

Refugee/Migration Flows and Security Issues in Europe

A dissertation

submitted for the requirements for the degree

of

**MA IN POLITICS & ECONOMICS OF CONTEMPORARY
EASTERN & SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE**

at

University of Macedonia

by

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Year of submission

2017

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Introduction

«Illegal asylum seekers», «bogus asylum seekers», «economic refugee/asylum seeker», «illegal migrant», «trafficked migrant», «over-stayers», «failed asylum seeker», «undocumented asylum seeker/migrant» are only a specimen of the pejorative labels, which express this new era. The vocabulary used may vary in its scope but its objective is particular and very specific, to express an image of marginality and threat of the unwelcomed guests.

Refugee status can be claimed from everyone, without any exception, but claiming the refugee label can only be grounded through a severe mix of deterrent measures and in-country policies and regulations. The above-mentioned labels are shaped and implanted in political discourse, policy and practice. Criminalization of those claiming refugee status and desperately seeking asylum leads to the perception that the protective label of the refugee is no longer a basic Convention right but a highly privileged prize which few deserve and most claim illegally.

At its core, the discourse on the refugee label transcends the institutional practices and constitutional processes as it displays the fear of the «other» and the social relations between newcomers and settled communities. It mirrors an emergent concern that national identities of the past may expire in a global era; and migrants/refugees pose the exemplification of these concerns. The label of the refugee carries undesirable images of impoverishment and comes forward as an unwelcome burden. Factors like a loud political discourse, the aggressive disposition of media towards refugees and «fake» asylum seekers, the predominance of far right - nationalist political parties, detaining asylum seekers or scattering them by force into communities that suffer from social deprivation and structural inequalities highlight the sense of alienation and anxiety about the «other»¹; and the impact that it may have on identity, employment and welfare. The present stigmatization of Islamic communities comes from this securitization of migration, as the greatest percentage of refugees and asylum seekers that reach Europe are of an Islamic background.

¹ Zetter, More Labels, Fewer Refugees: Remaking the Refugee Label in an Era of Globalization, 2007

However, actual numbers of asylum seekers and political friction or xenophobia do not always have a causal relationship². European societies were already severely challenged by globalization processes that altered labor markets and social systems and led to demographic decline and social division. The refugee flows added to the general feeling of individual uncertainty causing the emerging of a variety of concerns and emotions, including xenophobia, racism, social envy and the NIMBY («not in my back yard») phenomenon. The establishment and development of movements like the PEGIDA movement (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Western World) in Germany is owed to this shared sense of excessive struggles of society, as people from all social levels gather to collectively express their concern that the “other” will alter their lifestyle and eventually, their identity. In their standpoint, they easily find ways to rationalize their concerns, by mixing facts and myths of refugee migration and demographic decline, religious heterogeneity and declining social cohesion. Nevertheless, this refugee crisis might be triggered but is not rooted in refugees themselves but in the incompetence of the European Union and its member states to adequately and jointly address the needs of people eligible for international protection. It is this inability which has translated into political chaos and a sense of crisis.

The present dissertation examines how the refugee and migration flows have impacted the security issues in Europe; or in other words, the way that refugee and migrant flows are securitized in Europe. It addresses the factors informing views about asylum seekers’ impact on health, economy, identity and security in Europe. However, the main question that this dissertation analyses is; whether the concerns about refugees’ and migrants’ impact on the above-mentioned thematics are actually reflective of the prevailing state of affairs or are they scapegoated for the current EU crisis and the several difficulties that occur without the adequate data to justify the condemnations.

In the first and introductory part, some key concepts will be analyzed, namely the differences between refugees, migrants and asylum-seekers; some basic definitions

² Doomernik and Glorius, *Refugee Migration and Local Demarcations: New Insight into European Localities*, 2016

will be provided, which are needed for the analysis of the current status quo. After that, the latest available data, demographics and trends will be briefly presented as a basis for the understanding of the wider picture in the area.

In the second and main part of the analysis, populist right's and far-right's rhetoric, arguments and fears will be presented briefly, with actual statements, that will lead to the examination of the four main pillars: health, economy, identity and society in regard to asylum-seekers' effect on each one of them.

1. Refugee crisis' background information

According to UNHCR's Global Trends Report of 2016³, over the last 20 years, the global number of forcibly displaced people has risen significantly from 33.9 million in 1997 to 65.6 million in 2016, which is the highest record. This escalation took place mainly between 2012 and 2015, due to the conflict in Syria and other clashes in the wider region. Only during 2016, 10.3 million people were newly displaced, including 3.4 million who sought protection abroad and 6.9 million people who were forced to flee but remained in their own countries. These 10.3 million new displacements equated to an average of 20 people being newly displaced every minute of every day in 2016.

The countries that were mostly affected by forced displacement in 2016 were Syria, with 12 million people at the end of 2016 that included 5.5 million refugees, 6.3 million internal displaced persons (IDPs) and nearly 185.000 asylum-seekers; Afghanistan, with a total of 4.7 million forcibly displaced Afghans, of whom 1.8 million were IDPs and 2.9 million were refugees or asylum-seekers. Other countries with large displaced populations at the end of 2016⁴ were Iraq (4.2 million), South Sudan (3.3 million), Sudan (2.9 million), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2.9 million), Somalia (2.6 million), Nigeria (2.5 million), Ukraine (2.1 million) and Yemen (2.1 million). Worth-mentioning is the fact that Syria is the only country in which forced displacement affects the majority of the population, with a proportion of 650 people out of every 1.000 to be forcibly displaced.

Other crises, like the war in South Sudan, caused a fast outflowing of refugees and IDP displacements too, although they were overshadowed by the Syrian crisis. Some of them were situated in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Ukraine and Yemen. However, contrary to any anticipation, the fastest growing refugee crisis in 2016 was the South Sudanese.

³ UNHCR, Global Trends – Forced Displacement in 2016, 2016

⁴ with over 2 million displaced people, either internally or as refugees or asylum-seekers abroad

In 2015 and 2016, a great number of people tried to cross the Mediterranean Sea in a quest of protection. This led to an increase of the refugee and asylum-seeking population that reached Europe. In Germany, this population rose to 1.3 million people by the end of 2016; while in Sweden it reached 313.300. Around half of refugees were minors, which in many cases do not have the protection of a family or kin. More specifically, 75.000 unaccompanied and separated children were reported to have apply for asylum during 2016, although this number is considered to be an underestimate.

When it comes to the available demographic data of 2016, men consisted of 20.4 million and women 19.3 million people; and out of the 23.9 million people sheltered in 2016, 12.7 million were children below the age of 18, consisting a percentage of 51% of the total number. Moreover, 45% of the refugee population were in the working age (18-59) and only 4% were older (60 plus).

In regard to the living conditions, 60% of refugees were located in urban areas, as was the case back in 2015 too. This fact highpoints the urban nature of the refugee population. Furthermore, 63% of refugees were living in individual accommodation, similar to 2014 and a decline from 2015. The Syrian refugee crisis was characterized by refugees living in private or individual accommodation rather than camps, with 90% of refugees doing so. Most of the refugees, that were staying in rural locations, were living in a managed camp (67%) and only 18% of them were residing in individual accommodation.

1.1 In regard to refugees

At the end of 2016, the global number of refugees had risen at 22.5 million and the percentage of refugees that is under UNHCR's mandate had grown by 65% the last five years. However, the rate of growth is the slowest since 2012. In 2016, the refugee population increased by only 7% while in 2015, it had increased by 12% and in 2014, by 23%.

Due mainly to the crisis in Syria, the greatest percentage of newly recognized refugees in 2016 originated from Syria; as in the end of the year, 5.5 million Syrian citizens had sought refuge abroad. With 824.000 new recognitions only in 2016, the

number of refugees arriving in Europe keeps rising. However, Turkey has hosted the biggest proportion of refugees, with 2.9 million while the rest of Europe has hosted around 2.3 million refugees. Germany, the European country that has hosted the vast majority of refugees, increased its figures considerably in 2016 with 669.500 refugees, relatively to 2015, that was hosting 316.100. Other European countries that contribute to accommodating large numbers of refugees include Sweden, Austria and the Netherlands.

Except of providing international protection, other long-lasting solutions that assist displaced people to reconstruct their lives consist of voluntary repatriation, resettlement to a third country and local integration. Voluntary repatriation is the main durable solution. However, refugees who flee of war, conflict or violation of their human rights cannot return to their home countries; so voluntary repatriation is not always a viable solution. Furthermore, they may have sought refuge in countries where they are endangered or their basic needs cannot be fulfilled. Resettlement to a third country, which has agreed to declare them as refugees and eventually grant them permanent residence, legal and physical protection, access to civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights similar to those enjoyed by nationals, seems as more suitable solution. In 2016, the number of refugees that got accepted for resettlement was 189.300, according to government statistics, which is a 77% increase from 107.100 in 2015. Local integration can be successful too, if the above-mentioned legal, economic, social and cultural needs are met⁵.

1.2 In regard to asylum-seekers

In 2016, there were 2.8 million asylum-seekers⁶. As in 2015, Germany continued to be the first choice of new asylum applications, with 722.400 registered during 2016 in comparison to 2015, with 441,900 and 2014, with 173.100. Italy was the second-largest recipient with 123.000 new applications compared with 83.200 in 2015. Turkey has become the third-largest recipient of new asylum claims, although its 78.600 claims in 2016 were considerably less than the 133.200 recorded in 2015.

⁵ Ibid, 3

⁶ Asylum – seekers are people who are seeking international protection but whose refugee status is yet to be determined.

France received 78.400 new applications and became the forth-largest recipient; and finally, Greece was the fifth-largest recipient as 49.800 asylum claims were applied in 2016, which was a massive increase in regard to 11.400 new asylum applications that it had received in 2015⁷.

1.3 In regard to migrants

According to IOM's Global Migration Trends report of 2015⁸, migrants are calculated to be over 1 billion people globally, which equates with 1 in 7 people. This figure includes the international migrants⁹, whose number reached 244 million in 2015; and the internal migrants who consist of around 740 million, according to 2009 UNDP estimates. One very sad observation is that there have been recorded at least 5.740 deaths or disappearances, 3.770 out of which occurred in the Mediterranean Sea; leading to a 15% rise in fatalities in comparison to 2014.

In regard to demographics, 48% of the global international migrant stock is women and 52% is men. Additionally, the average age is 39; and 15% (37 million) of the total number is below the age of 20.

Concerning the available data for forced migration, 65.3 million individuals were forcibly displaced worldwide due to persecution, conflict, violence or human rights violations. This reflects an increase in absolute terms of 5.8 million people over 2014, and represents the greatest level of forced displacement ever recorded.

In respect to irregular migration, the latest worldwide estimation¹⁰, which dates back to 2010, indicates a figure of at least 50 million irregular migrants globally. When it comes to European Union, according to Frontex¹¹, irregular arrivals increased from 100.000 on 2013 to 280.000 in 2014, with more than 1.8 million listed irregular arrivals¹². The surge in the irregular migration flows in Europe is

⁷ Ibid, 3

⁸ IOM, Global Migration Trends, 2015

⁹ International migrants are the people who inhabit in a country other than their birth-country.

¹⁰ Which heavily relies on smuggling services.

¹¹ Frontex, Annual Risk Analysis Report, 2016

¹² However, the numbers may be an overestimate, due to double-counting issues: for instance, multiple crossings by the same individual along the same border or several borders along the journey may be counted more than once, generating an overestimate in the number of arrivals to Europe.

mostly based to the rise of migrant arrivals from Turkey to the EU via Greece, Bulgaria or Cyprus, aka the “Eastern Mediterranean Route”. During 2015, Greece had been the key entrance of irregular migrants and asylum-seekers in Europe, who exceeded 900.000 with 93% of them entering by sea (853.650)¹³. Not surprisingly, Syrians have been the greatest percentage of the total, with over 50% of irregular arrivals. The second biggest entry point has been Italy, with a total of 153.842 people arriving.

¹³ This figure was eleven times lower in 2014, with only 77.163 arrivals of undocumented migrants.

2. Terminology and Legal rights

The Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees¹⁴ is the key document that coordinates the international refugee protection, as we know it today. It was established in 1951; and it was grounded in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of human rights 1948, which acknowledges the right of persons to ask for asylum from maltreatment in other countries. It was activated on 22 April 1954; and it was revised only once through a 1967 Protocol, which eliminated the geographical and chronological barriers of the 1951 Convention, making its scope truly universal.

