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**The participation of the military forces of Greece in Peace
Operations. The case of Southeastern Europe and the
Middle East.**

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the participation of the Hellenic military forces in Peacekeeping operations in the Southeastern Europe and the Middle East. This Dissertation is structured in 4 chapters. The 1st chapter provides some important information concerning the peacekeeping doctrine; it is also referred to some basic principles as well as the procedures and the policy that regulate the UN PKOs. In addition, it explains the decision process that precedes the deployment of a peacekeeping operation and in the end it introduces the concept and evolution of use of Force. In order to understand the development of UN peacekeeping, a historical overview is outlined in Chapter 2 which provides an inside look into how the applicable norms became principles of peacekeeping. Apart from the United Nations, the African Union, the European Union and the NATO conduct peacekeeping operations not only by themselves but also in close cooperation among them; this is described extensively in Chapter 3. The 4th and last chapter discusses the Greek participation in peacekeeping operations and particularly is referred to the ongoing activities that Greece is participating in as well as the concluded activities that the country participated in the past.

Key words: UN Peacekeeping operations, mandate, mission, Greek participation

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List of Abbreviations

AU	African Union
APPMS	Armed Political Parties and Movements
AMID	African Mission in Burundi
ARPCT	Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism
ASF	African Standby Force
BiH	Bosnia Herzegovina
CNDD-FDD	Conseil National pour la Defense de la Democratie-Forces pour la Defense de la Democratie
CAR	Central African Republic
CSDPP	Common Security and Defense Policy
DUF	Directives on the Use of Force
DFS	Department of Field Support
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DSS	Department of Safety and Security
DDR	Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration
DFS	Department for Field Support
EAM	National Liberation Front
ELAS	National People's Liberation Army
ENTRi	Europe's New Training initiative
ECMM	European Community Monitoring Mission
ESS	European Security Strategy
EUNAVFOR	European Union Naval Force
EUAM	European Union Advisory Mission
EUBAM	European Union Border Assistance Mission
EUCAP	European Union Capacity
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission
EUMM	European Union Monitoring Mission
EUNAVFOR-MED	European Union Naval Force-Mediterranean
EUPOL-COPPS	European Union coordination office for Palestinian Police Support
EUTM	European Union Training Mission
FNL	Forces Nationales de Liberation
FAC	Foreign Affairs Council
FLS	Forward Logistic Site
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
HELBA	Hellas Bulgaria Austria
HLPG	High Level Planning Group
ICU	Islamic Courts
IFOR	Implementation Force
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
IEDs	Improvised Explosive Devices
JAM	Joint Assessment Mission
KKE	Greek Communist Party
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KYSEA	Hellenic Governmental Council of Foreign Affairs and National Defense

MTA	Military Technical Agreement
MNTF-N	Multinational Task Force-North
MSC	Military Staff Committee
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NTM-I	NATO Training Mission in Iraq
NSE	National Support Element
ONUC	United Nations Operations in the Congo
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PSOs	Peace Support Operations
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PCCs	Police Contributing Countries
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SMR	Senior Military Representative
SG	Secretary General
SOFA	Status Of Forces Agreement
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SFOR	Stabilization Force
TCCs	Troop Contributing Countries
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TGOT	Transitional Government
UNEF I	United Nations Emergency Force in the Suez
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNSCOB	Special Commission of the Balkans
UAR	United Arab Republic
UN	United Nations
UNOGIL	United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UPDF	Uganda People's Defense Force

Introduction

It has been claimed by many historians that the birth of peacekeeping comes from the Delian League of ancient Greece in the fifth century, BCE. But, like the Delian League, on closer investigation these paradigms of “proto” peacekeeping were common alliances that had little to do with ethical questions surrounding peace. From a western view, the closest paradigm from history that is similar of what we refer today as peacekeeping begun in the late tenth century by the early medieval Catholic Church through its attempts (the Peace of God and Truce of God) to limit the spread of war. Nevertheless, these ideals and some early efforts at arms control (i.e., the Second Lateran Council of 1139) also started to allow the fury of interstate war in Europe to be directed at the Muslim-dominated Middle East.

In 1623, Emeric Crucé introduced an innovating and radical idea .He stated that: *“all the worlds’ leaders, including all those outside of traditional Europe, should be included in an alliance that tried to resolve international disputes through mediation at a world council held in a neutral location”*. Over the next few centuries, more essential European efforts were made to peace-orientated agreements included the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, Utrecht in 1713, Paris in 1763 and in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars the Concert of Europe in 1815-18. There were some other efforts, but the first important system came into being after the atrocities of World War I (1914-18). The League of Nations was an initiative of American President Woodrow Wilson, and it was an effort at collective diplomacy and peace enforcement. However, It completely failed, but after the Second World War, the United Nations Organization (UNO) constituted the means of collective diplomacy and peace.¹

On 24 October 1945, the United Nations (UN) was created as a consequence of two World Wars and was intended, in the enduring words of the UN Charter, to saving “succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” Since its establishment, the UN has been called upon to prevent conflicts from developing into war, to convince opposing parties to use the conference table rather than armed forces and to contribute in restoring peace when disputes breaks out. Over the decades, the UN has contributed to terminate plenty of conflicts, in many cases through the conduct of peacekeeping missions.²

The geographical concentration of UN PKOs changes over time, depending on the location where a dispute breaks out. During the post–cold war era, there have been large- and small-scale non-UN PKOs led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU) and individual countries. Noteworthy, some non-UN PKOs include

¹ Sunil Ram (2008), The History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations During the Cold War: 1945 to 1987, Peace Operations Training Institute, USA

²Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2003), Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, New York, USA

the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, the Multinational Force—Iraq, US-led Operation Northern Watch in Iraq, the European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) in Ukraine, the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, (EUMM) and the AU missions in Darfur, Somalia and Burundi.³

Greece as a full member of EU, UN, NATO and other International Organizations, takes part in peacekeeping operations, emphasizing mainly on those taking place in areas of particular interest, like the Balkans and the wider region of the Middle East. Since early 80s Greek's involvement has been restricted to a small number of observers and small military forces, at company level, with some rare exceptions, e.g. Korean War.⁴ In the framework of the U.N. actions and the Security Council Resolutions, Greece is an active contributor in peacekeeping operations, distributing cadres from the three Services of the Armed Forces. The Greek participation in peacekeeping operation is subject to specific important conditions, like the existence of a Resolution or a Mandate of the U.N., before deploying a unit, chain of command and size, as well the adoption of clear Rules of Engagement. Peacekeeping missions that the Greek Armed Forces has participated in the last decade of the 20th Century and early 21st Century, indicate that military organization can adapt easily and adequately to any challenge and requirement within the International Community.⁵

Chapter 1: the normative framework for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

1.1 The Charter of the United Nations

In San Francisco, on 26 June 1945, was signed the Charter of the United Nations (UN) which constitutes the most important document for the entire United Nations' work. The United Nations was created in order to “*save succeeding generations from the scourge of war*” and one of its fundamental objectives is to preserve peace and security globally. Despite the fact that peacekeeping, is not directly provided for in the Charter; however it has developed into one of the most essential instruments used by the United Nations with the purpose to reach its goals.

The United Nations Security Council, under the Charter, has the vital obligation to secure the international peace and security.⁶ The Security

³Todd Sandler (2017), International Peacekeeping Operations, Burden Sharing and Effectiveness, Department of Economics, University of Texas, USA

⁴ The **Greek Expeditionary Force (GEF) in Korea** comprised a reinforced [Hellenic Army](#) infantry battalion and a [Royal Hellenic Air Force \(RHAF\)](#) flight of seven transport planes. Greece was the fifth largest troop contributor to U.N. Forces in Korea.

⁵ Hellenic National Defense General Staff, Peace Support Activities

⁶ Although the United Nations Charter gives primary responsibility to the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, General Assembly resolution 377 (V) of 3 November 1950, also known as the “Uniting for Peace” resolution, states that: “...if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to

Council, in order to fulfill this responsibility, may be adapted to a spectrum of actions, containing the creation of a United Nations peacekeeping operation. The legal framework for this specific activity exists in Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Charter. Although Chapter VI has to do with the “*Pacific Settlement of Disputes*”, Chapter VII concludes provisions which have connection with “*Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression*”. In addition, Chapter VIII of the Charter is referred to the engagement of regional arrangements and organizations in the maintenance of peace and security internationally, so providing such actions are compatible with the aims and principles defined in Chapter I of the Charter.

The peacekeeping operations of the United Nations have generally been related with Chapter VI of the Charter. Nevertheless, the Security Council is not be required to refer to a particular Chapter of the Charter when passing a resolution empowering the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation and has never called upon Chapter VI. In current years, the Security Council has embraced the procedure of invoking Chapter VII of the Charter when authorizing the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping operations into inconstant post-conflict settings where the State is inadequate to preserve security and public order. The Security Council’s invocation of Chapter VII in such circumstances denoting also the legal basis for its activity can also be recognized as an assertion of firm political resolve and a way of reminding the parties to a combat and the wider United Nations participation of their responsibility to give effect to Security Council resolutions.

Associating United Nations peacekeeping with a specific Chapter of the Charter can be deceptive for the objectives of operational planning, training and mandate implementation. Evaluating the essence of each peacekeeping operation and the capacities required to reinforce it, troop contributing countries (TCCs) and police contributing countries (PCCs) should be led by the duties authorized by the Security Council mandate, the idea of operations and accompanying mission Rules of Engagement (ROE) as regards the military sector, and the Directives on the Use of Force (DUF) concerning the police component.

1.2 Organs of the United Nations Body

Security Council

The Security Council is constituted of five constant members (France, the Russian Federation, China, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and ten non-permanent members. Half of the non-permanent countries are

the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression, the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” General Assembly resolution 1000 (ES-1) of 5 November 1956 authorizing the establishment of the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) was adopted under procedure established by the “Uniting for Peace” resolution

elected each year by the General Assembly for a time period of two years. The UN Charter provides an important jurisdiction on the Security Council to check into thoroughly any case or dispute that undermines international peace and security. Therefore, the Security Council is the dominant organization worldwide which is related with international peace and security and, by that, has legitimacy under international law for the use of force or intervention against a sovereign nation. Under Chapter VIII of the Charter, it can transfer this obligation to regional organizations, for instance the African Union (AU).⁷

The General Assembly

The General Assembly deals with any issue related to it by the Security Council. In addition, the General Assembly is referred to matters concerning to the promotion of international cooperation, disarmament, trusteeship, and human rights. Although most of its resolutions are not mandatory, General Assembly is the organ that approves and divides into shares the UN's annual budget, containing all costs related to Peacekeeping Operations.⁸

The UN Secretariat

The UN Secretariat is the permanent instrument responsible for the wide ranging of United Nations activities. Its supervisor is the Secretary-General⁹, and in essence constitutes the UN's civil service branch. Although this organization has many departments, the major departments that concerns PKOs are the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO); the Department of Field Support (DFS); and the Department of Safety and Security (DSS). The Under-Secretaries-general of these departments, with their specialist advisers – such as the Military Adviser or Police Adviser – are responsible for providing advice and guidance to the SG and the Security Council on peacekeeping operations and their associated disciplines, as well as for providing executive authority for their conduct and support when so delegated.¹⁰

Economic and Social Council

The Economic and Social Council constitutes the main body for coordination, policy dialogue, policy review and recommendations on economic, social and environmental questions, along with the implementation of globally agreed development objectives. It works as the key mechanism for actions of the UN policy and its specialized agencies in the economic, social and environmental fields, supervising subsidiary and expert bodies. It consists of 54 Members,

⁷ <http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/main-organs/>

⁸ <http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/main-organs/>

⁹ The Secretary-General of the UN, under the supervision of the Security Council, is in charge for the organization, the conduct, and the overseeing of a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation. Apart from the preparation of the operational plan and presentation of it to the Security Council for approval, the Secretary-General is responsible for carrying out negotiations with the host countries, the parties in dispute, and the Member States contributing troops and resources.

¹⁰ <http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/main-organs/>

elected by the General Assembly for overlapping three-year terms. It is the United Nations' central platform for reflection, debate, and innovative thinking on sustainable development.¹¹

Trusteeship Council

The Trusteeship Council was created in 1945 by the UN Charter, under Chapter XIII, to secure international surveillance for 11 Trust Territories that had been established under the supervision of seven Member States, and guarantee that sufficient measures were taken in order to prepare the Territories for self-government and independence. By 1994, all Trust Territories had attained self-government or independence. On 1 November 1994, the Trusteeship Council postponed operation. On 25 May 1994, by a resolution adopted the Council modified its rules of procedure to drop the obligation to meet annually and agreed to meet as circumstances required -- by its decision or the decision of its President, or at the request of a majority of its members or the General Assembly or the Security Council.¹²

International Court of Justice

The International Court of Justice is the main judicial organ of the United Nations. It is situated at the Peace Palace in Hague (Netherlands). It is the only one of the six principal organs of the United Nations not located in New York (United States of America). The Court's mission is to settle, in association with international law, legal disputes submitted to it by States and to provide advisory opinions on legal questions related to it by authorized United Nations organs and specialized agencies.¹³

Military Staff Committee

The Military Staff Committee (MSC) is the United Nations Security Council subsidiary body whose role, as defined by the United Nations Charter, is to plan UN military operations¹⁴ and assist in the regulation of armaments.¹⁵ Article 47 of the UN Charter entails the creation of a Military Staff Committee. The Committee consists of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council, who operate by offering recommendations and assisting on all issues regarding to the Security Council's military necessities for the maintenance of international peace and security. Although this task is mentioned in the UN Charter, in essence, the Military Staff Committee has not played the role envisaged by the Charter and has exerted very little influence on UN Peace Support Operations (PSOs).¹⁶

¹¹ <http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/main-organs/>

¹² <http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/main-organs/>

¹³ <http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/main-organs/>

¹⁴ Charter Of The United Nations: Chapter VII Archived2014-08-25 at the [Wayback Machine](#).

¹⁵ Charter Of The United Nations: Chapter V Archived 2013-10-01 at the [Wayback Machine](#).

¹⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_Staff_Committee

1.3 The Spectrum of Peace and Security Activities

Peacekeeping constitutes a part among a range of activities undertaken by the United Nations and other international actors in order to maintain international peace and security in all over the world. Even though peacekeeping is the main tool of this document, however it is essential for practitioners to realize how it relates to and differs from conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement and peace building.

