



ΠΑΝΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΙΟ ΜΑΚΕΔΟΝΙΑΣ  
ΣΧΟΛΗ ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΚΩΝ, ΑΝΘΡΩΠΙΣΤΙΚΩΝ ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΕΧΝΩΝ  
ΤΜΗΜΑ ΔΙΕΘΝΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΩΝ ΣΠΟΥΔΩΝ

ΔΙΔΑΚΤΟΡΙΚΗ ΔΙΑΤΡΙΒΗ

**Theory of International Relations:  
Small States in the International System**

ΥΠΟΨΗΦΙΑ ΔΙΔΑΚΤΟΡΑΣ: ΡΕΒΕΚΚΑ Γ. ΠΑΙΔΗ

ΕΠΙΒΛΕΠΩΝ ΚΑΘΗΓΗΤΗΣ: ΗΛΙΑΣ ΚΟΥΣΚΟΥΒΕΛΗΣ

ΘΕΣΣΑΛΟΝΙΚΗ, 2016

**Επιβλέπων Καθηγητής:**

Καθηγητής Ηλίας Κουσκουβέλης  
Τμήμα Διεθνών και Ευρωπαϊκών Σπουδών  
Πανεπιστήμιο Μακεδονίας

**Μέλη της Συμβουλευτικής Επιτροπής:**

Καθηγητής Γεώργιος Σπυρόπουλος  
Τμήμα Διεθνών και Ευρωπαϊκών Σπουδών  
Πανεπιστήμιο Μακεδονίας

Καθηγητής Χαράλαμπος Παπασωτηρίου  
Τμήμα Διεθνών, Ευρωπαϊκών και Περιφερειακών Σπουδών  
Πάντειο Πανεπιστήμιο

Δηλώνω υπευθύνως ότι όλα τα στοιχεία σε αυτήν την εργασία τα απέκτησα, τα επεξεργάστηκα και τα παρουσιάζω σύμφωνα με τους κανόνες και τις αρχές της ακαδημαϊκής δεοντολογίας, καθώς και τους νόμους που διέπουν την έρευνα και την πνευματική ιδιοκτησία. Δηλώνω επίσης υπευθύνως ότι, όπως απαιτείται από αυτούς τους κανόνες, αναφέρομαι και παραπέμπω στις πηγές όλων των στοιχείων που χρησιμοποιώ και τα οποία δεν συνιστούν πρωτότυπη δημιουργία μου.

**Ρεβέκκα Γ. Παιδή**

*Στους γονείς μου*

One runner told of a mantra his older brother, also a runner,  
had taught him which he's pondered ever since he began running.  
Here it is: Pain is inevitable. Suffering is optional.  
Say you're running and you start to think,  
Man this hurts, I can't take it anymore.  
The hurt part is an unavoidable reality, but whether or not  
you can stand any more is up to the runner himself.  
This pretty much sums up the most important aspect of marathon running.

Haruki Murakami,  
What I Talk About When I Talk About Running, p. vii

## Ευχαριστίες

Θα ήθελα να ευχαριστήσω θερμά τα μέλη της Συμβουλευτικής Επιτροπής, τον Καθηγητή Χαράλαμπο Παπαπασωτηρίου από το Πάντειο Πανεπιστήμιο, τον Καθηγητή Γεώργιο Σπυρόπουλο από το Πανεπιστήμιο Μακεδονίας και ιδιαιτέρως θα ήθελα να αναφερθώ στη συμβολή του επιβλέποντος της διδακτορικής διατριβής μου, Καθηγητή Ηλία Κουσκουβέλη.

Είμαι ευγνώμων γιατί αρχικά μου έδωσε το έναυσμα να επικεντρωθώ στη μελέτη των Μικρών Κρατών και στη συνέχεια την ακαδημαϊκή ελευθερία να προσεγγίσω το θέμα που επέλεξα μέσα από τα δικά μου ακαδημαϊκά ενδιαφέροντα και ανησυχίες, χωρίς να μου στερήσει ποτέ την υπομονή, την κατανόηση, τις συμβουλές του και κυρίως τον πλούτο της γνώσης του και νέες ευκαιρίες. Του οφείλω, επιπλέον, ευγνωμοσύνη γιατί για εμένα αποτελεί και θα αποτελεί πάντα πρότυπο ακεραιότητας, ακαδημαϊκής αριστείας, ευρυμάθειας, και γενναιοδωρίας. Χωρίς την αμέριστη υποστήριξή του δεν θα τα είχα καταφέρει σε δύσκολες στιγμές. Σε όλη την πορεία της εκπόνησης της διδακτορικής διατριβής μου και της συνεργασίας μας, το παράδειγμά του στην τάξη, αλλά και στη διοίκηση, δεν έπαψε να μου θυμίζει τι λέει ο ψαλμός του Δαυίδ για εκείνον που «όλη την ημέρα ελεεί και δανείζει».

Επιπλέον, θα ήθελα να ευχαριστήσω τα μέλη του ακαδημαϊκού και διοικητικού προσωπικού του Τμήματος Διεθνών και Ευρωπαϊκών Σπουδών γιατί φροντίζουν καθημερινά να εξασφαλίζουν τις καλύτερες συνθήκες συνεργασίας και αλληλοβοήθειας και ένα ευνοϊκό ακαδημαϊκό περιβάλλον, αλλά και για το χαμόγελο και το ενδιαφέρον τους.

Ιδιαιτέρως, θα ήθελα να απευθύνω τις ευχαριστίες μου στην Επίκουρη Καθηγήτρια Φωτεινή Μπέλλου και στον Αναπληρωτή Καθηγητή Σπύρο Λίτσα για την υποστήριξή τους, καθώς και στον Λέκτορα Κυριάκο Μικέλη, γιατί ήταν πάντα διαθέσιμος να μοιραστεί τη θαυμαστή γνώση του επί της βιβλιογραφίας των Διεθνών Σχέσεων. Επίσης, ευχαριστώ τους Βασίλη Κόνιαρη και Στέλλα Γεράνη, υποψήφιους διδάκτορες στο Τμήμα ΔΕΣ του Πανεπιστημίου Μακεδονίας, γιατί μοιραστήκαμε ευθύνες και αγωνίες, τους Δημήτρη Στροϊκό και Κοσμά Καπρίνη, υποψήφιους διδάκτορες στο LSE και την Οξφόρδη αντίστοιχα, που ήταν πάντα διαθέσιμοι να μου στείλουν τα άρθρα που τους ζητούσα, κάθε φορά που στην Ελλάδα δεν είχαμε πρόσβαση,

αλλά και την Alexandra Winsdor, Book Editor στο Political Studies Review που είχε την καλοσύνη να ανταποκρίνεται ευγενικά στα αιτήματά μου και να μου στέλνει βιβλία σχετικά με τα Μικρά Κράτη.

Σε όλη την πορεία της εκπόνησης της διατριβής μου είχα την ευλογία να περιστοιχίζομαι από φίλες και φίλους που δημιούργησαν ένα δίχτυ προστασίας στις αντιξοότητες που συνέπεσαν με την προσπάθειά μου να ολοκληρώσω τη διατριβή και θα ήθελα να τους ευχαριστήσω ξεχωριστά.

Πριν απ' όλους την Κατερίνα Σαρρή· χωρίς τη συνεισφορά, το ενδιαφέρον και την επιμονή της, μου είναι δύσκολο σήμερα να φανταστώ πώς θα ολοκληρωνόταν αυτή η προσπάθεια. Επιπλέον, επωφελήθηκα τα μέγιστα από τις συζητήσεις μας για την επιχειρηματικότητα.

Επίσης, οφείλω πολλά ευχαριστώ στην Άννα Πιατά γιατί με υπομονή και ενδιαφέρον παρακολουθεί αυτή την προσπάθεια από τις αρχικές σκέψεις και τις συζητήσεις μας στη βιβλιοθήκη του Sidney Sussex στο Cambridge μέχρι και σήμερα, αφαιρώντας εμπόδια από το δρόμο μου.

Ακόμη, ευχαριστώ την Ελισάβετ Κοκόζηλα, την Αναστασία Λιοφάγου και την Ιρίνα Τακά γιατί καθημερινά μου μαθαίνουν τι σημαίνει φιλία με κάθε τρόπο και δεν σταματούν να βάζουν τον πήχη ψηλά σε κάθε τομέα της ζωής τους. Η Μαρία Γιοκαρίνη αποτέλεσε την ιδανική συνεργάτη τον τελευταίο χρόνο και την ευχαριστώ για το βάρος που πήρε από πάνω μου, αλλά και γιατί μου έμαθε πολλά. Θα είμαι πάντα ευγνώμων στον Νεκτάριο Συλλιγαρδάκη, γιατί μου έδωσε νέες δυνατότητες και ευκαιρίες, στην κυρία Αθηνά Ράμμου που έγινε η μαμά μου στη Θεσσαλονίκη πολλές φορές και στο Νίκο Αντωνάκη για την απίστευτη συμπεριφορά του.

Η Ρόζα Παπαζιάν αποδείχθηκε πολύτιμη συνεργάτης μου και επιμελήθηκε την τυπογραφική σχεδίαση του κειμένου. Την ευχαριστώ, όπως και τον Λευτέρη Μπάκα, που μου σύστησε την Callibri και παρά τις σημαντικές ασχολίες του ήταν πρόθυμος να μου δώσει συμβουλές και να βοηθήσει με τη δημιουργία των σχημάτων. Δεν θα μπορούσα να παραλείψω από τις ευχαριστίες τον Δημήτρη και την Αρετή που είναι φίλοι και οικογένεια. Τους οφείλω πολλά.

Τέλος, ευχαριστώ την μαμά μου, επειδή είναι η μαμά μου και κάνει πάντα με αγάπη ό,τι καλύτερο ξέρει και μπορεί, ενώ δεν σταματάει σε όλες τις προσπάθειές μου να μου θυμίζει ότι υπάρχει ο καιρός της σποράς, και ο καιρός του θερισμού.

Η διατριβή αφιερώνεται στους γονείς μου για όλους τους αυτονόητους λόγους, κυρίως για όλες τις δυνατότητες που φρόντισαν να μου δώσουν και γιατί μου έμαθαν την αξία της ελευθερίας, της πίστης, της αξιοπρέπειας και της προόδου.

## **Contents**

<b>Chapter 1. Introduction</b>	<b>10</b>
1.1 The Research on Small States in International Relations and its Chronic Gap	12
1.2 This thesis	15
<b>Chapter 2. The “perennial problem of Small States” revisited</b>	<b>18</b>
2.1 Introduction	18
2.2 Approaches to the definition of the Small State	22
2.2.1 The “I know one when I see one” approach	24
2.2.2 The Quantitative approaches	24
2.2.3 The Perceptions approaches	31
2.2.4 The Behaviour approaches	34
2.2.5 The Relational approaches	37
2.2.6 The Residual approaches	38
2.3 Bridging the Gap: revisiting the Small State concept	40
2.3.1 The Common Points among Small State Scholars and the Small State	40
2.3.2 Small State and Realism	44
2.4 Conclusion	47
<b>Chapter 3. The “Power of the Weak” Revisited</b>	<b>49</b>
3.1 Introduction	49
3.2 The International System level Explanations	54
3.3 The State level Explanations	66
3.3.1 Geography	70
3.3.2 Prestige-Reputation	77
3.3.3 Population	82
3.3.4 Political System	90
3.3.5 Administration	97
3.3.6 Wealth	101
3.3.7 History	105

3.4 Individual Level Explanations	111
3.4.1 Leadership and Political elites	111
3.4.2 Economic elites	115
3.5 Bridging the Gap: The Power of the Weak Revisited	117
3.5.1 Common points among Small State Scholars	117
3.5.2 The behaviour of the Small State	121
3.5.3 Small State and Realism	123
3.6 Conclusion	130
<b>Chapter 4. The “small but smart” state revisited</b>	<b>133</b>
4.1 Introduction	133
4.2 Towards a Common Pattern of Small State Behaviour	138
4.2.1 Small States as Influence Maximizers: an Uncaptured Pattern of Behaviour	138
4.2.2 Small States in Alliances	143
4.2.3 Small States in International Organizations	152
4.2.4 Small States in the European Union	167
4.3 Bridging the Gap: the “small but smart” state reconsidered	177
4.3.1 Common Points among Small State Scholars	177
4.3.2 The Behaviour of the Small State	179
4.3.3 Small State and Realism	187
4.4 Conclusion	191
<b>Chapter 5. Conclusion</b>	<b>194</b>
<b>Selective Bibliography</b>	<b>199</b>

## Tables

Table 1.1 Contributions to the Small State field per decade based on Beyer	13
Table 2.1 Selected definitions based on quantitative criteria	25
Table 2.2 Definition approaches by International Organizations	26
Table 2.3 Keohane's categorization of states in the then international system	35
Table 2.4 Negative approaches to the Small State definition	39
Table 2.5 Differences between Great powers and Weak powers according to Handel	43
Table 3.1 Level of analysis and power resources framework based on Kouskouvelis	53
Table 3.2 Contributions of key studies with regard to resources of power at the International System level	55
Table 3.3 Contributions of key studies with regard to state level resources of power	69
Table 3.4 Contributions of key studies with regard to individual level resources of power	112
Table 3.5 Points of convergence among Small State scholars	118
Table 3.6 Level of analysis and power resources framework based on Small State studies	131
Table 4.1 Small State studies focusing on Influence	139
Table 4.2 Small State Studies discussing Influence	141
Table 4.3 Ranking of Small State Alliance Preferences according to conventional wisdom and Labs	146
Table 4.4 Elements of a Small State influence maximizing strategy within an alliance	151
Table 4.5 Examples of Denmark's activity in the UN based on data from Tarp and Hansen	158
Table 4.6 Elements of a Small State influence maximizing strategy within International Organizations	159
Table 4.7 Studies on the Smaller Member States and the EU's Foreign, Security, Defence Policies	169
Table 4.8 Elements of a Small State influence maximizing strategy within the EU	177
Table 4.9 Synthesis of elements of an influence maximizing Small State strategy	179

## Figures

Figure 3.1 Small State Behaviour Explanatory Framework	122
Figure 4.1 The "Small but Smart State" behaviour: strategies, roles, goal	180
Figure 4.2 The "Small but Smart State" behaviour: power resources, strategies, roles, goal	182

*Attempting to ingest a wide-ranging literature  
in one gulp, I became puzzled  
by the contrasting views of authors  
who while ostensibly dealing with the same subject matter,  
arrived at different and often contradictory conclusions.  
How could I make sense of the literature?  
Kenneth Waltz, (2001:viii)*

## Chapter 1. Introduction

Four years ago a video showing the President of the United States (US) Barack Obama praising on different occasions the Prime Ministers of Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands and Philippines for their states being US allies that manage to “punch above their weight” went viral on the youtube (NAUresistance, 2012). The aim of the video was to cauterize the way that America treats its allies. Yet, it revealed to a broader audience something already known to the International Relations scholars who focus on Small States, that the latter strive to enhance their position in the international system and usually they do so in order to get the attention of the Great Power or Powers in the system (Keohane, 1971; de Carvahlo and Neumann, 2015). In the autumn of 2015, the first Democratic presidential debate in the US was marked by the disagreement between Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton over whether US should become more like Denmark or not (Boyle, 2015). Although this debate dominated the public sphere in the US for a while last October, it is hardly a new debate. Peter Katzenstein in 1985, surprised by the economic success of small European states and their distinct sociopolitical organization, sought for the lessons that the US can draw from them and produced one of the seminal works in the field of Small States research. In the summer of 2015, the Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras in his first interview after signing a new and undesired deal with Greece’s creditors and partners said that he had believed that justice could prevail over power and moreover that he had thought of brinkmanship as an appropriate strategy for the negotiations (EPT WebTV, 2015). However, had it consulted the literature of Small States on negotiations and on Small States in the European Union (EU) (Arter, 2000; Grøn and Wivel, 2011; Panke, 2012a; 2012b; 2012c) the Greek government would have followed a different strategy and possibly would have got a more favourable deal. Similarly, politicians, academics and journalists looking for the reasons why different Small States responded differently to the financial crisis could turn to Small State studies that highlight the importance of the domestic arrangements to get some good answers (Katzenstein, 1985; Platias, 1986; Thorhallsson and Kirby, 2012; Kouskouvelis, 2015b). Recently, the economic and refugee crises in Europe brought to the forefront the differences between Small and Great Powers, as well as those among different Small States.

Moreover, it seems that many contributors to the public dialogue have been obsessed with the achievements of the smaller players in the system and they look for the secrets of their success (Frankel, 2010; O' Sullivan and Natella, 2014; The Economist, 2013). All these issues have been central to the Small State studies in International Relations since the very early efforts in the field (i.e. Fox, 1959.) Therefore, there is a great amount of literature that can help our understanding of the implications of power disparity between Small and Great Powers and the international relations of Small States.

Hence, my point here is that there is a growing interest in Small States in the public sphere, but their study remains marginalized, while there is a vast body of scholarship in Small States that is absent from International Relations courses and debates, and more or less constitutes an unknown territory for the majority of the International Relations scholars and students, policy-makers and opinion leaders. As might be expected this does not come as a surprise. The centrality of Great Powers in international politics is undisputed (Grieco, et al., 2015). Therefore, International Relations scholars have paid attention to them, investigating present and past cases in order to understand how the international system works (Bull, 1977; Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001) and the International Relations phenomena evolve (Papasotiriou, 2000; 2002; Kouskouvelis, 1999; Bellou, 2013; Litsas, 2014a). Although the focus on Great Powers is legitimate, it has encouraged a "bigness bias" (Leff, 1971) in the International Relations discipline.

As a result, two stereotypes have been perpetuated. First for the majority of International Relations scholars, Small States have been perceived as inconsequential players in the system and therefore as an unimportant topic for research; the study of the Great Powers has been the mainstream and exploring the area of Small States has been considered a "folly", according to Katzenstein (2003). In the beginning of his endeavour to write a second book on Small States Katzenstein has been warned by an eminent International Relations scholar asking him: "[S]ince nobody cares about small states why waste so much time writing about them?" (p.10). To such views Small State scholars responded by developing their own stereotyping view of the Small State that "punches above its weight" resembling more to David who triumphed over Goliath, than to the Melians who were destroyed by the Athenians; in this way they created a rosy image of the international relations of Small States. Yet, in the shadow of these stereotypes a field of research has been growing and striving for legitimacy, as almost every study in the field echoes Katzenstein's (2003:10) realization that "there were about 160 small countries, discussed in a remarkably small number of books and articles written by international Relations scholars. In contrast the scholarship on half a dozen large states filled whole libraries."

This thesis goes against the tide and concentrates on Small Powers in the international system. More precisely, it explores the body of literature that concentrates on the international relations of Small States in the hope that it will bridge the existing gap in the accumulation of knowledge and open up new questions for research. In doing so, it does not contest the preponderance of the Great Powers in the international system and their centrality in the study of International Relations. However, it questions those who reject the distinctiveness of the Small Power and the need to explore the implications of smallness in the international system (Baehr, 1975; Duval and Thompson, 1980; Carlsnaes, 2007; Lamoreux, 2014). In this sense, it follows Fox (1965), the founding figure of the field, who suggests that although Small Powers do not impact upon the system in the way that Great Powers do, the system would be different without them and that is why they deserve our attention. It is also in line with Neumann and Gstöhl (2006:3) who in the work that signified the reinvigoration of the field in 2000s note that they will not challenge the foundations that “International Relations is a state-centric discipline as well as a power-centered discipline...”. Instead they contend that their aim is “rather to draw attention to the importance of studying states in their diversity.” So, in a sense the research on Small States can enhance our understanding of the complexity of the international system and even of the Great Powers from a different perspective, that of the weaker player in the system, which is no less interesting.

### 1.1 The Research on Small States in International Relations and its Chronic Gap

The Small State has become the normal type of state in the twentieth century (Thurrer, 1998; Baldacchino, 2009). After every major international event, being it the WWI or the WWII, the decolonization or the disintegration of the USSR, the dawn of a new era has been marked by the rise of the number of Small States in the international system. Equally have increased Small Powers’ status and visibility (Hey, 2003), especially within the International Organizations. It was in the two Hague Peace conferences, 1899 and 1907, where for the first time lesser powers and Great Powers were participating on equal footing; this principle was also followed in the League of Nations, twenty years later (Vandenbosch, 1964). In addition, the foundation of the United Nations provided Small States with new opportunities to pursue their interests, despite the fact that the five permanent seats in the UNSC reflect an institutionalization of inequality (Vandebosch, 1964; Fox, 1965). What is more, the competition between the two superpowers during the Cold War benefited the lesser players in the system (Keohane, 1971). Last but not least, the EU has offered Small States the possibility of unprecedented levels of leverage on European and world affairs (Hirsch, 1976; 2010).

The academic interest in the Small State in international relations has followed after the above developments in the international system (Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006; Rickli, 2008), especially from the 1960s and on, as it can be seen in Table 2.1. In this context Paterson (1969: 119) notes that:

1967 will probably rate as the ‘annus mirabilis’ of the small state in international politics. Not only did Israel, North Vietnam and Rhodesia successfully defy larger Powers, but their success was accompanied by a dramatic increase in the literature dealing with the foreign policies of small states...This flood of literature is in marked contrast to past years when studies like Annete Baker Fox’s minor classic *The Power of Small States* scarcely raised a ripple of interest in a discipline fascinated by the superpowers.

Indeed, Table 2.1 shows that nine of the twelve publications on Small States in 1960s have been out from 1967 to 1969, and highlights the fact that the research on Small States has been informed by events in international politics and the increasing involvement of Small States in the world affairs.

**Table 1.1** Contributions to the Small State field per decade based on Beyer (2006)

1910	1	Nansen, (1918)
1950	2	Fox, (1959); Liska, (1957)
1960	12	Benedict, (1967);Bjørl, (1968); Blair, (1967); Keohane, (1969); Liska, (1968); Lloyd, (1968); Nuechterlein, (1969); Osgood,(1968); Paterson, (1969); Robinson, (1960).; Rothstein,(1968); Vital, (1967).
1970	20	Amstrup, (1976); Azar, (1973); Baehr, (1975); Barston, (1973); East, (1973); Gunter, (1977); Hansen, (1974); Harbert, (1976); Harris, (1970); Keohane, (1971); Mathisen, (1971); Mendelson, (1972); Neuman, (1976).; Plischke, (1977); Rapaport, Muteba, Therattil (1971); Reid, (1974).; Schou, Brundtland, (1971); Singer, (1972); Vayrynen, (1971); Vital, (1971)
1980	13	Sisay, (1985); Alapuro, Alestal, Haavio- Manila, Vayrynen,(1985); Dommen, (1985); Duval, Thompson (1980); Handel, (1985); Harden, (1985); Holl, (1983); Karsh, (1988); Katzenstein, (1985); Krasner, (1981) Lindell, Persson (1986); Papadakis, Starr (1987); Sharp, (1987)
1990	22	Ahnlid, (1992); Armstrong, Read (1998); Baillie,(1998); Bauwens, Clesse, Knudsen (1996); Duursma, (1996); Eide, (1996); Elman, (1995); Goetschel, (1998); Griffin, (1995); Hanf, Soetendorp (1998); Hong, (1995); Ingebritsen, (1998); Kantzestein, (1997); Kindley, Good (1997); Luif, (1995); McIntyre, (1996); Neumann, (1992) Olafsson, (1998); Reiter, (1994); Risse- Kappen, (1995); Sutton, Payne (1993)
2000-2006	17	Archer, Nugent (2002); Armstrong, Read (2002); Crowards, (2002); Galloway, (2002);Gstöhl, (2002); Hey, (2003); Ingebritsen, (2002;2006); Kantzestein, (2003); Kurzer, (2001); Männik, (2002); Miles, (2002); Moses, (2000) Rees, Holmes, (2002) Reiter, Gartner, (2001); Thorhallsson, (2000;2002)

International Relations scholars who have concentrated on the Small State phenomenon have been attracted by the increase in the number of Small Powers which surprisingly were able to survive major challenges and even to succeed in securing their interests on several occasions (i.e., Fox, 1959; Keohane, 1969; 1971; Mack, 1975; Levite and Platias, 1983; Handel, 1985; Goetschel, 1998; Knudsen, 2002; Cooper and Shaw, 2009; Fakiolas, 2012). In addition, cases of unexpected economic growth in Small States or of extreme economic vulnerability in such demanding eras as those of complex interdependence and globalization gained much attention (i.e., Katzenstein, 1985; Handel, 1985; Lindell and Persson, 1986; Armstrong and Read, 1998; Moses, 2000; Baldacchino, 2015). Moreover, the end of the Cold War and the EU's enlargement and further integration stimulated the research on Small States and added new states under the lens of the Small State scholars. The recent economic crisis sparked a new interest in the study of Small States (Thorhallsson and Kirby, 2012; Thorhallsson and Kattel, 2013; Jones, 2013; Fioretos, 2013; Verdun, 2013).

Thus a rich, albeit fragmented, marginal and complex field of Small State studies has been growing within the discipline of International Relations. Yet, from its very early stages until nowadays the development of the field has been hampered by a chronic gap; the field has been suffering from a lack of dialogue among scholars on the main issues of the field, limited testing of previous hypotheses, poor comparative research and interaction with the major debates of International Relations. So, there is a gap in the accumulation of knowledge in the field. That makes the field unhealthy if we take in consideration that "[O]ne of the earmarks of healthy scientific discipline is the extent to which each set of findings may be compared to and combined with the results of earlier investigations; in short, research must be cumulative" (Russett et al., 1968:932).

The predicament that the Small State studies field finds itself in has been observed as early as 1976 by Amstrup who noted that "the field of small state theory has not been lacking in contributions... [H]owever, there is an astonishing lack of cumulation in these contributions... Stated in the extreme one could say that it seems easier to develop one's own view on small states than comparing it with other and earlier views." (p.178). Amstrup made an effort to fill that void while there have been some similar efforts before (Bjørl, 1968) and after (Lindell and Persson, 1986) his own. Yet, it seems that they failed to strengthen the dialogue in the field, systematize and synthesize the existing knowledge, put forward new hypotheses for research as the field remained in many aspects stagnated, suffering from misunderstandings and repetitions. Many years after Amstrup's first diagnosis of the "illness" of the field, younger Small State scholars have often found themselves in the same quagmire. Knudsen (2002:182) argues that "the field of small state studies has little visible coherence" and that "the larger patterns connecting small-state problems tend to be lost." In a similar vein, Hey (2003:8) observes that "the literature on small state foreign policy lacks the kind of a paradigm that

can guide researchers to generate conclusions, that are comparable and cumulative.” More recently Archer et. al (2014:5) recognized that:

Even though the literature on small state security has been growing rapidly since the end of the Cold War, there have been few attempts to go beyond single country studies and provide a comprehensive overview of the general pattern of challenges, opportunities and strategies facing small states in the current security order. Now, as in the past, the study of small states is plagued by a lack of cumulative insights and coherent debate.

Therefore, the gap Amstrup identified four decades ago still remains unbridged. As a result, the literature is confusing and the student of the International Relations of Small States finds often herself in the same quagmire as Kenneth Waltz asking: “[H]ow could I make sense of the literature?” (2001:viii). There are no clear answers with regard to fundamental questions that could put some order in the field such as: first, the *raison d’ être* of the Small State studies, namely which concerns unite scholars in the field, the concept of the Small State itself, second, whether there is a Small State pattern of behaviour or not and third how Small State studies stand with regard to International Relations Theories. It seems that the field has a controversial relationship with Realism. Some scholars contend that Small States defy Realism and, furthermore, the dominance of the latter has posed an impediment to the development of the study of Small States (Elman, 1995; Goetschel, 1998; Hey, 2003; Ingebritsen et al., 2006; Browning, 2006). However, there are others who employ Realism and some of them welcome a further engagement with it (Mouritzen and Wivel, 2005; Chong and Maass, 2010; Maass, 2014; de Carvahlo and Neumann, 2015).

## 1.2 This thesis

The purpose of this thesis is to fill that void in the literature , respond to the above questions and provide a systematic review of the existing contributions. In Van Evera’s (1997) terms this thesis is a “stock-taking” dissertation. I draw on previous research on Small States in International Relations and investigate a body of literature that is scattered across many different issues, periods and geographic areas. In order to gain a coherent overview of the field I follow Pantev’s (2010:104) suggestion that “[W]hatever the research focus on small states’ security has been by now, it has had the positive effect of helping the description of the range of issues and specific influential factors, outlining the general picture of stability of the respective country. Every research focus could practically be added to the rest of similar efforts and approaches, thereby facilitating the drawing of the general picture.” Therefore, I build on previous research by collecting, compiling, summarizing and synthesizing the different contributions to the field according to their focus and the questions that concern this study; in the hope that I will create a systematic and coherent body of information that will enhance our

knowledge of the existing research, shed some light to our understanding of the Small State in International Relations and stimulate some new efforts in the field.

However, this cannot be a straightforward process because, as I noted above, the field itself lacks coherence and dialogue among scholars. Yet, there are three issues that have dominated the field, namely (a) the definition issue; (b) the power resources and the factors that impact upon a Small State's behaviour issue; (c) and the common pattern of behaviour issue. I categorize the different contributions around these three issues and therefore I use them as anchors for my analysis and synthesis. Each chapter presents a categorization and analysis part, and a part of synthesis of the different views where I make an effort to respond to the fundamental for the field questions I stated above.

Even with regard to the main three issues in the field I should note that the literature is scattered and sporadic and, what is more, it is likely that a work can focus on more than one of them or even on all three. Hence, in the face of a fragmented body of literature, in the beginning I drew on Beyer's (2006) compiled and annotated bibliography. However, this was far from being exhaustive. Thus, I also turned to the SCOPUS database, using the following terms as key-words: small states, small powers, in plural and singular, and in various combinations with the terms international relations, international organizations, security, European Union, alliances, United Nations. The Journal of Cooperation and Conflict has been an invaluable source in this effort and it is the most cited journal in this thesis. Moreover, I have also used several monographs and edited volumes on Small States. The time span of the literature that this study covers commences from Rappard's study in 1934 and ends up to works that were published up to the end of the year 2015. The vast majority of them are written in English.

Before proceeding to the synopsis of the thesis I should make clear that in a sense there is not a field of the International Relations of Small States, but a body of literature, to which I refer as Small State studies, that I assume to belong to a common research field. In order to explore the Small State literature and foster a dialectical relationship between the different contributions in the context of this thesis, I shall treat the International Relations scholars who have done research on Small States as members of a special field of research, the field of the International Relations of Small States. Thus, for the purpose of this thesis I shall refer to them as Small State scholars, recognizing that this is not what defines their identity as researchers. The key condition for their inclusion is that they take in their analysis a Small State perspective. I also refer to the body of International Relations literature that does not focus on Small States as mainstream International Relations literature in order to make the distinction between it and the Small State studies.

The remainder of this thesis is divided into four chapters. The second chapter deals with the question of the definition of Small States. The conceptualization of the Small State concerns almost every study in the field, and it is not an exaggeration to argue that almost every scholar defines the Small State in a different way. This is why the definition of small states is deemed the “perennial problem” of the field. Thus, the aim of this chapter is to take up this challenge and, to this end, I collect and classify the different definitions available in the literature into six different categories. I evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of each of them and in contrast with previous efforts that highlighted the differences among different scholars I look for the common points among them which I believe that constitute the essence of the concept of Small State and the glue that unite the Small State scholars in one field.

The third chapter focuses on the “power of the weak”. It seeks to identify the power resources of the Small States and the factors that influence their behaviour, according to the Small State scholars. Again, I do not seek the disagreements that have kept the field fragmented and in a sense stagnated. The goal of this chapter is to unveil the common points and concerns among the different studies in order to create a framework of analysis of the Small State behaviour based on the synthesis of the different views in the field. Thus, I take a comprehensive and eclectic approach which compiles the different power resources according to the three levels of analysis, analyzes the ways in which each one impacts upon the behaviour of the Small State and how these are distinct from the ways that Great Powers draw on their power resources.

In the fourth chapter, the issue of the common pattern of behaviour comes to the forefront. The question of the Small State behaviour has been one of the main concerns of the Small State scholars. The fact that different Small States make different choices, even under the same structural conditions have caught Small State scholars by surprise and triggered much of the interest in the research of the Small States. The differences in the Small State choices were also key to the critics of the study of the Small States. Based on the previous findings I discuss whether we should expect a dominant pattern in Small State behaviour; if the differences in the choices of the Small States reveal that they do not have anything in common; how they differ from the Great Powers and finally whether there is a common pattern of Small State behaviour. At this point my attention turns to the “small but smart” state and I attempt to unpack what smartness means in the context of the International Relations of Small States and reconsider the concept of the “small but smart” state . To this end, I employ insights from research on entrepreneurship.

The fifth chapter, finally, presents the conclusions of this thesis. I summarize and evaluate the findings of the thesis and based on them I draw some directions for future research in the field of the International Relations of Small States.

*“What’s in a name? That which we call a rose  
By any other name would smell as sweet.”  
Romeo and Juliet (II, ii, 1-2)*

## Chapter 2. The “perennial problem of Small States” revisited

### 2.1 Introduction

Since its early steps research on Small State in International Relations has been suffering from a “perennial problem”, in the words of Neils Amstrup (1976). Although there is a broad consensus that Small Powers exist, as hierarchy in the international system is a practice as old as the international phenomenon, and that smallness is worth studying, as it differentiates Small Powers from major powers in many ways (i.e., Rothstein, 1968; Vayrynen, 1997; Handel, 1985; Henrikson, 2001; Archer, Bailes and Wivel, 2014), Small State scholars have found it impossible to agree on a common definition, not even on which criteria they should use to define a state as small. Thus, take it to the extreme, one can find as many definitions as Small States exist or as many different approaches as the studies of Small State in international relations are. Hence, the definition puzzle still remains unresolved (Archer *et. al.*, 2014).

Debate over the definition holds a central position in the Small State literature. Neumann and Gstöhl (2006) argue that this disagreement has marked the field. Bishop (2012:946) states that “[T]he discipline was never really able to get beyond the thorny question of ‘what is small’ and dissatisfaction with this impasse further institutionalized the marginalization of the topic, with the notion of smallness coming to be viewed as conceptually irrelevant.” According to Amstrup (1976), research on Small States in the international system has been impeded by the confusion over Small State definition. Indeed, there are three reasons why he is right. First, scholars have paid so much attention to their predicament to agree on a definition, that it seems as Small State literature has nothing else significant to add in the fields of International Relations and International Political Economy (Mosser, 2001). In this context, Lee and Smith (2010:1094) note that “[F]or the Small States literature the question of ‘what is small?’ is central; for the rest of International Relations and International Political Economy the response is ‘who cares?’”. Second, due to the lack of a commonly accepted definition scholars preferred to adopt tailor-made approaches, *ad hoc* definitions, which, at least initially, make any comparative effort difficult and hamper the accumulation of knowledge in the field (Amstrup,

1976; Archer et. al., 2014). However, as Duval and Thompson (1980:523) suggest, “[B]efore we can expect consensual and cumulative empirical findings, we must decide how we wish to define the national attribute of size.” Third, in many efforts to define Small State and relate smallness to a certain behaviour the correlation between the properties of Small State and Small State actions has often been analysed inadequately. Amstrup (1976:165) argues that “it seems to be assumed that given a satisfactory definition of an independent variable, viz. size, it is also possible to predict something about the dependent variable, viz. the behavior of Small States. But obviously, this dependent variable is no less elusive than the independent variable of size.”

It was this inability to pinpoint a shared working definition that left the concept of Small State vulnerable to many different attacks. In a similar vein with Amstrup, Baehr (1975:460-461) criticises Azar (1973) for claiming that “Deutsch’s definition of a Small State, as an international political actor whose total GNP accounts for less than one per cent of the world’s GNP.. ‘is a very useful one for studying power relations and interstate conflict’”. Baehr argues that there is no visible connection between the definition and a state’s behaviour in international relations and interstate conflict. In his oft-cited review paper *Small States: Tool for Analysis?* he suggests that smallness as a focus of study should be abandoned, because “Small States” constitute a very broad category “to serve as a valid concept for scientific analysis” (p. 461).

This was neither the first nor the last time that the concept of Small State was challenged. Bull (1968) contested not only the value of the notion of Small State in International Relations, but also the viability of Small Powers as entities in the international system. Also, Carlsnaes (2007:12) argues that “[S]ize only enters into the picture when comparing states empirically -as one possible factor explaining differences or similarities between the actions of states. Size is thus an empirical, not a conceptual framework”. Moreover, in his view Small States should not be studied as if they formed a distinct group for two more reasons: first, because it is difficult to decide where to draw the line between small, medium, or micro states and second, because of the relative and contextualized nature of the concept, a state may be small in one area but not in another.

From a different perspective Thurrer (1998) wonders if in a world where Small States have many opportunities to compensate for their deficits, a distinction between small and big states is still meaningful. Equally, but in policy terms, Easterly and Kraay (2000) claim that there is no difference between small and large states, when the former can achieve as high growth rates -and even higher sometimes- as the latter; for that reason they suggest that both should take the same policy advice. Also, a WTO (2002) literature review on Small States concludes that a meaningful distinction between small and large states cannot be traced in the literature and

thus there is no reason for the Organization to consider a different treatment, specifically for Small States. In order to explain such views Lee and Smith (2010:1092) argue that “dissatisfied with...lack of substantive theorizing regarding smallness, scholars have sought to locate and interrogate its ontological status”. Yet, the concept of Small State is alive and well. The fact that it was impossible for International Relations scholars to delineate a precise definition for Small State cannot depreciate its conceptual value and, what is more, its existence. As Møller (1983:43) puts it “[F]ew concepts within political science have been attacked as fiercely as the concept of Small State and have still been used for political analysis.”

Despite the confusion, such a variety in definitions and views on the value of the Small State as a concept, in my opinion, is not unjustified, at least for a couple of reasons. First, –though surprisingly not adequately discussed among Small State scholars– the debate over definition, even when it is not noted, is centered around the concept of power, as the difference between Small Powers and Great Powers is about the amount of power they possess. However, power itself is one the most vague and disputed concepts in International Relations (Gilpin, 1975; 1981; Guzzini, 2000; Baldwin, 2002). Consequently, many of the deficiencies of the Small State conceptualization are inherited by the troublesome concept of power. The analogies between the debate on the conceptualization of power and the efforts to define Small State will be discussed later on this chapter. However, it is worth noting three points proving that both concepts suffer from similar inadequacies. Gilpin (1975: 24) notes that the “number and variety of definitions [of power] should be an embarrassment to the political scientists” and this is a suggestion that could be valid for the Small State definition too. Moreover, it is argued that power is so often redefined because researchers try to find an operational concept in absence of a commonly accepted definition and given the difficulty of its measurement (Frey, 1989). As it is stated above this is also the case with the Small State concept. Furthermore, Baldwin (2002:181) suggests that “is the desire of international relations scholars to rank the overall power of states from highest to lowest that generates the most difficult measurement problems.” This problem lies at the heart of the Small State definition debate.

Secondly, under the umbrella of the Small State concept there have been studied cases as diverse as the United States (Elman, 1995) and Malta (i.e., Baldacchino, 2009), Turkey (Fox, 1959; Gerger, 1975) and Luxembourg (i.e. Hey, 2002), Finland (i.e. Browning, 2006) Nepal (Vyas and Sangrula, 2014) and the Vatican City (Chong, 2010), Iceland (ie Thorhallsson, 2009) and Trinidad and Tobago (i.e. Braveboy Wagner, 2010), Israel (i.e. Vital, 1967) and Botswana (Taylor, 2014), Germany (Katzenstein, 1997; Tuschoff, 2001) and Cyprus (Evagorou, 2007; Kouskouvelis, 2015b). Therefore, it goes without saying that Small States form an extremely heterogeneous, contextualized and elastic group. “There is in fact more than one Small State in international relations”, as Maass (2009:66) reminds us. That is why, he suggests that pluralism in definitions has been fruitful for the field. It seems that for Maass the plethora of definitions encompasses

the richness of smallness, the various aspects that make a state small, rather well. Therefore, he argues that the elusiveness of the Small State concept is not only unavoidable, but also beneficial. In a sense Maass (2009) goes one step further from Amstrup (1976:179) who notes “that our discipline has to go on living with the vague, but at the same time very persistent notion of “small states””. At this point it is worth noting that earlier Vayrynen (1971:92) had advised scholars not to be absorbed by the definition problem as “one can reach quite similar conclusions in spite of different definitional starting points.” Should we, then, combine the three aforementioned views and just leave smallness to the eye of the beholder? Is this an adequate response to those who categorically reject the concept? Is it useful for the discipline? After all, this is not the first time in International Relations that words mean different things to different people (Wight, 2006).

There should be no doubt that pluralism and flexibility regarding the conceptualization of the Small State reflects the diversity that characterizes Small States as a group and has been necessary and beneficial for the field. This study, however, endorses Wight’s (2006:290) thesis that “conceptual inquiry is a necessary prerequisite to the empirical research.” In other words, we need to know what it is we are attempting to explain and understand. Only then, we will be able to respond why its study matters and what are the specific issues we need to explore. That is why, I try to shed some light to the “perennial problem” of the Small State studies from a different angle. Instead of identifying the differences among the various approaches, my aim is to find points of convergence among Small State scholars and also between Small State studies and mainstream International Relations. Such an endeavour articulates what different Small State scholars think that a Small State is and therefore contributes to the accumulation of knowledge in the Small State field.

In doing so, in this chapter I explore the various efforts to define an entity that has been analyzed under many different names: small state, weak state (Handel, 1985), weak power (Buzan, 1983) minor power (Wight, 1978; Krause and Singer, 2001), secondary and tertiary state (Lobell et al, 2015), or lesser state (Waltz, 1979; De Russet, 1954). I suggest that there is more common ground among the different approaches than it is usually believed. It seems that there is not a serious disagreement among Small State scholars on which states should be members of the Small State group -apart from marginal cases- as usually it is the same countries that are studied, but under different definitions. Moreover, what unites the states which are in and differentiates them from the states which are out is that they are not Great Powers, those states who control the system. Furthermore, even when unusual cases as Turkey (Fox, 1959; Gerger, 1975) or the US (Elman, 1995), appear they also meet this criterion for a specific period of time. Hence, I suggest that Small State scholars agree at least on an ontological level and such an agreement is of great importance; it explains the reason why at the end of the day pluralism in definitions does not prohibit scholars to arrive at similar conclusions, despite the differences in their starting point.

This chapter advances the view that efforts which define the Small State in a simple and self evident way as the state that is not a Great Power constitutes the common denominator of all the definitional approaches and therefore the most appropriate and pragmatic way to respond to the definitional problem. It also finds that such an approach is not far from the view of prominent International Relations theorists, such as Wight, Morgenthau, Buzan, Waltz and thus allows room for more dialogue between Small State studies and International Relations theories and, more precisely, with Realism.

In this context and regarding the conceptual value of smallness the study of Small States as a group suggests that as long as we have an order made by Great Powers in a world made up of Small States it is necessary to study how the latter respond to the intended or unintended effects of the actions of the former. Thus following Waltz (1979:96) who states that “the only interesting question is whether the category that classifies objects according to their common qualities is useful” I conclude that the concept of Small State is valuable. Moreover, I advocate that the notion of Small Power, and its other versions: ‘weak power’, ‘minor power’, ‘lesser power’ or ‘secondary power’, is more suitable and self explanatory in an International Relations context than that of Small State. Finally, I conclude that Small Power as a concept does not say anything about a state’s ability and performance in the international system, but that it holds limited resources and it is characterized by higher vulnerability and lower influence in comparison to the Great Powers. It constitutes only a starting point, a context for the analysis of the behaviour of and challenges for states that are not Great Powers. It is a necessary but not sufficient condition to explain and understand such powers in international politics, as smallness interacts with external and internal factors which affect a Small State’s behaviour, and success or failure is subject to different strategies.

## 2.2 Approaches to the definition of Small State

Efforts to conceptualize the notion of Small State stemmed from scholars’ dissatisfaction with the residual approach and which defines Small State simply as the state that is not a great power (Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006). Yet, as Smith et. al. (2005:ii) point out “the growing dissatisfaction with the lack of a positive definition has opened up more questions than answers.” Arguably the biggest question is the one concerning the starting point. Scholars, even when they intuitively agree on which states can be qualified as small, are confused with the appropriate criteria for defining the Small State. Indeed, the variety of definitions in the literature reconfirms Amstrup’s (1976:178) comment that “it seems easier to develop one’s own view on Small States than comparing it with other and earlier views.”

There are three scholars who tried to assemble and categorize the different efforts to define Small States. Vayrynen (1971:99) mentions four possible ways of definition. The first category is “related to ranks of countries”, the second emphasizes “the nature of behaviour of state”, the third is “based on distinct interest of small powers as contrasted with those powers” and the fourth applies “concepts of role theory”.

According to Barston (1973:15) there are four ways too, but they are different from them of Vayrynen: a) arbitrarily delimiting the category by placing an upper limit on, for example, population size; b) measuring the objective elements of state capability and placing them on a ranking scale c) analysing relative influence; d) identifying characteristics and formulating hypotheses on what differentiates Small States from other classes of states.

Barston perceives the aforementioned approaches as complementary, rather than mutually exclusive. However, it is worth noting that for his own research he chooses an upper limit of population between ten and fifteen million (Table 2.1) “purely to establish the boundaries of the subject for analytical purposes”, as he explains (p. 15).

Three years later Amstrup (1976) identified six different groups:

- i) The first group of authors avoids the entire problem of definition, either because it seems irrelevant to them or because it seems impossible to solve.
- ii) The second group tries to link size to some measurable characteristics of states.
- iii) For a third and more heterogeneous group the relationship between Small States and greater powers cannot be explained by the size variable alone, but also depends on other variables such as the structure of the international system, the geographical position, and the domestic political system.
- iv) The fourth group concentrates on size as a perceptual problem...states which perceive themselves as small are also small.
- v) A fifth group concentrates on specific situations to show some ‘essential’ characteristics of Small State behavior, which then can be generalized to other situations.
- vi) A sixth group points to the necessity of a differentiation of the size concept.

It is obvious that Amstrup’s account is richer than Barston’s and Vayrynen’s. In Amstrup’s categories we can incorporate many of previous and later from his work attempts to provide a definition of Small State. However, Barston’s third category which focuses on relative influence and constitutes a very popular choice among Small State scholars lately is missing from both Amstrup’s and Vayrynen’s analyses. That said, all the three ignore the negative approach. In my view, an up to date and comprehensive categorization of the various definitions is possible through a synthesis of the above groupings and the addition of the residual approach, therefore includes six categories, which I am going to present and assess below.

### *2.2.1 The "I know one when I see one" approach.*

First is the "I know one when I see one" approach. Streeten (1993) and Hey (2003) are representative examples of this first category. This is the same with Amstrup's first group which comprises scholars that "avoid the entire problem of definition, either because it seems irrelevant to them or because it seems impossible to solve". Hey admits that such an approach "avoids the intellectual squabbles" (p.3). Furthermore, in her opinion it is better than the "rigid definitions that fail to reach an agreed-on group of Small States" and closer to the real world where Small States act and interact.

### *2.2.2 The Quantitative approaches.*

Second, we should pay attention to the quantitative approaches which constitute probably the most populated, at least until the early 2000s, but also the most controversial group. Barston (1973) and Amstrup (1976) explain that scholars provide some measurable attributes of states (area, population, GNP) and then set an upper limit to determine who is in and who is out. Vital, (1967) Barston himself (1973) Thorhallsson (2012) and many others, as well as a series of International Organizations, as it can be seen in Tables 2.1 and 2.2, have adopted this approach.

The quantitative approaches have their roots back in the eighteenth century and into the traditional thinking about international politics according to which power can be measured by well defined variables such as population, territory, wealth, armies, navies (Gulick, 1955). This approach privileges material capabilities because they are associated with military preponderance. In this context military might is what distinguishes Small States from Great Powers. Goetschel (1998:14) suggests that: "[T]he categorization of states according to their territorial extension or the size of their population used to be of crucial importance. What today is called strategic depth and military manpower were essential factors which decided the survival of states." Quantitative approach finds also resonance with the Realist tradition. A large population and a big area are connected with market size and wealth which is also linked to military power (Waltz, 1979). Furthermore, according to Buzan (1983:41) the size of population matters because "state is primarily a social phenomenon". Buzan argues that "[W]ithout sufficient size, the unit is too fragile in the company of its larger fellows and lacks the capability to perform all the tasks of self rule."

**Table 2.1** Selected definitions based on quantitative criteria

<b>Author</b>	<b>Definition</b>
Demas (1965)	A small country is one with a population five million or less and a useable area of 10,000 and 20,000.
Vital (1967)	The rough upper limits of the class of Small States are a) a population of 10-15 million in the case of economically advanced countries and b) a population of 20-30 million in the case of underdeveloped countries.
Barston (1973)	For the purpose of this discussion a Small State is defined as having a population with an upper limit of between 10 and 15 million.
Jalan (1982)	Population below five million, arable land area below 25,000 square kilometers and a GNP below US\$2bn
Edis (1991)	A widely accepted definition or at least a parameter is a country having a population of one million or less.
Payne and Sutton (1993)	The definition of a Small State in this article accepts current usage i.e. a population of one billion and below.
Streeten (1993)	We know a small country when we see it. The best simple measure is population.
Armstong and Read (1998)	Upper limit 3.000.000
Daniel Thurer (1998)	Small States are states with fewer than ten million inhabitants.
Brunn (1999)	I define Small States as those with less than five million people in 1995.
Thorhallsson (2000)	Seven member states can be defined as smaller EU states during this period, ranging from Luxembourg with just over 400.000 inhabitants to the Netherlands with 15 million inhabitants.
Archer and Nugent (2002)	If population is to be the main indicator, then perhaps twelve million is a better break point than ten because it brings in a number of states –such as Hungary, the Czech Republic and Greece– that are likely to be identified either by themselves or from others as being small.
Bunse (2009)	Small States are those with significantly less than 40 million of inhabitants.
Panke (2012)	A state is small if it has less than average relevant capacities in a given negotiation setting.
Thorhallsson (2012)	10.000.000

**Table 2.2** Definition approaches by International Organizations

United Nations Report (1967)	Small States are entities, which are exceptionally small in area, population, and human and economic resources.
UNITAR (1969)	The concept is an elastic one and, not subject to any absolute definition.
House of Commons (1984)	Small States basic characteristic is an unavoidable need to seek outside assistance to preserve security and economic survival
World Bank	Population under 1.5 million. These countries vary greatly in their level of development and the size of their economies. They are also spread out geographically, with most of them clustered in the Caribbean, the Pacific, and in Africa. Despite their diversity, these countries share a common set of development challenges.
The Commonwealth	Small States are sovereign countries with a population of 1.5 million people or fewer. There are 31 Small States in the Commonwealth.
Forum of Small States (UN)	10.000.000
World Trade Organization	An early literature review by the WTO surveyed as Small States those with a population under five million.

Nowadays such views might seem obsolete because of the development of new forms of power (Shweller, 2014). Furthermore, there are Small States like Singapore (Mathews and Yan, 2007; Koh, 1998) or the militarily weak but economically strong Arab oil states (Handel, 1985), which perform rather well, despite their limited human resources and area, and others like the central European Small States that have even outperformed Great Powers (Katzenstein, 1985;2003). Indeed, although traditional thinking implies that Small States are impotent, more recent studies that also use quantitative criteria do not vindicate this view (i.e. Thorhallsson, 2011; Panke, 2012a; Bunse, 2009).

Panke’s (2012a:315) contribution constitutes an interesting case among the quantitative approaches. Her research is on Small States in negotiations and in this context she argues that “[A] state is small if it has less than average relevant capacities in a given negotiation setting.” It is worth noting that according to Panke we can determine smallness or bigness only in a “given negotiation setting” and only then “we could make inferences that help to assess which obstacles these states face”. Furthermore, Panke advances the quantitative approach in one more way. She connects financial resources with a state’s ability to participate effectively in international negotiations. Therefore she concludes that “in instances in which it is unclear which type of capacity might be most important for states in a negotiation, financial resources are a good proxy for size.”

Vital (2006:78 [1967]) who also privileges the value of the material approach, explains the reasons why such a perspective is valid, although he admits that capabilities are not the only factor that shapes a state's behaviour. He underlines that "material size is the factor which is least of all given to modification through the deliberate efforts of governments. It sets the limit to what can be attained and fixes the international role and status of the nation more surely than any other." Although Vital is right to argue that material size sets limits and it is related to the role that a state can play and its status, it is also true that one has not to compare the exact population or area sizes to determine if Norway's role and status is different from that of the US. In this sense the "I know one, when I see one" perspective appears more useful. Therefore some years later Vital (1971) admits that a loose concept of Small State would be preferable to a rigid definition.

The material size approach is still broadly used, both in research and practice, because it possesses a great advantage; it is very useful for delimiting a universe. However, most of the scholars using quantitative criteria admit that any boundary is artificial and arbitrary, set only to service the purposes of a particular study (ie Vital, 1967; Barston, 1973; Thorhallsson, 2011). Therefore, there is a great variation in upper limits, even when studies focus on the same context, i.e., EU (Bunce, 2009; Archer and Nuggent, 2002). Without doubt differences depend on the era under examination. The population variable for the developing states, for example, decreased from twenty to thirty million, according to Vital, in 1967 to one or one and a half million recently (Payne and Sutton, 1993) as a consequence of the growth in the number of states after decolonization, but it remained stable for the developed world: ten to fifteen millions. In this context, Sutton (2011:141-142) admits that "the concept of 'Small State' is imprecise and subject to judgements." He illustrates this point with a personal anecdote revealing the way that smallness can be determined within International Organizations. Sutton came across the definition puzzle in 1997 when he was appointed by the Commonwealth Secretariat as a lead consultant with the mission to update a Commonwealth report on Small States published twelve years earlier. He knew that if he used the 1985 criteria, population of around one million or less, the one million cut-off point would reduce the number of Small States from twenty-nine in 1985 to twenty-six or even twenty-four in 1997. Such a development, though, would be politically unacceptable. Therefore he suggested to lift "the threshold to one and-a-half million, arguing in the new report that since 1985 'world population has increased and relative upward adjustment of population is necessary to take account of this fact.'" This short story is indicative of the arbitrariness and also the political aspects of quantitative definitions. Moreover, it seems that the regional system plays a role, i.e. the population standard is different between Europe and the Caribbean. Neighborhood therefore matters in many ways. Schmidl (2001:85) underlines that "smallness of many countries in question is defined by the size of their neighbours rather than their own: Canada is small vis-a-vis the United States and so is Austria vis-a-vis Germany (and both suffer from their inferiority syndromes), yet Canada

is 100 times bigger than Austria (and, by way, 30 times the size of Germany), with more than four times as many inhabitants.“

In reality, it is difficult to explain the differences or the similarities between Canada and Austria, based only on quantitative terms, and the situation becomes even more confusing if one takes into account that even Germany has been studied as Small State (Tuschoff, 2001). It seems that weaknesses of the quantitative approach have no end. Even if we agree who is in and who is out of the group, it is hard to explain why a state with one and half million inhabitants would behave similarly or differently from a state with five, ten or forty millions people. It is almost impossible to find differences, especially among marginal cases, as it is irrational to suggest that the state which is ranked number twenty with fifteen millions people is somewhat different or behaves differently from the state ranked number twenty one with let's say sixteen million people because of its population size.

What is more, efforts to connect capabilities with policies (i.e., East, 1973) have been contested (Duval and Thompson, 1980). A WTO literature review (2002) does not find adequate common points in Small States problems and policies, capable to justify the need for a special treatment, therefore a WTO report (2005) concludes that there is no need for a distinction between small and large states and no reason to create a sub-category of Small States within the organization. In this context political incentives should not be underestimated. A creation of a Small States subcategory would imply a need for special treatment to smaller members, something which would be undesirable to the bigger players. Therefore, Sutton (2011:148) argues that lack of clarity in definition can itself be an objective in international organisations.

Furthermore, if one looks only at quantitative attributes, then gets odd results and thus might miss important points; i.e., in area terms Sweden should be among the three European Great Powers, and Canada should be a superpower; also Greece's military spending is disproportionate to its size, and Malta's contribution to International Maritime Law does not correspond to its position in the international system. Moreover, quantitative criteria say nothing about a state's relationship with its environment, whereas Small State scholars spare no effort to stress that the concept is relational; i.e., Bjørl (1971:29) claims that “[B]y itself the concept of Small State means nothing. [A] state is only small in relation to a greater one.” Moreover, a state might be small in one area, but great in another. The view supported by Keohane and Nye (1977) that size may differ with issue area, is also widely supported by many Small State scholars (Handel, 1985) A very recent example is a proposition made by Brill and Glassman (2012; 2014) for Singapore and Switzerland to join the G20, although if we take population as a standard they are by all means Small States. Therefore, the quantitative criteria approach alone and especially if it has only one dimension, i.e., population, seems inadequate to provide a concept which would be useful for analytical purposes.

The third of the Amstrup's groups points to other endogenous and exogenous variables that influence the size of a state; such factors can be the structure of the international system, the geographical position, the domestic political system. Indeed, many scholars, irrespective of the approach they themselves follow to define the Small State, have emphasized the impact of other variables that interact with size; among them Vital, (1967) Barston, (1973), Thorhallsson, (2006). However, such views should be better seen as efforts to understand smallness and therefore as complementary to definitions. They are very useful if we are to understand smallness and explain how it interacts with other factors but they fall short of articulating an operational definition. I argue that this is also the case with Amstrup's sixth group which advances a differentiation of the size concept. In his last group Amstrup cites Vayrynen's work 'on the definition and measurement of small power status' as an example.

Vayrynen (1971) presents five different properties of Small States: i) low rank/status ii) high degree of penetration by environment, iii) a given type of behaviour iv) difference in interests, v) a distinct role. Vayrynen makes a distinction between objective and subjective properties and also between endogenous and exogenous variables. However, he recognizes that all have their problems: "[T]he use of rank criteria in the separation of class of small powers is very common but its meaningfulness depends on the fact to which extent the multidimensional size of a nation acts as a determinant to its behaviour" (p. 94). Also he notes that high degree of penetration is more a consequence of low rank, rather than an independent variable. In addition, there is such a variety of behavioural tendencies that it is difficult to define a Small Power according to them. Moreover, regarding interests, he finds that difference in them "is due to material inequality" and it is not clear "whose interests in fact differ". Finally, Vayrynen (1971:99) regards "rank and role as basic definitional elements" and he considers "the interests approach as a very promising but to a large extent underexplored." Summarizing his views he attempts to "define and describe a small power and its position in the following, admittedly broad way" which in his own view does not constitute "a definition in the strict sense of the word" but articulates an approach to Small State characteristics according to them:

A small state is a state, which has a low objective and/or a low perceived rank in the context where it is acting. Furthermore, small powers are expected to behave in a given way, i.e., the role prescriptions differ from those of middle and Great Powers, which affect together with the low rank upon their behavior and possibilities of influence. Finally, the interests of small powers are at least to some extent different from the interests of Great Powers, a fact which denotes the latent or manifest conflict of interests between these two classes of states.

I suggest that such approaches seem to constitute more of a useful guide on thinking about Small State challenges and behaviour rather than an effort to define Small State and provide a working concept. Therefore, I would not include them into a list of differ-

ent definition categories. A more recent example which I believe reconfirms this point is Thorhallsson's effort to differentiate size. He combines traditional variables, i.e., population, area, GDP, military expenditure, with a wider range of internal and external variables, in order to provide a conceptual framework capable of both defining a state's size and explaining a state's behaviour. Thorhallsson (2006:28) argues that while traditional variables are useful, "a theoretical approach...has to examine in a much wider context what features determine concrete objective measurements". To further illuminate his point he notes that for example "a state's political size in terms of its military capability must be interpreted in conjunction with an assessment of the skills of its bureaucrats...and of aspects of its domestic politics." According to Thorhallsson (2006:8) an approach to a Small State size includes six categories:

- 1) fixed size (population and territory);
- 2) sovereignty size (whether the state can maintain a minimum state structure and presence at international level);
- 3) political size (military and administrative capabilities and the degree of domestic cohesion, combined with the degree to which the state maintains an external united front);
- 4) economic size (GDP, market size and development success);
- 5) perceptual size (how domestic and external actors regard the state);
- 6) preference size (ambitions and prioritizations of the governing elite and its ideas about the international system).

