67%	1,030
DE	64.00%	71.00%	63.00%	66.00%	1,554
HU	65.00%	74.00%	55.00%	64.67%	1,038
NL	58.00%	54.00%	53.00%	55.00%	1,025
PL	54.00%	50.00%	39.00%	50.67%	1,037
SK	61.00%	69.00%	35.00%	55.00%	1,080
SE	61.00%	41.00%	73.00%	58.33%	1,051
UK	38.00%	38.00%	36.00%	37.33%	1,382
Source: (European Commission, 2018)					

Table A9. *Most Important Problem Question from 2013 & 2017- Immigration*

Country	eb2013-Fall* % Respondents	2013- rank	Eb2017-Spring^ % Respondents	2017- rank	2013-2017 % Respondents change	2013 Gallup World Poll % Respondents who want immigration decreased
CZ	2%	11th	23%	2th	21%	59.4%
EST	2%	9th	14%	7th	12%	26.2%
FR	12%	7th	14%	3th	2%	43.8%
GER	16%	6th	37%	1st	21%	34.3%
HUN	2%	11th	27%	2nd	25%	57%
NL	4%	10th	37%	2nd	23%	38.4%
POL	3%	9th	16%	5th	13%	28%
SLK	1%	12th	8%	8th	7%	43.8%
SWE	13%	6th	29%	2nd	16%	34.7%
UK	33%	2nd	19%	3rd	-14%	68.8%
<p>*EB 2013 was conducted between the 2nd and the 17th of November 2013 from approximately 1,000 interviews. Statistical Margins due to the sampling process at the 95% level of confidence. QA4a-What do you feel are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTY) at the moment? ^EB 2017 was conducted between the 20th and the 30th May 2017 from approximately 1,000 interviews. Statistical Margins due to the sampling process at the 95% level of confidence. QA4a-What do you feel are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTY) at the moment? Source: (European Commission, 2013; European Commission, 2017)</p>						Source: (Gallup, 2013; Esipova, et al., 2015)

Table A10. *Change in the percent of Immigrants in the population between 2010-2017*

Country	Percent of immigrants in population 2017	Percent of immigrants in population 2010	Difference between 2010 and 2017	Migrant Stock change 2010-2015	Migrant Stock change 2005-2010
CZ	4.1%	3.8%	0.03%	0.9%	4.2%
DE	14.8%	12.1%	2.7%	0.8%	0.9%
EE	14.7%	16.4%	-1.7%	-2.3%	-1.4%
FR	12.2%	11.4%	0.08%	1.9%	1.3%
HU	5.2%	4.4%	0.08%	1.7%	3.5%
NL	12.1%	11.0%	1.1%	1.7%	1.1%
PL	1.7%	1.7%	0.0%	-1%	-2.3%
SK	3.4%	2.7%	0.07%	3.9%	2.3%
SE	17.6%	14.2%	3.4%	3.6%	3.4%
UK	13.4%	12.0%	1.4%	2%	5%
Source: (United Nations Population Division, 2017)					

QCA 2 – MSPs Relative Vote Change

Table A11. MSPs Relative change from last election compared to their prior two elections average