A distinct characterization of the term “refugee” is introduced in Article 1 of the Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, which is thus the most widely used definition. Vital ethics, such as non-discrimination in respect of sex, age, disability, sexuality or other prohibited grounds of discrimination; non-penalization as to being accused for migration or lawless violations related to the pursuing of asylum or being imprisoned only on the basis of seeking asylum; and non-refoulement with reference to the fact that nobody has the right to banish or return a refugee opposed to his will to a territory where he fears threats to life or freedom are also mentioned.

“A refugee is a person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group, is outside the country of nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country.”

Furthermore, rights such as access to the courts, to primary education, to work and the provision for documentation, including a refugee travel document in passport form are the least standards that need to be met. However, persons who have committed war crimes or crimes against humanity, severe non-political crimes or their actions oppose the commitments and values of the United Nations are excluded from the term “refugee”.

¹⁴ UNHCR, Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 2010

In the recent years, the term “migrant” has become widely and interchangeably used to substitute the term “refugee”, although there are critical legal dissimilarities between the two categories. The fact that there is not a single legal definition of the term “migrant” at the international level can blur the lines between refugees and migrants and lead to grim consequences for the lives and safety of refugees. According to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies’ (IFRC)¹⁵ policy, migrants can be described as “people who leave or flee their places of habitual residence to go to a new place, across international borders or within their own state, to seek better or safer prospects. Migration can be forced or voluntary, but most of the time a combination of choices and constraints are involved, as well as the intent to live abroad for an extended period of time. Therefore, the IFRC policy definition of migrant includes, among others, labor migrants, stateless migrants, and migrants deemed irregular by public authorities.”

Migration is often understood as a voluntary process, which is not the case for refugees who cannot return safely to their home country and therefore are owed specific protections under international law. Likewise, the use of the term “forced migrants” which is also not a legal concept, and like the concept of “migration” does not have a universally accepted definition, can cover a variety of phenomena but can also shift attention away from the specific needs of refugees and from the legal obligations the international community has agreed upon to address them¹⁶.

¹⁵ Canadian Red Cross, What is the difference between a refugee and a migrant?

¹⁶ UNHCR, ‘Refugees’ and ‘Migrants’ – Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), 2016

3. Introduction: Right wing's problematics

In recent years, Europe has witnessed a wave of far-right movements sweeping many of its societies, including Germany, Hungary, Slovakia, Denmark, France, Greece, Austria, Sweden and Britain; while eurosceptic and anti-immigration parties have been seeing significant gains. When the global financial crisis broke out in 2008, due to the failure of the establishment to contain the crisis, an atmosphere of public discontent prevailed. At that point racially inflammatory rhetoric began to surface, primarily targeting immigrants, calling for isolationism and the closure of borders. The perfect conditions arose, paving the right-wing parties' way to power. The national right-wing parties capitalized on the resentment of the citizens caused by the economic recession. On top of that, migrants were scapegoated as the faces of labor competition on the European job market. After 2011, following the unfortunate outcomes of the Arab Spring, illegal immigration to Europe witnessed a remarkable surge. EU measures failed to control the flow of new refugees crossing the Mediterranean Sea; in 2015, almost 1.500.00 asylum seekers were registered.

This situation led to an ideological struggle between humanitarianism and the complicated reality of a growing refugee population. In one hand, the humanitarian principles are embodied in most European constitutions and necessitate accommodating refugees that flee from war zones, creating a moral obligation to one considering oneself belonging to the EU. On the other hand, a series of terrorist incidents that took place in many European cities is being put in parallel with the growing migrant population of migrants treated as delinquent aliens. These incidents caused fear to spread among local European communities and to be directed against Arabs and Muslims, who differ from them in religion, identity and culture. Voters began to lean towards the far-right, identifying with their anti-immigration rhetoric and placing identity-based concerns above all other considerations.

Hungary's "Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance", Poland's "Law and Justice Party", Denmark's "Danish People's Party", Sweden Democrats, Austria's "Freedom Party", Greece's "Golden Dawn" are only a few examples of far- and extreme-right voices

that try to promote an ethno-nationalist sentiment and anti-immigration policies in Europe.

Some very provocative examples of the promotion of such an agenda are obvious in the statements of the European anti-immigrant party members. As a good example, one can consider the case of Poland's Law and Justice Party's head. Former Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski has made a statement, typical of the new right-wing rhetoric. He was warning that Muslim refugees would bring parasites and diseases to the local population. Making a point about public healthcare concerns, he stated: "There are already signs of the emergence of very dangerous diseases which haven't been seen in Europe for a long time: Cholera on Greek islands; dysentery in Vienna; various types of parasites, protozoa, which aren't dangerous in the organisms of these people but which could be dangerous here"¹⁷.

Furthermore, Sweden Democrats' leader, Jimmie Åkesson, had stated in 2014 that "Islamism is the Nazism and Communism of our time", "Swedish people don't feel at home any more. [...] The problem we have is basically with the Muslims. They have difficulty assimilating, so much of their culture is based on Islam". Plus, there is the fear that if Muslim immigrants' birth rate rises, this will eventually lead them in being the majority and inevitably weakening the nation's "Swedishness"¹⁸. Although a notion like that is hard to be defined; a case of diminishing sense of national identity is being put on the table, as the population mix seems to be changing dramatically.

Moreover, in Hungary, Fidesz's Orban had stated that the refugees entering Europe "look like an army", "This is a migratory movement composed of economic migrants, refugees and also foreign fighters. This is an uncontrolled and unregulated process", "Does it comply with the freedom of information and speech that media usually show women and children while 70% of the migrants are young men and they look like an army?"¹⁹, "We think all countries have a right to decide

¹⁷ U.S. News, Right-wing Polish leader Kaczynski says migrants carry diseases to Europe, 2015

¹⁸ The Guardian, The rise of the anti-immigrant Sweden Democrats: 'We don't feel at home any more, and it's their fault', 2014

¹⁹ The Guardian, Refugees 'look like an army', says Hungarian PM Viktor Orban, 2015

whether they want to have a large number of Muslims in their countries. [...] If they want to live together with them, they can. We don't want to and I think we have a right to decide that we do not want a large number of Muslim people in our country"²⁰, "Everything which is now taking place before our eyes threatens to have explosive consequences for the whole of Europe. [...] We must acknowledge that the European Union's misguided immigration policy is responsible for this situation. [...] We shouldn't forget that the people who are coming here grew up in a different religion and represent a completely different culture. Most are not Christian, but Muslim.... That is an important question, because Europe and European culture have Christian roots"²¹. It is worth-mentioning and ironic the fact that the man who wants to save Europe's Christian identity used to have no Christian identity himself. Hungary used to belong to the Soviet bloc before the fall of the Berlin Wall. It used to be a communist regime which tried to restrict all religious tendencies and to create an atheistic society. So, like many of his countrymen, Orban was educated as an atheist. Despite these facts though, his main concerns are directed towards the preservation of nationhood through the role of Christianity, which is under attack because of the Muslims and people with other religious beliefs who can be tolerated but are not necessarily welcome, according to the constitution's wording.

In addition, Heinz-Christian Strache, leader of Austria's Freedom Party, in accordance to the statements of other members of populist and far-right parties, posed his concern in regard to Europe's culture and identity. More specifically, he said that "We have a Christian culture, and we want to keep a Christian culture for our children"²².

In Netherlands, Geert Wilders, leader of the Party for Freedom, notified the public for the "Islamic asylum tsunami" that is approaching and characterized the refugees as "testosterone bombs" who "threaten our girls"²³. It is pretty noticeable from his statements that he did not just insist on the cliché of the Muslim migrant who desires the collapse of the European culture and way of living; but he went one step

²⁰ Huffington Post, How Hungary's Viktor Orban Became The Villain Of Europe's Refugee Crisis, 2017

²¹ The Washington Post, Muslims threaten Europe's Christian identity, Hungary's leader says, 2015

²² The Washington Post, Europe's refugee crisis strengthens far-right parties, 2015

²³ Ibid, 17

further by accusing the totality of the asylum seekers as potential criminals and rapists, equating them with wild animals which cannot contain themselves and will destroy everything on their path.

Except of the evident, above-mentioned, racist commentary; even the use and the recurrence of specific words/language can influence ideas in important ways, setting up subtle habits of which the person is probably unaware. The identity of the migrant as an alien is being constructed, maintained and popularized through pejorative terms. These terms seem at times neutral and at other instances expressly hostile. Taking into consideration that a great part of the public opinion is forming their images of the issue through these terms, we can see there is a battle of words, a challenge of terms underlying. David Cameron, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 2010 to 2016 and leader of the Conservative Party from 2005 to 2016, had referred to asylum seekers as a “swarm of people coming across the Mediterranean”²⁴. Furthermore, his foreign secretary, Philip Hammond, cautioned that “So long as there are large numbers of pretty desperate migrants marauding around the area, there always will be a threat to the tunnel security.”²⁵ One of the headlines of the Daily Mail warned the public that “this tidal wave of migrants could be the biggest threat to Europe since the war”²⁶. Even BBC, has used the verbs “flood” and “stream” in order to describe the movement of people north out of Italy²⁷. A plague of swarms of insects destroys crops. Invading armies burn down towns. Floods destroy properties and drown people. The connotations are simple enough for the connection to be made in public’s consciousness but not simplistic and provocative enough in order to be easily spotted.

Unfortunately, these hateful opinions seem be aligned with a great percentage of the public opinion. As a 2014 Pew survey²⁸ of seven European populaces’ results present, the majority of respondents wanted to limit the number of new immigrants

²⁴ The Guardian, Calais crisis: Cameron condemned for 'dehumanizing' description of migrants, 2015

²⁵ The Guardian, 'Marauding' migrants threaten standard of living, says foreign secretary, 2015

²⁶ Daily Mail, Forget the Greek crisis or Britain's referendum, this tidal wave of migrants could be the biggest threat to Europe since the war, writes MICHAEL BURLEIGH, 2015

²⁷ BBC, Migrants flood trains in desperate bid to leave Italy, 2015

²⁸ Pew Research Center, Chapter 3. Most Support Limiting Immigration, 2014

arriving in their countries, with those attitudes especially evident for people who identify as politically right wing. Furthermore, in a 2016 Pew Survey²⁹, in 8 out of the 10 European nations surveyed, half or more were believing that the incoming refugees will increase the chances of domestic terrorism in their country; and that they pose a major threat to their countries. Many were also concerned that the asylum seekers will become an economic burden, as they will occupy jobs and social benefits which, otherwise, would be available to citizens of each nation.

Islamophobia is another topic that needs to be addressed as most of the recent refugees to Europe are arriving from majority-Muslim nations, such as Syria and Iraq. The dominant view of the European societies is that Muslims want to be distinct from the rest of society rather than adopt the nation's customs and way of life. Negative opinions about Muslims are much more common among respondents who place themselves on the right of the ideological spectrum and hold much more negative attitudes toward refugees and Muslims, along with skepticism about the benefits of a diverse society. Language, customs and tradition are seen as central to national identity which is supposedly threatened by the newcomers. Although people who have a more negative view of Muslims are much more concerned about the threat of refugees to their country, Europeans do not see growing diversity in races, ethnic groups and nationalities as making their countries better. Organizations like Patriotic Europeans Against Islamization of the West (PEGIDA) in Germany, "Keep Europe Christian" in Hungary, "Stop the Islamization of Europe" in Poland and the initiative of European right-wing parties to launch "Cities against Islamization" showcase the magnitude of the fear and the resentment towards the asylum seekers and the migrants, the "others". Furthermore, a great percentage of EU societies believe that immigrants are responsible for the rise of criminality³⁰.

At the same time, populist right parties strengthen their anti-EU standpoint, attacking the European Union of being authoritarian and insisting states accept more refugees, although being ineffective due to its inability to moderate the crisis. European citizens seem to agree as they overwhelmingly disapprove the way

²⁹ Pew Research Center, Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs, 2016

³⁰ Pew Research Center, Chapter 3. Most Support Limiting Immigration, 2014

that the European Union is handling the refugee crisis; and this disapproval of the EU's handling of the refugee crisis comes from all segments of society across Europe³¹.

3.1. Health

Because of the unparalleled inflow of refugees, asylum seekers and other migrants into Europe, EU member states need to address, among other issues, the public health issues that may occur. The challenges for public health authorities relate to migrants' individual health problems: whether these may affect the native population; and how they can react sufficiently to asylum seekers' needs as well as providing access to healthcare.