Thorhallsson suggests that we should measure a state's action capacity and vulnerability within these categories and define the size of a state accordingly. Although there are good reasons for a multidimensional approach to a state's size and frameworks like the one provided by Thorhallsson are valid and sophisticated, in my view they face a series of weaknesses. First, most of the variables that should be calculated are in reality very hard to be measured. Second, they fail to provide a concrete definition, useful for analytical purposes. Third, they lack a comparative perspective which, however, is inherent in smallness, as well as in greatness. Fourth, they cannot account for cases of states whose power is differentiated among different issue areas. For example, Hanggi (1998:84) argues that "Switzerland is at the same time a Small State, a medium level power and a great power, depending on the criterion of analysis used." It is difficult though to determine where Switzerland stands according to Thorhallsson's framework.

It should be stressed at this point that Thorhallsson's variables of state's action capacity and vulnerability are close to what Vital (2006:78 [1967]) believed that are the key criteria of a state's strength and weakness, namely "the capacity of the state to withstand stress, on the one hand, and its ability to pursue a policy of its own devising." Therefore, although it is not stated, it is worth noting that we can identify a kinship between Vital's and Thorhallsson's

views, which are also close to the way that Fox perceived power. According to her (2006:40 [1959]) “[S]uccess or failure in securing its own demands or in resisting the demands of other states is the test of the power position of any state”.

### *2.2.3 The Perceptions approaches*

The next group, third in this study, is Amstrup’s fourth category which comprises definitions that understand size as a “perceptual problem”. The role of perceptions is also stressed in the frameworks of both Vayrynen and Thorhallsson, in the form of perceived ranking for the former and perceptual size for the latter. In this sense “states which perceive themselves as small are also –by definition– Small States” (Amstrup, 1976:166). Perceptions of smallness constitute an aspect much appreciated by first wave scholars such as Rothstein (1968), Fox (1969) and Keohane (1969), who –although each one from a different perspective– support that the perception of Small States leaders about their states’ smallness matter. According to Rothstein (1968:29), whose focus is on security “a small power is a state which recognizes that it can not obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states institutions, processes, or developments to do so; the small power’s belief in its inability to rely on its own means must also be recognized by other states involved in international politics.”

Keohane (2006:57[1969]) rejects this definition based on the view that “[W]here insecurity is constant and all pervasive, it cannot serve as a significant variable.” In his opinion, if we follow Rothstein’s version, then all states but the two superpowers are small, as no state alone can defend itself against a superpower. However, he argues that “‘objective reality’ does not determine statesmen’s behavior directly” and that is why he recognizes the importance of psychological dimension. Thus, he focuses on “the systemic role that state’s leaders see their countries playing”. In this context, he suggests that “a small power is a state whose leaders consider that it can never, acting alone or in a small group, make a significant impact on the system” (Keohane, 2006:60 [1969])

A definition by Fox (1969) seems to combine the above two views. She underlines the beliefs of Small State leaders and the perceptions of others about a state’s position in the system, but she goes beyond security, to a state’s influence. According to Fox (1969:751) Small States are: “those whose leaders (as well as those of other powers) recognise that their own state’s political weight is limited to a local arena rather than to the global one, that they are dependent upon outside political forces for much of their security, and that their particular state’s interests may be dispensable in the eyes of one or more Great Powers.”

Although the above definitions accentuate the importance of perceptions, we should note that they relate them to influence or security, therefore they are also relevant to another group of definitions which focus on the limits to what a Small State can do and which will be analyzed later. Thus, for the first wave of Small State scholars perceptions of insecurity and inability of a Small State to act alone constitute an important part of a Small State's identity and therefore indispensable part of its conceptualization.

Perceptions came also into the discussion later with the rise of constructivism. Scholars who found the negative narrative of smallness, which focuses on the impotent state, dissatisfying or intentionally imposed more or less argued that "smallness is what you make of it". These efforts look like a call for action to Small States either by promoting the idea of the small but innovative state (Browning, 2006) or by suggesting a rearticulation of smallness "in terms of defiance rather than constraint- in terms of what they will not, as opposed to cannot, do" (Lee and Smith, 2010:1096). Such approaches found resonance with scholars who suggest that states are able to choose their size. Thorhallsson (2009:138), for example, argues that Iceland "has chosen a new role internationally based on its reevaluation of its size... [it] has chosen a new size." Although Iceland in the early 2000s, but also earlier in its Cod War (Ingimundarson, 2003) with the United Kingdom managed to "punch above its weight", there is little doubt that it remains a Small State. Hence, one could more reasonably argue that Iceland upgraded itself within the category of Small States, constructing a new narrative about its smallness, rather than saying that it changed its size. After all, the global economic crisis revealed its high vulnerability.

The link between perceptions and a Small State's behaviour is further illustrated by Henrikson (2001:63), who argues that "[T]he critical test of 'smallness'...is a state's image and its related conduct. This way of identifying the Small State phenomenon is based on the recognition that some states regard themselves and are regarded by other as 'small states' and behave accordingly in a word, deferentially or, sometimes instead, defiantly."

However, autocategorization of states, according to their perceptions can be highly problematic, as President Wilson was once reminded: "nothing can be imagined as much more likely to cause discord than an attempt to have some thirty or forty States classify themselves." (quoted in Duval and Thompson, 1980). Such an approach faces a series of crucial questions: whose perceptions should we take into account? How can we test perceptions? What if perceptions differ and can they alone alter a state's size? There are plenty of cases of Small States that decided to play a greater role than their position in the system would permit; i.e., New Zealand (Henrikson, 2001), Netherlands (Maes and Verdun, 2005), Denmark (Wivel, 2013). Small State leaders often perceive their states as model states, which with their noble qualities, special skills, or success stories could exert significant influence into the world. Israel,

as it is depicted in the words of Abba Eban, constitutes a telling example. A prominent Israeli politician and diplomat Eban stated on a U.S television interview (Abba Eban 1965, quoted in Holsti, 1970: 266):

I think a small country should have a vocation outside itself. If it wants to be saved from provincialism it should play some part in the broader human arena... Quite unexpectedly, Israel, despite being small, is able to play this role...The variety of our efforts, the trial and error, the diversity of social experience, all of these make Israel apparently a very convenient arena in which other nations can learn the developing process.

It seems that Small States perception of having a special mission in the world is quite older; in order to justify the Scandinavian neutrality Norwegian Foreign Minister Nansen (1918:9-11) noted:

We have chosen to remain neutral and do our best to keep out of this war, believing that thus we may serve humanity...The great duty and mission of the Small States now is to keep the peace so far as it lies with them...It is the task of neutrals to keep unbroken the chain of human development...civilization itself demands that some should remain outside the conflict that is now drawing almost the whole world in its vortex. The fact that we Scandinavian nations are small does not prevent us from fulfilling this mission. Small States, in the nature of things cannot be imperialistic... and therefore they have a peculiar mission to seek out and find the new paths that humanity must tread in order to abolish war altogether.

More recently, John Kerry (2013) in his remarks after a meeting with the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Espen Barth Eide noted that “Norway plays one of the giant outsized roles of any country on this planet... it’s safe to say that Norway is one of the great global citizens”. What does this mean about Kerry’s perceptions of Norway’s role, and actual Norway’s role? Is Norway’s contribution significant or not, according to Keohane’s standards, and finally is Norway a Small State or not? Another example comes from this year’s elections debate in London; (The Economist, 4 April, 2015) referred to the United Kingdom as “Little Britain”, seeing it playing a smaller role in the world affairs and running down its military and diplomatic resources. But can Britain be perceived as little, as the leading magazine suggests? Although it is true that the UK has limited its army and diplomatic budgets, it is still a permanent member in the UNSC, a close ally to the US, a member of the EU, at least until now, and a powerful actor in global trade. Hence, it is clear that the perceptions approach also does not lend itself to define Small State.

#### 2.2.4 The Behaviour approaches

Definitions which encompass Small State behaviour, compose the fourth group in this study. Also Vayrynen (1971), Barston (1973) and Amstrup (1976) agree that behaviour constitutes an element according to which scholars define Small States and indeed there is much evidence supporting this view in the literature. Barston and Amstrup talk about some “essential characteristics of Small State behaviour”, while Vayrynen refers to “the nature of Small State behaviour”. In my view, scholars who define Small States according to their behaviour, focus mainly on limitations. Approaches within this group determine what a Small State is by what a Small State can do and what it cannot. Definitions which identify smallness with limited interests constitute representative examples of this category. Such views have their roots in the division between Great Powers and Small States in the Congress of Vienna (Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006; Wight 1978). To this background, Wight (1978:65) suggested that “[M]inor powers have the means of defending only limited interests, and of most of them it is true that they possess only limited interests.” Almost two decades later in the context of the Small State studies Krause and Singer connect behaviour with capabilities and note that (2001:16) “[M]inor powers can be defined as states whose diplomatic and material resources are so limited that their leaders focus mostly on the protection of their territorial integrity rather than on the pursuit of more far-reaching global objectives.” Although it is broadly accepted that Small States have limited interests and face limitations on their actions, such approaches, suffer from a chicken-egg problem. Do Small States exhibit a specific type of behaviour because of their limited capabilities or is there a specific type of behaviour that represents smallness?

Concerning national roles to which Vayrynen refers as an element which can identify a Small State, we should turn to Holsti (1970) and his work on *National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, which is one of the very few studies on roles in International Relations. Holsti associates specific responsibilities, like mediation or peace-keeping services with Small States. He attributes such choices to decision makers’ awareness of international status distinctions. Therefore, one can argue that perception again plays a role. However, Holsti does not connect any of the seventeen different roles that he analyzes exclusively with Small States. Thus, it seems that the explanatory power of definitions based on behaviour and specific roles is limited, as they take into account only one aspect and even in this case it is not clear if a certain behaviour is a consequence or an indication of smallness.

This is a challenge that should also be posed to another sub-group in this category, namely to those scholars who approach Small States as “security consumers”. As we saw above, Rothstein (1967), as well as Fox (1969), suggest that Small States are states that cannot rely on their own capabilities for their security, and thus they seek aid from external resources. Furthermore, in 1974 Raeymaeker argues that “a Small State is a state that thirsts for

security”(p.18) . For Elman (1995:171) “...a Small State can be defined by its limited capability to: (1) influence the security interests of, or directly threaten, a great power; and (2) defend itself against an attack by an equally motivated great power.” Henrikson (1998) defines “[A] small country as one that cannot protect itself by its own efforts.” However, the question whether a Small State is insecure because it is small or if it is small because it is insecure still begs for an answer. While inability to safeguard their security independently should constitute a Small State characteristic, it does not seem enough to determine smallness, especially in our era of extreme securitization and disorder.

Thus, Keohane’s (1969) critique to Vital (1967) is far more justified today than it was fifty six years ago. Furthermore, there are many scholars who privilege influence over security, as Keohane did. Goetschel (1998:19) suggests that “[T]he term Small State characterizes a state’s position towards its environment. This position is characterized by a deficit in influence and in autonomy.” From an International Political Economy perspective Moses (2000:1) argues that “[I]n contrast to larger states, small open states have little ability to affect international markets, or policies; by definition they are price and/or policy takers”. According to Mares (1988:456), “Small powers cannot affect the system individually and would have to ally in such large numbers in order to have an impact that any one small power loses its ability to influence the alliance”. This sounds exactly like Keohane’s definition but without the perceptions aspect. Indeed, both identify four different categories of states in regard to their position and influence in the system.

**Table 2.3** Keohane’s categorization of states in the then international system

<b>System determining (Great Powers)</b>	<b>System influencing (secondary powers)</b>	<b>System affecting (middle powers)</b>	<b>System ineffectual (small powers)</b>
Unites States Soviet Union	UK, France, West Germany, Japan, Communist China, India	Canada, Sweden, Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina	An array of other states, most of which would fail into Vital’s categories for Small States

However, we cannot articulate a comprehensive definition based on the characteristics of Small State behaviour and the limitations that Small States face. The value of the above approaches is that they give us a good idea of what smallness means for most of the Small State scholars which identify smallness with limitations and vulnerability (ie Vital 1967; Gerger, 1975; Knudsen, 2000). That said, we should point out that Small States have many times surpassed their limits and, what is more, have exploited the disparity of power to their advantage. Although their interests are limited, they are intense and there are plenty of scholars who argue

that this intensity matters to success (Fox, 1959; Bjøl, 1973; Karsh, 1997; Wallace, 1999; Lindell and Persson, 1986; Baldacchino, 2009; Thorhallsson, 2011; Panke, 2012a;2012b;2012c). While a great power has to disperse its capabilities all around the world, the Small State focusing on its own survival fights, with military, legal or diplomatic means, with an 'all or nothing' mentality, more often than not, wins (Mack, 1975; Shaohua, 2009). After all, what Vietnam still teaches us, among other things, is not to underestimate a Small State's moral when it comes in a 'life or death' situation. The answer of the Nguyen Van Thieu to Henry Kissinger when the former was asked to end the War in Vietnam are indicative (Nguyen Van Thieu, quoted in Waltz, 1979:194).

You are a giant, Dr . Kissinger. So you can probably afford the luxury of being easy in this agreement. I cannot. A bad agreement means nothing to you. What is the loss of South Vietnam if you look at the world's map? Just a speck. The loss of South Vietnam may even be good for you. It may be good to contain China, good for your world strategy. But a little Vietnamese doesn't play with a strategic map of the world. For us, it isn't a question of choosing between Moscow and Peking. It is a question of choosing between life and death.

Moreover, Small States made use of their smallness, their lack in security and influence when they wish to appear insignificant, and therefore not dangerous (Fox, 1959), or in cases when they present themselves as victims, bullied by a more powerful state, as Iceland did during the Cod War with Britain (Ingimundarson, 2003). What is more, many scholars argue that it is smallness that permits Small States to 'punch above their weight' and play at instances significant roles at the international level; nobody fears or hates a Small State. As Shmidl (2001:86) argues, "the rosy image of smaller states can be useful. Not being much of a 'power', they invite less polarised reactions (to burn the flag of Luxembourg or Austria is less fun than burning the Stars and Stripes)." Thus, smallness means limitations, it is about limited resources, however it says nothing about the performance of a Small State in securing its interests.

However, in my view the approaches which elaborate on lack of influence as an essential characteristic of Small States have a considerable merit as they offer a different perspective that is starkly missing from all the other efforts we have analysed until now. They remind us that International Relations is actually about relations, disparity of power and positions in the system. They underline an essential characteristic of Small States which is that alone they are unable to provoke any significant change in the system. This is an attribute only of Great Powers. Such a view is endorsed by Maass (2014:711), who, although five years earlier (Maass, 2009) had advocated a loose concept, in a more recent study he recognizes that "what characterizes Small States at the systems level is not their physical size but their structural negligibility in a system shaped by Great Powers. Small States are defined...as units of the state system that are individually irrelevant to the structure of the state system."

### *2.2.5 The Relational approaches*

This view is central to the fifth group of definitions in this study, the relational approaches, which are becoming more and more accepted by European scholars the last two decades, but can also be found among Barston's (1973) categories. In this context, Dahl (1997:177) notes that: small should not be interpreted merely as small in size...small is here perceived as small in relation to a much bigger and more powerful actor; "small" as "smaller than". To illustrate her point Dahl notes that such entities could be "geographically extensive or economically or otherwise successful or even dominant;" However, "the crucial part lies in the fact that, however strong it may be in other ways, from a strategic perspective a Small State finds itself, in a vulnerable position vis-a-vis another actor or group of actors." According to Hanggi (1998:84), "[S]mall states are defined as those states which are weakened or dependent in relation to more powerful states". Knudsen (2002:184) suggests that "[A] Small State can be any state in a relationship of marked inferiority of power vis-a-vis another state." An earlier case of a relational approach can also be found in a little known essay on Turkey as a Small State, written by Gerger (1975). In his opinion, "[T]he Small State is the weaker part in the relationship" (p.110). A similar view has been adopted by a series of Small State scholars (Rickli, 2008; Thorhallsson and Wivel, 2006; Wivel and Steinmetz, 2010; Archer et. al., 2014). They "define a small state as the weak part in an asymmetric relationship" which means that Small States are those states which are "stuck with the power configuration and its institutional expression, no matter what their relationship to it is" (Mouritzen and Wivel, 2005).

Since then a great body of scholarship has adopted slightly different versions of this definition which underline that what is distinct in Small States is that they cannot change "the nature or functioning of an asymmetric relationship" on their own (Wivel and Steinmetz, 2010: 7). This last wave in definitional approaches emphasizes the view that smallness or bigness should be determined and analysed in a specific spatiotemporal context, as a state might be small at the international system level but at the same time a great power regionally. What is more, a state's position may differ by issue area and, moreover, challenges and opportunities change from time to time and from area to area. In this sense, the relational approach advocates focus not on the amount of capabilities that a state possesses but in the power that it is able to exert.

However, the relational approach implies a dual relationship which seems simplistic, as usually international relations are far more complex. That said, it is this approach that lies at the heart of International Relations as it focuses on the relation of a state with its environment. Moreover, its emphasis on positions and influence is close to the views of the influence approach scholars (Keohane, 1969; Mares, 1988; Goetschel, 1998; Moses, 2000). What is more, Gerger (1975:110) argues that "the fundamental frame of reference for a small power within which

she ultimately has to act, is characterised by limitations -limited capabilities, limited resources, limited interests, etc. and vulnerability - vulnerability to coercion, to pressure, threats". Therefore we can assume that such an approach can be associated with the central propositions of those scholars who emphasize Small States' limitations and also with the much populated group which prioritizes the capabilities perspective. Thus, there are good reasons to start thinking that Barston was right to argue that the different definitions are more complementary rather than mutually exclusive. It seems that the different ways to define Small State are more connected than we tend to think and that there is some common ground among them.

What is more, in my view the relational definition is a reversed version of the initial negative approach which defines Small States simply as not Great Powers. To illustrate this view, I cite an example from Thorhallsson and Wivel (2006:654) who in defence of the relational definition claim that:

According to this definition, Small States are those states which are unable to change the basic contours of this context ... Conversely, a great power is a state capable of changing the condition of policy making: should the United States choose to move all its troops from the European continent or to leave the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or should France choose to leave the EU or fundamentally change its position on EU security policy, this would radically change these institutions and therefore conditions for policy making. In contrast, if Denmark left NATO or if Austria fundamentally changed its position on EU security policy, the consequences would mainly be felt by these Small States themselves. Therefore, they cannot credibly threaten to leave, alter or destroy the institutional structures. Therefore, they are expected to face a different set of challenges than the Great Powers.

### *2.2.6 The Residual approaches*

This leads us to examine the sixth group in this study, the residual approach, which makes a distinction between Great Powers and the rest. Although ignored in the review works of Vayrynen (1971) and Amstrup (1976) and even disapproved by contemporary scholars (Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006; Archer, et.al., 2014), the negative approach which has its roots in the division between minor powers and Great Powers in the Congress of Vienna has been used for a long time as it can be seen in Table 2.4.

In the above definitions one should add other efforts which define Small State in comparison with Great Powers like the one of Vandebosch (1964:294), according to whom: "[A] Small State is a state which is unable to contend in war with the Great Powers on anything like equal terms." Moreover, Kelstrup (1993:8) suggests that "[S]mall states are not in command

of power resources sufficient to pursue dominant power politics.” Also, Duke (2001:40) in the context of his study assumes, rather crudely as he admits, that “the ‘Small States’, are those who are not members of the Contact Group for Bosnia and Kosovo” in which the states that participated were: US, Russia and the Great European Powers; Germany, France, UK and Italy. Finally, in this group there is also room for scholars who adopt approaches from the mainstream International Relations like Krause and Singer (2001:15). They cite Singer and Small (1982) who:

distinguish among major and minor powers by referring to the following states as major powers: Austria-Hungary from 1816 to 1918; China from 1950 on; France from 1816 to 1940 and from 1944 on; Germany or Prussia from 1816 to 1918, from 1925 to 1945, and from 1990 on; Italy or Sardinia from 1860 to 1943; Japan from 1895 to 1945; and from 1990 on; Russia or the USSR from 1816 to 1917 and from 1922 on; the United Kingdom from 1816 on; the United States from 1899 on. Minor powers are all those states that are not on this list for the given years.

**Table 2.4** Negative approaches to Small State definition

Herre (1937)	Within the European historical development one should treat as Small States all those states which in the prevailing political system do not belong to the Great Powers.
Winberg (1987)	A small nation is a nation that is decidedly not a major power.
Schmidl (2001)	Small States are other than the big five. As long as they are not hegemonic powers.
Verdun (2012)	I will henceforth here assume that a ‘Small State’ is a stretchable term that would include tiny states, Small States and some medium-sized states, but would exclude the six large EU member states.

The advantage of such approaches is that they offer a clear and simple answer to the question “what we want to study?”. Almost every work on Small States in its introduction admits that its interest in Small States has been triggered by the dominance of Great Powers, not only as subjects of international relations but also as objects of International Relations research. Therefore, the object of Small State studies is not the state of one or ten millions, the non-influential or the less secure state. We look at the Luxembourgs, Singapores, Estonias and Botswanas of the world, but at times also at Turkey (Gerger, 1975), Germany (Tuschoff, 2001) and the US (Elman, 1995). The aim of Small State scholars is to examine how the weaker part responds in a situation of disparity of power or, in other words, how Small States survive in a system made up by Great Powers’ interactions. It is the non-dominant part that is our object of study. Hence, we have two options to define it; either by following the relational approach or by adopting the negative one.

## 2.3 Bridging the Gap: revisiting the Small State concept

### 2.3.1 *The Common Points among Small State Scholars and the Small State*

In my opinion, the latter is more suitable than the former for a series of reasons. First, it allows us to surpass the dual relationship obstacle and looks at Small States not as a cohesive group or category but as a continuum globally, at regional level or by issue area. Second, it is simple and elegant. As far as we know the Great Powers, it is easy to identify those states that can be defined as small. Moreover, such an approach is legitimated by the practice of international relations. Being it the UN, the EU, the G8 or the G20 or even the recent Iran talks, all prove that the division between the Great Powers and the rest exist. Therefore, such a definition reflects the reality of world affairs. Moreover, Small States, besides their differences in size, region, ideology, history, level of development, choose to differentiate their positions from those of Great Powers and ally with each other in order to defend what they perceive as common interests. Maybe the most characteristic case is the group of nine during the Cold War (Kirk Laux, 1972). The group of nine was anything but homogeneous; Belgium was ranked 14th on a traditional material power ranking, while Bulgaria hold the 43rd position among 103 countries. However, Kirk Laux presents how Small States from both blocks, besides their differences in levels of international participation and material power were united in the promotion of the depolarization of East-West relations in Europe and the increased participation of Small States by a common identity formed because of their dissatisfaction with the then *status quo*.

At this point the question as to what makes a great power great, from the perspective of Small State scholars, begs for an answer. To understand the distinction between great and small powers it is worth quoting Rappard (1934:544-545) who with his work on the League of Nations is one of the very first who studied Small States comparatively. He sheds some light in the confusion regarding the Small State definition by noting:

he who idly believed that words had no other significance than that given by the dictionary might well be surprised. China, with a population about ten times as great as that of France and Italy is a Small State. Brazil, with an area ten times as large as those of France and Italy combined, was, until discontented with her status as such, a Small State member of the League. Spain, Poland, Australia, Canada are counted as "small members" of the League as are Sweden, Holland, Luxembourg, Albania, Belgium, Hungary, Denmark, Switzerland, Liberia, and Panama. It is obvious then that smallness depends neither on population nor area. Nor does the status of a Small State stand in any relation to its place in history, to its neutrality or belligerency in the World War, to its geographical situation, to its form of government, to its possession of colonies, to its degree of civilization, to its per capita wealth, nor to its aggressive or pacific policies. In fact the so-called Small States within the League of Nations have nothing in common which distinguishes

them from others, except that they enjoy no permanent representation on the Council. And they are deprived of this privilege because they are not so-called Great Powers. And they are not so called Great Powers because they are not considered as such. And they are not considered as such because in the history of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries they have not been military dominant or at least prominent.

It seems that Rappard accepts the military preponderance approach, although he explores Small States' role in the League of Nations. Some sixty years later Brunn (1999:17) who analyzes Small States rhetoric in the UN agrees that it is history and global power that differentiates Small States from Great Powers but also the impact of the latter on the world affairs. According to him by the term Great Powers we refer to:

Russia, Germany, China, Japan, or the USA, as these are in key leadership positions in G8 talks, the World Trade Organisation, the European Union, NATO, and the United Nations. They, by their histories of regional and global power and leadership, are among the major players dictating and influencing the world economic and political agendas. Citizens and leaders of other states watch and listen to what these megastate leaders say about themselves, their neighbours, their adversaries, regional hegemony, and pressing global issues. What they express is conveyed to major viewing and listening audiences not only by major transnational media such as CNN and Rupert Murdoch's networks and affiliates, but also by official government pronouncements. Analysts carefully scrutinise the travels of institutional leaders, high-level delegations, and trade and cultural missions: where they are going and why, not only in the case of friendly states, but also when travelling to sites for conferences and meetings to open dialogue with adversaries or to serve as mediators with disputing parties. Small States by their demographics, territory, and economies have concerns and problems not shared by larger states.

Both Rappard and Brunn pinpoint the reasons why Small States are different from Great Powers. Their views could be summarized in three words: history, capabilities and clout. These are which actually give Great Powers a different status in international relations, in the sense that Holsti (1970:242) argues that "[C]onventional terms such as Great Powers or middle powers do not necessarily indicate how much diplomatic influence states wield within any set of relationships but they do suggest rough distinctions of status." Therefore, we should evaluate the political aspects inherent in the concepts of Great and Small Power. Thus, as Rothstein (1968:1) puts it, our central proposition is "that Small Powers are something more than or different from Great Powers writ small." From a more technical perspective East (1973b:491) argues that "there is a fundamental difference between the foreign policy-making

processes of small and large states.” East (1973a; 1973b) attributes these differences to the fact that Small Powers have limited resources to invest in their international relations. In a similar vein, Vayrynen (1997:42) notes that Small States’ “objectives, means, systemic factors are qualitatively different.” Therefore, they “are not able to dominate in international relations, an area that is primarily influenced by Great Powers and their mutual relations.” In the EU context Thorhallsson (2000:3) argues that “the smaller states are, of course, not identical but they have some common characteristics which distinguish them from the five larger states: their populations are much smaller, their administrations are considerably smaller, as is their geographical size, the scale of their economies and their GDP. ”

From an International Political Economy perspective Katzenstein (2003:10) observes that “[S]mall states differ from large ones in their basic condition. The size of the territory they control and the scale of their operations.” Yet, Katzenstein (2003:11) brings to the forefront a new perspective too, according to him “[S]mall size was a code for something more important.” In his view, the concept of Small State “was concealing and underlying a politically consequential connection...What really mattered politically was the perception of vulnerability economic and otherwise”. Therefore, we can clearly see two different images of states. On the one hand, the impactful Great Power, depicted in Rappard’s (1934) and Brunn’s (1999) views, and, on the other hand, the vulnerable Small State. Handel (1985) has elaborated on the differences among those two types of states, weak states and strong states according to him, across five criteria: population, area, economy, military power, the international system (Table 2.5).

Hence, it goes without saying that a definition based in the distinction between Great Powers and Small States is relevant and clear. More importantly it is ‘useful’ according to Waltz’s advice. In my view, it is the only one that answers Knudsen’s fundamental for the Small State field question: “what is the concept and idea of Small State supposed to explain?”. It is true that it leaves us with a loose and fluid concept and also with a very populated group of Small States. But also the truth is that this is the closest to the real world sample that we can have as International Relations researchers.

What is more, the “not a great power” approach suits well with the rest of the efforts to conceptualize the Small State; as it was stated above it essentially constitutes the reversed version of the relational approach. A Small State is not a great power, which means that it cannot impact upon the system. Therefore, a Small State has less influence in world affairs, faces greater levels of vulnerability than Great Powers, and its actions are limited in its vicinity. These limitations are connected with limited resources, no matter how limited exactly. Moreover, the simplicity of the “Small State is not a Great Power” definition is compatible with the “I know one when I see one” option. Thus, I argue that no matter how loose is the concept of Small State or how different starting points Small State scholars trying to define the Small State have, they agree on what a Small State is, in that it is not a great power, which, in an

international relations context, means that it has not a special position in the system, special rights or responsibilities recognized by others.

**Table 2.5** Differences between Great power and Weak powers according to Handel

Criteria	The Weak State	The Strong State
Population	Very small	Very large
Area	Very small	Very large
Economy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• GDP small in absolute terms</li> <li>• Little or no heavy industry</li> <li>• High degree of specialization in a narrow range of products</li> <li>• Small domestic market, hence high dependency on foreign markets for imports and exports</li> <li>• Research and Development very low in absolute terms</li> <li>• High dependence on foreign capital.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• GDP very high in absolute terms</li> <li>• Very large, highly developed heavy industry</li> <li>• Very high degree of specialization in large variety of products</li> <li>• Very large domestic market, hence little dependence on foreign export/import trade.</li> <li>• Research and Development very high in absolute terms</li> <li>• No dependence on foreign capital.</li> </ul>
Military power	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cannot defend itself against external threats by its own</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can defend itself by its own power against any state or combination of</li> </ul>
	<p>strength; high or total dependence on external help</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Total (or very high) dependence on weapon acquisition in foreign countries.</li> <li>• A high proportion of strength always mobilized or at its disposal; longer range war potential very low</li> </ul>	<p>states; very little reliance on external support.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Has full array of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.</li> <li>• Domestic production of all weapons system.</li> <li>• Large standing armies, combined with very high war potential.</li> </ul>
The International System	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Limited scope of interests (usually to neighboring and regional areas)</li> <li>• Little or no influence on the balance of power (or the nature of the system)</li> <li>• Mainly passive and reactive in foreign policy</li> <li>• Tends to minimize risks, especially vis-à-vis the powers</li> <li>• Can be “penetrated” relatively easily.</li> <li>• Strong support for international law and norms of international organizations.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Worldwide (global) interests</li> <li>• Weighs heavily in world balance of power; shapes the nature of the international system</li> <li>• Pursues a dynamic and active foreign policy</li> <li>• Tends to maximize gains (rather than minimize risks)</li> <li>• Relatively difficult to “penetrate” (depends on the nature of the political system).</li> <li>• Low regard of international law and organizations; prefers power and summit policies.</li> </ul>

Hence, I support the idea of an ontological agreement among Small State scholars, which can be also reconfirmed by evidence in the literature. For example, though using different criteria, Keohane's understanding of small power coincides with Vital's definition of Small States (see Table 2.3), but also focusing on the lack of clout in the international system, as a small power's attribute and its main difference from Great Powers, it is connected with the relational approach. After all, the ontological agreement can be also supported by the fact that Small State scholars have studied the same cases, i.e, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Portugal, Greece, Malta, in the case of Europe or in the case small island states in the Caribbean, Commonwealth states in the case of the South, Singapore in Asia, but under different definitions. So, scholars agree on which states are small, yet they use different paths to approach smallness.

### 2.3.2 *Small State and Realism*

Interestingly, the debate on definitions has rarely been connected with the main debates in the discipline of International Relations. However, there are scholars who tried to associate the different definitions with theories of International Relations. Rickli (2008:308-309) identifies four generations among the Small State scholars who are concerned with the issue of definition and he suggests that

The first generation stemmed from realist tradition, adopted a definition that was based on geographic or demographic size of the country or the GDP. The second generation associated with neo-liberals, focused on the role and the influence of Small States in the system. The third generation influenced by the constructivists adopted a psychological definition which maintained that smallness is a matter of self-perception...and the fourth generation considered smallness by its relation with power.

Browning (2006), on the other side, attributes definitions based on relative terms to realist and neo-realist perspectives. He argues that liberal perspectives perceive smallness as issue-specific. He also recognizes approaches that pay attention to perceptions and self-perceptions of smallness as cognitivist, while he himself, as we saw above, advances a discursive view according to which smallness is an issue of different narratives.

Although both Brownings' and Ricklis' attempts seem reasonable, a more careful look at Small State literature reveals a complexity which counters their arguments. First, it is hard to group Small State scholars according to International Relations theories cleavages, as many of them appear to subscribe to more than one of the approaches, analyzed above. Thorhallsson constitutes a telling example. In his debut work (2000:3) on *Small States in the EU* he accepts that for the period he is examining in his study "[S]even member states can be defined as smaller EU states..., ranging from Luxembourg with just over 400.000 inhabitants to the

Netherlands with 15 million inhabitants.” In order to reach this conclusion he adopts a material capabilities approach. As we saw above, in 2006 he presents his own framework that advances action capacity and vulnerability in several domains as the key variables that determine smallness. Later in a case study on Iceland (2009) he concludes that states are able to choose their own size. In 2012 in a study on Small States in the UNSC he enumerates the various approaches and difficulties to define Small State and he finally chooses the population criterion by setting the bar to ten millions inhabitants as an upper limit. However, he has also participated in two volumes (2010) and (2014) where he subscribed himself to the relational approach that was advanced by both volumes. While one could claim that Thorhallsson is inconsistent, he examines more or less the same cases, states like Iceland, Sweden, Greece, although under different definitions. In the context of this study his flexibility reconfirms the view that there is more common ground among the various views rather than unbridged differences.

The second problem with the International Relations lens adopted by Rickli (2008) and Browning (2006) to categorize the different approaches is that it is hard to imagine Keohane, Rothstein or Fox, the prominent members of the first wave of scholars who underscored a perceptual aspect in smallness as constructivists before constructivism. Furthermore, Rickli (2008) argues that the relational approach was born in 2000s after Small State scholars’ disappointment with the until then existing definitions. However, this study reveals that it is much older, as it was first stated by Gerger in 1975. Therefore, it seems to me that it is more appropriate to associate the different approaches with the discussion around power rather than with the International Relations debates.

In my view, a key cleavage among the definitions is between them who see power as an attribute and those who perceive power as a relationship. According to Brown (2005:82) who makes this distinction about power for the former, power “is something that people or groups or states possess or have access to, have at hand to deploy in the world”. Whereas for the latter, power “is the ability that people or groups or states have to exercise influence on others, to get their way in the world.” Of course, both approaches are interrelated and it is expected that strong capabilities lead to high levels of influence in a relationship and weak capabilities low. This is why, the different definitions of Small States should be viewed as complementary rather than as mutually exclusive.

Archer, et.al. (2014:6-7), although rejecting the residual approach, admit that one of the power approach merits is that it allows us to engage with the broader literature of International Relations and Security. Indeed, if we take into account Waltz’s (1979:194-95) assumptions about the implications of power, i.e., that a) “power provides the means of maintaining one’s autonomy in the face of force that others wield” b) “greater power permits wider ranges of action, while leaving the outcome of action uncertain” c) “the more powerful enjoy wider

margins of safety in dealing with less powerful and have more to say about which games will be played and how” d) “great power gives its possessors a big stake in their system and the ability to act for its sake” then it could be argued, as Archer, et. al. (2014:7) note, that Small States “(1) are not able by themselves to preserve their own autonomy in the face of force that others wield; (2) have a narrow range of action; (3) have little to say about which games are being played, and how; (4) have only a small stake in the system and are unable to act for their sake.”

It is evident that these four characteristics, which evolved from reversing Waltz’s assumptions about power, are close, if not identical with key conclusions in the Small State field. This leads us to further examine and look for affinities between contributions in Realism and Small State studies. According to Waltz (1979:192), “an agent is powerful to the extent that he affects others more than they affect him.” In my opinion, this “old and simple notion of power”, as Waltz characterizes it, fits nicely with views of Small State scholars who see Small States as the less influential parts in a relationship (Mouritzen and Wivel, 2005; Steinmetz and Wivel, 2010; Archer, et al 2014) or in the international system (Keohane, 1969; Mares, 1988; Goetschel, 1998; Lobell et al, 2015). Morgenthau (1972:129-130) also focuses on states’ impact when he suggests that “[A] great power is a state, which is able to have its will against a Small State.. which in turn is not able to have its will against a great power.”

Moreover, regarding the control of the international affairs Waltz, (1979: 198) underlines that in a bilateral system “[F]or all but the United States and the Soviet Union, problems are local or regional.” Therefore, his views coincide with those scholars who, as also Wight (1978) does, associate smallness with limited interests. In this context, Bull (1972:xxix) also states that “the only distinction in normal diplomatic intercourses is that between Great Powers and other powers” and he attributes to Great Powers the role of the guardians of the international order, differentiating, thus, the roles that states play in the system, as also Small State scholars do. According to Bull, what makes a power great and capable of playing a distinct role is that it has special rights and responsibilities, recognized by others. He accepts that there is injustice, but in his view, this is a price to be paid for the international order to be preserved. Buzan (1983:43) also pays attention to the differences among states, as these are which “determine the character of international relations in general, and the national security problem in particular”. For him inequality affects even the distribution of sovereignty, as he contests that Czechoslovakia and Poland can secure the same levels of sovereignty as Britain and West Germany. Thus, Buzan is close to those Small State scholars who emphasize vulnerability as a key Small State characteristic. According to him (p.66), “weak or strong powers will refer to the traditional distinction among states in respect of their military and economic capability in relation to each other”. Therefore, his views are not far from those Small State scholars who place capabilities at the heart of their definition.

Buzan makes one more distinction worth our attention. He clarifies the differences between the notions of weak state and weak power by suggesting that “weak or strong state will refer to the status of the unit concerned as a member of the class of states” (1983:6). In this context, weak state is usually underdeveloped, politically penetrated, unable to master resources necessary to build a stronger state. He argues that it is possible for a strong power to be a weak state and for a strong state to be a weak power, and is also highly likely for a weak power to be a weak state as well.

Indeed, there are many different approaches as to what constitutes a weak or a strong state (Krasner, 1978; Cohen et al, 1981; Handel, 1985) but analysing them is beyond the aim of this study. The point that is made here is that we should be able to distinguish between the notions of Small State and Small Power and those of Weak State or Weak Power and advance the term small power for a series of reasons. First, the concept of Small State means different things in different contexts. For example Fukuyama (2004) uses the term of weak state to describe fail states that need state building, in a sense close to that of Buzan (1983) and very different from that of Handel, while at the same time a small state for him is a state with limited state interference across public sectors: economic, social, etc. Therefore, he calls for a “small but stronger” state, a call which in an International Relations context would take a very different meaning. Therefore the term power in the manner that Wight (1978:25) suggests that “a power is a modern sovereign state in its external aspect” seems more appropriate in an International Relations context. Moreover, the term small power is self explanatory and for that reason eliminates the confusion produced by the many different definitions and names. It is the opposite of great power, i.e. it perfectly describes the type of state we want to study. Furthermore, it lies at the heart of the problem, because what is small and makes sense in what has been called Small State in the International Relations field is power. It is also more appropriate than the weak power term which portrays the states which are not Great Powers as necessarily impotent. As Kassimeris (2009:92) puts it, “[W]e choose to drop the excess luggage and employ the term ‘small power’ based on the belief that this term does not simply portray geographic size or relative political weakness.”

## 2.4 Conclusion

In this chapter I undertook the task to revisit the “perennial problem” of Small State definition. My aim was to look for common points among the different approaches and highlight the characteristics of a Small State, according to Small State scholars. Then, I put this notion of Small State into the broader framework of International Relations and examined how it fits. Indeed, I found that there is more common ground among Small State scholars and between Small State field and International Relations than Small State literature suggests.

This chapter advanced the view that from the six different approaches that have been analyzed, the one that defines the Small State, as the state that it is not a Great Power, for all its fluidity, appears as the most comprehensive as it encompasses all the other efforts. It also vindicates Barston's thesis that the different ways to define Small State is more complementary than mutually exclusive. Furthermore, such a definition is self explanatory has a conceptual merit and highlights the value of research on Small States. Moreover, it responds to the need for further engagement with the International Relations literature, as it permits further dialogue with the rest of the literature and especially with the prominent paradigm of Realism.

In his critique on Vital's work Paterson (1969:119) argues that the "failure to establish a class of Small States obviously distinct in their external relations from other states weakens the whole book." Apart from its simplicity and clarity probably a key advantage of the residual definition is that it is able to fulfil its aim: "to establish a class of Small States obviously distinct in their external relations from other states", as Paterson put it. It renders the category of Small States useful as it clearly distinguishes them from Great Powers. Thus, from this definition flows a series of research questions regarding the differences in Small State behaviour, challenges and strategies that should get our attention. In other words, as Small State students we are interested in which factors account for differences in the behaviour of the states that are not Great Powers, not of the states that have a population of ten or twelve millions people, and happen to be small powers. Such an approach brings the issue at stake, which is the asymmetry of power and its consequences, to the heart of the debate. Then, questions like what specific challenges these states face, what roles they play and what strategies they follow, given their higher vulnerability and lower influence in comparison to the Great Powers, reveal the reasons why Small State as a concept is useful within the International Relations field. Therefore, in the next two chapters I am going to discuss the factors that shape the Small State behaviour, the strategies that this type of state follows and the roles that they aspire to play. The question whether there is a specific pattern of Small State behaviour which justifies the existence of Small States as a category in the International Relations field will be further addressed.

*Science is the knowledge of many,  
orderly and methodically digested and arranged,  
so as to become attainable by one.  
Sir J. Herschel*

## Chapter 3. The “Power of the Weak” Revisited

### 3.1 Introduction

The definition of the Small Power as the state that is not a Great Power opens up an interesting discussion about Small Powers behaviour vis-a-vis the Great Power or Powers of the system and within the international system as a whole. There is no shortage of questions that one can raise into such a discussion. For instance, if Small Powers are unable to impact upon the system, then how do they pursue their interests? How do they react to the given asymmetry of power? Do all Small States respond similarly to systemic pressures? Where should the similarities and differences in their behaviour be attributed to? Last, but not least, which are the factors that shape a Small Power’s behaviour and impact upon their success or failure in foreign policy? Such questions are legitimate and many Small State scholars have tried to address them. In their findings we can identify two foci: some scholars emphasize the factors that influence the Small State behaviour while others focus on the strategies that Small States tend to employ. This chapter focuses on the former group, and the next one on the latter.

The paradox of the Small State power has gained much attention from as early as the initiation of the Small State research field in International Relations by Annete Baker Fox (1959). What triggered her interest in her seminal study *The Power of Small States* was the success of six small powers: Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Switzerland, Ireland and Portugal in avoiding being involved in the WWII, according to their wishes; and what is more their ability to emerge stronger from its ashes. Given the fact that during the WWII the prevailing view was that the era of Small States had come to an end, Fox (1959:1) posed a challenging question: “How could such relatively weak states survive while “total” war swept around them?”.

Similar questions would beg for answers many times in the future development of the field. In his broadly referenced study *‘The Power of the Weak’* (1968), Bjøl examines the sources of Small State behaviour with the aim of filling a void in International Relations. According to

him International Relations omit the important roles that Small States have played and their ability to defend their interests, even against more powerful actors in the international system. In a similar vein, Katzenstein (1985) examines the conditions under which central European Small States managed to respond effectively to threats posed by the global economy and even outperform Great Powers. A year afterwards, in 1986, Lindell and Persson would compile a great amount of Small State literature in order to explore views regarding the circumstances under which Small States have the ability to influence the major players in the system. These efforts could be connected with the later “small but smart state” thesis (Joenniemi 1998; Steinmetz and Wivel, 2010) and the close “vulnerability-resilience” debate (Cooper and Shaw, 2009).

The common point of departure of the aforementioned approaches and what makes them interesting for the International Relations field as a whole, is that it is assumed that they defy Realism (Ingebritsen et al, 2006). Some scholars look at the development of the Small State field as an opposite to the famous Melian dialogue; an early example of the role of power in asymmetric relations; it was stated by Thucydides and later became a cliché for Realism, a classic entry in every International Relations course and textbook. According to the Melian Dialogue, “The strong do as they can and the weak suffer what they must.” Despite its timeless wisdom, studies in the Small State field have shown that under particular circumstances Small States also do as they wish, while the stronger simply follows, nonetheless because the latter is bound by its own power and responsibilities (Keohane, 1971; Rothstein, 1967).

However, not all Small States succeed in pursuing their interests and not all circumstances are equally beneficial for Small Powers to exert influence over the issues in which they are interested. Moreover, different Small States make different choices even when they are to respond to the same challenges (Platias, 1986; Ingebritsen, 1998; Archer, 1999; Wivel, 2005; Ojanen, 2003; Grøn et al, 2015). Several Small State scholars have tried to explore the reasons why small states respond and perform differently under similar circumstances and also examine why some Small States succeed in securing their interests and others do not. To this end, scholars focus on the sources of Small State foreign policy and seek explanations to all three levels of analysis.

As it should be expected there is no general consensus among scholars on which level of analysis or set of sources prevails. Even at the same level of analysis studies shed light on different factors because they prioritize different aspects of power or of a state’s behaviour. Even in cases where scholars agree on one or several factors, efforts that test previously set hypotheses are few. There is not a research agenda and the dialogue between studies and schools of thought is sporadic. Hence, there is a lack of systematic research and of comparative case studies that could expand our knowledge about a single factor or set of factors. That,

said I should add that there are sparse comparative contributions from scholars who focus on Nordic states (Ingebritsen, 1998; Bailes, 2005; Grøn et al., 2015). As a result, the field of Small State studies is no less fragmented in this issue than it is in the definition affair (Chapter 2). Therefore, misunderstandings and contradictions reign over the field of the International Relations of Small States. To consider an example Hey (2003:189) argues that it is “important to note that domestic variables, contrary to most conclusions of the literature on small states, can weigh heavily in explaining foreign policy behavior.” It follows that from such a statement one deduces that domestic variables have been underestimated by Small State scholars, while systemic explanations prevail. However, later Maass (2014:711) asserts that in the majority of Small State studies “the key to understanding small state survival, it has been assumed, is to be found at the state level.” Then, the question who is wrong and who is right begs for an answer. This study is going to show that none of the above statements is right. Both international system and an array of domestic variables have been explored. What is more according to the majority of Small State scholars they are more complementary, rather than mutually exclusive. Both systemic and domestic front approaches are necessary if we are to understand the Small State phenomenon at its entirety. However, the point that I wish to make here is not that Hey (2003) or Maass (2014) are at fault, but that confusion characterizes the field.

Looking at several Small State studies one can identify two tendencies. First those that focus on a single factor as critical for a Small State’s fate and behaviour; such attempts include Katzenstein’s (1985) view of corporatist politics as an asset for a Small State’s success in the international political economy; Reiter’s (1994) focus on the importance of the past; Ingebritsen’s seminal study on the impact of the leading economic sector upon European membership decision making; Elman’s (1995) concern with the importance of the type of political system; Mouritzen’s and Wivel’s (2005) emphasis on past and present constellations; Maass’s (2014) examination of the primacy of the international system hypothesis, and Kouskouvelis’ (2015b) pioneering work on the significance of Small State leadership to Small State smartness. Second, there are Small State scholars who refer to various factors that shape Small States behaviour, but only as a part of more general overviews on Small States in the international politics, both analytically and conceptually. Therefore, in such studies one can trace many different factors but should not expect to find thorough analyses accompanied by case studies; Bjøl (1968); Barston (1973); Amstrup (1976); Wallace (1998); Kassimeris (2009) belong to this second category.

Yet, within this group Petersen (1988: 145-146) constitutes an exception. He notes that “there have been several efforts to compare the foreign and defence policies of the smaller European NATO members... [However] [T]he accent of these efforts has rather been on separate case studies, loosely tied by some introductory and concluding remarks by the editor.” He thus underlines the need for comparative studies through, first, careful choice of

case studies and, second, an appropriate “analytic framework”. In order to explain the security policy changes in the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Norway, Petersen (1988: 147) sets an “explanatory framework... which includes external and internal independent variables as well as transnational interactions between national and sub-national actors.”

Within this framework Petersen looks at a) the international system at global and regional level and also takes into account the impact of bilateral relations; b) domestic factors, namely societal and parliamentary; c) transnational relations especially at a subnational level, that is, links between parties from sister countries, peace movements etc. Although the multiple levels analysis that Petersen employs is in accordance with the general tendency in the literature, it seems to me that concerning its sub-categories this framework is adapted to the four particular cases at that time. Small State scholars across the decades have pinned down a richer variety of determinants of Small State behaviour (i.e. Fakiolas, 2012). What is lacking then is a comprehensive framework which would comprise all the factors that are present in the literature and could be used for the analysis of Small State behaviour universally. Such a framework could be useful not only for understanding current and future Small State choices but also for explaining Small States behaviour in the past. As Rogers (2007: 369) put it:

the foreign policies of small states may be treated separately within the field of international relations. Although research on the role of small states in international relations does not receive as much attention today as it did some forty to fifty years ago, earlier theoretical approaches provide a good starting point for developing a useful analytical model for the historical study of the foreign policy of small states.

The most recent effort to accumulate and review the existing knowledge in this context was made by Lindell and Persson in 1986. However, this also is not an exhaustive one, especially regarding the sub-categories of each factor. What is more, it is no longer up to date as changes in the international system ever since have enriched Small State research with numerous new case studies that might have not introduced new factors but have surely shed light on different aspects and the importance of particular factors. Thus, there is a need to accumulate and categorize the various views and to explore whether there is any common ground among them, sufficient to help us create a useful analytic framework. To this end, this thesis investigates a scattered across many different issues, periods and geographic areas literature, and looks for the determinants that influence Small State behaviour, increase the “power of the weak” and finally make different states respond to similar challenges in different ways.

Lindell and Persson (1986:81) associate the different factors, the “power base factors” as they call them, with: i) systemic characteristics: the structure of the international system, the state of the international system, international norms, and ii) actors’ internal qualities, that are also related to the Small States in the international system such as geographical factors,

material conditions, reputation, 'organizational capabilities', intensity of interests, and decision making process.

I suggest that to unfold the determinants of Small State behaviour, exploration should be twofold, as the different approaches can be categorized under two different types. First, a "resources of power" analysis should be used. In his *Introduction in International Relations* Kouskouvelis (2004) identifies three different groups of power resources: a) material: geography, population, wealth, military capabilities; b) functional: political system, state administration, military mobilization, a state's position in the international system; c) subjective: leadership, prestige. Second, this thesis advances a different categorization that follows the Waltzian model of three images and in the context of this thesis is compatible with the existence of various explanations at all the levels of analysis. In order for the two approaches to be combined, a framework which allocates resources of power at different levels of analysis is set. In this effort, I look at the different levels of analysis, namely the international system, the state and the individual, and seek to map the power resources that have been examined in the Small State literature.

**Table 3.1** Level of analysis and power resources framework based on Kouskouvelis (2004)

Level of Analysis	International System	State	Individual
Power resources	A state's position in the international system.	Geography, Population, Wealth, Military capabilities, Political System, Administration, Military mobilization, Prestige	Leadership

I find that there are three different approaches to the elements that determine the Small State behaviour: first, those who privilege processes at the international system level as the causes of Small State policy (i.e., Handel, 1985; Knudsen, 2002, Maas, 2014); second, those who find more powerful explanations at the state level (i.e., Katzenstein, 1983; Platias, 1986; Elman, 1995; Doeser, 2012); third, those who focus on the leader as an agent of decision making and change (i.e., Gvalia, et al. 2013; Kouskouvelis, 2015b).

That said most of the Small State scholars understand the complexity of international relations and advance the interaction between the different levels of analysis as the most appropriate path to understanding Small Power foreign policy (i.e., Amstrup, 1976; Platias, 1986; Petersen, 1988; Hey, 2003). Therefore, I suggest that evidence from both theoretical and empirical literature reveals a multi-causality behind Small State behaviour. Such a phenomenon is noth-

ing new in International Relations as it is known in the literature since Thucydides (Kouskouvelis, 2015a). In this context, I look for points of agreement among different studies regarding the factors that shape a Small State's behaviour at three levels: the international system, the state and the individual. I argue that a preponderance of the international system factor is evident. However, in order for the differences in Small Power responses and performance vis-a-vis the challenges posed by the international system to be understood, there are also state and individual variables which should be taken into account. Finally, I explore how these findings can be related to the core International Relations literature. The fact that the international system element is strong points to the direction of structural Realism. However, the presence of second and first image variables forces us to further explore the relationship of Small State field findings with assumptions from the broad church that Realism is.

### 3.2 The International System level Explanations

From the Small Power definition adopted in this study it follows that the entities falling under this term are disadvantaged to the forces of the international system. Small powers have to navigate themselves in an anarchical and competitive international system, which they are unable to shape. As Vayrynen (1971:98) put it, "[S]mall powers have not at all, or only to a limited extent, possibilities to influence the functioning of the system". Therefore, as Realists underline, the consequences of anarchy are more heavily felt by Small Powers than by Great Powers (Jervis, 1978). In this context, Waltz (1979:194-195) notes that "[t]he weak lead perilous lives..." and also that "[w]eak states operate on narrow margins". In a similar vein, but from a small state perspective, Barston (1973:19) had previously underlined that "[H]aving less margin for error than more powerful states, the small state must carefully manage its external relations in order to minimize risks and reduce the impact of policy failures." Handel (1985:3) incorporates the international system term and argues that "the international system leaves small states less room for choice in the decision making process." Hence, he suggests that as it is said that "small powers' foreign policy is governed by the policy of others. It follows that the student of small power policy, even more than the student of great power policy, must concentrate on the environment in which his subject exists." Gerger (1975:115-116) also warns that "[A]lthough all researchers of foreign policy must establish relative potency of systemic variables, I believe this is even more important for the students of small power foreign policy." The table 3.2 presents the scholars who refer to the international system as a determinant of Small State behaviour, showing that such a view is broadly shared among International Relations scholars in the Small State studies field. A more recent and bold entry into this list of scholars is made by Maass (2014:710), who emphatically rejects any explanation coming from the domestic level and demonstrates that "small state extinction, survival and creation,... is largely conditioned by the systemic environment." That said, it must be underlined that according to table 3.2 Maass's (2014:711) argument about the predominance of state level

variables in Small State studies should be reconsidered. However, it is a useful point as it reveals the need for a more systematic account of Small State literature and accumulation of the existing knowledge.

**Table 3.2** Contributions of key studies with regard to resources of power at the International System level

Factor	Authors
International System	Fox, (1959); Siotis, (1964); Vandebosh, (1964); Rothstein, (1966); Vital, (1967); Keohane, (1967; 1971)Bjøl, (1968; 1971); Liska, (1968); Fox, (1969); Barston, (1973) Gerger, (1975); Amstrup, (1976); Huldt, (1977); Handel, (1985); Lindell-Persson, (1986); Platias, (1986); Knudsen, (1988; 2002); Petersen, (1988); De Vries, (1988); Labs, (1992); Sutton and Payne, (1993) Zachariadis, (1994); Elman, (1995); Griffin, (1995); Dahl, (1997); Karsh, (1997); Inbar, (1997; 2007); Inbar & Sheffer ,(1997); Vayrynen (1997); Armstrong & Read (1998:2002); Baillie (1998); Olafsson (1998); Archer, (1999); Wivel (2002); Hey (2003); Mouritzen& Wivel (2005); Rickli (2008); Baldacchino, (2009; 2015); Kassimeris (2009); Wivel & Steinmetz, (2010); Pantev, (2010); Rostoks, (2010); Doeser, (2011); Thorhallsson, (2011); Archer, Bailes, Wivel (2014) ; Maas (2014); Griffith, (2014); Bailes et al, (2014); Ingólfssdóttir, (2014); Baldacchinno (2015)

Taking the irreversible pressures of the international system as granted, Small State scholars have elaborated upon the impact of the systemic variables on Small States from different perspectives than the scholars whose focus is on Great Powers. Their point of departure is the centrality of Great Powers in the international system. Fox (1959:183) argues that the Small States examined in her study employed tactics “[w]ithin the limits set by the inter-great Power.” Vayrynen (1997:43) notes that “[G]reat powers define the limits of international relations, but small states are able to choose different options within these constraints.” For Bjøl (1968:157) “power of the weak stems from the relationship among Great Powers themselves.” That Small States can benefit from Great Power rivalry is an argument that is commonly endorsed by Small State scholars, as we will see later, and has also been underlined by non Small State experts as Wolfers (1962). In this context, Inbar (1997:155) suggests that “[T]he destiny of small states, unlike that of major players in the international system, is especially dependent upon the power structure of the system and fluctuations in regional power relations”. Also, Inbar and Sheffer (1997:2) observe that “[T]he changes in the distribution of power in the international system affect two separate issues, the capabilities of the small states and their freedom of action”. Therefore, much of the research regarding the impact of the international system on Small State behaviour springs from issues around the relationship between Great Powers themselves and among Great and Small powers. More precisely, I have identified that studies focus on four different issues related to the international system level: first, the association between Great Power life and Power Cycles and Small Power survival; second, the type of the system and the level of competition among Great Powers as determinants of Small Power’s freedom to manoeuvre; third, the impact of changes in the international system

upon Small Power policy and orientation, and, last the role that rules, norms, procedures and principles at the systemic level have played in the shaping of Small Powers' foreign policy.

That said, it must be stressed that despite its significance the position of the Small State in the international system, namely its stance towards alliances, neutrality and non-alliance, membership in international organizations and European integration, which is among the functional resources of power regarding to Kouskouvelis (2004), has not been thoroughly and comparatively examined by Small State scholars. I assume that there are a series of reasons for such indifference. First, the bulk of research that has been conducted during the Cold War focuses on the West. Even if someone wished to undertake research on Small States members of the Warsaw Pact, it would be impossible to find any data. Therefore, there could not be comparative studies about Small States members of NATO and Warsaw Pact respectively. It would be interesting, though, if we looked at that period and the then Warsaw Pact members through the lens of Small State studies. It would enrich our knowledge, as small states in Eastern Europe have been members of what is known as an "Al Capone alliance" (Keohane, 1971). Second, in this context the only meaningful comparison of different positions in the system would be between NATO small member states and the neutral and non-allied states. However, such studies are sparse. What is more they tend to focus on the Nordic states and the discussion unfolds more around the viability of neutrality and the Nordic Model than to a comparison between the two different security identities and their advantages and disadvantages. Even when scholars do not focus on the Nordic model they are more tempted to look for the motives behind the different choices than to investigate the outcomes. It was only after the end of Cold War that scholars paid more attention to Small States position in the system, especially in respect of their attitude towards EU membership. In this context, Archer, (1999) notes that Denmark made different choices from the rest members of the Nordic club in regard to their policies towards the Baltic states, because it was an established EU member state, in contrast with Finland and Sweden which were 'freshers' at that time and Norway was an outsider. In a similar context Thorhallsson and Kirby (2012) look at Ireland and Iceland in order to explore the hypothesis whether the EU has constituted a shelter for its member states during the economic crisis or not. Results are mixed, as initially membership provided Ireland with a safety net; something that did not exist in the case of Iceland. However, subsequently the latter enjoyed more freedom in its choices than the former, whose actions were circumscribed by the Troika programme. Thus, there is no much evidence in regard to the impact of a state's position in the system. Small State scholars have been more tempted to explore how Small States with same security identities and orientation, respond to challenges, dangers and opportunities posed by the international system rather than to follow comparative approaches. Hence, as it is stated above analyses evolving mainly around Great Powers centrality.

The power cycle and life cycle theories as they have been articulated by Modelski (1978) and Gilpin (1981) capture the essence of rise and fall of Great Powers. As the focus is on the actors which control the system we know how changes in hegemonic powers' capabilities impact upon their position in the system and how distribution of power alters after every major war; history offers abundant examples (Kouskouvelis, 2004). Then, the question of how these changes affect the less powerful states constitutes an interesting research puzzle. According to Knudsen (1988; 2002), Small State life cycles are associated with Great Power life cycles. In his earlier work, with the provocative title *Of lions and lambs*, Knudsen examines the relations between neighbouring Great Powers and Small Powers. He finds that the expansion of a Great Power results in rising the tension between the great players in the system and in increasing the pressure to a neighbouring Small Power, whilst the decline of a great power and the shift of power to the other side is also followed by pressures on small state to choose a side. Therefore, we assume that when balance of power disappears and Great Powers reach their zenith or nadir points, small powers face enormous systemic pressures. Knudsen cites the case of the Soviet-German agreement in 1939 and the fate of Finland to illustrate the implications for the Small States when shift of power between Great Powers occurs. Finns, who had relied on Germany for their protection until then, found themselves exposed to the Soviet threat as a result of the change in the relationship between the Soviets and the Germans.