Conflict prevention contains the application of structural or diplomatic methods to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and contradictions from developed into violent conflict. Ideally, it should establish on structured early warning, information gathering and a accurate analysis of the reasons leading to the conflict. Conflict prevention activities may contain the use of the Secretary General's "good offices," preventive deployment or confidence-building measures.

Peacemaking in most cases consists of measures to address conflicts in progress and generally contains diplomatic act to bring opposed parties to a negotiated compromise. The United Nations Secretary-General, upon the request of the Security Council or the General Assembly or at his or her own initiative, may exercise his or her "good offices" to assist the progress of the resolution of the conflict. Peacemakers may also be groups of states, envoys, regional organizations, governments, or the United Nations. Peacemaking actions may also be undertaken by unofficial and non-governmental groups, or by a prominent personality working independently.

Peacekeeping is a method created to maintain the peace, however breakable, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in establishing agreements accomplished by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has developed from a mainly military type of watching cease-fires and the disengagement of forces after inter-state wars, to embody a complicated model of many components – military, police and civilian – working together to help lay the foundations for continuous peace.

Peace enforcement contains the application, with the supervision of the Security Council, of a range of forcible measures, involving the use of military force. Actions like these aim to rebuild international peace and security in occasions where the Security Council has addressed the presence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. The Security Council may make use of, where it is suitable, agencies and regional organizations for enforcement action under its authority.

Peacebuilding contains a variety of actions aimed to decrease the danger of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by making more powerful national capabilities at all levels for conflict management, and to pave the way for continual peace and improvement. Peacebuilding is a complicated, long-term procedure of establishing the needed circumstances for sustainable peace. It works by focusing to the deep-rooted, structural causes of fierce conflict in a

comprehensive manner. Peacebuilding actions target in crucial questions that affect the functioning of society and the State, and look for enhancing the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions.¹⁷

1.4 Basic principles of UN peacekeeping operations

Even though the operation of United Nations peacekeeping has developed significantly and with an extremely fast pace over the past sixty years, three fundamental principles have traditionally remained and continue to set United Nations peacekeeping operations apart as an instrument for maintaining international peace and security:

1. Consent of the parties
2. Impartiality
3. Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate

These principles are inter-related and mutually reinforcing. It is substantial to mention that their meaning and relationship to each other are without no doubt understood by all actors engaged in the planning and function of United Nations peacekeeping operations, in the way that they are applied effectively. Taking in to account that these principles are inter-related, they provide a navigation aid, or compass, for practitioners both in the field and at United Nations Headquarters.

1. Consent of the parties

The deployment of the UN peacekeeping operations is carried out with the consent of the basic parties to the conflict.¹⁸ For that reason the commitment by the parties to a political process is essential. Their approval of a peacekeeping operation provides the UN with the appropriate freedom of activity, political and physical at the same time, in order to conduct its mandated obligations.

In case of such consent is absent, then a peacekeeping operation is in danger to become a part of the conflict; and be drawn towards enforcement action, and far away from its crucial role of sustaining the peace.

The matter that the principal parties have given their consent to the United Nations peacekeeping operation to deploy does not necessarily mean or secure that there will also be consent at regional level, specifically if the

¹⁷ Harvey J. Langholtz, (2010), Ph.D.: Principles and Guidelines for UN Peacekeeping Operations, *THE EVOLVING ROLE OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS*, p.17-18 Peace Operations Training Institute, USA

¹⁸ The Security Council may take enforcement action without the consent of the main parties to the conflict, if it believes that the conflict presents a threat to international peace and security. This, however, would be a peace enforcement operation. It may also take enforcement action for humanitarian or protection purposes; where there is no political process and where the consent of the major parties may not be achievable, but where civilians are suffering. Since the mid-1990s, enforcement action has been carried out by ad hoc coalitions of Member States or regional organizations acting under United Nations Security Council authorization.

predominant parties are internally divided or have weak administrative and control systems. Universality of consent becomes even less feasible in volatile settings, characterized by the presence of armed groups not under the supervision of any of the parties, or by the presence of other spoilers.¹⁹

2. Impartiality

Impartiality is imperative to keep the consent and cooperation of the main parties, but should not be confused with neutrality or inactivity. United Nations peacekeepers should be characterized by impartiality while dealing with the parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the conduction of their mandate.

Just like a respectable referee is impartial, but will punish offences, with the same way a peacekeeping operation should not forgive actions by the parties that violate the undertakings of the peace procedures or the international rules and principles that a United Nations peacekeeping operation supports.

Despite the necessity to create and keep favorable relations with the parties, a peacekeeping operation must carefully stay away from actions that may undermine its role of impartiality. A mission should not shy away from a rigorous application of the idea of impartiality for risk of misinterpretation or retaliation.

Unable to do so may erode the peacekeeping operation's integrity and legitimacy, and may drive to a removal of consent for its presence by one or more of the parties.

3. Non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate

UN peacekeeping operations are not an enforcement tool. Nevertheless, they may use force at the tactical level, with the authorization of the Security Council, if acting in self-defense and defense of the mandate.

In specific hostile circumstances, the Security Council has given UN peacekeeping operations "*robust*" mandates allowing them to "*use all necessary means*" to prevent violent actions aiming to disorganize the political process, secure civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or help the national governments in maintaining law and order.

As envisaged under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, robust peacekeeping should not be confused with peace enforcement, even though on the ground they may sometimes seem similar.

- "*Robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the authorization of the Security Council and consent of the host nation and/or the main parties to the conflict.*" (Harvey J. Langholtz, Ph.D, 2010)
- By contrast, "*peace enforcement does not require the consent of the main parties and may involve the use of military force at the strategic or international level, which is normally prohibited for Member States under Article 2(4) of the Charter, unless authorized by the Security Council.*" (Harvey J. Langholtz, Ph.D, 2010)

¹⁹ Spoilers are individuals or parties who believe that the peace process threatens their power and interests, and will therefore work to undermine it.

UN peacekeeping operations should only use force as a tool of last resort. It should always be measured in an accurate, suitable and appropriate way, in the framework of the principle of the minimum force needed to accomplish the desired result, while maintaining consent for the mission and its mandate. The use of force by a UN peacekeeping operation always has political impact and sometimes can give rise to unexpected circumstances.

Judgments with the regard to its use is necessary to be made at the suitable level within a mission, based on a mixture of factors containing public perceptions; mission capacity; force protection; humanitarian impact; safety and security of personnel; and, most substantially, the effect that such action will have on national and local consent for the mission.²⁰

1.5 Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping

1.5.1 The Legal Framework

UN peacekeeping – regardless the level of force an operation is required to use – is not mentioned in the UN Charter. The drafters of the Charter did, nevertheless, provide a crucial role for the Security Council in authorizing the use of force where international peace and security had been risked or threatened. The rules and principles envisaged on the use of force in the UN Charter are straightforward:

1. No state may threaten or use force against another state;²¹
2. Where the Security Council finds that a state has threatened or breached international peace and security or engaged in an act of aggression,²² it may take measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, including, where necessary, the authorization of the use of armed force;²³
3. States may take measures in self-defense until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security;²⁴
4. Decisions taken by the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII are binding on all member states.²⁵

The model is clear, even though it has crucial disadvantage: it provides a Security Council with a permanent force at its disposal, which it may call upon to enforce its will. For the reason that such a force has never been enacted, when it came to the use of force, self-defense under Article 51 was practically the only choice –during the Cold War, at least. In 1950, although there was, an authorization for the use of force against North Korea to be conducted by a US-led coalition of the willing (as an alternative to the nonexistent standing

²⁰<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-of-peacekeeping>

²¹ Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.

²² Article 39 of the UN Charter

²³ Article 42 of the UN Charter

²⁴ Article 51 of the UN Charter.

²⁵ Article 24(1) and 48(1) of the UN Charter.

force), this was the only such authorization during the Cold War. The politics of the Cold War made it unlikely that the authorization of force would be judged to be in the common interests of all of the veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council.²⁶

Even though peacekeeping was not referred to in the Charter, there were some efforts to fit it in the framework of the Charter. While it was not envisaged as being powerful in nature and because it was only to take place on the consent of the states affected, it was not necessary for the Security Council to rely on its Chapter VII powers which, allow it to authorize the use of force and to obligate member states without their consent. After all, the fact that peacekeeping operations were usually armed and generally constituted of thousands of military personnel indicated that they did not fit accurately into Chapter VI of the UN Charter. This fact drove to some mentioning to the legal basis for the establishment of a peacekeeping operation as being 'Chapter VI 1/2' of the Charter. However, as peacekeeping has developed any division between Chapter VII 'enforcement' and Chapter VI 1/2 'peacekeeping' has become very murky indeed.

1.5.2 Phases of the Use of Force

Phase 1: Peace Observation Missions

For some people, the peace observation missions that firstly be seen with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in the late 1940s, are not necessarily be acknowledged as peacekeeping at all; in the contrary, they recognize these operations as predecessors to peacekeeping. Although these observations missions are substantially dissimilar from the character of peacekeeping operations which initiated with UNEF I in 1956, it is crucial to include this category of operations to the concept of peacekeeping. However, their actions overlap with those of other peacekeeping missions; furthermore the operations are considered as peacekeeping by the UN and many scholars.

Phase 2: UNEF I

With the creation of the first United Nations Emergency Force in the Suez (UNEF I) by the General Assembly, the type of UN peacekeeping was changed. The operation was given a mandate that was more thorough in nature and envisaged a significantly larger number of troops than the observation-focused operations that had existed before it. At its maximum strength, UNEF I had 6,073 military personnel, boosted by international and local civilian staff. With the rise in size and actions of the operation it had the ability to importantly influence the situation in the field. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld acknowledged that UNEF I had a totally different character

²⁶ With the end of the Cold War the force of the impediments, both legal and political, to the Security Council authorizing force and delegating the use of force to a state or coalition of the willing has subsided.

from observer forces which previously were established by the UN. He defined it as '*paramilitary in character and much more than an observers' corps*'.²⁷ Apart from this, he underlined that it was to be '*in no way a military force temporarily controlling the territory in which it is stationed*'.²⁸

Phase 3: 'Defense of Mandate' Operations

Hammar-skjöld's accurate approach to the use of force by peacekeeping operations was moved away from almost rapidly, and the second phase featured a single operation: UNEF I. Although it is reasonable that the following peacekeeping operations were taken place by the Security Council, it is meaningful to indicate that the Security Council was not, at this level, invoking its Chapter VII powers in conducting operations. For that reason, Hammar-skjöld's principles of use of force only in self-defense, consent of the host state and impartiality, established in the context of the UNEF I operation, were extremely influential to subsequent peacekeeping practice.

Phase 4: Non-Forceful Peacekeeping Operations which Become Forceful when Confronted with Crisis (Mission Creep)

Just before the publication of the Brahimi Report in 2000 – a document that is referred to the fifth phase, mentioned below – the authorization of offensive force in UN peacekeeping was limited and constituted a means of a desperate, last resort for the Security Council when trying to save a failing peacekeeping operation opposed to a deteriorating condition on the ground. Operations included to this category referred to the UN peacekeeping operation created in the Congo in 1960 (ONUC), the UN operations in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia established in 1992 and the UN operations in East Timor established in 1999. In each case, a peacekeeping operation was established with an authorization to use force rarely and, in each case, peacekeepers were authorized to use offensive force by a rattled Security Council when violence on the ground compromised the original operation.

Phase 5: The Brahimi Report and the Invocation of Chapter VII from the Outset

Secretary-General Annan decided to assemble a high-level Panel to undertake a comprehensive review of the UN's peace and security actions, in March 2000. This led to a broad ranging report on peacekeeping, the so called the Brahimi Report after its Chairman, Lakhdar Brahimi. The Report, transmitted in August 2000, has been remarkably influential concerning the use of force by peacekeeping operations. The Brahimi Report indicated that

²⁷ United Nations, 'Second and Final Report of the Secretary-General on the Plan for an Emergency International United Nations Force Requested in Resolution 998 (ES-I), Adopted by the General Assembly on 4 Nov. 1956' (UN doc A/3302), 6 Nov. 1956, para. 12. See also the Secretary-General's 1958 Summary Study, para. 15.

²⁸ Second and Final Report, para. 12.

peacekeeping must be reinvented in a way that it is authorized to guarantee security and protect civilians.²⁹

Chapter 2: Historical Evolution of PKOs

2.1 UN Peacekeeping: The beginning (1947-1956)

The three peacekeeping missions which were taken place during the period from 1947 to 1956 were the reason for starting a series of actions through which peacekeeping constituted an indispensable element for the UN. Their main objective was to investigate, monitor, observe, establish facts and report their findings. The first mission was UNSCOB, established in 1947 to oversee and investigate allegations that came from Greece concerning the support provided by Bulgaria, Albania and Yugoslavia to communist guerrillas in Greece, who aimed to overthrow the established government. UNSCOB followed by the UNTSO, which was established in 1948 in order to monitor cease-fire lines between Israel and its neighbors. UNMOGIP which was set up in 1949 to monitor and observe the situation along cease-fire lines within Kashmir over which India and Pakistan had engaged into a conflict during the period from 1947 to 1949.

2.1.1 United Nations Special Commission on the Balkans (1947-1951)

With resolution 109 (II) on 21 October 1947, the General Assembly established the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB). Nine of the eleven members of the Security Council, including the Netherlands, each provided two delegates for UNSCOB. The Soviet Union and Poland declined to participate. The four nations involved were required by the resolution to seek a peaceful resolution to their differences.³⁰

There has been a serious debate over United Nations Special Commission on the Balkans (UNSCOB) on whether it is considered as a peacekeeping operation. A thorough analysis of UNSCOB demonstrates that there was never existed any crucial evidence showing the cooperation from the communist states neighboring northern Greece. Nevertheless, UNSCOB is considered as a part of UN peacekeeping and it is the first time that used an observation group consisted of by impartial military personnel. For that reason this mission constituted the basis for the following peacekeeping operations.