First of all, it should be specified that migrants and refugees tend to be in relatively good health when their journey begins³². However, during the migration process, several hardships can have a negative influence on their health, like traumas suffered from war and conflict, exposure to infectious pathogens, lacking basic health necessities, living conditions in refugee camps or reception centers, etc.³³

According to World Health Organization (WHO)³⁴, refugees and migrants face comparable health problems to the rest of the society. Accidental injuries, hypothermia, burns, gastrointestinal illnesses, cardiovascular events, pregnancy- and delivery-related complications, diabetes and hypertension are the most common health problems of newly arrived refugees and migrants. Female refugees and migrants frequently face specific challenges, particularly in maternal, newborn and child health, sexual and reproductive health and violence. Moreover, because of the refugees' and migrants' population movement, they may have developed psychosocial disorders, reproductive health problems, higher newborn mortality, drug abuse, nutrition disorders, alcoholism and exposure to violence. All of the

³¹ Pew Research Center, European opinions of the refugee crisis in 5 charts, 2016

³² European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Risk of importation and spread of malaria and other vector-borne diseases associated with the arrival of migrants to the EU, 2015

³³ Ibid, 32

³⁴ World Health Organization, Refugees and migrants: common health problems

above-mentioned increase the chances for non-communicable diseases (NCDs) to flourish.

The disruption of medical treatment is the main problem in regard to NCDs. This can be caused either due to lack of access to health care system and providers or because their destruction. Additionally, displacement and population movement results in interrupting the continuous treatment of chronic conditions, that otherwise cannot be cured or become suppressed. Children and other vulnerable individuals are likely to suffer from respiratory infections and gastrointestinal illnesses because of poor living conditions, limited hygiene and hardships during migration. All these incidents require access to proper health care. Likewise, poor hygienic conditions can also lead to skin infections.

There is a common perception that the importation of infectious diseases is closely linked to migration. However, according to Zsuzsanna Jakab, who is the WHO Regional Director for Europe, “despite a common perception that there is an association between migration and the importation of infectious diseases, there is no systematic association. Communicable diseases are primarily associated with poverty. Refugees and migrants are exposed mainly to the infectious diseases that are common in Europe, independently of migration”³⁵. Communicable diseases are related primarily with poverty; migrants usually originate from communities hit by war, conflict or economic crisis which forces them to decision to flee in order to improve their living conditions. All the sufferings that they face during travelling may lead to the emergence of communicable diseases in the group, like measles, food- and waterborne diseases³⁶. Moreover, according to Martin Seychell, who is the Deputy Director-General of the Commission's Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety, measures to protect refugees' health are being taken “not out of unfounded fears that they might spread infectious diseases' or 'place a burden on the health systems. [...] Their health is at risk, not the health of EU citizens”³⁷.

³⁵ World Health Organization, Population movement is a challenge for refugees and migrants as well as for the receiving population, 2015

³⁶ World Health Organization, Migration and communicable diseases: no systematic association

³⁷ European Commission, Refugee crisis: "Noble words need to be followed by concrete action"

In a GeoSentinel analysis³⁸ which examined mainly male unaccompanied Syrian minors (UAMs) in Berlin, from 2013 to 2015, it is specified that the majority of them posed very limited infectious risk. Screening of the UAMs showed mostly intestinal parasites (22%) and positive schistosomiasis serology (1.4%). Furthermore, no importation of wild-type poliovirus was detected among 629 Syrian toddler refugees³⁹. Although most UAMs screened were free of infectious disease, 7% had *G.Duodenalis*⁴⁰ infection, which could lead to further transmission (e.g. under crowded conditions and considering the sometimes extensive delay until screening). On the other hand, this figure is only slightly higher than the proportion of giardiasis in international travelers returning to Europe⁴¹ and it goes along with the comparatively low prevalence of parasitic diseases observed in a small group of UAMs from western Asia (Syria, Iraq, Georgia) arriving in Germany in 2011 to 2014⁴².

Europe has managed to suppress communicable diseases like tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, hepatitis, measles and rubella; although, it has a very long history of them. Economic development, better housing conditions, access to clean water, sanitation and access to health systems that provide vaccines and antibiotics were the factors that managed to limit their spread. However, they have not been eliminated completely and they still exist in Europe, regardless of migration. In the Mediterranean area, the case is similar about vector-borne diseases, such as leishmaniosis. In the Syrian Arab Republic, where most refugees come from, cases with leishmaniosis were reported but it should be noted that leishmaniosis is not transmitted from person to person and can be effectively treated. Likewise, cases of typhoid and paratyphoid fever were also recorded in Europe. Worth-mentioning is the fact that the vast majority of cases of importation of exotic and rare infectious

³⁸ Mockenhaupt, Barbre, Jensenius, Larsen C, Barnett, Stauffer, Rothe, Asgeirsson, Hamer, Esposito, Gautret, Schlagenhauf, Profile of illness in Syrian refugees: A GeoSentinel analysis, 2013 to 2015, 2016

³⁹ Bottcher, Neubauer, Baillot, Rieder, Adam, Diedrich. Stool screening of Syrian refugees and asylum seekers in Germany, 2013/2014: Identification of Sabin like polioviruses

⁴⁰ Otherwise, known as *Giardia Lamblia*, it is the parasite which causes giardiasis.

⁴¹ Schlagenhauf, Weld, Goorhuis, Gautret, Weber, von Sonnenburg, et al. Travel-associated infection presenting in Europe (2008-12): an analysis of EuroTravNet longitudinal, surveillance data, and evaluation of the effect of the pre-travel consultation.

⁴² Marquardt, Kramer, Fischer, Pruffer-Kramer, Health status and disease burden of unaccompanied asylum-seeking adolescents in Bielefeld, Germany: cross-sectional pilot study.

agents into Europe, such as Ebola, Marburg and Lassa viruses or Middle East respiratory syndrome is extremely low. But whenever importation occurs, it usually involves regular travelers, tourists or health care workers rather than refugees or migrants⁴³.

Likewise, the fact that certain infectious diseases appear to be disproportionately affecting migrant populations after their entry into Europe, as shown by data from the European surveillance system operated by the European centers for disease control (ECDC) needs to be widely known. HIV, tuberculosis, chronic hepatitis B and parasitic diseases such as malaria, Chagas disease or schistosomiasis are a few of these chronic diseases⁴⁴ ⁴⁵. In some instances, introduction of a disease by migrants has been incorrectly associated with the occurrence of a local epidemic in the country of arrival, as was the case with a recent malaria outbreak in Greece where autochthonous cases were associated with cases in recently arrived migrants⁴⁶.

Infectious diseases are not overwhelmingly common among irregular migrants. However, the overcrowded conditions, in which they usually live after their EU country entry, create the perfect environment for the propagation of an easily transmitted pathogen such as certain respiratory (e.g. influenza) or intestinal pathogens (e.g. cholera) or meningococci. Another example, that proves that migrants and refugees are mostly vulnerable to transmitted diseases after they enter to the host country, is in regard HIV. Migrants and refugees constitute 35% of new HIV cases in the EU/EEA and there is increasing evidence that migrants acquire HIV after their arrival⁴⁷.

⁴³ Ibid, 36

⁴⁴ European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Assessing the burden of key infectious diseases affecting migrant populations in the EU/EEA, 2014

⁴⁵ Gautret, Cramer, Field, Caumes, Jensenius, Gkrania-Klotsas, de Vries, Grobusch, Lopez-Velez, Castelli, Schlagenhauf, Hervius Askling, von Sonnenburg, Laloo, Loutan, Rapp, Basto, Santos O'Connor, Weld, Parola, Infectious diseases among travellers and migrants in Europe, 2010.

⁴⁶ Danis, Baka, Lenglet, Van Bortel, Terzaki, Tseroni, Detsis, Papanikolaou, Balaska, Gewehr, Dougas, Sideroglou, Economopoulou, Vakalis, Tsiodras, Bonovas, Kremastinou. Autochthonous Plasmodium vivax malaria in Greece, 2011.

⁴⁷ European Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Infectious Diseases of Specific Relevance to Newly-Arrived Migrants in the EU/EEA, 2015

In regard to non-communicable diseases (NCDs)⁴⁸, which are mainly cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, cancer, chronic lung diseases, diabetes and hypertension; refugees and migrants with NCDs are more vulnerable than the rest of the society due to the hardships that they face during their travel. More specifically, regular treatment and follow-up care is not an option; healthcare costs usually are higher.

It should be stated that the right to health is a basic social right. The United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which has been ratified by all 28 EU Member States, protects in its Article 12 “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health”. Core obligations resulting from this right apply to everyone, regardless of status⁴⁹. Human rights law contains specific provisions concerning child, prenatal and post-natal healthcare. At EU level, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union includes the right to healthcare under Article 35, which states that “[e]veryone has the right of access to preventive healthcare and the right to benefit from medical treatment under the conditions established by national laws and practices”⁵⁰. However, although it does not make any distinction on the ground of nationality, it does make the exercise of the right to healthcare subject to national laws and practices. Additionally, legal status has proved to be one of the main formal barriers to migrants' access to healthcare. In many EU Member States, undocumented migrants are only able to access emergency healthcare, which is not always granted free of charge.

Except of the spread of communicable diseases, one of the key issues that concerns the European societies, that receive or are about to receive refugees and migrants, is whether refugees and migrants are going to burden the national healthcare systems, both in terms of equipment and financially.

⁴⁸ World Health Organization, Migration and non-communicable diseases

⁴⁹ OHCHR, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966

⁵⁰ EUROPARL, CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2000

In a research that was conducted from the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA)⁵¹, it is evident that providing regular preventive care, as opposed to providing only emergency care, is cost-saving for healthcare systems. Treating a condition only when it becomes an emergency not only endangers the health of a patient but also results in a greater economic burden to healthcare systems.

In the model that was examining hypertension in EU member states⁵², it was evident that providing access to healthcare services to hypertensive migrants in an irregular situation is cost-saving, regardless of the time horizon and the age group adopted in the analysis. Furthermore, even if all migrants in an irregular situation make regular use of preventive healthcare, after one year this would result in cost-savings of around 9% compared to no access to healthcare. Moreover, the hypertension model was also applied to other time periods. When the costs were calculated for a period of five years and then over a lifetime, the cost-savings of providing regular access to care over emergency treatment increased. Over a period of five years, the cost-savings increased between 12% and 13%; the cost-savings over a lifetime were even higher, about 16%.

In the model that was examining prenatal care⁵³, the results demonstrated that providing regular care is indeed cost-effective; compared to the costs of managing the additional cases of low birth weight (LBW) associated with the non-provision of prenatal care. This means that the costs associated with LBW babies whose mothers do not receive prenatal care are higher than the costs of providing regular access to healthcare to all migrant mothers in an irregular situation. This model's findings suggest that a situation in which 100% of pregnant migrant women in an irregular situation access prenatal care may generate savings of up to 48 % in Germany and Greece and up to 69 % in Sweden (this amounts to about €56, €52 and €177 per woman, respectively) over two years.

⁵¹ European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Cost of exclusion from healthcare - The case of migrants in an irregular situation, 2015

⁵² Ibid, 51

⁵³ Ibid, 51

A report from the Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM) also aligns with the above-mentioned observations. Providing access to regular preventive healthcare for migrants in an irregular situation would not only contribute to the fulfilment of the right to enjoy the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health set forth in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights but it would also be economically sound. Besides that, not giving undocumented migrants timely access to screening and treatment, but treating conditions only when they become an emergency, may not only endanger their individual health, but could also be harmful to public health⁵⁴.

Summarizing, the inflow of the asylum seekers into Europe has resulted into panic concerning public health and the possible illnesses that these people may transfer to the natives. Although, absolute guarantee cannot be granted; the latest data proves that refugees and migrants do not carry deadly communicable diseases and thus, they do not consist of such a destructive threat, as they are represented by the far right rhetoric. However, the public health authorities should not should not become complacent. On the contrary, the screenings of the asylum seekers should be accelerated and their access to preventive public health care should be allowed; not only because it's their legal right or because this way a future epidemic may be avoided but also, because according to the reports, it is cost saving in the long run.

3.2 Economy

This sub-chapter analyses the economic aspect of the latest surge in asylum seekers in the European Union. This inflow has exposed flaws in the common asylum policy and raises questions about the EU's ability to quickly integrate the newcomers into the economy and society. Furthermore, fears that immigrants will compete for work and will end up lowering the wages; and that they will take advantage of the public budget are very common and re-produced from the right wing rhetoric. In analyzing the economic impact of the asylum seekers' arrival, observations and conclusions are drawn from the experience of previous economic migrants and refugees.