However, there are also cases when the rise or the demise of a great power brings about opportunities for the creation of new Small Powers, as it happened with the collapse of the Soviet Union that led to the proliferation of Small Powers in South Eastern Europe. In this context, one could also add the view that Small State survival or proliferation is dependent upon the functional role that they can play in the system stability. Such an example is the recognition of Belgium as an independent state. Actually the creation of Belgium was the response of the Concert powers to the threatening expansion of France and the following disequilibrium in the balance of power (Maass, 2014). Moreover, Handel (1985:5) observes that there are "cycles of security or insecurity, influence and impotence of the weak states in the international system." For Handel these cycles are related to the rise and fall of Great Powers. Thus, he cites as examples the "rise of the revisionist powers in the 1930's... [which] marked the lowest point in the security of the weak states since the Napoleonic wars" and also the post WWII period when the two superpowers spare no effort to exert control to weaker states in their spheres of influence. It is in this context that Knudsen (2002:184-185) differentiates Small States from Great Powers by claiming that what makes the former distinct is that they usually have 'characteristic life cycles' which are connected with the life cycles of the latter. According to Knudsen, this proves that there is a significant theoretical difference between the two kinds of units and thus justifies the value of Small State concept.

Furthermore, scholars have paid considerable attention to the consequences that different types of systems have on Small State security and to the ways that the level of competition between the Great Powers affects Small States. Bjørl (1971:32-34) notes that “[F]or the small state,..., the environment is a much more important variable than for the great power, and hence any reasoning about its role should probably start by an identification of the type of international system in which it has to operate.” In the same vein, Gerger (1975:116) recognizes that “...the potentialities of small states to engage in profitable relationships do differ, say, in hegemonial and alliance systems.” Similarly, Huld (1977) suggests that any options available to a Small State are dependent on the character of the system in which it operates. Handel (1985: 5) argues that “[T]he historical period and the structure of the international system in which the position of weak states is examined are of great importance”. Lindell and Persson (1986) also associate a state’s capacity to exert influence with the character and the state of the international system. Moreover, Hey (2003:187) underlines that “different world systems have different consequences” and, furthermore, that “the system level is a key explanatory factor in small state foreign policy... nonsystemic factors come into play only when the system ‘permits’ them to”. Such views are reconfirmed by Maass (2014), who in his effort to demonstrate the preponderance of the systemic factors in shaping the fate of Small Powers shows how the balance of power system between 1648 and 1792, the concert system between 1815 and 1914, the interwar years system in the twentieth century and the international system during the Cold War affected the status of small states differently.

More precisely, regarding the different types of system Liska (1968:44) argues that “[S]mall state subsystems would enjoy a maximum of practically attainable autonomy in a multipolar global system combining competition with concert”. Fox (1959:183) also emphasizes on the existence of a complex balance, where “numerous powers with conflicting demands” would be “concerned about the small power.. and give effect to their concern” constitutes one of the conditions, if a Small State is to succeed. The others are also related to the nature of balance and the interests of Great Powers. She observes that it is more possible for Small State to resist the pressures of belligerents when there is a “balance of military strength among the contending powers in the region of the small state” and/or when there is “greater...range of competing interests elsewhere, on which the demanding great power needed to focus” (p.184). Maass (2014:715) too, notes that in the early years of the post Westphalian system which was “based on the ‘jealousies’ of the Great Powers, small states could benefit as Great Powers constantly checked each other moves.” Furthermore, Rothstein (1966:397) argues that “[A] functioning balance-of-power system, comparable to the one which existed throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, limits the ability of Small Powers to achieve their own goals... However... it provides more real security for them.” In addition, he recognizes that Small Powers would prefer a bipolar or quasi-bipolar system because of the unfavourable circumstances that a hegemonial system offers. Olafsson (1998) suggests that because of their military weakness and vulnerability Small States would be better off in a stable global system.

Although there is not a consensus on which type and character of system is the most beneficial for Small States, the majority of scholars values the advantages of a bipolar system with intense level of competition between the Great Powers (Handel, 1985; Vandebosch, 1964; Barston, 1973; Rothstein, 1966; Siotis, 1964; Vital, 1967; Sutton and Payne, 1993; Baldacchino, 2009; Maas, 2014). The main argument of the scholars supporting this thesis is that, as the tension between the two Great Powers is increasing, Small Powers find windows of opportunities to pursue their interests and “punch above their weight“. As Barston (1973:22) summarizes it, “[U]nder systemic conditions as those of a bipolar world a small state can exercise disproportionate influence to the ranking suggested by ‘objective’ elements of its capability.” Siotis (1964:77), also, in his study of Greece as a Small Power, notes that “[T]he role that small states can play is conditioned upon the degree of disagreement between the Great Powers.” Indeed there is much evidence in the literature which reconfirms such views.

Probably the most representative empirical piece of research is Keohane’s (1971) *The Big Influence of Small Allies*. Keohane argues that US preoccupation with the Soviet threat has led to several multilateral and bilateral agreements with lesser states and consequently increased the leverage of small allies over US foreign policy. According to Keohane (1971:161), the influence of small allies is such big that “[T]hese [the small allies] are the badgers, mice and pigeons -if not the doves- of international politics, and in many cases they have been to lead the elephant.” Indeed, there are many different ways through which small allies try to persuade or force the elephant to follow them. For example, sometimes they choose to play the role of the ‘loyal ally’ and present themselves as the only reliable state in an area. This is what President of Pakistan Ayub Khan did before the US congress in July 1961, when he argued that “[I]f there is real trouble, there is no other country in Asia where you will be able to put your foot in. The only people who will stand by you are the people of Pakistan” (quoted in Keohane, 1971:167). However, three years earlier, President Garcia of the Philippines had declared before the same body that he came “on behalf of the Filipino people, your best friends in Asia” (quoted in Keohane, 1971:167). So, it is evident that small allies try to capitalize on the US need for local control in Asia. Another tactic, Keohane notes, is a hybrid strategy that was followed by Turkey and Thailand and which balances between a “super loyal” stance and a tendency to moderate independence as a result of dissatisfaction with the US policy. Keohane also demonstrates how small states gained access to US policy decision making through bureaucratic agencies or other means such as lobbying diaspora, playing the public opinion, arms transfers, always in the competitive context set by the Cold War.

There is a plethora of examples of Small Powers that succeeded in securing their interests by exploiting the tension between the two superpowers during the Cold War. An interesting case is that of Iceland in its dispute with Britain; a crisis within the NATO during the Cold War that is known as the Cod War (Ingimundarson, 2003). In 1971 a newly elected left-wing

government in Iceland decided to extend Iceland's fishery limits from twelve to fifty miles, an unilateral act that caused the aggressive reaction of Britain which did not hesitate to respond with sending the British Navy to a NATO ally. Iceland threatened that "it would leave NATO if the British did not withdraw the warships" (Ingimundarson, 2003:128) and connected, at least in the mind of some government ministers, the fishery dispute with the US base in Keflavik. The government exploited the importance of its strategic location in North Atlantic and made clear that the Americans should not take Iceland's devotion for granted; in this way it managed to keep the US restrained during the Cod War. Whilst they "could have used far more heavy handed tactics... including economic and political pressure", according to Ingimundarson (2003:130) the Americans let the Icelanders to shape their policies and defend their positions.

Moreover, the Arab-Soviet disagreements on the Arab-Israeli conflict provide a telling example of the power of the weak during bipolarity. According to Karsh (1997), Syria and PLO opposed the proposition for a peaceful resolution and, what is more, Egypt, Soviet's closest ally in the area, managed to get the Soviets involved in the war of attrition against Israel by threatening them with a switch of power to a pro-American President; a threat made by President Nasser himself.

The bipolar system proved itself beneficial for the group of the nonaligned states too. According to Rothstein (1966:406), nonalignment "proponents see it as an active policy designed to exploit the Cold War for their own ends." The tension between the superpowers gave to lesser powers the opportunity to play a role, become determining factors at a regional level and extract benefits from both sides. The words of Nehru are revealing: "When there is substantial difference in the strength of the two opposing forces, we in Asia, with our limitations, will not be able to influence the issue. But when the two opposing forces are fairly evenly matched, then it is possible to make our weight felt in the balance" (quoted in Rothstein, 1966:405). According to Dahl (1997), Sweden had designed its activist policy based upon the assumption that there would be two opposite blocks between which Sweden could play a role. Therefore, Olof Palme, the then Swedish Prime Minister, underlined the value of polarization among Great Powers by revealing his fear that détente would diminish Sweden's market value and, moreover, put the neutrals in troubles (Lindell and Persson, 1986; Dahl, 1997). As he put it, "[W]e are living in a time when the hegemony of the superpowers grows stronger and stronger and détente between them may mean a threat to the independence of the small nations" (Palme quoted in Goldmann, 1979). Rothstein (1966) reconfirms that as the tension between the superpowers was decreasing it was less easier for Small Powers to extract the concessions they wished for.

However, superpowers' competition is desirable up to the point that the tension does not endanger the survival of the bipolar system. Such a system is necessary as a precondition that enhances the chances that the Small Powers will achieve their goals. Otherwise it would be impossible to play between the two Great Powers. As Rothstein (1966:403) argues: "...*both* the allied and the nonallied Small Powers have at least one identical systemic interest: insuring that both blocs survive. The allied Small Powers require the presence of the other bloc in order to maintain their value as allies. The unaligned Small Powers require the presence of both antagonists in order to retain their maneuverability." In a similar vein, Dahl (1997), who examines the consequences of the end of Cold War in the Swedish Foreign policy, depicts how important are the shifts of power between the superpowers to the Small States. She notes that:

Small states nervously study every alteration in the distribution of power among those actors which dominate their strategic environments. A shift in the balance of power from one to another, or a shift from a bipolar to multi or unipolar-system, leads to changes in the living conditions for the small state stuck in the middle, geographically or figuratively speaking. Changes of this kind could result in a sudden or gradual loss of freedom for the small state, or the reverse: an increase in the space allocated to the small state to carry on with its life. (p. 178)

Because of such a vulnerability to transformations at the international system level, it is argued, that Small States are more familiar with change and prepared to adapt to new circumstances. Scandinavia after WWII, during the Cold War and also after its end provides ample examples of such a behaviour. For instance, Tiilikainen (2007) presents the changes in Finland's orientation as consequences of fluctuations in the distribution of power in the system. She notes that "a new political environment was seen to demand a new policy, and Finland changed- smoothly and pragmatically- its Cold War policy of neutrality into a policy of firm commitment to European integration. This was not difficult for a people that had been used to changing policy and international orientation on the basis of changes in the country's international environment" (p. 77)

It is interesting that Tiilikainen does not perceive such a change as a disruption in Finnish policy, because for Finland adaptation is a constant. "In fact, an ability to adapt to new conditions had always been praised as a virtue by Finnish political leaders", as she puts it (p. 77).

It would be a mistake to assume that this tendency has been confined only in the Cold War period. Although Rostoks (2010:99) writes on Small States and uncertainty almost a couple of decades later, at a period when the international system was quite different, he also underlines that "smallness is related to constant concerns over international political change." Rostoks also noted that tension and uncertainty in the system are beneficial to Small Powers. In his view,

small states get favourable treatment because of the unknown and unintended consequences that a different approach might bring. Moreover, according to Rostoks, Great Powers which wish to introduce changes in the international system, know that their image counts; they are aware that without Small States' participation, any change would seem less legitimate. Indeed, Fox (1965) argues that the amendments that Small States managed to advance to the UN chart were accepted by the Great Powers, only because the latter needed the former's participation in order to legitimize the organization. Furthermore, they also know that bullying a weaker state harms their image and provoke reactions. Thus, periods of change in international system tend to be favourable to Small States because they constitute the weaker part in a relationship where Great Powers are constrained by their own responsibilities and interests in the system. Browning (2006) also suggests that Small States capitalising on the changing structure of the international system to assert their preferences. However, Pantev (2010:105), offers a more moderate view. He argues that in a changing international system "smallness of states" remains fluid and that a Small State's assessment of its value and options should not take in consideration only the "adversarial intentions of the more powerful player(s)...but the transformation of the whole configuration of the global centres of power." Therefore, Pantev offers a piece of advice: "[T]he small country needs to follow closely the status of the power cycles in the international system and use its historical experience in its relations with each of the 'centres of power'." Such an observation reminds us of Knudsen and the important role that he attributed to the power cycles of Great Powers with regard to Small States survival.

Furthermore, there are also other systemic developments that change the relationship between Great and Small States and affect Small States ability to pursue their interests. In this context Maass (2014:710) introduces the concept of "normative structure" which goes along with material structure. Nuclear weapons, self-determination, decolonisation and the rise of international organizations have been studied under this spectrum. There is little doubt that, despite of its later failure, the creation of the League of Nations, provided Small States opportunities that hadn't previously exist (Vandenbosch, 1964). Similarly, the UN gave Small States chances to pursue their interests and fight for them in ways and at levels that earlier would seem out of proportion to a Small State's weight (Vandenbosch, 1964, Rothstein, 1966; Keohane, 1967; Fox, 1969; Thorhallsson, 2011). Regarding the impact of international organizations a representative work is Krasner's (1981) paper on Third World states' effort to mitigate the pressures of the international system by transforming international regimes. According to Krasner, one of the factors that facilitated their endeavour was their ability to pursue their demands through international organizations, to which post war liberal world paid great attention. What is more, both institutions were perceived by small powers not only as means through which they could increase their leverage, but also as factors that could possibly restrain Great Powers. In a similar vein, Maass (2014:720) points out that "the growth of International Law, in terms of its quantity and coverage, its institutions and its ef-

fort to regulate state behavior in much more ambitious ways contributed to an environment in which size-differentials mattered less.” In this context, apparently one should also add the European integration process that has offered new possibilities and also posed new challenges and dilemmas to the small European states (Hirsch, 1976; Wivel, 2005; Steinmetz and Wivel, 2010).

Moreover, the nuclear stalemate that was reached by the two superpowers and made the war unthinkable in the second half of the 20th century offered small states opportunities to maximize their influence. In this context Rothstein (1966:400-401) argues that:

[I]n earlier international systems Small Powers achieved a transitory maneuverability as a result of power configuration per se, as well as the prevalent assumption that general war was imminent. In the contemporary system the power configuration is not nearly so clear, and it is the assumption that general war must be avoided, not that it is imminent, which accounts in some degree for the new status of Small Powers.

So, in addition to bipolarity during the second half of the twentieth century, nuclear weapons also have further enhanced Small Powers’ ability to advance their interests. This period was supportive to Small State survival and proliferation also because of the prevalence of the principles of self-determination and decolonization, which were endorsed by the superpowers in order to increase their own leverage (Maass, 2014). As Maass (2014:721) puts it, “both superpowers engaged in what has been called ‘competitive decolonization’. Both sides supported competing independence movements in mostly European colonies, hoping that their side would win, form the government of the newly created state and move the state into this particular superpower’s orbit.”

The impact of the international system on Small State behaviour is also evident in the developments following the end of bipolarity, a fact that could not but trigger new interest on Small States. The fall of the Berlin Wall marked a new era in the international system which led to a series of processes; Small State proliferation, unipolarity, regional integration mainly in Europe, turbulence in the Middle East, and rise of new types of threats. As Griffin (1995:261) suggests regarding Small States in the Caribbean: “[A] transforming world... redefines national interests and security objectives.” Similarly, Dahl (1997:176) notes that “[T]he end of Cold War tossed familiar concepts and conditions around, in a sometimes distressing fashion for the northern European countries”. Small State scholars then turned their attention to the ways that these changes would affect Small States’ power and to how they would condition their policy options and success. Consider, for example, that Zachariadis (1994) looked at how the response of Greece to the rise of nationalism in FYROM was mediated by international and regional structural parameters. Karsh (1997) examined whether changes in

the international distribution of power would influence small states' freedom of manoeuvre and policy choices in the Middle East. Interestingly, as they look at different areas their views on policy continuity and change differ. Zachariadis expects that further EU integration in the foreign policy domain would change the Greek foreign policy. Karsh assumes that the inability of Great Powers to influence foreign policy choices made by the Middle Eastern Small States would continue. In a similar context, Inbar (2008) observes that the end of the Cold War and its consequences changed the perceptions of Israeli leaders, namely Rabin and Peres, who subsequently developed a new strategic thinking and a reevaluation of national power in Israel, which in accordance to the post Cold War international environment became more dovish.

Security issues, globalization and regional integration attracted the interest of most of the scholars during the post-Cold War period. Those who focused on security questions echoed Amstrup (1976:169) who notes that the "security problem of small state [is seen] as mainly determined by factors far beyond the influence of small states themselves." Therefore, they examined issues like the future or the value of neutrality and non-alliance in a unipolar world (Dahl, 1997:187; Vayrynen, 1997), the military policies available to small European states (Rickli, 2008) and the challenges posed by new kinds of threats (Archer, et al, 2014), like economic crisis (Griffith, 2014), societal security (Bailes, 2014), and environmental degradation (Ingólfssdóttir, 2014).

It is not difficult to find a common point among these approaches. Whether they refer to the North and the Scandinavian states or to the South and African Small States or small island states in the Caribbean, they agree that autonomy is no longer a sound option. Shifts in the international system in the last twenty five years provoked a series of complex threats whose reduction demands cooperative strategies. Vayrynen (1997) argues that in the end of the Cold War Small States find themselves in front of a paradox: "they have to lose a part of their sovereignty by joining economic and security integration to become fully fledged members of the international community, in order to reclaim their sovereignty" (p.70). In this context, Dahl (1997:187) finds that neutrality constitutes a redundant option and she states that "[T]he entire, activist programme, presenting Sweden as a forceful "third way" was based upon the idea of two opposite blocs between which Sweden could independently act. A shift in superpower relations also had an impact on the politically activist role that Sweden could play on the international scene." Some ten years later Rickli (2008) suggested that the risks and the high level security institutionalization that characterized the unipolar system made "a defensive posture for small states counterproductive." As he puts it "[I]n today's environment an autonomous posture is equated with security free-riding. Opting out cannot combat global risks" (p.314). According to Rickli, changes in the system and the nature of threats allow, if not oblige, Small States to contribute to international operations in ways that match their strategic culture and the degree of influence they wish to exercise. Basically, if they wish to play a role

they have two choices: either to adopt “a niche strategy by specializing in a specific type of force” or to follow “a framework or a lead nation strategy.” However, cooperation advantages come with a price. In their recent work Archer, et. al., (2014) explore the security challenges and opportunities that Small States face after the end of the Cold War and underline that costs of the use of institutions as shelters should be further investigated. Thus, they not only point to a new direction for the field but they also offer a new perspective which mitigates the euphoria that had dominated the field in previous decades.

Moreover, the importance of structure is also underlined by de Vries (1988), who offers a different structural determinant of Small State bilateral relations. He incorporates the structural stability theory into the Small State field and wonders whether two Small Powers increase the cooperation between them under conditions of similar relations with third parts, i.e., when they confront the same enemies or have the same friends. In its simplest form structural stability theory would predict that my friend’s friend is a friend and my enemy’s enemy is also a friend. De Vries (1988:43) finds that small European states “act more supportively towards one another when they act within similar socio-political structure.” Therefore, when this structure changes, relations among small states shift accordingly. Thus, he “stresses the need to analyse international relations among Small States within the contextual system of which they are a part, and especially as a function of differences with respect to their specific positions within this system” (1988:51).

The above analysis shows that Small State scholars have approached the impact that the international system has upon Small States existence and behaviour from many different directions, with different goals and at different times; though always following developments in the international system. However, if we should arrive at a general conclusion regarding their positions, this is that they accord primacy to the international system as a Small State behaviour determinant; the international system is that sets the stage where small states can act and defines the limits of their action. As Baldacchino (2015:1) put it recently “[I]t would be rash and irresponsible to discount the many ways in which most states and territories navigate a world in which they must willy-nilly either accept decisions taken elsewhere and/or bear the brute force of natural or economic events that can have catastrophic consequences.”

More precisely, scholars argue that the fate of Small States is connected to Great Powers life and power cycles. There is also a broad consensus among them that opportunities for Small States to succeed are related to the number of Great Powers in the system and the level of competition among them. Also, most scholars advance the view that among all the different types of international systems, bipolarity is the most beneficial to Small States. Furthermore, studies agree that changes in the international system pose challenges to Small States; yet there is not an accord if such a development bears more opportunities or more dangers for

Small States. That said, as a different international system where Great Powers are expected to assume new roles is evolving (Reich and Lebow, 2014), it remains to be seen whether findings from Small State studies will be reconfirmed and also if new findings will emerge.

In general, the view that Small States in the international system are 'price takers' and not 'price makers' is vindicated. What this means for Small States survival and success remains a crucial question both in research and practice. There is no doubt that such a predicament means different things to different states. However, it is a shared view among Small State scholars that Small States are vulnerable to the forces of the international system but they are not impotent. Irrespective of their focus on international system or domestic variables most scholars agree that: "challenges and opportunities are most often determined by factors external to the small states, but the small states themselves are responsible for facing the challenges and taking advantage of the possibilities" as Pantev (2010:104) put it. Similar arguments have been expressed in different contexts across the years. To consider some examples, Platias (1986:466) notes that "[A]lthough the international system exerts some strong constraints on small states, some autonomous response remains." Also, Ingebritsen (2006:290) suggests that: "[S]mall states are players in the international system - even though they do not structure the rules of engagement." Hence, 'vulnerability' and the 'power of the weak' are central concepts in the study of Small States in the international system. From the various examples cited above it seems that in order to increase their power and consequently decrease their vulnerability, Small States, even when their margins of action are limited, seek to exploit opportunities arise from the 'material' or 'normative structure'. To do so they have harnessed the competition among Great Power, the stalemate created by the prevalence of nuclear weapons, the rise of international organizations and regional integration, etc. Yet, these opportunities, as well as challenges, do not arise in a vacuum. Usually, seizing them is an effort that is related to the condition of the international system, as we already saw, but also to a state's particular sources of power and their management. Even when opportunities or challenges are not directly connected to sources of power at the state level, their management is. Thus, the sources that are related to the domestic level and the ways that impact on a Small State's behaviour are analyzed below.

### 3.3 The State level Explanations

Equally with their consensus on the primacy of the international system as a generator of Small State behaviour, most Small State scholars agree that a series of domestic factors impact upon Small States' choices and they are critical to their success or failure. That said, I should add that there are also exceptions such as Maass (2014) and Handel (1985); both not simply accord primacy to the international system, but they suggest that domestic factors do not play any particular role in the fate of a Small State. However, in the bulk of cases scholars argue

that Small State behaviour is influenced by an interaction between international and domestic variables. Thus, differences in Small States responses to the same systemic pressures are due to the different sets of domestic circumstances that shape their behaviour (Amstrup, 1976; Platias, 1986; Hey, 2003). For Thorhallsson (2006:27) such “domestic characteristics” are of such importance that they actually “establish the scope within which the notion of a state’s size can be fitted.” In this sense, smallness becomes fluid. Although it enables vulnerability to systemic forces, as Small States lack influence upon it, how vulnerable a Small State finally is, how successfully it can cope with its vulnerability, depends on qualities of state specific variables. Thus, any examination of a Small State’s choices should take into account not only the systemic but also the domestic level sources.

Hence, the question of which unit level variables should be studied begs for an answer. The exploration of the growing body of Small State literature leads to two interesting answers. First, Small State scholars have taken interest in a series of state level factors (Table, 3.3). Thus, the argument that domestic variables have been ignored seems to be invalid. Second, synthesizing the Small State literature on this issue reveals one more consensus on Small State literature; most scholars enumerate same or similar variables. Barston (1973:18-19) suggests that “to outline the limitations on the policies and influence of Small States, it is necessary to modify the elements of capability...by the inclusion of other factors such as tradition, strategic locations, the degree of domestic stability, organization and personality.” Wallace (1998:14) notes that “[D]omestic politics, national myth and identity, economic strength or weakness, geographical position and security constraints shape perceptions of interests.” Hey (2003:187) also argues that “although small states face a common systemic challenge, operating at a disadvantage to local hegemonic powers, they respond in a myriad of ways that reflect historical circumstance, domestic political dynamics, individual choice and of course, the behavior of the hegemonic powers.” More recently, in order to investigate which variables are responsible for continuity and change in the European policies of Nordic states Grøn et. al., (2015:8), use a continuum from unchangeable to changeable factors. It is interesting that they note that the continuum is appropriate only for Small States as Great Powers usually have more freedom to manoeuvre.

Their heuristic tool, then, comprises:

- geopolitical setting
- size in terms of population,
- economic structure
- identity
- history
- EU membership status
- general capacity of administration
- resources for EU work

Yet, Small State scholars ascribe different degree of importance to different factors. Hey (2003:189), for example, argues that: “[T]wo state-level features deserve special attention: regime type and level of development.” What is more, the depth of the analysis varies among the studies from a simple reference to thorough hypothesis examination. Looking for the common ground among Small State scholars and between the Small State field and mainstream International Relations, I analyze the different views in the context of Kouskouvelis’ (2004) list of sources of power which, as I have placed them at the State level of analysis, are: geography, population, prestige, wealth, military capabilities, political system, state administration, military mobilization. Such an approach seems appropriate, as most of the various state variables that Small State scholars examine can be grouped into the above categories. It is also useful because it helps us, first, to compare how these sources of power correlate with a small state’s behaviour; and second, to see whether this broadly accepted list needs to be modified in order to meet the findings stemming from Small State studies. For instance Knudsen (2002:190) argues that “[S]mall states tend more than others to be dependent on immaterial factors: political legitimacy, political mobilization and concentration, organisation, talent and good leadership.”

Indeed, if we compare Kouskouvelis’ (2004) sources of power list with the various factors that Small State scholars enumerate (see above) there is a striking absence; military capabilities and military mobilization are missing. Research and even references on military capabilities is sparse (Inbar, 2008; Matthews and Yan, 2007). It is probable that taking military impotence as a given, Small State scholars paid attention to other factors that contribute to the internal strengthening of Small States; their focus is on diplomacy. After all, in what is perceived the founding study of the field Fox (1959:2) notes that “for the small state diplomacy is the tool of statecraft in whose use it can on occasion hope to excel.” To this background I adapt state level variables, that I have cited above, to the factors explored by Small State studies. Thus a categorization of the sources of power that have been examined by Small State scholars comprises: geography, history, reputation-prestige, population, political system, economy, administration. In Table 3.3 I have compiled Small State studies that have made contributions to research connections among state level factors and Small State behaviour. This table is the basis for the analysis that follows. It remains to be explored in which ways each factor influences Small State behaviour; and also if this ways are different from those that literature has analysed in regard to Great Powers.

**Table 3.3** Contributions of key studies with regard to state level resources of power

Factor	Authors
Geography	Kjellén, (1916); Liska, (1957); Fox, (1959; 1969); Bjøl , (1968); Keohane, (1969); Paterson, (1969); Barston, (1973); Amstrup, (1976); Hirsch, (1976); Sjöstedt, (1977); Ronfeldt, (1978); Alford, (1984); Handel, (1985); Lindell & Persson, (1986); Knudsen, (1988); Sutton & Payne, (1993); Armstrong & Read (1995; 1996; 1998; 2004); Vayrynen, (1997); Olafsson, (1998); Wallace, (1998); Baillie, (1998; 1998b); Archer, (1999); Moses, (2000); Lassinantti, (2001); Schmidl, (2001); Ingebritsen, (2002; 2006); Hey, (2003); Mouritzen & Wivel, (2005); Miles, (2005); Browning, (2006); Mouritzen, (2006); Matthews & Yan, (2007); Verdun, (2013); Baldacchino, (2009; 2015); Grøn et al. (2015)
History	Bjøl , (1968); Barston, (1973); Katzenstein, (1985); Reiter, (1994); Vayrynen, (1997); Baillie, (1998); Tiilikainen, (2001); Thorhallsson, (2002); Mouritzen and Wivel, (2005); Ingebritsen, (2006); Wivel & Steinmetz, (2010); Rickli, (2010); Braun, (2010); Rood, (2010); Panke, (2012b); Fioretos, (2013); Jurkynas, (2014); Wivel & Marcussen, (2015); Grøn et al. (2015)
Prestige - Reputation	Fox, (1959); Bjøl , (1968); Keohane, (1971); Ørvik (1973); Handel, (1985); Baillie, (1998; 1998b); Goetschel, (1998); Wallace, (1998); Schmidl, (2001); Ojanen, (2002); Ingebritsen, (2002; 2006); Browning, (2006); Baldacchino, (2009); Pantev, (2010); Thorhallsson, (2012)
Population	Vital, (1967); Bjøl , (1968); Fox, (1969); Paterson, (1969); Gerger, (1975); Mack, (1975); Amstrup, (1976); Diggines, (1985); Katzenstein, (1985); Hveem, (1987); Wiberg, (1987); Edis, (1991); Streeten, (1993); Vayrynen, (1997); Armstrong-Read, (1998); Wallace, (1998); Moses, (2000); Ingebritsen, (2002; 2006); Matthews & Yan, (2007); Cooper and Shaw, (2009); Chong, (2009) Thorhallsson, (2012); Thorhallsson and Kattel, (2012); Fioretos, (2013); Goodby, (2014); Taylor, (2014);
Political System	Hambro (1936); Ronfeldt (1978); Katzenstein (1985); Platias, (1986); Petersen (1988); Streeten (1993); Schwartz (1994); Elman (1995); Kaarbo (1996); Armstrong & Read (1998); Baillie (1998; 1998b); Ingebritsen (2002; 2006); Abuza (2003); Hey (2003); Tiilikainen (2007); Hirsch (2010); Doeser (2011); Thorhallsson & Kirby (2012); Fioretos (2013); Bailes et al (2014); Crandall, (2014); Thorhallsson, (2015)
Economy	Benedict, (1967); Leff (1971); East (1973); Katzenstein, (1985); Diggines, (1985); Hveem, (1987); Streeten, (1993); Sutton and Payne, (1993); Luif, (1995; 2003); Ingebritsen, (1998); Armstrong et al (1998); Armstrong and Read, (1998); Baillie, (1998b); Easterly and Kraay (2000); Moses, (2000); Schmidl (2001); Briguglio, (2003); Fioretos, (2003); Verdun, (2003); Briguglio et al, (2009); Cooper and Shaw, (2009); Prasad, (2009); Chong, (2009); Cooper, (2009); Frenzt, (2010); Griffiths (2014); Thorhallsson, (2015); Baldacchino, (2015) Wong and Chi sen Siu, 2015; Aloisio, (2015); Entwistle and Oliver, (2015); Baldacchino and Melor, (2015); Bertzold, (2015); Grøn et al. (2015)
Administration	Fox, (1959); Vital, (1967); Benedict, (1967); Barston, (1973); East, (1973); Diggines (1985); Katzenstein, (1985; 2003); Streeten, (1993); Armstrong & Read, (1998); Joenniemi, (1998); Thorhallsson, (2000; 2002; 2012); Hey, (2003); Cooper & Shaw (2009); Frenzt (2010); Panke, (2012a; 2012b); Grøn et al. (2015)

### 3.3.1 Geography

Geography is the second most popular among the factors that have been analyzed in the literature, following that of the international system, as Table 3.3 shows. According to Kouskouvelis (2004: 149) geography offers a state advantages and disadvantages. It is one of the factors that influences a state's policies at every stage: development, adoption, implementation, as it is connected with the area, the morphology, the climate, the position of the state in its immediate environment and the international system. Equally the importance of geography and the ways it impacts upon the Small States of behaviour have been highlighted by Small State scholars since the foundation of the field. Fox (1959:8) notes that "[G]eography was often an important element in the calculations of the great and small powers." However, she underlines that "it could not be said to determine their course." Handel (1985 [2006:151]) argues that "even at the same period in history, weak states located in different areas have different neighbors and thus face different problems." Therefore, it is his view that it is impossible for Small State scholars to generalize about Small States behaviour. That is why, according to Handel, "studies of Finland, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Poland, Hungary and Israel stress problems of survival and vulnerability, while works in Portugal, New Zealand, Chile and even Switzerland and Sweden emphasize their safety and capacity to hold their own against the powers." However, I would argue that in this context Handel himself makes a general assumption: geography matters. Such a view is also shared by Sutton and Payne (1993:592) who study small island developing states in the Caribbean. In their view, "[T]he environment within which the SIEDS are located and the circumstances obtaining at the same time are all important. The most illuminating framework within which this can be comprehended is the region." In a same vein, Mouritzen and Wivel (2005:15), who look at the small European states in the euro-atlantic integration, argue that "states are affected in very different ways by one and the same systemic or regional polarity, depending on their location ('constellation') in it. Constellation, therefore, carries the burden of explanation."

Location matters more for small powers than for Great Powers (Mouritzen and Wivel, 2005). Because of their smallness and relative lack of means, the former cannot overpass consequences of their geographic position like the latter do. Such a view is reflected in the words of the President of Finland Paasikivi, who once said: "[O]ne thing is certain we (Finland) can't change our geopolitical location" (quoted in Lassinantti, 2001:101). What is more, as it was stated in the previous chapter, Small States are distinct from Great Powers in that they have limited interests usually related to their vicinity. Thus, Small Powers tend to be "local powers" as Fox (1959 [2006:45]) characterizes them. Therefore, their immediate environment plays an important role in their policies.

However, the most popular assumption among Small State scholars regarding geography has not to do with their immediate environment but with the role a Small State's location can play in the conflict between Great Powers (Kjellén, 1916; Liska, 1957; Amstrup, 1976; Sjöstedt, 1977; Alford, 1984; Lindell and Persson, 1986; Knudsen, 1988; Hey, 2003). In this context, studies have identified both opportunities and threats. Kjellén (1916:70-72) stresses the advantages and disadvantages of buffer politics. According to him:

buffer politics contains a life insurance for the small states. The intermediate position, which is the condition for the buffer aspect and which easily can be politically dangerous for the small state, is on the other hand from an economic point of view very advantageous... This explains the strong development of trade in (states like) the Netherlands and Belgium, Switzerland and Denmark.

The advantages for a state which is positioned between two Great Powers have also been underlined by Baillie (1998b:196) in the case of Luxembourg. Baillie stresses the importance of geography by noting that "the Grand Duchy's strategic location at the crossroads between France and Germany determines its position in the EU."

According to this view, Luxembourg possesses linguistic and cultural assets which permit it to associate with France as it does with Germany. Therefore, the conditions of "perfect understanding of and even identification with its neighboring states", as Baillie put it, constitute "vital element of Luxembourg's negotiation assets." That is why it managed to play a special role in the EU, that of the mediator between France and Germany. At the same time, such a sharing of characteristics helps Luxembourg in having, whenever needed, support and understanding from both French and Germans. In this context, Baillie notes that "[T]he sense of *camaraderie* between Chancellor Kohl and Luxembourg Prime Minister Juncker goes back to the close cultural ties between the two countries."

That said, the security implications for a state which finds itself between two Great Powers are severe and shape its responses to external threats. Hey (2003) argues that it was Luxembourg's precarious geographic location between Germany and France that forced this small state to be one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the European integration. In addition Archer (1999), asserts that Danish foreign policy towards the Baltic states after the end of the Cold War has been influenced by perceptions of both Russian and German reactions; probably more of the latter than of the former. Indeed, Germany, as a powerful regional power in the immediate environment of Denmark has seriously impacted upon Danish strategic thinking. As Miles (2005:100) notes "[G]iven Denmark's close geographical proximity to Germany, Danish concerns over rising German influence do fuel greater resistance to participation in specific EU policies."

Alford (1984:377) who examines the Commonwealth Small States also perceives geographical position as a source of external threats. Actually he argues that external threats are consequences of an enviable position more than anything else. It is for this reason, according to him, that Great Powers do “hijack” Small States and not just because they are “hijackable”. As he puts it:

Larger powers generally seek to take over the control of small weak states because of where they are - and not just because they are small weak states. They must offer some geographical advantage -whether in war, in a liberation struggle, in the East-West competition or, in defensive terms, to pre-empt a potential military opponent and prevent him from gaining a position of military advantage. Often micro-states are islands, which offer stepping stones to other places.

The idea of Small States as “stepping stones” was also analyzed later in a European context by Knudsen (1988). In his work *Of lions and lambs: The relationship between Great Powers and their smaller neighbours* Knudsen argues that “the territory of the small neighbor may be used as a stepping stone or a gateway in an attack on the big neighbor by its great-power rival. Such events may occur even against the will of the small neighbor, as its forces may be too weak to resist a major assault. The small neighbor cannot easily alter this by political moves, short of drastic accommodation or amalgamation with the big neighbor” (p.115).

What is clear then is that neighborhood matters, especially if you are a small power and your neighbour is a great power. Small State scholars agree that such a coincidence constitutes a threat for the weaker state. Bjøl (1968:158) argues that “[I]t makes a lot of difference whether a country is in an immediate neighbour of the Soviet Union, like Poland or Hungary, or whether it is at a comfortable distance from it like Albania.” According to Bjøl technology has altered the importance of position. To illustrate his view Bjøl suggests that the significance of Denmark, Greenland and Norway has changed in the US calculations since the development of military technology, such as the B-29 and nuclear weapons whose use upgraded the value of these countries as indispensable links for the security of the West. In addition, Vayrynen (1997:46) notes that: “[S]mall states are assumed to be particularly sensitive to a proximate great power.” A similar view is expressed by Baldacchino (2009:26) who argues that “impression of vulnerability increased the closer a small state was in proximity to the great power’s sphere of influence.” Furthermore, Mouritzen and Wivel (2005:16) note that as non mobility is a fundamental attribute of states “[P]owerful actors in the immediate vicinity of the state are of particular importance because *power and incentive wane with distance from their home base*, other things being equal.” Therefore they argue that different responses to the 1989-1991 turbulence in Europe reflect differences in distance from the Soviet Union/Russia. Archer (1999), also, advances a similar view, as he suggests that variations among post Cold War foreign policies of Nordic states can be partly explained by nearness or distance from Russia.

In this context, scholars also suggest that when small states are to ally with a more powerful state they prefer a distant protector to the powerful neighbour (Hirsch, 1976; Wallace, 1998; Fawn, 2006). To this background Hirsch (1976:116) explains the American connection with the European states:

Knowing quite well that their security cannot be organized by themselves, they give their preference to the security guarantee of a strong, trustworthy, but far-away friend, rather than trusting a strong but neighbouring friend whose ability to provide reliable security framework might be questioned and who might be suspected of wishing to extract many more political concessions in exchange than the distant protector.

In a similar way, Wallace (1998:15) asserts that “[T]he Dutch, in particular looked to the USA and to Britain as external supporters to limit -through NATO- its otherwise unavoidable dependence on France and Germany.” Fawn (2006), also, states that one of the reasons that explain the old Europe-new Europe division over the Iraq War, was the attachment of the central eastern European Small States to the US as the guarantor of their security against an always threatening Russia.

More recently Dinesen and Wivel (2014) show that despite the fact that the end of Cold War created a beneficial for Small States environment, Small States in different neighbourhoods face different challenges. Examining Moldova and Georgia they argue that their nearness to Russia determine their fate, which seems to be very different to that of the Small States in the Euro-Atlantic area. However, there are differences even between those two states. Dinesen and Wivel note that because Moldova is closer to the EU and NATO member states than Georgia is, the former has more possibilities than the latter for attracting West’s interest and support. Thus, based on the cases of Georgia and Moldova they highlight the significance of geography and moderate enthusiasm about the small European states opportunities for influence in the post Cold War era. It is their view that “these opportunities are often conditioned upon geopolitical and historical peculiarities that are not easily generalized outside the Euro-Atlantic area or even the EU (p. 161).”

However, location can also be a source of opportunities. According to Keohane (2006:62 [1969]) “[E]xploitation of position is one of the most two powerful small state weapons.” Olafsson (1998) who studies the economic and political standing of Small States based on Iceland as a case, suggests that geographic position can facilitate the success of a Small State. Such views are also broadly shared by Small State leaders who see their countries as capable of playing a special role in their region because of their location. For example, even though Cyprus is a very small state President Makarios argued that it could constitute an important bridge builder in its vicinity (quoted in Holsti, 1970:267):

History and tradition, civilization and customs place Cyprus in the Western world. However, we want friendship with all states... We do not overestimate the role that Cyprus could play in the international arena. Nevertheless, I believe that its geographic location, as a bridge uniting three continents, and other factors give Cyprus the opportunity to play an international role greater than the size of its population and territory.

There are several scholars who shed light on the circumstances under which geographic location can be an asset (Lindell and Persson, 1986). According to Liska (1957), if a state is strategically situated in a web of interdependence or if other states are dependent on its resources, no matter how low it is in the hierarchy of power it is able to exert considerable influence. Barston (1973:22) suggests that "if a great power perceives the territory of the small state to be of great importance bargain power can be increased." Sjöstedt (1977:33), also, argues that a small state can enhance its status if it is "located at the centre of an important network of international transactions". Baldacchino (2009:35) points out that small states "are especially good in diplomatic adventures if among others locate the issue at hand within the geostrategic considerations of superpowers conflict."

All the aforementioned views can be vindicated by the Cod War case, analyzed above. Iceland's geographic location, close to the USSR, and the importance of the Keflavik base to the US increased the power of the Icelanders and gave them the opportunity to maintain a tough stance against the UK in the fishery dispute. Moreover, Ronfeldt (1978:2) who examines the relationship between US/USSR and Iran/Cuba respectively in a superpowers - superclients context notes that: "geography, more than any other consideration, explains the attractiveness of the Iran and Cuba to the United States and the Soviet Union." It was their proximity to the competing superpower that gave them leverage.

Also, in this context, recent developments regarding the negotiations between Greece and its partners in the eurozone constitute an interesting case which could reconfirm the importance of location to a Small State's strategy formation and fate. According to Reuters: "[T]he United States has added its voice to calls for a deal this weekend, concerned at the geopolitical consequences if Greece were to be cut loose and become a failed state in the fragile southern Balkans, adjoining the Middle East. "No one wants to see a North Korea in southeastern Europe," a European Commission official said." Hence, the role that the location of Greece and the circumstances in its vicinity played in strengthening its position against a GREXIT needs further investigation.

Beyond the studies that emphasize the position of a Small State in the system or in its vicinity, and the relations of a Small Power with an adjacent Great Power, Small State scholars also looked at morphology and climate in the context of security geography. Bjøl (1968:158) argues that “security geography would be one of the first categories to take into consideration if one wants to elaborate a conceptual framework for the analysis of the role of small states in international politics.” According to him what matter are frontiers and morphology. To illustrate his point, Bjøl argues that the fact that Switzerland and Albania are mountainous makes them hard to be approached. He adds that islands too have advantages in solving their security problems. Furthermore, Bjøl points out the importance of climate as it is crucial if a country is appropriate for guerilla warfare or not.

The suitability of a country’s climate for guerilla warfare as a critical factor for the security of a Small State is also noted by Paterson (1969) and Barston (1973:20) who notes that “[T]he nature of terrain of a state, though, does sometimes assist national survival in a military conflict. Thus this factor, together with a flexible politico-military administration, has enabled North Vietnam to withstand the effects of the United States strategic bombing”. The reason why conditions for guerilla warfare get attention is that guerilla warfare is the type of warfare which, according to Small States scholars, is suitable for the weaker part in an asymmetric conflict (Mack, 1975). From another perspective Fox (1959) observes that Small States which managed to maintain their freedom during WWII were on the periphery of the conflict.

Moreover, while geography tops the list of the factors that influence a Small State’s behaviour in terms of international politics and security, it is also present in the domain of the economy. Scholars assume that limited area means limited resources and a limited market and therefore a poor economy. However, there are several exceptions to this rule, especially the oil-rich Small States (Handel, 1985; Armstrong and Read, 1998). Emphasis has also been given to the significance of the constituent region of a Small State as a critical condition for its economic performance (Barston, 1973; Armstrong and Read, 1995; Moses, 2013). Barston (1973:20) associates ‘freedom of manoeuvre’ with strategic location and mentions for example that “the freedom of choice and type of external relations of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland is very limited because of economic dependence resulting largely from their land-locked geographical location vis-a-vis South Africa and Rhodesia.” Furthermore looking at the consequences of the recent economic crisis on small states, Moses (2013:274) notes that “small states in the periphery are being battered the most.” Indeed, Verdun (2013:279) observes that peripheral countries “suffered most in the sovereign debt crisis” and wonders “whether core countries are more influential in the EU than those in the periphery.” However, such assumptions are hardly new. To stress the differences between small European states and developing states Katzenstein (1985, [2006:203-204]) notes that:

Small European states are not in the periphery of the world capitalist system. Their insertion into the international economy occurred at an earlier date... This early development is reflected in the structural characteristics of their foreign trade... The geographic and commodity concentration of foreign trade and the imbalance between the import of raw materials and the export of manufactured goods, as well as between the export of "traditional" as compared to "modern" manufactured products, are greater in the small European states than in the large ones; but they are smaller than in the developing countries.

That said, there are scholars who support that isolation has also a positive impact on the formation of a nation's character. Small States located in the periphery in their effort to cope with the difficulties of a harsh environment become more innovative, creative, entrepreneurial. Such an attitude spills over also in other domains of life, such as politics and economics. Ingebritsen (2002:13) argues that "[S]candinavia became a norm entrepreneur in contemporary international politics because, among others, of its remote geographic position." Browning (2006), also, attributes the entrepreneurial spirit of Finland and its evolution as an innovator in contemporary politics to the specific characteristics of its milieu. Such views can also be reconfirmed by the case of Israel (Sanon and Singer, 2009). Being a small power, located in a poor in natural resources area and among hostile neighbors, Israel was forced to foster an entrepreneurial culture in its society, political system, and economic orientation. As Simon Peres put it (2011:xii) "[I]srael bred creativity proportionate not to the size of our country but to the dangers we faced." Such mentality encourage Israel's economic miracle and establish Israel as a model for other small powers who aspire to become start-up nations. Therefore, it seems that geography also influences a nation's identity in a positive way and thus a state's behavior and performance in the international system. A similar view has been expressed recently by Baldacchino (2015). In his work on entrepreneurship in Small State islands Baldacchino adopts an optimistic stance; he sees islandness, smallness, remoteness and peripherality as opportunities; "qualities that permit some island-based businesses to emerge, thrive and survive" as he notes (p.1).

Hence, Small State scholars agree that geographical location impacts upon Small Powers in several ways. Studies pay attention to the existence of a great power in a Small Power's immediate environment, as the former is supposed to play a major role in the latter's fate and strategy designing; while the coexistence of two Great Powers and the competition among them makes the situation far more complex. It has also been noted that it is crucial whether a Small Power is located at an area of strategic importance to one or more Great Powers or not. Furthermore, scholars underline that different areas pose different threats to Small Powers. What is more there is also a core-periphery aspect that should be taken into account when the impact of geography is discussed. It is assumed that geographically isolated Small

State confronts disadvantages in economic terms as well as in terms of influence. However, other scholars suggest that limitations due to isolation fuel creativity and help in fostering an entrepreneurial culture. Last but not least, a series of studies connect climate and morphology with a Small Power's ability to defend itself especially by waging guerilla warfare.

### *3.3.2 Prestige-Reputation*

Prestige and reputation have also gotten considerable attention among the Small State scholars (Table 3.3). Kouskouvelis (2004:181-186) asserts that the reputation and prestige that a state enjoys due to its capabilities, power, behaviour and/or diplomatic skills constitute a source of power. Image and reputation can be accumulated as capital out of past behaviour in international relations; but they also shape a state's future stance in world affairs. The value of a good reputation to the international relations is known since antiquity. According to Isocrates, Athenians should not think of anything as more significant than their good name, because a good reputation increases power. In this context Kouskouvelis provides many examples from the Hellenic War between Athens and Sparta, and also contemporary cases such as those of the UK regarding the Falklands War, and the Reagan's Administration foreign Policy. However, they all concern Great Powers and even empires. Therefore, they are cases where a powerful player seeks, even through war, to restore, protect or establish its reputation as a consequence of another event, i.e. restoration of US image after the Vietnam War, or as a part of a broader strategy.

In the Small State studies context scholars look at the functional role that reputation plays in enhancing a state's position in the influence continuum. Lacking other sources of power small states seem to invest in their good name more than the Great Powers; "material constraints aside, considerable resources can exist in playing on a 'small state' identity" as Browning (2006:669-670) put it. Such a view has been expressed from as early as the foundation of the Small State studies field by Fox. In explaining how Great Powers diplomacy, despite their military preponderance, has many times been defeated by the skillful Small of States acts Fox notes (1959:2) that these acts are "often tied in with other means of gaining support. For example, small states may have at their command the capacity to appeal to world opinion, operating from a "rectitude" base, or their fighting qualities may gain them a reputation for being likely to resist violence with violence." In this context, Bjøl (1968:162), also, asserts that "[T]he aspects of prestige and reputation can lay claim to particular importance in any attempt to develop a theory of the role of small states in international politics."

Although such a theory does not exist, at least not yet, we are able to identify different ways through which prestige impacts upon a Small State's success in international relations. First, in a similar vein with Fox, Bjøl (1968) notes that the reputation of Finns as determined and experienced fighters may have deterred Soviets from intervening violently in Finnish affairs. Ørvik (1973) holds a similar view when he emphasizes the role that credibility plays in a state's security. In his view "[T]he small nation's ability for carrying out limited military operations and for denying both access to and use of its territory must not be placed in doubt; neither should the capacity of its political leadership for total resistance be questioned" (p. 228). Indeed, recent findings by Weisiger and Milo (2015:474) corroborate that a state's "reputation for resolve", i.e., "others' perception of that state's willingness to risk war.", which is based on that state's past actions, matters. Weisiger and Milo also find that states with a bad reputation for resolve face more provocations, while the opponents of states which have a "good reputation" for resolve are willing to make more concessions.

Second, in security terms too Handel (2006:190 [1985]) argues that: "[T]he most important condition for the security of the weak states... is the ability to appeal to other states for help and support." Therefore, a good reputation can secure allies and a favourable environment. Moreover, Keohane (1971:171) notes the importance of past behaviour if a small state wish to exert influence over a more powerful ally. He notes that "only a country with a reputation for independence can effectively threaten to undergo a "radical shift in orientation". Effective bargaining along these lines, therefore, requires frequent shows of such independence."

However, most scholars who refer to Small State image as an asset in the international relations underline the impact of a good reputation on a state's diplomatic performance. Bjøl (1968:165-166) looking at reputation in a Great Power-Small Power context argues that in the relations between them the reputation of both matters; while it would be bad for the reputation of the Great Power to impose its will, "how unfair it is felt to be often depends on the reputation of the small state involved."

Other scholars relate a good reputation with the special roles that a Small Power is able to undertake because of its peaceful, honest, non-threatening character. Schmidl (2001:88) notes that the "rosy image of small states" can be valuable in international operations. That is why Small States constitute indispensable parts of multiethnic troops. Pantev (2010:106), too, underlines the kind of contribution that Small States make to NATO-led and UN-mandated operations. He suggests that "[T]hough insignificant in absolute terms, the economic, financial, technological or military power of a small country may play a major role as a contribution to the pooled resources of a coalition or an alliance of states... Small states rarely add significant 'hard' power capabilities to an alliance, but they often add legitimacy." In this context, Ojanen (2002:221) stresses that "[S]mall states are often seen to have more inter-

national credibility being understood as having fewer hidden agendas and less ambitious national interests than more powerful states.” Furthermore, Goetschel (2011:312) suggests that “neutral states due to their reputation as peace, sovereignty and autonomy advocates can become credible brokers of peacebuilding ideas, that appear as threatening to violate sovereignty and autonomy”. Thus, although neutrality seems redundant it can still help Small States to contribute to enforcement of positive reforms in international relations.

Moreover, according to Baillie (1998b) it is their tendency to avoid conflict in negotiations that increase Small States’ influence. She argues that the fact that Small States tend to appear as insignificant and non-threatening enhances their possibilities to play an active role as mediators and honest brokers within a specific institutional context as the EU is. Pantev (2010:108) goes one step further, by suggesting that the EU should take advantage of this Small State potential. In his view small member states can enhance EU’s ability to exert ‘soft power’ and improve their capacities at the same moment. Goetschel (1998:31), also, emphasizes that Small States could gain from their identity. His point is that in a changing international system where ‘software factors’ of power matter more than ‘hardware factors’ “smallness might turn out to be a positive attribute... What has been stated in an economic context might thus also become true in a political one: as the advantages of being large diminishes, the attractions of being small increase.” Ingebritsen (2006:289) asserts that the fact that “small states are outside the formal corridors of power” permits them to play a great role as models. She notes that “Scandinavia has cultivated a niche in international society as a social laboratory for innovative solutions-from the provision of welfare benefits according to principles of universalism, to the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize.” In a similar vein, Baldacchino (2009:35) stresses that “[S]maller states are especially good in diplomatic adventures where among others, they command the moral high ground such that it whips up domestic support and distorts the international media campaign.” Wallace (1998:24) also argues that “[R]eputation acquired through activities on their international stage sustained over time, enables Small States to “punch above their weight.” Therefore, Small States, especially the Scandinavian ones, cultivate their image as exceptional citizens of the international system. According to Ingebritsen (2002[2006:275]) such an effort is conscious and “a cornerstone of the Scandinavian diplomatic relations”. In this context they act as “trustworthy and effective negotiating partners” and/or “norm entrepreneurs”. Indeed Scandinavia provides ample examples of such efforts; Norway’s role in the Middle East conflict, Sweden’s and Finland’s contribution to the incorporation of the Petersberg Tasks in the EU’s security agenda (Björkdahl, 2008; Jacobsen, 2009), enforcement of environmental and social welfare standards at a global level, and foreign aid are only but a few of them. Earlier, Bjøl (1968:166), had shedded some light on how Small States cultivate their image with the help of their internal and external behaviour. He notes that:

A small country's international reputation can perhaps be enhanced by clever propaganda, but in the long run its actual behaviour is probably decisive: external behaviour in the way of a non-provocative foreign policy and a certain talent for promoting 'just settlements' of international conflicts; internal behaviour in the sense of creating a civilized political and social system.

Then, such an effort results in an increased ability of these states to exert influence. According to Thorhallsson (2012:154-155), all Nordic states, which "are seen as norm entrepreneurs in the fields of human rights, development assistance, women's rights, participation in peace operations, humanitarian efforts, and environmental protection" have harnessed this image "in order to build coalitions and have issues placed on the agenda of the UNSC." Therefore, Small States build their reputation as 'good citizens' of the international system and harness it in order to maximize their influence. In this context, it is interesting to note Ingebritsen's observation (2002[2006:275], that "[W]hile some critics may view the role of norm entrepreneur as strategic action by a small state, this does not discount the effects of Scandinavia's pursuit of different models of interaction, models that structure the choices available to states in international politics." Thus, we see how an immaterial factor contributes to a Small State's power and constitutes an indispensable component of its strategy.

However, Small State scholars seem to analyze a particular type of Small State, the ideal Small State, as they underestimate the impact of bad reputation. To consider an example of how image of the past can both enhance and mar a state's future situation Greece constitutes a telling case. Greece's image as the cradle of democracy, the land of the invaluable ancient Greek culture, provided Greece a special position among its allies and the international public opinion. In his effort to explain the reasons why Greece, in contrast to its neighbours, has been able to generate favorable and crucial for its fate foreign interventions, despite "Western distaste for involvement in the Balkans, which was rooted in the perception of their supposedly fundamental un-European character" Kalyvas (2015: 201-202) suggests that it was "Greece's ancient legacy [which] always marked it as special case among the Europeans". To illustrate his point Kalyvas argues that Greece managed to get disproportionate to its size, resources and importance attention and aid at several instances, such as the Greek rebellion, the Anatolian disaster, the Greek Civil War and the transition to democracy, for symbolic, among others, reasons. As he analyzes the Greek rebellion case:

The Greek rebellion against the Ottoman Empire captured the hearts of both liberals (who saw it as a noble struggle for freedom) and romantics (who were enthralled by the reappearance of Greece on the world stage). A Greek defeat struck them as a great tragedy that had to be averted. The creation of the Greek state was seen as an attempt to bring European civilization to a backward corner of Europe and a Greek defeat would have amounted to a Western European setback.

Yet, past behaviour can ruin a Small State's reputation too. Greece and the recent economic crisis constitute an illustrative case. In the past Greek governments followed unwise, short-sighted economic policies which ruined the sustainability of the Greek economy. As a result Greece was not capable of responding effectively to the challenges of the global economic crisis; it made itself dependent upon its partners in the Eurozone and the IMF, which enforced programmes of extreme austerity. However, inherent fallacies of such policies with the help of incompetent Greek governments and inflexible European leadership further deteriorated the economic and social situation of Greece. Then, parts of the European public opinion, especially in the North, European officers, politicians and many European heads of states have accused Greece for its irresponsible economic policies. Greeks are depicted as lazy, corrupted, tax evaders, who do not deserve to be members of the Eurozone and even of the European Union. However, Greece is not the only EU's member state which confronts such challenges. As Jones (2013:294) put it "Greece is the most obvious example of a small state that has not managed to navigate the global economic and financial crisis successfully. But Greece is hardly alone." According to Jones, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal, and also larger economies such as Italy share many of the Greek case characteristics. He argues that the mechanisms behind the Greek failure and the global economic crisis are the same and therefore the explanation as well as the solution to the Greek and the European economic crisis should be structural rather than country specific. However, getting to Greece Jones (2013:303) notes that it was "[L]ike a canary in a coal mine, ...just the most vulnerable... Given its reputation for vice, Greece is an obvious scapegoat. The Greeks are not only unlucky in being so poorly equipped to handle the crisis, they are also unlucky in being stereotyped as Greeks." Therefore, further examination of the Greek and other similar cases can contribute to the Small State literature in two ways: they reveal first how important it is for a Small State to protect its reputation and capitalize on it, and second that the consequences of a ruined reputation should also be further examined in the Small State studies context.

Hence, it is a shared view among Small State scholars that a good reputation increases a small state of the strength; it helps in gaining allies, assume special roles in international organizations and international operations, and also deterring potential enemies. However, it should be noted that the "rosy image" of a Small State does not come automatically with smallness. As many studies note it is a result of past behaviour. Moreover, from the different contributions regarding reputation one can deduce that it is an outcome of Small State's effort to be consistent with their Small State identity, which after all permits them to punch above their weight. Thus, building a good reputation becomes part and parcel of a broader "small but smart" state strategy.

### 3.3.3 Population

It goes without saying that a large population constitutes a source of power (Kouskouvelis, 2004). However, Small States lack it by nature. Therefore, Small Powers usually dispose 'a limited pool of talent' from which they derive political and economic leadership. Moreover, such a lack of human resources inhibits effectiveness in both public administration and the economy domain (Diggines, 1985; Edis, 1991; Armstrong and Read, 1998). However, Small State scholars have analyzed aspects related to population such as its cohesion, level of mobilization and unity; attributes that impact upon the power of the weak in several domains (Table 3.3). Thus, it could be said that the attention of Small State scholars in regard to population is actually to the kind and the qualities of society.

Generally speaking, Small State studies agree that the human factor matters. Vital (2006:87 [1967]) argues that "[T]he crucial factor in almost every case is the human one and where the society coheres and is strongly led very great obstacles can often be overcome." For Bjøl (1968: 160) "internal cohesion" is one of the "criteria for the strength of the will of power of the small state." In this context, Bjøl underlines the importance of the intensity of interest. As he puts it: "[I]t may be assumed that the 'motive' would often be stronger in a small state with a bilateral or unilateral focus than in a great power with a multilateral focus." In diplomatic terms Wallace (1998: 24) notes that "a firm domestic base is a prerequisite for success." In a similar vein, Ingebritsen (2006: 289) asserts that "[S]ocietal forces in small states may outsmart the strong."

Plus precisely, Small State students emphasize the importance of the ability of a state to mobilize its citizens. Paterson (1969:120) underlines not only that such an ability is important but also that: "most smaller states appear to have a relatively high capability in this respect." Chong (2009:69-71) reconfirms that strong relations between government and society can be a source of extra power. Thorhallson's (2012:147) view that "the cohesion and national unity that are evident in the Nordic states' foreign policy objectives towards the UN (that is, in the case of Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland) contributed greatly to their commitment to the UN's cause" seem to reconfirm what Chong suggests. Having a non-European focus as he looks at Commonwealth Small States, Diggines (1985:192), too, observes that "the very closeness of a small society produces a feeling of identity of the individual with his whole community which is more difficult to achieve in larger nations."