Germany occupied Greece during World War II and that led to the establishment of an underground resistance movement, the so called National Liberation Front, commonly known by its acronym EAM. Although EAM and its military wing ELAS (the national People's Liberation Army) operated under the supervision of the Greek Communist Party (KKE), however there were

²⁹ James Sloan (2014) The Evolution of the Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 37:5, 674-702, University of Glasgow, School of Law

³⁰ <https://english.defensie.nl/topics/historical-missions/mission-overview/1947/united-nations-special-committee-on-the-balkans-unscoob>

many non-communists in its rank.³¹ Disagreements between communists and non-communists increases and a civil war broke out in the country. While the civil war expanding north, the communist guerrillas started receiving military support from the newly created communist states of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Disputes grew resulting in UN intervention.³² The Greek civil war highlighted the emerging conflicts between the West and the Soviet bloc which drove the deadlock of the Security Council. The persistence by the Soviet Union to use veto led to the issue being removed from the Security Council to the General Assembly, which later instructed UNSCOB to monitor progress and to provide support if requested. UNSCOB's actions and tasks were limited and included information and observations by groups patrolling near the northern borders of Greece. Their major task was to investigate whether the Greek guerillas were being supplied with weapons and other equipment by the neighboring communist states.³³ The UNSCOB operation did not include all the characteristic of what was later considered as peacekeeping, however it was the first effort to place observers in the field to determine the facts.³⁴

2.1.2 United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (1948-present)

Because of the confusion concerning the United Nations Special Commission on the Balkans (UNSCOB), some consider UNTSO to be the first actual UN peacekeeping operation. UNTSO is crucial as a peacekeeping mission because it was the antecedent of six other missions established in the Middle East during the Cold War. It is acknowledged as an observer mission, and its task is to observe and oversee the cease-fire between Israel and its neighbors. One important function that UNTSO has achieved was its mandate to investigate local tensions as well as to pursue to control circumstances along the cease-fire lines which may have evolved into turbulence.

The United Nations General Assembly, in November 1947, approved a plan for the separation of Palestine, providing for the establishment of an Arab State and a Jewish State, with Jerusalem to be placed under international status. Palestinian Arabs and Arab States and Palestinian Arabs rejected the plan.

The United Kingdom relinquished its mandate over the issue of Palestine and the State of Israel was proclaimed, on 14 May 1948. The next day, the Palestinian Arabs, supported by Arab States, started disputes against Israel. On 29 May 1948, the Security Council, in resolution 50 (1948), called for an ending of hostilities in Palestine and pronounced that the UN Mediator should oversee the truce, with the support of a military observers' team. In June 1948, the first group of military observers, known as the United Nations

³¹ Higgins R. United Nations peacekeeping, documents and commentary, IV Europe 1946-1979, p. 5-7

³² Birgisson K.: United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, p. 77-79

³³ Hill and Malik: Peacekeeping and the United Nations, p. 27-28

³⁴ Ingunn Hilmarsdóttir, (2012) United Nations Peacekeeping, p.30-31

Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), went in the region. In 1949, UNTSO military observers continued to stay there in order to monitor the Armistice Agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors, which for a long time constituted the central foundation of an unstable truce in the region. UNTSO actions are expanded over the five States including the parties of the Armistice Agreements: Israel, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, Jordan, and Egypt.

Due to the wars of 1956, 1967 and 1973, the actions of the observers changed, but they remained in the region, acting as go-betweens for the opposed parties and in a way by which isolated adverse facts could be restricted and prevented from developing into serious disputes.

UNTSO personnel have also been available at short notice to form the nucleus of other peacekeeping operations on a temporary basis. The capability of UNTSO military observers to deploy after the Security Council acted to create a new mission has been a significant tool contributing to the initial effectiveness of such missions.

2.1.3 United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (1949-present)

The third peacekeeping operation created by the UN in the first period, started in 1949 with a cease-fire compromise between India and Pakistan. UNTSO had a specific mission; to observe the cease-fire between the two countries, prevent negligible incidents from concluding into hostile disputes and oversee both state for compliance with the arms restriction agreement. Both the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan UNMOGIP as well as UNTSO demonstrate the significance of the political settlement, without that peacekeeping missions may be continued for many years. After the end of the World War II, the decolonization process concerning the Indian Subcontinent signified a territorial dispute. India and Pakistan gained their autonomy from the British domination soon after the adoption of the Indian Independence Act of 1947. In addition this Act constituted the base for the independence of over 500 other sovereign states. Geography and religion made it quite simple for most states to join either India (mainly comprised of Hindu Provinces) or Pakistan (a Muslim state). One of the most crucial noteworthy questions was the case of Kashmir.¹¹² Kashmir's Hindu ruler did not take into consideration the desires of the majority of Muslim population, which fact drove to an invasion by Pakistan, obligating Kashmir's ruler to turn to India for military support. In October 1947, the accession of Kashmir to India led to a war breaking out between India and Pakistan. Hilmarsdóttir argues that *"the UN became involved following India's complaint to the Security Council, that Pakistan was threatening international peace and security through its invasion of Kashmir. Pakistan maintained that the accession of Kashmir to India had been illegal and that a vote was necessary. This led to the hostilities between the two neighboring countries. The UN set up the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan*

(UNCIP) to mediate between the two states, which managed to arrange a cease-fire, went into effect 1 January 1949.³⁵

2.2 The Assertive Period: 1956-1974

In the end UN had a decisive role concerning the peacekeeping in 1956. The abovementioned peacekeeping operations, demonstrated specific elements according to which peacekeeping could be materialized. A host nation's consent and impartiality of military observers provided a stable basis upon which the UN could conduct observer missions. In the beginning these operations were dealing with tasks such as reporting, observing and managing to minimize tensions caused by negligible disputes along cease-fire lines. Some crucial events took place during this period: With regard the case of UNSCOB, the General Assembly, promoted the mandate for peacekeeping mission and set a precedent for Assembly involvement. Furthermore it is important to mention that Hilmarsdóttir states that: *this period also saw the formalization of the characteristics of peacekeeping in the sense that the factors of consent, the non-use of force and the use of military personnel evolved to become established principles of peacekeeping.* Taking this fact into consideration nine peacekeeping missions were conducted in this period, however only a few will be discussed in this chapter.³⁶

2.2.1 United Nations Emergency Force I (1956-1967)

The Suez Canal Company was nationalized by Egypt over the protest of France and the United Kingdom, in July 1956. On 13 October, the Security Council initiated a resolution introducing forth specific principles as regards the Canal operation. Consultations on the implementation of those principles were in progress when new disputes started in the broad area.

Israel on 29 October 1956, invaded on Egypt and occupied Sinai and the Gaza Strip. The Security Council examined the abovementioned issue on 31 October, but no agreement could be materialized, owing to the vetoes of France and the United Kingdom. According to "Uniting for Peace" resolution, the question was then transferred to the General Assembly, which met in emergency special session from 1 to 10 November. The Assembly called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from occupied territories. Furthermore it set up the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to observe and oversee the cessation of disputes. Following the dispatch of the Emergency Force to the area, the French and British forces left the Suez Canal Zone by 22 December 1956. The withdrawal of the Israeli forces was completed by 8 March 1957.³⁷

³⁵ Hill and Malik, Peacekeeping and the United Nations, p. 31-32

³⁶ Ingunn Hilmarsdóttir, (2012) United Nations Peacekeeping, p.32-40

³⁷ <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unef1backgr1.html>

The establishment of UNEF, actually the first United Nations peacekeeping force, provided an important innovation within the United Nations. UNEF was not just a peace-enforcement operation, as referred in Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, but a peacekeeping mission to be conducted with the consent and the collaboration of the parties to the conflict. This operation was an armed one, but the participants were to use their weapons only in self-defense cases and even then with utmost restraint. Their central task was to oversee the withdrawal of the three occupying powers and, after the withdrawal was achieved, to work as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces and to secure the impartial supervision of the ceasefire. Finally, UNEF, was established completely on Egyptian area with the consent of the Government, patrolled the Egypt-Israel armistice demarcation line and the international frontier to the south of the Gaza Strip and brought relative quiet to a long-troubled area.

2.2.2 United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (1958)

During 1958 ethnic tensions in Lebanon were evolved to be complicated by the interference of the United Arab Republic (UAR), concluding Syria and Egypt. The United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) was established in order to confront this threat. It was totally different from the other peacekeeping missions in one crucial respect; the mandate limited it to just ascertain the events before the UN implement any further measures. Peacekeeping operations such as UNTSO, UNEF I and II and UNMOGIP had broader tasks that included observing, reporting and trying to defuse potential problem incidents.

2.2.3 United Nations Operation in the Congo (1960-1964)

ONUC was set up by Security Council resolution 143 (1960)³⁸ of 14 July 1960, by which it decided "*to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as might be necessary until, through that Government's efforts with United Nations technical assistance, the national security forces might be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks*".³⁹

The primary mandate of ONUC was to secure the withdrawal of Belgian forces from the Republic of the Congo, to support the Government in implementing the law and order and to provide technical assistance. The UN operation in the Congo (ONUC) between 1960 and 1964 was one of largest operations tackled by the Organization. As Hilmarsdóttir argues: "*Apart from being one of the most complex peacekeeping operations of them all, it cost*

³⁸ <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/157/32/IMG/NR015732.pdf?OpenElement>

³⁹ <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/onucM.htm>

*the UN greatly, both financially and in terms of lives, including that of the Secretary-General Dag Hammerskjöld*⁴⁰ (Hilmarsdóttir,2012).

2.2.4 The 1973 Arab-Israeli War-United Nations Emergency Force II (1974-1979)

In the Middle East, on 6 October 1973, a war broke out again when concurrent, not expected, attacks were started against Israel by Egyptian forces crossing the Suez Canal and Syrian forces assaulting in the Golan Heights. The Egyptians advanced east of the canal. The Israelis responded and, when a cease-fire took place, both the Israelis and Egyptians had troops on either side of the canal. The UNEF I had worked as a buffer between Egyptian and Israeli forces from November 1956 until withdrawn at the demand of Egypt prior to the June 1967 war. Australia did not provide troops to that force. Following the October 1973 war, UNEF II was formed to oversee the cease-fire agreements between Egypt and Israel. On 18 January 1974 and 4 September 1975, UNEF II was in charge of observing the redeployment of forces and manning and controlling the buffer zones east of Suez and in the Sinai Peninsula that were set up by those agreements.⁴¹

2.3 The Inactive Period: 1974-1987

After the creation of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), the UN retreated significantly from new peacekeeping operations. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was the only one peacekeeping operation conducted during this period. This inaction can be interpreted as a reaction to the fact that the UN had extended itself substantially. UNIFIL showed that nothing had gone right with UN peacekeeping operations indicating the high costs, the refusal of the Member States to pay for the assessments, the lack of consent and the co-operation of disputants. These facts mean that peacekeeping operations could only achieve their goals if the majority of the criteria were present. UNIFIL's mission was to supervise the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon and maintain peace. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was conducting frequent invasions on Israeli territory with the contribution of the surrounding countries, including Lebanon. The PLO in Lebanon intensified the tensions in all over the country. In 1975, civil war broke out between Christians and Muslim groups, and this led Syria into complicated situation when it delivered forces into Lebanon stating that its objective was to secure stabilization within the country. Measures taken by Syria did not impede PLO attacks on Israel from Lebanese troops. In such circumstances and with high Jewish death rates, Israel decided to invade in Lebanon on 14 March 1978 in order to destroy PLO bases. The US concerned that this attack could minimize the

⁴⁰ Secretary General Dag Hammerskjöld was killed in a plane crash on his way to meet President Twombe of Katanga. This was to further complicate the UN's efforts in expelling foreign mercenaries from the Congo.

⁴¹ <http://klik.dva.gov.au/history-library/part-1-military-history/ch-7-peacekeeping-forces-middle-east/s-3-united-nations-emergency-force-ii-unef-ii>

chance of a peace Treaty with Egypt.⁴² That's why, the US requested the contribution of the UN and after four days the Security Council adopted resolutions 425 and 426 which called upon Israel to cease all military actions and withdraw its troops from Lebanon immediately. In 1985, the Israelis started a partial withdrawal but kept on maintaining a security zone in the border area. Even so, its failure to carry out its function has little to do with its own ability. UNIFIL without any doubt indicates that peacekeeping operations can only be profitable if appropriate conditions exist.