Party	1st-Ele.	2nd-Ele.	Average	3rd-Ele.	Change	Relative Change	LMPs-Avg. Change	RMPs-Avg. Change	LMPs-Relative Avg. Change	RMPs-Relative Avg. Change
CSSD	22.08%	24.60%	23.34%	7.27%	-16.07%	-68.85%	-16.07%	—	-68.85%	—
ODS	20.22%	7.73%	13.98%	11.32%	-2.66%	-19.00%	—	-2.66%	—	-19.00%
ANO	N/A	18.66%	18.66%	29.64%	10.98%	58.84%	—	10.98%	—	58.84%
SDE	10.60%	17.10%	13.85%	15.20%	-1.35%	-9.75%	-1.35%	—	-9.75%	—
ER	27.80%	28.60%	28.20%	27.70%	-0.50%	-1.77%	—	-0.50%	—	-1.77%
EK	26.10%	23.30%	24.70%	24.80%	0.10%	0.40%	—	0.10%	—	0.40%
PS	24.73%	29.35%	27.04%	7.44%	-19.60%	-72.49%	-19.60%	—	-72.49%	—
LR/UMP	39.54%	27.12%	33.33%	15.70%	-17.63%	-52.90%	—	-17.63%	—	-52.90%
SPD	23.00%	25.70%	24.00%	20.00%	-4.00%	-18%	-4.00%	—	-18%	—
CDU	27.30%	34.10%	30.70%	26.80%	-3.90%	-12.70%	—	-3.90%	—	-12.70%
CSU	6.50%	7.40%	6.95%	6.20%	-0.75%	-10.79%	—	-0.75%	—	-10.79%
FDP	14.60%	4.80%	9.70%	10.70%	1.00%	10.31%	—	1.00%	—	10.31%
MSzPL	19.30%	25.57%	22.44%	11.91%	-10.53%	-46.91%	-10.53%	—	-46.91%	—
Fidesz	52.73%	44.87%	48.80%	49.27%	0.47%	0.96%	—	0.47%	—	0.96%
PvdA	19.60%	24.80%	22.20%	5.70%	-16.50%	-74.32%	-16.50%	—	-74.32%	—
VVD	20.50%	26.60%	23.55%	21.30%	-2.25%	-9.55%	—	-2.25%	—	-9.55%
CDA	13.60%	8.50%	11.05%	12.40%	1.35%	12.22%	—	1.35%	—	12.22%
SLD	13.20%	8.24%	10.72%	7.55%	-3.17%	-29.57%	-3.17%	—	-29.57%	—
PO	41.50%	39.18%	40.34%	24.09%	-16.25%	-40.28%	—	-16.25%	—	-40.28%
PiS	32.10%	29.89%	31.00%	37.58%	6.59%	21.25%	—	6.59%	—	21.25%
Smer	34.79%	44.41%	39.60%	28.28%	-11.32%	-28.59%	-11.32%	—	-28.59%	—
KDH	8.52%	8.20%	8.36%	4.94%	-3.42%	-40.91%	—	-3.42%	—	-40.91%
SaS	12.14%	5.88%	9.01%	12.10%	3.09%	34.30%	—	3.09%	—	34.30%
SAP	30.66%	31.01%	30.84%	28.26%	-2.58%	-8.35%	-2.58%	—	-8.35%	—
M	30.06%	23.33%	26.70%	19.84%	-6.86%	-25.68%	—	-6.86%	—	-25.68%
KD	5.60%	4.57%	5.09%	6.32%	1.24%	24.29%	—	1.24%	—	24.29%
Labour	29.00%	30.40%	29.70%	40.00%	10.30%	34.68%	10.30%	—	34.68%	—
Cons	36.10%	36.80%	36.45%	42.40%	5.95%	16.32%	—	5.95%	—	16.32%
Source: (NSD 2019; Global Elections Database 2019)				MEAN	-3.51%	-12.74%	-7.48%	-1.30%	-32.22%	-1.93%
				MEDIAN	-2.42%	-10.27%	-7.26%	-0.20%	-29.08%	-0.68%

QCA 1 & 2 – Purple Grand Coalition

Table A12. *Government Coalitions*

Country	Parties	PGC	Years	Parties	Years	PGC
CZ	ANO-CSSD-KDH	No	2013-2017	ANO-CSSD	2017-today	No
DE	CDU/CSU-SPD	Yes	2013-2017	CDU/CSU-SPD	2017-today	Yes
EE	ER-Pro Patria-SDE	Yes	2010-2016	EK-SDE-IRL	2016-today	Yes
FR	PS-EELV	No	2012-2017	REM-MOD	2017-today	No
HU	Fidesz-KNDP	No	2014-2018	Fidesz-KNDP	2018-today	No
NL	VVD-PvdA	Yes	2012-2017	VVD-D66-CDA-CU	2017-today	No
PL	PO-PSL	No	2011-2015	PiS	2015-today	No
SK	Smer	No	2012-2016	Smer-SNS-Most-Hid	2016-today	No
SE	SPL-MP	No	2014-2018	SPL-MP-C	2018-today	No
UK	Cons	No	2012-2016	Cons-DUP	2017-today	No

Source: (Party Facts, 2019)

Table A13- *QCA 1 Country Wide Raw and Calibrated Data Matrix*

Country	AVG. SHIFT 14 vs. 17 [†]		Anti-Immigration Polling AVG.*		RRW Vote [°]		Purple Grand Coalition [‡]
	raw	fuzzy	raw	fuzzy	raw	fuzzy	Crisp
CZ	16.38%	0.97	59.67%	0.95	14.27%	0.38	1
EE	-3.45%	0.01	57.7%	0.91	8.30%	0.11	0
FR	-0.08%	0.01	48.67%	0.4	14.37%	0.39	1
DE	7.72%	0.57	66.00%	0.99	13.00%	0.31	0
HU	19.94%	0.99	64.67%	0.99	19.21%	0.8	1
NL	5.47%	0.34	55.00%	0.82	15.50%	0.47	0
PL	18.31%	0.99	50.67%	0.55	21.25%	0.9	1
SK	20.1%	0.99	55.00%	0.82	23.31%	0.96	1
SW	38.78%	1	58.33%	0.92	18.12%	0.71	1
UK	0.69%	0.06	37.33%	0.02	1.83%	0.02	0

[†]Shift: Data was taken from Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk, et al., 2017).
^{*}Polling: Data was taken from special Eurobarometer 469 (European Commission, Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, 2018).
[°]RRW Vote: Data was taken from last parliamentary election in each country (NSD, 2019).
[‡]Purple Grand Coalitions: Data was taken from Party Facts website (Party Facts, 2019).