In this context, the domains that got most scholars attention are security and economy. In his study on asymmetric conflicts, *How Big Nations Lose Small Wars*, Mack (1975) argues that by, on the one hand securing intensive political mobilization in their homeland and, on the other creating divisions in the metropolis, guerillas achieve to overturn the asymmetry in military capabilities into their advantage. According to Mack (1975:178), such an argument

is also central to Mao's strategic theory which "is based on the premise that "if the totality of the population can be made to resist surrender, this resistance can be turned into a war of attrition which will eventually and inevitably be victorious."" Mack cites the examples of Vietnam and of the Algerian Wars. However, the value of social unity has also been underlined earlier by Fox (1969:184) who asserts that "[S]mall states that managed to maintain their freedom during WWII had a quiet domestic political scene." In his study of Turkey as a small power Gerger (1975:115) notes that "a) a relatively homogeneous and b) a relatively closed society are especially potent variables." Wiberg (1987:352) also argues that "[A] country with strong national unity will be more difficult to subdue even with military means. A country with a considerable degree of local self reliance will be more difficult to divide and rule." According to Wiberg (1987:354) under conditions of military occupation and repression "culture and cultural symbols have in many cases been last resorts of national defence." In the security context too, Vayrynen (1997) looking at Small States after the end of the Cold War, notes that "[N]ational coherence is an important [requirement for security]." Such views are also reflected in Goodby's (2014:33) work on the *Survival Strategies of Small Nations*. In his effort to explain how weaker states survive and are able to choose their fate Goodby asserts that Small States that have managed to survive show "a propensity towards self-identification as a distinctive people with unique language and culture." Using Finland as a case study, Goodby argues that the Finnish generated confidence from a sense of a exceptionality which has been cultivated as a deterrent to their fear because of their preoccupation with survival given their position in a hostile environment. Therefore, it is broadly accepted among scholars that vulnerability stimulates unity, which subsequently can play a great role in a Small State's success against a powerful enemy. Hence, "politics may become the continuation of war by other means" as Mack (1975:179) paraphrases Clausewitz.

Nonetheless, the high levels of vulnerability which are evident in Small States' societies are valuable not only in terms of security but also in the economy domain as Katzenstein (1985) argues. In the most cited work among Small State studies, according to Scopus, Katzenstein looks at central European Small States in the 1980s and advocates that the threats posed by pressures of the international economy to the whole of the society triggered a sense of vulnerability, which subsequently encouraged the rise of an ideology of unity. The fruitful co-existence of high levels of vulnerability with greater social unity is also identified by Armstrong and Read (1998:570). They note that "a greater degree of social homogeneity, cohesion and identity encourages the formation of social capital and a fertile environment for economic growth." According to Fioretos (2013:307), in this context national unity can be understood "as a process in which social groups support or reject the same economic policies and jointly coordinate investments and sacrifices over time..." It was this ideology that provided the ground for the corporatist and consensual politics to grow and finally helped Small States in sustaining competitiveness and development that helped them confronting the challenges of an increasingly globalized economy (Katzenstein, 1985; 2003).

A similar view is also advanced by Hveem (1987). Focusing on Nordic countries he suggests that the tectonic changes in the international economic system increased the vulnerability of the small and open economies. In this context, Hveem (1987:193-194) understands vulnerability as “an aspect of dependency and interdependence... a situation where an actor has to bear the costs of change in international environments.” It follows that these costs are not the same for all the states and small open economies are in a disadvantaged position. However, in reference to the Nordic countries Hveem (1987:205-206) underlines that “the socio-political institutions of the “Nordic Model” are its chief “comparative advantage...” It was this model that permitted Nordic states to handle “vulnerability in an egalitarian way”. Therefore, these countries as other central European small powers too, i.e. Austria and the Netherlands, “have been able to develop and maintain national consensus on economic and social policies under periods of international strain. Nationwide social contracts secured peace in manager-worker relations and made everybody share in carrying the costs imposed by external vulnerability.” Hveem argues that this form of ‘democratic corporatism’ as it has been introduced by Katzenstein (1985) explains why these small European states have managed “to combine economic dependency with political autonomy” in contrast with other corporatist but not so democratic states like Argentina, Southern Europe etc.

In this sense Fioretos (2013:308) notes that “corporatism represented an institutionalised form of cross-class compromises that helped societies share the benefits of economic expansion and make shared sacrifices during crises.” The value of corporatist domestic arrangements which permit the cooperation between classes is also underlined by Moses (2000) in his work on Small States in the global economy. In a different context, Platias (1986:78) underlines the significance of corporatist arrangements as a “good way of organizing for the management of security affairs.” Also Katzenstein (2003:11) in his later effort to revisit his work and respond to his critics accentuates the importance of this finding by noting that:

...an analysis that focused only on objective data of economic openness missed the crux of the matter...What really mattered politically was the perception of vulnerability, economic and otherwise. Perceived vulnerability generated an ideology of social partnership that had acted like a glue for the corporatist politics of the small European states. This was the first and most important explanatory variable in *Small States*. Yet none of the reviews of the book published after it appeared paid any attention to it.

Looking for case studies in the Small State field that vindicate the value of a cohesive society and a shared ideology beyond Europe, Singapore constitutes a telling example. Matthews and Yan (2007:379-380) argue that “Singapore’s developmental success is rooted in the social and cultural fabric of its people.” According to them: “[O]bservers with an understanding of Singapore will attest to the commitment and hardworking values of its citizens. There

is a cultural consensus that transcends those of other communities in the region...This has much to do with the proximity that comes from 'small size', arguably strengthening social bonds and enhancing the socio-economic benefits." That is why the 'Total Defence' plan that constitutes the essence of the Singaporean strategy contains as its key components 'psychological defence' and 'social defence' elements. The former refers to "an array of educational campaigns aimed at creating the collective will and commitment among Singapore's citizens to defend the country", while the latter addresses "the need for all ethnic groups to be assimilated into the community so that a meritocracy based on multicultural consensus is achieved."

Chong (2009: 68-69) refers to Singapore's model as a form of 'authoritarian corporatism'. According to him, the aim of the People's Action Party (PAP) was to form a special Singaporean identity which would act as an 'umbrella' in order for social divisions and "racial inequalities" to be transcended. Suffering from the limitations imposed by its size and lacking any other valuable resources Singapore had to invest in its people and reputation. Therefore, PAP had been promoting the idea of a unique culture even before Singapore became a sovereign state "in an attempt to brand its identity at home and abroad as socialist, democratic, multi-racial and pragmatic." Such an effort has been expanded to the economy front too. In this context, Chong notes that "soft power was derived from a narrative of efficient hospitality to foreign investment coupled to a reality that matched it." To this end "a disciplined structure of employer-worker relations where both had to be persuaded through strong arguments to re-imagine themselves as stakeholders in a communitarian effort to lift Singaporean prosperity" was imposed. Hveem (1987) pointed out that different forms of corporatism have different levels of effectiveness in regard to growth, attributing differences to the political system, "democratic corporatism" versus "less democratic corporatism". Yet, the case of Singapore proves that "authoritarian corporatism" may be effective too. Therefore, the role that other interacting factors such as geography, history, leadership play should be examined too.

For all the differences between them, the cases of western European small states and Singapore reveal that the development of a national narrative of vulnerability that encourages cooperation, cohesion and corporatism within a society, matters. It, also, constitutes an asset in building a good reputation, as we have seen above. It seems that in both cases, in order to cope with adversities Small States developed specific identities and a special form of social organization which they made use of it as their comparative advantage. Therefore, a pattern arises and is one that requires further investigation, especially in the context of the contemporary economic crisis. The pattern goes like this: adversities increase Small State societies' vulnerability. Subsequently, for these societies to foster a unifying culture of cooperation and shared burden becomes a necessity. Such a culture legitimates corporatism which finally helps in increasing competitiveness. In this way, Small States in Europe and Asia have withstood systemic pressures and secured growth.

That said, Fioretos (2013), although he does not contest the importance of national unity, cooperation and corporatism as assets for political unity and economic success, suggests that the linkage between vulnerability and social/political unity is not as direct and strong as the Small State literature usually suggests. Using Greek crisis as an example, he shows that even when Greeks faced high levels of vulnerability, broad societal or political cooperation did not emerge, apart from the cases of short-lived caretaker governments. Therefore, Fioretos argues that we should not understand social/political unity simply as by-products of vulnerability. According to him, their existence presupposes a specific historical context and a combination of national and international circumstances, to which we will refer later.

A similar to Fioretos (2013:7) argument is also articulated by Thorhallsson and Kattel (2012) in regard to Estonia and Iceland. They see corporatism as: “the result of historical choices and the smallness of a society. The political elite has come to the conclusion that inclusive decision-making based on consensus is best suited to minimize conflicts and maximize economic gains. This decision-making framework is vital in order for small states to deal with economic and political vulnerability due to increased economic openness”.

However, such a condition has been absent in both Estonia and Iceland prior to the recent economic crisis and remained so after it. As a result the crisis in both countries deepened. So, Thorhallsson’s and Kattel’s point of convergence with Fioretos (2013) is that corporatism does not arise through conditions of crisis. A culture of consensus and cost-sharing cannot be fostered, if it were not existing before. Yet, Iceland and Estonia responded to such a predicament differently. The political landscape in the former was polarized, governmental measures were heavily disputed, and during the crisis there were more “conflicts between the largest labour movement and government... in the period 1995-2007” (p. 15). In contrast, in the latter public protest and social unrest was little, while the coalition that has run the country since 2005, survived the crisis and was reelected. Interestingly enough, Estonia since its independence avoided to adopt a corporatist model and emerged even less corporatist after the crisis. Then, questions why Estonia succeeded, while Iceland failed, and how it compensated for the lack of corporatism beg for an answer.

To unpack Estonia’s stability, one should look at what determined the state-society relationship; the reasons why government enjoyed such a wide approval. Thorhallsson and Kattel (2012: 8) argue that

...Estonia rapidly became a simple polity in the sense that coordinative discourse was almost non-existent, but communicative discourse, aimed at both the domestic electorate and European peers, came increasingly to dominate policy-making processes and structures. Accordingly, accession to the EU (and NATO) then to the euro zone became overarching political goals behind which the government could rally support without much actual discussion in the society at large.

Moreover, the government capitalizing on the success of the 1990's and early 2000's economic policy, sold again to the public its ingredients as necessary preconditions that guarantee growth. Thus, "the currency board, the balanced budget, and the proportional income tax are the three 'holy pillars' of Estonian politics, which cannot be challenged" (Thorhallsson and Kattel, 2012:8). Therefore, it seems to me that the use of a unifying overarching aim by the government, has secured the necessary social consent. In this sense, Estonia has managed to achieve high rates of social development, ie. conditions that permit dialogue, cooperation and finally an "effective functioning of the economic apparatus without the hindrance of civil unrest", that is one of the components of economic resilience, according to Briguglio *et. al.*, (2008:10).

Estonia is not the only Small State that succeeded in creating such a national narrative of a precious goal. Another small state's case study, Taylor's (2014) analysis of Botswana's developmental strategy, has many common points with Estonia's success story. Botswana's determined political elite managed to articulate a "national vision for development" and based on this achieved an alliance among Botswana's elites. In essence "development has been Botswana's ideology" (Taylor, 2014:192). Hence, in addition to corporatism, I suggest that setting a unifying goal and a common narrative about a national purpose can constitute a significant asset to a Small Power's strategy.

A Small State case that could be informative if examined in this context is contemporary Israel. Israelis have fostered an entrepreneurial culture not only in regard to their economy, but also in politics and all across society. An entrepreneurial revolution is taking place and it is of such scale that Israelis are called a "start-up nation" (Senor and Singer, 2011). For Israel entrepreneurial nation-building was a response to various adversities, but also a means towards growth; it constituted a way to combat vulnerability. If one should choose a motto to describe this national strategy it would be Intel's Israel mantra "survival through success" (Frohman, quoted in Senor and Singer, 2011: 282), which means that the goal is success but the motivation is survival.

It seems that entrepreneurship as a national strategy serves Israel in two ways. First, it mobilizes its society's and diaspora's creative forces through offering them a common purpose. Senor and Singer (2011: 275), who coined the term start-up nation, note that "a thread runs through the founders' time of draining swamps and growing oranges to today's era of start-ups and chip designers. Today's entrepreneurs feel the tug of this thread. While the founders' milieu was socialist and frowned on profit, now "there's a legitimate way to make a profit because you're inventing something... The new Zionist narrative is about creating things"".

Second, it projects Israel as a distinct case of an entrepreneurial state which could serve as a model for other states. Diplomats and entrepreneurs are traveling all around the world to present Israel's special achievements, find new start-ups abroad to invest to, attract start-up-ers and/or researchers to Israel and finally build, or rebuild, Israel's reputation. Thus, I suggest that there are affinities between Israel and other Small States which also project themselves as models, i.e. Nordic states in Europe or Singapore among the developmental states based on the particular qualities, values and culture of their societies.

Each of these small powers has achieved to create a special state-society relationship based on a common perception of uniqueness, distinct national role in the world and a common purpose both at the domestic and the international level. Therefore, in my view the state-society link as a source of power is well worth further exploring in the Small State studies context. In such an enterprise engaging with theories of Social Capital (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 2001) and Entrepreneurial Society (Audretsch, 2009) or Entrepreneurial Capital (Audretsch, 2006) would be mutually beneficial for both Small State and social/entrepreneurial capital research agendas.

Examining the role that people can play in the success of Small State endeavour to promote its interests, scholars also refer to the contribution that a Small State's diaspora can make. Keohane (1971:166; 175-179) underlines the value of lobbying "with an American accent", if small states wish to penetrate into both US policy makers and society. He claims that: "The obvious response in a democracy to recalcitrance among elected officials is to mobilize public support for one's position." In this context, he cites the example of Israel, whose expatriates in the US have managed to gain the support of both politicians and society for their country. According to Keohane, such an accomplishment is not simply the result of the large number of Jews living in the US. Their success is due to their sense of a special Jew identity, their well organized community and efforts, a large amount of money that they can spend and close cooperation with the Israeli government.

It worths noting that pro-Israeli lobbying has been so successful that in 2006 two prominent Realists, Mearsheimer and Walt, occupied themselves with the impact of the Israel lobby on the US foreign policy. The essence of their argument is that Israel's interests have a central place in the US foreign policy in the Middle East; even when such a focus on Israel's security imperiled theirs. In their view, US pro-Israeli stance is not based on common interests with Israel in the region or shared values between the two states. It is due to the excessive influence that US Jews are able to exert upon specific groups of people within the US. Therefore, their work vindicates Keohane's (1971: 161) argument that the elephant can sometimes be guided by lesser animals. Such a view coming from two central figures of Realism not only reconfirms Keohane's earlier proposition, but also, in my view, shows why Realism should pay more

attention to Small States and Small State studies assumptions. Yet, this is an issue to which I will go into later in this chapter.

The important role that an active diaspora can play in attracting the sympathy of public opinion abroad is also noted by Cooper and Shaw (2009:13). In a completely different context they refer to celebrity diplomacy and how it can be supportive to national efforts. They provide the example of Rihanna, a distinguished member of the Caribbean diaspora, whose appointment as “honorary youth and cultural ambassador of Barbados” according to them, constitutes an “innovative use of celebrity diplomacy” showing “that small countries can be quick to make sure success stories at the individual level are linked to national rebranding.”

Moreover, the expatriates’ contribution to small states has also been pointed out in regard to remittances that reinvigorate small economies, especially in the developing world (Diggines, 1985; Streeten, 1993; Baldacchino, 2015); and also concerning expatriates’ practice to serve in public sector positions, where they can assist with their knowledge from abroad as in the case of Botswana (Taylor, 2014); moreover their ability to transfer know-how and invest in new enterprises, as in the case of Israel (Senor and Singer, 2011).

Therefore, Small State studies look at the population factor from a more qualitative perspective. Given that quantitatively speaking Small Powers are by definition disadvantaged, the ties among a Small State population and between society and the state become critical resources for a Small State’s success. Thus, Small State scholars agree that a state’s cohesion, homogeneity and national unity constitute important assets. Moreover, it is argued that vulnerability, inherent in a Small State in both economic and security terms, can play a positive role in verifying unity in a Small State’s society. A series of scholars since the 1980s have paid considerable attention to the link between vulnerability and the establishment of corporatism in the society. Although, there are different views regarding the circumstances that lead a society to adopt a corporatist model, there is little doubt that such a model is helpful to Small States that wish to confront global economic pressures successfully and achieve growth.

Yet, a more thorough approach to the literature reveals one more pattern regarding the role that the government-society relationship play in Small States that pursue their goals both at the domestic and the international fronts; what matters is a unifying national narrative about a unique identity, a threat and an overarching goal. Then, a Small State can exploit the strength of its population in full. Furthermore, Small State scholars have also referred to the contribution that a Small State’s diaspora can make in terms of diplomacy, economy and public administration.

### *3.3.4 Political System*

Following Kouskouvelis' (2004:169-170) categorization, the political system of each country belongs to its functional resources of power. Kouskouvelis notes that domestic peacefulness and unity contribute to the power of a state, irrespectively of its type of political system. However, he underlines that the International Relations literature focuses more on the kind of political system. Actually scholars have focused on whether a democratic or an authoritarian system offer more advantages in regard to an effective foreign policy. Yet, in the Small State literature the situation is reverse. Small State scholars recognize the importance of political system (Table 3.3). For instance, Baillie (1998b) attributes the potential of a Small State to exert influence within a supranational organization to domestic arrangements and Ingebritsen (2002; 2006), too, suggests that Scandinavian states' ability to act as norm entrepreneurs is strengthened by their unique domestic institutions. However, they pay much more attention to the processes under which decisions are taken within democracies than to the type of the political system.

In this context, political unity, consensual politics and stability are directly connected to foreign policy effectiveness. Actually all three conditions are interrelated. Political unity, as Fioretos (2013: 309) defines it, is "a product of coordination games between groups that hold distinct and sometimes convergent and complementary preferences." Therefore, where there is political unity there is less political contestation and thus a beneficial to consensual politics environment. Then stability, longevity and coherence in foreign policy dominate as a consequence of consensus in political life. The advantage of such conditions is that at the international level "agenda-setting is not only possible but is a likely outcome" because "domestic institutions permit consistent, focused interest articulation" as Ingebritsen put it (2006: 289). Indeed, Scandinavia, which is Ingebritsen's area of study, holds a long tradition in consensual politics. In 1936 Hambro, a prominent Norwegian politician and Norway's representative in the League of Nations had highlighted how Small States differ from Great Powers in that matter. He argues that in Small States foreign policy is not a source of disagreement between parties as it happens to be in Great Powers where the political landscape is more complex. Therefore, he notes that "[T]he delegations of these Small States are never party delegations; all parties are represented on them, irrespectively of the government that may have nominated them" (p. 170). He himself had represented his country in Geneva under four different governments, and suggests "that it is of some importance that there is a certain continuity of policy in some countries. It is very difficult to follow any consistent line of policy or principle when delegates are constantly changing; and some of the smaller States have achieved something in this connection which seems to me to be of real international importance" (p. 170-171).

In this context, also, Hirsch (2010: xi-xii) suggests that Luxembourg's impact on the EU was increased by the presence of Luxembourg statesmen; Pierre Werner, Gaston Thorn, Jaques Santer, and Jean Claude Juncker. Yet, he argues that: "[T]he decisive influence exerted by these politicians in European affairs is not only a result of their strong personalities, but also of the longevity of Luxembourg politicians. The country enjoys a remarkable degree of political stability: coalition governments complete their term as a rule, and politicians stay in office longer than elsewhere".

In a different context, Kaarbo (1996) looks at the link between Israel's domestic politics and its behaviour in negotiations concerning the Arab Israeli Peace Process. He argues that when coalition governments are in power the decision making process and its outcome is different because opposition is within the state; negotiations should be made between coalition partners, unless they want to risk the survival of their government. Therefore, while "the nature of the political system sets the stage for the interaction between the internal and the external environment", according to Kaarbo (1996:276), political structures matter more because they determine the type of the intra-state bargaining and its outcome.

Furthermore, scholars who focus on Small States in the international political economy have also underlined the importance of consensual politics. The dominant view is that Small States that managed to confront systemic pressures and withstand economic crises were able to do so because of political structures and traditions that encouraged unity at home. Thus, governments could take hard decisions without the risk of political or social resistance. In this context, Streeten (1993:200) who focuses on the problems of small economies argues that "[D]isagreements in small countries between parties, factions, or leaders can be paralyzing." Katzenstein (1985 [2006:210]), also, notes that "'[A]dversarial politics" typical of the United States is constrained in the small European states by awareness of common interest and the "unitary politics" it creates. Typical of small states is decision-making by consensus, which supplements majority rule." Indeed, Schwartz (1994) in his work *Small States in Big Trouble*, where he examines how Denmark, New Zealand, Australia and Sweden responded effectively to the pressures of global economy by reorganizing the welfare state, shows that such a transformation was possible because of broad coalitions formed by necessity. As he puts it: "[I]n these four countries coalitions of politicians, fiscal bureaucrats, and capital and labor in sectors exposed to international competition allied to transform what they saw as a major factor contributing to declining international competitiveness: the state" (p.531). That said, Schwartz notes that coalitions achieved different levels of success because of differences in the political structures of different countries. To consider an example, Schwartz underlines that "[I]n Denmark, in contrast to the other three, hardly anything facilitated change. Denmark's system of proportional representation with a 2 percent threshold creates highly fragmented parliament with minority governments-more than any other OECD nation" (p. 550).

Some twenty years later, amid the recent global economic crisis, the linkage between domestic politics and external performance under conditions of economic restructuring came to the forefront again. Small State scholars find that a Small State's success or failure to confront the crisis has depended upon domestic arrangements. In their effort to examine whether membership in the eurozone provided a shelter for Small States which were hit by the crisis, using Ireland and Iceland as their case studies, Thorhallsson and Kirby (2012) argue that although being inside or outside of the eurozone created different conditions for the two countries, domestic arrangements mattered too. For instance they attribute Iceland's relatively earlier recovery to "the early change of government and the success of domestic policy in restructuring the banking sector" (p. 815). Thus they suggest that "national choices" should be taken into account if we are to understand such phenomena.

A similar case is made by Fioretos (2013: 306) who explains the political and economic divergence of Greece from the small Western European economies by focusing on "diverse constellations of domestic institutions." In other words, Greece lacked a tradition of political unity and therefore consensual politics could not arise from nowhere. Fioretos makes an interesting contribution to the debate on the linkage between domestic politics and external environment. According to him political unity in small states is not achieved due to vulnerability under conditions of crisis; rather it is cultivated during times of growth with the precondition that the external environment is beneficial. Therefore, he suggests that, "[N]ational unity in Greece over the long term requires domestic reforms, but such reforms will not be sustainable without external economic growth and a multilateral architecture that incentivizes economic groups to share the benefits and costs of structural reform" (p. 305). Thus, Fioretos maintains, first, that political unity is vital in a country's effort to avert the malaises of a global economic crisis and, second, that there is a linkage between domestic arrangements of unity and external environment. However, he claims that for unity to exist and be preserved, it should predate crisis and be fostered under circumstances of growth.

Thus, Fioretos suggests that a Small State in crisis cannot produce political unity if it had not experienced such a condition before. It seems that such an argument stands against Katzenstein's (1985) point on the importance of vulnerability, although Katzenstein himself also implies that there is an aspect of tradition, when he notes that success of corporatistic politics in small European states had its roots in the '30s and the '40s. However, Fioretos' main point is not so much about tradition but about the development of unity; it is not vulnerability that creates unity, according to him, but growth. Hence, there is a series of remarks in the Small State literature on political system that should be made here.

First, there is a tendency in the literature to conceive political unity, consensual politics and national unity as characteristics inherent to the Small State. To consider an example, Baillie (1998b: 200) assumes that “[W]ithin the small state, actors are quick to agree on a common interest when dealing with European issues. This consensual policy style considerably speeds up the decision-making process and renders it more efficient, flexible and pragmatic.” Armstrong and Read (1998:570) state that “small size is argued to facilitate relatively greater communal involvement and consensus in decision making.” However, it seems that it is more a desirable attribute, an achievement that can be accomplished under distinct circumstances, rather than a common trait among small states. Such a point can be reconfirmed not only by the case of Greece or other small European states which also have experienced a harsh political environment during the economic crisis (Thorhallsson and Kattel, 2012) but also by small states in the South and relatively new small states in the North which suffer from intra-state conflicts. Bailes et al. (2014:33) argue that “[S]mall state politics can be vicious and polarized precisely because they are so easily personalized, and rival ideologies can generate violence...”. Small states in Western Balkans, Southeast Asia, Central America and the Caribbean provide good examples of polarized politics because of ethnic, religious or other conflicts. In addition, they note that “...small state may be directly born of conflict when it breaks out of a colonial empire or parent nation... in such cases both the ‘broken’ and the ‘breakaway’ state have to find a way to consolidate their identity and healing the scars of conflict -with fewer assets and perhaps less intrinsic credibility, than an average-sized nation would enjoy.” Kosovo Vs Serbia, Transnistria Vs Moldova and Abkhazia and South Ossetia Vs Georgia constitute the cases that Bailes et. al., (2014) cite in this context.

Yet, such a situation does not reflect only troubled or developing states. Estonia, an EU and NATO member-state, faces an inner soft security threat by its Russian-speaking population; to preserve the Estonian national identity the government took measures, which created a rather fragmented society (Crandall, 2014). Thus, we should wonder whether the linkage between unity, consensual politics and a Small State’s success in international relations exists only to certain states which share similar characteristics in terms of geography, history, development, political traditions, such as the Nordic states or the central European Small States.

Such an assumption leads to my second point which is that for the process of political unity creation to be better understood both Katzenstein’s and Fioretos’s points deserve further research based on past and contemporary case studies. New case studies from different areas and eras will shed light on such processes and will prove whether the dominant view about the connection between vulnerability and political unity can hold true outside of a specific European context. That said, my third point is that it should not be contested that political unity play a crucial role in a Small State’s success in foreign policy. However, we ought to study how it is created and what happens in its absence too. Last but not least,

there is a bigger picture that should not be obscured. It concerns the connection between the domestic and the external and the direction of influence. It seems that a general pattern arises. External conditions, being it beneficial or adverse, impact upon domestic politics. As Schwartz (1994: 551) notes in regard to Denmark, Sweden, Australia and New Zealand “the international economic pressures that motivated coalition members to seek reorganization have caused changes in the political regime and not just in bits and pieces of administrative practice.” These developments, subsequently, influence a Small State’s foreign policy and standing in the international system.

To illustrate this point, recent developments in the countries of eurozone that were hard hit by the economic crisis and followed economic adjustment programs constitute an indicative example. The political landscape in all them but Cyprus has changed. If we focus on Greece politics since 2009 have been shaped by two external events. First, the break-out of the global economic crisis and, second, the interventions of international institutions through the enforcement of economic packages based on austerity. During this period politics in Greece became extremely polarized; radical left and radical right increased their power. The memorandum/anti-memorandum division dominated the agenda and, in 2015, after contiguous failures of austerity programmes and mutual mistrust between the Greek political system and the international institutions that formed the so-called Troika, the anti-memorandum powers, a coalition of radical leftists, SYRIZA, and a populist right party, ANEL, came into power. Both parties came into prominence promising to change Greece’s international standing. Anti-European sentiments and a nationalistic rhetoric had already been spread across a great part of the society and within the parliament. Thus a change of Greek foreign policy was welcomed, if not inevitable. As a result, it was the first time that Greece’s euro-atlantic orientation, the famous Karamanlis’ doctrine: “we belong to the West”, was contested and its future within the eurozone was jeopardized. One could read these events as a result of simply the rise of SYRIZA and nationalism in Greece. However, another hypothesis could be that if there had not been the global economic crisis and the inability of both Greece and the eurozone to manage it successfully, it is rational to assume that radical parties would have remained a minority in Greece and foreign policy orientation would have also been intact. Yet, even unwillingly the Greek coalition followed the European track and continued the policy of “memorandums”, as Greece was in a dire economic situation and it has no other options at the regional or international level. Thus, it could be argued that regarding the Small States the interaction between the domestic and the external is constant and dynamic.

In regard to the debate on the democratic versus authoritarian state, it seems that it got little attention among Small State scholars. Yet, an interesting point is brought up by Hey (2003). Based on findings from different case studies she suggests that sometimes a domestic variable can play an important role, even an equal to the international system factor. She argues

that the type of political system can have paramount influence as “non and questionable democracies like Jordan and Gambia, as well as in new democracies like Paraguay and Panama, use foreign policy primarily to enhance and ensure regime security.” Indeed, case studies in her volume reveal that “[A]ngry populations (supporting Iraq and opposing U.S., control of the canal respectively) concerned the Jordanian King and the Panamanian president to the extent that they developed regional foreign policy largely with those populations in mind.” In contrast, she notes that “firm democracies like Luxembourg, Austria and the Caribbean states enjoy legitimacy that a long tradition of democracy affords them, and therefore rarely use foreign policy for legitimacy, as opposed to popularity” (189-190). Thus, Hey casts a doubt on the dominant view that the foreign policy of democratic states is more constrained by the public opinion than the one of authoritarian states is.

Furthermore, a state’s dominant political ideology as a foreign policy determinant has also been examined by a series of Small State scholars. Petersen (1988) attributes the foreign policy change of Nordic states foreign policies in the 1980s to the rise of social democratic ideas. Then, foreign policy orientation became an issue of controversy between government and the opposition that operated as a source of leverage at the domestic level. Doerer (2011) too expresses a similar view concerning the impact of domestic politics on Danish foreign policy in 1980s. He regards Denmark’s foreign policy change as a consequence of change in party opposition and public opposition; government had to change its foreign policy because of changes in the strength of the above two factors. Furthermore, Thorhallsson (2015) emphasizes the role that eurosceptic parties in Norway played in strengthening the opposition towards EU membership. In a different context, Abuza (2003) shows how a marxist ideology has shaped Laos’ foreign policy.

Last but not least, Small State scholars argue that states with highly centralized and stable political systems are more able to exercise influence. Interestingly, such an argument is supported by both scholars who study authoritarian regimes and others who look at democracies. Ronfeldt (1978: 1) suggests that Cuba and Iran managed to advance their interests as superclients of the two superpowers because they “had strong leadership in a centralized regime.” Yet, Tiilikainen (2007: 84) argues that Finland achieves coherence in its foreign policy through a “very streamlined national system, where the Prime Minister has become the real leader.” Moreover, Elman (1995) underlines the importance of centralizing power in democracies in times of crisis. She looks at the constitutional change in the pre-1900s US as a response to the systemic pressures and notes that “[B]ecause international circumstances threatened national survival, an executive less likely to be buffeted by societal whims became all the more necessary. Thus presidentialism was an attempt to adapt domestic circumstances to a rapidly deteriorating external environment” (p. 216).

Elman (1995) constitutes a special case in Small State literature for two reasons; first, because she examines the United States as a Small Power, and, second, because she aspires to “challenge *Neorealism in its own backyard*”, as she puts it. Her aim is to prove that domestic factors do matter. She suggests that if domestic theory is verified in the case of a weak state, where is less expected, then the battle is won. Although she admits that initially systemic factors impact heavily upon domestic arrangements such as the constitutional reform, later “institutional structures and rules of democratic presidentialism” influenced the course of the US security and foreign policy. As a result, Elman supports that the system constitutes a determining factor in the political design of emerging states, but in later stages choices reflect domestic institutional structures, which, however, have been shaped by the international system. Therefore, she argues that “[T]he US case study provides a springboard for speculating on the international context of democratization in Eastern Europe and the long-term foreign-policy consequences of this domestic regime choice” (p.171). Following Elman’s rationale, if Eastern European democracies had emerged in a less favourable international system, they possibly would have not chosen parliamentarism over presidentialism. In any case their choice of parliamentarism will impact upon foreign policy formation. Although such a hypothesis is interesting, it seems that it followed the fate of other findings within the Small State field, which means that it was never tested. That said, through examining Small Powers’ choices among democratic alternatives and their relationship to the international system and foreign policy formation Elman makes a more general assumption about the interplay between domestic and external factors; as she puts it: “any generalized claim for the causal priority of international or domestic explanations of small state behaviour is unwarranted. Both levels of analysis matter because while the international environment influences domestic political choices, these institutional decisions shape foreign policies in later periods” (p. 217). Such an opinion tallies with the reasoning stated above about the interaction of state level and system level determinants in regard to political unity and a Small State’s political landscape, as they are analyzed in the literature.

Hence, in regard to the political system Small State scholars have focused less on the kind of the system or the prevalent political ideology and more on qualitative attributes like political unity, consensual decision making, stability, coherence and consistency in foreign policy. Such conditions are supposed to render a Small State’s foreign effective policy. There is again a tendency to present such characteristics as inherent to Small States’ political systems, as in the case of the benign Small State identity and Small State good reputation. However, new case studies, from different areas and far from the ideal Small State model, suggest that although desirable and possibly necessary consensual politics are not intrinsic to Small States. Moreover, studies recognize an interplay between the domestic and the international level. Furthermore, there is strong evidence that a Small State’s history impacts upon its political system. Thus, there is also an interaction between variables at the state level.

### *3.3.5 Administration*

The effectiveness of a state's administration which is judged by a state's ability to achieve the desired outcomes constitutes another functional source of power (Kouskouvelis 2004). To have an efficient state apparatus is equally important for Small and Great Powers. However, it is a shared view among Small State scholars that because Small States are more exposed to the transformations of the international system, they need to be: flexible, adept at managing change, and consistent. It goes without saying that such an enterprise requires skilful administration. As Tiilikainen (2007:82) puts it "a small state,..., needs to guarantee the cohesion of its policy. An efficient national system of policy preparation and coordination is another condition for such cohesion at the international level." It seems, however, that an administration's efficiency is not a matter of a state's size. There are Small Powers with an effective public sector and Great Powers that have experienced setbacks because of maladministration. Lack of organization, competition or conflicting views among different departments are usually the sources of ineffectiveness. That said, the quality of administration is multidimensional; it depends upon the level of organization, the amount of financial resources, the education and overall quality of its human resources. Thus, a Small Power that by nature has a limited budget and a limited pool of talent is disadvantaged.

This is one of the most common assumptions among Small State scholars (East, 1973; Benedict, 1967; Barston, 1973; Diggins, 1985; Joenniemi, 1998) and one that distinguishes Small States' foreign policy making from that of Great Powers (Thorhallsson, 2000; 2002). For instance, East (1973) notes that because a Small State can invest limited resources in foreign affairs and the international sector in general the capability of its foreign policy-making machinery is limited too. Therefore, it is expected that a Small State cannot monitor but a limited spectrum of issues, while usually it will lack the adequate information even on issues which are of great interest to it. As a consequence East suggests that "[I]n behavioural terms, this limited capacity to monitor issues and to analyze and evaluate the data which are collected means that small states often are unable to perceive the many opportunities for action that occur during various stages in the development of international issues" (p. 492).

East's case study is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Uganda. However, his proposition concerns Small States in the developed world too. Thorhallsson (2002) argues that the small size of Iceland's administration and lack of expertise were among the chief reasons for which Iceland governments in the '80s and the '90s have been hesitant towards European integration. Thorhallsson (2002: 67) observes that "[T]he small administration did not have the resources to look beyond what was for it a huge task." Therefore, "[E]xperts' knowledge in international affairs was mainly restricted to Nordic and EFTA cooperation, NATO affairs and the Icelandic-US relations in the field of defence. Experts within the administration also had a solid knowledge

of Britain because of the importance trade relations and the Cod Wars.” Such an observation reflects the definition of a Small Power as a state with limited interests; moreover, underlines the difference from Great Powers which have experts on almost every area in the world and finally offers a good account of how a small state’s administration operates. Indeed, it is noted that inadequate personnel was one of the problems that Central and Eastern European states have had to confront after their accession into the EU in 2004 (Valášek, 2005). Yet, Frenzt (2010:137) describes a similar situation and its consequences in regard to Luxembourg, one of the founding members of the European Communities, as following:

Luxembourg’s foreign policy executive suffers from chronic overstretch, and even more so during an EU presidency. A foreign ministry with slightly more than 200 staff members can hardly have the same overview and cumulated expertise as for instance the Quai d’Orsay with around 9,400 employees. This translates into a more modest geographical outreach of Luxembourg’s diplomatic network. Luxembourg’s foreign policy priorities have been set at the European level, for vital economic interests, particularly in the areas of finance and tax. The modest foreign representation, that functions without having an in-house analysis and planning unit at its disposal, suggest reserve prudence and low profile in foreign relations, which make ‘go it alone’ initiatives rather unlikely. It further suggests that Luxembourg takes part in many decision-making processes as low-key participant.

However, such limitations have not inhibited Small States’ administrations to achieve desired outcomes and even play a greater -than they were supposed to- role in international politics. Lacking material resources Small States have invested in different assets. Fox (1959) praises the exceptional skills of Small States diplomats. Thorhallsson (2012) observes that states who managed to exert influence on UNSC processes and contribute to the UN demonstrate administrative competence; according to him their assets are “good diplomatic skills, knowledge of the issues, expertise, thorough preparation, cautious choice of their battles and political entrepreneurship”. Indeed, elements of Small States administrative capacities, such as a state’s ability to act as an entrepreneur at the domestic level and in international affairs, constitute *terra incognita* for mainstream International Relations. However they are important to Small States literature. In an earlier work Thorhallsson (2002) notes that one of the weaknesses of Iceland’s administration was that it was not responsible for innovation. In parallel with Thorhallsson, Ingebritsen (2002; 2006) and Bunse, (2009) Norback (1998:9) argues that “[I]t is no longer a question of whether you are big or small... It is more a question of whether you can produce new ideas and fresh initiatives.” Moreover, Panke’s (2012a; 2012b) propositions in regard to Small States in international negotiations are similar to those of Thorhallsson (2012). Panke recognizes that the lack of financial as well as human resources render small states less well-equipped on the negotiations table. However, among others, administrative capacities like prioritization, knowledge of the issues, proper communication with administration back

home and awareness of the goals as well as expertise, can help small states to 'punch above their weight'. Panke (2012a; 2012b) also notes that Small States can compensate for the lack of expertise in ministries and cut administrative costs through asking for consultation from epistemic communities, industry and civil society actors. Such a view can be reconfirmed by Norway's preparation for membership in the UNSC. Norway's "successful strategy...included close cooperation with its knowledge institutions such as universities, research institutions and non-governmental organizations" (Thorhallsson, 2012:153). To further illustrate such points Thorhallsson cites a series of examples concerning Norway's, New Zealand's, Ireland's, and Liechtenstein's contributions to the UN; he highlights the importance of the role played by their respective administrations by suggesting that "[T]he IR theories need to consider the administrative competence and perception of states, along with traditional variables in order to produce a fuller picture of the power potential of small states in the international system" (p. 160).

Yet, it seems that an effective state apparatus is not a priority and a privilege, at the same time, of Small States located in the North. Many scholars who have explained Botswana's developmental miracle underline the contribution of its competent bureaucracy (Du Toit, 1995; Samatar, 1999; Taylor, 2014). According to Taylor (2014), Botswana's leadership was determined to create an efficient administration. This was a significant advantage in comparison with other Small States in the rest of the continent. Indeed Botswana achieved to foster a "professional bureaucracy that has conducted and implemented policy making efficiently" due to an "essential alliance amongst elites" and the help of expatriates who served at senior positions in the civil service (Taylor, 2014: 189). Therefore, Botswana combines a series of successful Small State characteristics; i.e. intensity of interest and determination, unity, social consensus and an efficient administration.

In addition, studies focus on two other aspects of administration related to smallness; both have to do with the close ties that exist among people in a Small State. Katzenstein (2003: 11) notes that "if you give a party in the capital, you can easily invite all the important political players. This makes a difference to both politics and policy." Such closeness, according to the literature, has both positive and negative effects upon a state's administration performance.

First, it is argued that smallness encourages flexibility and that is why Small States are faster in decision-making and more effective in problem-solving (Streeten, 1993; Katzenstein, 1985; Thorhallsson, 2000). Vital (1967:31) attributes Small States' effectiveness to the personal involvement of policy makers. As he put it: "policy makers in small states can themselves become personally familiar with the detail of the topics they are most concerned with. The influence of the bureaucracy is therefore much reduced and decisions are more apt to be taken without or despite its advice and with far inhibition than might be the case in Great Powers."

Such a view tallies with the existence of a highly centralized political system and a powerful leader. However, later studies refer to a broader structure of administration which is effective because of its smallness. Baillie (1998b:200) argues that “[T]he small size of a small state’s administration results in a very close-knit environment conducive to a strong common identity. Physical proximity and the limited number of domestic actors involved leads to very close cooperation and to a high propensity of successful compromises.” In a similar vein, Schmidl (2001:86) suggests that “[B]ecause of their structure - ‘small is beautiful’- these countries are sometimes better organised, and benefit from the ‘everybody knows everybody’ - syndrome. Being smaller tend to be more flexible.” In her work on the foreign policy of Luxembourg Frenzt (2010) expresses a similar view. She notes that:

Small size... gives the non-politicized administration a number of advantages. Internal communication links between departments are short with few administrative layers to confound communication and support relationships with relative ease... Politicians and officials tend to know each other personally, resulting in trust and considerable autonomy in decision-making.

Hey (2003:92), also in regard to Luxembourg, observes that “states’ well-oiled bureaucracy and small status... contribute to a smooth-running foreign policy machine that behaves in a manner approaching a rational actor, that is, one that defines national interests and pursues them in an apolitical way.” Moreover, Thorhallsson (2012:155) attributes Ireland’s success in its term to the UNSC to qualities of its delegation such as “informality, flexibility, prioritization...” Specifically he notes that “[I]n the aftermath of 9/11 when the United States showed signs of uncertainty about taking the attack to the UNSC, the Irish delegation -informally- managed to persuade the United States to take the issue of the attack to the UNSC, thus strengthening the institution.”

However, other scholars note that such closeness in society may be rather a source of maladministration. Armstrong and Read (1998:570) warn that “close ties between representatives and constituents may encourage divisive rent-seeking behaviour based upon family ties or clientelism.” In a similar vein, Cooper and Shaw (2009:11) argue that “small state ‘governance’ is different because of the intimacy of the ruled with the rulers. The elites across the club and network divides all know each other... Distinctions between state and non-state, or political and economic tend to be blurred, and the external tends to be more salient than in the larger states...” Both Armstrong and Read, and Cooper and Shaw do not provide any examples. However, Iceland’s case as it is examined by Thorhallsson seems to reconfirm these points. Thorhallsson (2002: 68) argues that “ministers were more concerned with a good working relationship with interest groups than general policy-making with the administration itself.” Also, there were a “lack of regulation of working procedures. The handling of cases or individual issues has traditionally been much less cohesive than those of other

states in Western Europe. Politicians have had a strong influence on the handling of individual cases and have not hesitated to intervene into the day-to-day work of officials.” Furthermore, Thorhallsson notes that because of its small size administration was dependent upon external help for getting information etc.; as a consequence close ties with pressures groups and vested interests were developed. Yet, their influence was such that “[I]t was not always possible to see where the role of the state ended and that of pressure groups began”, as he puts it (p. 67). Thus, conditions of small administration that were beneficial for other Small States, namely flexibility, informality, external assistance (Thorhallsson, 2002; 2012; Panke, 2012b), personal involvement of a state leader in the administration (Vital, 1967) proved to be weaknesses in the case of Iceland. Thorhallsson suggests that such predicaments are due to the special way that the Icelandic administration has been developed; for instance “institutions, units, ministerial departments, have been created according to political emphasis”.

Hence, in my view, the main shared point among Small State scholars, in regard to administration, is that there are important differences between a Great Power’s and a Small Power’s state apparatus; that said, it is broadly supported that despite its lack of resources a small state can have an efficient administration. Actually, scholars suggest that a Small State cannot “punch above its weight” without a well prepared, coordinated, flexible, innovative and in general capable administration. In cases, of an inefficient administration historical reasons should be also examined. Moreover, it is argued that because of its small size, a Small State’s administration enjoys more flexibility, informality, while it also displays better knowledge of issues at hand and coordination; therefore smallness can constitute an asset. However, conditions of closeness might encourage corruption.

### *3.3.6 Wealth*

It is well known since Demosthenes era that a state’s foreign policy is associated with its wealth (Kouskouvelis, 2004). The amount and the nature of a state’s financial resources determine the degree of its independence, its ability to carry out foreign policy goals successfully, and its competence in a competitive and globalized economic system. For instance, Griffiths (2014: 59) notes that “smaller richer states have the advantages of possessing economic resources to sustain good governance structures and to support strong social cohesion around policies of adjustment and adaptation.” Such is the case of Luxembourg, whose affluence empowered it to be a pioneer in European integration (Baillie, 1998b; Hey, 2003). In a similar vein, Ingebritsen (1998;2001) and Thorhallsson (2015) suggest that Norway took different decisions from Finland and Sweden because of its higher levels of prosperity. “Norway,..., can afford to raise issues such as ‘who are we in relation to Europe’, which were less prevalent in those states where economic priorities and sectoral politics led to an entirely different set of issues - most noticeably Finland”, as Ingebritsen put it (2001:101). Looking from the other end of the rich-poor con-

tinuum, East (1973) underlines that for poor Small States bilateral diplomacy is very expensive. Therefore, “[S]mall states are likely to avoid those styles of statecraft and modes of foreign policy behavior which are costly... bilateral diplomacy is eschewed in favor of multilateral diplomacy, and foreign policy actions are more frequently undertaken jointly by smaller states” (p. 492). Thus, it could be argued that Small Powers are looking for economies of scale in both economic and political domains. We have already seen how pressures from the global economy increase a society’s vulnerability; and possibly its level of cohesion. It has also been noted how limited financial resources are related to difficulties in administration performance, success in negotiations, lack of adequate information etc. Moreover, it has been suggested that level of development and state of economy influences the goals of foreign policy and its performance (Hey, 2003; Baillie, 1998b; Thorhallsson, 2015). It also seems that Small States make virtue out of necessity by developing their adaptability and flexibility. Schmidl (2001:86) notes that “[S]maller countries are often forced to work with limited budgets. Therefore personnel from a smaller country (military, police or civilian) are used to improvise and trained to think flexibly. This is an obvious requirement in peace operations... just as it used to be in earlier counter insurgency campaigns.” Thus, there are no big surprises in the ways that Small State scholars approached the impact of economy on foreign policy.

Furthermore, there is an unprecedented consensus among Small State scholars in regard to the characteristics of Small State economies (Benedict, 1967; Diggins, 1985; Sutton and Payne, 1993; Streeten, 1993; Armstrong and Read, 1998; Moses, 2000; Griffiths, 2014; Baldacchino, 2015). The discussion has evolved around Small States openness and vulnerability, small size of markets and territories, trade dependence, the value of natural resources and the consequences of the lack of them, entrepreneurship and small states ability for resilience; especially concerning the European integration Small State scholars have also discussed the role of economy’s leading sector in foreign policy choices (Ingebritsen, 1998; Frenz, 2010; Thorhallsson, 2015). In this context, Baldacchino’s (2015: 7) view on small island state economies constitutes a representative summary of various Small State scholars contributions:

An unavoidable openness to all things external (markets, prices, investments, tourists, financiers, environmental hazards, military invasions, epidemics, and now global warming and sea level rise) renders such small island jurisdictions inherently fragile and highly elastic, liable to large oscillations of economic fortune and collapse. There are no cushions, no robust economic differentiation, no economies of scale, no physical, economic, or psychological hinterland to absorb any such shocks: a dismal string of deficit discourse. Any economic graph would show dizzy ups and downs...”

For Baldacchino (2015) this is the “mantra of small island state vulnerability”. Yet, I would add not only of small island state but of every small state. Vulnerability to the global economic forces is a central issue touched on by various Small State scholars, irrespective of whether their focus is on the North or on the South (Katzenstein, 1985; Moses, 2000; Sutton and Payne, 1993; Briguglio et al, 2009; Cooper and Shaw, 2009; Griffiths, 2014). Griffiths (2014:48) sheds light on the causal relationship between vulnerability and smallness by stressing that the latter “exacerbates the impact of external shocks or diminishes the capacity to absorb them.” Thus, he focuses on these characteristics of vulnerability that are related to size and –in this context– downplays other elements of vulnerability that are equally related to poverty and underdevelopment. In this sense all Small States are susceptible to vulnerability; however the degree of their vulnerability varies. Then, a crucial question, concerning Small States response to such a predicament arises.

Many scholars have referred to resilience as an attribute of Small State economies (Sutton and Payne, 1993; Briguglio et al, 2009; Cooper and Shaw, 2009; Griffiths, 2014). According to Griffiths (2014:57), resilience “has be taken to embrace two associated issues, namely the ability to withstand an exogenous shock should one occur, and the ability to respond to a crisis should it develop.” He notes that “the first depends on mechanisms of flexibility and adaptability and the second depends on the quality of governance and the policy options available.” What Briguglio (2003) coined as the “Singapore Paradox” depicts the vulnerability resilience nexus vividly. On the one hand Singapore is extremely vulnerable to external shocks because of its unavoidable openness, and on the other it has achieved high rates of economic growth and per capita GDP. Briguglio et al (2009:2) assert that “[T]his reality can be explained in terms of the ability of Singapore to build its resilience in the face of external shocks.” In their view, good governance, sound macroeconomic management, market efficiency and social development constitute essential components of resilience. Therefore, one can observe a correlation between the economic factor and other factors, analyzed above.

We have already seen the societal response hypothesis developed by Katzenstein (1985;2013) and others (Hveem, 1987; Moses, 2000). According to them vulnerability reinforces unity and cooperation within a Small State’s society. Thus it encourages the kind of corporatist politics that make a Small State’s economy competitive and capable of increasing growth. In this context Katzenstein praises Small States intelligence. He states that:

The adjustment strategy of the small European states is summed up by the story of the snake, the frog, and the owl. Fearful of being devoured by the snake, the frog asks the owl how he might survive. The owl’s response is brief and cryptic. Learn how to fly. None of the small European states has learned to soar like the eagle. What they have learned to cultivate is an amazing capacity to jump... and retain

their ability to jump again and again in different directions, correcting their course as they go along. In a world of great uncertainty and high-risk choices, this is an intelligent response. Frogs can escape snakes, and the small corporatist states can continue to prosper - not because they have found a solution to the problem of change but because they have found a way to live with change.

A similar view is also advanced by Cooper and Shaw (2009). They argue that “what small states lack in structural clout they can make up through creative agency” and talk about the “innovative character” of small states (p. 2). In the economy domain, small states have showed creativity in finding niches and fostering new, usually unconventional, sectors of economic activity (Cooper and Shaw, 2009). Baldacchino (2015: 5) enumerates some of them: “offshore banking and financial services, ... , the sale of citizenship, Internet domains, philately, generic drugs, aggressively place-branded food and drink, plus various rent-driven geostrategic services (tourism, second-home residences, telecommunications infrastructure, military bases, detention facilities, transshipment depots....).” In this sense, “resilience is based on a type of “opportunistic pragmatism” (Cooper and Shaw, 2009:10).

Yet, the common point of several studies on this issue is that Small States find ways to compensate for their limitations (Prasad, 2009; Chong, 2009; Cooper, 2009; Wong and Chi sen Siu, 2015; Aloisio, 2015; Entwistle and Oliver, 2015; Baldacchino and Melor, 2015; Bertzold, 2015). That is why Baldacchino (2015) argues that it is time to articulate more positive narratives about the economies of Small States and he chooses to explore their performance in regard to entrepreneurship. However, this is not the first time that someone reveals the robustness and the possibilities of Small State economies. Easterly and Kraay (2000), Armstrong et al (1998) and even earlier Leff (1971) have tried to correct the “bigness bias” in the literature, as Leff put it; they deconstruct the myth of the economically unviable Small State by proving that Small States can perform equally well with and sometimes even better, than the Great Powers. Therefore, the majority of scholars in one way or another focus again on Small States ability to survive and even succeed against a harsh environment, through finding creative solutions.

A very different aspect regarding the impact of the economy on foreign policy choices is explored by Small State scholars who focus on the approaches of small European states, especially of the Nordics and the neutral-non allied ones, towards EU membership and performance. They argue that what accounts for the differences among them is the orientation of their leading economic sectors and the organized interests behind them (Luif, 1995; 2003; Ingebritsen, 1998; Frenztz, 2010; Thorhallsson, 2015). For instance desire to maintain control over natural resources and primary economic sectors explain Norway’s and Iceland’s rejection of EU accession, according to Thorhallsson (2015). However, economic survival was among the primary reasons for which Austria, Finland, and Sweden applied for membership (Luif, 1995;

2003). In this sense, Ingebritsen (2001: 100) argues that “economic resources –not votes– are decisive when deepening political cooperation with Europe becomes an option.” Such a view was contested by Neumann (2001), who advances the role that national identity plays, and Tiilikainen (2001), who suggests that history counts too. However, a series of studies seem to reconfirm Ingebritsen’s view (Luif, 2003; Frenzt, 2010; Thorhallsson, 2015).

Hence, discussion over Small State economies is centered around a familiar question: “how do small states survive?”. Thus, scholars focus on the elements of vulnerability and the components of resilience. Furthermore, Small State literature has highlighted the impact of economy not only upon a Small State’s limitations in terms of military capabilities, administration etc, but also on Small States’ foreign policy choices.

### *3.3.7 History*

At this point we should add a factor that, as we said above, there is not among Kouskouvelis’ sources of power; yet it is one that is popular among several Small State studies across the years and also one that we have met many times in the above analysis, as interacting with other state level factors, such as reputation, society, administration, political unity. This is history. History is an influence that is often underestimated by mainstream International Relations, when determinants of a state behaviour are discussed. Yet, in the Small State studies field the past has gained considerable scholarly attention either as a source of power or as a compass for future choices. It has been stated earlier in this analysis how a state’s history impacts upon its prestige and helps a state to gain support for its pursuits or, in a case of bad reputation, to lose it. However, such an influence is indirect; a by-product of the effect that a state’s history has to others. Small State scholars have also examined history as a factor that shapes a Small State’s behaviour and/or determines its success in more direct ways.

In this context, the most common thesis among scholars is that a Small State’s past experiences influence its future behaviour and success. According to Bjøl (1968:160), past behaviour can provide inspiration and determine the “strength of the will power of the small state.” From a different perspective Baillie (1998b:195-196), too, underlines the advantageous role that history can play in improving a state’s position in a specific institution and therefore in increasing its bargaining power. As he puts it,

Certain factors at the basis of an actor’s influence can be pinpointed by empirical observation to be immediately discernible as specific to the actor in question. They derive from the actor’s specific historical context a combination of events and characteristics which is unlikely to be found in the same form in the case of a different factor.

Using Luxembourg as its case study and analyzing its behaviour within the EU context, Baillie suggests that “its status as a founding member affects its position inside the EU.” According to this view, early integration helped Luxembourg, first, to fully coordinate its institutions and decision-making processes with those of the EU, and, second, for its political personnel to get first-hand experience and connections from the very first day of the European integration. Therefore, Luxembourg appears to be an effective, integral and well-respected partner among the EU member states and especially regarding to the Franco-German axis.

In a similar vein with Baillie (1998b), Panke (2012b: 318), whose focus is on negotiations, notes that the timespan that a state participates in an institution matters; the longer it is, the easier a Small State can overpass issues related to its smallness. Panke suggests that “[L]earning from past experiences with the negotiation setting, the other actors, and policies increases the available expertise and allows one to save transaction costs in the conduct of shaping strategies.” Yet, this can work if states develop “institutional memory”, as Panke puts it, i.e. if they prolong their diplomats postings to a particular institution, or if they enable a “rotation system between attachés in line ministries, on the one hand, and attachés and diplomats on the international level on the other.” Panke sees such a strategy as no-cost “capacity building”. Following this line of reasoning there are two points that should be underlined. First, Panke is preoccupied with cost reducing and expertise. Thus, she highlights the fact that a Small State can be successful in negotiations, if it can compensate for its poor resources and find a niche. Second, Panke’s view reconfirms earlier Hambro’s statement on the importance of his stay in the League of Nations under four different governments that was possible because of Norway’s tradition of consensual politics. Moreover, it shows how the factors that shape a state’s behaviour are interrelated. In this sense, a state’s history determines the processes of decision-making which subsequently define the ways that administration works, namely, if it is effective or ineffective; consequently a state’s experiences are formed respectively and influence its future behaviour. In this context, Iceland’s weak administration constitutes also an example of how history influences the capacity of a state’s administration. Thorhallsson (2002) asserts that in order to understand the differences of the Icelandic administration from those of the rest of the Nordic countries we should put it in a historical perspective, as he argues that its predicaments have their roots in 1874 and the “establishment of the legislature before the administration and the executive” (p. 68).

Furthermore, Small State scholars have also looked at the impact of history on a state’s economy. Katzenstein (1985 [2006: 206]) asserts that what determines Small State success in confronting the pressures of the global economy is the consequences of “the interaction of historically-shaped domestic structures with the world economy.” He (1985 [2006:212]) notes that “[T]he distinctive strategy by which the small European states adjust to change derives from corporatist domestic structures that have their historical origin in 1930s and 1940s.”

Indeed, Fioretos (2013: 306-310), in his effort to explain the reasons why Greece, during the recent economic crisis, has not matched with the small but strong state example regarding the reinforcement of social and political unity, contests the importance of vulnerability alone and asserts that historical context matters too. He attributes differences in political and economic development to different sets of domestic institutions. However, the latter are a by-product of history. Therefore, according to Fioretos “history becomes destiny.” To illustrate this point, he shows how the early industrialisation that took place in the small central European states and their earlier, than Greece’s, integration into the international markets created the conditions for cross-class cooperation and compromise, which Greece lacked. Thus, Fioretos notes that “without the type of history that characterised its wealthier partners in the EU,... Greece was never a strong candidate for premier membership in the corporatist club.”

Yet, the most broadly shared assumption regarding the impact of history upon a Small State’s foreign policy is related to the influence that past experiences, what has been called “shadow of the past”, have on a small state’s future security choices. Among the first wave of scholars Barston (1973: 20) notes that “[T]he type and scope of a state’s foreign policy can be limited by historical factors.” To illustrate his point he refers to Finland’s choice to follow neutrality after 1945 as a result of its “traditional unsettled relations with Russia” and “the events leading up to the Winter War in 1940-41”. In addition, Barston attributes the language, cultural, political and economic ties between former colonial powers and their ex-colonies to historical factors too.

However, it was Reiter (1994) who elaborated on the role that past experiences play in shaping a Small State’s behaviour. Reiter introduced the theory of learning in the Small State studies and suggested that such an approach should be incorporated, not as a unique explanation, but in order to enrich Realist tradition. In Reiter’s view, lessons from the past have a formative effect; they shape beliefs and consequently choices. He suggests that such “lessons are drawn from significant foreign policy experiences... continuity of policy follows success, while innovation follows failure” (p. 490). In this context, it is argued that minor powers because of their limited interests and narrower spectrum of experiences are in a better position to define their experiences as successes or failures. To assess his hypothesis Reiter proposes a model which assumes that “nations can draw one of two lessons from a formative event: either that neutrality best protects national security or that alliance best protects national security” (p. 426). In this context, systemic wars are perceived as the most formative events. To test his model he assumes that WWI and WWII were major events for which the decision to ally or remain neutral was crucial for every Small State. Therefore, he collects data from Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey, in regard to post World War I period and from Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Luxembourg, the

Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey and Yugoslavia concerning post World War II period. Indeed, what he finds is that lessons from the past become formative national experiences and explain alliance preferences better than perceptions of external threat. To consider but one example, Reiter (2006:261 [1994]) writes on Scandinavia:

Experiences of successful neutrality for Denmark, Sweden, and Norway in World War I reinforced their traditional adherence to neutrality, a commitment that lasted through the late 1930s in the midst of a mounting German threat. However, the two nations that experienced failed neutrality in World War II, Denmark and Norway, abandoned their long traditions of neutrality to join NATO... Additionally, the single Scandinavian nation that was allied during World War II, Finland, experienced failure and opted for neutrality after the war (p. 522).

In order to code the formative importance of past experiences Reiter introduced to the Small State field a new term “the shadow of the past” that would be used by many others later. Vayrynen (1997) also endorses this view based on a learning approach and beliefs (1997). Mouritzen and Wivel (2005:38-39), too, use historical experiences as part of their explanation of non-pole state behaviour. According to them, “what is usually seen as the role of domestic factors in foreign policy often turns out, on closer inspection, to be traceable to ‘lessons’ inherited from the effects of past foreign policy.” Thus, it is their view that “shadow of the past” appears to have a restrictive impact on state foreign policy, especially in regard to “the priority given to national autonomy.” As Reiter (1994) also does, they suggest that “these lessons originate in the most recent war.” Yet, in contrast with Reiter, who emphasizes on the role that lessons from the past play in the formation of leaders beliefs, they note that “the decision-makers, the press, the attentive public, and –regarding major traumatic events– the population in general learn lessons that persist through socialization and other mechanisms” and in this way influence foreign policy decision making.