2.4 Rebirth of Peacekeeping: 1988-1991

At the end of the 1980's, the international political system changed extremely. The UN had the chance to renew peacekeeping's visibility and perceptibility in the international arena around the world when requested for help with disengaging the superpowers and support the conflict ridden nations that were left behind to find lasting peace. As Hilmarsdóttir states: *"this led to problems in peacekeeping operations because resources for planning, deploying and maintaining operations were insufficient for the number, size and complexity of these operations"* (Hilmarsdóttir,2012). During 1993, the UN encountered a credibility crisis when unexpected humanitarian catastrophes overwhelmed the organization in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia. In the post-Cold War, evolution of peacekeeping era starts with the perception that peacekeeping operations achievements in 1988-1991 led the UN to disregard the inherent inadequacies to carry out large multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations. The UN evolved to larger and more complex operations until recognizing its weakness with the failure of the second Angolan operation in 1992. In the first three years of the post-Cold War era peacekeeping operations were without any success for the UN. Having been inactive for over a decade, peacekeeping reemerged as a proper and successful means of resolving long-standing and unmanageable conflicts. By the end of 1991, the Organization developed to a trustworthy one, so much so that it was ready to conduct the largest and most costly operations ever undertaken in Cambodia.⁴³

2.5 Peacekeeping in the 1990s

The end of the Cold War signaled the outset of a new time period in history as regards the UN peacekeeping. The reform of methods and approaches continued to exist during the 1990s. The deadlock between the two Superpowers collapsed and the Council's paralysis ended. In addition, the raise of civil wars and actions of state violence against civilians led to a compulsion towards international involvement. These reasons paved the way for a fast increase in the number of peacekeeping operations were conducted by the UN. 67 UN peacekeeping operations took place since its creation, 49 of them have deployed since 1990 (UN 2012 list of operations). This new changing of the Security Council authorized the UN to take part in more

⁴² James, A.: Peacekeeping in international politics, p. 340

⁴³ ⁴³ Ingunn Hilmarsdóttir, (2012) United Nations Peacekeeping p.40-42

dynamic missions. The UN started to set up forces to war areas before a ceasefire had been taken place with the purpose to either guard civilians in an act of humanitarian interference or to put an end in disputes by way of 'peace enforcement'. However, in 1993, the situation changed dramatically after UNITAF, a US-led intervention in Somalia, provoked the death of 18 US soldiers in the Battle of Mogadishu. Even so, peacekeeping operations continued to expand, specifically following the 1992 Agenda for Peace, drafted by the then Secretary General Boutros-Ghali. In this report, the significance of continuing peace is underlined and it is mentioned that this could only be succeeded through the creation of stable institutions, the so called 'peace building'. Consequently, the UN's engagement within countries evolved into more expansive. Procedures like the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of warring parties (DDR) and the development of a state's administrative capacity constitute part of peacekeeping operation mandates. These operations are known as 'robust', 'complex' or 'multi-dimensional' peacekeeping operations, to emphasize the new scope and size. Usden and Juergenliemk argue that: *"In 1992, the UN established the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), in order to design and manage the increasing number and growing size of operations. Before a resolution for a new peacekeeping operation has been passed, DPKO offers support with fact-finding operations. Upon adoption of a mandate, it deals with the logistical challenges of recruiting personnel, military forces and deploying the necessary equipment to the theatre. Upon the start of the operation, it acts as the interface between the Security Council and the mission on the ground. In the past few years, the DPKO has been restructured and the Department for Field Support (DFS) has been established to oversee logistics in the field".*⁴⁴

2.6 Recent developments (The Brahimi Report)

Peacekeeping has evolved into one of the most crucial challenges the United Nations (UN) has dealt with since the end of the Cold War because of the increase of civil wars in the 1990s. The Brahimi report was drafted in 2000 by a panel of ten specialists in response to the failures of UN peacekeeping in the 1990s, particularly in Rwanda and Srebrenica. In alignment with Boutros Boutros Ghali's 1992 Agenda for Peace, the Brahimi report targeted in renewing the commitment of UN member states to the "maintenance of international peace and security" (Gray 2001). The report introduces recommendations in order to make better operational and doctrinal aspects of peacekeeping. It questioned the appropriateness of pre-Cold War traditional peacekeeping when dealing with "new wars". *Lauren Durand states that: "The progress made by peacekeeping since 2000 has been influenced by the publication of the report. First, post-Brahimi report missions have been characterized by the increasing participation of non-UN third parties and regional organizations. Furthermore, as recommended by Brahimi,*

⁴⁴ Rebecca Usden & Hubertus Juergenliemk, History of UN Peacekeeping, Global Governance Institute, Belgium

peacekeeping operations (PKOs) have moved away from neutrality to become instead impartial and robust. Finally, immediate relief is no longer the first priority of the UN (Durand, 2011). Instead, reconstruction, development and sustainable peace have been developed to one of the crucial priorities of the organization, which is aiming to promote peacebuilding. As long improvements have been remarked, the UN must “continue to strengthen the peacekeeping machinery” and renew the commitment of states for future achievements (Ban 2010).

“The Brahimi report is not an achievement in itself since very few of the recommendations made were implemented or implemented properly. However, the report greatly contributed to the progress of peacekeeping by highlighting its operational and doctrinal flaws” (Durand, 2011). The UN and its partners understood the seriousness of the case and introduced a number of reports aiming to reform peacekeeping. One of such reports constitutes the 2008 capstone doctrine that demonstrates the principles and guidelines of PKOs. Post-2000 peacekeeping is referred to an escalating engagement of transnational and regional organizations that enhance the credibility and feasibility of the mandates. In addition, more robust operations have removed peacekeepers from neutrality and impel them to engage in impartiality in order not to be complicit in crimes against humanity. Beyond any doubt, the Brahimi report was the first move towards the “humanitarianisation” of peacekeeping and responsible for peacebuilding and development objectives. Nevertheless, regardless of all the good signs that peacekeeping have shown since 2000 and the few achievements registered by the UN, PKOs still deals with crucial operational questions because of the lack of funds and resources and the disengagement of TCCs.⁴⁵

2.7 The present

Today, more than 110,000 military, police and civilian staff simultaneously serve in 14 peacekeeping operations, demonstrating a reduction in both personnel and peacekeeping missions due to the peaceful transitions and the rebuilding of functioning states. Nevertheless, the decrease in personnel and peacekeeping missions in the current years without any doubt shows that the confrontations faced by the UN are minimizing. The existence of new hostiles expanding beyond local and regional borders indicate that the request for field operations is expected to stay high and peacekeeping is going to be one of the UN’s most complicated operational missions. In addition, the political complication facing peacekeeping operations and the scope of their mandates, together with the civilian aspect, remain very broad. There are clear evidences that particular specialized organs such as police, will be in exceptionally high demand over the following years. Today’s multidimensional peacekeeping will maintain to improve the political procedure, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants,

⁴⁵ Laurent Durant, (2012), How did the Brahimi Report Improve the Effectiveness of UN Peacekeeping Operations?, E-International Relations Students

protect civilians, support the organization of elections, assist in restoring the rule of law and protect and promote human rights .⁴⁶

Chapter 3: Regional peacekeeping operations

3.1 The African Union (AU)

For many decades, Africa has been the central area of deployment as regards the international peace operations—not only because of the instability and fragility that characterize the region, but also for the reason that the Security Council has fewer conflicting interests than in the case of other regions and countries (e.g. the Middle East), allowing the Security Council to reach agreement on mandating and conducting peacekeeping missions.

African countries are improving, with an extremely fast pace, their policies for participation in multilateral peace operations, whether in the framework of the UN, the AU, or in coalitions of the willing. Central among these member states are Nigeria, South Africa and Ethiopia. Ethiopia has risen to become the largest troop contributor country in the UN regarding the peacekeeping operations, and also constitutes the largest contributor to AU peace operations, with its 4395-strong contingent in AMISOM in Somalia (AMISOM 2014).⁴⁷

Three main peacekeeping operations have been conducted by the African Union since the inaugural summit meeting of the AU in July 2002: in Burundi (2003), the Darfur region of Sudan (2006), and Somalia (2007) (Mark Malan, 2008) .

3.1.1 Burundi

The first full-fledged peacekeeping operation for the African Union took place in Burundi. After a continued civil war that break out in 1994, a peace process led by the President of Tanzania, the late Julius Nyerere —and later by former President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela —concluded on August 28, 2000 in the signing of the Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation for Burundi. The Arusha Agreement determined that “immediately following the signature of the Agreement, the Burundian Government shall submit to the United Nations (UN) a request for an international peacekeeping force.”⁴⁸ However, the implementation of the Agreement was quite slow, and disputes remained.

Given the fact that the UN would not mandate the conducting of a peacekeeping operation in the absence of an inclusive cease-fire, South Africa launched a Protection Support Detachment in October 2000 in order to protect select exiled leaders who came back to participate in the agreed-upon political process. Two cease-fire agreements took place next—the first signed by the Transitional Government of Burundi (TGoB) and the Burundi Armed

⁴⁶ <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/our-history>

⁴⁷ John Karlsrud, (2018) The Un At War, Peace Operations in a New Era, Nupi, Norway, p. 112-113

⁴⁸ Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation for Burundi, Protocol V, Article 8, August 28, 2000.

Political Parties and Movements (APPMs) on October 7, 2002; the second agreement signed by the TGoB and the Conseil national pour la defense de la democratie-Forces pour la defense de la democratie (CNDD-FDD) of Pierre Nkurunziza, on December 2, 2002. The Palipehutu–Forces nationales de liberation (FNL) of Agathon Rwasa remained outside these processes, and it continued to use force of arms.

The AU approved the deployment of the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), in April 2003, with a task to supervise the implementation of the cease-fire agreements; support disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants; establish favorable circumstances for the creation of a UN peacekeeping operation; and provide support concerning the political and financial stability in Burundi.

Malan argues that: *“AMIB had a maximum strength of 3,335 troops, with military contingents from South Africa (1,600), Ethiopia (858), and Mozambique (228), as well as the AU observer element (43) drawn from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo, and Tunisia. AMIB started the establishment of its headquarters on April 27, 2003. However, it was not until the arrival of the contingents from Ethiopia and Mozambique (September 27 to October 23, 2003) that the force became fully operational. The force was concentrated in Bujumbura, with the South African and Ethiopian contingents expected to establish demobilization centers in the provinces to canton and disarm an estimated total of 20,000 ex-combatants”* (Mark Malan,2008) .

AMIB was unable to enforce the implementation of the cease-fire agreements completely, as well as it was not able to secure stability in Burundi in cooperation with newly established national defense and security practices. Failure to develop good relations and to collaborate with the TGoB on the designation and security of identified preassembly and disarmament centers, accompanied with the absence of full cooperation from the APPMs, led to the inefficiency of the operation to make much headway with the DDR process.

From the beginning, the AU had worked on the precondition that AMIB was a holding mission pending the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation. On May 31, 2004, the function of AMIB came to an end. Effective June 1, 2004, the responsibility for peace operations in Burundi was assumed by the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) mandated by Security Council Resolution 1545 (2004), on May 21, 2004.

3.1.2 Darfur

A cruel humanitarian catastrophe started to culminate in Sudan’s western region of Darfur, in February 2003. In a year, more than one million displaced in a well-coordinated campaign of ethnic cleansing by government-supported militia and tens of thousands of civilians died. The U.S. Congress passed a nonbinding resolution characterizing the Darfur situation “genocide”, in July 2004; then, in September 2004, the Secretary of State Colin Powell called the consistent and widespread patterns of dislocations, killings, and rapes in

Darfur “genocide” too, and he blamed the government of Sudan and the Janjawiid militia as responsible of that crisis. No stable steps followed in order to impede the atrocities, but the AU had been putting pressure on the Sudanese government to stop the militias, and it had started dialogue with Khartoum to approve an African peacekeeping force of two thousand to supervise the safety in Darfur, protect civilians, and promote the provision of humanitarian aid. 150 Rwandan soldiers reached in Darfur as the vanguard of this force, on August 15, 2004. After a week, Nigeria’s parliament voted to send in 1,500 troops. Until the end of August 2004, the AU had 305 soldiers in Darfur acting as cease-fire monitoring mechanism, and the UN was cooperating with the AU on plans to increase force levels.⁴⁹ By early 2006, the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) had almost 6,000 military and 1,500 police in the ground.

The fact that the operation deployed at all, and that it was capable of expanding from a force of less than four hundred to over seven thousand in a brief time, is a credit to the AU, but there was a significant absence of ability to set objectives; civilian, military planning, and integrate police; sequence deployment; provide logistic support; and mainly to deploy the operation in a intelligible manner. Partners have played a crucial role in AMIS, supporting technically and economically. The downside of this large-scale involvement, nevertheless, is that it has established a continuing dependence, making the aspect of African “ownership” of African missions ever more implausible.

The net result of severely restrict AMIS and AU capability is that the operation’s preventive outcome has been very limited. An AU Joint Assessment Mission (JAM)—with U.S., EU and UN participation—which was conducted in March 2005 concluded: AMIS played a key role where it was present, but huge areas of Darfur kept beyond its reach; neither the expectations on which the operation was designed nor those on which the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement was planned had been borne out; and AMIS had not achieved in establishing a safe environment.

The AU Peace and Security Council, on November 30, in 2006, provided the Addis plan and further determined that the hybrid operation should profit from UN “backstopping” and command and control practices. On December 19, 2006, the Security Council approved the Addis Ababa results and the AU communiqué, called for their immediate implementation, and also asked for all parties to ease the deployment of the UN light and heavy support packages as well as a hybrid mission in Darfur without delay. On December 23, 2006, in a letter to the secretary-general, President Al-Bashir reassured the willingness of the authorities of the Sudan to implement the Addis Ababa conclusions and the Abuja communiqué. In addition, the government of the Sudan let the African Union to know of its approval of the resolution of the Peace and Security Council.

⁴⁹ Lansana Gberie, *The Darfur Crisis: A Test Case for Humanitarian Intervention* (Accra, Ghana: Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center, 2004).

However, as Malan mentions “ *the deployment of both the heavy support package and the AU-UN force remains stalled, and it is unlikely that the hybrid force will materialize before 2008. This is due to the perennial problems of force generation and of finding UN member states that are willing and able to volunteer the quantity and quality of personnel and equipment required for an effective mission of this size in a hostile operational environment*” (Mark Malan,2008) .

3.1.3 Somalia

In late 1993, the death of seventeen U.S. soldiers in Somalia signaled the outset of the end for a U.S.–UN peacekeeping operation that finally left Somalia in 1995. The operation removed with few of its mandate goals succeeded, making Somalia a state of anarchy. The latest phase of civil war started in May 2006 with the Union of Islamic Courts’ (ICU) conquest of Mogadishu from the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT), and it kept going with further ICU extension in the country. Ethiopian government involved with forces in support of the Transitional Federal Government, in July 2006.

During the period from December 24, 2006 to early January 2007, the UIC—which had under control of eight of Somalia’s eighteen administrative regions—was removed by Transitional Federal Government troops and Ethiopian forces. Remnants of the UIC militia were violently pursued in southern Somalia. The similarity of order and security that the UIC had established started to fade, and public displeasure of the presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia generated an unstable situation that limited humanitarian emergency missions in the central and southern regions of the state.

On February 20, 2007, the UN Security Council, operating under Chapter VII of the Charter, approved the conduct of AMISOM in order to enhance discussion and reconciliation in Somalia by supporting the security of all those engaged with the procedure; to guarantee the safety of the Transitional Federal Government institutions and secure the central infrastructure; to oversee the implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan, specifically the recreation of Somali security forces; and to provide support for humanitarian assistance.⁵⁰

AMISOM is to contain an initial three battalions, increasing to a total of nine battalions of 850 soldiers each. In March 2007, Uganda started the troop deployment. By June the two Ugandan battalions, about 1,600 troops, constituted the only AMISOM troops in Somalia. In late July, the government of Burundi pointed out that it could be prepared to situate troops to Somalia—few months after Security Council approval and shortly before AMISOM’s six-month mandate expires. As regards AMIS and the organized hybrid operation for Darfur, it is noticed a lack of willingness from African states to support with

⁵⁰ UN Security Council, Resolution 1744, S/RES/1744, 2007.

personnel and equipment an AU operation in a non friendly security environment.