Table A14- QCA 2 -Raw and Calibrated Data Matrix

	Conditions							Outcome	
	RRWVOTE°		POLL*		RELCHANGE^		PGC‡	SHIFT†	
Case	raw	fuzzy	raw	fuzzy	raw	crisp	crisp	raw	fuzzy
CZ-ANO	14.27	0.39	59.67	0.98	58.84	1	1	22.86	1
CZ-CSSD	14.27	0.39	59.67	0.98	-68.85	1	1	23.51	1
CZ-ODS	14.27	0.39	59.67	0.98	-19	0	1	2.47	0.13
DE-CDU	13	0.32	66	1	-12.7	0	0	0.32	0.05
DE-CSU	13	0.32	66	1	-10.79	0	0	3.89	0.21
DE-FDP	13	0.32	66	1	10.31	0	1	24.26	0.13
DE-SPD	13	0.32	66	1	-18	1	0	2.52	1
EE-EK	8.3	0.12	57.7	0.91	0.4	0	0	4.81	0.28
EE-ER	8.3	0.12	57.7	0.91	-1.77	0	0	-5.72	0
EE-SDE	8.3	0.12	57.7	0.91	-9.75	0	0	-9.44	0
FR-LR/UMP	14.37	0.4	48.67	0.4	-52.9	1	1	5.96	0.4
FR-PS	14.37	0.4	48.67	0.4	-72.49	1	1	-7.37	0
HU-Fidesz	19.21	0.75	64.67	1	0.96	0	1	19.9	1
HU-MSzPL	19.21	0.75	64.67	1	-46.91	1	1	0.04	0.02
NL-CDA	15.5	0.47	55	0.82	12.22	1	1	7.38	0.54
NL-PvdA	15.5	0.47	55	0.82	-74.32	1	0	2.39	0.12
NL-VVD	15.5	0.47	55	0.82	-9.55	0	0	6.75	0.47
PL-PiS	21.22	0.88	50.67	0.55	21.25	1	1	35.14	1
PL-PO	21.22	0.88	50.67	0.55	-40.28	1	1	8.15	0.61
PL-SLD	21.22	0.88	50.67	0.55	-29.57	1	1	11.64	0.85
SE-KD	18.12	0.69	58.33	0.93	24.29	1	1	37.57	1
SE-M	18.12	0.69	58.33	0.93	-25.68	1	1	43.96	1
SE-SAP	18.12	0.69	58.33	0.93	-8.35	0	1	34.81	1
SK-KDH	23.58	1	55	0.55	-40.91	1	1	-1.63	0
SK-SaS	23.58	1	55	0.55	34.3	1	1	39.73	1
SK-Smer	23.58	1	55	0.55	-28.59	1	1	22.19	1
UK-Cons	1.83	0	37.33	0	16.32	1	1	-0.45	0
UK-Labour	1.83	0	37.33	0	34.68	1	1	-0.92	0

†SHIFT: Data was taken from Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk, et al., 2017). *POLL: Data was taken from special Eurobarometer 469 (European Commission, Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, 2018). °RRWVOTE: Data was taken from last parliamentary election in each country (NSD, 2019). ^RELCHANGE: Data was taken from the UN (United Nations Population Division, 2017). ‡Purple Grand Coalitions: Data was taken from PartyFacts website (Party Facts, 2019).