Later, Steinmetz and Wivel (2010) reconfirm the value of the “shadow of the past” explanation; they find that several contributors to their volume employ lessons learnt from past experiences to explain small European states choices. For instance, Rickli (2010) notes that Austrian and Swiss elites and populations were strongly attached to neutrality because it was linked to periods of security and growth and as a result it was perceived as a cornerstone of their societies. Moreover, Braun (2010) argues that differences in the stances of Slovakia and Czech Republic towards the EU can be attributed to different perceptions of continuity and change in regard to the Czechoslovak state. Furthermore, Rood (2010) interprets Netherlands’ ambitious foreign policy as a by-product of its imperial past. In addition, in a more recent volume on Small States, Jurkynas (2014:116; 124) argued that Baltic states’ foreign policies have been guided by a mixture of “geopolitical and memory-related sensitivities.” According to

him, “Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian policy makers tend to base their security assessments on a well-established, ‘anti-Russia’ habit as part of their identity.” Therefore, the three small Baltic states “show how the ‘post-traumatic disorder’ of nations -once occupied, annexed and rather recently independent- seeps into identity and drives the search for security against a former ruling power and its legacies.”

In a similar vein, Wivel and Marcussen (2015: 206; 219-220) attribute the moderate Europeanization of the Nordic security and defence policies to, among other factors, the fact that “Nordic countries continue to live in the shadow of history..”. National security identities and common values rooted in 1930s transformations and even further in nineteenth century Scandinavism determine their policies, according to the authors. Therefore, different states make different choices within the European context: “Sweden continues as a norm entrepreneur as it has done for decades...; Denmark continues its pragmatic, self-interested use of international institutions...; and Finland has readily adapted to the external environment, now the outcome of European policy-making rather than superpower Cold War.” Therefore, there is a “path dependency” which reflects Reiter’s (1994) view that there is a learning process according to which success in a Small State’s past choices is followed by continuation of the same policies.

Yet, in the context of this thesis it should be underlined that besides the fact that such a view is broadly shared, referencing and dialogue among scholars on the impact of history is poor. To consider an example, in the case of the “shadow of the past” on a small states security decision-making, while scholars make use of the same or similar concepts and examples, the only references are from Vayrynen (1997) to Reiter (1994) and from Steinmetz and Wivel (2010) to Wivel and Mouritzen (2005). Moreover, even Steinmetz’s and Wivel’s emphasis on the convergence among many of the contributors to their volume views regarding the importance of the “shadow of the past” as a determinant of Small State behaviour is not an outcome of a systematic examination of the “shadow of the past” hypothesis, but a conclusion of theirs based on the findings of various analyses in their volume. Thus, again Amstutz’s (1976:176) view that: “[S]tated in the extreme one could say that it seems easier to develop one’s own view on small states than comparing it with other earlier views” is fully confirmed.

In addition, one point concerning “lessons of the past” and Great Powers should be made. The question whether the learning process that Reiter (1994) articulates regarding alliance choice, can have a broader impact and even concern Great Powers’ choices, begs for an answer. What was the impact of the “shadow of the past” upon Germany’s post WWII turn to a more pacifist identity? Of course, it was an effort to alter its image in the world and rebuild its power apparatus; however it can also suggest that the dictum “change follows failure” is valid in the case of big players in the system too. Furthermore, whether post ‘War on Terror’ US policy in

the Middle East has been influenced by the shadow of history constitutes a justified question. After all Gilpin (1981) notes that historical experiences influence the perceptions of ruling elites when they are to take the risk of changing the *status quo*. That said as Levy (1992) points out learning alone cannot provide a sufficient explanation. Therefore, it should be integrated with other theories in order to enhance their explanatory power, as Reiter (1994) argues in regard to Realism. Thus, it is apparent that similar assumptions can be made about both small and Great Powers. So, incorporating hypotheses coming from Small State studies can be fruitful for explaining and understanding great power policies too.

Hence, it seems that, although neglected in mainstream International Relations, history and learning, according to a series of Small State scholars, have a considerable impact upon a small state's foreign policy. It is argued that history influences a Small State's behaviour in two ways either as a source of power, or as a limiting factor. Small State Studies note that history can be used as a source of inspiration; it also influences the economy, society, political life and administration of a small state; while lessons from the past have a critical influence on future decisions.

Therefore, the above analysis shows that state level factors have drawn considerable attention within the Small State field. Moreover, it is evident that there are many points of convergence among Small State studies in regard to the importance of domestic factors and the ways that they affect Small State behaviour across the time and irrespective of their geographic focus. Furthermore, by exploring factors at the state level analysis we have a better idea of how and in what ways Small Powers are different from Great Powers. In addition, it seems that there is ample room for integration of Small State studies with other theories and disciplines, for instance in regard to reputation engagement with Nye's 'Soft Power' would be mutually beneficial; equally, Social Capital theories as well as Entrepreneurship could shed some light in aspects of Small State power resources and behaviour, while at the same time case studies focused on Small States would enrich these theories. Last but not least, it should be underlined that although Small States scholars look extensively at state level factors, international system's primacy has not been contested, even from Scholars that wish to emphasize the importance of domestic arrangements. For example, Elman (1995:217) notes that "any generalized claim for the causal priority of international or domestic explanations of Small State behaviour is unwarranted. Both levels of analysis matter because while the international environment influences domestic political choices, these institutional decisions shape foreign policies in later periods." Also, Ingebritsen (1998:6) makes explicit that "small trading nations never have the luxury of autonomously pursuing policies incompatible with the interests of more powerful states." Furthermore, Doeser (2011:217) suggests that "the foreign policies of *democratic small states* are exposed to major pressures from both the international and the domestic political environments. Because they are *small states*, they are highly constrained

by the international system, unlike Great Powers. Because they are *democratic*, they are also highly constrained by the domestic political environment, unlike *non-democratic* small states." Therefore, it remains to be seen how variables from the two aforementioned levels, namely the international system and the state, interact with the third level.

### 3.4 Individual Level Explanations

#### 3.4.1 Leadership and Political elites

If one looks for explanations about a state's behaviour, success or failure, at the individual level then leadership is where they can be found. By leadership scholars usually refer to an individual leader and sometimes to political elites. Kouskouvelis (2004) notes that capable leadership constitutes an important resource of power that can be associated with a state's history and fate; equally a leader's inability, fear, unsound ambitions may weaken a state's position. However, the degree of importance that a leader has to a state's power and his/her influence on foreign policy shaping are highly contested among International Relations studies, independently of their focus on Great or Small Powers (Jervis, 2013; Hey, 2003).

For a leader's impact to be evaluated the critical question would be if in a matter at hand a different leader would act differently. Yet, there are so many intervening factors at the system and state levels that such a question could not have an easy answer. For instance, Hey (2003), argues that although Jean Claude Juncker has been a competent and charismatic prime minister, it is possible that any other at his position would have accomplished equal achievements, due to specific systemic conditions and Luxembourg's capable administration. If Luxembourg, though, is a European, developed and privileged Small Power where a competent leader can make little difference, according to Hey it does not constitute a unique case. She asserts that even in Small States beyond Europe, like Jordan, Gambia, Laos, Paraguay, where it seems that a powerful leader dominates the foreign policy arena, leaders actually adapt their preferences to conditions shaped by systemic and state variables. Therefore, "[L]eaders are not simply doing what global and domestic forces dictate, but neither can they overcome those pressures" as she puts it (p. 192). A similar view is expressed by Jervis (2013) in regard to a series of US presidents. He is sceptical about the distinct imprint every president is assumed to have upon US foreign policy and looking at successive administrations suggests that "Presidents are not mere pawns, but neither are they masters of their countries' fate" (p. 178). Hence, it seems that leaders in both Great and Small Powers are viewed more as managers whose choices are conditioned by external and domestic coincidences. However, the conditions under which a leader of small state acts and the role that he or she can play differ from those of a leader of a great power. In this context, Small State scholars have referred to the importance of leadership and to the specific limitations and opportunities that leaders of Small States face.

**Table 3.4** Contributions of key studies with regard to individual level resources of power

Factor	Authors
Leadership	Fox, (1959); East, (1973); Streeten, (1993); Sutton and Payne, (1993); Hey, (2003); Abuza, (2003); Sanchez, (2003); Ingebritsen, (2006); Thorhallsson (2006) Matthews & Yan, 2007; Gvalia, Siroky, Lebanizde and Iashvili, (2013); Kouskouvelis, (2015b); Miles, (2015);
Political Elites	Gvalia, Siroky, Lebanizde and Iashvili, (2013); Miles, (2015)
Economic Elites	Luif, (1995; 2003); Ingebritsen, (1998; 2001); Neumann, (2001); Tiilikainen, (2001); Thorhallsson, (2015)

Yet, it should be stressed that thorough analyses on these issues are few, views are mixed and rather general and at times superficial. Three recent contributions: Gvalia, *et. al.* (2013), Kouskouvelis (2015b), and Miles (2015) that explore the role of leadership in depth constitute exceptions. Although they elaborate on very different case studies, the first in Georgia and its relationship with Russia, the second to Cyprus, natural resources and the economic crisis, and the third to Sweden's approach to the European Union, all three emphasize the role that leaders and political elites can play in regard to foreign policy change. Also Sanchez (2003) and Abuza (2003) highlight the importance of leaders ability to introduce changes in Panama and Laos respectively. Thus, apart from general statements on the impact of skillful leaders and the limitations of Small States, an interesting pattern which connects change in a Small State's foreign policy with its leadership beliefs, determination and skills arises. Therefore, I am going to first present the various references on leadership in Small State studies and then focus on this pattern, while at the end of this analysis I will also refer to the role of economic elites as it has been pointed out by Small State scholars.

It is argued that within Small States politics and policies, and especially foreign policy, are dominated by individual personalities (East, 1973; Sutton and Payne, 1993; Hey, 2003). Lack of human resources, or state structures leave foreign policy decision-making on the hands of individual national leaders and thus to "personal stature and idiosyncratic factors" as East (1973) put it. Then, foreign policy success becomes more an issue of charisma, skills, political orientation and even regime maintainance (Hey, 2003) and less a matter of competent administration and ministry of foreign affairs input (East, 1973). Barston (1973:25) notes that "[T]he contribution which the personality of leader of a small state can make to its international prestige can be seen in the cases of Tito, Nkrumah, Nyeere Nasser and Makarios. What might have been little known national capitals, appear, like the leaders, regularly in the Press." In this context the words of Henry Kissinger about Austria's Chancellor Bruno Kreisky are revealing:

Austria's shrewd and perceptive Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, who had parlayed his country's formal neutrality into a position of influence beyond its strength, often

by interpreting the motives of competing countries to each other... He was much traveled; his comments on trends and personalities were invariably illuminating. He had a great sense of humor and far more geopolitical insight than many leaders from more powerful countries. (Kissinger, quoted in Luif, 2003:112)

However, it is expected that a small population limits a state's possibilities for capable leadership. Streeten (1993:197) notes in regard to small countries that "if talent is randomly distributed, the quality of leaders in all fields will be lower for a small country than for a large one, since it can draw only on a smaller pool."

Yet, Small State limitations also leave ample room for a leader to act, be visible and therefore be credited with success, if desirable outcomes are achieved. In the previous chapter, we saw that first wave scholars such as Rothstein (1968); Keohane (1969) and Fox (1969) advocated that in regard to a state's definition leader's perceptions are decisive. Such a point can be illustrated by Thorhallsson's (2006:28) view on leadership. He notes that "political leaders... decide how states respond to domestic and international events. Political leaders base responses on their own assessment of any given situation, and their state and its capability internal and external" (p. 28). In this sense, Small States leadership determines how small smallness is. Therefore, a Small State's achievements are easily attributed to a skillful leadership. In regard to the six Small States that avoided to be involved in WWII Fox (1959:8) suggests that "the expectations of the leaders sometimes influenced by geographical considerations, to be sure, were the crucial factor." According to Fox, small states leaders and diplomats excelled in diplomacy and negotiations and thus achieved the outcomes they desired. Wallace (1998:24) expresses a similar view: "[P]ersonal skills and leadership qualities are the stock-in-trade of the successful small state." Indeed, for Matthews and Yan (2007: 378) the first among the reasons that justify Singapore's success story is the "strong, stable and decisive leadership under Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew who held his post from 1959 to 1990." Furthermore, Ingebritsen (2006: 289-290) assigns the term "norm entrepreneurs" to exceptional international figures, who although coming from Small States accomplish to exert influence at the world stage level. As she puts it:

Prominent individuals, referred to as "norm entrepreneurs" or "rooted cosmopolitans", can bring parties to the table in new and innovative ways -as demonstrated by Norwegian activism in working behind the scenes to negotiate the Oslo Accords, an internationally recognized benchmark in achieving trust between opposing parties in the Middle East conflict- and as transnational actors in international society.

In addition, Ingebritsen (2006:290) refers to specific personalities such as “Hans Blix, the Swedish weapons inspector, [who] has played a critical role in protesting American intervention in Iraq, similar to the role defined by Olof Palme during the Vietnam War”, when she cites particular cases in which small states have provided “moral balance of power in the international system.”

It is interesting that Ingebritsen (2002; 2006) who had previously associated the concept “norm entrepreneurs” with the Small States role in international politics, in order to show how societal power matters and helps Small States to make a virtue out of their smallness, now “transfers” this attribute from the state to its leader. In this way she underlines the importance of prominent figures in Scandinavian Politics; a point also made by another Scandinavian, Hambro (1936), almost seven decades earlier concerning the influence in the League of Nations.

In a similar vein Kouskouvelis (2015b) suggests that the attribute of smartness, which is associated with Small State (Joenniemi, 1998; Wivel, 2010), should be credited to a Small State’s leadership and therefore “the personification of small state should be abandoned” (p.93). In this context, he examines the influence of Small State leadership upon success and failure in foreign policy. Looking at four consecutive Presidents of Cyprus he argues first that the success in the energy resources affair was a “result of successive and coherent actions of three long time experienced politicians”, namely Clerides, Papadopoulos and Christofias; and second that the mismanagement of economic crisis was a consequence of lack of preparedness, timely reaction, mistaken negotiation strategy from the part of President Christofias and President Anastasiades. Therefore, Kouskouvelis asserts that what makes a Small State smart is its leadership and not its smallness and the consequent flexibility that small size provides.

Thus, the question what makes a leader smart is more than legitimate. What he defines as smart leadership, then, is “a capable and decisive leadership that enables the small state to “punch above its weight,” pursue its objectives, and satisfy its interests against those of stronger actors” (p. 93). Thus, it is apparent that in this approach leadership is crucial. Concerning what differentiates leaders who succeed from leaders who failed, in my reading of Kouskouvelis’s analysis it is the ability of the former to “bargain with its [state’s] assets... and deal successfully with stronger powers” while they introduce change, as in the case of Cyprus Kouskouvelis notes that “especially the cooperation with a company of American interests, the support of the US, the United Kingdom and the EU to Cyprus on this issue, and the multifaceted cooperation with Israel in the pursuit of the Mediterranean energy resources mark a relative shift of the Cyprus foreign policy” (p. 107).

The critical role of a Small State's political elites in fostering foreign policy reorientation is also underlined by Gvalia, et al (2013). They attribute Georgia's detachment from Russian policy and Western orientation to its political elites' beliefs about modernization, Georgia's identity as a European country and no-longer a post soviet state, and their view that modernization was possible only through integration with the West. Thus, they argue that while based on international and regional systemic variables one would predict that Georgia would bandwagon with Russia, in contrary Georgia chose to balance against Russia because of the ideas of political elites that dominated foreign policy. Moreover, the authors compare their findings on Georgia with the case of Azerbaijan and find that their argument is reconfirmed; what distinguishes one case from another are the beliefs of respective political elites about their state's identity and purpose.

A different perspective on leadership and change is provided by Miles (2015). Looking at the shift in Swedish perceptions towards European integration through the lens of political entrepreneurship, Miles analyzes how the then Prime Minister Carl Bildt and Swedish political elites, acting as political entrepreneurs managed to change Swedish perceptions about the EU and consequently Sweden's foreign policy successfully. Connecting Miles' (2015) work with other Small State studies on leadership it would be interesting to examine whether the notion of political entrepreneur could help to conceptualize the role that successful leadership plays in Small States. According to Petridou, Aflaki and Miles (2015:1) "[A] political entrepreneur is a special kind of actor, embedded in the sociopolitical fabric, who is alert to the emergence of opportunities and acts upon them; he or she amasses coalitions for the purpose of effecting change in a substantive policy sector, political rules or in the provision of public goods." In my view, such an approach could be of great value if we wish to further explore what lies behind Kouskouvelis's "smart leader" and Ingebritsen's "norm entrepreneurs" Therefore, I suggest that a further engagement of Small State tied with political entrepreneurship research would be mutual beneficial. After all as Miles (2015: 134) argues: "FPA and political entrepreneurship scholars have, in many ways, been addressing similar research puzzles... associated with policy change and continuity, but have simply used different language."

### *3.4.2 Economic elites*

Beyond an individual leader or political elites, Small State scholars have also noted the influence that economic elites have upon a small state's foreign policy choices. We have already referred to the impact that the leading economic sector of different European states had on their approach towards the European integration. Economic elites and electorates in each country have played a significant role in shaping national stances towards the EU (Ingebritsen, 1998; Thorhallsson, 2015). According to Luif (1995) in Austria, Sweden and Finland elites perceived integration as a solution to their economic predicaments. Especially, in Austria

it was the Federation of Austrian Industrialists that officially requested membership into the EC; then the Federal Chamber of Commerce followed and later the ÖVP, the party which had strong ties with the business community demanded EC membership (Luif, 2003: 101-102). It is also argued that “when Danes joined the European Community, they did so with their purses-not their hearts” (Einhorn, quoted in Ingebritsen, 1998:12). Yet, Thorhallsson (2002; 2015) also attributes to organized economic interests the opposition of Iceland and Norway to EU membership. Ingebritsen’s (1998:11-12) work has been pioneering and illuminating in this sense. As we have seen above, she introduced the idea that differences among Nordic states attitude towards EU accession are due to the impact that leading economic sector of each state had upon EU accession decision making. Actually, Ingebritsen focuses “on the role of leading sectors and the political coalitions that organized for or against accession in each state.” What she finds is that these:

Five states have centralized economic interest organizations. Employers, industry and agriculture are represented nationally and consulted directly in the formation of government policy.... States dependent on manufacturing felt more pressure to join the EC from industrial leaders and trade union officials than did states that export raw materials, because of patterns of foreign direct investment from the Nordic states to the EC after 1985.

According to Neumann (2001:93) –who, however, is not persuaded by her main argument and emphasizes the role of a nation’s identity in foreign policy decision making– “Ingebritsen advances our knowledge by offering a bridge between the existence of sectors and the policy of states, namely, the activities of sector-based interests groups and social movements.” Indeed, economic elites seem to exert influence on foreign policy decision-making even in well established EU member states. Such is the case of Luxembourg, where, according to Frenzt (2010: 136) “government... would avoid taking an international decision going against strong business interests... Similarly, trade unions, traditionally linked to political parties, also understand that their interests are tied to the success of private international business and generally support government foreign policy decisions on that basis.”

Hence, although, the importance of a unique personality, the leader of a Small State has been noted by a series of Small State scholars, leadership in Small State’s foreign policy has remained underexplored. Case studies are few and very recent. Yet, these efforts associate leadership with foreign policy change and smartness. Thus they point to a new direction that needs further exploration and can contribute more broadly to the foreign policy change research, an aspect of foreign policy analysis that remains neglected (Alden and Aran, 2012). Moreover, apart from the individual leader, the role that political and economic elites play in foreign policy continuity and change should be further investigated. Especially in regard to the economic elites, more case studies beyond the response of Nordic’s and neutrals towards

European integration should be conducted in order for economic elites influence to be further investigated.

In regard, to the interaction with the other two levels it goes without saying that the actions of leaders and elites are conditioned by both international system and state level variables. For instance, Fox (1959) relates leaders' actions with their considerations over geographic factors; Ingebritsen (1998) explores how economic elites of small economies reacted to pressures emanating from changes in a rapidly globalizing economic system. Hey (2003), attributes Juncker's success to his charisma and political skills, which, however, was supported by a favourable international system but also to an effective public administration and a consensual stable political system. Moreover, changes in the international and regional system were that permitted Cypriots leaders to take action over the natural resources exploitation, while it was the global economic and euro crisis to which Cypriot leadership reacted inadequately (Kouskouvelis, 2015b). Furthermore, transformations in the international and european system forced Swedish leadership to act in an entrepreneurial way in regard to Sweden's attitude towards the EU (Miles, 2015). Therefore, the interactions of three levels is incontestable.

### 3.5 Bridging the Gap: The Power of the Weak Revisited

#### *3.5.1 Common points among Small State Scholars*

By examining a series of Small State studies I aimed to show how the landscape of Small State scholars' views with regard to the factors that shape Small States behaviour is formed. In this section I am going to discuss the findings and make an effort to bridge the gap among the different Small State studies and between them and the International Relations discipline. Table 3.5 below summarizes the points of convergence among Small State scholars. It presents what we know about the "power of the weak", thus adding to the accumulation of existing knowledge in the field.

**Table 3.5** Points of convergence among Small State scholars

<p><b>International System</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Great Powers are central to International Relations.</li> <li>• Small Powers’ fate is connected with Great Power life/power cycles.</li> <li>• Different types of system pose different challenges to Small Powers.</li> <li>• Bipolar System is the most beneficial for Small Powers.</li> <li>• Level of competition among Great Powers matters; the higher the level of competition, the more the opportunities for Small Powers to exert influence.</li> <li>• Changes in the distribution of power affect Small Powers.</li> <li>• The position of a Small Power in the system matters.</li> <li>• Small Powers are influenced by changes in the material and the immaterial systemic structure and try to exploit opportunities emanating from both.</li> <li>• In the post Cold War era autonomy is a central issue for Small States; they have to strike a balance between sovereignty and integration to regional and international organization and arrangements.</li> </ul>
<p><b>State</b></p>	<p><b>Geography</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Location matters more for Small Powers than for Great Powers.</li> <li>• If a Small Power is located beside a Great Power it will seek for a distant protector.</li> <li>• Being located between two Great Powers offers advantages and disadvantages.</li> <li>• Being located in an area of strategic importance to one or more Great Powers is an asset to a Small Power’s strategy. It offers the opportunity to exert influence on Great Powers’ policy.</li> <li>• Small Powers located in the periphery face different challenges from them who are in the core.</li> <li>• Remoteness constitutes an adversity, but it can also fuel creativity.</li> <li>• Morphology and climate are important in the case of war.</li> </ul>

*(see next page)*

	<p><b>Reputation</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reputation for resolve can deter potential enemies.</li> <li>• Credibility is important to getting allies.</li> <li>• ‘Small Power identity’ is beneficial in negotiations. It also helps smaller players in the system to assume special roles and ‘punch above their weight’.</li> </ul> <p><b>Population</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Small size of population means a small pool of talent.</li> <li>• Cohesion and unity among population are qualities critical to the success of a Small Power. Vulnerability creates conditions for unity.</li> <li>• In economic terms, high levels of cross-class cooperation, a beneficial to corporatism environment, enhances the possibilities of a successful response to pressures emanating from the global economic system.</li> <li>• State-Society relationship is equally important. The ability of a Small Power to mobilize its citizens is significant. A unifying national narrative about a special identity and an overarching common goal are helpful in this effort.</li> <li>• Expatriates can play vital roles in national endeavors by supporting diplomatic efforts, contribute to the economy through investments and remittances and also transfer knowledge by assuming roles in the public administration.</li> </ul> <p><b>Political system</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Political structures of decision making matter. Small Powers tend to have stable and consensual political systems. Historical record is important.</li> <li>• Both democratic governments and authoritarian regimes make use of foreign policy in order to maintain and increase their power at the domestic level.</li> <li>• A centralized political system constitutes an advantage.</li> <li>• A government’s ideological position can influence foreign policy choices.</li> <li>• There is a constant and dynamic interaction between international developments and domestic politics.</li> </ul> <p><b>Administration</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of financial and human resources is an impediment to administration’s effectiveness.</li> <li>• In order for a small sized administration to succeed in international negotiations or within the context of an international organization good communication, good knowledge of the issues ahead and expertise are critical elements.</li> <li>• Smallness in terms of administration encourages flexibility, informality, and entrepreneurship, that help a small administration compensate for its limitations; however, it also involves the danger of increasing corruption due to close ties among its members and organized interests.</li> </ul> <p><b>Wealth</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Limited budget constrains foreign policy options.</li> <li>• Openness is a <i>sine qua non</i> for small sized economies. This makes small</li> </ul>
--	--

(see next page)

	<p>powers vulnerable to the pressures of the global economy. However, degree of vulnerability varies among different Small Powers.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Small powers have shown surprising ability for resilience through fostering cooperative societal arrangements and finding niches to exploit.</li> <li>• The leading economic sector of a Small Power influences its foreign policy choices.</li> </ul> <p><b>History</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lessons from past experiences, what has been called ‘shadow of the past’ condition Small Power’s choices. Continuity follows success, while change comes after failure.</li> <li>• Past record in terms of bravery in war influence people’s determination.</li> <li>• Societal arrangements, political structures, administration, economy are influenced by historical developments.</li> </ul>
<b>Individual</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Leaders’ perceptions of their country and the international system matter.</li> <li>• Prominent figures can play a great role in a Small Power’s foreign policy and success.</li> <li>• Leadership is associated with foreign policy change and Small State smartness.</li> <li>• Differences in the Nordic and Neutral states stances towards the EU integration are due to different economic needs and expectations manifested by economic elites in each country.</li> </ul>

It is evident that Small State scholars agree that there is an interaction between the three levels of analysis that shape Small State policy and its performance. However, they accord primacy to the influence of variables at the international system level. Moreover, Small State scholars’ views converge on which factors are crucial at each level and in what ways they influence Small State behaviour. Findings reveal that there is a multicausality, a *polyaitiokratia*, behind Small State behaviour.

In this context, Small State scholars combine material with immaterial approaches; while the former point to limitations, the latter reveal opportunities. Thus, scholars also concur with each other in what differentiates Small from Great Powers. Their mixture of power are qualitatively different. Immaterial factors such as reputation, a record of determination, a strong state, consensual politics, ability to innovate, a functional state-society relationship and cooperative societal arrangements, as well as skilfull leadership and windows of opportunity at the system level, are vital if a small state wishes to succeed in international politics.

That said, one more common assumption among Small State scholars is that vulnerability remains the dominant attribute of Small States. Therefore, one can argue that the focus of Small State scholars is on vulnerability, opportunities and influence. Vulnerability is related to international system forces and smallness; opportunities, arise from the international system and a state’s special attributes; these attributes finally determine a state’s ability to be resilient, decrease its vulnerability and increase its influence, given the constraints posed by the international system.


In regard to what we need to know, it has been stated above that Small State studies tend to portray the ideal Small State, the “small but smart state.” In my view, this tendency should not be surprising due to the fact that the Small State field has revolved around various versions of one major question: “how do small states survive, despite their smallness?”. Therefore, Small State scholars have concentrated their research efforts on the components of the “power of the weak”. Then, we need more case studies from various Small States to test hypotheses set forward mainly by success stories, in order to see if their strategies are applicable elsewhere or to examine the reasons for Small State failure, which has got little attention. Furthermore, as the most of the Small State literature is rooted to previous types of international system, now that changes are taking place at both international and regional levels (Shweller, 2014; Reich and Lebow, 2014) new research should be undertaken, if we wish to acquire a better understanding of Small State challenges and responses. Last but not least, security issues, the behaviour of Small States in conflicts and military capabilities should also get more attention.

Thus, findings from Small State studies remain valuable for examining past, present and future cases. Moreover, they can contribute to the enrichment of the International Relations discipline through many ways; first by expanding our attention span to the minor players in the system, second by incorporating assumptions about vulnerability, opportunity and influence that have not attracted much attention in the field and, finally, by integrating International Relations studies of Small State with other theories and disciplines, such as social capital, soft power, state building theories or entrepreneurship and political entrepreneurship. Therefore, the Small State field seems to constitute a very promising research area.

### *3.5.2 The behaviour of the Small State*

Yet, in this chapter’s introduction I argued that the field lacks a comprehensive explanatory framework that could improve our understanding of the behaviour of Small States. I suggest that we can create such a framework through a synthesis of the assumptions Small State scholars tend to share. This explanatory framework can therefore be illustrated like this (Figure 3.1):

**Figure 3.1** Small State Behaviour Explanatory Framework



The framework in Figure 3.1, as it is deduced from various contributions in the Small State literature, suggests that international system forces create conditions of vulnerability and opportunities for Small Powers. Therefore, the international system sets the limits of what can be attainable by Small Powers in international politics. Although the pressures that the international system exerts towards Small Powers are constant, their degree is variable as well as their outcomes, i.e. the level of vulnerability or the range of opportunities are different under conditions of a bipolar system in comparison to those of a multipolar or within conditions of mature anarchy. However, international system outcomes, vulnerability and opportunities, do not shape Small Power’s behaviour directly. Even the levels of vulnerability or the value of opportunities differ among different Small Powers. Small Powers’ sensitivity, ability to react and options are mediated by a set of state and finally individual factors. These factors are common to all Small powers; however the composition of each set of factors is unique to each Small State, because the qualities of the state and individual level factors are different from state to state. This is why Small Powers respond differently to the same systemic challenges. In other words, the power resources of a Small State form a unique combination which given the constraints set by the international system determines a Small State’s behaviour and its effectiveness. The relationship between factors and final choices is unique to each case. It goes without saying that such a combination of material and immaterial factors is time-sensitive, as the qualities of each one factor at all the three levels are of a dynamic nature. Moreover, it is possible that not all the factors codetermine a state’s behaviour at the same time. For sure, they are not equally important. We can imagine a pie, where the lion’s share belongs to the forces of the international system and the rest is subject to constant rearrangements.

Using such a framework can help us explain why and how a Small Power behaves as it does. Then variation in Small State behaviour should be more what is expected, rather than an exception. Moreover, we can arrive at generalizations about a very diverse group of states without losing sight of the differences among them. For instance, based on this framework we can use the Small Power concept analytically in order to understand why a certain state responded in a certain way with regard to the European integration or towards the economic crisis. In both cases, small European states faced similar systemic challenges, however, these challenges were translated differently in different states due to their different qualities and therefore small European states responded in various ways. In addition, with a framework like this the factors that determine a Small State's success or failure can be more thoroughly examined. Furthermore, we can have a better understanding of the differences between Small Powers and Great Powers. In this context, there is no shortage of hypotheses that could be investigated. What is important is that using a common framework makes comparative research and accumulation of knowledge possible; this is a much needed possibility in the Small State field and one that has both theoretical and policy implications.

### *3.5.3 Small State and Realism*

The final question of this section concerns the relationship of Small State studies with the core of the International Relations discipline. How could the above findings and framework be integrated into the main debates in International Relations? In the previous chapter I argued that there is an affinity between the views of Small State scholars and Realism. Yet, in the introduction of this chapter I suggested that the Small State field has been supposed to grow against the dominance of Realism. Actually, many Small State scholars assert (Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006 Ingebritsen, 2006 Katzenstein, 2003) that it was the preponderance of Realism that led to the marginalization of Small State studies. Indeed, Realism with its focus on Great Powers and material capabilities might seem an inappropriate tool for the examination of Small State behaviour. However, in my opinion, such a perspective that is loaded with clichés about Realism does not do justice to the rich tradition of Realism and moreover impedes the integration of Small State findings into the core of the International Relations scholarship, as the links that can be developed between the Small State field and the Realist school of thought are important. Thus, in this chapter I continue to suggest that the integration of Small State studies with Realism is possible, appropriate and mutually beneficial. My view is grounded on three different reasons. First, most Small State scholars accept the main tenets of Realism, namely that material capabilities matter, that is why there are Great Powers and Small Powers, which hold different positions in the system and whose differences attract the interest of Small State scholars; second, the majority of Small State scholars does not contest the core Realist belief that is the competition among Great Powers which shapes the international system in which anarchy and uncertainty prevail. Furthermore, scholars within the Small State field perceive the state as the principal actor in international politics, exactly as Realists too suggest.

Second, although theoretically informed studies in the Small State field are few, there are many among them which subscribe to Realism. Therefore, the links between Small State studies field and Realism are not only implicit but also explicit. For instance, Reiter (1994) suggests that by incorporating learning theory into his analysis his aim is to enrich the existing tradition of Realism. Goetschel (1998) refers to Neoclassical Realism and Constructivism as the two most competent approaches to the analysis of Small States. Moreover, Mouritzen and Wivel (2005) and more recently de Cravalho and Neumann (2015) state that their work is rooted in Neoclassical Realism. Equally, Toje (2010), who looks at the EU through the lens of Small Power, endorses Neoclassical Realism. Archer (2010) advances a Realist explanation with regard to the variations among the responses of small EU member states towards the ESDP. In a similar vein, Chong and Maass (2010: 382) assert that “the starting point of analysis remains the realist reading of power.” Recently, Maass (2014) uses a Structural Realist approach to explain *Small States Survival and Proliferation* and argues that an engagement of Structural Realism with the study of Small States would be mutually beneficial. In his view “a richer and thicker theory that includes the small state may evolve. In particular, the survival rate of small states may shed light on the specific shifts and changes in the state system...” According to Maass, “small states may potentially be the canaries in the coal mine, enabling the early detection of changes in the system.” Thus, it seems that there is much evidence supporting a connection between Small State studies and Realism. However, this relationship needs further investigation. All the above contributions, with the exception of Maass, do not go beyond a statement of their theoretical orientation. Therefore, there is much common ground for both Small State scholars and Realists to explore.

My third point, then, concerns the need for further research on this connection. I strongly support that there is a correspondence, implicit or explicit, between Small State scholars and Realism because findings from Small State studies (Table 3.5) anticipate many of Realism’s assumptions. Indeed, one could counter-argue that the framework that presents the sources of Small State behaviour (Figure 3.1) is too complicated for the parsimonious theory that Structural Realism is. Yet, this sounds like a light-hearted aphorism to Realism. In my view, there are three issues that should be further investigated in order for the relationship of Realism with Small State studies to be explored. The first concerns the “power of the weak”; the second is related to the determinants of Small State power and behaviour; and the third regards the appropriate level of analysis. The crucial question is whether Small State scholars’ views with regard to these three questions converge with Realism’s insights or not.

With regard to the first, there is an assumption among Small State scholars that the behaviour of Small States challenges Realism’s expectations. For instance, in the back cover of the volume that reinvigorated the scholarly debate in the field in the 2000s Ingebristen *et. al.* (2006) note:

Smaller nations have a special place in the international system, with a striking capacity to defy the expectations of most observers and many prominent theories of international relations... The volume is organized around themes such as how and why small states defy expectations of realist approaches to the study of power.

Such premises, though, are not systematically explored; in contrast they are mainly based on underlying presumptions that Realism sees Small Powers as impotent and rejects their ability to act in their interest, which, however, are partially true. Within the Realist camp Small Powers are perceived as inconsequential. Great Powers are those who make decisions that shape the system and impact upon other Powers (Waltz, 1979; Gilpin, 1981; Clark, 1989; Kirshner, 2015). The prevalent view among Realists is that “those states that historically have been called the Great Powers and are known today as the superpowers establish and enforce the basic rules and rights that influence their own behavior and that of the lesser states in the system” (Gilpin, 1981: 30). That is why Waltz (1979) and Gilpin (1981) refer to what in the Small State field is called *Small State* or *Small Power*, as *lesser power*, namely not so great or important, lower in rank. However, the centrality of Great Powers is not contested by the majority of Small State scholars. Yet, in this context a part of Small State Scholars would raise an objection against Realism’s view about the ability of Small powers to influence a Great Power; in other words, against Morgenthau’s view that: “a great power is a state, which is able to have its will against a small state... which in turn is not able to have its will against a great power” (1972: 129-130). Indeed, in the Small State literature there are ample cases that challenge such a belief. After all, if there is a mantra among Small State studies, this is that “ a small state can punch above its weight”. However, none of them suggests that Small Powers are equally powerful with Great Powers or that the former can manage the international system as the latter do. Small powers occasionally manage to “punch above their weight” due to a combination of beneficial external and internal circumstances that they manage to harness. Those exceptional circumstances that permit Small Powers to score diplomatic and, more rarely, military triumphs have triggered the interest of Small State scholars.

However, such an approach is not far from what Waltz (1979: 184) suggests about the strength of lesser powers in a bipolar world: “[W]hen Great Powers are in a stalemate, lesser states acquire an increased freedom of movement. That this phenomenon is now noticeable tells us nothing new about the strength of the weak or the weakness of the strong. Weak states have often found opportunities for maneuver in the interstices of a balance of power.” Based on various analyses within the Small State field that I have presented above, I assume that this is a quote that Small State scholars would find hard to object to. After all, the term “power of the weak” which was introduced to the Small State field by Bjøl (1968) was coined by Wolfers (1962: 111) when he observed that:

There is one familiar phenomenon in international relations that seems to run counter to the suggested relativity of power. It could be called the paradoxical “power of the weak”- vividly demonstrated by the success with which a score of very shaky new states have gained advantage from the world’s superpowers, and especially by the ways in which tiny Cuba and tiny Albania, each on at least one occasion, were able to reject pressures from overwhelmingly powerful close neighbors... The chief reason for this “power of the weak” stems from the relationships among the Great Powers themselves...

Moreover, Wolfers (1962:112) notes that “weak countries as a rule are not lacking coercive power assets of their own.” In his view, such advantage is “the solidarity that usually prevails among the lesser countries and makes all of them sensitive to the “bullying” of one of them.” Moreover, he states that a small power could improve its position if it could credibly threaten a great power that would change its orientation. In this way, he argues, “[T]he United States has added immeasurably to the influence of the many neutralist states that have arisen in the postcolonial era, and even to the influence of some of its allies...” Thus, it seems that Wolfers (1962) and Keohane (1971) are of the same mind on *The Big Influence of Small Allies*. In a similar vein, Morgenthau (1993: 385) warns strong nations of the danger of leaving a weak ally to decide for them. According to him, “[S]ecure in the support of its powerful friend the weak ally can choose the objectives and methods of its foreign policy to suit itself. The powerful nation then finds that it must support interests not its own and that it is unable to compromise on issues that are vital not to itself, but only to its ally.” Such assumptions from the heart of the Realist camp would comfortably fit within the Small State field. Therefore, with regard to the first question it seems that Realists and Small State scholars have more in common than is usually believed.

Yet, the second question concerning the components of a state’s power and the determinants of its behaviour remains unanswered and pressing. Given that Realism prioritizes military and economic power (Carr, 1939; Waltz, 1979; Gilpin, 1981), how a Realist approach would be compatible with Small State studies which *de facto* focus on the immaterial aspects of power. In my view, there are two points that should be clarified with regard to the intangible variables. First, Small State scholars themselves do not argue that military or economic power do not matter and therefore they focus on immaterial sources of power. In contrast, their preoccupation with the importance of intangible factors is due to the recognition of the limitations that Small Powers have to confront because they lack economic and military power. Their aim is to identify the sources of Small Power strength and see how different Small Powers tap them. Second, in contrast to what is commonly believed Realism is not indifferent about intangible aspects of power. Realists take into consideration factors such as history, domestic politics, ideology, perceptions, legitimacy. Kirschner (2015: 160) notes that “[T]o many modern ears this sounds

incongruous because the dominance of structural realism has left the impression that “realists can’t do that.” But classical realists take domestic politics and other such variables seriously.” Indeed, Gilpin (1981) pays attention to history, and also to social, political economic arrangements as conditions that can help or hinder a state to adapt and exploit opportunities. For Gilpin the perceptions of the ruling elites matter. He argues that “[F]oremost among the determinants of these perceptions is the historical experience of the society. What, in particular, have been the consequences for the country from past attempts of its own and others to change the international system, and what lessons has the nation learned about war, aggression, appeasement, etc.?” (p. 51). In this sense, Gilpin (1981) thinks along similar lines with Reiter (1994) who introduced the “shadows of the past” factor in the Small State studies. Moreover, Gilpin asserts that “[T]he character of a society is critical to its response to the opportunities gain made possible by favorable environmental changes and shifts in the international distribution of power” (p. 96); and elsewhere he notes that “a society cannot grow in wealth and power unless its social organization is efficient” to add that “[T]he rise and decline of social classes, the shifting coalitions of domestic interest groups, and secular economic-demographic changes, as well as other developments, can lead to far-ranging changes in the objectives of foreign policy and the capacities of states to pursue foreign-policy goals” (p. 97). In my view such approaches are not far from Ingebritsen’s (2006) argument concerning the special identity of Scandinavia which permitted Scandinavian states and prominent figures to seize opportunities and change the system through acting as norm entrepreneurs; or her earlier work on the impact on organized economic interests upon the choices of different European small states with regard to membership in the EU (Ingebritsen, 1998); while social organization constitutes a central issue for all those Small State scholars who perceive corporatism and unity as necessary components of Small State success (Katzenstein, 1985; Thorhallsson and Kattel 2013; Fioretos, 2013). Of course, Gilpin refers to Great Powers and their ability to provoke changes in the system. However, this is not a reason for Small State studies to object Realism; it is rather an opportunity to complement Great Power and Small Power approaches in order to see how the same components of power work in each case.

Moreover, if in Gilpin (1981) we find some common ground with Small State scholars, Morgenthau ([1948] 1993: 113-165) presents a list of elements of national power that matches well with findings from Small State studies. National character, national morale, the quality of diplomacy, the quality of government, accompanied by geography and other material factors are among the components of national power according to Morgenthau. With regard to national character Morgenthau notes that during the WWI German leaders contemplated American power because they underestimated “the qualities of the American character, such as individual initiative, gift for improvisation, and technical skill, which together with the other material factor and under favorable conditions might more than outweigh the disadvantages of geographical remoteness and of a dilapidated military establishment” (p. 149). In this

sense, one can argue that many Small State scholars and leaders who have emphasized the value of a special “culture pattern”, for instance the “asian values” in the case of Singapore, the innovative culture in the case of Scandinavia or the entrepreneurial culture in the case of Israel, echoed Morgenthau’s words.

In addition to national character, Morgenthau emphasizes national morale, “the degree of determination with which a nation supports the foreign policies of its government in peace and war.” Thus, he reminds us of those Small State scholars who underlined the important role that determination has played to successes of Small States at both diplomatic and military front. Yet, for Morgenthau the quality of society and government. are crucial to national morale. He argues that:

Any segment of population which feels itself permanently deprived of its rights and of full participation in the life of the nation will tend to have a lower national morale, to be less “patriotic” than those who do not suffer from such disabilities. The same is likely to be true of those whose vital aspirations diverge from the permanent policies pursued by the majority or the government. Whenever deep dissensions tear a people apart, the popular support that can be mustered for a foreign policy will always be precarious and will be actually small if the success or failure of the foreign policy has a direct bearing upon the issue of the domestic struggle (p. 152).

Thus, Morgenthau (1948) pays attention to the relationship between society and government and to the role that unity plays in national efforts; as we have seen earlier in this study these are two qualities that are highly valued by Small State scholars too. Interestingly, in this context Morgenthau, who focuses on Great Powers, cites examples coming from Small States. He argues that democratic states have to achieve such high levels of unity “through the free interplay of popular forces, guided by a wise and responsible government”; therefore, their effort is harder than that of the totalitarian states which use only “force, fraud and deification of state.” However, he underlines that “[T]he national morale of Denmark under the German occupation from 1940 to the end of the Second World War and the bravery of the Norwegians against the invading Germans illustrate this point no less strikingly than did the national morale of Germany until the defeat of Stalingrad” (p. 154).

Moreover, Morgenthau stresses the significance of diplomacy. In his view, all the other elements of national power are useless unless there is a diplomacy apparatus of high quality. For Morgenthau “diplomacy is the brains of national power as national morale is its soul” (p. 155). He notes that: “[O]ften in history the Goliath without brains or soul has been smitten and slain by the David who had both.” Without doubt, these words would fit well in any Small State analysis. In this sense, Morgenthau expresses the views of many Small State scholars. The

value of a diplomatic service of high quality was underlined by Fox (1959), and many others subsequently. Last but not least, he also refers to the value of gaining “the support of the public opinion of other nations” (164). Therefore, it seems that Realists take in consideration reputation too. They admit that “[T]he power of a nation,..., depends not only upon the skill of its diplomacy and the strength of its armed forces but also upon the attractiveness for other nations of its political philosophy, political institutions, and political policies”, as Morgenthau put it (p. 165). Of course, Morgenthau has in his mind the Soviet Union and the United States and their efforts to capture “hearts and minds” during the Cold War and sees reputation as complementary. However, he admits that this holds true for other nations too and notes that “[A]n underdeveloped nation that could increase in a spectacular fashion the health, literacy, and standard of living of its people would thereby have achieved a considerable increase in its power in other underdeveloped regions of the world.” If we substitute “underdeveloped” with “Small Power” in this sentence we get an argument that lies at the heart of many Small State studies and refers to Small States as norm entrepreneurs. Hence, the hypothesis that Small State studies share some common ground with Realism is further reconfirmed. What is more, use of Realism’s concepts such as “national character”, “national morale”, “quality of government and society” would have helped Small State scholars to systematize and integrate their knowledge and research into the International Relations discipline.

Last but not least, there remains a question concerning the appropriate level of analysis. For Realists, the behaviour of a Small Power is determined by forces emanating at the international system level. Thus, a Small Power is supposed to lack any control over its fate, and a uniformity in Small State responses to international system challenges is expected. However, the majority of Small State scholars have identified explanations for Small State behaviour at all three levels, as the table 3.5 shows, and expect a variety of responses, each based on a unique set of factors as the figure 3.1 suggests. Scholars who focus only at the international level, the state or the individual level constitute exceptions, not the rule in Small State studies. In other words, Small State scholars seeking explanations accept the preponderance of the international system, but also open the “black box” of the Small State or States under analysis. How can the parsimony of Realism then be compatible with the complexity of Small State studies?

A brief answer would refer to Waltz’s *Man State and War*; where the prominent structural Realist argues that “The third image describes the framework of world politics, but without the first and second images there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy; the first and second images describe the forces in world politics, but without the third it is impossible to assess their importance or predict their results” (1959: 238). A more detailed one, though, would point to the version of Realism that is called Neoclassical Realism. Neoclassical Realists incorporate a triple set of variables to their analyses: the dependent variable, that is a state’s behaviour, the independent, which lies at the international system level, and the intervening

variables that can be found at the domestic level (Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, 2009; Toje and Kunz, 2012). Rose (1998: 146), who coined the term, asserts that:

Its adherents argue that the scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative power capabilities. This is why they are realists. They argue further, however, that the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level. This is why they are neoclassical.

Thus, Neoclassical Realism is compatible with findings from various Small State studies for three reasons: first, because it recognizes that relative power capabilities, such as a state's position in the system, determine its foreign policy; second, because it accepts variables coming from the domestic level and suggests that they mediate the impact of international system pressures; and third because they admit that as unit level variables act like "transmission belts" that transform the influence of structural pressures from state to state, a state's behaviour and its outcomes do not always correspond to the level of this state's material capabilities; therefore, "some powers punch above their weight and others fail to grasp the positions that seems to be theirs for the taking" as Toje and Kunz put it (2012: 5). Therefore, Neoclassical Realism can offer Small State scholars the lens through which they will systematize their knowledge and also new concepts that they can use as tools or sources of inspiration in order to embark on new research. Moreover, Neoclassical Realists also converge with Small State scholars in the variables that they examine at the domestic level: state-society relations, leader perceptions, political system, domestic interpretations of national history (Zakaria, 1998; Ripsman, 2009; Toje and Kunz, 2012). Therefore, Neoclassical Realists can find in Small State studies a vast array of cases that can enrich their knowledge about the ways in which each of the intervening variables operates. Hence, a further engagement of Small State scholars with Neoclassical Realism would be mutually fruitful.

### 3.6 Conclusion

This chapter showed that a plethora of Small State scholars has undertaken the effort to identify the sources of the "power of the weak". Its overall extent does justice to the attention that has been paid to the determinants of Small State behaviour by Small State scholars across time. Yet, this area of Small State studies suffers from malaises that are common in the field: lack of accumulation of knowledge, few comparative studies, shortage of analytical tools and poor dialogue among scholars. As a consequence, confusion is unavoidable. By exploring a wide range of Small State studies from different eras, i.e., Cold War period and post Cold War, and various areas of study, i.e. alliances, international political economy, European studies, international organizations, I have tried to accumulate the existing knowledge and identify

the points of agreement among Small State scholars, thus aiming to bring the different studies together and draw the whole picture of the Small State behaviour determinants. I argued that the factors that impact upon a Small Power’s behaviour can be found in all the three levels of analysis and constitute its power resources (Table 3.6).

**Table 3.6** Level of analysis and power resources framework based on Small State studies

Level of Analysis	International System	State	Individual
Power resources	Type of the system Level of tension in the system. Great Power’s life/power cycle. A state’s position in the international system	Geography, Population, Wealth, Political System, Administration, Reputation-Prestige History	Leadership Organized interests

It is commonly accepted among Small State scholars that international system forces play the primary role among the factors that shape the behaviour of Small Powers. That is why vulnerability is the main attribute of Small Powers given their lack of material resources. Small Powers have narrower margins of action than Great Powers. Yet, the International System creates both challenges and opportunities. Small State scholars concur with each other in the importance that state and individual factors have to the ability of a Small Power to respond to such challenges and opportunities. Moreover, they have underlined the fact that given the lack of material resources, immaterial factors are of great significance to Small Powers. Furthermore, in the vast majority of Small State studies it is evident that all three levels are intertwined, while the different factors interact with each other in various combinations. Therefore, these three attributes: the preponderance of the international system influence, the ways that state and individual factors interact with smallness, and the immaterial nature of Small State assets are the reasons why we should regard Small Powers as distinct from Great Powers. Subsequently, vulnerability, opportunities and influence are of central importance to Small Powers and consequently to Small State studies.

In addition, based on the findings from Small State studies I presented a framework that can be used as a tool for the analysis of previous, present and future Small State choices. The value of this framework is that it can constitute a common base for comparative studies across many different areas of study and across different eras. Moreover, it highlights what Small States have in common and what makes each state unique. The factors that impact upon the behaviour of Small States are common to all of them. However, the set of these factors

and their qualities are unique for each state. Therefore, in order to examine the similarities and differences among the responses of various small states in a given common challenge it suffices to look at the similarities and differences in their sets of power resources. It goes without saying that a framework which permits to explore differences and similarities among Small States across all the three level of analysis is by nature eclectic. Yet, it is one that depicts the complexity of the international relations.

Last but not least, in this chapter I made an effort to integrate findings from Small State studies field into the mainstream International Relations. Following the assumption that a Realist reading of the world is inherent into the Small State concept I explored how the points of convergence of Small State scholars tally with tenets of Realism. Contrary to the broadly accepted argument that Small States behaviour defies Realism's beliefs, I suggest that Small State scholars and prominent Realists have many views in common. I presented how core arguments in the Small State literature coincide with views of structural, classical and neoclassical Realists. Therefore, further research on the Small State and Realism would be mutually beneficial; by using Realism as a theoretical anchor the former can systematize its findings, while by expanding into the Small State studies the latter would become more representative of the reality and the complexity of international relations. The present study has made a modest contribution to this direction.

*I also saw under the sun this example  
of wisdom that greatly impressed me:  
There was once a small city with only  
a few people in it. And a powerful king  
came against it, surrounded it and  
built huge siege works against it.  
Now there lived in that city  
a man poor but wise,  
and he saved the city by his wisdom.  
But nobody remembered that poor man.  
So I said,  
“Wisdom is better than strength.”  
Ecclesiastes 9*

## Chapter 4. The “small but smart” state revisited

### 4.1 Introduction

It must be clear by now that to suggest that size matters in international politics is hardly new and interesting. Equally, it should go without saying that Small Powers form a distinct but not homogeneous group of states, which despite all their differences share in common the fact that they are not Great Powers. Thus, Small Powers have at least to survive and at best to thrive living with the implications of their smallness, that is vulnerability and lack of influence in an international system dominated by one or more Great Powers. Hence, how Small States handle the consequences of the power disparity with which they have to live remains a provocative question within the International Relations discipline.

In the previous chapter, based on a vast amount of Small State literature I focused on the power resources of Small States and I listed the points of convergence among the Small State scholars. The factors that impact upon a Small State’s behaviour are critical as they determine which strategy is the most suitable for it. To draw the whole picture, in this chapter I analyze how Small State literature approaches the strategies that Small Powers follow; in other words I explore the behaviour that Small Powers manifest due to their smallness, according to the existing literature.

To identify Small State behaviour and the ways through which Small Powers pursue their interests has been the primary goal of the Small State studies field. However, an array of questions remains unanswered. Do all Small States behave in a similar way? Do Small State scholars actually agree on how Small States behave? Is really Small Powers behaviour distinct

from that of Great Powers? Does smallness impact upon a state's behaviour? Is the "small but smart state" something more than a cliché? What strategies do Small States follow and what roles do they aspire to play? For all their disagreements Small State scholars agree that there is not a common pattern of Small State behaviour (Hey, 2003; Mouritzen and Wivel, 2005; Verdun, 2013). Indeed, the student of the Small State literature comes across many different and even contradicting views about the nature of the Small State behaviour. Such differences usually have their roots on divergent perceptions of smallness.

There are scholars, especially in the early period of Small State studies, who see Small States from the point of view of Great Powers simply as objects in the international system (Vital, 1967). Threats to the survival of Small States constitute their main concern. Under this view Small Powers cannot play any role in international relations. Therefore, those scholars tend to be pessimists about the ability of Small States' to shape their future. Their position is reflected in Henrikson's (1998:2) view, who referring to Small States suggests that "[T]hey are not the knights, the bishops, or the rooks of international chess –but merely the pawns counting for only "1" each in points. Although they have little inherent strength of their own, they can, sometimes, hold positional advantages. But they have limited range, and can rarely enter into large, complicated, and strategic international power plays."

In contrast to the above group there are optimists who suggest that Small States can play distinctive roles in their region or even in the whole system. This group of scholars identifies smallness with the "power of innocence". According to their views, Small States, due to their special identities and values, have a particular mission to fulfill (Goetschel, 2011). Among them there are usually officials from Small States who wish to raise their countries' prestige and justify their choices to the eyes of others; especially to those of the Great Powers at times of high tension in the international system. They express views like that of the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Nansen who in order to justify the Scandinavian neutrality in a passionate article back in 1918 argued that:

We have chosen to remain neutral and do our best to keep out of this war, believing that thus we may serve humanity... The great duty and mission of the small states now is to keep the peace so far as it lies with them...It is the task of neutrals to keep unbroken the chain of human development...civilization itself demands that some should remain outside the conflict that is now drawing almost the whole world in its vortex. The fact that we Scandinavian nations are small does not prevent us from fulfilling this mission. Small states, in the nature of things cannot be imperialistic... and therefore they have a peculiar mission to seek out and find the new paths that humanity must tread in order to abolish war altogether (9-11).

The third group is populated by those who suggest that smallness is accompanied by both challenges and opportunities, advantages and disadvantages. Their views lie in between the two aforementioned positions. Hence for them the performance of a Small State in its international relations looks like a test of wills and skills. In this context Knudsen (2002:188) notes that: “[W]hat is significant about small states is therefore perhaps not so much that they are weak, or that they are strong in a very peculiar way but that they are so “survivable”, so adaptable”. Although there have been scholars praising Small States’ adaptability and ability to survive and excel for a long time (i.e. Fox, 1959; Katzenstein, 1985), Small States’ resilience and smartness, either as small powers traits or as pursuits, have come to the forefront, especially after the end of the Cold War (Joenniemi, 1998; Cooper and Shaw, 2009; Steinmetz and Wivel, 2010). Due to such a pragmatic and comprehensive approach that this group of scholars takes one could refer to them as pragmatists. Platias (1986:482) successfully depicts what these scholars believe by offering a telling simile “[A] small state is like a bicyclist in a traffic jam: the risks may be higher than those of automobiles and trucks, but there is usually greater opportunity for maneuver. Clever strategies may even get him to his destination more quickly and safely.”

All the above positions can be vindicated by a series of examples, thus possibly they all hold some truth. Usually ideas are byproducts of a specific spatiotemporal context; hence each one’s validity is dependent upon the state and issue-area under examination and also upon the period, the region and the type of the existing international system. However, such views concern more the character of Small States than their actual choices. Yet, with regard to their choices there are also many generalizations in the literature (Hey, 2003; Kouskouvelis, 2013). Hey (2003: 5-6) provides a list of the most common assumptions concerning Small State behaviour. According to her, Small States:

- exhibit a low level of participation in the world affairs
- address a narrow scope of foreign policy issues
- limit their behavior to their immediate geographic arena
- employ diplomatic and economic foreign policy instruments, as opposed to military instruments
- emphasize internationalist principles, international law, and other “morally minded” ideals
- secure multinational agreements and join multinational institutions whenever possible
- choose neutral positions
- rely on superpower for protection, partnerships, and resources
- aim to cooperate and to avoid conflict with others
- spend a disproportionate amount of foreign policy resources on ensuring physical and political security and survival.

However, as Hey herself admits, “even a casual glance at the list reveals two primary flaws. First it is too long to be meaningful, that is, to act as a guide for identifying and predicting how small states will act. Second, and relatedly, it is self-contradicting.” For instance, according to the list Small States would take neutral positions, while at the same time would sought for a superpower’s protection. Yet, it is true that there are numerous examples of Small State behaviour that can reconfirm, each one of the above assumptions separately and many cases that can vindicate the most of them together. Thus, such a list can shed some light on the options available to Small States, but it tells us little about a Small State pattern of behaviour.

Then, in order to explore whether there is a certain Small State pattern of behaviour we should look in detail at specific Small State choices; for instance, whether Small States choose to balance or to bandwagon with regard to alliances constitutes a legitimate question in this context. However, literature suggests that Small States do both and there is no agreement among scholars on which tendency is dominant (Wiberg, 1987; Labs, 1992; Anis, 2015). Similarly, there are various views on which type of alliance is more beneficial for a small state (Rothstein, 1966; Osgood, 1968; Liska 1968; Vayrynen, 1997; Krause and Singer, 2001), as well as on whether it is better for a Small State to remain neutral or to join an alliance. As Wiberg (1987:345), put it, “any solution carries some resemblance to a gamble”. In this context Reiter too (2001:13) notes that “[T]he ambitious demands resulting from the theoretical considerations,..., do not light up a fire in the dark but only demonstrate what is certain in any case: namely, that in the end everything is uncertain.”

Hence, if different Small States, or even the same Small State, make different choices under same or different circumstances what matters, is to explore whether there is a connection between certain factors and choices and see if there is a pattern of behaviour relating to those circumstances; i.e. what choices Small Powers located next to a Great Power make or how Small States having territorial disputes between them behave towards Great Powers. Such an approach would be close to Reiter’s (1994) work on the influence of lessons from the past, that of Mouritzen and Wivel (2005) on the importance of the position of a Small State in the international system; Ingebritsen (1998) should also be added to this list as she connects a state’s behaviour towards European integration to the type of its leading economic sector. Although well researched and well argued, none of these efforts depicts a general pattern of behaviour, though, and possibly none of the above scholars aspired to find one.

Should we then abandon the effort to identify Small State behaviour? I suggest that we should not give up this endeavour; after all Small State behaviour is what Small State scholars want to explore. We have to continue looking for similarities in Small State behaviour, as well as highlight the differences among them. It seems that Small State scholars paid much attention to the latter and less to the former, assuming that different responses imply that

there is not a common pattern of behaviour. Yet, as we saw in the previous chapter, a Small State's behaviour is influenced by a series of factors whose combination is unique for every state. Thus, for different states to respond differently is what we should expect rather than a surprising finding. Therefore, I suggest that the debate over the common pattern of behaviour is structured in a wrong way. It would be more productive, in my view, if the focus has been on the ways in which the implications of smallness impact upon a state's behaviour. To address such a question, though, first it is important for scholars to reach a minimum agreement on what smallness implies and second to investigate in what ways Small Powers' behaviour differs from that of Great Powers. Thus, we should seek for a broader pattern of Small State behaviour; look at what Small States aim at in the international system and how they reach their goals.