In Somalia, as it happened in Darfur, the AU continues to remain entirely based on donor funding and on external technical assistance for the preparation and management of the operation. Last October, the latter practice was stressed as a crucial weakness at the IPA workshop on AMIS, and it was identified during the Africa–G8 meeting in Evian in June 2003. The Joint Plan obviously acknowledged an unstable strategic management capability for multidimensional peace missions within both the AU and regional organizations as a major obstacle to achieving the requisite peace operations capacities. Yet the UN and the interested international community—Africa’s “donor partners”— keeps on approving and conducting new AU operations like AMISOM with apparently scant regard for the reason that Africa only started establishing modest regional peace and security structures and abilities during the past decade, while the vastly more capable UN has had approximately sixty years of experience in peacekeeping.⁵¹

3.2 European Union (EU)

3.2.1 The EU-UN partnership

Over the past decade, the EU and the UN have developed cordial relations and become real partners as regards the crisis management. Since the EU-UN Joint Declaration of September 2003, the two organizations have gradually stabilized and institutionalized their cooperation in ways unmatched by other institutions. The EU and the UN together have collaborated in the ground through many and different actions and practices, from the Democratic Republic of Congo to Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR). For that reason these two institutions have demonstrated a specific capability to adopt practices in order to easily be adapted to the new environment of international crisis management, which is by nature multi-actor and demands a high rate of cooperation. Lately, the Dutch and Swedish participation to the UN mission in Mali signaled the European come back to UN peacekeeping that has been especially welcomed on the UN side.

The 2012 EU ‘Action Plan on CSDP support to UN peacekeeping’ accompanied with the EU-UN collaboration in the ground, has improved even more this partnership. It comes to its two-year conclusion in this rather positive context and, in all likelihood, will be refreshed in a format still to be agreed upon.

As Pietz and Tardy indicate “*Cooperation may also allow the two institutions to confront common challenges, most notably in relation to the management of the pool of trained personnel, training certification procedures, and bridging*

⁵¹ Donald C. F. Daniel Patricia Taft & Sharon Wiharta, (2008), *Peace Operations, Trends, Progress, Prospects, Africa: Building Institutions on the Run* p.95-100, Georgetown University Press, Wasinghton

the gap between preliminary training and actual deployment. As a matter of good practice, Europe's New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management (ENTRI) has targeted both CSDP and UN personnel for its training courses, which include pre-deployment modules for countries where both organizations are present. Such cooperation might well be widened and intensified". (Tobias Pietz and Thierry Tardy, 2014).

Over the past decade, rule of law and SSR practices have constituted the basis of both UN and EU operations. Nevertheless, rule of law and SSR, are two terms that can be interpreted with various ways and also the implementation of them in the field still differ. Even if, the UN has been capable of achieving system-wide over the past decade cooperation on these questions, internal cohesion on the CSDP side still constitutes a challenge. That said, with the Action Plan and the 'modalities for coordination', organs are ready to exert joint attempts on SSR to a new degree. Both documents emphasize to these areas as a means of developing good coordination, calling, for example, on the EU for a 'division of labor and complementarities/synergies with UN planned activities in the rule of law and security sectors'. Synergies could be succeeded by training together, co-locating units or SSR personnel, deploying joint assessment operations and after-action reviews, as well as establishing a standing working group on the rule of law and SSR and which serves the two institutions.⁵²

3.2.2 The participation of EU in PKOs

ALTHEA/BiH

The European Union's Military Contribution to the Stabilization and Integration of Bosnia Herzegovina into European Family Nations. The mandate for EUFOR's Operation Althea is in two parts, Executive and Non-Executive. The Executive mandate is given by the UN Security Council, and the EUFOR is then based on the EU Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) Joint Action which includes an Executive part derived from the UN Security Council (Supporting the BiH authorities maintain a safe and secure environment). It also includes and a Non-Executive part (Capacity Building and Training for the AFBiH). This supports BiH in its progress to being a 'security provider' rather than a 'security consumer'.⁵³

EU NAVFOR Somalia

The European Union is concerned with the effect of Somali-based piracy and armed robbery at sea off the Horn of Africa and in the Western Indian Ocean. As a result, and as part of its Integrated Approach to Somalia, the EU launched the European Union Naval Force ATALANTA (EU NAVFOR) in December 2008 within the framework of the European Common Security and

⁵² Tobias Pietz and Thierry Tardy, 2014, The EU and the UN: together for peace, European Union Institute for Security Studies

⁵³ <http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/index.php>

Defense Policy (CSDP) and in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) ⁵⁴ and International Law.⁵⁵

EUAM Iraq

The EU Advisory Mission in support of Security Sector Reform in Iraq (EUAM Iraq) was launched to respond to the request for advice and assistance by the Iraqi government. The Mission has an initial mandate for one year. It will focus on assisting the Iraqi authorities in the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Iraqi security strategy.⁵⁶

EUAM Ukraine

The European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) Ukraine is a non-executive mission of the European Union that formally began operations from its headquarters in Kyiv on 1 December 2014. The goal is to achieve a civilian security sector that is efficient, accountable, and enjoys the trust of the public.⁵⁷

EUBAM Libya

On 22 May 2013, the Council of the European Union gave the green light for EUBAM (EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya). Libya, a civilian Mission under the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), to support the Libyan authorities in improving and developing the security of the country's borders.⁵⁸

EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine (This Mission is not managed by CSDP structures)

The European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) was launched in 2005. The legal basis for EUBAM is the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the European Commission and the Governments of Moldova and Ukraine on 7 October 2005.⁵⁹

EUBAM Rafah

The European Union Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point- code name EUBAM Rafah- was launched on November 2005, to monitor the operation of the border crossing point between Gaza Strip and Egypt, after the Israel and the Palestinian Authority concluded an Agreement on Movement and Access on 15 November 2005.⁶⁰

EUCAP Somalia

In July 2012, the EU launched EUCAP (European Union Capacity) Nestor, a civilian mission which assists host countries develop self-sustaining capacity

⁵⁴ http://www.un.org/Depts/los/piracy/piracy_documents.htm

⁵⁵ <http://eunavfor.eu/>

⁵⁶ https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/euam-iraq_en

⁵⁷ <http://www.euam-ukraine.eu/>

⁵⁸ https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eubam-libya_en

⁵⁹ <http://eubam.org/>

⁶⁰ <http://www.eubam-rafah.eu/>

for enhancement of maritime security. EUCAP Somalia contributes to the establishment and capacity building of maritime civilian law enforcement capability in Somalia, including Somaliland.⁶¹

EUCAP Sahel Mali

EUCAP Sahel Mali is a European Union civilian mission based in Bamako, Mali. It was launched on 15 January 2015, following an official invitation by the Malian government to assist the internal security forces with reasserting the government's authority over the whole of the country, following the 'Northern Mali Crisis' that left large parts of the country under the control of various factions.⁶²

EUCAP Sahel Niger

The Sahel has a prominent place in European Union policy. Europe has numerous interests in the region, ranging from combating security threats, terrorism, organized crime and illegal migration to assuring energy security.⁶³

EULEX Kosovo

The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) was launched in 2008 as the largest civilian mission under the Common Security and Defense Policy of the European Union. EULEX's overall mission is to assist the Kosovo authorities in establishing sustainable and independent rule of law institutions. The Mission's current mandate has been launched to cover the period until 14 June 2020 based on Council Decision CFSP 2018/856. EULEX works within the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 1244.⁶⁴

EUMM Georgia

European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, (EUMM). It is an unarmed civilian monitoring mission of the European Union. It was deployed in September 2008 following the EU-mediated Six Point Agreement which ended the August war.

Their priorities are:

- to ensure that there is no return to hostilities;
- to facilitate the resumption of a safe and normal life for the local communities living on both sides of the Administrative Boundary Lines (ABL) with Abkhazia and South Ossetia;
- to build confidence among the conflict parties;
- to inform EU policy in Georgia and the wider region⁶⁵

⁶¹ <https://www.eucap-som.eu/>

⁶² https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eucap-sahel-mali_fr

⁶³ https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eucap-sahel-niger_en

⁶⁴ <http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/>

⁶⁵ <https://eumm.eu/>

EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia

*EUNAVFOR MED – European Union Naval Force-Mediterranean operation Sophia is but one element of a broader EU comprehensive response to the migration issue, which seeks to address not only its physical component, but also its root causes as well including conflict, poverty, climate change and persecution.*⁶⁶

EUPOL COPPS/Palestinian Territories

EUPOL COPPS, established on 1 January 2006, is the EU Police and Rule of Law Mission for the Palestinian Territories. Initially the Mission was established as a Police Mission comprising a Police Advisory Section. In 2008 a Rule of Law Section was added. EUPOL COPPS (the EU Coordination Office for Palestinian Police Support), mainly through these two sections, assists the Palestinian Authority in building its institutions, for a future Palestinian state, focused on security and justice sector reforms.⁶⁷

EUTM RCA

Military training mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA) in letter dated 8 October 2015, the Chef de l'Etat de la Transition of the Central African Republic (CAR), Mrs Catherine Samba-Panza, invited the European Union to further support the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) through a reinforced operational training structure in full collaboration with United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic.⁶⁸

EUTM Somalia

On 10 April 2010, the EU launched a military training mission (EUTM Somalia) in order to contribute to strengthening the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the institutions of Somalia. Initially, training took place in Uganda due to the security situation in Somalia at that time, and in close collaboration with the Uganda People's Defense Forces (UPDF). On 22 January 2013, the Council of the European Union extended the mandate of EUTM Somalia to March 2015. This 3rd Mission Mandate contained a significant change of Mission focus, with the addition of strategic advisory and mentoring activities to complement the training role. In the first months of 2014 EUTM – S Mission HQ was relocated to Mogadishu, along with all advisory, mentoring and training activities, which lead to the closure of all locations in Uganda.⁶⁹

EUTM-Mali

In order to continue providing military training and advice to the Malian Armed Forces the Council of the European Union decided in 23 March 2016, EUTM

⁶⁶ <https://www.operationsophia.eu/>

⁶⁷ <http://eupolcopps.eu/>

⁶⁸ https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eutm-rca_en

⁶⁹ <https://www.eutm-somalia.eu/>

Mali's Fourth Mandate, this will last until 18 May 2020. EUTM Mali will train, advice and educate the MaAF under the control of legitimate civilian authorities, in order to contribute to the restoration of their military capacity with a view to enabling them to conduct military operations aiming at restoring Malian integrity, protecting the population and reducing the threat posed by terrorist groups.⁷⁰

3.3 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

NATO-Relations with the United Nations

United Nations (UN) and the NATO are obligated to oversee and maintain the peace and security around the world. Since the early 1990s, the two institutions have been collaborating in this stage conducting peace-support and crisis-management missions. The difficulty of current's security challenges demands a more comprehensive discussion between NATO and the UN. This has driven to better coordination and liaison arrangements between the personnel of the two organizations, as well as UN specialized agencies.

3.3.1 Framework for Cooperation with UN

In September 2008, based on the experience of over a decade of cooperation, the Secretaries General of the two institutions accepted to create a framework for expanded consultation and cooperation. Since the signing of the 2008 framework, collaboration has continued to be improved in a workable way, taking into consideration each organization's particular task, procedures, expertise and capacities. Regular exchanges and communication at senior and working levels on political and operational questions have been developed to a standard characteristic of the inter-institutional relationship. Secretary General of NATO reports to the UN Secretary-General on regular basis regarding the progress in UN-mandated NATO-led missions and on other crucial decisions of the North Atlantic Council, including in the environment of crisis management and in the battle against terrorism. The UN is often invited to attend NATO ministerial meetings and summits; the NATO Secretary General participates in the UN General Assembly; and staff level meetings, covering the broad range of cooperation and dialogue, take place on an annual basis between the secretariats of NATO and the UN.⁷¹

3.3.2 NATO's Operations and Missions

NATO is a key actor and essential contributor as regards the international peace and security. It promotes democratic values and is responsible for the normal and peaceful resolution of conflicts. Nevertheless, in case of failure of the diplomatic attempts, it has the military ability needed to conduct crisis management missions, separately or in coordination with other states and international organizations.

⁷⁰ <http://eutmmali.eu/>

⁷¹ https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50321.htm#

NATO in Afghanistan

At the present time NATO is the main Resolute Support, a non-combat operation which promotes guidance, training and support to Afghan security staff and institutions. Resolute Support was established on 1 January 2015. It consists of about 16,200 personnel from both NATO and participant states and works with one hub (in Kabul/Bagram) and four spokes in Herat (western Afghanistan), Mazar-e Sharif (northern Afghanistan), Laghman (eastern Afghanistan) and Kandahar (southern Afghanistan).

Central functions are: *“supporting planning, programming and budgeting; assuring transparency, accountability and oversight; supporting the adherence to the principles of rule of law and good governance; supporting the establishment and sustainment of processes such as force generation, recruiting, training, managing and development of personnel”*⁷².

The legal framework of the Resolute Support Mission is based on an official invitation from the Afghan Government and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between Afghanistan and NATO, which oversees the existence of Allied troops. In addition the Resolute Support is endorsed by the international community and it is mentioned to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2189, unanimously approved on 12 December 2014. This resolution is followed by the new Resolute Support Mission and underlines the significance of sustained international assistance for the solidity of Afghanistan.

Resolute Support is an operation occurring as a consequence to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). From August 2003 to December 2014, ISAF was under leadership of NATO. It was created after a call for support by the Afghan government and by a UN mandate in 2001 to impede terrorists to get once again the leading role in Afghanistan. Furthermore, ISAF was authorized to deploy new Afghan security forces and enhance Afghan authorities to provide efficient security around the country with the purpose to establish favorable conditions to the functioning of democratic institutions and the implementation of the rule of law.

Until today, the operation in Afghanistan constitutes the Alliance's most important operational commitment. Furthermore, apart from Resolute Support and ISAF, Allies and partners states are committed to the wider international community's support for the long-term economical help of the Afghan security forces. NATO authorities have also reassured their commitment to a continuing cooperation between NATO and Afghanistan, by reinforcing political consultations and useful coordination within the context of the NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership created in 2010.

⁷² https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52060.htm

NATO in Kosovo

Even if, Afghanistan remains NATO's top priority, the Alliance has not faltered on its other commitments, specifically in the Balkans. Nowadays, almost 4,000 allied and partner forces are deployed in Kosovo as part of NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR).