⁵⁴ Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM), Access to Health Care for Undocumented Migrants in Europe: The Key Role of Local and Regional Authorities, 2014

However, it should be stated that the characteristics of economic migrants can be different from refugees in terms of demographics and skills, motivations for departing from their home countries and in the likelihood that they will establish long-term residence in their destination countries.

It is well-known that the number of asylum seekers arriving at the EU borders cannot be compared with the size of preceding inflows of the modern times; and it is expected to continue for some time in the future, too. The number of the asylum applications in 2015 managed to exceed the previous peak reached after the fall of the Berlin Wall and during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, which was until now the largest recent refugee inflows to the EU in recent times⁵⁵. As a response to this great influx of asylum seekers, EU countries have taken one-sided and many times conflicting measures wishing of its control. Some EU border countries have closed their external border to asylum seekers while destination countries, like Austria, Germany and Sweden, have temporarily re-established border controls within the Schengen area. For instance, Sweden has announced plans to replace permanent with temporary resident permits for some asylum seekers while Germany has broadened its list of safe countries of origin and replaced cash benefits with in-kind support.

According to International Monetary Fund (IMF), the initial macroeconomic impact from the inflow of asylum seekers is through aggregate demand while labor supply effects develop gradually⁵⁶. Additional public spending for the provision of first reception and support services to asylum seekers, such as housing, food, health and education will increase aggregate demand. In the latest edition of the OECD Economic Outlook, it is estimated that in 2016 and 2017, the additional spending for the provision of support on refugees could boost aggregate demand in the European economy by about 0.1-0.2% of GDP. These government spending for

⁵⁵ Asylum applications in the EU peaked at 670,000 in 1992, and remained at elevated levels during 1990–93. The number of refugees from the former Yugoslavia reached 1.4 million in 1996, and decreased thereafter, with many going back to their home countries after the return of stability. The Kosovo crisis in 1999 also led to a surge in asylum applications, above 400,000 annually. Before the current surge, the number of refugees living in Europe was well below the levels of the 1990s—and it amounted to only 11 percent of refugees globally.

⁵⁶ IMF, *The Refugee Surge in Europe: Economic Challenges*, 2016

caring for the asylum seekers could be sizable in some countries. However, in the main countries affected, the additional expenditures announced so far have been relatively contained^{57 58}.

To illustrate the short-run economic impact of the current surge in asylum seekers, a simulation has been conducted by the IMF using the EUROMOD model⁵⁹. In regard to population, the assumed annual increase in population equals with 0.15% of the EU total population (or 0.8 million) in 2015. Furthermore, it is expected that up to two years are needed for the refugees to become qualified to work. Once they are eligible to work, it is estimated that refugees will have a lower participation rate than natives and a higher unemployment rate by 2020. Concerning fiscal, in the short term the asylum seeker's inflow result in additional government spending and fiscal transfers for all individuals in the asylum process for up to two years as well as financial support for rejected applicants for a year. Past evidence^{60 61 62}, on the fiscal impact of refugees, demonstrates that net direct fiscal impact of welcoming refugees can be relatively high in the short term but it will decrease rapidly over time as their labor market integration improves. Additionally, the expected initial effects on aggregate EU GDP are positive but small, with a more significant impact on the countries where the refugee inflows are concentrated. However, it should be noted that refugees' labor market performance may be less advantageous than that of other migrants because of their asylum application which is being considered and other legal barriers to employment that asylum seekers face⁶³.

In general, migrants integrate slowly in the recipient countries' labor markets. In Europe and other advanced economies, they have, on average, lower participation rates, employment rates and wages than natives. The earning and employment gaps

⁵⁷ OECD, How will the refugee surge affect the European economy?, 2015

⁵⁸ Germany projected an additional 0.5% of GDP per annum of public spending in 2016 and 2017 to meet initial needs of the newly arrived immigrants and to integrate them in the labor market; Austria 0.3% of GDP in 2016 and Sweden 0.9% of GDP in 2016. (OECD, 2015)

⁵⁹ EUROMOD is part of the IMF's Flexible System of Global Models (FSGM) capturing the global economy.

⁶⁰ Lu, Frenette and Schellenberg, Social Assistance Receipt Among Refugee Claimants in Canada: Evidence from Linked Administrative Data Files, 2015

⁶¹ Cully, More than Additions to Population: The Economic and Fiscal Impact of Immigration, 2012

⁶² CIC, Evaluation of Government Assisted Refugees (GAR) and Resettlement Assistance Program (RAP), 2011

⁶³ Ibid, 56

are particularly distinct in the years immediately after arrival and diminish while they spend more time in the host country and they improve their language skills or obtain more relevant job experience. However, the condition of the labor market at the time of entry can affect critically the speed of labor market integration. If migrants arrive in a period of high local unemployment, their employment rates and wage integration can be delayed. This is especially relevant given the slow recovery of many European economies from the global financial and sovereign debt crises, although asylum seekers' show preference for host countries with low unemployment rates. Furthermore, it is possible that the most recent wave of asylum seekers is better educated than past immigrants from the same countries of origin, so the relatively recent statistics are encouraging^{64 65}.

Labor market outcomes of native workers can be effected by migrants through 3 main channels. First of all, through labor supply effect: If migrants have different skills in comparison to the existing workers, natives' employment displacement and negative wage pressure from migrants' integration into the labor force will be lower. Secondly, through aggregate demand effect: As the population will be growing, bigger demand for goods and services will follow; firms will rise production and finally, labor demand will increase. Last but not least, though the allocation of resources, product mix and technology effects, as immigration may lead to changes and advancements in the goods and services produced⁶⁶.

However, it should be mentioned that the effect of new arrivals on native workers is usually small. Most studies on large immigration waves in European economies show that the average wages of native workers' respond little and that the effect on unemployment is also limited. Evidence suggests that immigration has only a small impact on employment or wages. Unskilled workers and existing migrants are the most vulnerable, as they are the closest substitutes for the new arrivals. For example, a recent paper by Stephen Nickell of Oxford University and Jumana Saleheen of the Bank of England found that a 10% rise in the share of migrants

⁶⁴ Ibid, 56

⁶⁵ In Germany, 21 percent of the Syrian asylum seekers who arrived in 2013–14 reported having tertiary education, close to the average for the native population (23 percent).

⁶⁶ Ibid, 56

working in unskilled jobs decreased wages for such positions by just 2%. The size of the effect depends on several factors like the complementarity of natives' skills with those of the immigrants, the flexibility in the labor market, the state of the economy and the size of the net immigration flow⁶⁷. Moreover, immigration can have a positive impact on native labor market performance by promoting skill upgrading. In a number of countries, the influx of immigrants has encouraged native workers to specialize in more complex tasks that are associated with higher skills and better pay. In a paper of Mette Foged and Giovanni Peri, it is obvious how refugees who arrived in Denmark between 1991 and 2008 pushed low-educated natives out of simple jobs; while the displaced natives switched to jobs that involved less manual labor and sometimes higher salaries⁶⁸. This can be applicable in the current refugee surge and as a result of this upward career mobility, natives' incomes may rise in response to immigration. However, on the negative side, the inflow of refugees will put pressure on the market for affordable housing.

In the medium and long run, the impact of the refugees on employment and GDP will depend on the speed of their integration in the labor market and the extent to which the newcomers' skills will complement or substitute those of the native labor force. For example, by 2020, the level of GDP could be about 0.25% higher for the EU as a whole and between 0.5% and 1.1% higher in the three main destination countries (Austria, Germany and Sweden). The initial impact of higher asylum seekers on the labor force will depend upon the success of asylum-seekers in gaining refugee status, the length of the application process and whether or not they will enter the labor force. Finally, the ultimate economic impact will largely depend on the success of medium and long-term labor market integration, as most refugees will actually settle⁶⁹.

However, according to studies^{70 71}, in the long term, both high and low-skilled workers who migrate bring benefits to their new home countries by increasing

⁶⁷ Nickell and Saleheen, Immigrants' Effect on Native Workers: New Analysis on Longitudinal Data, 2015

⁶⁸ Foged and Peri, The impact of immigration on occupational wages: evidence from Britain, 2016

⁶⁹ Ibid, 56

⁷⁰ IMF, Migrants Bring Economic Benefits for Advanced Economies

⁷¹ VOX, Immigration and economic prosperity, 2017

income per person and living standards. High-skilled migrants bring diverse talent and expertise while low-skilled migrants fill essential occupations for which natives are in short supply and allow natives to be employed at higher-skilled jobs.

A report from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine⁷² proves that when measured over a period of 10 years or more, the impact of immigration on the wages of native-born workers overall is very small. To the extent that negative impacts occur, they are most likely to be found for prior immigrants or native-born workers who have not completed high school. Some evidence on inflow of skilled immigrants suggests that there may be positive wage effects for some subgroups of native-born workers, and other benefits to the economy more broadly, as immigration is found to have an overall positive impact on long-run economic growth in the U.S. In terms of fiscal impacts, first-generation immigrants are more costly to governments than are the native-born. However, as adults, the children of immigrants (the second generation) are among the strongest economic and fiscal contributors in the U.S. population. Over the long term, the impacts of immigrants on government budgets are generally positive at the federal level although fiscal effects vary considerably across states.

Moreover, the results from a simulation of d'Artis Kanacs and Lecca⁷³ suggest that, although refugee integration is costly for public budgets, in the medium to long-run the social, economic and fiscal benefits may significantly outweigh the short-run integration costs. In addition, integration policy has the potential to play an important role in improving social inclusion, filling vacancies, improving the ratio of economically active to those who are inactive, addressing Europe's demographic challenges and boosting jobs and growth in the EU.

A research paper from Peri⁷⁴ provides evidence that the economic impact of immigration on receiving economies can be analyzed by the specific skills brought

⁷² National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, *The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration*, 2017

⁷³ d'Artis, K. and Lecca, P, *Long-term social, economic and fiscal effects of immigration into the EU: The role of the integration policy*, 2016

⁷⁴ Peri, G., *Immigrants, Productivity, and Labor Markets*, 2016

by immigrants, too. The complementarity and substitutability between immigrants and natives in employment, and the response of receiving economies in terms of specialization and technological choices are very important when considering the general equilibrium effects of immigration⁷⁵.

Another survey that was conducted in Germany⁷⁶ makes evident that the share of companies that have employed refugees has tripled from 2016 to 2017. In manufacturing and distribution there seem to be more employment opportunities for refugees than in the service sector. However, the companies that did not employ refugees justified it by special requirements in terms of language, qualifications or other branch-specific conditions. International experience with economic immigrants suggests that migrants have lower employment rates and wages than natives, though these differences diminish over time. Slow integration reflects factors such as lack of language skills and transferable job qualifications, as well as barriers to job search. In the case of refugees, legal constraints on work during the asylum application period also play a role. The lack of the national language skills was cited as by far the greatest barrier to recruitment, followed by legal framework conditions and the qualification level of refugees. Furthermore, the residency status of refugees represents a major barrier for most companies, followed by the duration of administrative processes, the ban on employing refugees from safe countries of origin, administrative approval, recognition of foreign professional and higher education qualifications, the costs related to internal supervision of refugees, priority checks as well as the internal administrative costs of the checks procedure⁷⁷.

Some more evidence, which prove that the refugee flows can have a positive effect on the local economy, can be found in non-western countries, too; like Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey.

⁷⁵ In the United States, a balanced composition of immigrants between college and non-college educated, together with the adjustment of demand and technology, imply that general equilibrium effects on relative and absolute wages have been small.

⁷⁶ CES Ifo, Share of Companies Employing Refugees Triples, 2017

⁷⁷ Ibid, 52

In the case of the Lebanon, the economy has been growing beyond expectations. The World Bank⁷⁸ had estimated 2.5% growth in real terms this year, which is the country's highest growth rate since 2010. The inflow of refugees has arguably helped the Lebanese economy withstand the negative effect of its neighbor's civil war. Refugees have been an important source of demand for locally produced services in Lebanon, funded from own savings and labor income, from remittances of relatives abroad and from international aid. In fact, a World Bank report⁷⁹ estimates that an additional 1% increase in Syrian refugees increases Lebanese service exports by 1.5%. And the UNHCR and U.N. Development Program⁸⁰ estimate a similar economy-wide impact from the \$800 million that the U.N. spends annually on Syrian refugees in Lebanon. This economic flexibility in the face of large inflows of refugees has been the case for Jordan (which has taken 630,000 Syrian refugees or around 10 percent of its population) and Turkey as well, with both economies growing consistently throughout the refugees' inflow.