We ought to ask, then, if Small Powers behave differently from Great Powers. There is a series of scholars advocating that such a distinction is meaningless (Baehr, 1975; Duval and Thompson, 1980; Wallace, 1998; Carlsnaes, 2007; Lamoreux, 2014). For instance, Wallace (1998:12) notes that "[T]he hypothesis that small states share common interests implies a parallel assumption that large states share different and distinctive interests... But there is little evidence from West European politics over the past 40 years that large states have consistently perceived or pursued common interests." From a different perspective Lamoreux (2014) argues that there is no difference between Small and Large Powers behaviour. He categorizes what he calls repetitive expectations with regard to the difference between the behaviours of Small and Great Powers in four categories, explained below (p. 567):

1. Small states are less secure than large states because of their size (highlighting the exceptional position of small states). Consequently, we should expect small states to act differently from large states.
2. Small states join alliances because they allow them to punch above their weight and allow them to choose their own size. In other words, alliances allow them to act large.
3. Small states are international norm setters/upholders and often occupy the highroad vis-a-vis large states. Again, this allows them to act large.
4. Small states can be more important economically than they are militarily, which explains their importance to alliances and organizations.

Concerning them, Lamoreux's view is that "'small-state expectations' are not unique to Small States, but we can expect any state to act in the same way in the face of perceived threats". Thus, he suggests that Russia and the Baltic states have responded in similar ways to predicaments coming from conflicts between them.

In my view, both analyses, of Wallace and Lamoreux, miss an important point with regard to smallness and its implications. Smallness is not about common interests and what is more it is not the same with greatness. Limited resources, less influence on the system and higher vulnerability are the essential attributes of smallness. Small Powers have a different array of means, more limited than that of Great Powers. Moreover, they also have less room for maneuvering than Great Powers. They also face different challenges and, as we have seen in the previous chapter, power resources interact with smallness in certain ways that in some respects are different from the ways that they are used by Great Powers. Therefore, Great Powers can in some respects act as Small Powers, but Small Powers cannot act as Great Powers and this is a point that at least Lamoreux doesn't seem to take into account.

What is more, to oversee the differences between smallness and greatness is to pretend that we live in a world that asymmetries in power do not matter; where there is not a UNSC in the context of the UN or arrangements among the big three, in various combinations among them, within the EU; a world where there has not existed a Contact Group to manage the crisis in the Balkans or the group of P5+1 to conduct the talks with Iran recently; last but not least, a world where the views of, e.g., Antigua matter equally with those of the US, or the array of interests of Latvia within the EU are the same with those of Germany. Definitely, this is not the world we live in. Therefore, how Small Powers react to conditions created by an inherent to the system coexistence of anarchy and hierarchy and how they handle the asymmetry of power remains a provocative question.

As I argued above, we cannot address such a question if we explore only single choices. We expect that single decisions such as to choose to ally or to remain neutral can be different from state to state or from period to period. What we should explore, then, is whether there are common points, recurrent trends in Small Power behaviour irrespectively of their different choices. To address this question this chapter investigates the Small State literature on three different areas on which Small State scholars have concentrated their research efforts: alliances, international organizations and the European Union.

## 4.2: Towards a Common Pattern of Small State Behaviour

### *4.2.1 Small States as Influence Maximizers: an Uncaptured Pattern of Behaviour*

I argue that there is a common pattern of behaviour, which has gone unnoticed, although many Small State scholars have been concerned with it. I suggest that Small Powers behave as influence maximizers. Influence, as well as power, are much-debated concepts in the International Relations literature (Holsti, 1964; Waltz, 1979; Guzzini, 2005; Schmidt and Juneau, 2012; Reich and Lebow, 2014; Hill, 2016). In the context of this thesis I regard influence not in an abstract way but as the ability of a Small State to "have the desired effect on outcomes in issues it has an

interest in” (Baillie: 1998b). In this sense influence has been a central issue in the Small State studies since the founding study by Fox (1959). For example, Nasra (2011:165) for the purpose of his article defines the influence of Small States “as the correlation between its preferences and the final outcome of EU policies.” Of course influence is important to Great Powers too (Reich and Lebow, 2014; Hill, 2016) and it is possible that they too act as influence maximizers (Schimdt and Juneau, 2012) After all, both Small and Great Powers are optimizers. Yet, as it is clearly stated in this thesis Small Powers and Great Powers have different starting points, different means and different ends. They both have “possession goals” and “milieu goals” (Wolfers, 1962), which, however, are of different amplitude and, what is more important, they are pursued through different strategies. Small Powers are disadvantaged in terms of material power and therefore they are not able to shape developments in the way that Great Powers can do. It goes without saying that a Great Power would exert more influence than it would accept, while a Small Power is expected to be more influenced than influential.

My assumption then is based on four premises. The first is intuitive and it is related to the nature of smallness. Smallness is associated with a deficit of influence; thus it is rational to expect that Small Powers would attempt to increase their influence. Second, influence constitutes a central and recurrent issue in Small State literature, as the Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show. It is worth noting that the greater part of the works in these tables refers to Small States in the EU and International Organizations, revealing in this way that influence is what is at stake for the smaller member-states within these institutions.

**Table 4.1** Small State studies focusing on Influence

Title	Author	Area
The Study of Political Influence in the General Assembly	Keohane, (1967)	International Organizations (IOs)
The Big Influence of Small Allies	Keohane, (1971)	Alliances
Influence Without Power: Small States in European Politics	Hirsch, (1976)	EU
Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy	Risse-Kappen, (1995)	Alliances
A Theory of Small State Influence in the European Union	Baile, (1998)	EU
Between Autonomy and Influence Small States and the European Union	Proceedings from Arena Annual Conference (1999)	EU
Small State Influence Within the EU: The Case of Finland's “Northern Dimension Initiative”	Arter, (2000)	EU

Participation and Influence: Finland, Sweden and the Post-Amsterdam Development of the CFSP.	Ojanen, (2000)	EU
Engineering Influence : The Subtle Power of Small States in the CSCE/OSCE	Mosser, (2001)	IOs
The Influence of Small States on NATO Decision-Making	Honkanen, (2002)	Alliances
The Opportunities and Pitfalls of the Transatlantic Rift for Small States in Europe: Rethinking Assumptions about Power and Influence in International Relations	Browning, (2005)	Alliances
Norm Advocacy: a Small State Strategy to Influence the EU	Björkdahl, (2008)	EU
Small States, Big Influence: The overlooked Nordic Influence on the Civilian ESDP	Jakobsen, (2009)	EU
Small States in Europe : Devising a Strategy for Influence in the European Union	Wivel, (2010)	EU
'Borrowing' Power to Influence International Negotiations: AOSIS in the Climate Change Regime, 1990-1997	Bertzold, (2010)	IOs
Governance in EU foreign policy: Exploring small state influence	Nasra, (2011)	EU
Maximizing Influence in the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty: From Small State Policy to Smart State Strategy	Grøn,Wivel, (2011)	EU
Small states in the UN security council: Means of influence?	Thorhallsson, (2011)	IOs
Size and Influence. How small states influence policy making in multilateral arenas.	Tarp & Hansen, (2013)	IOs

**Table 4.2** Small State Studies discussing influence

<b>Title</b>	<b>Author</b>	<b>Area</b>
Transforming International Regimes: What the Third World Wants and Why	Krasner, (1981)	IOs
Punching above their weight: How small developing states operate in the contemporary diplomatic world	Edis, R. (1991)	IOs
The Foreign and Security Policy Interests of Small States in Today's Europe	Goetschel, (1998)	EU
Gaining Control	Tushhoff (2001)	Alliances
Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia's Role in World Politics	Ingebritsen, (2002)	IR
Thucydides or Kissinger? A Critical Review of Smaller State Diplomacy'	Baldacchino, (2009)	IR
Small States and EU Governance	Bunse, (2009)	EU
Dwarfs in international negotiations: how small states make their voices heard	Panke, (2012a)	IOs
Being small in a big union: punching above their weight? How small states prevailed in the vodka and the pesticides cases?	Panke, (2012c)	EU
Small states in multilateral negotiations. What have we learned?	Panke, (2012b)	IR
The European Union in the G20: what role for small states?	Nasra & Debaere, (2012)	EU
Beyond soft balancing: small states and coalition-building in the ICC and climate negotiations	Deitelhoff & Wallbott, (2012)	IOs

Keeping discourses separate: explaining the non-alignment of climate politics and human rights norms by small island states in United Nations climate negotiations	Wallbott, (2014)	IOs
“Smart” Leadership in a Small State: The Case of Cyprus	Kouskouvelis, (2015b)	IR

Third, the closer we have to a Small State pattern of behaviour is the assumption that Small States act in smart ways in order to achieve their pursuits and optimize their position in the system. To describe these ways apart from the term smartness, Small State scholars have also referred to wisdom (Fox, 1959), intelligence (Katzenstein, 1985), and cleverness (Platias, 1986). Especially, after the end of the Cold War the “small but smart” state idea has been very popular in the Small State field (Joenniemi, 1998; Arter, 2000; Tiilikainen, 2007; Wivel, 2010; Grøn and Wivel, 2011; Kouskouvelis, 2015b). Yet, even though not always explicitly, Small State smartness is associated with influence. Hey (2002: 224) notes about Luxembourg that “[L]ucky to be in Europe and wealthy, but also smart about its choices and skills, Luxembourg has managed to be a regional, even global, player despite its small size.” Arter (2000) examines whether Small States within the EU have become smart in Joenniemi’s terms by exploring their ability to exert influence. Grøn and Wivel (2011) develop the elements of a strategy that would permit small member states to maximize their influence within the EU and interestingly they name it a “smart state strategy”. Furthermore, Kouskouvelis (2015b) makes a direct connection between smartness, at the level of a Small State’s leadership, and influence maximization by identifying the former with the latter. As he puts it: “we should consider as “smart” a capable and decisive leadership that enables the small state to “punch above its weight”, pursue its objectives, and satisfy its interests against those of stronger actors” (p. 93).

Fourth, in addition to the “small but smart state” assumption, scholars also agree on the roles that Small States usually play in the international scene; Small States choose to be experts (Barston, 1973; Rickli, 2008; Thorhallsson, 2012), mediators (Fox, 1965; Mosser, 2001; Shlapentokh, 2014), bridge builders (Baillie, 1998b; Schmidl, 2001; Maes and Verdun, 2005) norm entrepreneurs (Ingebritsen, 2002; Björkdahl, 2008; Tryggestad, 2014), and political entrepreneurs (Bunse, 2009). All these roles are related to Small States’ increasing involvement in regional and world affairs and their visibility. In other words, Small Powers harness opportunities to maximize their influence through undertaking or participating to specific initiatives that allows them to play specific roles and in this way to have an impact greater than their material capabilities permit them to.

All the above four reasons are in favour to the premise that influence constitutes a central issue in the Small State studies and that Small States act as influence maximizers. Moreover, bringing them together reveals a broader pattern of Small State behaviour whose elements are broadly accepted but scattered in the literature. In the context of this study I articulate them as a coherent hypothesis. Therefore, based in the literature I suggest that the “small but smart state”, being aware of its limitations, acts as an influence maximizer. It does so through harnessing opportunities that arise from the international system and unit specific attributes, which permit it to play roles that are compatible with its size while at the same time help it to “punch above its weight”. Hence, smartness is related with influence maximization, opportunities and specific roles, as the ability to match means with ends.

It should be noted that not every Small State acts as a smart state. Yet, there is ample evidence in the literature about the Small but Smart State behaviour and this study makes an effort to put it in a context. Then, it is more accurate to argue that in the literature there is a common pattern of the successful Small State behaviour, taking success as the achievement of desired goals. By looking at the literature in this way this study wishes to pay justice to the great amount of works which focus on influence as a small state goal, contribute to the unpacking of the broadly used but hardly explored concept of smartness and finally help in further conceptualizing the roles that Small Powers use to undertake. To this aim in the following part of this chapter I investigate the Small State literature concerning alliances, international organizations and european integration and look for the elements of the Small but Smart State pattern of behaviour that permits Small States to maximize their influence. Then, I will discuss the findings by highlighting the common point of departure among Small State scholars, articulating the “Small but Smart State” strategy elements and making an effort to integrate them into the International Relations theory.

#### *4.2.2 Small States in Alliances*

Alliance is a core concept of International Relations, but also one that lacks clarity, as again there is no consensus among scholars on one and single definition (Keohane, 1969; Krause and Singer, 2001). Among many definitions which do not make a clear distinction among alliance, coalition, defence pact, and alignment a working one is articulated in the context of Small State studies, by Bergsmann (2001:36), who critically reviews previous works on alliances and concludes that a concept should be theoretically and practically useful, thus according to him “an alliance shall be defined as an explicit agreement among states in the realm of national security in which the partners promise mutual assistance in the form of a substantial contribution of resources in the case of a certain contingency the arising of which is uncertain.”

The choice to join an alliance or not is central to the strategy of every state. It suffices to focus on the four elements of the above definition: a) “explicit agreement among states”, b) “realm of national security”, c) “substantial contribution of resources”, d) “promise mutual assistance” and to the fact that all are set in a context of uncertainty, to understand that such a choice containing the purpose of collective security and collective defence is critical for every state’s security and survival. Especially for Small States the decision to join an alliance or remain neutral instead, is of vital importance as their autonomy, security and survival are more vulnerable than those of the Great Powers, and their resources are much more limited. Therefore, margins for errors are narrow and the dilemmas are appalling. Then, it is not surprising that much of Small State literature, especially in its early years, during the Cold War, has focused on alliances (Amstrup, 1976). According to Lindell and Persson (1986:85), “[O]ne of the most frequently discussed questions in the literature on small states, and in the studies of the special phenomenon of small state influence is whether non-alignment or alliance membership is the most advantageous strategy.” In this context, scholars have been concerned with the reasons and the conditions under which Small Powers engage in alliances; the challenges, costs and benefits of such a choice and their allocation among the major and minor members of the alliance; the factors that determine who allies with whom; the types of alliance that Small States tend to form; the ability of Small States to serve their own security and other interests within an alliance and even at cases to become an integral part of it. However, there is not much common ground among the different views.

To begin with, there is no agreement among scholars on the type of alliance that the Small States tend to choose and also on the exact reasons that explain their choice to align over staying neutral. Wiberg (1987:343) suggests that Small States have five different options and their policies “lie close to one of the following ideal types, or some combination thereof: 1) [B]ilateral alliance with a major power, 2) alliance of two or several Small States, 3) membership of a multilateral alliance around one or more major powers 4) non-alignment aiming at neutrality in any war, 5) non-alignment without any generalized commitment to neutrality” But as always happens when reality comes in grips with concepts, the latter fall more or less short. Wiberg admits that “whereas it would seem that this typology exhausts all logical possibilities, it may be more important to note that we find several different varieties of each type.”

It also remains unclear which one among the above options would be the optimum one for a Small State to choose; for example in interwar Europe one can find all types of alliance policy, but no evidence of which one would better guarantee Small States interests (Wiberg, 1987). If one looks in cases where Small States adopted neutrality, they would find that Sweden indeed stayed out of WWII, but Finland was attacked and occupied. Similarly, results diverged when a Small State allied with a major power; Albania, for example, was entrapped by Italy, while Czechoslovakia was abandoned by France.

With regard to the type of alliances Rothstein (1966) suggests that the optimum option is related to perceptions of threat. If the threat is perceived as imminent, then a bilateral alliance with a Great Power is preferable because in this case the former can hold the latter accountable. In this context, Rothstein (1996) argues that, although in a multilateral alliance the commitment is diluted, this form of alliance offers to a Small Power more opportunities for leverage. Concerning alliances consisting of Small Powers only, Rothstein (1966) writing in a period when political victories have been of much importance downplays their military weakness and praises their political strength. Another option is that of a mixed alliance comprised of Small States and what is called 'secondary powers' (Osgood, 1968; Liska 1968). According to Liska (1968:29), who has in mind the cases of Japan with the Republic of Korea and also of British and French ties with Africa, "to an increasing number of less developed countries, selectively disengaged ex-metropolitan powers may be more efficient and more tolerable great-power allies in the search for post-independence stability than superpowers without colonial antecedents, as long as the ex-metropoles retain the capacity and will for instant but limited re-engagement". After the end of Cold War too, scholars suggest that multilateral alliances have constituted the optimum option to safeguard Small States security, as they may increase Small State security but leave some room for predictability and flexibility too (Vayrynen, 1997; Krause and Singer, 2001).

Yet this is not the only categorization of and debate on Small Powers' alliance options. The issue of the optimum choice between balancing and bandwagoning has also been debated among Small State scholars. Most of Small State scholars argue that Small Powers tend to bandwagon with the more powerful or the winning side (Fox, 1959; Rothstein, 1967; Handel, 1985; Mouritzen and Wivel, 2005). Labs (1992), however, contests this view suggesting that historical evidence does not support the premise that bandwagoning is the prevalent choice. Contrary to the conventional wisdom then Labs deemphasizes bandwagoning and proposes an alternative ranking of Small Power choices (Table 4.3). Yet, Labs' hypothesis has not been tested further.

The view that Small Powers prefer to bandwagon, was also challenged later by Gvalia et al (2013), El Anis (2015) and Lobell et al (2015). In addition, Van Staden (1995) offers a more complex view on Small State choices by arguing that the Netherlands strongly supported US leadership in the transatlantic alliance not for balancing against the Soviet threat but in order to achieve balance at regional level. In this sense the Dutch made use of the alliance to secure their immediate interests, while Van Staden suggested that after the Cold War in the then future Netherlands would bandwagon with its more powerful European partner, i.e. Germany. Thus, in order to understand Small Power choices with regard to alliances' regional considerations and the state of the international system should be taken into account in tandem.

**Table 4.3** Ranking of Small State Alliance Preferences according to conventional wisdom and Labs

	Ranking of Small Powers preferences according to the conventional wisdom	Ranking of Small Powers preferences according to Labs
1	Nonalignment	Nonalignment
2	Bandwagon with the threatening state	Balance with a protecting Great Power for a free-ride
3	Balance with a protecting Great Power for a free-ride	Balance with a protecting Great Power and fight
4	Balance with a protecting Great Power and fight	Seek an alliance of weak states
5	Seek an alliance of weak states	Fight alone
6	Fight alone	Bandwagon with the threatening state

For all their differences Small State scholars agree that although non-alignment is desirable, autonomous response to threats is not a sound option. Vital (1967), Rothstein (1966), Osgood (1968) and Liska (1968) agree that the costs of independence are high and rising and thus non-alignment cannot be a viable alternative to alliance formation. Although Vital (1967) does not accept alliance as an effective policy and strategy, because according to him it is not possible that two states can appreciate their national interests identically, as they are not alike, he admits that an alliance can be acceptable only in times of war. Therefore, he warns that to maintain an alliance beyond the point where the interests of the involved states diverge can be disastrous for those members that have to make the major concessions, arguably for the minor powers. Thus, for Vital the decision of a small state to join an alliance is a ‘mixed bag’; “a price must be paid for protection and insurance” involving sacrifice of autonomy, in terms of resources and loss of freedom for political maneuvering. After the end of Cold War, Small State scholars reconfirmed the view that “autonomy is counterproductive” (Rickli, 2008; Honkanen, 2002) and Small States should strike a balance between sovereignty and integration in multilateral institutions (Vayrynen, 1997).

Moreover, there is a consensus among Small State scholars on the dangers that Small States face within an alliance. In the case of a bilateral, and even a multilateral, alliance with a Great Power, given the implications of power disparity and uncertainty that reign in the anarchic international system, a Small Power should take into account the fact that it is possible to be dominated by its major ally which would act as an hegemon within the alliance, when at the same time the security of the minor power would be threatened by one or more Great Powers from the opposite camp. What is more, it remains unknown if its Great Power ally would come

to rescue in case of a serious threat. As Platias (1986:26) puts it: “[W]hether a great power will honor its commitment to a small state will be known when the test comes, but then may be too late”. It is obvious then that a minor power cannot count on absolute security guarantees. At the same time, it might find itself dragged into a conflict in which it has not an immediate interest or to make undesirable concessions (Honkanen, 2002). Thus, when they are to decide to join an alliance Small Powers face a severe challenge, which is conceptualized as one of “abandonment or entrapment” (Platias, 1986; Gartner, 2001).

It is obvious that in such an unequal relationship the weaker part should be concerned not only with the external dangers, but also with internal threats coming from its own great power ally who acts in an imperialistic way. The Warsaw Treaty Organization was conceived as such a case and was labeled “Al Capone alliance”. Under such circumstances, Keohane (2006:66 [1969]) suggests that:

remaining a faithful ally protects one not against the mythical outside threat but rather against the great-power ally itself, just as, by paying “protection money” to Capone’s gang in Chicago, businessmen protected themselves not against other gangs, but against Capone’s own thugs. What happened in August 1968 to Czechoslovakia is not so different from what would have happened to a recalcitrant Chicago bootlegger in 1920.

To sum up the above views, Small State scholars agree that Small States join alliances in order to safeguard their survival, as they cannot provide for their security alone. Yet there is not a certain type of alliance that is preferable or optimum. It depends on the options available, regional considerations, the Small State under consideration and the state of the international system. Moreover, they recognize a clear distinction between Great Powers and Small Powers, as the former are power and security suppliers and the latter power and security consumers, or in other words free riders. Yet, this is a relationship of interdependence since both parts have their goals, apart from security (Suhrke, 1973; Van Staden, 1995).

For all their differences Small State Scholars also agree that alliances serve the interests of Small States in other areas beyond security. Rothstein (1966) argues that: “from the point of view of Small Powers, alliances have increasingly become instruments designed to achieve nonmilitary goals”. Indeed, there is empirical evidence that trade among allies is increased (Gowa and Mansfield, 1993; Gowa, 1994) and also that Small States tend to join an alliance in order to protect their security but also to achieve non-military objectives, such as trade privileges, support for domestic regimes, increase of prestige, financial aid (Nuechterlein, 1969; De Raeymaeker, 1974; Van Staden, 1995; Krause and Singer, 2001; Gartner, 2001; Honkanen, 2002). Alliances also have a political, symbolic dimension, which cannot be satisfied without the participation of Small Powers (Suhrke, 1973). Different Small States or even the same Small

State at different times have different motives for joining an alliance (Wiebes and Zeeman, 1993). In any case, though, participation in an alliance enables an array of challenges and opportunities.

The crucial question then is how Small States respond to this mixture of challenges and opportunities given the asymmetry of power. Although it is expected that power differentials would benefit the stronger part in the alliance, asymmetry of power has many times proved itself beneficial for the weaker part. In this context influence, the ability to achieve desired results is critical. According to Lindell and Persson (1986: 86), “[S]everal observers speak of how membership in a military alliance may enhance the small states’ possibilities of exercising influence...”. Keohane (1971:181) notes that “[F]rom a small power’s viewpoint the search for influence is sensible, indeed almost essential.” Suhrke (1973) looks at the relative bargaining positions of large and smaller allies and suggests that regarding this asymmetrical relationship “tyranny” and “gratuity” are two sides of the same coin. As he puts it (p. 508):

What is described as tyranny of the weak may simultaneously be viewed as a gratuity extended by the larger power to its smaller client. Rather than a tyranny, it is the logic and values of the policies of the larger power that permit the smaller state to influence the alliance in its favor. These views partly reflect different perspectives -what appears to the large power to be tyranny may well be seen as a limited gratuity by the smaller state- but both represent a *reductio ad absurdum* of the bargaining that takes place in most alliances between small and large power.

Handel (1985:171) also suggests that “[I]n order to enhance their strength and improve their position vis-a-vis other states, the weak states must rely on external sources of strength.” In addition, Van Staden (1995:35) asserts that “[T]hrough alliances it was contended small nations obtain access to consultations among major powers, and opportunities may arise for these nations to increase their political clout by gaining support of major powers”.

There is ample evidence in the literature that reconfirms that Small States make use of their participation in an alliance in order to secure and advance their interests, in ways that are beyond simply responding to imminent security threats. Keohane, (1971) shows how Small allies exploited US weaknesses in the fragile Cold War environment in order to service their interests. Van Staden, (1995:36) argues that “[N]ot only have alliances been used by larger nations to restrain the behaviour of minor states, smaller allies have also used alliances to manipulate larger partners and to extract payoffs from them.” In this context he suggests Netherlands drew on US power in order to secure its regional interests. Risse-Kappen (1995) explores the transatlantic relationship during the Cold War and finds that the Western European allies, as well as Canada, were exerting a disproportionate amount of influence to the US foreign policy. According to Risse-Kappen, what offered smaller allies this opportunity was the NATO

framework. Tuschhoff, (2001) also explains how Germany in the '50s and '60s used the NATO framework in order to optimize its position vis-a-vis more powerful allies. Honkanen (2002) examines the cases of Denmark, Norway, Hungary and Czech Republic with regard to NATO and suggests that "[W]hile NATO membership used to be about national security, it is now about the country's influence and position in the European Politics." In a similar vein, Dörfer (1997:93) suggested that "NATO membership is the lingua franca of European security policy. If you do not speak it, people will not hear you".

In this context, it seems that Small Powers pursue two different kinds of aims; first, they try to secure specific gains and their immediate interests and, second, they seek to have a seat at the decisions table in order to upload their views and shape their immediate and broader environment. There are a series of characteristic cases. Although Honkanen (2002) admits that the NATO agenda is dominated by the US and the bigger member states, she asserts that the two Nordic members, Denmark and Norway, have successfully maintained an ambivalent position towards the alliance during the Cold War, influenced the organization's agenda; while at times Denmark even tried to shape it, as in the case of the Baltic enlargement and the PFP program, too where the Danish played a key role. Another telling example is the support of thirteen post-communist governments to the American position on Iraq in 2003. Fawn (2006) notes that central eastern European states followed the US as they expected to receive pay offs, such as economic benefits or inclusion to the Visa Waiver Program. In addition, he states that FYROM, despite its limited contribution, joined the coalition with a very specific goal: that the US would adopt the name that the country has chosen for itself. Moreover, Wivel (2013) suggests that Denmark's active foreign policy within NATO and with regard to international military operations is not motivated by security concerns but rather by an aspiration to play a greater role and advance its liberal views. Therefore, Small Powers in alliances pursue both "possession" and "milieu goals".

Small State scholars have been concerned mainly with the ways through which Small Powers try to achieve these goals. In the previous chapter I analyzed how Small Powers exploit opportunities arising through the competition among the Great Powers in the system and also through their special characteristics. In addition, Small State scholars suggest that by playing the role of the "loyal ally" or the "unsatisfied ally" Small Powers manage to exercise leverage and get concessions from the Great Power part (Keohane, 1971; Suhrke, 1973; Van Staden, 1995). Furthermore, Small Powers have played the card of values and ideology; during the Cold War America's preoccupation with the communist danger made it vulnerable to the demands of a series of smaller allies (Keohane, 1971; Van Staden, 1995; Karsh, 1997). Later, it was crucial for the ex Warsaw Pact member states to join a club of democracies; it was an existential goal which coincided with the need of the then West to expand its influence in Eastern Europe (Krause-Singer, 2001; Honkanen, 2002). Furthermore, Small States may extract aid from Great

Powers by threatening them with collapse out of weakness (Keohane, 1971; Suhrke, 1973; Van Staden 1995). Strong leadership, capable personnel in key positions, active participation, coalitions with other small states and diplomatic skills play also an important role (Keohane, 1971; Honkanen, 2002).

Yet, most Small State scholars agree on the importance of two elements: geography and specialization matter in alliances. The strategic importance of Small State's location determines the challenges that it will face and the available opportunities. Thus, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Turkey, Philippines being indispensable allies to the US during the Cold War due to their position, have had a special treatment and achieved to influence NATO's or US policies (Honkanen, 2002; Tuschhoff, 2001; Ingimundarson, 2003; Keohane, 1971; Van Staden, 1995). Of course, geography is an important factor but cannot help alone. Wriggins (1975) analyzing the negotiations between Malta and Great Britain/NATO shows that it is the combination of various factors such as the state of international system, leadership skills, domestic unity that is critical to the success of a Small State. Thus, Small State strategy choices and power resources are interrelated.

In addition, specialization, having an expertise, helps Small Powers make a difference and punch above their weight. Honkanen (2002) suggests that "[A]fter the Cold War, NATO's widened agenda has given small states a possibility to find new "niches" of influence and new roles to play within the Alliance." Thus, Denmark has been a bridge builder between NATO and the Baltic states (Archer, 1999; Wivel, 2013); and also Hungary and Czech Republic participated actively in the preparation of their neighbours for the NATO enlargement (Honkanen, 2002). Fawn (2006) looking at the participation of central eastern European Small States in the US coalition against Iraq makes a similar argument with regard to Albania and Estonia, whose forces made an effort to excel among the allies and prove their military usefulness. He cites a characteristic example: "US officers praised the troops for finding arms caches and gleaning intelligence while on foot patrols, second nature for Estonian soldiers trained for guerilla warfare" (Carroll, (2005) quoted in Fawn, 2006:469).

In this context, Rickli (2008) makes an interesting contribution. He argues that cooperative strategies are *a sine qua non* for Small Powers after the end of Cold War because "[D]ue to their lack of power small states cannot shape events. They seek to position themselves as advantageously as possible in the system. Not only is autonomous defence option no longer feasible but the adoption of a cooperative strategy imposes difficult military choices" (p. 322). The difficulty that Rickli recognizes is related to the new kind of international operations which require capabilities beyond the means of a Small Power. Therefore, a Small State that wishes to maximize its influence under these circumstances has to play a specialized role, according to Rickli. He suggests that there are two options of specialization appropriate both for states

with high and low ambition to maximize their influence. States can follow a niche strategy by developing an expertise that is in need; for example “Norway has specialized in special operations forces, the Czech Republic in NBC elements, and Lithuania is developing water purification capabilities” (p. 318). A niche strategy, especially when it is much needed, permits a Small State to take part in the decision-making process and exercise leverage upon stronger allies. The other choice is for a Small Power to undertake a more active role by following a “framework or a lead nation strategy.” That said, it is not self-evident that every Small State member of an alliance can follow this strategy. Especially, the ability of the newcomer Small States to contribute to NATO has been contested, as it had been suggested that they do not have the ability to do so (Männik, 2004).

Hence, the above analysis has shown that influence maximization has been a central issue in the literature that focuses on Small States in Alliances. Alliances have, among other things, been “windows of opportunity” for Small States wishing to increase their influence. As Keohane (1971:171) puts it, “America’s search for international influence present its small clients with opportunities to influence the United States.”; and elsewhere “[T]he big influence of small allies is an unplanned but natural result of our globally active foreign policy” (p. 182). The Table 4.4 presents the elements of a strategy through which Small Powers can exercise leverage within an alliance, as they are discussed above. Although the studies refer to different Small States and different types of the international system, it is evident that there is much common ground among the different scholars. It remains to be seen whether studies in the other areas such as International Organizations and the European Union reconfirm these findings and therefore point to a pattern of influence maximization behaviour.

**Table 4.4** Elements of a Small State influence maximizing strategy within an alliance

Keohane (1971)	commitment to anti-communism; strategic location; mutual interdependence; close cooperative ties with powerful elements of the American society; cooperation among Small States; relationships with interested sub-units (army, navy, air-force, CIA); support of organized groups in the US (lobbying), influence domestic opinion; threatening to collapse; being loyal ally; a stance of moderate independence
Suhrke (1973)	being a weak ally; being an unreliable ally; being a contributing ally; credibility; determination; exploit internal dissent within the larger state; bargaining when the stronger ally wish to decrease its commitment
Van Staden (1995)	common political values; being recalcitrant or threatening to not cooperate; latitude in the domestic political situation; credibility; blackmail from weakness; trapping the Great Power in a conflict
Honkanen (2002)	strategic location; domestic pressures and constraints; skillful argumentation; active participation and proposing initiatives; having capable national representatives in NATO bodies, gaining high posts in the NATO bureaucracy, coalition-building, expertise, smallness as a means of influence
Rickli (2008)	cooperative strategy; specialization; niche strategies; framework or a lead nation strategy; cooperation with other Small States

#### *4.2.3 Small States in International Organizations*

When looking at Small State strategies in the international system international cooperation holds a central position. Small States have seen a positive development in the rise of International Organizations mainly for two reasons; first because International Organizations are supposed to provide the opportunity to create rules and bind Great Powers and second because they constitute an arena where Small States can defend and promote their interests. As Coufoudakis (1975:293) notes with regard to Greece, “[T]he fundamental reason for the participation of Greece in international political organizations must be found in the weakness and small state characteristics...” Although there is a broad agreement among Small State scholars on the importance that Small States place on multilateralism, research on Small States in International Organizations is sporadic and mainly of two kinds: studies are either case studies about a specific country in the UN (Keohane, 1967; Coufoudakis, 1975; Tarp and Hansen, 2013; Tryggestad, 2014) or general reviews of Small States in one or several international organizations (Rappard, 1934; De Russet, 1954; Vandebosch, 1964; Fox, 1965; Krasner, 1981; Edis, 1991; Brunn 1999; Mosser, 2001; Schmidl, 2001; Thorhallsson, 2012; Súilleabháin, 2014). The strategies of Small States in international negotiations have also attracted the interest of a series of scholars more recently (Lee, 2009; Cooper, 2009; Panke, 2012a; 2012b; Jackson, 2012; Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012; Walbott, 2014). The United Nations get the lion’s share of Small State scholars’ interest, but Small States in the League of Nations (Rappard, 1934; Vandebosch, 1964), in WTO (Lee, 2009; Cooper, 2009; Jackson, 2012) and in CSCE/OSCE (Williams, 1992; Mosser, 2001) have also been studied.

The common research agenda and the consensus among the aforementioned studies are unprecedented in the field of Small State research. Their views can be best summarized in Súilleabháin’s words with regard to the UN; Súilleabháin (2014:1) notes that “multilateral platforms like the UN provide small states the opportunity to play a role in global affairs that is disproportionate to their size. Yet, while small states have served as key drafters, negotiators, and thought leaders on a variety of international issues, many nevertheless face challenges in advancing their interests at the UN.” Hence, International Organizations offer Small States a voice, leverage and status, yet they nonetheless remain an element of the international system where hierarchy matters.

Such views have been reflected in the literature from as early as 1934, when Rappard published his study on the Small States in the League of Nations. Later, Vandebosch (1964:309) highlighted the paradox that “[T]he disparity in military strength between the Great Powers and the small states has widened drastically, yet the political power of the latter has increased rather than decreased.” However, he admitted that the position of Great Powers within the International Organizations is stronger. Barston (1973:26), too, admits that the UN and related

institutions “provides the small state with an arena for international contact, the opportunity to express its political views and at times exert disproportionate influence”; but, on the other hand, he also recognizes that “[T]he problem of limited political influence can be seen in the attitudes of the smaller states members of the post-war European economic and security organizations. A common concern has been with the dominance of medium and Great Powers in the collective decision making” (p. 21). Panke (2012b), explores the circumstances under which Small States can “punch above their weight” in international organizations and also argues that equality is only theoretical as Small States face several obstacles due to their limited resources. Hence, what makes Small State behaviour in International Organizations a worthwhile research subject is a combination of, on the one hand, the opportunities that International Organizations provide Small States, and, on the other, the obstacles that they face due to limited resources and asymmetry of power (Keohane, 1967; Panke, 2012a). In this context, Small State scholars have focused on three issues: the implications of disparity of power within International Organizations, the strategies Small States follow and the roles they can play, as well as on the ways Small States handle international negotiations. In all three issues the question of Small State influence is central. In what follows, I am going to analyze how scholars have approached the question of Small State influence with regard to each of the three issues.

International Organizations resemble Orwell’s *Animal Farm*; all members are equal but some are more equal than others. Against this background, Small States’ equal participation in International Organizations and collective decision-making initially was not welcome. The first time that all the independent states, irrespective of their size, took part in an international conference was in the second Hague Peace Conference in 1907. There, Small States approached their involvement in the world affairs with enthusiasm which is reflected in the words of the Chairman of the Argentine delegation: “[W]e may affirm henceforth, that the political equality of states has ceased to be a fiction and that it abides established as an obvious reality” (Vandebosch, 1964: 296). Yet, this view was not universally accepted on the Great Powers side. According to the *London Times*, the Conference was a failure because “[T]he only principle upon which all these powers could be induced to send delegates to it was the legal and diplomatic convention that all sovereign states are equal. For certain purposes the convention is useful, but, on the face of it, it is a fiction and a very absurd fiction at that. Everybody knows that all sovereign States are not equal” (Vandebosch, 1964: 296-297). The picture was not different in the League of Nations. According to Rappard (1934:553), “[T]he problem,..., was to reconcile the principle of the equality of States with the necessity of setting up a body sufficiently strong to carry decisive weight with the world community, while small enough to be capable of executive action.” The solution of a Council with permanent and non-permanent members and the categorization of the member states into Great Powers, Small Powers and an intermediate category comprising two states: Poland and Spain, was

a compromise for all parts involved. "It was also a compromise between law and politics, between juristic theory and tradition and political expediency" as Rappard (1934:557) put it.

Yet, the most important development from then on would be the institutionalization of "organized inequality". Despite their strong views on the principle of equality small member states accepted a compromise as they recognized that they could achieve more through the League of Nations than without it. Rappard (1934: 563-565) notes three reasons that justify the position of Small States. First, "they have everything to gain from the establishment of law and order in the world." Second, "the Small States realized that through the organization of the League they have gained in influence on world affairs much more than they have lost in theoretical equality." Third, "[W]hile deprived of permanent seats on the council they have played an exceptionally important part in supplying international conferences and commissions with presidents and chairmen." However, Vandebosch (1964:300) argues that the structure of the League created a form of "hotel diplomacy", as "[I]mportant decisions were reached by the Great Powers outside of the League system." The League of Nations was dissolved with the two parts, Great Powers and Small, condemning each other for its failure. Yet, the mixture of advantages and disadvantages the League had for Small States would define their behaviour towards and within International Organizations later on.

In the early stage of the UN formation Small States reactions varied. According to Fox (1965: 776), "their expectations or lack of expectations" were determined by "their experience from their participation in the League of Nations along with their differing fates from the WWII." However, she notes that "European States entertained few illusions about the potentialities of the UN and were much more conscious of its limitations." Fox (1965:774) argues that "[T]heir participation followed, for the most part, the model of the "honorable, independent, disinterested small state": sober, responsible, speaking mainly when spoken to, but assiduously seeking out ways to make their voices heard in the alleviation of international conflict." Yet, a series of developments proved beneficial for Small States in the UN. First, the realization from the Great Powers' part that for the actions of the Organization to be legitimate the participation of the lesser powers is a *sine qua non* (Fox, 1965). This is of high importance as the Organization "serves them [the Great Powers] as a mechanism of disembarassment and disentanglement" as Vandebosch (1964:312) puts it. Second, the "one state-one vote" principle in the General Assembly gave Small States a voice and leverage that they never had before, and that made leaders and people from the Great Powers' side to ask for a weighted voting system, as they were worried that Small States would be "back-seat drivers" (De Russet, 1954). Third, systemic developments such as the Cold War and decolonization increased Small State influence in the General Assembly (Maass, 2014). The former made Small States' votes sought after, while the latter increased the number of the Small States in the Assembly and therefore the opportunities for Small State blocs, groups and coalitions to be formed. It is

not by accident that in their research on the reasons why states change their positions in the General Assembly Brazys and Panke (2015) find that “while large and rich states make a small number of purposive vote shifts, poor and aid-recipient states engage in ‘serial shifting’ on the same resolutions, a finding suggestive of vote-buying.”

However, it is broadly accepted in the literature that for all their benefits, the United Nations and the circumstances cannot bridge the influence-gap between Great Powers and Small States for two reasons. First, International Organizations’ politics are not independent from world politics; in other words they reflect power configurations (Keohane, 1967) and other hierarchies (Pouliot; 2016). Second, Small States face severe constraints due to their limited resources. The most important of them, beyond the structural barriers, are that they usually lack information, their missions are small so they cannot handle all the available information, have knowledge and form a position for every issue or/and monitor all the processes (Edis, 1991; Thorhallsson, 2012; Súilleabháin, 2014). Given these predicaments, it is not surprising why influence maximization within International Organizations has been a key issue for Small States themselves and a fascinating research subject for Small State scholars.

The majority of Small State scholars who have occupied themselves with Small States in International Organizations has explored them in a way similar to Fox (1959), who had looked at the neutral Small States in the WWII. Their interest is in the ways that Small States, given the implications of the asymmetry of power, manage to pursue their interests, shape policies and achieve their goals. Thus, it is not surprising that the literature is focused on success stories. Fox (1965) asserts that even though Small States were not totally satisfied with the final form of the United Nations Charter the latter would not be the same without the changes that had been incorporated to meet Small Powers’ demands. The idea that Small States have successfully exploited the opportunities to play a greater systemic role provided by the International Organizations dominates the literature (Fox, 1965; Barston, 1973; Krasner, 1981; Edis, 1991; Mosser, 2001; Thorhallsson, 2012; Súilleabháin, 2014). According to Edis (1991:50) “[T]he classic way small states have found to make an impact internationally in pursuit of their interests has been to participate in multi-lateral organisations, whether regional or international.” Brunn (1999:23) asserts that “[M]ost small states saw the United Nations as an organisation that provided them with a forum to express their views.” Tarp and Hansen, (2013:6) reconfirms that Small powers see multilateralism “as their primary channel of influence on major global issues.” Specifying the advantages that multilateral organizations have for “the smaller kids on the block” Edis (1991:50-52) mentions: “the reassurance of belonging to a bigger “gang”..., an alternative and cut-price means of cultivating bilateral relations..., high-level access to the leaders of major states..., information exchange on a multiplicity of diplomatic issues..., access to sources of funding and technical expertise of all sorts... support of larger groups for issues of particular concern to them.”

Moreover, Mosser (2001:72) advocates that “[I]nternational organizations...allowed smaller and weaker participating states the opportunity to express their views and engage in creative diplomacy in ways hitherto impossible.” In a similar vein, Krasner (1981) argues that third world states tried to minimize the implications of their vulnerability by pursuing international regimes restructuring mostly through International Organizations. As he puts it, developing states “attempted to create new institutional structures or to change new patterns of influence, particularly voting allocations, in existing structures. They have sought to establish international norms. And they have tried to change rules” (p. 126). According to Krasner, many of these attempts have been fruitful and, as he notes, “it is difficult to imagine similar success in the absence of international structures that provided automatic access to developing countries” (p. 143). Krasner underlines that third world countries had not demanded simply to increase their wealth, they rather wanted control over the international regimes, to transform them in ways that would match their interests. Thus, “[B]y using its voting majority in the General Assembly, the South has been able to create new institutions, especially UNCTAD and UNIDO, which represent its interests”. In other words, third world states made an effort to maximize their influence in the international arena and in their endeavour they were supported by the structure and processes of international organizations that the North and especially the US had created.

Krasner refers to a large group of states that coordinated their efforts to achieve a common goal, to make their voice heard; in their case their large number and unity have been critical to their successes. Yet, scholars have also looked at the efforts of a single state to exploit International Organizations in order to promote its interests (Keohane, 1967; Coufoudakis, 1975; Tarp and Hansen, 2013). To highlight the unforeseen dynamics that can be developed within the United Nations General Assembly and the circumstances under which influence can be exerted in the absence of the impact of material power Keohane (1967) focuses on the case of Cyprus and, in particular, on how in the General Assembly’s twentieth session it engineered support from members of the Assembly against the more powerful Turkey. Keohane recognizes that the interactions between the primary players, i.e. the United States and the Soviet Union, and between the primary players and lesser powers were those that were the most important; and he also underlines that “[T]o understand great-power relationships with small states it is necessary not only to investigate the influence of the former over the latter but also the converse...” (p. 228). Keohane admits that General Assembly’s processes, if appropriately exploited by smaller players, can constitute a means for extending influence over the greater players. In addition, Coufoudakis (1975:296-297), who examines Greece in the United Nations, notes that the latter provided Greece with “increased diplomatic options” to conclude that although Greece did not achieve all its goals with regard to the Cyprus Question “with the limited political influence of Greece and the international politics of the period, she would have been unable to achieve as much without the United Nations... Greek diplomacy would

have been deprived of the significant supplementary channels of action that the organization provided it within this instance.”

Yet, Coufoudakis (1975) asserts that the case of Greece, as well as the United Nations’ involvement in peacekeeping and peacemaking in Cyprus (Coufoudakis, 1976), shows the limits of Small State influence on the United Nations and also, with regard to the latter, the limitations of the organisation itself to act without taking in consideration the interests of the greater players within it. Although most of the Small State studies portray the United Nations as an organization which safeguards Small States interests in cases of disputes between Small States or between Great Powers and Small States, its effectiveness is contested (Coufoudakis, 1976); more specifically, in the case of Cyprus United Nations’ involvement has been identified even as an “international relations debacle” (Palley 2005). Therefore, it is worth looking at what kind of goals Small States have achieved within and through International Organizations and how.

The record of Small States achievements in International Organizations reveals that with the appropriate strategy and under certain circumstances Small States can secure their immediate interests and also promote changes and innovations that are beneficial to the lesser powers and their role in the world. Thus, as I have mentioned above Small States in San Francisco managed to import some changes in the United Nations charter (Fox, 1965) and developing states achieved to restructure international regimes (Krasner, 1981). Listing a series of Small States achievements in the United Nations Súilleabháin (2014:7) refers to: the Arms Trade Treaty, the resolution for the security implications of climate change drafted by the Pacific Small Island Developing States; the establishment of an International Criminal Court and the process of negotiating the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Most of the above examples refer to cases in which Small States acted as a group.

Moreover, scholars have also studied cases of a single state that managed to increase its influence within an International Organization, and more usually within the United Nations. For example, Cyprus was able to get a positive for its case outcome against a more powerful Turkey and with no involvement from the Great Powers (Keohane, 1967). In addition, Malta contributed to the reorientation of the International Law of Sea through its initiatives and active participation in the United Nations and the advancement of a then “radically new concept... that of the Common Heritage of Mankind” (Inglott, 1979). Furthermore, Malta skillfully manipulated the consensus rule within the CSCE to incorporate a Mediterranean chapter to the Helsinki Final Act, despite the strong Soviet opposition. In addition, Denmark provides another example of an active and successful Small State in the United Nations. Denmark has tried to exert influence on a series of agendas such as the UN’s Peacebuilding Architecture, the Rule of Law agenda, the post 2015 Goals agenda, environmental affairs, and the fragile states

agenda. Table 4.5 presents some examples of Denmark’s engagement with the UN. Although the cases presented differ in many ways from each other, what they have in common is that they lie at the heart of the Danish foreign policy. As table 4.5 shows, Denmark has attained to “punch above its weight” due to its active, strategic and focused involvement inside and outside the United Nations Security Council, in areas which were important to Danish for economic or security reasons and also where Denmark has a “comparative advantage” (Tarp and Hansen, 2013). Therefore, Small State scholars have explored not only what Small States have achieved through International Organizations but also how they did so. To identify the common characteristics of their strategies is indeed of great importance both in theoretical and policy terms; with regard to the former it is critical to explore if there is a common pattern of behaviour among successful Small States, while with regard to the latter, if such a pattern exists it is useful to see whether it can be articulated as a strategy and followed by other states too.

**Table 4.5** Examples of Denmark’s activity in the UN based on data from Tarp and Hansen, 2013

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Instrument/ Process</b>	<b>Role</b>	<b>Ally/ Partner/ Group</b>	<b>Area</b>
Establishment of UN’s Peacebuilding Architecture	UNSC	Non-permanent member	Tanzania	Security
Facilitate negotiations on the Rule of Law Agenda	High-level Meeting on the Rule of Law	Co-Chair	Mexico/ Deputy Secretary General	Rule of Law
Support for Environmental Issues (Climate Change/ Green Economy)	Rio 2012+20 Negotiations	Co-Leader/ Negotiator	EC-EEAS/ South Korea	Environment
Substantial Funding to the Global Consultations for the post 2015 Development Goals	Global Consultations for the post 2015 Development Goals	Donor	UNDP/ UN Women/ Unicef/ Ghana	Development
Engagement in fragile states agenda/ G7+ Group	International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding	Co-Chairman/ Donor	Timor/ G7+ Group	Fragile States

Exerting influence upon a heterogeneous body of states with often conflicting interests and various goals is a test of wills and skills given that Small States lack material power. Therefore, masterful diplomacy is a *sine qua non* for a Small State success. Looking at Small State studies for the elements that enable Small States to attain their goals in International Organizations we discover a general consensus among Small State scholars. As table 4.6 shows, most studies identify active participation, prioritization, expertise, reputation, alliances, networking, policy innovation, capable personnel in key positions, process exploitation, ability to act as mediators or bridge-builders, as the key elements of an effective Small State strategy in International Organizations.

**Table 4.6** Elements of a Small State influence maximizing strategy within International Organizations

Fox (1965)	expertise, financial and human resources contributions, participation to multinational operations, neutrality
Keohane (1967)	group formation, coalition management, unity, moral authority, exploitation of quasi idealism and universal principles, take advantage of the procedure
Barston (1973)	active foreign policy, mediators, providers of personnel, expertise,
Krasner (1981)	specific content of demands, coalitions, alliances, unity
Edis (1991)	support of larger groups
Mosser (2001)	make use of the consensus procedure, bridge-builders
Thorhallsson (2012)	have political incentives and ambition to adopt an active role in the UN, be able to prioritize, have good knowledge of their chosen issues, ability to take initiatives and diplomatic skills to pursue their initiatives and fulfill their responsibilities, leadership and coalition building, ability to develop a reputation as a norm entrepreneur or norm-setter in its chosen policy field, expertise
Tarp and Hansen (2013)	agile diplomacy, flexibility, exploit the power of the chair, play agenda setting role, participate to missions, specialization, alliances with like-minded countries and/or regional groups, focus, commitment to multilateralism, impartiality, support at home, comprehensive approach, attempt to shape organization's thinking, expertise, support at home, reputation, open, advanced export oriented economy
Súilleabháin (2014)	provide personnel, stimulate innovation, focus, prioritization, investment in missions, skilled and experienced staff, coalitions with like-minded and/or regional partners, networking, build and exploit bilateral relations, reputation
Tryggestad (2014)	support for multilateralism, welfare state, reputation, cooperation with civil society,

Small State Scholars agree that Small States succeed in their battles in international organizations because they pick them very carefully (Tarp and Hansen, 2013; Súilleabháin, 2014). Due to their limited resources Small States cannot handle all the workload and processes within International Organizations. Therefore they focus on the cases that are of great importance to them and prioritize, i.e., the Cyprus issue in the case of Cyprus and Greece or the Law of the Sea in the case of maritime states. They also concentrate their efforts to areas where they can make an important contribution due to their experience and expertise; consider, e.g., Denmark (Tarp and Hansen, 2013; Wivel, 2013) and Norway (Stokke, 2012; Tryggestad, 2014) and their activity in the areas of peacebuilding, peacekeeping or the environment constitute such examples (Ingebritsen, 2002).

In this context two elements are important. The first is expertise. Most scholars agree that having a particular knowledge or experience upon a specific issue constitutes a key comparative advantage; usually expertise provides Small States with the opportunity to play a greater role than their rank predicts, get the attention of major powers, contribute with experts in missions and administration positions and, finally, exert influence upon decisions, agendas and processes. Thorhallsson (2012:149-150) claims that states such as “Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Finland, Belgium, Ireland and Denmark” are often invited to the UNSC due to the fact “that these states’ activities are related to particular knowledge and expertise in certain policy fields.” According to evidence provided by Thorhallsson (2012), between 2000 and 2007 Norway has been invited fifty seven times, and is the most invited among the states mentioned above, while Denmark, the less invited among the countries above, was called twenty five times. Moreover, Fox notes that between 1955 and 1965 Small States had provided “approximately a quarter of the experts carrying out technical assistance programs”.

Beyond expertise, the second element is reputation. It is common ground among Small State scholars that neutrality has constituted an advantage in many cases as it is perceived as impartiality and helps Small Powers to be welcomed as mediators, peacebuilders and peacekeepers; moreover, non-colonial past and commitment to a higher international cause are also elements of a good reputation that permits Small States to play a greater role in International Organizations (Fox, 1965; Mosser, 2001; Schmidl, 2001; Thorhallsson, 2012; Súilleabháin, 2014; Tryggestad, 2014). Furthermore, in order to support their initiatives Small States’ should also provide credentials that they have already be consistent with regard to the respective policy at home or internationally (Ingebritsen, 2002; Tryggestad, 2014).

In addition, bridge-building and mediation have been tasks that Small States, especially the neutrals, have undertaken in several occasions. In a sense, Hambro (1936) suggests that Small States were expected to play such roles even in disagreements between Great Powers in the

League of Nation and this is what made them valuable members of the League. To support his case Hambro refers to an incident that it is worth mentioning:

There was some conflict of opinion between Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay... Mr Banting of Sweden represented his country on the Council, and some question came up before it,..., in connection with which there was a certain French proposal. If the British representative said "Yes" to that proposal it might involve disturbance at home, and if he said "No" it might involve some disturbance between England and France, and so he cabled home and asked to be given some definite instructions. It is told that he received the following answer: "England expects every Swede to do his duty," and Mr Branting did; he at once declared that Sweden could never agree to the proposal, with the result that the British delegate was in the happy position of being able to say that he rather regretted that the question should be settled in a such an off-hand manner, but, since unanimity was required, he felt that it would be a waste of time to continue the discussion.

In a similar vein, Fox, (1965) underlines the mediating role between North and South that Sweden, Denmark and Norway have played. Mosser (2001:75) refers to the fundamental efforts of the neutral and non-aligned states to build bridges between the East and the West in the CSCE by highlighting "their success at keeping the conference alive during the dark days of the late Cold War but also in the day-to-day negotiations on finding consensus on many different issues."

In this context, Thorhallsson (2012:150) claims that "neutrality has benefited the Nordic states in their international work, in particular in Africa, distinguishing them from other active small states, such as the Netherlands, Portugal and Belgium whose intentions will always be tented by the colonial legacy." Similarly, Tryggestad (2014) argues that among others two elements were important to Norway's performance as a norm entrepreneur in the promotion of the Women Peace and Security Agenda and plus precisely in the case of the peacekeeping process in Burundi, which Norway oversaw; first it was Norway's reputation of a neutral state and second its commitment to multilateralism, United Nation's strengthening and the promotion of women's rights in the peace and security agenda that made it an effective norm entrepreneur.

Furthermore, the ability of a state to put forward new ideas and shape other states' thinking constitutes an important asset. Norm entrepreneurship (Ingebritsen, 2002), or thought leadership (Súilleabháin, 2014) is important for two reasons: firstly, it enables Small States to be innovative, constructive and consequently appreciated for their action; and, secondly, it helps them bring in world politics changes that suit their values and interests. Small States champion ideas in areas related to peacebuilding and peacekeeping, environmental issues,

development, and energy, in which they are expected to lead. Usually, Small States advance propositions that nobody else would be eager to suggest, but at the same time no one can reject (Keohane, 1967). In this context Schmidl (2001:85) notes that: “[E]ssentially, the role of smaller or weak states in international politics is limited: they execute rather than formulate policy. However, smaller states can serve important roles as transmitters or in getting processes starting and moving.”

Framing and moral authority are very important elements in this required process of persuasion (Jaschik, 2014). Keohane argues (1967) that Cyprus was able to earn the support of many Third World states because it successfully constructed its arguments around the issue of self-determination. The Cypriot representative in the First Committee made an explicit reference to Africa. “The dedication of the African peoples to true democracy was an example to be proud of and to follow” he said (quoted in Keohane, 1967:229). Furthermore, alliances, groups and networks are important. Small States collaborate with other Small States or Great Powers with which they have shared interests, and/or common ideology, and/or a specific identity.

Alliances with like-minded states, as in the case of the Non-Alignment Movement or the G77, are a valuable tool as they allow Small States to share information and workload with each other while at the same time increasing their number of votes in the decision making processes. Furthermore, participation in regional groups or organizations such as the EU benefits Small States not only through increasing their supporters but also because they usually can rely on such institutions for having a foreign policy on issues that are not among their specific priorities (Keohane, 1967; Edis, 1991; Tarp and Hansen, 2013; Súilleabháin, 2014). Beyond formal or *ad hoc* alliances among states, scholars observe that networking with non-state actors such as NGOs (Tryggestad, 2014) and/or research centers and think tanks (Thorhallsson, 2012; Tarp and Hansen, 2013) can help Small States compensate for their lack of resources, as they acquire the needed knowledge and expertise through their partners. An example of that is Norway’s partnership with civil society organizations in order to promote the Women Peace and Security Agenda (Tryggestad, 2014) and also its careful preparation in “close cooperation with its knowledge institutions, universities, research institutes and non-governmental organizations...” in order to assume its non permanent position in the UNSC (Thorhallsson, 2012:153). Moreover, Jaschik (2014) asserts that in the efforts of Maldives and Tuvalu to set the agenda with regard to the climate change the cooperation with NGOs and the creation of advocacy networks were critical components of their strategies.

Yet, Small States cannot manage anything without capable administration. To staff their missions with skilled personnel is indispensable in the pursuit of their goals (Williams, 1992; Súilleabháin, 2014). Moreover, due to their reputation of impartiality and commitment

to multilateralism Small States often provide personnel for key positions in International Organizations (Fox, 1965; Súilleabháin, 2014); these are general secretaries, secretaries, negotiators or chairmen who can play a mediating role among the different states or group of states but also support the image and the interests of their countries. In addition, Small States seize opportunities that arise through the International Organization procedures (Keohane, 1967; Mosser, 2001; Thorhallsson, 2012; Tarp and Hansen, 2013). Mosser (2001:81) notes that “small states were able to engineer influence in the organization, [CSCE], but not without utilizing the built-in rules and decision-making procedures undergirded by strong norms favoring equality and negotiation over confrontation”. Moreover, membership in the UNSC or other instruments, holding the chair in committees, summits, etc. provide Small States the chance to make their voice heard. Indeed, the study on Denmark in the UN by Tarp and Hansen, (2013) makes evident that Denmark’s initiatives have been developed during periods that Denmark had the “power of the chair”. In a similar vein, Tryggestad (2014:469) notes that “[M]embership in the PBC [Peacebuilding Committee] was also regarded by senior diplomats and the political leadership of Norway’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs as providing an important arena for the exercise of political influence and the promotion of Norwegian policies and interests on a whole set of thematic issues...”. What is more, it is worth noting that this is not a post Cold War trend, an effect of increased Small States freedom of action. Small States have been always seeking such opportunities and were able to capitalize on them. Williams (1992:56) looks at the behaviour of Small States within CSCE during the Cold War and notes that the neutrals have managed to act successfully as mediators on several occasions because “[T]heir role has been consolidated in the CSCE by virtue of their chairmanship of all the informal meetings of delegations”, as he puts it.

Furthermore, contributions are another important tool in Small States’ toolbox; it is imperative that financial support should follow Small States’ actions (Súilleabháin, 2014). Indeed, Tarp and Hansen (2013:18) underline with regard to Denmark that it has “‘put its money where its mouth is’”. Their findings suggest that Denmark’s goal has been “to enhance the system’s advantages with core funding and simultaneously pull and push it in the right direction through earmarked contributions to specific programmes that are at the same time Danish priority areas and in line with the organisations’ mandates and strategic plans”. Moreover, Small States used to contribute personnel in international operations, in order to either exploit a niche or simply to prove that they can be credible members; “...suffering from inferiority syndromes vis-a-vis ‘big brothers’, smaller countries occasionally are tempted to ‘show their mettle’, trying to excel in peace operations...” as Schmidl (2001:86) put it. Again, it is not the end of Cold War that left Small States with ample space to play a role. Small States have found such niches and have been members and even leaders in multinational UN peacebuilding and peacekeeping forces in all around the world since the very early days of the United Nations establishment (Fox, 1965). Schmidl (2001:87-88) even notes that because “[T]

he Cold War often resulted in reduced or limited involvement of the 'Big Five' in peacekeeping missions. Out of this emerged the idea that smaller countries might actually be better peace-keepers."