Having first entered Kosovo in June 1999 to end widespread violence and halt the humanitarian disaster, KFOR troops continue to preserve a forceful existence around the area.

In February 2008, after Kosovo's declaration of independence, NATO continued to deploy its troops in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Since then it has contributed to establish a professional and multi-ethnic Kosovo Security Force, which is a softly armed force in charge of security missions that are inappropriate for the police. For the time being, development has been noticed in the European Union-sponsored Dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. The restoration of relations between Serbia and Kosovo constitutes a crucial factor for the resolution of the political crisis over northern Kosovo.

Securing the Mediterranean Sea

NATO missions are not restricted only to zones of dispute. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO right away started to adopt practices in order to increase the options available to confront the threat of international terrorism. In October 2001, it launched the maritime surveillance Operation Active Endeavour aiming to detect and prevent terrorist actions in the Mediterranean. In October 2016, the mission ended and was accomplished by Sea Guardian, a flexible maritime mission able to conduct the various maritime security operations tasks.

Sea Guardian is conducting three main missions in the Mediterranean Sea: maritime situational awareness, support to capacity-building and counter-terrorism at sea. In addition, if authorized by Allies, it could also conduct other tasks like conducting interdiction tasks, upholding freedom of navigation and protecting critical infrastructure. In general terms, it is contributing to keep a secure and out of danger maritime environment while enhancing the Alliance's three crucial tasks: crisis management, cooperative security and collective defense.

Training mission in Iraq

In July 2018, the "NATO Mission Iraq" was officially started at the Brussels Summit, at the request of the Iraqi leaders and in accordance with the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. It constitutes a non-combat training and capacity-building operation that consists of some hundred NATO trainers. These trainers will support the Iraqi troops to protect their country and the broader region against terrorism and prevent the re-emergence of ISIS. The operation will be created on current attempts to train Iraqi instructors in sectors such as

confronting improvised explosive devices (IEDs), military medicine, armored vehicles maintenance and civil-military planning. In addition, it will contribute in establishing military schools to raise the professionalism of the Iraqi troops and support to preserve more efficient, transparent and comprehensive national security structures and institutions.

During the period between 2004 and 2011, NATO organized relatively small but crucial support operations in Iraq that contains mentoring, training and supporting the Iraqi Security Forces, the so called NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I).

Supporting the African Union

Except for the Euro-Atlantic region, the organization continues to help the African Union (AU) in its peacekeeping operations on the Africa. Since June 2007, NATO has supported the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by providing air- and sealift assistance for AU peacekeepers following renewed AU requests. Moreover, NATO is providing capacity-building support, as well as expert training support to the African Standby Force (ASF), at the AU's request. The ASF aims to be conducted in Africa in times of crisis and is part of the AU's attempts to promote long-term peacekeeping practices. ASF represents the AU's vision for a continental, on-call security apparatus with some similarities to the NATO Response Force.

Air policing

Since Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in Ukraine in 2014, NATO has adopted some more practical measures for its Allies. Among these is the enhancing of NATO's air policing operations.

Air policing missions are collective peacetime operations that help NATO to detect, observe and identify all infringements and violations of its airspace in order to take the appropriate measures. NATO fighter jets oversee the airspace of Allies who do not possess fighter jets of their own. NATO has provided extra aircrafts to strengthen missions over Montenegro, Albania, and Slovenia, as well as the Baltic region, where NATO F-16s have frequently restrained Russian aircrafts violating Allied airspace.

This air policing mission is one of three NATO lasting forces on active duty that help to the Alliance's collective defense efforts on a regular basis. They also contain NATO's standing maritime forces, which are prepared to operate when called upon, as well as an integrated air defense system to protect against air attacks, which also includes the Alliance's ballistic missile defense system.

Chapter 4: The Greek Participation in PKOs

4.1 Greece and UN

Greece in the Security Council

On October 15th, 2004, Hellas, together with Japan, Argentina, Denmark and Tanzania, was voted as a non permanent member to the Security Council. In 1952-1953, Greece held a non permanent position in the Security Council for the last time. The Security Council's primary objective is to maintain the international peace and security, an actually difficult task. Since 1990 the Council has changed its practices of work as well as its agenda, while the workload itself has increased considerably. It has been developed to a more active organ and also has acknowledged the interaction of the issues that were not generally part of its area of activity.

During the two-year term in the Council, Greece was guided by the main principles of the foreign policy which are: dedication to peace, respect for international law, democracy and human rights, eradication of poverty and hunger and the strengthening of international cooperation among all the people of the world. In close cooperation with the other partners of the Security Council and in accordance with the international justice and legality, Greece shows its willingness to support unstable regions by making serious efforts to establish lasting peace and protect people's lives.

Members of the Council entrusted Greece with the Chairmanship of two fundamental sanctions Committees, on Cote d'Ivoire and on Sudan, as well as the Chairmanship of the Working Group on General Issues on Sanctions. Greece also held the vice-chairmanship of the Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee.

Greece was and continues to be obligated to contribute with all its available means in order to reinforce and acknowledge UN as the protector of the international law and to maintain the peaceful coexistence and cooperation amongst humans of the world.⁷³

4.2 Greece and NATO

Membership to NATO constitutes a significant factor of Greece's defense and security architecture along with its EU membership. Since its accession in 1952, Greece not only has been an active member of Euro-Atlantic contributing in security but also has been protected by the security umbrella the Alliance provides its members.

Since Greece is one of the oldest members of the Alliance, a wide consensus has been formed among its residents about the special and crucial role of NATO in guarantying the common defense and security of its members. This consensus was developed in a gradual way despite times when Greeks were profoundly concerned about the country's relationship with NATO. At the present time, citizens together with the politicians, under the difficulties of the

⁷³ <https://www.mfa.gr/missionsabroad/en/un-en/greece-in-organization/peace-and-security.html?page=2>

contemporary security environment, acknowledge that NATO has stopped to be a simply military alliance and has been developed into a political organization of wider scope. In additions, Greece's stability has been boosted importantly. Being situated in a strategically significant region, Greece has earned a security dividend.

Greece's participation proved favorable for the security and stability of both Greece and its Allies in NATO. Its important geostrategic position widened the Alliance's perimeter and the stability zone of Europe. It is very important to mention that Greece actively participates in all NATO missions, encompassing the Libyan crisis when it contributed in Operation Unified Protector from the first moment, providing its air and naval assets as well as its most important bases in Crete and Peloponnesus to the Allied forces.

Membership into Alliance has unquestionably had an advantageous result for Greece because it has increased remarkably the chances to reform defense capacities and generate the appropriate stability and security for development in the political, economical and civil sector. Greek participation increased and boosted the military forces' outreach opportunities to all aspects of defense reform including organizational improvements, concept development, enhancing operational capabilities, infrastructure, training and standardization.⁷⁴

4.3 Greece and EU

Greece's contribution to the Common Security and Defense Policy

During the Greek Presidency of the Council of the EU in 2003, the European Security Strategy (ESS) was drafted. In this document, the European Union clarifies its security strategy, which is aimed at achieving a secure Europe in a better world, identifying the threats facing the Union, defining its strategic objectives and setting out the political implications for Europe.⁷⁵ The ESS has ever since constituted a basis of reference for both ESDP, and its successor, CSDP, up until the demonstration of the EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy by the High Representative in June 2016. In this framework, Greece was actively involved in the drafting procedure of the Global Strategy.

Apart from ESS, significant developments regarding many aspects of the (then) ESDP were carried out during the Hellenic Presidency of the Council, in 2003: *“deployment of the first civilian ESDP Mission EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina, deployment of the first military ESDP operation CONCORDIA in FYROM, finalization of the EU-NATO relations framework, launching of the first training programs on ESDP, and major steps towards the establishment of an agency in the field of defense cooperation and military equipment (the European Defense Agency)”*⁷⁶.

⁷⁴ <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2012/turkey-greece/greece-nato-partnership/en/index.htm>

⁷⁵ <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Ar00004>

⁷⁶ <https://www.mfa.gr/en/foreign-policy/greece-in-the-eu/eu-common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp.html>

During the latest Hellenic Presidency of the Council of the EU (1st semester of 2014), Greece conducted various activities in the field of the CSDP, for instance Informal Meetings, seminars and workshops focusing on questions of maritime security and surveillance, enhancement of military capabilities, sustainability of the defense sector and cyber-security . It is important to mention that, following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Presidency tasks concerning CFSP/CSDP issues are fulfilled by the HR/VP and, so the role of the rotating Presidency is constrained to supporting activities.

Greece is an active contributor enhancing CSDP continuously, within the context of supporting the EU Global Strategy, with the purpose to secure the Union's strategic self-governance, to strengthen the EU's role as a trustworthy international stability and security contributor, as well as in efficiently confronting and preventing challenges.

4.4 Ongoing Activities

The participation of the Hellenic armed forces in KFOR

Since June 1999, NATO has had a leading role in peace support mission in Kosovo (KFOR) in support of broader international attempts to establish peace and stability in the area.

Greece provided facilities to facilitate the advance of personnel and equipment to Skopje in the framework of "JOINT Guardian" Plan, authorized by NAC, on the 10th of June 1999. The Multinational Force, under the U.N. guidelines, is known as Kosovo Force (KFOR).

KFOR's mandate is based on the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 of 10 June 1999 and the Military-Technical Agreement (MTA) between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia. KFOR is deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and for that reason constitutes a peace enforcement mission, which is more broadly mentioned to as a peace support operation.

The Greek Governmental Council on Foreign Affairs and National Defense, on 11th June 1999, determined that Greece would take part in with a force at Brigade Level, providing support for the conduction of the operation. The Greek Force was known as Hellenic Contingent in Kosovo. The objective of the Contingent was to establish a harmless environment for the citizens in Kosovo and guarantee a secure return of the refugees and those who had been removed from Kosovo.

Participation of Hellenic Forces:

After a Governmental Council on Foreign Affairs and National Defense decision, the 34th Mechanized Brigade consisting of 1162 men, was established in Kosovo. In addition, one (1) C-130 a/c with 10- crew members and 30 Officers and Soldiers were allocated to man Allied Staffs, HQs and Commands, as well as 157 Officers and soldiers to provide Host-Nation Support.

The Contingent includes also one (1) Infantry Company with Engineer

Elements, consisting of 60 Officers and Soldiers, as well as one Support Detachment and one (1) Facilities Detachment with a total force of 10. The Company was stationed at Communication Zone South, in Thessaloniki.

The Brigade was stationed at different camps, "Megas Alexandras" in Kosovo- Polije, camp "Rigas Fereos" at Urosevac and camp "Tobacco Factory" at Mitrovica. All above camps were established in a short time by the Hellenic Army mostly by the 34th Engineer Battalion.

The Hellenic Contingent in Kosovo deployed hundreds of reconnaissance, escorting, traffic security and control missions. It allocated personnel to man seven (7) check points and assumed the responsibility to conduct and command the traffic control operations in the road axis connecting FYROM with Pristina and the border station of "Kosovo-FYROM".

Furthermore, Hellenic military personnel protected, on a 24 hour basis, two (2) Weapon Staging Areas, for arms collected from UCK, and prepared arms transportation and destruction. The most important success of the Greek Contingent was the finding of an ammunition depot in which a big number of arms and ammunition were hidden. KFOR acknowledged the achievement as the second most essential and fundamental discovery that has been made in Kosovo so far.

The Hellenic Contingent in Kosovo destroyed more than 4.000 arms of several types and caliber, hidden in shelters by paramilitary organizations and extremist groups, which were and gathered by KFOR. The arms were destroyed by the Hellenic Army, in a furnace of a metallurgy factory.

The Hellenic Contingent guarded on 24-hour basis the Christian churches within its AOR. A crucial fact is the immediate response of a Greek patrol team to prevent Saint Uros church from getting burned. This unpleasant event took place in Urosevac. All holy relics were saved and were transferred to the holy Monastery in Gratsanitsa for secure keeping.

The Contingent got involved importantly to the transportation, escort and delivery of humanitarian aid by "FOCUS" Organization: 160 tons of humanitarian aid was delivered to different villages in Kosovo.

Moreover, the Greek Contingent has contributed to providing medical treatment to the local population. The medical staff have examined more than 2.000 people in Urocevac and Kosovo Polije.

Following Order No. 152/2001 of the Minister of National Defense, a War Cross, First Class, was awarded to the Battle Colors of the 34th Mechanized Brigade, the 501st Mechanized Infantry Battalion and the 507th Motorized Infantry Battalion. On 30 September 2003, the KFOR Commander awarded the 507th Motorized Battalion a Special Honor Distinction.

The big number of missions conducted without disputes shows the perfect organization and professionalism of the staff of the Greek Contingent in Kosovo.

During 2003, following a decision to reorganize KFOR in personnel and means, the Hellenic Contingent obtained a rather "light" structure, reducing its numbers as follows:

- Two (2) Mechanized Infantry Battalions at MNB (N) and MNB (E) under French and U.S. command, stationed at Mitrovica and Urosevac, respectively. The strength amounted to 700 men with a command at regiment level, and one (1) National Support Element.
- Five (5) helicopters, stationed at Stefanoviki airfield in Volos, Greece, at full readiness, to conduct MEDVAC missions and support UNMIK, if required.
- One C-130 a/c for flight route Elefsis -Skopje-Sarajevo-Elefsis.
- Manning of the Pristina airport and the allocation of one (1) vehicle.
- A Traffic Control Company (until early June 2003).

Twelve (12) Hellenic Army Officers and NCOs (eight Officers and four NCOs) serve in KFOR HQs at Kosovo.

In August 2003, following the new reorganization of the Forces in the Balkans, the Hellenic Force was reduced to:

- 12 cadres to HQ -KFOR Pristina
- One (1) Mechanized Infantry Battalions of 218 men at MNTF-N based at Mitrovica
- One (1) Mechanized Infantry Battalions of 300 men at MNTF-E based at camp "Rigas Fereos" at Urosevac
- One (1) National Tactical Command of 5 men based at camp "Rigas Fereos"
- One (1) Liaison Mission Team of 6 men at MNTF-E based at camp "Rigas Fereos"

During the visit of the Chief of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff to Armenia, on 3rd September 2003, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed, regarding the allocation of an Armenian Rifle Platoon under the Hellenic Contingent in Kosovo. NATO approved the involvement of the Armenian Platoon in KFOR, under Hellenic command, on 26th November 2003. After a decision of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff, and with the approval of the Armenian Government, the Platoon is replaced by another one every six months.