Table A15- QCA 3 -Raw and Calibrated Data Matrix

Case	Conditions								Outcome	
	Volatility 2010-2016*		Opposition°		Party Size^		Institutionalization‡		SHIFT†	
	raw	fuzzy	raw	fuzzy	raw	crisp	raw	Crisp	raw	fuzzy
CSSD	20.5	1	Gov.	0	large	0	2	1	23.51%	1
ODS	20.5	1	Opp.	1	small	1	4	0	2.47%	0.13
ANO	20.5	1	Gov.	0	large	0	-1	1	22.86%	1
SDE	3.5	0.22	Gov.	0	small	1	6	0	-9.44%	0
ER	3.5	0.22	Gov.	0	large	0	6	0	-5.72%	0
EK	3.5	0.22	Opp.	1	large	0	4	0	4.81%	0.28
PS	0.7	0.07	Gov.	0	large	0	0	1	-7.37%	0
LR/UMP	0.7	0.07	Opp.	1	large	0	1	1	5.96%	0.39
DE-SPD	2.9	0.18	Gov.	0	large	0	4	0	2.52%	0.13
DE-CDU	2.9	0.18	Gov.	0	large	0	3	0	0.32%	0.05
DE-CSU	2.9	0.18	Gov.	0	small	1	3	0	3.89%	0.21
DE-FDP	2.9	0.18	Opp.	1	small	1	1	1	24.26%	1
MSzPL	8.8	0.8	Opp.	1	large	0	3	0	0.04%	0.05
Fidesz	8.8	0.8	Gov.	0	large	0	5	0	19.90%	0.99
PvdA	0.5	0.06	Gov.	0	large	0	2	1	2.39%	0.12
VVD	0.5	0.06	Gov.	0	large	0	3	0	6.75%	0.47
CDA	0.5	0.06	Opp.	1	small	1	2	1	7.38%	0.54
SLD	10.5	0.9	Opp.	1	small	1	1	1	11.64%	0.85
PO	10.5	0.9	Gov.	1	large	0	2	1	8.15%	0.61
PiS	10.5	0.9	Opp.	0	large	0	1	1	35.14%	1
Smer	11.9	0.95	Gov.	0	large	0	2	1	22.19%	1
KDH	11.9	0.95	Opp.	1	small	1	3	0	-1.63%	0.02
SaS	11.9	0.95	Opp.	1	small	1	0	1	39.73%	1
SAP	0.7	0.07	Gov.	0	large	0	5	0	34.81%	1
M	0.7	0.07	Opp.	1	large	0	2	1	43.96%	1
KD	0.7	0.07	Opp.	1	small	1	1	1	37.57%	1
Lab	1.6	0.1	Opp.	1	large	0	3	0	-0.92%	0.03
Cons	1.6	0.1	Gov.	0	large	0	4	0	-0.45%	0.04

†SHIFT: Data was taken from Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk, et al., 2017).

†Shift: Data taken from Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk, et al., 2017). *Volatility: Data was taken from (Emanuele, et al., 2018).

°Opposition: Data taken from (Party Facts, 2019) (ParlGov database, 2019).

^Party size: Authors own calculations using election returns (NSD, 2019). ‡ Institutionalization: Authors own calculations see Table A16.

Table A16 -QCA 3- Party size

Country	Party	5 th Election	4 th Election	3 rd Election	2 nd Election	Last Election	Party Size
CZ	CSSD	30.2	32.3	22.1	20.5	7.3	Small
CZ	ODS	24.5	35.3	20.2	7.7	11.3	Small
CZ	ANO2011			N/A	18.65	29.64	Large
EST	SDE		7	10.6	17.1	15.2	Small
EST	ER		17.7	27.8	28.6	27.7	Large
EST	EK		25.4	26.1	23.3	24.8	Large
FR	PS		24.3	24.9	29.4	7.5	Small
FR	LR/UMP		33.30	39.54	27.12	15.77	Small
FR	REM/MOD		4.86	7.61	1.77	28.21	Large
GER	SPD	38.5	34.2	23	25.7	20.5	Large
GER	CDU	29.5	27.8	27.3	34.1	26.8	Large
GER	CSU	9	7.4	6.5	7.4	6.2	Small
GER	FDP	7.4	9.8	14.6	4.8	10.7	Small
HUN	MSzPL	42	43.2	19.3	25.6	11.9	Small
HUN	Fidesz	41.1	42	52.7	44.9	49.3	Large
NL	PvdA	27.3	21.2	19.6	24.8	5.7	Small
NL	VVD	17.9	14.7	20.5	26.6	21.3	Large
NL	CDA	28.6	26.5	13.6	8.5	12.4	Small
POL	SLD	41	11.3	13.2	8.2	7.6	Small
POL	PO	12.7	24.1	41.5	39.2	24.1	Large
POL	PiS	9.5	27	32.1	29.9	37.6	Large
SLK	Smer	13.5	29.1	34.8	44.4	28.3	Large
SLK	KDH	8.3	8.3	8.5	8.8	4.9	Small
SLK	SaS			12.1	5.9	12.1	Small
SWE	SAP	39.9	35	30.7	31	28.3	Large
SWE	M	15.1	26.2	30.1	23.2	19.8	Small
SWE	KD	9.15	6.59	5.60	4.60	6.32	Small
UK	Labour	40.7	35.3	29.1	30.5	40	Large
UK	Cons	31.7	32.4	36.1	36.9	42.3	Large