The above elements of a successful Small Power strategy apply in many areas of concern in International Organizations; they become essential, though, when it comes to the area of negotiations, where financial and human resources are of great importance and therefore the power disparity is critical (Panke 2012a). Panke (2012b), who has looked at several cases of Small States in negotiations, reconfirms the importance of the aforementioned elements as a key to Small States' success. In her account, the essential components of a successful Small State strategy in negotiations are: prioritization, knowledge of the agenda, use of institutional opportunities, serving as chair, coalitions, cooperation with NGOs and the International Organization's specialized agencies and argumentation (legal, moral and normative, technical and scientific). Panke notes that when Small States fail in negotiations it is because of either lack of prioritization or due to a preference to follow bargaining strategies instead of persuasion. Thus, she concludes that "small states are neither *per se* power brokers nor are they *per se* political dwarfs in international negotiations" (Panke, 2012b:396). A series of empirical studies corroborates Panke's list and her position by showing that when it comes to issues that matter to Small States their hands are not tied, yet there is a limit on what they can achieve. To name but a few, Cooper (2009) and Jackson (2012) focus on the Antigua Vs US disputes in the WTO. What makes this case important is that, while US afforded not to comply with the rules, Antigua made every effort to defend its interests and did not hesitate to confront the super-power. However, it was the WTO dispute settlement framework that provided such a "window of opportunity" and enabled Antigua to follow strategies that brought some relative gains and challenged the US interests (Cooper, 2009; Jackson, 2012).

It is worth noting that Antigua's strategy had four characteristics; first it was aggressive; second as Antigua did not have much financial resources to back its efforts, it was financially supported by the gambling industry that was directly affected; third it had legal strength as it was in accordance with the WTO's legal framework; and fourth it aimed at the international public opinion in order to portray Antigua as a defender of the WTO values and victim of the US violations (Cooper, 2009; Jackson, 2012). Another interesting case of Small States in negotiations in the area of trade is the "cotton four" example (Lee, 2009). The WTO enabled Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali to challenge US policy of cotton subsidies. Cotton constitutes an important source of revenue for all the four states which are "the most competitive cotton producers in world trade and enjoy substantial comparative advantage" according to Lee (2009:203). What makes them weak, however, is illuminating about the hierarchy in world trade; "they are more vulnerable, than say the US fluctuations in market prices and ... they cannot block US market price distorting policies." Yet, the four countries exploited the opportunity that was provided

by the WTO decision-making process, cooperated with each other and with NGOs in order to draw on their expertise and gain the attention of the public opinion, tuned their vision with the Organisation's values and finally achieved to influence the Doha talks by showing that "domestic subsidies in cotton is the elephant in the room", as Lee (2009:204) put it.

The establishment of the International Criminal Court constitutes another case of Small State success in negotiations against Great Powers. There were two sides in the negotiations: the like-minded states which were pro an independent ICC, and the members of the United Nations Security Council that wanted the ICC to be bound to the Security Council. According to Deitelhoff and Wallbott (2012), the like-minded states won because they combined their resources, reframed the issue from security to justice, networked and gained expertise from civil society organizations, and reached out to persuade every state involved. A similar strategy was followed by the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) with regard to the climate change but the outcome was not equally successful. Thus, scholars argue that the institutional setting and the nature of the issue matter (Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012; Wallbott, 2014).

To sum up, it is clear that Small States do not see international cooperation as a paradise of justice and equality. For Small States International Organizations are arenas that replicate international politics' inequalities but also provide "windows of opportunity" for those wishing to maximize their influence. Successful Small States are not naive; they are prudent enough to be aware of the implications of power disparity, even in institutions where the equality rule is well established. Therefore, they devise strategies that enable them to "punch above their weight." Small State scholars agree that essential elements of such strategies are: prioritization, cooperative mindset, flexibility, networking with international organizations' agencies and NGOs, moral, legal and technical argumentation, expertise, skilled personnel and innovative thinking.

Thus, Small State scholars have focused on the opportunities for Small States to maximise their influence and the strategies they develop to do so. As these opportunities are *ad hoc*, Small State scholars underline the importance of being alert and flexible and even argue that Small States have a series of comparative advantages to exploit with regard to the international cooperation (Schmidl, 2001; Tarp and Hansen, 2013). Moreover, the above analysis shows that leadership is not a privilege of Great Powers. Under specific circumstances Small States can play significant roles and exert disproportionate to their rank influence. Small States aspire to be agents of peaceful change and it seems that at times they manage to do so.

What is important in this context is to explore the motives of Small States. Is peaceful change an end in itself for Small States? Is simply playing a greater role than they are supposed to play their aim? Are they more altruistic than Great Powers and simply wanting to make good

on International Politics? Although the view that Small States are agents of good has been very popular among Small State officials, and Small States' mission in the world has been evoked on several occasions (Nansen, 1918; Rappard, 1934; Vandebosch, 1964), Ingebritsen (2002:13) advocates that "[W]hile some critics may view the role of norm entrepreneur as strategic action by a small state, this does not discount the effects of Scandinavia's pursuit of different models of interaction, models that structure the choices available to states in international politics." Yet, a series of studies refers to a co-existence of strategic action and peaceful change, which of course, as Ingebritsen argues, does not depreciate Small States contribution in world politics. More precisely, according to the literature the motive behind their behaviour is not simply to bring about changes in the international system, but also to defend and optimize their position in it.

Mosser (2001:75) notes that "[B]ridge-building was not altruistic behavior but rather the best strategy for the NNAs to achieve their stated end of maintaining both their neutrality and their security." Furthermore, with regard to Norway's global activism Stokke (2012:27) suggests that "peace engagement represents a strategic adaptation to a situation where Norway's geo-strategic relevance and leverage has been reduced while there was a widened international space for value diplomacy." Thus, with its activism Norway kills two birds with one stone; As Stokke (2012:27) puts it, Norway promotes "peace as a global public good" and supports "Norway's standing and influence in international relations." In a similar vein, Tryggestad, (2014:477) asserts that "through the exercise of... normative power, small states are able not only to promote and/or reinforce a given issue, but also to reinforce their own standing within the international community of states." In other words, Small States compensate for their smallness by creating value for themselves and for the others.

That said, not every Small State aspires to play a systemic role. The case of Greece as it is examined by Coufoudakis (1975) and Cheila (2005) is illuminating in this case; the former notes that Greece saw in the United Nations an opportunity to internationalize issues of its national interest, while the latter shows that the policy of Greece in the United Nations has followed Greece's pursuits in other areas; for example, when Greece aspired to entry the Eurozone it was very careful not to vote against the preferences of the bigger players in the Union. Hence, what we know about Small States in International Organizations is mainly about the successful and the active Small States that achieved to exert influence upon a specific case. Moreover, we are aware of the strategies that those states have followed. However, we need more case studies focusing on different states in order to portray the whole picture of Small States in International Organizations.

#### *4.2.4 Small States in the European Union*

The history of the European Union is often told from the side of the Great Powers of Europe. The progress or the stagnation of the European integration has been usually understood in relation to the preferences and the initiatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom; it is broadly accepted that the European project proceeded through the conflict and cooperation among them (Moravcsik, 1993; Kouskouvelis, 1995; Voskopoulos, 2008). Indeed, several times the Franco-German cooperation has been the steam engine of the European integration (Heisbourg, 2004). It was the convergence of the Franco-British views that initiated the development of a Common European Security and Defence Policy at Saint Malo; while later Germany, motivated by fears of exclusion, made every effort to formalize the agreement in the EU context during its Presidency (Deighton, 2002). The creation of the Eurozone itself was designed as a project supposed to respond to the German reunification (Maes and Verdun, 2005).

There is no doubt that the big three, Germany, France and the United Kingdom, have shaped the development of the European Union. Recently, it seems that Germany has extended its responsibilities towards the European integration and it is often depicted as a hegemonic power in contemporary Europe. Yet, without the smaller member-states the EU would be different; it would resemble to a closed club of the powerful states, reproducing patterns of behaviour similar to those of the 19th century. As Dennison (2013) put it, "It is always the big states that make the headlines in EU policy making... However,..., the story behind the headline is increasingly the small states". Looking at the contemporary economic crisis, the EU's enlargements, the EU's geography, its troubles and its capabilities, or the lack thereof, its innovative politics and policies, one cannot but agree with Dennison. There is not one single issue, challenge or opportunity that is not related to one or more of the Small EU Member States.

If we look at research questions that have dominated the EU literature such as: what kind of power the EU is (Manners, 2002; Smith, 2005; Stavridis, 2001; 2011); the capabilities-expectations gap (Hill, 1998); the consensus-expectations gap (Toje, 2008); the problems of coherence and consistency (Nuttall, 2005); EU's governance and decision-making after enlargements (Nugent, 2016); the role of the EU in the UN (Hill, 2006); the EU-NATO partnership (Ojanen, 2006) or the transatlantic relationships in general and the EU-US-Russia triangle (Kouskouvelis and Voskopoulos, 2011); the euro-crisis (Thorhallsson and Kirby, 2012); all somehow impact upon the Smaller Member States or even are influenced by them to a certain degree. What is more, it is a matter of numbers: in the EU of twenty-eight member states, the Small State is the typical type of state.

Both the importance of the big three and the implications of the position of Smaller EU Member States are reflected in the literature. However, research on the big three and scholarship on the Smaller Member States are two worlds apart. Scholars who occupy themselves with the Great Powers focus on the responsibilities of the big three, the cooperation or the competition among them and the need for leadership in the EU. For example, in studies concerning the EU's foreign and security policy there are several works on Germany, France and the UK, (Hill, 2006; Giegerich, 2006; Brummer, 2006; Stark, 2006; Algieri et al, 2006; Whitman, 2006). The CFSP's evolution is associated with the so-called *directoire*, and there have been many voices calling for the need of leadership by the big three in the CFSP (Keukeleire, 2001; Crowe, 2003; Grant and Leonard, 2006). In these studies Small Member States are downplayed, if not completely ignored, when they are not perceived as obstacles to a stronger EU foreign policy and/or as ineffective partners (Everts, 2001; Sangiovanni, 2003; Grant and Leonard, 2006). At the same time, there is a great body of literature, which deals with Smaller Member States with regard to these areas. Most of them focus on the ways that Small States employ to influence those policies and their role in the EU's foreign and securities policies as well as with the challenges that these policies pose to them (Table, 4.8). Thus, Small State scholars concentrate on the challenges and opportunities for influence that Smaller States in Europe, EU members and non-members, face in an environment mostly set up by the preferences of the big three.

Apart from the foreign policy and security areas, Small State scholars have also examined the position of the Smaller Member States in relation to: new Treaties and institutional changes (Larsen, 1993; Zbinden, 1998; Galloway, 2002; Bunse, Nicolaidis and Magnette, 2005; Schure and Verdun, 2008; Bunse, 2009; Ojanen, 2009; Grøn and Wivel, 2011); enlargements, with a particular focus initially on the issue of neutrality and the need for adaptation with regard to Austria, Finland and Sweden (Luif, 1995; Gstöhl, 2002; Ferreira-Perreira, 2006; Ojanen, 2008; Wedin, 2008) and later to the Baltic states, mainly with regard to the ESDP and their relationships with the Nordics and Russia (Archer, 1999; Galbreath, 2006; Lamoreaux, and Galbreath, 2008; Männik, 2002; 2008; Miniotaite, 2008; Ozalina, 2008; Pastore, 2013). More recently, the economic crisis and the potential of using the EU as a shelter have also received the attention of Small State scholars (Thorhallsson and Kirby, 2012; Bailes and Thorhallsson, 2013; Verdun, 2013; Jones, 2013; Fioretos, 2013).

**Table 4.7** Studies on the Smaller Member States and the EU's Foreign, Security, Defence Policies

<b>Author</b>	<b>Title</b>
Archer (2008)	New Security issues in Northern Europe: the Nordic and Baltic states and the ESDP
Archer (2010)	Small States and the European Security and Defence Policy
Arter (2000)	Small State Influence Within the EU: The Case of Finland's "Northern Dimension Initiative"
Björkdahl (2008)	Norm Advocacy: a Small State Strategy to Influence the EU
Borcher (2001)	Switzerland and Europe's Security Architecture: The Rocky Road from Isolation to Cooperation
Brummer (2007)	The North and ESDP: The Baltic States, Denmark, Finland and Sweden
Duke (2001)	Small States and European Security
Eide (1996)	Adjustment Strategy of a Non-Member: Norwegian Foreign and Security Policy in the Shadow of the European Union.
Ferreira-Pereira (2006)	Inside the Fence but Outside the Walls-Austria, Finland and Sweden in the Post-Cold War Security Architecture
Graeger (2009)	Inside NATO-Outside the EU Norwegian security and defence policy in the high North'
Jakobsen (2009)	Small States, Big Influence: The overlooked Nordic Influence on the Civilian ESDP
Knutsen (2000)	The Nordic dimension in the evolving european security structure and the role of Norway
Lamoreaux & Galbreath (2008)	The Baltic States as 'Small States': Negotiating the 'East' by Engaging the 'West'
Lee-Ohlsson (2009)	Sweden and development of the European Security and Defence Policy: A Bi - Directional Process of Europeanization
Männik (2002)	EU and the Aspirations of Applicant Small States: Estonia and the Evolving CESDP
Nasra (2011)	Governance in EU foreign policy: Exploring small state influence
Ojanen (2000)	Participation and Influence: Finland, Sweden and the Post-Amsterdam Development of the CFSP
Pastore (2013)	Small New Member States in the EU Foreign Policy: Toward 'Small State Smart Strategy'?
Rottenberger (2010)	Austria and Finland: two European neutrals on their way to and in the ESDP
Wivel (2005)	The Security Challenge of Small EU Member States: Interests, Identity and the Development of the EU as a Security Actor

Looking into how the literature on Small States and the EU has evolved one can identify four underlying assumptions. First, the research of Small State in the EU has followed the course of the European integration. Second, smallness within the EU matters. It is a common point among the different studies that, although the EU is an institution of shared leadership and equality, the size factor has always played a role (Archer and Nugent, 2006). Thus, in the case of the EU, too, we are in front of the familiar pattern where formal equality among the member states co-exists with informal inequality. Small State scholars are interested in the implications of this power disparity. Therefore, research on Small State behaviour in the EU focuses on what the Lilliputians in the Union can attain within and through the EU; and also on the ways through which Smaller Member States respond to the challenges and opportunities that arise from the European integration. Third, there is a special interest in the areas of security and foreign policy. Most scholars agree that the power disparity among the EU member states is greater in these areas (Wallace, 1999; Duke, 2001; Wivel, 2005) and therefore it is in them that Small States are faced with greater challenges and dilemmas of “abandonment or entrapment” (Wivel, 2005); at the same time, though, participation to EU activities in both areas enables Smaller Member States to “have a say” in world affairs and escape from their smallness (Wallace, 1999; Archer, 2010; Bailes and Thorhallsson, 2013). That is why “[S]mall member states have made an important contribution to the ESDP. They have encouraged the EU to take on defence and security tasks and they have been active in the development of this policy, especially its civilian side”, as stated by Archer (2010:58). What is more, the development of a Common European Security and Defence Policy seemed a very promising and simultaneously challenging field of action in the early 2000s and therefore got much scholarly attention (Posen, 2004; Sjursen, 2004; Bellou, 2006; Menon, 2009) which spilled over to the Small State field of study as well. Fourth, against this background, Small State influence constitutes a central issue.

Most Small State scholars agree that the EU is an arena where Small States can, want and try to maximize their influence. From the very beginning of the European integration Hirsch (1976) observes that its story can also be told in the terms of David and Goliath because Small States see their membership in the EU as an opportunity to enhance their role, reject domination by the larger states and manage to increase their leverage, as the cases of Luxembourg and Belgium show. In a similar vein, Wallace (1999) asserts that through their participation in the EU the Smaller Member States aspire to exert influence over their larger neighbours and have a seat at the table when important developments about Europe are discussed; yet he underlines that such an endeavour entails “delicate trade-offs” between influence and autonomy. In addition, Archer and Nugent (2002:6) argue that “examples of small state influence might even be taken as evidence that part of the very rationale of the EC/EU was and is to get away from raw power politics to allow small states an opportunity for action and influence they otherwise would not have if all business was conducted on an inter-state basis”. In this context, Arter (2000:693) asserts that “small EU states with bright

ideas can in the right circumstances exert influence on Union-policy-making". Moreover, Wivel (2010:26) suggests that "[D]espite their weakness in material capabilities, small states may act as policy entrepreneurs and maximise their influence in the European Union by employing a smart state strategy." To this background, Nasra (2011:164) advocates that Small States "may be small in terms of resources but not necessarily small in terms of influence"; while Nasra and Debaere (2012) propose that through the EU Small States are able to advance their interests even in forums such as the G20 where they are excluded because of their size.

A series of case studies reconfirm the above views (Baillie, 1998; Maes and Verdun, 2005; Björkdahl, 2008; Jacobsen, 2008; Nasra and Debaere, 2012). To provide evidence through a series of examples: Ojanen (2000:23) notes that "[P]articipation and influence' has been the motto of Finnish integration policy: one has to participate in order to have influence on decisions that in any case have consequences on oneself." Although Latvia and Finland have many differences from each other, it seems that they share the same rationale with regard to their EU membership. Galbreath (2006:449) states that "[P]ost-enlargement foreign policy strategies overall focus on Latvia's membership of the EU and how to utilize this position to maximize the influence of a small state." From their very early days into the EU Sweden and Finland sought to play an active role and they have proved that exerting influence upon the EU is possible for a Small State, if the latter employs an appropriate strategy. Their initiative for the adoption of the Petersberg Tasks is probably the most successful example of Small State activism within the EU (Björkdahl, 2008; Jacobsen, 2009). Pastore (2013) suggests that even newer member states like Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Malta and Cyprus do not spare efforts in order to upload their geographic considerations with regard to the EU's neighbourhood policy. Moreover, Archer and Nugent (2002:6) underline the contribution of the Benelux countries to the development of the European integration and note that:

small states have been instrumental over the years in promoting many specific issues... Greece has obliged the EU to face the question of Cypriot membership, Portugal has kept East Timor on the agenda and Finland has promoted the Northern Dimension. In respect of "mainstream" policies, Greece, Portugal and Ireland have all been prominent in promoting the EU's structural policies; Ireland has been in the fore of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) discussions, whilst Luxembourg has been an important policy actor in deliberations on financial services.

Therefore, it is evident that Small State scholars share the view that the EU provides an environment where Small States can enhance their position, despite the incontestable preponderance of the big three. The view that Small States attempt to harness their EU membership in order to serve their interests and enhance their position can also be vindicated by studies that look for explanations for Small States' actions or conceptualize the roles that Small States undertake. Thus, Archer (2010:59) argues that Sweden and Finland together with

Austria and Ireland see their participation to the ESDP “as a way of underpinning their view of the world, one which is more institutionalised and sympathetic to the existence of small states.” Moreover, Graeger (2009:9) examining a non-member state, Norway, argues that “Norwegian participation in the ESDP is not coupled to territorial defence, but to its role as a contributor to international operations, and to the idea that the provision of forces could produce influence, based on... a “troops-for-influence” strategy. Furthermore, in clarifying the role of the “policy entrepreneur” with regard to EU’s Council presidency Bunse (2009) sheds some light to the self-interested aspect of the Small States’ action; as she put it: “[T]he policy entrepreneur concept argues that the presidency actively seeks to enhance its influence and circumvent formal constraints. It stresses: the biased nature of the presidency; its informal agenda-setting powers and the strategic dimension of its formal administrative/organisational task...”.

However, Small State scholars also underline that there are limits in what Small States can attain (Wivel and Thorhallsson, 2006; Wallace, 2009; Nasra, 2012). Exerting influence within the EU is a bi-directional process; Small States can be influential, but they are also influenced (Ojanen, 2000; Lee-Ohlsson, 2009). Wivel (2005:408) underlines that in order to benefit from the developments in the EU’s security and defence areas “small states need to accept some inequality in decision-making power, reflecting the inequality in resources provided for operations and risks taken to implement them”. Therefore, EU membership comes with both benefits and costs (Steinmetz and Wivel, 2010; Bailes and Thorhallsson, 2013). Thus, it is a common ground that the Smaller Member States have to act strategically and meticulously follow a series of steps in order to maximize their influence (Maes and Verdun; 2005; Bunse, 2009; Nasra 2012; Nasra and Debaere, 2012), to act as a “small but smart state” in other words (Arter, 2000; Wivel, 2005; 2010; Grøn and Wivel, 2011). Hence, in what follows I am going to elaborate upon the ways that Small EU Member States employ in order to maximize their influence, namely on the elements of the “small but smart state” strategy with regard to the EU.

Actually, the “small but smart state” concept that has been put forward by Joenniemi (1998) has been adopted mainly by those Small State scholars who focus on the EU. Joenniemi suggests that the end of the Cold War created new circumstances under which Small States could be influential and therefore “small could become a synonym for smart”. To support his case he highlights Small States’ flexibility, adaptability and the fact that Small States “having none of the ‘hung ups’ associated with being a large power” (p. 62). Arter (2000) who was the first to elaborate upon Joenniemi’s view offers a richer account of the “small but smart” state concept. According to Arter (2000:269):

small EU Member States will be ‘smart’ (influential) when, firstly, they come up with innovative initiative (product) which crucially is presented as being in the interests

of the Union as a whole; secondly, they are able (in promoting the product) to present themselves as 'honest brokers' above the clash of competing big power factions... and thirdly, they contrive to mould supportive interstate alliances and/or otherwise engage to good effect in the network-building process.

Hence, Arter associates smartness with the maximization of influence and presents as essential elements of a smart strategy, traits such as innovativeness, impartiality, and cooperativeness. Moreover, he stresses that for any initiative to be successful it has to create some value for the whole of the EU as an institution and the rest member states. In this way Arter explains how Finland managed to promote the Northern Dimension Initiative and transform the EU's foreign policy.

In a similar vein, but looking at the security and defence area, Wivel (2005:408) notes that Small EU Member States should not try to bind the three Great Powers but revise their strategies and "maximize influence... by acting as 'smart states', focusing on institutional innovation and flexibility" instead. Beyond the emphasis on innovation, Wivel also stresses the importance of a "small but smart state" for picking the right issues to "fight" for, while seeking for consensus by playing the role of 'honest brokers' and forming workable coalitions. Later, elaborating upon the above "small but smart" strategy elements Wivel (2010:24) notes that "small states may thrive in an institutional environment rewarding innovation" while he supports that "the European Union creates new possibilities for small member states in realising their normative power potential." In this context, Wivel (p. 24-25) emphasizes the need for political substance; which means that a "small but smart state" strategy "must present the solution to a problem recognised by all or most of the relevant actors"; then, he reaffirms the importance of prioritization and finally accentuates Small States' ability to act as mediators because their weakness and limited interests help them to appear as neutral actors. The transition from a conventional strategy that simply aims at binding the big three to a smart one that harnesses Small State weakness constitutes the central issue in the work of Grøn and Wivel (2011), who focus on Small States' options after the Lisbon Treaty. The two authors observe that as the leverage of both the Commission and the rotating presidency has been mitigated, the position of Small States in the EU has become more vulnerable and therefore they should undertake specific roles in order to maximize their influence. Thus, they advance as compatible with a "small but smart state" three strategies: a) the state as lobbyist b) the state as a self-interest mediator and c) the state as a norm entrepreneur. Hence, diplomatic skills and innovative ideas, which lead to the establishment of new policies, play a central role if Small States are to maximize their influence. These are elements that we come across in many different Small State studies that explore Small States behaviour in the EU, although they do not always refer to the "small but smart state" strategy explicitly.

For example, Maes and Verdun (2005), who look for the conditions under which Belgium and the Netherlands managed to exert some influence upon the creation of the EMU, assert that creative and diplomatic proposals matter, while good preparation, credibility and consistency are also necessary for success. It is worth mentioning that both countries had already been pioneers in terms of European cooperation and both had strong, though not coinciding, interests with regard to the creation of a monetary union. Thus, it seems that history and reputation also constitute substantial elements of a “small but smart” strategy.

Yet, exerting influence is an incremental process. In the case of Belgium, there were three faces, according to Maes and Verdun (2005:333): “first... was the development of influential ideas and proposals to shape the debate and set the agenda... second, were contributions as ‘policy entrepreneur’ putting forward concrete proposals to advance European monetary integration. Third, Belgium played a diplomatic role, often contributing to a crucial (Franco-German) consensus on EMU issues.” With regard to Netherlands the two authors stress that “persuasive ideas, compelling demands, consistency and credibility” helped the Dutch to play the role of the “gate-keepers”, “consisting of a continuously trying to accommodate the Germans whilst keeping the other Member States on board” (p. 338).

Although there is a consensus among Small State scholars on the nature of the circumstances that allow Small States to “punch above their weight” they do not always articulate their views in the “same language” or they use concepts that they have subtle differences with each other. Nasra (2011) uses a different terminology to conceptualize the processes that Small States follow in order to maximize their influence. According to him, to succeed in pursuing its interest a Small State should show commitment, have and exploit a network capital, mobilize immaterial resources such as expertise, knowledge, contacts, and proceed with deliberation to advance its ideas and seek for consensus. Nasra uses the efforts of Belgium to influence EU’s policy towards the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to test his arguments. Indeed he shows how the relations of Belgium with other EU member states, EU institutional actors and external actors; its ability to keep the DRC issue in the agenda, provide appropriate information, forge a consensus between UK and France that have had strong disagreements on African issues, and develop innovative arguments as well as an action plan helped Belgians to succeed in persuading their European partners to take action in DRC. Yet, Nasra also underlines that the last Belgian effort in 2008 failed to continue European engagement in DRC due to the opposition of Germany, France and the UK and therefore he highlights the limits of Small State action within the EU.

Nasra's concepts of network capital, i.e. the depth and breadth of a Small State's relations", immaterial resources, i.e. the extent to which actors add value through their expertise and knowledge, and deliberation, i.e. actor's capacity to persuade, deliberate and argue, have also been used later by Nasra and Debaere (2012) who explore the influence of Small States on G20 (p. 4). As Small States are not among the G20 members, the EU constitutes the platform through which they can pursue their goals. However, the EU positions in the G20 are heavily conditioned by the European participants. Thus, their margins for influence are limited and the possibilities to find themselves entrapped, as members of the EU are high. To this background, Nasra and Debaere (2012) assert that if using an appropriate strategy, Small States have not their hand tied and provide a series of examples with regard to Belgium, Sweden, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. In the context of this work it is worth noting the distinction that the two authors make between networks and coalition-building; according to them the former is "less neutral" than the latter, thus "implying a proactive stance of those states involved" (p.4). Hence, the authors underline that a cooperative stance is necessary but not sufficient; Small States should be proactive and exploit the whole depth and breadth of their relationships.

The importance of being active is also highlighted by Panke (2012c), who having examined a series of Small States negotiations in the EU context argues that "active small states can punch above their weight, if they make arguments that fit the nature of the issue and resonate well with prior beliefs of the addresses of the arguments" (p. 329). Interestingly, Panke suggests that it is more important for smaller states to be present and active than for the bigger states because the latter, even when they are absent, they cannot be ignored. However, she notes that active participation is a necessary but not sufficient precondition for success. Panke demonstrates that Small States "can be active and influential actors in day-to-day EU negotiations taking place under the shadow of weighted voting". Yet, prioritization, administrative efficiency, effective moral or technical argumentation and reframing are critical elements of a successful strategy, as the examples of the pesticides and vodka cases reveal.

In addition, most Small State scholars agree that the Council's rotating presidency has been a very powerful and effective tool in the hands of the Small EU Member States that wish to pursue their interests and play special roles in the EU arena and the world (Arter, 2000; Archer and Nugent, 2002; Wivel, 2010, Grøn and Wivel, 2011). Small States during their term of the Presidency exploit the power of the chair and use to extend the EU's agenda towards their interests. The record of several Small States' presidencies is in tandem with the above view (Luther, 1999; Elgström, 2002; Dimitrakopoulos and Passas, 2004). This is why, according to Bunse, bigger states wanted to mitigate the leverage of the rotating presidency. To this background, which is described as the most stark and explicit quarrel in EU bargaining between small and bigger states (Bunse, 2009) and because of the changes that the Lisbon Treaty brought about Bunse (2009) examines in depth how Small States make use of the Presidency and pre-

sents the strategies that have been fruitful. Her views do not differ from the approaches we saw above. Using Belgium, Greece and Finland as case studies Bunse underlines that during their respective terms in Presidency “[A]ll outcomes accommodated presidency interests to a great extent and no compromises brokered were against the presidencies interests” (p.204). Although the level of influence that the three states exerted varies, all three chose to ‘pick their battles’ and concentrate their efforts on dossiers that were of importance to them; thus their priorities reflected national and domestic interests, i.e. Finland advanced e-commerce and Northern Dimension, Belgium promoted postal liberalisation and EU engagement in Africa – despite French and British reactions– and Greece furthered Community Patent and EU’s action with regard to the Western Balkans. Beyond prioritization, appropriate preparation and intensity of interests, Bunse also stresses the efficiency of Small States in facilitating agreements and in introducing new ideas. In the three cases of her study she observes that “[I]n the foreign policy realm presidencies sought policy innovation rather than merely going with the flow of existing agenda.” Such a finding is consistent with the view that Small States make use of the EU’s power in their area or even at the world level in order to escape from their smallness. It is in this context that Bunse introduces the concept of “policy entrepreneurship” with regard to the Small States’ ability to lead, as well as to “initiate policies, mediate, and broker deals.” Hence, Bunse adds the concept of the “policy entrepreneur” to the many other roles that Small States are able to undertake in order to enhance their position.

Looking at the above views (Table 4.9) it is not difficult to reach the conclusion that proactiveness and a cooperative attitude, innovative ideas and expertise that can add value to the EU’s actions, flexibility, prioritization and credibility, are the capacities that help a Small State to seize opportunities and ‘punch above its weight’; hence, to act as a “small but smart state” within the EU context.

However, one cannot escape from realizing that most of the case studies refer to either the Benelux or the two of the Nordics, namely Sweden and Finland. Therefore, there is a need for more case studies exploring how Small States in the South or newer EU member states respond to the challenges of the European integration. Moreover, most of the studies come from an era when the European integration project was flowing without obstacles; looking at today’s Union one cannot but wonder whether the above findings can be reconfirmed. That said, Small State studies have not been ignorant of the difficulties ahead. Thorhallsson and Wivel (2006) had stressed that Small State’s position in the EU is becoming more vulnerable; while even from 1999 Wallace had foretold that “small states within an EU of 20 or more risk marginalization unless they manage to combine- to build sustainable coalitions, to launch joint initiatives” (p. 24). Therefore, one can assume that the more vulnerable Small States in the EU become the smarter they have to act. Hence, further conceptualization and more testing of the “small but smart” state concept is needed in order to better understand the context and

the content of its strategy and whether it can be transferable and adaptable into current and future circumstances.

**Table 4.8** Elements of a Small States influence maximizing strategy in the EU context

Arter, 2000	to undertake innovative initiatives that add value to the EU; to play the role of an “honest broker”; to build alliances; to engage in networks; holding the Council’s presidency
Wivel, 2005; 2010	to focus on institutional innovation; seeking consensus as an “honest broker”; prioritization; to add value; to act as a mediator; holding the Council’s presidency
Maes and Verdun, 2005	good preparation and proposals; policy entrepreneurship; act as a mediator; policy entrepreneurship; credibility; consistency
Bunse 2009	holding the Council’s presidency; policy entrepreneurship; expertise; efficiency
Grøn and Wivel, 2011	lobbying; norm entrepreneurship; to act as a mediator; focus; expertise; forging consensus
Nasra, 2011; Nasra and Debaere, 2012	create and exploit network capital; commitment; seeking consensus actively; expertise; knowledge; contacts; deliberation
Panke, 2012	prioritization; contacts with the stakeholders and NGO; appropriate argumentation (technical or moral); knowledge; re-framing; commitment of resources

4.3 Bridging the Gap: the “small but smart” state reconsidered

In the introduction of this chapter I argued that despite the fact that Small State scholars are unanimous about the lack of a Small State pattern of behaviour, there are increasing signs in the Small State literature indicating the existence of one common pattern of Small State behaviour. I suggested that this is the “small but smart” state behaviour, whose goal is to maximize a Small State’s influence in a given context. Then, I highlighted the central position that influence maximization holds in Small State studies across different areas and showed how different Small State scholars conceptualize the elements of a successful Small State strategy in these areas. In this section I am going to discuss my findings with regard to the three main questions that this thesis addresses: the points of consensus among Small State scholars, the pattern of a Small State behaviour -in a sense the whole chapter constitutes an answer to this second question-, and the relationship between Small State studies and Realism.

4.3.1 Common Points among Small State Scholars

In this context, the unifying element among Small State scholars is not only their interest in the states that are not Great Powers; their preoccupation with Small State research is mainly

stemming from the observation that Small States despite their smallness are able to survive, adapt and achieve their goals; that is to say, they are “so survivable, so adaptable” as Knudsen (2002:188) put it. Small State scholars are interested in identifying the ways in which Small States handle the circumstances of formal equality and informal inequality between Great and Small Powers in the international system. Influence and smallness seem to be the focal points of their analyses. Small State scholars agree that under certain preconditions Small States are able to exert influence and what is more they suggest that Small States, due to their Smallness, are actively engaged in a quest for influence.

Thus, a series of studies, examined in this chapter, shows that the focus of the field has been on the Small State that “punches above its weight.” Moreover, bringing for the first time together findings from three different strands of Small State research, alliances, International Organizations and the European Union, this study reveals that there is a strong consensus among Small State scholars on the components of a successful Small State strategy, although they don’t all of them use the same terminology in their studies. The table 4.10 presents the elements of an influence maximizing Small State strategy as they are conceptualized by different scholars in different Small State areas of study; it reveals that in order to succeed, according to different Small State scholars, Small State needs to dispose: a) a cooperative mindset in order to forge coalitions and networks with other states, institutions and civil society organizations; b) ability to add value through its actions: namely, innovative initiatives and proposals, policy or norms entrepreneurship, mediation, honest brokership, knowledge and expertise, contributions in financial or human resources; c) a reputation of a credible, neutral, non-dangerous, and loyal partner; d) a proper sense of priorities and focus; e) a skill in exploiting procedural opportunities, such as presidencies and/or chairmanships; f) persuasive arguments in technical or moral terms.

In this context, Small State scholars suggest that Small Powers are agents of peaceful change; their aim is to satisfy their interests and enhance their position in the system, despite their smallness. Yet, Small State scholars are not idealists with regard to power. They do stress that Small States’ margins of action, as well as their capabilities, are limited; so they recognize that their ability to exert influence is not simply a matter of diplomatic skills and creativity. It is also conditioned first by structural and secondly by domestic arrangements and leadership. Yet, there are Small States that are surprisingly successful in pursuing their interests despite their inadequacies and that is why Small State scholars find them “smart” (Joenniemi, 1998; Wivel, 2005;2010; Wivel and Grøn, 2011; Tarp and Hansen, 2013), wise (Fox, 1959) intelligent (Katzenstein, 1985), and clever (Platias, 1986). Hence, it is this interplay between structure and agency at the Small State level and Small State successes that have attracted the interest of the Small State scholars and motivated their will to carry out research on the ways in which Small States pursue their interests and maximize their influence. That is possibly why most of the literature focuses on a Small State’s ability and strategy to maximize its influence.


**Table 4.9** Synthesis of elements of an influence maximizing Small State strategy

Element	Alliances	IOs	EU
policy entrepreneurship; norms entrepreneurship; exploiting niches; innovative initiatives and proposals	✓	✓	✓
alliances; coalitions; network capital; lobbying	✓	✓	✓
mediators; honest brokers; bridge-builders	✓	✓	✓
prioritization; focus	✓	✓	✓
reputation; credibility; consistency; loyalty	✓	✓	✓
expertise; knowledge; specialization	✓	✓	✓
appropriate argumentation (moral, technical); exploit community in values or ideology	✓	✓	✓
exploit smallness/weakness	✓	✓	✓
contributions in money or personnel	✓	✓	✓
the power of the Chair		✓	✓
capable personnel in key positions		✓	✓

*4.3.2 The behaviour of the Small State*

The above analysis traces a common pattern of Small State behaviour, the “small but smart” state behaviour. Small States follow specific strategies and play appropriate roles in order to maximize their influence (Table 4.10). According to this pattern, when Small States choose to join an alliance, the EU, or to act in the context of an International Organization their aim is not simply to participate but to enhance their position and advance their interests (Figure, 4.1).

**Figure 4.1** The “Small but Smart State” behaviour: strategies, roles, goal




Hence, to return to the debate I presented in the beginning of this chapter Small States are neither pawns, nor are they missionaries. Their behaviour is closer to Platias’ (1986) simile: Small States have the potential to arrive to their destination sooner acting as “bicyclists”; yet, this chapter shows, as Figure 4.1 presents, that there is more in Small Power’s behaviour than what simply flexibility implies. As stated earlier, Small State scholars in order to conceptualize Small States behaviour have attributed to them qualities such as wisdom, intelligence, cleverness, and smartness. Thus, in this context “the small but smart state” behaviour is worth further investigation.

Smartness in International Relations literature is usually associated with Nye’s “smart power” concept (Nye, 2008), which involves a mixture of hard and soft power instruments and means that are used appropriately with regard to the respective context. However, Small State scholars have taken a different approach; the use of hard power has been out of question for the field, with few exceptions, while the term soft power has been sporadically employed (Chong, 2009; 2010). Among Small State scholars, smartness means different things to different people. As we saw earlier in this chapter, Joenniemi (1998), who introduced the smartness aspect in the field, underlines Small States’ ability to adapt, be influential and not having any of Great Powers’ liabilities. Yet, his account of smartness is brief and mainly suggestive. Joenniemi makes an interesting point that became almost a cliché in the Small State field, but he does not provide any further analysis of it. Later, as we also saw earlier in this chapter, most of Small State studies that focus on smartness make an implicit or explicit association between smartness and influence. Some of them highlight the steps of a “small but smart” state strat-

egy (Arter, 2000; Wivel and Grøn, 2011). Others offer more general views such as that of Wivel (2010) who notes the importance of an environment that encourages innovation and of a strategy that adds value, as preconditions for success. Moreover, most of the studies that refer to smartness focus on the EU context. Only Joenniemi (1998), and Kouskouvelis (2015b) put smartness in a broader perspective of bilateral relations, while Tarp and Hansen (2013) explore the smart ways in which Small States act within the United Nations. Thus, the “small but smart” state remains an important, popular but obscured concept. Its meaning is fluid and dependent upon the context of the analysis. Hence, its usefulness is diminished, as its use cannot capture the strategy of an influence maximizing Small Power at its entirety. Therefore, there is a need for further conceptualization of this strategy.

In order to shed some light on the “small but smart” state behaviour as an influence maximizing Small State strategy I suggest that first we should integrate it with Small State studies beyond the EU. Based on Table 4.10, which shows that the elements of an influence maximizing Small State strategy are common in different areas, we can safely assume that the “small but smart” strategy is followed by Small States in their international relations in the EU context but also beyond it. Then, we should look at smartness through the lens of the Small State studies tradition and compare it with similar terms attributed to Small States such as wisdom (Fox, 1959), intelligence (Katzenstein, 1985), and cleverness (Platias, 1986). It is not hard to observe that what Small State scholars wish to conceptualize by using those terms is the behaviour of the Small State that manages to achieve its goals in a context where Great Powers prevail, the Small State that maximizes its influence against all odds. Therefore, if we combine the two perspectives, “smartness” does not refer simply to influence maximization. It encompasses both means and ends; the ultimate goal and the steps that a Small State should take to reach it. And yet this is not the whole picture, as the efforts that a Small State can undertake are dependent upon its power resources, both material and immaterial, at the individual, state or system level, as they have been presented in the previous chapter. Thus, an analysis of an influence maximizing Small State strategy or, in other words, of the “small but smart” state behaviour should start, as the Figure 4.2 shows, by the opportunities and challenges posed by the international system to the respective Small State and to which that state has to respond. Then, an examination at the unit and individual levels is needed to identify the by definition limited specific power resources that a Small State has at its disposal and the domestic arrangements that can offer advantages or disadvantages. Finally, an investigation of the ways in which a small state choose to combine its means towards its end, the strategies that it follows and the roles that undertakes complete the puzzle of the influence maximizing strategy.

**Figure 4.2** The “Small but Smart State” behaviour: power resources, strategies, roles, goal



Thus, “smartness” in the context of Small State studies refers to an effective use of means to the attainment of a specific end, which is none other than the maximization of influence, as this chapter shows. Of course, influence is not an abstract end in itself; “small but smart” states want to enhance their position in the system and safeguard their specific interests. Yet, to further unpack the “smartness” concept, we should ask how Small States act in general terms, beyond their specific strategies and roles; in other words, to look for the elements that underpin all those strategies and roles.

One important aspect of the “small but smart” state strategy, is that it takes into account the existing power configuration and the implications of power disparity between Great Powers and Small Powers. In other words, it is a strategy based on the fact that Small Powers have fewer resources and less influence than Great Powers; however limitations do not act as deterrents for “small but smart” states that want to promote their interests. Instead there are Small States that even make use of their smallness. Aware of their limitations and of the circumstances they find themselves, they look for the ways that will permit them to “punch above their weight”. Therefore, due to their smallness they undertake initiatives and roles that suit their power resources and are of different nature and scale in comparison with those that Great Powers hold; yet still they manage to pursue and secure their interests. It has become clear from a series of studies presented in this chapter that creativity, flexibility and expertise play a great role in this context (i.e. Schmidl, 2001; Cooper and Shaw, 2009; Rickli, 2008; Wivel and Grøn, 2011; Panke 2012a; 2012b).

Also, both the last two chapters showed that when Small States manage to “punch above their weight” they usually take advantage of an opportunity, whether systemic or institutional. In addition, when the institutional environment permits it Small States create opportunities, as

for example in the case of the incorporation of the Petersberg Tasks in the context of the then European Security and Defence Policy, supported by Sweden and Finland (Björkdahl, 2008; Jacobsen, 2009). To this background, being adaptable, proactive, innovative and persistent has proved of great value for influence maximizing Small States (Arter, 2000; Tiilikainen, 2006; Ricki, 2008; Thorhallsson, 2011). In this context, Small States usually aspire to bring about low scale changes that are in accordance with their interests mainly at their immediate environment and/or related to their expertise. It goes without saying, then, that the “small but smart” state is an agile and proactive state that takes initiatives, as it was evident in the sections about alliances, international organizations and the EU in this chapter. However, what else has become apparent in this chapter is that none of the Small States that succeed in maximizing their influence can afford to go it alone (Rickli, 2008; Panke, 2012a; 2012b; Nasra, 2011; Súilleabháin, 2014). “Small but smart” states capitalize on the resources of other actors, be they Great Powers, other Small States, institutions or NGOs. Moreover, it has been noted many times in this chapter that in order to succeed a Small State’s initiative or contribution should have substance, add some value, make a difference to other partners or in international politics too (Arter, 2000; Wivel, 2010). The actions of the “small but smart” states are, or at least appear, as beneficial not only to them but also to the environment in which they act.

To sum up, then, if a Small State wishes to maximize its influence, to be a “small but smart” state, it should make an effective use of its limited power resources, act upon opportunities, or create them, and cooperate with others in order to serve its interests, bring about change or changes and create value for itself and for others. In this context, creativity, innovativeness, flexibility, adaptability, proactiveness, expertise and a good reputation are necessary qualities. To this background a State can “punch above its weight” through acting as a mediator, an honest broker, a policy or norm entrepreneur, an expert, as Figure 4.2 shows. Hence, the “small but smart” state concept obscures more than it reveals. It is vague and therefore it lacks the analytical value that could help us better understand, theorize about the influence maximizing Small State and develop appropriate policies.

As since Fox (1959) diplomacy is highly acclaimed among Small State scholars, it is worth exploring whether the concept of the skilled diplomat serves us better. Effective diplomacy is essential for a Small State maneuvering among more powerful players. In essence a Small State has no other means than diplomacy to attain its goals. It goes without saying that a state which aspires to be a successful mediator, an honest broker, a policy or norm entrepreneur, a state that systematically builds up its good reputation and cultivates its relationships with other states has to dispose a skilled diplomatic cadre. However, before identifying the “small but smart” state with the diplomatically skillful state a couple of points should be made. First, the notion of the state as a skilled diplomat is equally vague with the “small but smart” state concept. It says nothing about the specificities of smallness, the strategies that

a Small State needs to follow or about the attributes it should have, in order to maximize its influence. It cannot capture the whole strategy of an influence maximizing state. Second, it is not diplomacy alone that makes Small States, smart states. What is more, skillful diplomacy is not an exclusive privilege of Small States. Diplomacy is equally significant to Great Powers. More importantly, Great Powers due to their ample financial and human resources are better equipped than any Small State in the diplomatic arena; for instance they are able to have bigger missions everywhere and better information. Consequently, for a Small State to be competent in the diplomatic arena in order to pursue its interests, it is a necessary but not sufficient requirement. Hence, we should look for a different concept, one that it is able to encompass all that is distinct about the “small but smart” state.

All the tools that International Relations have provided us so far are the vague concept of “smartness” and the more specific roles of: mediator, honest broker, policy entrepreneur, norms entrepreneur, which, although legitimate and useful, give only a partial view of an influence maximizing strategy. So, in order to identify a more comprehensive concept, I suggest that we should turn to another discipline, as International Relations scholars have done before in order to conceptualize their ideas (Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1972; Waltz, 1979; Bell, 2006).

My proposal is that the notion of the entrepreneur as it has been used in the economic theory can prove itself a useful concept for the Small State studies field. Entrepreneurship has gained considerable legitimacy as an academic discipline of its own during the last decades (Lumpkin, 2011), while nowadays it is a major trend intellectually, socially and in the economy. Prominent academics from the entrepreneurship field (Lumpkin, 2011; Sarasvathy and Venkataraman, 2011) have encouraged the engagement of entrepreneurship with other disciplines. Political scientists have also drawn on entrepreneurship premises, and literature in political entrepreneurship is burgeoning (Aflaki, Petridou and Miles, 2015). Miles (2015) recently argued that “FPA [Foreign Policy Analysis] and political entrepreneurship scholars have, in many ways, been addressing similar research puzzles...associated with policy change and continuity, but have simply been using different language (or keys) to open them.” Indeed, in the international Relations context, there are only a few efforts that engage with entrepreneurship, beyond the concept of the “norm entrepreneur” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998); however, each of them holds a different perspective and scope (Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1972; Checkel, 1993; Moravcsik, 1999; Blavoukos Bourantonis, 2012; and Miles, 2015). For most of them the entrepreneurs are individual leaders or practitioners who follow innovative approaches, transform public’s beliefs inside or outside their countries, break with past behaviour or perceptions, provide public goods. So, there is not a coherent body of International Relations literature that engages with the concepts of the entrepreneur and the entrepreneurship theory. Moreover, when studies employ the concept of the entrepreneur, it is rare to analyse choices at the state level. Hence, what makes the concept of the entrepreneur relevant to the Small State studies

field is a question begging for an answer. In order to respond to this question, I am going to draw on analyses of the concept of the entrepreneur, both in the polis and in the market, and show how the essence of the concept tallies with the traits of a “small but smart” state strategy, as it has been articulated in the context of this study.

Although there is a great diversity in the approaches to the concept of the political entrepreneur, Aflaki, Petridou and Miles (2015:1-2) synthesize them to a definition according to which “[A] political entrepreneur is a special kind of actor, embedded in the sociopolitical fabric, who is alert to the emergence of opportunities and acts upon them; he or she amasses coalitions for the purpose of effecting change in a substantive policy sector, political rules or in the provision of public goods.” They associate “[E]ntrepreneurial action in the polis, much like in market entrepreneurship” with creativity, innovation and profit, which in the context of the polis is political profit. The affinities with the traits of the “small but smart” state strategy are already evident. Yet, an exploration of the entrepreneurship literature in the area of business studies makes the similarities between the concept of the “small but smart” state and that of the entrepreneur even more striking and consequently the engagement between Small State studies and entrepreneurship even more promising.

As it happens with the Small State concept, there is not a consensus among the entrepreneurship scholars on one and single definition of the entrepreneur notion (Sarri, Laspita and Patzelt, 2012). However, the main constitutive elements of the entrepreneur are not different from those of the political entrepreneur, namely: opportunity, change, creativity, innovation and value creation. Moreover, scholars have also underlined the role that, among others, autonomy, proactiveness, responsiveness and adaptiveness to challenges posed by the environment and competition play in the entrepreneurial orientation (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). These traits are also prerequisites for the “small but smart” state strategy, as it was noted above. Furthermore, looking through the lens of the market entrepreneurship enables us to incorporate into our analysis competition and asymmetry of resources. In this context, Casson (1982:23) has defined the entrepreneur as “someone who specializes in taking judgmental decisions about the coordination of scarce resources.” Hence, this is another point that the entrepreneur concept shares with that of the “small but smart” state; optimum exploitation of limited resources. Contemporary efforts in the field of the entrepreneurship suggest that we should treat it as something more than a “sub-discipline of economics or management” (Saravathy and Venkataram, 2011:114) and seek to find how it informs life (Lumpkin, 2011). For Saravathy and Venkataram (2011:125), it is a “distinct method of human problem solving that we can categorize as entrepreneurial.” Lumpkin (2011:5) argues that a critical question entrepreneurship scholars have to ask is “how entrepreneurial knowledge can contribute to understanding goal accomplishment and human achievement generally” and “what the impact of acting entrepreneurially has on outcomes outside of business” (p. 7). Therefore,

based on the similarities between the “small but smart” state strategy and the concept of the entrepreneur and inspired by recent research on the entrepreneurship and International Relations fields which call for a broader use of the entrepreneurial knowledge with regard to the purposeful enactment of goals I propose that there is something like an entrepreneurial pattern of behaviour. In other words, “smartness” becomes a synonym for the entrepreneurial in the Small State studies context.

Such an approach holds a series of advantages. It can help us systematize our findings and put some order in the research on the «small but smart» state strategy, which seems to be growing in a haphazard manner. In this context, it should be underlined that, in contrast with what Miles (2015) claims, the language of entrepreneurship is used extensively by Small State scholars. I have already highlighted the central terms that the two fields share in my analysis. In addition, I would add Arter’s (2000:691) view that Small States are smart in the “sense of being enterprising” and that they are also marketing their ideas. Also, Browning (2006:679) argues that what matters nowadays is not so much the relative size of a state but “whether a state is innovative and active.” In addition, Cooper and Shaw (2009:2) note that “[W]hat Small States lack in structural clout they can make up through creative agency.” Furthermore, Rickli (2008) suggests that Small States wishing to play a role in the post Cold War security architecture should exploit relevant niches. These are only a few examples, stated also elsewhere in this thesis, which show that Small State scholars have captured the essence of the entrepreneurial action; yet they have lacked the framework that would allow them to describe, explain and test it in a systematic way.

Thus, by exploiting knowledge gained in the entrepreneurship field we can broaden and deepen our understanding of the successful Small State strategy. The mystery of the “small but smart” state strategy which “punches above its weight” is not a mystery anymore. Influence maximization is the outcome of entrepreneurial action, through which Small States seize opportunities to reshape their environment, respond to systemic changes by adapting their policies, create something of value and serve their interests. Therefore, by looking at Small States which manage to enact changes in their regional or even in the international system level through the lens of the research on entrepreneurship we can comprehend the decisions, the actions and the motivation of the “small but smart” state as a self-interested state. In this context there are plenty of stories that can be retold; to name but a couple I would mention the change in the security policies of the Nordic States after the end of the Cold War and their contribution to the European Security architecture or the more recent cooperation between Cyprus and Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Moreover, the integration of insights from the entrepreneurship research field into the International Relations discipline provides us with new possibilities for research on opportunity, change, value creation, that have been hardly explored before in the context of the International Relations discipline. Furthermore, we will be able to explore not only what accounts for an entrepreneurial strategy in the International Relations context, but also whether it is related with the existence of entrepreneurial action in other social, economic or political domains at the domestic level and in what ways. Last but not least, by demystifying the influence maximizing Small State strategy we can make it available to even more Small States that wish to maximize their influence, as it becomes clear that it is not the privilege of some enlightened states, but the outcome of employing a certain problem solving method, namely entrepreneurial action. Thus, the concept of the entrepreneur contributes to a more comprehensive and thorough understanding of the “small but smart” state strategy and the development of the entrepreneurial framework in this context can be useful to both the researchers of the Small States accomplishment and the policy makers.

#### *4.3.3 Small State and Realism*

It is in this context of the accomplished Small State, where the wisdom of Realism is contested as it is argued that the behaviour of the Small States collides with tenets of Realism. It is somehow assumed that the Small State that makes its own choices and actively pursues its interests, maximizes its influence and plays an active role in international politics in order to provoke desired changes in its immediate environment or even at the international system level proves wrong the Realist school of thought (Ingebritsen et al., 2006; Nasra, 2011). However, such assumptions have not been systematically tested against the core premises of Realism. Moreover, there are neither many works engaging with the Small State behaviour that draw on Grand Theory, nor is there a debate on the Small State behaviour among Scholars from different schools of thought. When Small State scholars state that they rely on a theory, they do look at the Small State choices through the lens of Realism, more often than the stereotypical view assumed about the incompatibility between Small States and Realism (Archer, 2010; Chong and Maas, 2010; de Carvahlo and Neumann, 2015). So, based on the proposals I made in the previous chapters, first that there is a Realist reading in the Small State concept itself and second that Small State studies do not contest the core principles of Realism, in this chapter I am going to explore how my findings about the Small State behaviour stand vis-a-vis the Realist thinking. I recognize that this chapter has discussed the Small State behaviour to the background of the international cooperation and diplomacy, as the vast majority of Small State studies do. Thus, it could be assumed that the findings of this study could constitute a hard test for Realism. Yet, I argue that a closer look on Realism premises and core views in the Small State studies field would fortify the belief that there is some Realist thinking underpinning Small State studies and would suggest that a further engagement with

Realism would be fruitful for the Small State studies field and vice versa. Thus in the following paragraphs I am going to discuss the relationship between the influence maximization as a Small State behaviour and Realism.

It would probably suffice to argue that what has inspired scholars to deal with the Small State behaviour and conceptualize it as smart, wise, intelligent etc is the Realist belief that Great Powers are central to the international system and that Small Powers having limited resources have also limited choices and limited influence upon the system. The counterargument of course would be that it was the success of Small States which came as a surprise to a discipline dominated by the Realist focus on Great Powers, hard power and security that triggered the interest for research on Small States. Although this is absolutely true, it does not defy Realism for two reasons. First, because Realists do not contest the ability of lesser powers to pursue their interests and succeed (Waltz, 1979; Morgenthau, 1948). Second, because Small State behaviour as it is depicted by Small State scholars, does not disprove the preponderance of Great Powers and recognizes the limits to the Small State actions. The vast majority of the Small State studies admits that Small States act in conditions of formal equality and informal inequality, which force them to find smart ways to pursue their interests given their limitations.

For example, both Arter (2000) and Nasra (2011) praise the ability of Small States to promote their initiatives and put into action their ideas in the EU context, though both make clear that what determines the fate of an initiative is how interested Great Powers are in it and in what ways. Their views, then, are close to those of Realists who stress the centrality that Great Powers have even in the EU context (Kouskouvelis, 1995) and argue, for example with regard to the CSDP, that “[W]hen the three most powerful countries in Europe are dissatisfied with the CSDP process, this can only lead to a crisis for legitimacy for the institution itself” (Haine, 2012:201).

From the analysis in this chapter it has become evident that a Small State initiative can thrive as long as it does not contradict the interests of one or more Great Powers. The shortcomings of the UN in the case of Cyprus (Coufoudakis, 1976) is another example which vindicates that although the rise of the International Organizations have provided Small States with arenas where they can defend their interests, the enforcement of their decisions is still at the hands of the Great Powers. The US-Antigua case (Jackson, 2012), also, reveals that International Organizations offer Small States the possibility, when Great Powers lose a case they can afford, not to comply with the decision. So, both the ways that Small States behave and consequently that Small State scholars treated the subject of their behaviour do not challenge the core belief of Realism that International Organizations reflect the interests of the Great Powers (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 1994). Small States’ freedom of action and influence is dependent upon the Great Powers’ will and thus the spirit of Morgenthau’s view (1939) with regard to

Small States' neutrality in the interwar years and their influence within the League of Nations, that it would survive as long as it would be functional for the Great Powers, is still alive and well.

Also, it seems that Small State studies that focus on Small States' behaviour in alliances, have many common points with seminal works in the Realist camp. Small State scholars who have focused on alliances agree that Small States, irrespectively of their choice to balance or bandwagon, look for ways to maximize their influence and enhance their position. According to Small State studies, they usually seek to exploit their membership in an alliance to other ends beyond security while they do not hesitate to threaten the more powerful ally with their collapse or change of camps. Then, it would be hard for Small State scholars not to agree with Walt (1987:157) who argues that "[B]ecause the superpowers are so ready to balance against each other, lesser powers can reap ample rewards by threatening to shift their allegiance. Realists believe that Small States can make their own decisions with regard to alliance choice; Walt (1987:30) suggests that "weak states can be expected to balance when threatened by states with roughly equal capabilities but they will be tempted to bandwagon when threatened by a great power... Of course, excessive confidence in allied support will encourage weak states to free-ride, relying on the efforts of others to provide security. Free-riding is the optimal policy for a weak state, because its efforts will contribute little in any case." However, Snyder and Diesing (1977:421) argue that "[I]f left to their own devices, they will align with the superpower that appears least threatening to their own security or that is most congenial ideologically." Thus, although they do not focus on Small Powers, Realists do share similar concerns and views with the Small State scholars. In this context, it is also useful to turn to Schweller's "bandwagoning for profit" argument. Although Schweller aims his attention to the revisionist state, the essence of his argument is about the tendency of the lesser power to seek for opportunities, even amidst a crisis or maybe especially amidst a crisis and to bandwagon with the more powerful state in order to maximize its gains. Then, it seems that the cases of the Small States from the "New Europe" camp which allied with the US in the War against Terror (Fawn, 2006), more vindicate than defy Realism.

Then, if we conclude that Realism can explain the behaviour of Small States and that many Small State studies are compatible with the Realist school of thought, even when they do not state it, there is a legitimate question that should be answered and it concerns the relationship between the influence maximization as a pattern of behaviour and Realism. As it is assumed that Realists focus on power and power maximization how can we make sense of influence maximization in the context of Realism, if we can? If we look at both structural and classical Realism it is hard to find evidence supportive to our argument. Yet, Neoclassical Realism provides very useful ideas in this context. For Neoclassical Realists maximization of influence constitutes the dominant pattern of behaviour (Schmidt and Juneau, 2012).

According to Rose (1998:152) “neoclassical realists assume that states respond to the uncertainties of international anarchy by seeking to control and shape their external environment...” Moreover, when it comes to what is meant by influence maximization there is another coincidence of views between Neoclassical Realists and Small State scholars, as the former argue that influence maximization is about “shaping of outcomes” and “achievement of desired outcomes” (Schmidt and Juneau, 2012:74-75) and thus they are in alignment with the ways in which Small State scholars have perceived influence (Baillie, 1998; Arter, 2000; Nasra, 2011). Of course, for this strand of Realism influence maximization is not unrelated to power. Rose notes that “as their relative power rises states will seek more influence abroad, and as it falls their action and ambition will be scaled back accordingly” (p. 152). Moreover, Neoclassical Realists do not have only Small States in mind. In contrast, their case studies refer mostly to Great Powers. However, their analyses are relevant for Small States too, if we assume, as Neoclassical Realists also do, that by power we do not mean simply material power. In the previous chapter we saw that Small States dispose a variety of power resources at all three levels and they also get or create opportunities to increase their influence. Thus, their strength can be greater than its level of material power presumes, and thus they constitute an interesting object of study as they can enhance our understanding of the relationship between strength and influence maximization and even of the elements of non-material power and influence maximization. Therefore, a further engagement of Small State studies with Neoclassical Realism can be mutually beneficial, as Small State studies can shed some light on what Realism means for lesser powers.

To this background, even Small State smartness can be associated with the Realist school of thought. Jansson(2015) unpacks Nye’s concept of smart power in order to show that it is underpinned by a Realist understanding of world politics and suggests that smartness is a synonym for prudence or better for *phronesis*. In this sense, Jansson argues that smartness is related to good judgement, in other words, it is about “what is the appropriate thing to do in a given context” (p. 11). Thus, well thought out and effective use of a state’s means of power in order to achieve desired goals is an essential element of smartness. Hence, Jansson’s view on smartness through the lens of Realism shares many points with the way in which Small State scholars have employed smartness.