In the case of Turkey and Jordan, recent research⁸¹ finds that while Syrian refugees in Turkey, the majority of whom have no formal work permits, have displaced unskilled informal and part-time workers, they have also generated more formal non-agricultural jobs and an increase in average wages for Turkish workers. In addition, many of the displaced workers have gone back to school and may well increase their wages once they return to the labor market. This picture is also consistent with the Jordanian case, where unemployment has not increased in areas where Syrians have resettled, as Syrian workers have tended to find employment in low-skill sectors that Jordanians typically avoid. And this evidence⁸² is consistent with that on the net impact of migrants on host countries' labor markets, which is typically small⁸³ and positive on average⁸⁴.

⁷⁸ World Bank, *LEBANON ECONOMIC MONITOR - THE ECONOMY OF NEW DRIVERS AND OLD DRAGS*, 2015

⁷⁹ World Bank, *THE IMPACT OF THE SYRIAN CONFLICT ON LEBANESE TRADE*, 2015

⁸⁰ UNHCR and UNDP, *IMPACT OF HUMANITARIAN AID ON THE LEBANESE ECONOMY*, 2015

⁸¹ World Bank, *The Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Turkish Labor Market*, 2015

⁸² Brookings, *Jordan's Syrian refugees*, 2015

⁸³ Center for Global Development, *Temporary Work Visas: A Four-Way Win for the Middle Class, Low-Skill Workers, Border Security, and Migrants*, 2013

⁸⁴ Cloyne, J. and Surico, P., *Household Debt and the Dynamic Effects of Income Tax Changes*, 2017

In regard to the fiscal burden, Turkey can be used again as an example. It has provided free access to health care and education to all registered refugees and has built camps that have become a “model for the perfect refugee camp.” To provide these services the Turkish government has spent nearly 5.37 billion euros since the refugees first began arriving, entirely funded through its own fiscal resources. While this is undoubtedly a lot of money, there is no indication that this spending has jeopardized the country’s fiscal sustainability. This should be even more the case for the EU, whose economy is 23 times larger than Turkey’s. Moreover if allowed to work, newly arrived migrants can increase their net fiscal contribution⁸⁵ to the host economy.

Summarizing, in the case of refugees, the impacts may be felt more in the social field as the perception of citizens associates the arrival of refugees with increased competition for social allowances and benefits.

In the short term, the effect from the asylum seekers’ influx is likely to be perceptible like a modest increase in GDP growth, reflecting the fiscal expansion associated with support to the asylum seekers as well as the expansion in labor supply as the newcomers begin to enter the labor force.

In medium and long-term, the impact of the refugees depends on how they will be integrated in the labor market.

The main difference between migrants and refugees is that in one hand, the migrants are usually young men with training and entrepreneurship, although subsequent family reunification may later lead to a better balance. Refugees, on the other hand, are whole families, with members of all ages and a level of income that allows them to reach the countries they have chosen beforehand, and with a high level of human capital. Despite this difference, numerous studies have shown the economic benefits of migrants for host countries. In a study on the impacts of immigration in Europe, various authors point out that, contrary to popular beliefs, the effects on average salaries are positive and wage inequality among native workers is reduced⁸⁶. From a technical point of view, Georges J. Borjas has demonstrated that unrestricted cross-border migration increases efficiency and,

⁸⁵ Dustmann, C. and Frattini, T., *The Fiscal Effects of Immigration to the UK.*, 2014

⁸⁶ Docquier, Özden and Peri, “The wage effects of immigration and emigration”, 2010

just as with free trade, the free movement of people is necessary to increase global GDP⁸⁷. With emigration the balances are restored, diminishing labor surpluses in countries of origin at the same time as meeting the demand in host countries. Thus, the allocation of resources in the labor markets is improved. Nevertheless, the perception of the consequences in host countries is normally negative, protectionist attitudes arise along with demands for protection in terms of free trade. The perception of workers in host countries is that salaries may fall and they will have more competition and may even lose their job. At the same time, the unemployed feel that they may have to wait longer to find work if the new arrivals in the labor market compete for the same job. This is another of the perceptions that goes beyond the labor market and affects competition for social services and their possible decline in quality due to the arrival of new beneficiaries⁸⁸.

3.3 Society - Identity

There is little doubt that Muslim immigrants are at the center of current political discussion in Europe. Intolerance for and perceived threats from Muslim immigrants is a re-occurring topic globally. The rise of right-wing parties, anti-immigrant movements, as well as the discontent towards the lack of integration of these populations into host societies seem to lead to the rise of the support for right wing and populist political movements, along with xenophobia / islamophobia directed towards refugees and migrants. The increased numbers of immigrants and asylum seekers arriving in the EU from Muslim countries in recent years and the list of terrorist attacks, that keeps growing continuously, have brought the issue of security, as well as other problems that are supposedly related to Muslim immigrants, to the forefront of public and political discussions. Heightened fears and public perceptions of potential terrorist attacks, rising unemployment issues, resource pressures and cultural clashes represent just a few of the concerns that need to be addressed, in general. In particular, Muslim populations have faced serious challenges from rising perceptions of threat and the potential socially and politically relevant negative outcomes of the above-mentioned fears. Recent terrorist

⁸⁷ Borjas, "Immigrant and emigrant earnings: a longitudinal study", 1989.

⁸⁸ Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB). Pressure and Opportunity in the Labor Markets. 2015

attacks by IS supporters in Europe have also made life significantly more difficult for both Muslim immigrants and the public at large. However, whether society's identity is at risk through the cultural clashes that may occur is the key question of this sub-chapter; whether the fears of society's identity alienation and islamization are sensible. Islamophobia and Orientalism are the two notions that are going to be examined. Furthermore, defining of the securitization of migration based on the theory of the Copenhagen School for Security Studies will be included as this part of the paper focuses on the societal aspect of security studies while the national security threats of potential terrorist attacks remains outside of the scope of this chapter.

In recent years, many European and Western countries have seen a rise in populism, nationalism and right-wing extremism. As Matthew Feldman, the director of the Radicalism and New Media Research Group at the University of Northampton, observed "Instead of open racial attacks, they (right-wing and populist politicians) play up a threat to national identity and criticize multiculturalism, particularly as it relates to Islam"⁸⁹. Moreover, Bravo Lopez comments in his paper that "What is scary about Islam is the way it evokes the specter of puritanical Christianity, a moral crusade"; the same "moral" reaction to Islamophobia is demonstrated in modern-day Central Europe, manifested as far right politics⁹⁰.

Today, Islamophobia, alongside a widespread hysteria towards migration inflows, has become largely institutionalized and normalized in public language, in mainstream party programs and in media coverage. Distrust, fear and even hatred towards Muslims and Islam have become dominant, while Islamophobic discourses are being reproduced with moral indifference, without taking into consideration the moral stigma and troubling implications that may lead to.

However, Islamophobia is informed by, and works in conjunction with, Orientalism. Edward Said adopted the term in order to name the discourse surrounding how the

⁸⁹ CNN, Anger At Austerity, Immigration Feeds Far Right's Rise In Europe, 2012

⁹⁰ Bravo López, Towards a definition of islamophobia: Approximations of the early twentieth Century, 2011

West imagines the East. Said's Orientalism⁹¹ demonstrates that the West views the East in no other terms than the "other", constructing the East as a poorly defined opposition that is both repulsive and intriguing to Western imagination. There are power relations infused to Orientalism, namely that the West defines the East, and that the East has no power to represent itself. This power imbalance is replicated nowadays, through the "refugee crisis" in European politics, since refugees and migrants have no voice to represent themselves in political debates. The West views the people of the East as numerous, threatening and evil. They are irrational people and the natural enemies of the morally and intellectually superior West. These images and ideas are prevalent in rhetoric surrounding the Middle East and Muslim and Middle Eastern refugees and migrants. The ideas that Islam and Muslims are inherently dangerous and incompatible with Western life and society fuel much of the language behind far right politics.

Unfortunately, the members of the society who have faced the most uncertainty and loss because of the European economic crisis may turn to ideas of national or ethnic superiority because of the security brought by in-group belonging. This nationalist ideology is established on notions of inclusion and exclusion and that explains why distrust and fear of those, who are excluded, grows. As a result, the right wing politicians and the populists, who have "warned" first the public sphere about those terrors, are able to exploit the public opinion with ease by scapegoating the feared "other" for problems that their voters face⁹².

To take one step further and in order to justify a number of laws targeting Muslim minorities in several European countries, politicians have used the idea of "Eurabia" to cause fear and gain support. As it was mentioned previously, the main idea behind the term is that Muslims and Muslim majority countries present a threat to European sovereignty and identity. Many Europeans believe that Islam is incompatible with European values and ideals, which has been untrue for many Muslim communities across Europe. As Leora Moreno describes in the article

⁹¹ Said, Orientalism, 1978

⁹² Weiss, A Cross-National Comparison of Nationalism in Austria, the Czech and Slovak Republic, Hungary, and Poland, 2003

“Fearing the Future: Islamophobia in Central Europe,” many Europeans see the presence of mosques or outward symbols of religious affiliation as a failure to integrate, despite the fact that many European Muslims share many “European” values, in spite of religious affiliation⁹³. Secondly, many far-right politicians refer to low birth rates amongst Europeans in comparison with Muslim and Middle Eastern birth rates as a reason to fear the growth of Muslim populations. These fears of an eventually Muslim majority in their countries are completely unfounded. What would one or two million refugees mean in a Europe of 500 million citizens? To put it in context, we are talking about 0.2% or 0.4%.; even if all five million Syrian refugees came to Europe and all of them were Muslim, it would raise the Muslim population on that continent from its current 4% to only 5%. And even though the birthrate among European Muslims is slightly higher than non-Muslims, birth rates decline as the standard of living and education rises. Moreover, Syrians are already well-educated and their birthrate is comparable to that of many European countries⁹⁴.

However, the refugee crisis can be seen as an opportunity and solution towards an aging Europe, too. Birth rates are generally low; the aging and demographic decline is expected to continue and even accelerate. Since large numbers of young refugees are coming with children of schooling age, they can counterbalance this trend. Additionally, although integrating migrants is challenging, there are examples across Europe where integration has been successful. For example, the Vietnamese community that has been living in the Czech Republic consists of more than 60,000 ethnic Vietnamese today, which is 20 times more than the European Commission’s refugee quota would allocate to the country. Many Vietnamese have excelled in education and are active in the business community⁹⁵.

However, neither Islamophobia nor the broader anti-immigration / anti-multiculturalist rhetoric are confined to the radical right parties and their voters. In fact, if someone focus on election results alone can realize a deeper, more

⁹³ Moreno, Fearing the future: Islamophobia in central Europe, 2010

⁹⁴ Zunes, Europe's Refugee Crisis, Terrorism, and Islamophobia, 2017

⁹⁵ Brookings, Is the refugee crisis an opportunity for an aging Europe?, 2015

threatening social reality, whereby Islamophobia effortlessly covers the supposed mainstream-extremism nexus of contemporary western societies. The trope of the “silent majority”⁹⁶, a favorite slogan of many radical right politicians in contemporary Europe, implies that mainstream society has become less liberal on a subcategory of issues relating to immigration, Islam, multiculturalism and human rights.

An incident, which depicts the above-mentioned decline of liberalism, can be traced in Wangen bei Olten⁹⁷ of Switzerland, in 2005, long before and refugee or economic crisis. A local Turkish cultural association, which in 2003 had been granted permission to use an industrial building as a cultural and worship space, applied to the authorities for the construction of a single minaret, only six meters high. The Swiss People’s Party⁹⁸ took up the issue, arranging the required number of signatures for a referendum (100,000). Parties of the center- left and -right, as well as the majority of Swiss religious organizations, urged voters to reject the proposal. The Swiss courts warned that approval of the measure would risk running foul of international human rights principles, damage inter-community relations and damage Switzerland’s image. Opinion polls indicated that public support for the initiative, although constantly rising in the months before the referendum, remained reassuringly below 40%. On the day of the referendum, however, on 29 November 2009, 57.5% of voters endorsed the measure.