PRESENT PARTICIPATION OF HELLENIC FORCES

From 31st January 2010 the Hellenic Force in Kosovo is as follows:

- One (1) National Tactical Command and the National Support Element (NSE)
- One (1) mechanized Infantry Battalion at MNBG North
- One (1) mechanized Infantry Battalion at MNBG East.
- Four (4) liaison monitoring teams
- One C-130 a/c twice a month for flight route Elefsis -Naples-Sarajevo-Pristine.
- 12 cadres to HQ -KFOR Pristine and NIC
- 6 cadres to HQ - MNBG North
- One (1) Armenian Rifle Platoon of 35 men

- One (1) General Transportation Company to transport strategic and operational reserves to Kosovo, if required. The above Company is stationed in Communication Zone South, Thessaloniki.⁷⁷

Bosnia - Herzegovina - Operation "ALTHEA"

The Istanbul Summit, held on 28-29 June 2004, decided upon the end of operation Stabilization Force (SFOR). However, the UN Security Council, by resolution 1551 on 9 July 2004, asked for the continuation of the mission by the European Union. The EU, following the successful deployment of the mission Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, decided, as a NATO successor, to organize a bigger military mission, this time in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

On 12 July 2004, the EU in the wider context of the European Security and Defense Policy decided the conduct of the mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina under the Code Name "ALTHEA". The operation will be deployed according to the agreements provided for by "BERLIN PLUS" between NATO and the EU. The operation was launched on 2 December 2004 and its duration has yet to be determined.

On 12 July 2007, the Greek Forces stationed to the Multinational task Force – North (MNTF-N), situated in TOUZLA. Bosnia-Herzegovina terminated its operation successfully and the Hellenic Armed Forces returned to Greece. After the Operation had entered the next Phase (Step -1, on 28 February 2007), Greece was authorized by EUFOR and the other MNTF-N participating countries to negotiate and sign the relevant MOU with the Bosnian Government on delivering the Camp Eagle Base (where a multinational force was allocated) to the Bosnian Ministry of Defense.

On 27 June 2007, the Base was handed over. The ceremony took place under the presence of the Commander of the B' Hellenic Army Corps, as a representative of Greece and the EUFOR Commander, as well as the presence of the MOD of Bosnia Herzegovina, Selmo Cikotic, who cordially expressed his thanks Greece for the successful command of the peacekeeping operation by the Multinational Task Force North. He emphasized that the Hellenic Command gained the trust and the gratefulness by the government and the local population for achieving their objectives.⁷⁸

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) - NHQ SKOPJE

In April 2002, in the context of NATO Force Review in Balkans, a new NATO Headquarters was created in Skopje, apart from the two existing Headquarters in FYROM, the KFOR Rear Headquarters and the Brigade of "AMBER FOX" Operation. NHQ, under the supervision of the Senior Military Representative (SMR), is subordinated directly to the CINCOUTH and has the

⁷⁷ <http://www.geetha.mil.gr/en/peace-support-activities/3985-the-participation-of-the-hellenic-armed-forces-in-kfor.html>

⁷⁸ <http://www.geetha.mil.gr/en/peace-support-activities/3984-bosnia-herzegovina-operation-althea.html>

following tasks: Following an order issued by CINCSOUTH, NATO Headquarters in Skopje provides support to the Observers of the National Organizations with the purpose to contribute to the stability of the country and the region, by acting specific missions, as follows:

- Command over all NATO as well as NATO subordinate forces within FYROM. Investigation of all reports referring to violations of the truce.
- Support KFOR and ensure communication lines in the country, including coordination of the activities of National Support Elements. Investigation of all reports referring to violations of the truce.
- Facilitate the exchange and release of information, aiming at the support and military cooperation with the General Staff, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of the Interior and other Governmental Authorities that would be authorized by NATO to investigate reports for violation of the truce.
- Cooperation with other International Organizations investigating violations of the truce.
- Acting as liaison to Governmental Authorities, in cooperation with the Ambassador of NATO to FYROM, on a case by case basis.⁷⁹

Other ongoing Activities

Operation "ENDURING FREEDOM"

GREEK PARTICIPATION

On the 14th of March 2002, Frigate "PSARA" was the first frigate to be deployed in the Persian Gulf for about a 3 month period and being replaced by Frigates "SPETSES", "ADRIAS", "HYDRA", "KOUNDOURIOTIS", "NAVARINON" which all being replaced in turn and eventually returned to base on the 1st of September. The conducted missions included:

- Maritime Interception Operations
- Assisting supply units and aircraft carriers
- Sea lines of Communication Control and Protection Operations
- Search and Rescue Operations

In the context of the Operations, the following forces, means and facilities have been allocated:

- Souda Naval Dockyard, activated as a Forward Logistic Site (FLS) with increased measures of anti-air defense
- Souda Airfield has been allocated to support allied aircraft
- Special security measures for the military facilities used by NATO or U.S. forces have been applied.
- Athens Naval Hospital, with full hospital treatment, if required
- Additionally, 1 Naval Officer has been assigned to HQ U.SCENTCOM at Taba, Florida, USA.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ <http://www.geetha.mil.gr/en/peace-support-activities/3986-former-yugoslav-republic-of-macedonia-fyrom-nhq-skopje.html>

Operation "UNIFIL"

GREEK PARTICIPATION

During the period between 18 September and 15 October 2006, an Interim Naval Force was deployed under the supervision of the Italian Navy (Initial Maritime Task Force 425). The Hellenic Navy got involved with a frigate from the very beginning of the creation of the mission. Later on, except for the frigate, dating from 20 April 2007, a torpedo boat was provided for the reinforcement of the Maritime Task Force. On 20 December 2008, Greece removed the frigate from the mission and currently is participating with a Guided Missile Fast Patrol Boat or a Gunboat.⁸¹

Hellenic Contribution to the Reconstruction of Afghanistan

GREEK PARTICIPATION

the Hellenic Governmental Council on Foreign Affairs and National Defense (KYSEA), on January 15, 2002, with its decision no.3/2002, authorized the establishment of the Hellenic Forces in Afghanistan, particularly in the KABUL area and the surroundings, in accordance with the Bonn Agreement, dated 5 December 2001 and based on the UN Security Council Resolution no.1510 (non-deployment of the Hellenic troops outside the city of Kabul constitutes a national restriction).

Starting on 19th February 2002, the following forces were deployed:

- A Hellenic Army Engineers Company for Peacekeeping missions
- Support and security echelons
- National Support Element-NSE (in Karachi, Pakistan), and a
- Small number of staff officers, in liaison role, at various ISAF headquarters
- two (2) C-130s in airlift/ transport role (in Karachi, Pakistan)

The total force of the Hellenic participation amounted to 175 men. The duration of the Hellenic sojourn was initially determined to three (3) months, i.e. until 30th April 2002. Consequently, the Defense Council (SAM) gradually decided to extend the period until today.⁸²

EU Operation "ATALANTA"

GREEK PARTICIPATION

Greece took on the command of the Force for the 1st quarter of 2009 and handed it over to Spain on April 6th 2009. Our country, having assumed the Force Command, contributed to the operation during the A' quarter (Dec 08-Apr 09), with the following assets and personnel:

⁸⁰ <http://www.geetha.mil.gr/en/peace-support-activities/3989-operation-enduring-freedom.html>

⁸¹ <http://www.geetha.mil.gr/en/peace-support-activities/3972-operation-unifil.html>

⁸² <http://www.geetha.mil.gr/en/peace-support-activities/3987-hellenic-contribution-to-the-reconstruction-of-afghanistan.html>

- 1 Frigate with an organic helicopter (Frigate “Psara”)
- 10 Staff Officers at the Commander's Staff
- 3 Staff Officers at the operational headquarters in the UK
- 9 Staff Officers at the Logistics base⁸³

4.5 Concluded Activities

GEORGIA (UNOMIG)

Dispute in Abkhazia⁸⁴, which is situated in a crucial strategic place in the Black Sea (in the North-west region of the Republic of Georgia), started with social turmoil and attempts of the local government to separate Abkhazia from the Republic of Georgia; the situation was developed in an armed conflict and serious incidents took place in the summer of 1992, when the Government of Georgia deployed 2.000 men to Abkhazia to restore order. The dispute was destructive, with 200 dead people and hundreds wounded. The Abkhazian’s local authorities were removed from the capital, Sukhumi, to Gudauta City.

Since the 5th of September 1994, Greece has allocated five (5) cadres (two (2) from the Army, two (2) from the Navy and one (1) from the Air Force) to the Mission. After a U.N. request that was approved by the Greek MOD, a Transportation contingent was created in order to support the mission, including 15 cadres, one (1) command vehicle and five (5) general purpose vehicles. This team will be sent to Georgia, whenever is needed, following a U.N. mandate

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA - ECMM – EUMM

On July of 1991, after a joint announcement by E.U. and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was approved the creation of a European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM). The main objective of the operation was to oversee the implementation of the cease-fire agreement and other

⁸³ <http://www.geetha.mil.gr/en/peace-support-activities/3971-eu-operation-atalanta.html>

⁸⁴ Simmering ethnic tensions between the [Abkhaz](#)—the region's "titular ethnicity"—and [Georgians](#)—the largest single ethnic group at that time—culminated in the [1992–1993 War in Abkhazia](#) which resulted in Georgia's loss of control of most of Abkhazia, the *de facto* independence of Abkhazia, and the [ethnic cleansing of Georgians](#) from Abkhazia.

arrangements that have been signed between warring parties and the E.U. The mission operated as a neutral mediator aiming to resolve problems.

At the present time, after forces reduction, Greece participates with fifteen (15) cadres, allocated to the Committee (Six (6) from the Army, five (5) from the Navy and three (3) from the Air Force).

EVACUATION OF 240 FOREIGN DIGNITARIES FROM ALBANIA OPERATION “KOSMAS” (15 March 1997)

The crisis that broke out in Albania, in early March of 1997, following the collapse of the banking system, spread quickly. Albanians raised against the Government and the State, arms depots were broken into and people stole arms. Armed groups started to plunder and people were too scared to go out.

From early March 1997, the situation was escalated and developed to extremely hazardous for all foreigners living in Albania and many foreign embassies started closing down. The U.S. Marines conducted an evacuation mission that lasted three days. Many American and European citizens were evacuated from Tirana. On the 14th of March, 52 Greek citizens, together with the staff of the Greek Embassy, 5 Belgians and a number of Jordanians and Palestinians were removed by the Greek Navy. In the beginning of March, fear spread throughout the country and there were talks that extremists would burn the capital of Albania, Tirana. This situation led to a large number of people gathering outside the Greek Embassy in Tirana, demanding to be evacuated. Requests for evacuation were put forward to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, specifically by Countries that were not able for distance reasons to protect their citizens in Albania. The Hellenic MoFA requested the support of the Hellenic MoD, the Ministry of Defense authorized the Hellenic National Defense General Staff to organize and conduct an evacuation mission.

The night of the 14th of March 1997, the Hellenic Defense Attaché, his counterpart from China, the Ambassador and A' Secretary of the Embassy of Egypt, the Charge' d'affaires of the Embassy of Iraq and the Ambassador of Palestine met in Tirana and agreed on the time and exact number of foreign citizens that were to be evacuated from the capital and moved to the port of

Duress. The whole operation included the evacuation of 171 Chinese citizens, 40 Egyptians, 10 Iranian and 20 Jordanians and Palestinians. The Hellenic Navy got involved with the Frigate "AIGAION", the guided missile ship "KAVALOUDIS", the mine sweeper "KLEO", the torpedo-boat "LELAPS", and a SEAL Team.

After organized attempts, the Greek vessels and the foreign citizens to be evacuated arrived at the port of Durres. The "LELAPS" torpedo-boat conducted deceptive man oeuvres near the right dock of the port, while the mine sweeper "KAVALOUDIS", docked the on left platform of the port, already ensured by the underwater demolition team. The crowd 4.000 Albanians that had gathered at the point was kept back by the Navy SEAL Teams and the foreign citizens managed to embark safely followed by the Navy SEAL Team and both vessels exited the port. The evacuated citizens were moved to frigate "AIGAION", and the operation concluded, with the ships sailing to Corfu during the night.

The Evacuation of the foreign citizens from Albania was a very risky operation, in an anarchic environment with unstable conditions, where human life had no value. The Hellenic Navy acted in full coordination and cooperation, to achieve the objective. Crucial and vital was the role of the men of the Hellenic Underwater Demolition Command, in coordination and support with the Greek Defense Attaché in Tirana.

BOSNIA – HERZEGOVINA (IFOR-SFOR) (14 December 1995 – 4 December 2004)

After the conflict, which was broken out in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the summer of 1991, the E.U. and OSCE took the initiative to bring back the peace and establish the dialogue in the area. By the 713/25-9-1991 Resolution, the U.N. requested of all member-states to impose a "general" arms and military supplies embargo against the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.

In early 1992, UNPROFOR was deployed to Former Republic of Yugoslavia to mediate between opposing parties, while UNPREDEP was sent in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The situation in B-H got worsened, because of the peace-making plan was not accepted and due to important

conflicts and conflict of interest's crisis were escalated. The U.N. UNPROFOR was removed from the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.

On the 21st of November 1995, in the framework of the Dayton Agreement, the final document was signed in Paris in December 1995, and the 1031UNSC Resolution, the establishment of a NATO Multinational Military Force, IFOR (Implementation Force), was approved by NATO. B-H territory was within IFOR AOR. The mission labeled with the code name "Joint Endeavor". The Hellenic Governmental Council on Foreign Policy and National Defense decided the participation of the Hellenic Armed Forces in the abovementioned operation.

On 18 June 2004, during the Istanbul Summit, NATO decided to conclude SFOR operations and launch "ALTHEA" E.U.-led operations instead. The E.U. would assume responsibility from 4 December 2004. Furthermore, the NATO HQ was created at Sarajevo. Its manning started in July 2004 and began to operate in December 2004.