Source: Data was taken from last parliamentary elections in each country (NSD, 2019)

Table A17 – Institutionalization of Political Parties

Party	Party Age [†]	First Multi-Party Elections*	Ratio	Party Age Score	Party Membership [°]	Voters [^]	Membership to Population Ratio	Membership Score	Relative Vote Change [‡]	Vote Change Score	Final Total	QCA Score	
CSSD	30	29	100%	2	17,863↓	5.09m	0.0035%	1	-68.85%	-1	2	1	
ODS	28	29	97%	2	21,473↓	5.00m	0.0043%	1	-19.00%	1	4	0	
ANO	7	29	24%	0	3,751↓	5.00m	0.0008%	0	58.84%	-1	-1	1	
SDE	29	27	100%	2	5,570↓	565k	0.0100%	2	-9.75%	2	6	0	
ER	25	27	92%	2	12,025↔	565k	0.0213%	2	-1.77%	2	6	0	
EK	7	27	26%	0	14,826↑	565k	0.0262%	2	0.40%	2	4	0	
PS	114	149	77%	1	42,300↓↓	22.65m	0.0019%	0	-72.49%	-1	0	1	
LR/UMP	61	149	41%	0	234,556↓	22.65m	0.0103%	2	-52.90%	-1	1	1	
DE-SPD	156	100	100%	2	443,152↓	46.98m	0.0094%	1	-18%	1	4	0	
DE-CDU	74	100	74%	1	425,910↓	46.98m	0.0091%	1	-12.70%	1	3	0	
DE-CSU	74	100	74%	1	140,983↓	46.98m	0.0030%	1	-10.79%	1	3	0	
DE-FDP	71	100	71%	1	56,000↓	46.98m	0.0012%	0	10.31%	1	2	1	
MSzPL	30	29	100%	2	22,300↓	5.05m	0.0044%	1	-46.91%	0	3	0	
Fidesz	31	29	100%	2	40,000↓	5.05m	0.0079%	1	0.96%	2	5	0	
PvdA	125	131	95%	2	45,040↓	10.52m	0.0042%	1	-74.32%	-1	2	1	
VVD	71	131	54%	1	25,557↓	10.52m	0.0024%	0	-9.55%	2	3	0	
CDA	39	131	30%	0	43,133↓	10.52m	0.0041%	1	12.22%	1	2	1	
SLD	20	30	67%	1	36,329↓	15.20m	0.0023%	0	-29.57%	0	1	1	
PO	18	30	60%	1	41,833↓	15.20m	0.0027%	1	-40.28%	0	2	1	
PiS	18	30	60%	1	22,000↑	15.20m	0.0015%	0	21.25%	0	1	1	
Smer	20	29	69%	1	9,087 ↓	2.65m	0.0034%	1	-28.59%	0	2	1	
KDH	29	29	100%	2	11,704↓	2.65m	0.0044%	1	-40.91%	0	3	0	
SaS	10	29	35%	0	166↔	2.65m	0.0001%	0	34.30%	0	0	1	
SAP	130	154	84%	1	101,674↓	6.23m	0.0163%	2	-8.35%	2	5	0	
M	115	154	75%	1	39,998↓	6.23m	0.0064%	1	-25.68%	0	2	1	
KD	55	154	36%	0	21,148↓	6.23m	0.0034%	1	24.29%	0	1	1	
Lab	119	182	65%	1	540,000↑	32.20m	0.0168%	2	34.68%	0	3	0	
Cons	185	182	100%	2	124,000↓	32.20m	0.0038%	1	16.32%	1	4	0	
	0= <50%, 1=51%-90%, 2=>90%				0= <0.25%, 1=0.26%-0.99%, 2=>1%				-1= > 51%, 0= 50%-21%, 1=20%-11%, 2=<10%				
[†] Age: Data taken (Holger & Manow, 2019)(Party Facts, 2019). * First Multi-Party Election: Data was taken from countries lower parliament webpages and (Hand, 1979; Caeamani, 2000). [°] Membership: Data taken numerous sources from each country. [^] Voters: Election data taken from (NSD, 2019). [‡] Vote Change: Data taken from the last election in each country (NSD, 2019).													

Declaration of Authorship

I hereby certify that this thesis has been composed by me and is based on my own work unless stated otherwise. No other person's work has been used without due acknowledgment in this thesis. All references and verbatim extracts have been quoted and all sources of information, including graphs and data sets, have been specifically acknowledged.

Date: 01/16/2020

Signature: _____

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "G. J. Jett", is written over the signature line.