The 2009 Swiss referendum, along with the almost contemporary Belgian and French legal bans on female Islamic dress were disturbing milestones in the mainstreaming of Islamophobia in Europe. Then, in early January 2015, the murderous attack on the offices of the French weekly Charlie Hebdo prompted a fresh wave of concerns about radical Islam in Europe. Once again, it was the radical right that rushed to extract as much political capital as possible out of the attack, portraying the incident as a terrible evidence of their warnings about the supposed

⁹⁶ The silent majority is an unspecified large group of people in a country or group who do not express their opinions publicly. The term was popularized by U.S. President Richard Nixon in a November 3 1969, speech in which he said, "And so tonight—to you, the great silent majority of my fellow Americans—I ask for your support."

⁹⁷The Guardian, Swiss vote to ban construction of minarets on mosques, 2009

⁹⁸ It is a national conservative party that underwent significant transformation in a radical-populist direction in the 1990s and emerged as a major party in the following decade.

danger that Islam posed for Europe. Almost immediately, the leader of UKIP, Nigel Farage, blamed state multiculturalism for the rise of home-grown terrorism in Europe, while Geert Wilders called for an all-out “war against the Islamization of Europe”⁹⁹. The current, rapidly escalating refugee crisis in Europe and its melodramatic coverage by mainstream media can only cause more insecurity and expose Muslim minorities in Europe to new verbal and physical attacks.

It is a fact that xenophobic movements and political parties remain a minority but it is also true that citizens’ support for the refugees is gradually diminishing. A survey carried out recently by the French Institute of Public Opinion (IFOP) shows that only 12% of those surveyed in France are in favor of implementing programs of help and reception for the refugees. In Germany, the percentage of those interviewed who consider that there are too many foreigners has risen from 33% to 44%, and 80% want the refugees only to stay a few months or years¹⁰⁰.

In another experimental study¹⁰¹ that investigated the dynamics of intolerance and threat perceptions of EU citizens in Germany and the Netherlands, it is evident that differences of conceptualization of political and social intolerance exist. Results reveal that threat perceptions operate at two separate levels, personal and sociotropic. The public differentiates between each threat level but people seem to be overwhelmingly influenced by the social effects of immigrants on the public at large rather than by effects on their personal security. In Germany, for instance, the Muslim indication increases political intolerance but decreases it in the Netherlands. One possible reason for this could be different perceptions of Muslims in these two countries. Although the Dutch are significantly more intolerant of Muslim immigrants than the Germans, given the Muslim indication, they become much more tolerant and less threat perceptive toward the group. For the Germans, however, the Muslim indication influences how much they would tolerate allowing Muslims to exercise their political rather than social or cultural rights. Fear and anger increase intolerance and threat perception. It is also obvious that the Dutch

⁹⁹ EURACTIV, *Hebdo’s gift to the right*, 2015

¹⁰⁰ Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB), *The right to asylum at stake*, 2015

¹⁰¹ Erisen, C. and Kentmen-Cin, C, *Tolerance and perceived threat toward Muslim immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands*, 2016

participants that support democratic values and trust political institutions are significantly less likely to be intolerant while also perceiving less threat from the (Muslim) immigrants. On policy preferences, the social aspects of Muslim immigrants are significantly more important for the Germans and the Dutch than political or personal threat.

Another interesting view is that of Moreno who states that after the fall of communism, western world and Europe needed a new enemy. It is known that identities are formed in opposition to others, and national identities are no different¹⁰². The example of Central European counties can be used as an illustrative example. These countries had the historical roles of being a barrier between the Christian West and the East. By reviving this idea, it provides a sense of identity. However, it requires trust on the idea that the Middle East and Islam in general are natural and incompatible enemies to Europe. As Said writes “the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience”¹⁰³. European culture gained strength and identity by distancing itself against the Orient, the “other”, the threatening Muslims.

For example, Zeman, who is the President of Czech Republic, justified his stance on refugees in 2015 by drawing an arbitrary connection between Muslim migrants and “Sharia law”, claiming that Muslim asylum-seekers surely would implement restrictive religious law in Europe, an imaginary situation which would be detrimental to Czech society because “we [Czech men] will lose women’s beauty because they will be covered head to toe in burqas”¹⁰⁴.

Another example, that inferences can be drawn from, is the fact that the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, while representing Fidesz which is a mainstream Conservative party with a huge share of the vote, invoked history and more specifically the long period of the Ottoman rule in the Balkans in order to assert that “we (the Hungarian state) have a right to decide that attitudes. First, the idea

¹⁰² Ibid, 65

¹⁰³ Ibid, 63

¹⁰⁴ The Atlantic, European Refugee Crisis: A ‘Systematic’ Violation of Human Rights, 2015

that Europe was Christian beforehand is not necessarily true. This statement erases the presence of both Jewish and Muslim communities that have existed in Europe for many centuries. Secondly, Orbán chose the time following the shocking attacks in Paris to launch his campaign, framing Muslims, particularly refugees, as those who threaten “Christian Europe”. In this statement, Orbán frames all non-Christians as a threat, and as people who should be kept out of Europe. “We do not want a large number of Muslim people in our country”¹⁰⁵. He also presented the inflow of refugees as an existential threat to Europe’s “Christian values”¹⁰⁶. Orbán’s government had made headlines even earlier that year with its decision to erect a barb-wire fence along its border with Serbia to stop migration into Hungary, boldly claiming that “Hungary is the defense of Europe against Islam”.

Another theory, that can set light to the current political reality and possibly enlighten the decisions that are taken at present, belongs to the Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde from the Copenhagen School for Security Studies who have conceptualized security studies in a broader sense. According to their framework, instead of relating to traditional concepts of the stability and persistence of a state and its sovereignty, security can relate to any issue that is “presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object” that “justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them.” Any referent object that is supposed to be threatened by an existential force legitimizes “actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure” and thus becomes securitized¹⁰⁷.

The Copenhagen Schools’ understanding of security studies includes different sectors that incorporate various part of daily human life: military, political, economic, societal and environmental. Their innovation to the study of security, which also has implications for the study of migration, is the distinction of two categories of security: national security and societal security. For Wæver “societal security concerns the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats,” or to put it more generally,

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 16

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 17

¹⁰⁷ Buzan, Wæver, and De. Wilde. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 1998.

“societal security is about situations when societies perceive a threat in identity terms”¹⁰⁸. Like national security, societal security is concerned with survival. However, instead of being concerned with threats to state sovereignty, it focuses on threats to group identity, i.e. the self-conception of a community, as a separate referent object. “A state that loses its sovereignty does not survive as a state; a society that loses its identity fears that it will no longer be able to live as itself”¹⁰⁹. In this section of the paper, the relevant sector of security that relates to migration is societal security. According to Buzan et. al, societal security’s referent object refers to large-scale collective identities of a society¹¹⁰. These identities naturally evolve and change according to internal and external pressures, but “whether migrants or rival identities are securitized depends upon whether the holders of the collective identity take a relatively closed-minded or relatively open-minded view of how their identity is constituted and maintained”¹¹¹.

O’Neill emphasizes that societal security does not depend on whether or not the cause of security threat is real or not but rather how states and polities react to this debate based on the perceptions of their societies¹¹². Georgios Karyotis similarly posits that any force that threatens the identity of a society “challenges the very existence of a traditional pattern of living” and thus can be conceived as a security threat¹¹³. Specifically, the process of securitizing migration includes an understanding that migrants and “outsiders” pose a threat to the collective cultural identity as they challenge the homogeneity and collectivity of a society. It threatens the cultural cohesion and exclusive national identity of a society¹¹⁴. Karyotis mentions that it is the political elites of Europe “who often see themselves as defenders of national purity and societal security” that aim to place migration within security terms and treat migrants and asylum seekers as a threat to a society’s cultural identity¹¹⁵. This process of defining migrants as threats to collective identity

¹⁰⁸ Wæver, *Societal security: the concept*, 1993

¹⁰⁹ Wæver, *Securitization and Desecuritization*, 1995

¹¹⁰ *Ibid*, 54

¹¹¹ Banulescu-Bogdan and Collett, *Refugee Crisis Deepens Political Polarization in the West*, 2015.

¹¹² O’Neill, *The European Union and Migration*,

¹¹³ Karyotis, *The Fallace of Securitizing Migration*,

¹¹⁴ *Ibid*, 57

¹¹⁵ *Ibid*, 58

is what securitizes migration. Anastassia Tsoukala theorizes that European political elites, who fear a loss of sovereignty due to globalization and Europeanization, place blame on foreigners for social problems, justifying strict immigration policies as a way to protect borders and maintain a sense of control over collective national identity. The mainstream political elites, she argues, transmit discourse that describes a reality of national culture that is threatened by outsiders¹¹⁶.

Worth-mentioning is the fact that although European identity has not replaced national group identity and probably will not do so in the near future, it is important for the reshaping of national identities. More specifically, it provides an additional layer to national self-conception, and facilitates the definition of interest and options for action of nation-states¹¹⁷.

Within the literature about security studies, many scholars point to the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 as a crucial moment that reinforced the way nations address migration within a modern security framework. Jocelyne Cesari describes how the “War on Terror” regards Islam as an existential threat that necessitates an emergency political response outside the bounds of regular action¹¹⁸. Furthermore, Karyotis characterizes that period as inextricably linking migration to security as “it became almost unthinkable to refer to the fight against terrorism without special reference to the threats posed by migration”¹¹⁹. As he describes, the securitization of migration highlights how citizens and politicians of a nation claim that “our security justifies limitations to their rights” which legitimizes restrictive policies against migrants of specific religious or ethnic backgrounds.

This current period with this new range of issues, such as immigration, international terrorism, national sovereignty, globalization and the effects of the worldwide economic crisis has created a political environment that has allowed the

¹¹⁶ Tsoukala, *Turning Immigrants into Security Threats: A Multi-faceted Process*, 2016.

¹¹⁷ Wæver, *The EU as a security actor: reflections from a pessimistic constructivist on post-sovereignty security orders*, 2000

¹¹⁸ Cesari, *Securitization of Islam in Europe*,

¹¹⁹ Karyotis, *European Migration Policy*

radical and extreme right to blossom and unite its otherwise disparate and fragmented forces. The ideology of the international radical and extreme right is particularly hard to be classified, ranging from extreme social conservatism to populism, often with liberal hues, to violent activism; and from seemingly respectable, polite agents of the parliamentary democracy to groups with paramilitary characteristics or even clandestine terrorist links.

Mudde defined right wing extremism as “nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and the belief in a strong state”¹²⁰; while Falter and Schumann created a wider definition: “extreme nationalism, ethnocentrism, anti-communism, anti-parliamentarianism, anti-pluralism, militarism, law-and-order thinking, demand for a strong political leader and/or executive, anti-Americanism and cultural pessimism”¹²¹.

Summarizing, trying to limit growing migration inflows from north Africa and Asia, the post-9/11 fear of al-Qaeda and more recently the so-called Islamic State (IS), basic opposition to multiculturalism, fears of national and European identity dilution, calls for a “fortress Europe” and the fighting over the EU’s Schengen border zone, as well as concerns about unemployment and falling living standards after the 2008 financial crisis were linked originally to a form of xenophobia, racism and primarily religious intolerance that later transformed into a profound and severe security concern.

Radical and extreme right were promoted with every terrorist incident committed in the name of Islam, with every wave of immigration, with every negative data about unemployment and pressure on social services, with every critique of multiculturalism and expression of anxiety about a supposedly weakened European identity. There is an increasing, multidimensional securitization of Islam that raises Islamophobia among mainstream society. For communities with a Muslim background living in Europe these are hard times. They are blamed to be “aliens” to Europe, as they supposedly are culturally incompatible (whether because they allegedly refuse to assimilate or because they apparently cannot do so while

¹²⁰ Mudde, *The war of words defining the extreme right party family*, 1996

¹²¹ *Ibid*, 54

maintaining their religion and associated way of life). They have been portrayed as dangerous competitors for material prosperity, in terms of occupying jobs and social benefits. They have been assumed to be exceptionally vulnerable to ideological radicalization and recruitment to terrorist causes and de facto suspected of harboring an extremism that constantly threatens social peace.

For many years, populist radical right parties have relied upon xenophobic, nationalist and popular sovereignty ideologies to gain support and make claims that reject the social inclusion of migrants or regard migrants as security threats. While there exist many different political actors that contribute to the securitization of migration, populist radical and extreme right parties play a key role in promoting rhetoric that capitalizes on the public anxieties towards migrants and places migration within a national security context to protect original national values. These groups present “immediate and demagogical solutions to people’s day to day problems”¹²² that rely upon a belief that international migration has posed a significant threat to the society’s traditional culture and safety. The extreme right is focused on the preservation of a set of identities, which they think are threatened by globalization.