PARTICIPATION OF THE HELLENIC FORCES:

Greek contribution:

- One Special Transport Company of 250 men and 117 vehicles, subordinated to the Belgian Transport Battalion, stationed at Visoko, named as the Hellenic Contingent in Bosnia
- One Frigate and two Mine Sweepers to support "SHARP GUARD" operations.
- One C-130 a/c and 17 men as supporting personnel, stationed at Rimini, Italy to assist in transportation of personnel and material for IFOR-SFOR
- Fifteen officers in support of the HQS

In November 1996, the Hellenic Governmental Council on Foreign Policy and National Defense decided to widen the involvement of the Greek Contingent in Bosnia and in the Multinational Force, renamed as SFOR (Stabilization Force) on 20 of December 1996. The task of the Hellenic Contingent was to

deliver and supply materials from the airports and ports in Bosnia for the reconstruction of the country.

It included one Company of 280 men (with staff from Greece, Belgium, Luxemburg and Austria), situated at camp in "Vissoko", 28 km north-west of Sarajevo. The Transportation Battalion was called "BELUGA", according to the initials of the countries composing it (Belgium, Luxembourg, Greece, and Austria). In April 1997, Belgium, which had the leading role of the camp, withdrew from BELUGA and the Hellenic Contingent took over the leadership of the Force.

On the 28th of June 1998, a Bulgarian platoon of 26 men became a part the Hellenic Force. After the withdrawal of Luxemburg, the International Force was named HELBA, (HELLAS-BULGARIA-AUSTRIA) until early 2003, despite the withdrawal of the Austrian Transport Battalion on the 14th of December 2000, and the Bulgarian Platoon, on the 14th of January 2001. The Hellenic Contingent was repatriated in early 2003. The Hellenic Contingent in Bosnia conducted more than 2000 operations successfully, covering 19.000.000 km under bad weather conditions and on poor and rough road-network.

A noteworthy action of the Hellenic Contingent in Bosnia is the cooperation with the Greek Embassy in Sarajevo, as well as the Organization "Doctors of the World". Twenty-two handicapped children from different areas in B-H and Serbia were gathered and transferred to Greece for 15 days; the children were victims of exposed minefields during the war. The successful deployment of the operations demonstrated the high-degree of professionalism which characterizes the Hellenic Force staff. Transportation flexibility was vital for the logistic System of the Multinational Force.

In the framework of SFOR, the Hellenic Contingent was moved into Transportation Company, with one (1) Medical Platoon and one (1) National Support Element, the total strength amounting to 100 men. Moreover, six (6) Greek Officers were assigned to SFOR HQs. The Allied Military Intelligence Battalion and National Intelligence Cell were subordinated to SFOR. In the

former unit, two (2) cadres participated and in the latter, four (4) cadres participated from Greece.

As regards the NATO decision to review its forces in the Balkans, Greece participated as leading Nation from February 2003, with one Military Police Company of 45-50 men, to the SFOR International Military Police, stationed at BUTMIR Camp (Sarajevo). The force was situated there on the 10th of January 2003 and the Transportation Company moved to Greece in February 2003, with material and vehicles being forwarded to the Military Police Company.

NAGORNO - KARABAKH (HLPG)

In the context of OSCE, the High Level Planning Group (HLPG) HQ has been established in Vienna to elaborate methods to de-escalate tension between conflicting parties (Armenia and Azerbaijan) in the area of Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as conditions under which they could intervene to enforce peace. Greece deployed one (1) cadre (Army) assigned to the Operations Branch of HLPG.

OPERATION “ESSENTIAL HARVEST” (22 August – 26 September 2001)

The preparations for the operation begun on the 22nd of August 2001 and on the 27th of August 2001 the mission was fully operational and capable to be conducted. It lasted 30 days, with the participation of 4.145 men from NATO member-states, under the leadership of U.K. The objective was to disarm the ethnic Albanian NLA.

PARTICIPATION OF THE HELLENIC FORCES:

Greece participated with the 525th Mechanized Infantry Battalion and supporting Units, including about 400 men and was called Hellenic Contingent in Skopje. It acted between the 24th and 25th of August 2001. The Force was situated in Krivolac, in FYROM military camps, which were constructed and converted accordingly in order to provide better living conditions to the staff. On the 27th of August 2001, the Battalion was ready to assume responsibility, especially to receive and forward collected arms to Greece, with the purpose be destroyed. The Hellenic Contingent consisted of 180 vehicles and several

types of toad trailers. On the 4th of October, started the return of the Hellenic Contingent and terminated on the 7th of October 2001.

Greece also provided one Greek Officer to the 15-member Team of Advisors escorting the NATO Secretary General Special Envoy to FYROM, Peter Feith, whose objective was to estimate the situation and suggest a solution. Furthermore, ten (10) staff officers were assigned to NCCC PLUS headquarters, including the post of KFOR-REAR Deputy Commander.

The creation of Thessaloniki-Skopje main re-supply axis was provided for by the Plan indicated for one more time the significant and strategic value of the Hellenic territory and specifically Thessaloniki for concentrating a large amount of military forces and conducting missions in the wider area.

Since the beginning of “ESSENTIAL HARVEST” operation, 15 a/c (4 from Italy, 3 from Germany, 6 from U.K., and two from the Netherlands) transporting 1972 people, 9 ships (3 from Italy, 4 from U.K., 1 from Germany and 1 from the Netherlands) carrying 880 vehicles, 87 containers and 40 trailers, as well as 2 trains (1 from Hungary and 1 from the Czech Republic) passed through the port and airport of Thessaloniki. The road network from Thessaloniki to Skopje and vice versa was extensively used, while the Hellenic Police provided security and escort services to the convoys.

The following weapons and means were collected and destroyed in Greece: 2 Armored Personnel Carriers, 1 T-55 tank, 17 anti-aircraft launchers, 161 mortars, 483 heavy and light machine-guns, small A/T rocket launchers, 3.210 rifles, sub-machine guns and carbines and 2.944 spare parts. All above weapons and guns were destroyed in “Chalibourgiki” Steel Industry bringing in 69.780 kg of steel. The destruction of ammo took place in FYROM. A total of 397.625 rounds of different caliber were destroyed.

OPERATION “AMBER FOX “(26 September 2001 – 15 December 2002)

On the 26th of September 2001, NAC authorized SACEUR, General Joseph Ralston, activated “Amber Fox” Operation to protect International Observers who were committed to supervise the implementation of Peace Plan in FYROM. Germany had the leading role in this mission. The number of the

Force primarily was about 700, and, if necessary, the Force would be reinforced by 300 men, already deployed in the area. The operation would last for three (3) months and, if necessary, be extended. On the 15th of December 2002 The operation was finally completed.

PARTICIPATION OF THE HELLENIC FORCES:

Greece contributed 28 cadres to the mission, as follows:

- Eight (8) cadres as an augmentation to Headquarter Staff, to cover vacancies.
- Four (4) cadres to the German Brigade Headquarter
- Three (3) liaison teams. Totally, twelve (12) persons with transportation vehicles
- One (1) ambulance with the required medical and nursing personnel and more specifically one (1) doctor, two (2) nurses and one (1) driver

On the 16th of December 2002, in response to a request made by President Traikovski, NAC approved to continue the support of FYROM with a new Operation. Acknowledging that Operation “AMBER FOX” could be concluded successfully, NAC agreed that there was a request to continue international military existence in the country, so that the dangerous of destabilization would be minimized.

OPERATION “CONCORDIA” (31 March 2003 – 15 December 2003)

On the 17th of March 2003, NAC decided to conclude Operation “Allied Harmony” on the 31st of March 2003 and hand over command to the E.U and FYROM Authorities fully agreed upon, in view of the important progress achieved during operation “Allied Harmony” and previous operation “AMBER FOX”, towards restoring stabilization.

PARTICIPATION OF THE HELLENIC FORCES:

Greece contributed cadres, means and forces to the mission, as follows:

- Three (3) staff officers to support HQ of the Operation: one of them was assigned as Deputy Commander of the Force, one (1) staff officer

in the Operational Headquarters in Belgium and another one (1) in the Department of the European Union in Naples

- Three (3) liaison teams of twelve (12) men and six (6) transport vehicles, one (1) ambulance vehicle with the required medical and nursing personnel (one (1) doctor, two (2) nurses and one (1) driver).
- A security platoon for the Headquarters in FYROM, with eighteen (18) men and four (4) VBL vehicles.
- The 424th General Military Field Hospital based in Thessaloniki, for medical support.
- A C-130 transportation a/c to make the route Elefsis - FYROM and vice versa.
- A Helicopter Team composed of five (5) helicopters (one CH-47 and four CH-1H), based at Stefanodikio airbase at Volos, Greece, in readiness, to conduct air evacuations, if necessary

The mission was terminated on the 15th of December 2003, succeeded by EUROPOL where Greece provided assistance for air-evacuation in peace time and established the 424th General Military Field Hospital in Thessaloniki.

OPERATION “PROXIMA” (15 December 2003 - 15 December 2005)

The European Union Police Mission in FYROM launched operation PROXIMA, on the 15th of December 2004, as follow-on Mission to the E.U. mission CONCORDIA.

The contribution of the Hellenic Armed Forces to the operation is as follows: Undertake MEDEVAC Missions under normal circumstances by allocating the necessary means (1HU-1H helicopter stationed at Alexandria, Greece during day light, and 1 C-130 aircraft for night operations), with air evacuation capability to the 424th General Military Field Hospital in Thessaloniki within 6 hours, or to the 401st General Military Hospital in Athens, subject to early warning.

Other Concluded Activities

- HUMANITARIAN AID PROVIDED TO THE USA FOLLOWING THE "KATRINA " CYCLONE (16-19 Sep 05)

- HUMANITARIAN AID PROVIDED BY NATO TO PAKISTAN FOLLOWING THE EARTHQUAKE ON 8-10-2005 (10 October 2005- 31 January 2006)
- GREEK PARTICIPATION IN THE EU-LED OPERATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (24 January- 30 November 2006)
- KOREA (November 1950 - May 1958)
- CONGO-UNIKOM (14 March 1961 - 9 November 1961)
- OPERATION «NEARHOS» KUWAIT (2 September 1990 – 31 July 1991)
- KUWAIT-UNIKOM (13 April 1991 – 6 October 2003)
- NORTH IRAQ – UNGCI (26 July 1991 – 11 September 2003)
- SOMALIA – UNITAF (4 March 1993 - 3 March 1994)
- SOUTH AFRICA (April – May 1994)
- ETHIOPIA
- PALESTINE (9 November 1995 - 25 January 1996)
- CONGO – OPERATION “ARTEMIS” (12 July - 1 September 2003)
- CHAD - CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (EUFOR TCHAD - RCA)
- ERITHREA – ETHIOPIA (UNMEE)

Conclusions

More than half a century after the deployment of the first UN field operation in 1948, the size and scope of UN peacekeeping operations has increased rapidly. The UN can provide unique skills and resources to bear on conflicts that are ready for resolution, thus contributing to alleviate the pain of people damaged by war and helping them in the reconstruction of their post-conflict societies. Nevertheless, multidimensional peacekeeping cannot be rolled out at will, and there is no “one-size-fits-all” model. To succeed, peacekeeping operations must have clear mandates and adequate resources and must be tailored to fit the political, regional and other realities of the country or territory in question. It is important to mention that they must respond to the desires and aspirations of the local population. Only then do multidimensional peacekeeping operations work as a truly effective tool as the UN aims to an international peace, the goal envisioned at its establishment 73 years ago.⁸⁵

⁸⁵Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2003), Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, New York, USA

Both the EU and NATO seem to be developing into more active in the sectors of training and assistance. NATO's training activities, also elsewhere globally will aim to the building up of national armed forces and defense organizations. The EU will also continue to conduct this type of training programs, mainly for the building up of armies in African countries. Furthermore, hybrid operations (mainly security sector reform) and civilian missions to develop capabilities in former conflict areas will feature prominently. The possibility of funding civilian missions from the EU budget constitutes a crucial factor in this regard. Cooperating with international organizations, mainly the UN, and regional organizations such as the African Union and ECOWAS in order to coordinate simultaneous or follow-up operations is becoming more significant to both organizations. EU and NATO assistance in the building up of African capabilities is becoming essential. Therefore, both organizations will increasingly call on member states to make appropriate personnel, knowledge and expertise available. The expectation is that the EU and NATO will remain indispensable element in the future for crisis management operations, mainly in complicated situations for which other organizations are inadequately equipped in military terms. The EU and NATO appear to be becoming more engaged in the expanding grey zone between external and internal security, especially in the context of counterterrorism, anti-piracy and other missions at sea.⁸⁶

Greece has always actively endorsed and taken part in Peacekeeping missions and other similar operations world widely, from Balkans to Africa and Asia, reassuring steadily its commitment to the UN and its task on sustaining the international peace and security. This obligation to Peacekeeping is interpreted via the political and economical help and the existence of Greek military forces in cooperation with the civilian policemen, in various operations. In addition, in 2000 , Greece following these steps, created **MPSOTC (Multinational Peace Support Operations Training Center)**⁸⁷ authorized by NATO, certified by UN and in 2008 **NMIOTC (NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Center)** certified by NATO, with the purpose to help to the establishment of safer and more secure land and maritime environment accordingly. Regardless the varied national and international commitments of the Greek Military Forces and Police, Greece is

⁸⁶ Margriet Drent, Dick Zandee, (2015), Peacekeeping operations in a changing world, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Netherlands

⁸⁷ The Multinational Peace Support Operations Training Center (MPSOTC) was established after a directive of the Hellenic Ministry of Defense in November 1998. Since 19 May 2000 Greek MPSOTC, has formally certificated by NATO as a PfP Training Center, after a successful evaluation which was taken place and lasted approximately one year. The primary objective of the Greek PfP TC is to exploit the experience being gained from the long lasting participation of Greek Forces in Peacekeeping, by providing high standards, realistic and updated training to multinational personnel and to national contingents, during their preparation for an operation deployment. MPSOTC's principal objective is to provide academic and field training, to National and Multinational personnel in accordance with the most current international accepted standards regarding NATO, UN, EU and OSCE .

aiming to make every possible effort in order to boost its support to UN Peacekeeping.⁸⁸

⁸⁸ Hellenic Republic, Permanent Mission of Greece to the United Nations (2018), Peace and Security, Greece

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