For example, in the case of France, the religious aspect acts as a barrier to inclusion; Muslims are often portrayed as being threats to society while certain political parties work towards stigmatizing immigrants of Muslim origins. News stories that present an account of overwhelming numbers of migrants and migrants committing crimes create situations in which stereotypes and general fears are bred in the public mind. Normally open borders began restricting access, a strong military presence became visible in train stations and the issue of asylum-seekers became a major focus of public attention. Combined with terrorist attacks all over the western world in subsequent attacks, apparently inspired by the so-called “Islamic State,” it has contributed to an alarming growth in xenophobia and Islamophobia throughout Europe.

¹²² European Humanist Federation, *The European Union and the Challenge of Extremism and Populism: How to Protect Democracy and the Rule of Law in Europe?*, 2013

Last year's terrorist attacks all over the western world, which killed plenty of innocent people, were not only tragic in themselves but have resulted in an erosion of civil liberties, increasing Islamophobia and anti-immigrant sentiment, and the risks of further Western military intervention in the Middle East. It is important to note, however, that terrorist attacks in Pakistan, Nigeria and Iraq during this same period have killed even more people and they are not even widely known. Despite the fact that the victims were no less innocent and the results were no less tragic, they did not receive anything close to the media attention or sympathy of Westerners.

3.4 Security - Terrorism

The discovery that the terrorists, who committed the Paris attacks, travelled along the eastern Mediterranean migration route in their attempts to exit and re-enter Europe, undetected, has moved counterterrorism debates in the direction of examining whether the threat of terrorism in Europe is connected with migration flows towards Europe. Migration has not primarily been treated as a security issue up until the late 1980s; however, after 9/11, migration appeared prominently in the debate on anti-terrorism. Could refugees be recruited by terrorists while on route or in asylum facilities? Are refugees more vulnerable to radicalization? Could terrorists enter Europe by "disguising" themselves as refugees? In sum, are current migration flows to Europe exacerbating the threat that terrorist organizations pose to Europe? These are only a few of the questions that are examined in this chapter of the dissertation.

In regard to radicalization and recruitment of refugees, it is undeniable that asylum seekers are fleeing from areas where terrorist groups operate. Since 2015, IS has used provincial media outlets in Syria, Iraq and Yemen to engage with large-scale propaganda campaigns portraying those who flee the Caliphate as "infidels" seeking refuge in un-Islamic lands, instead of defending their Muslim allies.

At the same time, the threats by IS to use "migrants as a "psychological weapon" have made far-right politicians across Europe, including the Czech Prime Minister Milos Zeman, argue that refugee flows form part of an "organized invasion" of

radicalized Muslims to Europe, demanding a closure of borders. However, international humanitarian organizations have opposed such claims by emphasizing that refugees are fleeing terrorism rather than engaging with it. The report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human rights, issued in September 2016, concludes that “there is no evidence that migration leads to increased terrorist activity”. On the contrary, the report warns, perceptions that link migrant flows to an increased threat of terrorism might produce “migration policies that are restrictive or that violate human rights [...] [and] create conditions conducive to terrorism”¹²³.

According to a DIIS Report, the attempts by the Islamic extremist recruiters to infiltrate asylum-seekers and asylum facilities are expected. Even if they fail to recruit asylum seekers successfully, these activities will have at least politically divisive and polarizing impact. It has long been recognized that it is in IS’ interest to cast suspicion on refugees and inflame the refugee situation in order to turn EU populations against refugees seeking asylum, thus creating an environment of fear that could strengthen the potential for radicalization and recruitment. So far, IS’ suspected weaponization of refugee flows towards Europe has been greatly exaggerated. This does not mean that IS and other groups have not attempted to recruit refugees in Europe, nor that refugees have not plotted attacks in Europe at their own initiative. Yet, by considering only attacks in Europe carried out between January 2016 and April 2017, it turns out that out of four terrorist incidents in Europe, four asylum-seekers (of whom three have had their asylum requests rejected) and no refugees were involved¹²⁴.

While there are, as mentioned, examples of asylum-seekers who have been involved in terrorist attacks in Europe, the idea that refugees constitute “a Trojan horse” of potential terrorists¹²⁵ appears exaggerated. Moreover, there is proof that asylum-seekers and migrants coming to the EU from areas where terrorist groups operate are not only potentially vulnerable to radicalization, but also prepared to report

¹²³ Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), *Europe’s Refugee Crisis and the Threat of Terrorism - AN EXTRAORDINARY THREAT?*, 2017

¹²⁴ *Ibid*, 123

¹²⁵ Financial Times, *Europe refugee policy is ‘Trojan horse of terrorism’, says Orban*, 2017

attempts to recruit them or cases of suspected radicalization¹²⁶. Worth-mentioning is the fact that so far, the only case of a Syrian asylum-seeker being arrested for terrorist-related charges came to the attention of German authorities by other Syrian refugees. There was an incident in Germany where three Syrian refugees in Germany overpowered a bomb suspect who managed to escape from the commandos and was being persecuted for two days. Police believe that Jaber al-Bakr, also a Syrian, was planning a bomb attack and had links to so-called Islamic State. Although they found 1.5kg of explosives in his flat in the eastern city of Chemnitz, they did not manage to arrest him. However, he was handed to police when he made his way south to Leipzig and sought help from fellow Syrians, who overpowered him. According to the German officials who identified the explosives that found in Chemnitz as TATP, a home-made explosive used in the deadly jihadist attacks in Paris and in Brussels; the threat was "extremely dangerous"¹²⁷. However, it is believed that a number of jihadists are travelling through Europe in order to radicalize Muslim refugees. According to unconfirmed information, German authorities were aware of around 300 recorded attempts made by jihadists to recruit refugees who were trying to enter Europe by April 2016¹²⁸.

In all circumstances, the surge in the number of incoming refugees and asylum-seekers in 2015 and 2016 cannot be causally linked to the surge in the number of terrorist attacks in the same period. Rather, it was European citizens, some of them "returnees" who had joined IS or al Qaeda in Syria or elsewhere to fight, who were behind the great majority of attacks and responsible for most of the casualties in Europe in 2015 and 2016¹²⁹.

IS' claim in January 2015 that they had sent 4,000 fighters to Europe via Turkey¹³⁰, clearly highlights their interest in misrepresenting refugees to European public opinion. While this number is unrealistically high, the mere spreading of numbers like these contributes to the securitization of refugee flows and helps create refugee-hostile environments that might facilitate recruitment and radicalization. Hence,

¹²⁶ RT, IS tried to recruit refugees from Danish migration center – report, 2016

¹²⁷ BBC, Germany bomb threat: Jaber al-Bakr 'caught by three Syrians', 2016

¹²⁸ EUROPOL, Changes in Modus Operandi of Islamic State (IS) revisited, 2016

¹²⁹ Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), Database of materialized Islamist terror plots in the West, 2017

¹³⁰ European Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), Refugees versus terrorists, 2017

Europe's so-called "refugee crisis" poses a range of exploitable opportunities for IS to provoke polarization.

As the refugee flows put severe strains on EU's external borders, speculation about the weaponization of migration flows by IS was complemented by fears that chaotic conditions and a lack of the capacity to process asylum - seekers at the EU's external borders would provide terrorists from IS-controlled areas outside the EU with an opportunity to penetrate refugee flows as a way to gain undetected entry into the EU. These fears were later confirmed by the discovery that a large number of the November 2015 Paris attackers, as well as those involved in the March 2016 Brussels attack, had succeeded in entering the EU using fake papers and Syrian passports to register as asylum-seekers or travel via migration flows towards Hungary and further on to Belgium¹³¹. According to Frontex's 2016 annual risk report, 'The Paris attacks in November 2015 clearly demonstrated that irregular migratory flows could be used by terrorists to enter the EU.'¹³²

Revelations that IS, since 2014, has assembled teams of foreign fighters in Syria to carry out revenge attacks back in Europe has partly shed light on how European foreign fighters who were on European watch lists exploited irregular migration routes to return to Europe undetected. As foreign fighters emigrate and cross borders, they are, as such, migrants. If European foreign fighters intentionally exploit irregular migration routes to re-enter the EU to engage in terror-related activities, it posits a link between migration flows and terrorism. These returnees after they travelled back to Europe under false identities, they subsequently drew on their local knowledge and old networks to plan and carry out the attacks.

For European foreign fighters, who are often already known to the authorities and under surveillance, migration routes and the status of asylum-seeker may present desirable pathways to re-enter Europe in order to carry out attacks. Chaotic asylum processes or the lack of means for border staff to investigate identity papers upon arrival can allow known foreign fighters and terrorist suspects to re-enter Europe undetected. Using false identities, they can avoid the prospect of being arrested

¹³¹ Brisard and Jackson, *The Islamic State's External Operations and the French-Belgian Nexus*, 2016

¹³² *Ibid*, 11

upon their return by using their knowledge of and networks in Europe. However, the primary threat does not appear to be one in which an increased refugee intake equals an increased risk of terrorism in the EU. Rather, the threat seems to reside in a combination of returning foreign fighters who are European citizens or residents and a lack of officials' capacity to detect them. However, there is no firm evidence that terrorist travelers systematically use the flow of refugees to enter Europe unnoticed but it is indisputable that some have entered the EU posing as refugees. The jihadists using the migration flows may only be expendable soldiers while highly trained operators and experts may be provided with genuine or false travel documents and use more sophisticated routes. Illegal travel options carry the risk of detention and of being taken to another country rather than the intended destination and therefore remove the element of control from the terrorist's hands¹³³.

A characteristic example of how known to the authorities foreign fighters took advantage of the refugee flows is the one about the offenders of the Paris and Belgium bombings. In the first case, with the exception of two Stade de France suicide bombers and the explosives expert Ahmad Alkhalid, all of the Paris accomplices and in the second case, all five attackers in the Belgian plots were European citizens, many of whom had gone to Syria as foreign fighters and returned to the EU to commit attacks. None was a refugee. The majority of the IS returnees who were involved in this plot had traveled back to Europe via Turkey and Greece, probably using false Belgian passports. The alarming fact is that only one of the Verviers plotters, a French citizen, Walid Hamam, is known to have posed as a Syrian refugee in Greece before travelling on to Belgium; leading to the fear that nearly all the foreign fighters can come back to Europe using forged Syrian passports and infiltrating the refugee flow.

According to EUROPOL, IS appears to have a preference for attacking soft targets as a means to instill maximum fear in the general public. In general terms, jihadists committing terrorist acts in the EU can be described as a particular group of mainly young men who have a criminal past; are or feel discriminated, humiliated and

¹³³ Ibid, 123

marginalized in society. These perpetrators, although almost all European-born, are perceived by many Europeans to be outsiders. European Muslims are disproportionately part of the underclass, often in segregated neighborhoods, facing discrimination in employment, harassment by police and an uncertain future. All the above-mentioned can lead to mental health issues or identity problems. Adding the lack of education, the unemployment and an inferiority complex, they can be vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment, offering a sense of social belonging and emotional fulfilment. They are targeted for recruitment by terrorist groups who recognize that vulnerable alienated youth are susceptible to indoctrination and desperate to find community and a mission in life. Not only is Islam not the primary motivator for their terror, these recruits generally know little about the Quran or Islam¹³⁴. Astonishing is the fact that they are not strictly practicing their Islam religion but have been radicalized in a very short period, either through intervention of recruiters or on their own, inspired by the narratives publicized by IS on internet, and subsequently deciding to travel to IS territory or to become “a soldier of IS” in their country of residence. They may perceive that a decision to commit an attack in their own country may transform them from “zero to hero”¹³⁵. Furthermore, these individuals are often already known to the authorities and various organizations before they leave the EU because of their violent behavior or social problems.

Meanwhile, it is reasonable to expect increase in the rate of return of foreign terrorist fighters from the conflict zones back to the EU, in order to extend their terrorist activities to the EU but also as a result of the deteriorating situation for IS in the conflict area and the living conditions in the IS caliphate which are steadily worsening due to air strikes and the lack of basic facilities such as good healthcare. However, despite the fact that IS is losing fighters and territory in Iraq and Syria, it remained the world’s deadliest militant organization last year and the number of its attacks rose¹³⁶. Only during 2016, the self-proclaimed Islamic State has organized or inspired more than 1.400 terrorist attacks in many countries, except of Iraq and Syria. Those attacks have killed at least 7.000 and injured thousands more¹³⁷.

¹³⁴ Ibid, 94

¹³⁵ Ibid, 117

¹³⁶ Ibid, 114

¹³⁷ The Guardian, Number of IS attacks rose in 2016 despite loss of fighters, report finds, 2017

Senior US counterterrorism officials said the latest attacks fit a pattern as the organization adapts to significant battlefield obstacles in Syria and Iraq by intensifying calls for attacks by individuals or small groups using whatever means possible. Moreover, other groups affiliated with it carried out more than 950 attacks last year that killed nearly 3,000 people¹³⁸.

The threat posed by future returnees is expected to be greater than the one of those who returned to the EU before 2017 posed. According to a General Intelligence and Security Service report, future returnees are expected to be more ideologically hardened than the group that has already returned. Even children of school age may have been brainwashed with jihadist teaching material. More particularly, boys from the age of nine that have stayed in IS-held territory may have received weapons training and training in making explosives. Children as well as adults may have participated in the fighting or in other acts of violence such as executions. It is possible that these experiences lower the threshold for using violence and can result in traumas. By now, nearly all of those who left Europe have spent at least a year in the conflict zone. In light of the battle experience that many of these individuals will have gained, the capabilities of future returnees are generally greater than those of the group that has returned up to now. During their time in the conflict zone, these returnees have also established contacts with regional extremists and other European IS members, who either remained there or returned home. Finally, the current territorial losses suffered by IS increase the risk of attacks in the West, as the group becomes keener to prove itself by means of threats and attacks against the West. IS' repeated calls to supporters in the West to commit attacks is one such example. These attacks are a show of force designed to discourage enemies and to impress existing members and new recruits¹³⁹.

Summarizing, the large numbers of professionals among the great majority of individuals involved in terrorist attacks in Europe have been EU citizens or residents. It's true that European foreign fighters who had joined IS in Syria have used migration routes to re-enter Europe undetected. However, as it is evident from

¹³⁸ Ibid, 114

¹³⁹ General Intelligence and Security Service, Focus on Returnees, 2016

Figure 1, most of the cases were lone-wolves or European foreign fighters, not refugees. Jihadist actors can be both directed by IS or merely inspired by IS ideology and rhetoric, being a lone-wolf. Furthermore, another observation is that terrorists are interested in hitting spots that are public, vulnerable and easily exploitable by media's attention. Four asylum – seekers, three of whom were rejected, were involved in carrying out attacks in Europe from January 2016 to April 2017. Although, in the short term, the terrorist threat in Europe does not stem directly from refugees but clearly from EU citizens, less linear effects of mass immigration and the potential links to terrorism cannot be excluded in the longer run. Disenfranchisement and a perceived or real lack of opportunity and justice make recruitment within vulnerable groups of refugees or asylum-seekers possible. Furthermore, now that the Islamic State is losing ground, the chances that highly skilled returnees will come back to Europe are vertically rising, leading to fears about more terrorist attacks.




Figure 1. Timeline of terrorist attacks recorded in Europe (2015-2017). See also Table 1 in Appendix.

Conclusions

The present dissertation attempted to examine whether refugee and migration flows have been securitized in Europe and in which ways these flows have impacted the security issues in Europe. Common fears concerning health, economy, identity and public security have been addressed, clearing up to a point potential misapprehensions that exist. The core question of this dissertation, whether the concerns about refugees' and migrants' impact on the above-mentioned thematics are actually reflective of the prevailing state of affairs or are they scapegoated for the current EU crisis and the several difficulties that occur without the adequate data to justify the condemnations, has been partly answered.

Europe is suffering from an economic and financial crisis in the midst of which the values of tolerance and openness are in decline, leading to a European identity and unity crisis. The above-mentioned facts in combination with the strict austerity measures feed directly anti-European populist discourses. To this may be added the public alarm about Islamist terrorism, which seeks to link Muslim identity to an excess of immigration that desires to "islamize" the European continent. As Malik says, the, in general, failure of the European policies in many European countries has encouraged the dangerous perception that Europe is suffering from excessive immigration and a lack of integration. It is a perception that is difficult to counteract with arguments, based on the need for foreign labor in ageing population, and it is being eventually capitalized by right wing parties in order to promote their agendas¹⁴⁰.

It is today self-evident that the desire of some to build a strong Social Europe is fading away in the name of global economic efficiency on the one hand and national interests on the other. Despite explicit reference to the need to combine social cohesion and economic growth, the former has clearly been sacrificed in the name of the latter. As a result, in a union, where even its members feel not equal, refugees, migrants and asylum seekers receive an even worse treatment. Europe's current crisis, therefore, is not really a refugee crisis. It is a battle between the idea of the

¹⁴⁰ Malik, *The Failure of Multiculturalism*, 2015

liberal democracy, based on the idea of universal equality, and the fact that the provision of certain rights is limited by territorial, political, legal and economic borders. In the European eyes, the asylum seekers are potential terrorists hiding among the crowd of migrants and the terrorists are potential migrants ready to move into Europe at any moment. Despite the fact that almost the totality of the attacks were perpetrated by European citizens; weak border security and migrant “floods” are being blamed for the attacks. Moreover, they are perceived as breathing threats to the European culture, identity, way of living and even nationhood while they are exploiting the kindness of their host countries, taking advantage of the public social benefits, transmitting supposedly deadly diseases to the host communities and being a burden to already stressed economies.

What the two crises of migration and terrorism both have in common is that they have become the dominant political figures through which European states express their own internal crises. In one hand, migrants and refugees increasingly drive the European nations to greater social inclusion and hospitality, as it is already stated on their national laws and the European conventions that they have signed. However, at the same time, asylum seekers push the EU states to their limits as they can no longer support the requirements of such heterogeneity, mobility and autonomy because nation-states are always linked to certain forms of territory, national identity and state. On the other hand, the terrorist incidents increasingly push the European states toward greater social exclusion, restricted mobility, religious and ethnic extremism, xenophobia and islamophobia. European states are progressively crossing the limits beyond liberal democracy; sometimes even resembling authoritarian states. Such a case was evident in France’s declaration of a state of emergency and positioning of 10.000 militants into the streets of Paris after the attacks.

Europe’s anti-immigrant rhetoric is closely connecting migrants to terrorism. There is a political analogy: the asylum seekers are belligerent “others” who threaten the nation with cultural conflict while terrorists threaten the European states with security infringement. However, the majority of the new refugees from Iraq and Syria do not come from a poor underclass but they are well-educated doctors, lawyers

and professors as well as small-business people. The majority of them were forced to flee their homes in urban areas when forces of the IS seized the area and imposed their totalitarian rule. Most of the poorer, less-educated refugees cannot afford the costs of the smugglers who charge extreme amounts of money to transport them from refugee camps in southeastern Turkey to Turkey's west coast and place them on boats to make the crossing to Greece to begin their travel towards Europe.

In addition, data shows that refugees who become permanent immigrants have a lower crime rate than the native population. When allowed to integrate into their new countries, they tend to become productive citizens, start small businesses and in the long run, put a lot more money into the social system than they first take out. In the short term, support for asylum seekers may cause a small increase in GDP growth, reflecting the fiscal expansion. However, refugees and migrants are not going to demolish the national economies as it is widely spread. On the contrary, they will fill needed vacancies that are not attractive to the local population and in the cases, where local low-skilled workers are replaced by migrants, these people tend to train and educate themselves, and finally occupy more challenging and highly-paid jobs.

In regard to terrorism, it is confirmed that asylum seekers are opposed to radicalization and they even deliver to the authorities individuals of delinquent behavior. These perpetrators of terrorist attacks, especially in the EU, include both foreigners, of whom a number may have resided in the EU for a long time; and nationals who have grown up in the countries they attacked. More specifically, the great majority of individuals involved in perpetrating terrorist attacks in Europe within the last decade have been EU citizens. Many have been foreign fighters, and most were already known to the European authorities. Concerning the influx of refugees and migrants to Europe, it has already been exploited by the IS, that is sending individuals to Europe to commit acts of terrorism, taking advantage of the large inflow of asylum seekers. Since January 2015, the terrorist threat related to refugee flows primarily stems from European foreign fighters who have traveled along migration routes to reenter Europe undetected.

Concerning health and the pressure on the public healthcare systems, many reports have proved that refugees, migrants and asylum-seekers do not transfer communicable and highly dangerous diseases. To be more precise, many of the cases that have been recorded after they settled into European grounds were transmitted from already existing cases into European territory because of the nasty living condition that these people are exposed to. Asylum seekers tend to be healthy in the beginning of their journey; during the long way, they may come in contact with various pathogenic agents or develop psychological trauma because of the hardships. However, they do not pose a threat to public health. Especially, if they are granted their human right to health and their access to preventive health care is permitted, public healthcare costs will be reduced and the possibilities for an outbreak of a highly transmitted disease are diminished.

Finally, in regard to the fears about the alienation of society's identity and the subsequent islamization of the European continent, it is statistically confirmed that right wing's rhetoric is over exaggerating in the projections. The integration may be a challenging topic that needs long-term planning; however, there are already existing examples of communities of different background who managed to integrate successfully and thrive. The belief that after the fall of communism, western world needed a new enemy, that found after the 9/11 attack in the Twin Towers, in Islamism is well-founded as it is well-known that identities are formed and maintained through the opposition to the "other". The above-mentioned opinion in connection to the notion of xenophobia / islamophobia along with Said's Orientalism and with the advancement Copenhagen's School of Security Studies in regard to societal security can explain current political and social reality in Europe.

Within the larger European context, the rising right wing movement reveals the frustrations and skepticism for the political strength and control that the European Union has over continental issues, like migration. The current success of right wing parties across Europe could have tremendous consequences for the future of the European Union and Europe, as a continent, as many of these Eurosceptic parties call for both national and European-wide major reformations that can reverse much of the progress that has been made since World War II. This current refugee crisis

hit Europe in a time where severe crisis was already oscillating it. Only time will show if the present inflow of asylum-seekers will push EU to balance back economic and fiscal priorities towards the original EU rationale or the other way around.

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Appendix

Country	Event	Date	Dead - Injured		Status	Perpetrators' Identity
			Dead	Injured		
France	Paris attacks	November 2015	130	368	Coordinated terrorist attack	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • French citizenship • Belgian citizenship • Iraqi citizenship
Turkey	Istanbul bombing	January 2016	13	14	Coordinated terrorist attack	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Syrian citizenship
Turkey	Istanbul bombing	March 2016	4	36	Coordinated terrorist attack	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Turkish citizenship
Belgium	Brussels bombings	March 2016	32	340	Coordinated terrorist attack	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Belgian citizenship • Swedish citizenship
France	Magnanville stabbing	June 2016	2	0	Lone wolf	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • French citizenship
Turkey	Atatürk Airport attack	June 2016	45	239	Coordinated terrorist attack	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Uzbekistani citizenship • Russian citizenship • Kyrgyzstani citizenship
France	Nice attack	July 2016	86	434	Lone wolf	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tunisian citizen, living in France
Germany	Würzburg train attack	July 2016	0	5	Lone wolf	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afghan citizen, unaccompanied minor
Germany	Ansbach bombing	July 2016	0	15	Lone wolf	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Syrian citizenship
France	Normandy church attack	July 2016	1	3	Lone wolves	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • French citizenship • Algerian citizen, living in France
Belgium	Charleroi attack	August 2016	0	2	Lone wolf	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Algerian citizen, living illegally in France
Germany	Berlin attack	December 2016	12	56	Lone wolf	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tunisian citizenship, failed asylum-seeker
Turkey	Istanbul nightclub shooting	January 2017	39	69	Coordinated terrorist attack	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Uzbekistani or Kyrgyzstani citizenship
UK	Westminster attack	March 2017	7	49	Lone wolf	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • British citizenship
France	Paris shooting	April 2017	2	2	Lone wolf	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • French citizenship
UK	Manchester Arena bombing	May 2017	22	59	Coordinated terrorist attack	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • British citizenship
UK	London attack	June 2017	8	48	Coordinated terrorist attack	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • British citizenship • Moroccan or Libyan citizen, failed asylum seeker • Moroccan and Italian citizenship
Spain	Barcelona attack	August 2017	13	100	Coordinated terrorist attack	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Moroccan citizen, living in Spain
UK	Parsons Green bombing	September 2017	0	30		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Iraqi citizen, refugee
France	Marseille stabbing	October 2017	3	0	Lone wolf	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tunisian citizenship

Table 1. Terrorist attacks recorded in Europe (2015 - 2017)