In sum, it seems that even the behaviour of the “small but smart state”, namely the Small State that manages to maximize its influence, the one that has inspired International Relations scholars to look at the behaviour of the Smaller Powers and that has been supposed to defy Realism can be understood and explained through the lens of Realism. It is not only that the Small State concept is underpinned by a Realist reading of International Relations and that Small State scholars do not challenge main principles of Realism but also that when it comes to the core of the Small State field, the Small State behaviour, Realism can enhance

our understanding and moreover Small State scholars share many points with Realists. As in the previous chapters I did not aim at an exhaustive analysis of Realism; rather my goal was to highlight the strong affinities that I have found between Small State Scholarship and the Realist school of thought and my findings are subject to further research. I believe that further engagement between Realism and the Small State research would be mutually beneficial, as the former can contribute a better understanding and further systematization, while the latter offers a different perspective of Realism, a view from the part of the weak. Such a view stresses that Small States, despite their more limited capabilities and limited margins of error can act strategically and pursue their interests by making good judgments on their limitations and opportunities and effective, prudent use of their power resources. In my view, this is a crucial point for the Small State field because it shows that what Small States defy is not the essence of Realism. They would have proved Realism wrong if they had acted as Great Powers, or if they had challenged Great Powers in the domain of high politics, which is not the case. So, what the behaviour and the success of Small States, or better of some Small States, undermine are those views stated in the beginning of this chapter that perceive Small States as pawns or as missionaries; especially with regard the latter view that depicts Small States as exceptional citizens of the international society, which dispose a political vision about a more peaceful world order and hold a higher moral ground, this chapter has revealed that Small States that manage to bring about some change in their immediate environment and promote their interests are all but utopians. They do cooperate with each other but they do also compete for influence and through “do goodism” they seek to get the attention of the more powerful players and seize opportunities to enhance their position (Wohlforth, 2015). Hence, they act as “selfish in a self-help system”, to use Mearsheimer’s terms (1994), but they use different means from those of Great Powers, the means they can, and they prove that such a behaviour pays back.

#### 4.4 Conclusion

This chapter explored whether Small States show a common pattern of behaviour. Small State scholars agree that there is not such a thing like a common pattern of Small State behaviour. However, in my view it would be more accurate if they had argued that there is not a dominant pattern of Small State behaviour when it comes to their choices with regard to alliance or neutrality, the type of the alliance they choose or their decision on issues related to the European integration. Looking for a pattern of behaviour Small State scholars have concentrated on such choices. Yet, as these choices are influenced by a set of systemic and domestic factors whose combination is unique for each state, it should be expected that their choices would vary. What is more in their effort to find a pattern of behaviour under this limited perspective, it seems that Small State scholars have missed a broader pattern of behaviour among Small States.

In this chapter I have argued that there is abundant evidence in the literature of the existence of a common pattern of behaviour, suggesting that Small States act as influence maximizers. I do not suggest that every Small State acts as an influence maximizer, but looking at Small States in alliances, International Organizations and the EU, I contend that those Small States that maximize their influence follow certain strategies and play roles that are common to all of them. Their behaviour has usually been conceptualized in the literature under the vague notion of the “small but smart” state. As smartness in the International Relations literature has taken several meanings and because the analysis in this chapter showed that it cannot encompass all what is distinct about a Small State’s influence maximizing strategy, I suggested that we should look for another concept capable of capturing the whole depth and breadth of this strategy. Therefore, I proposed the incorporation of the concept of the entrepreneur as it is used in the economic theory, into the analysis of the Small State behaviour because there are striking similarities between the constitutive elements of the entrepreneur and those of the “small but smart” state strategy.

In this context, Small States employ an entrepreneurial strategy. The main elements of such a strategy in the International Relations domain are that in a competitive environment which is characterized by anarchy and inequality and where Great Powers are central, Small States acting as entrepreneurs: seize opportunities; make an optimum use of their limited resources in order to accomplish their ends, namely to maximize their influence upon the issues that are of interest to them and enhance their position in the system; provoke changes, which usually are of low scale and related to low politics; create something of value in the international politics, a policy, a norm, a condition. Small States following such a strategy are proactive, adaptable, innovative and flexible. The further engagement of Small State scholars with the entrepreneurship would be beneficial and bring in the forefront new issues for research in the International Relations discipline such as the recognition or creation of opportunities, the strategy of engineering change and create value, the co-competition among states.

In sum, this chapter showed that Small States can and do pursue their interests. They are selfish in a self-help system in the way and to a degree that their amount of power permits them to be. It also revealed that for all their differences the Small States that manage to maximize their influence adopt a common pattern of behaviour; they follow an entrepreneurial pattern of behaviour. Moreover, it is evident from this chapter that Small State scholars have more in common than their interest in the states that are not Great Powers. They accept the centrality of the Great Powers in International Politics, the conditions of formal equality and informal inequality and they are especially concerned with the ways that Small States handle the disparity of power between them and the greater players in the system and with the elements of the strategy they follow to maximize their influence. They also agree on which these elements are. Last but not least this chapter bridged the gap between the Small State studies

and Realism by exposing the points of agreement between Small State scholars and Realists. Therefore, the main contribution of this chapter is that it turns our attention to a common pattern of Small State behaviour and it associates it with both Realism and Entrepreneurship, which can enhance our understanding of the International Relations of Small States, assist policy-making in Small States and offer new opportunities for research.

## Chapter 5. Conclusion

In this thesis I collected and “packaged” research that had already been developed but needed synthesizing. My purpose was to systematically review the existing literature on Small States in International Relations and fill the gap in the accumulation of knowledge in the field. In other words, this thesis presents in a systematic way what we know about the Small State in International Relations; and also identifies what we need to know. To this aim, I collected and integrated views developed in independent contributions to the field and I believe that this integration created synergies that add value to the field of the International Relations of Small States.

More specifically with regard to the goal that unites the Small State scholars in the field the thesis suggests that they all share a common starting point. Their aim is to study the state that is not a Great Power; and therefore the state that cannot shape the system, the one, which is a “price-taker” and not a “price-maker”. In this context, the least common denominator among the Small State scholars in the field is that these states are characterized by higher vulnerability and lower influence in comparison to the Great Powers. So, Small State scholars recognize that Small Powers are different from Great Powers and this is what makes them an interesting object of study. The differences in the behaviour between the two groups of states are due to the differences in the amount of their capabilities.

Therefore, the researchers in the field focus on the implications of smallness; on the ways in which Small States handle the disparity of power with which they have to live. So, they look for explanations for the behaviour of the Small States and they have thoroughly investigated their power resources, the “power of the weak”. To this background, Small State scholars have sought for answers at all the three levels of analysis and the vast majority of them admits that the behaviour of Small States can be understood only through a synthesis of explanations from different levels of analysis. Small State scholars are particularly interested in the ability of some Small States to survive, achieve their objectives and “punch above their weight”. Therefore, the question of the influence maximization holds a central position in the field. In this context there is one more point of agreement among Small State scholars. Irrespective of their area of research, they concur with each other in the elements of the Small State influence maximizing strategy.

Yet, the body of literature on Small States in International Relations has been developed and in a degree it is continuing to grow only in one direction, that of the successful Small State, the “small but smart” state. Several studies across the years, irrespective of the area of research or the state of the international system focus on the achievements of the Small State(s) under consideration. Furthermore, the case-studies in this context usually concentrate

on Small States in Northern Europe and only recently scholars have looked in other directions and other continents. Therefore, the scope of the field has been limited; and in order for the field of the International Relations of Small States to increase its legitimacy and value for the discipline, its horizons should be expanded both in terms of the geographic and the issue areas that it explores. This thesis showed that there is no shortage of hypotheses to be tested, in terms of the impact of specific factors at the systemic, the unit or the individual level or in terms of a state's strategy in negotiations, alliances, International Organizations and the EU. What is more, for the field to be comprehensive new studies are needed on a different group of Small States, those that do not achieve to enhance their position in the system. Last but not least the thesis revealed a new gap in the literature which also opens up new opportunities for research: issues of high politics such as the use of hard power or cases of territorial disputes between Small States or between Small States and Great Powers have been examined only by exception.

Having overpassed the perennial problem of definition, building on several previous contributions and synthesizing views from different areas of interest this thesis presents a cohesive framework of analysis which begins from the definition of the Small State, continues with its power resources to end up to the behaviour of the Small State that acts as an influence maximizer. It is an integrative framework and it can constitute a useful tool for exploring previous, present and past cases. It remains for this framework to be tested, but also to be engaged with other bodies of literature beyond the Small State studies, such as those of entrepreneurship, soft power, social capital. Yet, in the context of this thesis it shows that there can be some analytical value to the Small State concept, which, however, was shrouded by the fog of the “perennial problem” of the definition and the nature of a fragmented discipline.

With regard to the Small State behaviour, then, the thesis provides the framework of analysis I described above and in addition it makes two other points that could enhance our understanding of the Small State behaviour. First, it underlines that there is not a dominant pattern of Small State behaviour. This should neither be surprising nor does it constitute an obstacle to the further development of the field. Every Small State is influenced by the same set of factors whose combination, however, is unique for each state. Thus, differences in the behaviour of different Small States or even of the same Small State under different systemic and/or domestic circumstances are what we should expect as researchers. However, the thesis suggests that there are Small States that share a common pattern of behaviour.

Hence, the second point that this thesis makes in this context is that it reveals that for all their differences the Small States that manage to maximize their influence, the “small but smart” states, adopt a common pattern of behaviour; they follow an entrepreneurial pattern of behaviour. To this background, I incorporated into my analysis insights from the economic

theory and more precisely from research on entrepreneurship and I suggested that what has been conceptualized as smart in the context of the International Relations of Small States it can be better captured by the notion of the entrepreneur. Therefore, the main elements of an entrepreneurial pattern of behaviour in the International Relations domain are that in a competitive environment which is characterized by anarchy and inequality and where Great Powers are central, Small States acting as entrepreneurs: seize opportunities; make an optimum use of their limited resources in order to accomplish their ends, namely to maximize their influence upon the issues that are of interest to them and enhance their position in the system; they provoke changes, which usually are of low scale and related to low politics; create something of value in the international politics, a policy, a norm, a condition. Small States following such a strategy are proactive, adaptable, innovative and flexible. To this background, I argue that this innovative approach to the behaviour of the “small but smart” state can provide analytical rigor and a new research agenda for the field, as the constitutive elements of the entrepreneurial pattern of behaviour have been hardly explored in the discipline of International Relations. For one more time economic theory is a source of inspiration and in this sense we should think if the notion of the entrepreneur could complement Waltz's (1979) analysis of the analogy between the market and the international system; and between firms of different size and powers of different size.

The last question that this thesis addresses is the relationship between the body of literature of the Small State studies and the Theories of International Relations, and more precisely with Realism whose explanatory power has been both contested and praised from different Small State scholars. The thesis points out that systematic testing of hypotheses drawn from the mainstream International Relations literature is scarce. Small State studies are only slightly underpinned by different theoretical traditions. In this sense, the field is characterized by a “theoretical pluralism” in Holsti's (1989:255) terms; yet it lacks a vibrant debate informed by different theoretical approaches. Therefore, I contend that those who suggest that when it comes to Small States the explanatory power of Realism is limited hold a stereotypical view of the Realist school of thought and, moreover, oversee both Realists' insights about the lesser powers and Small State scholars' views that coincide with the Realist School of thought.

Indeed, looking for the main characteristics that different Small State studies have in common I found many points of convergence with Realism. Small State scholars admit that the state is the principal actor in the international system which is anarchic and competitive; competition does not exist only among the Great Powers, but also among Small Powers too. Moreover, the majority of Small State scholars accepts that capabilities shape the behaviour of states and that Great Powers are central in International Politics. Furthermore, Small State scholars have highlighted the conditions of formal equality and informal inequality in the international system and they are especially concerned with the ways that Small

States handle the disparity of power between them and the greater players in the system by being self-interested. In addition, Small State scholars seeking explanations about the Small State behaviour in all the three levels of analysis, but they recognize the preponderance of the international system. Thus, it seems that there is a strong Realist underpinning in the Small State body of literature. To this background I argue that there is a particularly great affinity with the strand of Neoclassical Realism, as the eclectic nature of the latter and its emphasis on the three levels of analysis, the significance of the relationship between the state and the society, the role of both material and ideational variables, and on influence maximization as a pattern of behaviour are highly compatible with main characteristics of the body of literature on Small States. Therefore, a further engagement between the Neoclassical Realism tradition and the research on Small States could be mutually beneficial.

All in all, the contribution of this thesis in the field of the International Relations of Small States can be summarized in five main points. First, the thesis fills the chronic gap in the accumulation of the existing knowledge in the field of the Small States in International Relations and provides a systematic review of the existing literature. By collecting, compiling, summarizing and synthesizing a vast amount of literature the thesis remedies long-standing weaknesses and limitations in the field for new scholarship to be produced. Second, the thesis provides a comprehensive and cohesive framework of analysis that can be a useful tool for exploring past, present and future cases. Third, the thesis sheds some light on the controversial relationship between Realism and the Small State body of literature and suggests that there are many affinities between the two. Fourth, the thesis introduces the concept of the entrepreneur into the Small State analysis of the “small but smart” state and encourages a further engagement of the research on Small States with the existing knowledge in the entrepreneurship field. Fifth, the thesis discovered new gaps in the literature and suggested that further research is needed beyond the behaviour of the Small State that “punches above its weight” and the geographic area of Northern Europe, where most of the Small State scholars concentrate. The Mediterranean and the Central and Eastern Europe can provide many interesting cases for consideration.

All the above five points on the one hand provide answers and on the other, open up opportunities for new scholarship to be produced in the field. Also, more concrete suggestions for research have been made within the respective chapters. Hence, the thesis enhances our understanding of the International Relations of Small States in several terms and puts a fresh and illuminating perspective on an important and relevant field of study in the International Relations discipline. In addition, the cohesive picture of the International Relations of Small States that it provides it could help policy-makers and also citizens in Small States to gain a better insight into: the role of power, the complexities of the international system, the impact of domestic arrangements, the elements of an entrepreneurial pattern of behav-

ious; and therefore to make more informed decisions. I believe that this last point is highly relevant to the case of Greece today; thus in a sense this thesis wishes to contribute to both the intellectual and the public debates on the Greek crisis and the way out of it. It has been suggested that International Relations provide the most appropriate framework for those who wish to understand the past and the present of the Greek crisis (Kostis, 2013). Indeed, there have been some valuable contributions by International Relations scholars each one offering a unique perspective (i.e. Kouskouvelis, 2012; Litsas, 2013a; 2013b; 2014b; Tziampiris, 2013; 2015). From a Small State perspective ten years ago in a paper on Small States in the EU Thorhallsson (2006:21) noted that "Greece and Belgium has weakened their stand in EU negotiations: changes of government in Greece have frequently led to change of personnel within the Greek administration, making it more difficult for it to handle EU business." Thirty years ago, Platias (1986: 478;480) highlighted the impact that domestic arrangements in the case of Greece; thus he suggests that "Greece's poor strategies and the resulting misfortunes are to a very large extent products of Greek domestic politics." Therefore, "Greece's domestic division has inhibited the successful management of security affairs." In this context, I believe that a Small State perspective, as it has been analyzed in this thesis, could complement the above works and offer useful insights to both the intellectual and the public debates and to policy-makers.

## Selective Bibliography

- Abuza, Z. (2003) 'Laos: Maintaining Power in a Highly Charged Region', in Hey J. (ed), *Small States in World Politics,- Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado, pp 157-184.
- Ahnlid, A. (1992) 'Free Riders or Forced Riders? Small States in the International Political Economy: The example of Sweden.' *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*, 27(3), pp 241-276.
- Alapuro, R., M. Alestalo, E. Haavio-Mannila, R. Vayrynen, eds. (1985) *Small States in Comparative Perspectives: Essays for Erik Allardt*. Oslo: Norwegian University Press.
- Alford, J. (1984) 'Security dilemmas of small states', *The round Table: The commonwealth journal of International Affairs*, 73:292, pp 377-382.
- Amstrup, N., Sørensen, C. (1975) 'Denmark - Bridge Between the Nordic Countries and the European Community', *Cooperation and Conflict* 10, pp 21-32.
- Amstrup, N. (1976) 'The Perennial Problem of Small States: A Survey of Research Efforts.' *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*, 11(3), pp 163-182.
- Antola, Esko (2002) 'The Future of Small States in the EU', in Mary Farrell, Stefano Fella & Michael Newman (eds) *European Integration in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, pp. 69–85, London: Sage.
- Archer, C. & Nugent, N. (2002) 'Introduction: Small States and the European Union', *Current Politics and Economics*, 11(1), pp 1-10.
- Archer C. & Nugent N. (2006) 'Introduction: Does the Size of Member States Matter in the European Union?', *Journal of European Integration*, 28(1), pp 3-6.
- Archer, C. (1999) 'Nordic Swans and Baltic Cygnets', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 34(1), pp 48-71.
- Archer, C. (2010) 'Small States and the European Security and Defence Policy' in Steinmetz, R. & Wivel, A. (eds.), *Small States in Europe: Challenges and Opportunities*. Surrey: Ashgate, pp 47-64.
- Archer, C. (2002) 'Introduction: Small States and the European Union', *Current Politics and Economics of Europe*, 11(1), pp 1-10.
- Archer, C. (2008), *New Security issues in Northern Europe: the Nordic and Baltic states and the ESDP*. London: Routledge.
- Archer, C. (2008) 'Introduction' in Archer, C. (ed) *New Security issues in Northern Europe: the Nordic and Baltic states and the ESDP*. London: Routledge, pp 1-14.
- Archer, C. (2008) 'The ESDP and Northern Europe: conclusions and projections', in Archer, C. (ed.) *New Security issues in Northern Europe: the Nordic and Baltic states and the ESDP*, London: Routledge, pp 193-211.
- Armstrong, H. W., R. Read (1995) 'Western European Microstates and European Union Autonomous Regions: The Advantage of Size and Sovereignty.' *World Development* 23(7), pp 1229-1245.

- Armstrong, H. W., R. Read (1998) 'Trade and Growth in Small States: The Impact of Global Trade Liberalization.' *The World Economy* 21(4), pp 563-585.
- Armstrong, H. W., R. Read (2002) 'Small States and European Union: Issues in the Political Economy of International Integration.' *Current Politics and Economics of Europe* 11(1), pp 31-48.
- Armstrong, H., Read, R. (1998) 'Trade and Growth in Small States: The impact of Global Trade Liberalisation', Blackwell Publishers, pp 563-585.
- Arter, D. (2000) 'Small State Influence Within the EU: The Case of Finland's "Northern Dimension Initiative"', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 38(5), pp 677-697.
- Azar, E. E. (1973) *Probe for Peace: Small- State Hostilities*. Minneapolis: Burgess Publishing Company.
- Baehr, P.R. (1975) 'Small States: A Tool for Analysis?', *World Politics*, 27(3), pp 456-466.
- Bailes, A. J. K. and B. Thorhallsson (2013), 'Instrumentalizing the European Union in Small State Strategies', *European Integration*, 35(2), pp 99-115.
- Baillie, S. (1998) 'A Theory of Small State Influence in the European Union', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 1 (3-4), pp 195-219.
- Baker Fox, A. (1959) "The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in WWII" Chicago: Chicago University Press
- Baker Fox, A. (1969) 'The Small States in the International System, 1919–1969', *International Journal*, 24, pp 751–764.
- Baker Fox, A. (Summer,1965) 'The Small States of Western Europe in the United Nations', *The MIT Press*, 19 (3), pp.774-786.
- Baldacchino, G. (2009) 'Thucydides or Kissinger? A Critical Review of Smaller State Diplomacy' in Cooper, A. & Shaw, T. (eds) *The Diplomacies of Small States- Between Vulnerability and Resilience*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 21-40.
- Baldacchino, G., (2015) *Entrepreneurship in Small Island States and Territories*. New York: Routledge.
- Barston, R. P. (1973) *The Other Powers: Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States*. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.
- Battistella, D. (2012) 'Raymond Aron: a neoclassical realist before the term existed?', in Toje, A & Kunz, B. (eds), *Neoclassical Realism in European Politics- Bringing power back in*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, pp 117-137.
- Bauwens, W., A. Clesse, and O.F. Knudsen (1996) (eds.), *Small States and the Security Challenge in the New Europe*. London: Brassey's.
- Bellou, F. (2006) 'The EU in Southeastern Europe: From Crisis Management to Integration' in D.K. Xenakis and M.I. Tsinisizelis (eds) *Global Europe? International Dimensions of the European Union*, Athens, Sideris 2006 pp. (in Greek)
- Bellou, F. (2013) *American Leadership Image and the Yugoslav crisis*, Saarbrücken: Scholar's Press.

- Benedict, B. (1967). *Problems of Smaller Territories*. London : The Athlone Press.
- Berenskoetter, F & Quinn, A. (2012) 'Hegemony by invitation: neoclassical realism, soft power and US-European relations', in Toje, A & Kunz, B. (eds), *Neoclassical Realism in European Politics- Bringing power back in*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, pp 214-233.
- Bergsmann, S. (2001) 'The Concept of Military Alliance', in Reiter, E., H. Gartner, eds.' *Small States and Alliances*. Heidelberg: Physica Verlag, pp 25-38.
- Betzold, C. (2010) 'Borrowing' Power to Influence International Negotiations: AOSIS in the Climate Change Regime, 1990-1997', *Politics*, 30(3), pp 131-148.
- Bickerton, C., Irondelle, B. & Menon, A.(2011) 'Security Co-operation beyond the Nation-State: The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 49(1), pp 1-21.
- Biscop, S. (2010) 'From ESDP to CSDP: Time for some Strategy', [www.diploweb.com](http://www.diploweb.com), last access 31/10/2013, pp 1-6.
- Bishop, M. L.( 2012) 'The political economy of small states: Enduring vulnerability?', *Review of International Political Economy*, 19:5, pp 942-960.
- Bjøl, E. (1968) "The Power of the Weak", *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*, 3(2), pp 157-158.
- Björkdahl, A. (2008) 'Norm Advocacy: a Small State Strategy to Influence the EU', *J EUR Public Policy*, 15(1), pp 135-154.
- Björkdahl, A. (2013) 'Ideas and Norms in Swedish Peace Policy', *Swiss Political Science Review*, 19(3), pp 322-337.
- Borchert, H. (2001) 'Switzerland and Europe's Security Architecture : The Rocky Road from Isolation to Cooperation', in Reiter, E., H. Gartner, eds.' *Small States and Alliances*. Heidelberg: Physica Verlag, pp 161-182.
- Braveboy-Wagner, J. A. (2003) 'The English-Speaking Caribbean States: A Triad of Foreign Policies' in Hey J. (ed), *Small States in World Politics,- Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado, pp 31-51.
- Braun, M. (2010) 'Slovakia and the Czech Republic in the European Integration Process: Birds of a Feather Flying Apart?', in Steinmetz, R. & Wivel, A. (ed), *Small States in Europe: Challenges and Opportunities*, Surrey: Ashgate, pp 147-160.
- Brawley, M.(2009)' Neoclassical realism and strategic calculations: explaining divergent British, French, and Soviet strategies toward Germany between the world wars (1919-1939)', in Lobell, S., Ripsman, N. & Taliaferro, J. (eds), *Neoclassical realism, in the state, and foreign policy*, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, pp 75-98.
- Browning, C. (2005) 'The opportunities and pitfalls of the transatlantic rift for small states in Europe: Rethinking Assumptions about Power and Influence in International Relations', paper presented at the ISA 46th Annual Convention, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA, 1-5 March 2005.
- Browning, C. (2006) 'Small, Smart and Salient? Rethinking Identity in the Small States Literature', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 19(4), pp 669-684.

- Brummer, K. (2006) 'The Big 3 and ESDP-France, Germany and the United Kingdom', Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gutersloh.
- Brummer, K. (2007) 'The North and ESDP-The Baltic States, Denmark, Finland and Sweden', Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gutersloh.
- Bull, H. (2008) 'Force In Contemporary International Relations', *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 10(9), pp 300-302.
- Calleya, S. (2005) 'The south', in Mouritzen, H. & Wivel, A. (eds)' *The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration.*' London:Routledge, pp 111-127.
- Carlsnaes, W. (2007) 'How should we study the foreign policies of small european states?', 118-3, pp 7-20.
- Checkel, J. (1993) 'Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution', *World Politics*, 45, pp 271-300.
- Chong, A. (2009) 'Singapore and the Soft Power Experience' in Cooper, A. & Shaw, T. (eds)' *The Diplomacies of Small States- Between Vulnerability and Resilience*', Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 65-80.
- Chong, A. (2007) 'The foreign policy potential of "Small State Soft Power" Information strategies' *European International Studies Association (EISA)*, viewed on 2 April 2016 <<http://www.eisa-net.org/sitecore/content/be-bruga/eisa/publications/feeds/turin.aspx>>
- Chong, A. & M. Maass (2010) 'Introduction: the foreign policy power of small states', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 23(3), pp 381-382.
- Christensen, S. (2001) 'The Danish Experience. Denmark in NATO, 1949-1999', in Reiter, E., H. Gartner, eds.' *Small States and Alliances.*' Heidelberg: Physica Verlag, pp 89-100.
- Coleman, W. D. 'Open states in the global economy: The political economy of small-state macroeconomic management by Jonathan Moses', *The American Political Science Review*, 95(3), pp 767-768.
- Constanza, M.( 2002)' European foreign policy: A Collectivity Policy or a Policy of "Converging Parallels"?'', *European Foreign Affairs Review*,8 (1).
- Cooper, A. & Shaw, T. (2009)' *The Diplomacies of Small States- Between Vulnerability and Resilience*',Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cooper, A. & Shaw, T. (2009)' The Diplomacies of Small States at the Start of Twenty-first Century: How Vulnerable? How Resilient?', in Cooper, A. & Shaw, T.(eds)' *The Diplomacies of Small States- Between Vulnerability and Resilience*', Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 1-18.
- Criekemans, D. & Duran, M.(2010) ' Small State Diplomacy Compared to Sub- State Diplomacy: More of the Same or Different?' in Steinmetz, R. & Wivel, A. (ed), '*Small States in EUrope: Challenges and Opportunities*', Surrey: Ashgate, pp 31-46.
- Crandall, M. (2014) 'Soft Security Threats and Small States: the Case of Estonia', *Defense Studies*, 14(1), pp 30-55.
- Crowards, T. (2002) 'Defining the Category of small states' *Journal of International Development*, 14(2), pp. 143-179.

- Dahl, A. S. (1997) 'To Be Or Not To Be Neutral: Swedish Security in the Post-Cold War Era', in Inbar, E.(ed)' *The National Security of Small States in a Changing World*, London: Frank Cass & Co. LTD, pp 175-196.
- Deitelhoff N. and Wallbott L. (2012), 'Beyond soft balancing: small states and coalition-building in the ICC and climate negotiations', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 25(3), pp 345-366.
- De Ruseff, A. (1954), 'Large and small states in international organization. Present attitudes to the problem of weighted voting', *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944), 30(4), pp 463-474.
- Devine, K. (2013) 'Values and Identities in Ireland's Peace Policy: Four Centuries of Norm Continuity and Change', *Swiss Political Science Review*, 19(3), pp 376-409.
- Diggines, C. E. (1985) 'The problems of small states, The Round Table: The commonwealth' *Journal of International Affairs*, 74:295, pp 191-206.
- Dimitrakopoulos, D.G. and Passas, A.G. (2004) 'The Greek Presidency: In the shadow of war', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 42:s1 (September 2004), pp 43-46.
- Dommen, E., P. Hein, eds. (1985). *States Microstates, and Islands*. London: Croom Helm.
- Duculescu, V. (1979) 'The assertion of small countries in international life: A Romanian view', in Worsley, P. & Kitromilides, P. (eds), *Small states in the modern world: the conditions of survival*, Nicosia, Zavallis Press Limited, pp 243-254.
- Dueck, C. (2009) 'Neoclassical realism and the national interest: presidents, domestic politics, and major military interventions', in Lobell, S., Ripsman, N. & Taliaferro, J. (eds), *Neoclassical realism, in the state, and foreign policy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp 139-169.
- Duke, S. (2001) 'Small States and European Security', in Reiter, E., H. Gartner, eds. *Small States and Alliances*. Heidelberg: Physica Verlag, pp 39-50.
- Duursma, J. (1996) *Fragmentation and the International Relations of Micro-states: Self-determination and Statehood*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Duval, R. & Thompson, W. (1980) 'Reconsidering the Aggregate Relationship between Size, Economic Development, and some types of Foreign Policy Behavior' , *Midwest Political Science Association*, 24(3), pp 511-525.
- East, M. A. (1973) 'Size and foreign policy behavior: A test of Two models', *Cambridge University Press*, 25(4), pp 556-576.
- Easterly, W., and Kraay A. (2000) 'Small States, Small Problems? Income, Growth, and Volatility in Small States', *World Development*, 28(11), pp 2013-2017.
- Edis, R. (1991), 'Punching above their weight: How small developing states operate in the contemporary diplomatic world', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 5 (2), pp 45-53.
- Egeland, J. (1984), 'Human Rights. Ineffective Big States, Potent Small States', *Journal of Peace Research*, 21(3), pp 207-213.
- Eide, E. B. (1996). 'Adjustment Strategy of a Non-Member: Norwegian Foreign and Security Policy in the Shadow of the European Union.' *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association* 31(1), pp 69-104.

- Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. & Verdier, D. (2005) 'European Integration as a Solution to War', *European Journal of International Relations*, 11(1), pp 99-135.
- El-Anis, I. (2015) 'Explaining the behaviour of small states: an analysis of Jordan's nuclear energy policy', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*. Available at: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09557571.2015.1018136>
- Elgström, O. (2002) 'Dull but Successful – the Swedish Presidency', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40:s1 (September 2002): pp 45-48.
- Elman, M.F. (1995), 'The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in its own Backyard', *British Journal of Political Science*, 25(2) , pp 171-217.
- Evagorou, E. (2007) 'Small States and their Strategy in the International System: The Case Of Cyprus', *Geostrategy*, Institute of Defense Analysis, Vol. 12, Sep-Dec. 2007 (in Greek).
- Fawn, R. (2005) 'The east', in Mouritzen, H. & Wivel, A. (eds) *The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration.* London:Routledge, pp 128-148.
- Fawn, R. (2006) 'Alliance behaviour, the Absentee Liberator and the Influence of Soft Power: Post-Communist State Positions over the Iraq War in 2003' *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 19(3), pp 451-464
- Ferreira-Pereira, L. C. (2006) 'Inside the Fence but Outside the Walls-Austria, Finland and Sweden in the Post-Cold War Security Architecture', *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*, 4(1), pp 99-122.
- Fioretos, O. (2013), 'Origins of embedded orthodoxy: international cooperation and political unity in Greece', *European Political Science*, 12, pp 305-319.
- Fordham, B.(2009) 'The limits of neoclassical realism: additive and interactive approaches to explaining foreign policy preferences', in Lobell, S., Ripsman, N. & Taliaferro, J. (eds), *Neoclassical realism, in the state, and foreign policy*, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, pp 251-279.
- Frankel, J. (2010), 'Big Ideas from Small Countries', *Project Syndicate*, October 21st. Available at: <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/big-ideas-from-small-countries?barrier=true>
- Frentz, J. M. (2010) 'The Foreign Policy of Luxembourg', in Steinmetz, R. & Wivel, A. (ed), *Small States in EUrope : Challenges and Opportunities*. Surrey: Ashgate, pp 131-146.
- Frohlich, N. and J. Oppenheimer (1972), 'Entrepreneurial Politics and Foreign Policy', *World Politics* , 24, pp 151-178.
- Galbreath, D. (2006) 'Latvian Foreign Policy after Enlargement: Continuity and Change', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 41, pp 443-462
- Galloway, David (2002) 'The Treaty of Nice and Small Member States'. *Current Politics and Economics of the European Union*, 11(1), pp 11-30.
- Gärtner, H. (2001) 'Small States and Alliances', in Reiter, E., H. Gartner, eds.' *Small States and Alliances.* Heidelberg: Physica Verlag, pp 1-10.
- Gärtner, H. & Holl, O. (2001) 'Austria', in Reiter, E., H. Gartner, eds.' *Small States and Alliances.* Heidelberg: Physica Verlag, pp 183-194.

- Gärtner, H. (1993) 'Small states and security integration', *Coexistence*, 30, pp 303-312.
- Gebhard, C. (2013), 'Is Small Still Beautiful? The Case of Austria', *Swiss Political Science Review*, 19(3), pp 279-297.
- Gegout C., (2002) 'The Quint: Acknowledging the Existence of a Big Four-US Directoire at the Heart of the European Union's Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 40, no. 2.
- Gegout, C.(2012) 'Explaining European military intervention in Africa: a neoclassical realist perspective', in Toje, A & Kunz, B. (eds), '*Neoclassical Realism in European Politics - Bringing power back in*', New York, Palgrave Macmillan, pp 138-160.
- Goetschel, L. (1998) *Small States Inside and Outside the European Union: Interests and Policies*. Boston /Dordrecht/ London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Goetschel, L. (2000) *Small States and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU: A Comparative Analysis*. Berne: NRP42 Project-4042-044205 Final Report.
- Goetschel, L. (2011) 'Neutrals as brokers of peacebuilding ideas?', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 46(3), pp 312-333.
- Goetschel, L. (2013) 'Bound to be peaceful? The changing approach of Western European small states to peace', *Swiss Political Science Review*, 19(3), pp 259-278.
- Goodby, J. E. (2014) 'The survival strategies of small nations: Survival global politics and strategy', 56:5, 31-39, Routledge, London.
- Graeger, N. (2008) 'Norway between Europe and the US', in Archer, C. (ed)' *New Security issues in Northern Europe: the Nordic and Baltic states and the ESDP*, London: Routledge, pp 94-114.
- Graeger, N. (2009) 'Inside NATO- Outside the EU Norwegian security and defence policy in the high North', *Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu Strategian Laitos*, 4:32, pp 1-13.
- Graeger, N. (2015) 'From 'forces for good' to 'forces for status'?' In de Carvalho B. and Neumann I. B. (eds.) *Small State Status Seeking*. London/New York: Routledge. pp 86-107.
- Griffin, C. (1995) 'Confronting Power Asymmetry: Small States, Strategic Behavior, and National Interest.' *Social and Economic Studies*, 44(3/4), pp 259-286.
- Grizold, A. & Vegie, V. (2001) 'Small States and Alliances: The Case of Slovenia', in Reiter, E., H. Gartner, eds.' *Small States and Alliances*. Heidelberg: Physica Verlag, pp 145-160.
- Gron, H., Wivel, A. (2011) 'Maximizing Influence in the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty: From Small State Policy to Smart State Strategy', *Journal of European Integration*, 33(5), pp 523-539.
- Gstöhl, S. (2002) *Reluctant Europeans: Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland in the Process of Integration*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Gunter, M. M. (1977) 'What Happened to the United Nations Ministate Problem?', *American Journal of International Law*, 71, pp 110-124.
- Gustenau, G. (1999) *Towards a Common European Policy on Security and Defence: An Austrian View of Challenges for the "Post-neutrals"*. EU-ISS Occasional Paper 9, October 1999. Available [online] - URL:[<http://www.isis-europe.org/isisieu>].

- Guzzini, S. (2010) 'Power Analysis: Encyclopedia entries', DIIS Working Paper 2010:34.
- Guzzini, S. (2009) 'On the measure of power and the power of measure in International Relations', DISS Working Paper 2009:28.
- Haine, J. Y. (2012) 'The rise and the fall of the Common Security and Defence Policy: bringing strategic culture back in', in Toje, A & Kunz, B. (eds), *Neoclassical Realism in European Politics- Bringing power back in*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, pp 182-213.
- Handel, M. (1985), *Weak States in the International System*. London: Frank Cass.
- Hanf, B., Soetendorp, K. eds. (1998). *Adapting to European Integration: Small States and the European Union*. London: Longman.
- Hansen, P. (1974). 'Adaptive Behavior of Small States: The case of Denmark and the European Community.' P. J. McGowan, ed. *Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies*, 2. London: Sage, pp 143-174.
- Hansen, A. (2004) 'Security and Defence: the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina', in Carlsnaes, W., Sjurgen, H. & White, B. (eds), *Contemporary European Foreign Policy*, (Sage, 2004).
- Harbert, J. R. (1976). 'The Behavior of the Ministries in the United Nations, 1971-1972.' *International Organization*, 30, pp 109-127.
- Harden, S., ed (1985), *Small Is Dangerous: Microstates in a Macro World*. London: Frances Pinter Publishers.
- Harbottle, B. M., (1979) 'Cyprus: an analysis of the U. N.'s third party role in a "small war"', in Worsley, P. & Kitromilides, P. (eds), *Small states in the modern world: the conditions of survival*, Nicosia, Zavallis Press Limited, pp 213-226.
- Harris, W. L. (1970), 'Microstates in the United Nations: A Broader Purpose', *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law*, 9, pp 23-53.
- Henrikson, A. (1998) 'Diplomacy And Small States In Today's World', 12th Dr Eric Williams Memorial lecture, available at <http://textus.diplomacy.edu/thina/txgetxdoc.asp?idconv=3224>, last accessed 05.03.2014.
- Henrikson, A. (2001) 'A coming 'Magesian' age? Small states, the global system, and the international community', *Geopolitics*, 6:3, pp 49-86.
- Heisbourg François, (2004) 'The French-German Duo and the Search for a New European Security Model', *The International Spectator*, XXXIX,3, July-September .
- Herz, J. (1960) *The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II*. by Annette Baker Fox reviewed in *Political Science Quarterly*, 75(1), pp 129-130.
- Hey, J. (2002) 'Luxembourg's Foreign Policy: Does Small Size Help or Hinder?', *The European Journal of Social Science Research*, 15(3), pp 211-225.
- Hey, J. A. K. (2003) (ed.) *Small States in the World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Hey, J. A. K (2003), 'Luxembourg: Where Small Works (and Wealthy Doesn't Hurt), in Hey J. (ed), *Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp 75-94.

- Hey, J. (2003) 'Refining Our Understanding of Small State Foreign Policy', in Hey J. (ed), *Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp 185-196.
- Hill, C. (1998) 'Closing the capabilities - expectations gap', in Peterson, J. & Sjursen, H.(eds), *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe?*. London: Routledge.
- Hill, C. (2006) 'The European Powers in the Security Council: Differing Interests, Differing Arenas', in Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith (eds.), *Intersecting Multilateralisms: the European Union at the United Nations* Houndsmills: Palgrave.
- Hirsch, M. (1976) 'Influence without power: small states in European politics', *World Today* 32(3), pp 112-118.
- Holden, P. (2012) 'Looking after the 'European' interest? Neoclassical realism and the European Union's engagement with sub-Saharan Africa', in Toje, A & Kunz, B. (eds), *Neoclassical Realism in European Politics- Bringing power back in*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, pp 161-181.
- Hoffmann, S. (1977) 'An American Social Science: International Relations', *Daedalus* 106(3), pp 41-60.
- Holl, O., ed. (1983), 'Small States in Europe and Dependence. Boulder. CO: Westview Press.
- Holsti, K. J. (1970) '*National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy*', *International Studies Quarterly*, 14(3), pp 233-309.
- Holsti, K. J. (1964) '*The Concept of Power in the Study of International Relations*', *Background*, 7(4), pp 179-194.
- Honkanen, K. (2002), *The Influence of Small States on NATO Decision-Making. The Membership Experiences of Denmark, Norway, Hungary and the Czech Republic*. Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency. Available at: [www.foi.se/reportfiles/foir\\_0548.pdf](http://www.foi.se/reportfiles/foir_0548.pdf)
- Hong, M. (1995) 'Small States in the United Nations', *International Social Science Journal*, 47(2), pp 277-287.
- Hurrell Andrew (2007) 'One world? Many worlds? The Place of regions in the study of International society', *International Affairs* 83: 1, pp 127-146
- Hveem, H.(1987) 'Small Countries under Great Pressure. The Politics of National Vulnerability during International Restructuring', *Cooperation and Conflict*, XXII, pp 193-208.
- Inbar, E.(1997) '*The National Security of Small States in a Changing World*', London: Frank Cass & Co. LTD.
- Inbar, E.(1997) 'Introduction', in Inbar, E.(ed) '*The National Security of Small States in a Changing World*', London: Frank Cass & Co. LTD, pp 1-9.
- Inbar, E. (1997) 'Israel's Predicament in a New Strategic Environment', in Inbar, E.(ed) '*The National Security of Small States in a Changing World*', London: Frank Cass & Co. LTD, pp 155-174.
- Ingebritsen, C. (1998) *The Nordic States and European Unity*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

- Ingebritsen, C. (2001), 'When Do Culture and History Matter? A Response to Neumann and Tiilikainen', Symposium on Ingebritsen The Nordic States and European Unity, *Cooperation and Conflict*, 36(1), pp 99-103.
- Ingebritsen, C. (2002) 'Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia's Role in World Politics', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 37(1), pp 11-23.
- Ingebritsen, C. (2006) 'Learning from Lilliput', in Ingebritsen, C., Neumann I. and S.Gstöhl (eds.) *Small states in International Relations*. Washington: University of Washington Press.
- Inglott, P. S. (1979) 'The law of the sea and the development of mediterranean regional institutions', in Worsley, P. & Kitromilides, P. (eds), *Small states in the modern world: the conditions of survival*, Nicosia, Zavallis Press Limited, pp 227-242.
- Ingebritsen, C. (2002) "Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia's Role in World Politics" *Cooperation and Conflict:Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association* 37(1), pp 11-23.
- Ingebritsen, C. (2006) 'Scandinavia in World Politics. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
- Ingimundarson, V. (2010) 'A Western Cold War: The crisis in Iceland's Relations with Britain, the United States, and NATO, 1971-74', *Diplomacy & Statecraft* , 14(4), pp 94-136.
- Jazbec, M. (2000) 'The small new states in Europe after the Fall of the Berlin Wall and their Diplomacies', *The Sarmatian Review*, 20(3), Available: <http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~sarmatia/900/jazbec.html>
- Joenniemi Pertti, (1998) 'From Small to Smart: Reflections on the Concept of Small States', *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, Vol.9., pp 61-62
- Jones, E. (2012) 'Getting to Greece: uncertainty, misfortune, and the origins of political disorder', *European Political Science*, 12, pp 294-304.
- Julien, K. S. (1992), The problems of small States, *The Round Table: The commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*, 81-321, pp 45-50.
- Kapur, A. (1997) 'Nuclear Policies of Small States and Weaker Powers', in Inbar, E.(ed) *The National Security of Small States in a Changing World*, London: Frank Cass & Co. LTD, pp 107-126.
- Karsh, E.(1997) 'Cold War, Post-Cold War: Does it Make a Difference for the Middle East?', in Inbar, E.(ed) *The National Security of Small States in a Changing World*, London: Frank Cass & Co. LTD, pp 77-106.
- Karsh, E. (1998), 'Neutrality and Small States. New York: Routledge.
- Kasekamp, A. (2005) 'The north-east', in Mouritzen, H. & Wivel, A. (eds) *The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration.* London:Routledge, pp 149-164.
- Kassimeris, C. (2009) 'The foreign policy of small powers', *International Politics*, 46 (1), pp 84-101.
- Kattel, R. , Kalvet, T. ,Randma - Liiv, T. (2010) 'Small States and Innovation', in Steinmetz, R. & Wivel, A. (ed), *Small States in Europe* Surrey: Ashgate, pp 65-86.
- Katzenstein, P. J. (1985). *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe*. Ithaka, NY: Cornell University Press.

- Katzenstein, P. J., ed. (1997). *Tamed Power: Germany in Europe*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Katzenstein, P. J. (2003), 'Small States and Small States Revisited.' *New Political Economy*, 8(1), pp 9-30.
- Kelstrup Morten and Williams Michael C. (eds.) *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration*. London: Routledge.
- Keohane, O. (1967) 'The study of political influence in the general assembly', *International Organization*, 21(2), pp 221-237.
- Keohane, Robert O. (1969) 'Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics', *International Organization*, 23 (2), pp 291–310.
- Keohane, O. (1971) 'The big influence of small allies', *Foreign Policy*, 2, pp 161-182.
- Keohane, R. O.(1987)' Power and Interdependence Revisited', *International Organization*, 41(4), pp 725-753.
- Kerremans, B. And Drieskens, E. (2002) 'The Belgian Presidencies of 2001', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40:s1 (September 2002), pp 49-51.
- Keukeleire, S. (2001) 'Directorates in the CFSP/CESDP of the European Union: A Plea for 'Restricted Crisis Management Groups'', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 6, pp 75-101.
- Klicka, O. (1966) 'Small States and big Problems', *Survival*, 8(5), pp 162-165.
- Kindley, R., D. Good (1997). *The Challenge of Globalization and Institution Building: Lessons from Small European States*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Kirk Laux, J. (1972) 'Small States and Inter-European Relations: An Analysis of the Group of Nine', Journal of Peace Research, 9(2), pp 147-160*
- Kitchen, N. (2012) 'Ideas of power and the power of ideas', in Toje, A & Kunz, B. (eds), '*Neoclassical Realism in European Politics- Bringing power back in*', New York, Palgrave Macmillan, pp 79-95.
- Kitromilides, P. M.(1979) 'The survival of small states: Dimensions of the Problem', in Worsley, P. & Kitromilides, P. (eds), 'Small states in the modern world: the conditions of survival', Nicosia, Zavallis Press Limited, pp 9-15.*
- Koht, H. (1943) 'The small nations in the post-war world', Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 87(2), pp 152-160.*
- Kouskouvelis Ilias (2012) 'Greek Foreign Policy in the era of Crisis', *Foreign Affairs The Hellenic Edition*, 1. Dec. 2011-Jan.2012 pp. 45-56 (in Greek).
- Kouskouvelis Ilias, (2013) 'Small States' Strategy in the International System', in P. Papapolyviou et al. (ed.) *The Cyprus Issue 1945-1974: Looking for a Place in the World*, Tassos Papadopoulos. Center for Studies Athens: Patakis pp. 395-416.
- Kouskouvelis Ilias, (2015a) *Decision Making in Thucydides*, Thessaloniki:UOMPress.
- Kouskouvelis Ilias, (2015b) "Smart' leadership in a small state: The case of Cyprus' in Spyridon N. Litsas & Aristotle Tziampiris (eds.), *The Eastern Mediterranean in Transition: Multipolarity, Power and Politics*, London: Ashgate Publishing pp. 93-117.

- Knudsen, O. (2002) 'Small States, Latent and Extant: Towards a General Perspective', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 5(2), pp 182-198.
- Knutsen, B. O. (2000), *The Nordic dimension in the evolving european security structure and the role of Norway*. Paris: Institute for Security Studies Western European Union, *Occasional Papers 22*, pp 1-35. Accessed via: [www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/occ022.pdf](http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/occ022.pdf)
- Knutsen, T. (2012) 'Realism-a distinctively European academic tradition', in Toje, A & Kunz, B. (eds), *Neoclassical Realism in European Politics- Bringing power back in*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, pp 17-29.
- Krasner, S. (1981) 'Transforming International Regimes: What the Third World Wants and Why.' *International Studies Quarterly*, 25(1), pp 119-148.
- Krause, V., Singer, D. (2001) 'Minor Powers, Alliances, and Armed Conflict: Some Preliminary Patterns', in Reiter, E., H. Gartner, eds.' *Small States and Alliances.* Heidelberg: Physica Verlag, pp 15-24.
- Kunz, B. & Saltzman, Z. (2012) 'External and domestic determinants of state behavior', in Toje, A & Kunz, B. (eds), *Neoclassical Realism in European Politics- Bringing power back in*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, pp 96-116.
- Kurzer, P. (2001). 'Markets and Moral Regulation: Cultural Change in the European Union. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.
- Labs, E. (1992) 'Do Weak States Bandwagon?', *Security Studies*, 1(3), pp 383-416.
- Lamoreaux, J. & Galbreath, D. (2008) 'The Baltic States as 'Small States': Negotiating the 'East' by Engaging the 'West'', *Journal of Baltic Studies*, 39(1), pp 1-14.
- Lamoreaux, J. (2014) 'Acting small in a large state's world: Russia and the Baltic states', *European Security*, 23(4), pp 565-582.
- Larsen, H. (2008) 'Denmark and the ESDP opt-out: a new way of doing nothing?', in Archer, C. (ed) *New Security issues in Northern Europe: the Nordic and Baltic states and the ESDP*. London: Routledge, pp 78-93.
- Larsen, F., Mouritzen, H. & Wivel, A. (2005), 'The institutional dynamics of Euro- Atlantic integration', in Mouritzen, H. & Wivel, A. (eds) *The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration*. London:Routledge, pp 43-67.
- Lassinantti, G. (2001) 'Small States and Alliances- A Swedish Perspective', in Reiter, E., H. Gartner, eds.' *Small States and Alliances.* Heidelberg: Physica Verlag, pp 101-112.
- Lebow, R. N. (1997) 'Small states and Big Alliances', *The American Political Science Review*, 91(3), pp 705-709.
- Lee, D. and Smith, N. J. (2010) 'Small state discourses in the international political economy, *Third World Quarterly*, 31(7), pp 1091-1105.
- Lee-Ohlsson, F. (2009), 'Sweden and development of the European Security and Defence Policy: A Bi - Directional Process of Europeanization', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 44(2), pp 123-142.
- Leff, N. (1971) 'Bengal, Biafra & The Bigness Bias', *Foreign Policy*, 3, pp 129-139.

- Leira, H. (2013) 'Our Entire People are Natural Born Friend of Peace': The Norwegian Foreign Policy of Peace', *Swiss Political Science Review*, 19(3), pp 338-356.
- Levite, A. & Platias, A. (1983), 'Evaluating small states' dependence on arms imports', Peace studies program occasional paper, 16, pp 1-73.
- Lewis, V. (2009) 'Foreword: Studying Small States over the Twentieth into the Twenty-first Centuries', in Cooper, A. & Shaw, T.(eds) *The Diplomacies of Small States - Between Vulnerability and Resilience*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp vii-xv.
- Lieshout, R. H. - Segers, M. L. L. and van der Vleuten, A M. (2004) 'De Gaulle, Moravcsik, A. (1999) 'Is Something Rotten in the State of Denmark? Constructivism and European Integration'. *Journal of European Public Policy*, Special Issue, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 669–82 Moravcsik, and The Choice for Europe: Soft Sources, Weak Evidence', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 6 (4), pp 89-139.
- Lindell, U., S. Persson (1986) 'The Paradox of Weak State Power: A Research and Literature Overview.' *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*. 21(2), pp 79-97.
- Liska, G. (1957). *International Equilibrium: A Theoretical Essay on the Politics and Organization of Security*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Liska, G. (1968). *Alliances and the Third World*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.
- Lloyd, P. (1968). *International Trade Problems of Small Nations*. DURHAM, NC: Duke University Press.
- Litsas, S. (2013a) 'Sovereignty and International Politics: Interdependence, Self-Help, and Survival' in Lavdas et al. (eds.), *Stateness and Sovereign Debt: Greece in the European Conundrum*, Lanham, Maryland:Lexington Books, pp. 58-92.
- Litsas, S. (2013b) 'State and Sovereignty: Mythical Talos and the Politics of Conventional Rationality' in Lavdas et al. (eds.), *Stateness and Sovereign Debt: Greece in the European Conundrum*, Lanham, Maryland:Lexington Books, pp. 41-58.
- Litsas, S. (2014b), 'The Greek Failing State and its "Smart Power" Prospects: A Theoretical Approach', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 25(3), pp 52-73.
- Lobell, S., Ripsman, N. & Taliaferro, J. (2009) *Neoclassical realism, in the state, and foreign policy*, Cambridge :Cambridge University Press.
- Lobell, S., Ripsman, N. & Taliaferro, J. (2009)'Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy',in Lobell, S., Ripsman, N. & Taliaferro, J. (eds), *Neoclassical realism, in the state, and foreign policy*, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, pp 1-41.
- Lobell, S.(2009) '*Threat assessment, the state, and foreign policy: a neoclassical realist model*', in Lobell, S., Ripsman, N. & Taliaferro, J. (eds), *Neoclassical realism, in the state, and foreign policy*, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, pp 42-75.
- Luif, P. (1995). *On the Road To Brussels: The Political Dimension of Austria's, Finland's, and Sweden's Accession to the European Union*. Vienna: Braumuller.
- Luif, P. (2003), 'Austria: The Burdens of History' in Hey J. (ed), *Small States in World Politics,- Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado, pp 95-115.

- Lumpkin, G. T. (2011), 'From legitimacy to impact: Moving the field forward by asking how entrepreneurship informs life', *Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal*, 5, pp 3-9.
- Luther, K.L. (1999) 'Small and New, but Nonetheless Competent: Austria and the EU Presidency', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 37:s1 (September 1999), pp 65-67.
- Maass, M. (2009) 'The elusive definition of the small state', *International Politics*, 46, pp 65-83.
- Mack, A. (1975), 'Why big nations lose small wars: the politics of asymmetric conflict', *World Politics*, 27(2), pp 175-200.
- Maes, I. and A. Verdun (2005) 'Small States and the Creation of EMU: Belgium and the Netherlands, Pace-setters and Gate-keepers', *JCMS*, 43(2), pp 327-348.
- Major Claudia, (2005) 'Europeanization and Foreign and Security Policy – Undermining or Rescuing the Nation State?' *Politics*, 25(3), pp 175-190.
- Mannik, E. (2002). 'EU and the Aspirations of Applicant Small States: Estonia and the Evolving CESDP' *Current Politics and Economics of Europe*, 11(1), pp 77-90.
- Mannik, E. (2008) 'The security situation in Northern Europe after the Cold-War', in Archer, C. (ed) '*New Security issues in Northern Europe: the Nordic and Baltic states and the ESDP*', London: Routledge, pp 15-37.
- Mannik, E. (2008) 'The role of the ESDP in Estonia's security policy', in Archer, C. (ed) '*New Security issues in Northern Europe: the Nordic and Baltic states and the ESDP*', London: Routledge, pp 139-154.
- Mathisen, T. (1971). *The Functions of Small States in the Strategies of the Great Powers*.
- Matthews, R. & Zhang Yan, N. (2007) 'Small country "Total Defence: A case Study of Singapore"', *Defence Studies*, 7:3, pp 376-395.
- McIntyre, W. D.(1996), 'The Admission of Small States to the Commonwealth.' *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 24(2), pp 244-277.
- Mearsheimer, J., S. Walt (2007). *The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy*. London: Penguin Books.
- Melakopides, C. (2010), 'Cyprus, Small- Powerhood and the EU's Principles and Values', in Steinmetz, R. & Wivel, A. (eds.), *Small States in Europe : Challenges and Opportunities*. Surrey: Ashgate, pp 161-180.
- Menon, A. (2009) 'Empowering paradise? The ESDP at ten', *International Affairs*, 85(2), pp 227-246.
- Moravcsik, A. (1999) 'A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation', *International Organisation*, 53(2), pp 267-306.
- Moravcsik, A. (2001) 'A Constructivist Research Program in EU Studies?', *European Union Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 226–49.
- Mendelson, M. H. (1972). 'Diminutive States in the United Nations.' *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*. 21, pp 609-630.
- Miles, L. (2002). 'Small States and the European Union: Reflections.' *Current Politics and Economics of Europe*, 11(1), pp 91-98.
- Miles, L. (2005) 'The north', in Mouritzen, H. & Wivel, A. (eds) *The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration*. London: Routledge, pp 92-110.

- Miniotaite, G.(2008) 'Lithuania's evolving security and defence policy: "not only consumer, but also contributor"', in Archer, C. (ed)' *New Security issues in Northern Europe: the Nordic and Baltic states and the ESDP*, London: Routledge, pp 155-173.
- Moller, B. (1997) 'Small States, Non- Offensive Defence and Collective Security', in Inbar, E.(ed)' *The National Security of Small States in a Changing World*, London: Frank Cass & Co. LTD, pp 127-154.
- Mora, F. (2003) 'Paraguay: From the Stronato to the Democratic Transition' in Hey J. (ed), *Small States in World Politics,- Explaining Foreign Policy behavior*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado, pp 13-29.
- Moravcsik, Andrew (1993) 'Preferences and Power in the EC: A liberal intergovernmentalist Approach', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31 (4), pp 473- 521.
- Moravcsik, Andrew & Nicolaïdis, Kalypto (1999) 'Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, Institutions', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 37 (1), pp 59-85.
- Morgenthau, H.(1985) 'Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace' / Hans J. Morgenthau: revised by Kenneth W. Thompson - Brief ed., United States of America.
- Mosser, M. (2001), 'Engineering Influence : The Subtle Power of Small States in the CSCE/ OSCE.' in Reiter, E., H. Gartner, eds.' *Small States and Alliances.* Heidelberg: Physica Verlag, pp 63-84.
- Mottola, K. (2001) 'Finland, the European Union and NATO- Implications for Security and Defence.', in Reiter, E., H. Gartner, eds.' *Small States and Alliances.* Heidelberg: Physica Verlag, pp 113-144.
- Mouritzen, H. and Wive A. (2005) 'The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration.' London: Routledge.
- Mouritzen, H. & Wivel, A.(2005) 'Introduction', in Mouritzen, H. & Wivel, A. (eds)' *The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration.* London: Routledge, pp 1-13.
- Mouritzen, H. & Wivel, A. (2005) 'Constellation theory',in Mouritzen, H. & Wivel, A. (eds)' *The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration.* London: Routledge, pp 15-42.
- Mouritzen, H. & Wivel, A. (2005) 'Comparative analysis meets theory',in Mouritzen, H. & Wivel, A. (eds)' *The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration.* London: Routledge, pp 167-206
- Mouritzen, H. (2005) 'Prospects for Europe', in Mouritzen, H. & Wivel, A. (eds)' *The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration.* London: Routledge, pp 209-227.
- Moses, J. W. (2000). *Open States in the Global Economy: The Political Economy of Small - State Macroeconomic Management.* New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Murumets, J.(2008) 'Hard questions about European defence', in Archer, C. (ed)' *New Security issues in Northern Europe: the Nordic and Baltic states and the ESDP*, London: Routledge, pp 174-192.
- Musu Costanza, (2002) 'European foreign policy: A Collective Policy or a Policy of "Converging Parallels"?' *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 8(1) Spring, pp 35-49.
- Nansen, F. (1918) 'The Mission of the Small States', *The American- Scandinavian Review*, 1(6), pp 9-13.

- Nasra, S. (2011) 'Governance in EU foreign policy: Exploring small state influence', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 18(2), pp 164-180.
- Nasra, S. & Debaere, P. (2012) 'The European Union in the G20: what role for small states?', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 1, pp 1-22.
- Neumann, S. G. (1976) (ed.), *Small States and Segmented Societies: National Political Integration in a Global Environment*. New York: Praeger Publishers.
- Neumann, I. (1992) 'Poland as a Regional Great Power: The Inter-war Heritage' in I. Neumann I. (ed.) *Regional Great Powers in International Politics*. London: St. Martin's Press.
- Neumann, I. B. (2001) 'The Nordic States and European Unity', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 36(1), pp 87-94.
- Neumann, I. B. and B. de Carvalho (2015) 'Introduction: Small states and status', in de Carvalho B. and I. B. Neumann (eds.) *Small State Status Seeking*. New York: Routledge, pp 1-21.
- Nuechterlein, D. E. (1969) 'Small States in Alliances: Iceland, Thailand, and Australia', *Orbis*, 13, pp 600-623.
- Ojanen, H. (2008) 'Finland and the ESDP: "obliquely Forwards"?' in Archer, C. (ed.) *New Security issues in Northern Europe: the Nordic and Baltic states and the ESDP*. London: Routledge. pp 56-77.
- Ojanen, H. (2000) 'Participation and Influence: Finland, Sweden and the Post-Amsterdam Development of the CFSP', *International Security Information Service*, Occasional Paper 11. Available [online] - URL: [<http://www.isis-europe.org/>].
- Ojanen, H. (2003) 'Concluding Remarks', in Hanna Ojanen (ed.) *Neutrality and Non-Alignment in Europe Today*. FIIA Report 6. Available at: <http://www.upi-fiaa.fi>
- Smith, N., Pace M. and Lee D. (2005) 'Size Matters: Small States and International Studies', *International Studies Perspectives*, 6(3), pp 395-397.
- Olafsson, B. G. (1998). *Small States in the Global System: Analysis and Illustration from the Case of Iceland*. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate.
- Olsen Johan P., (2002). The Many Faces of Europeanization. *Journal of Common Market*.
- Ørvik, N. (1974) Small States in International Relations, Nobel Symposium 17 by August Schou and Arne O. Brundtland reviewed in *The American Political Science Review*, 68(4), pp 1875-1877.
- O'Sullivan, M. and Natella S. (2014), 'Small Countries' Big Successes', *Project Syndicate*, September 19th. Available at: <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/michael-o-sullivan-and-stefano-natella-ask-why-small-countries-are-disproportionately-prosperous?barrier=true>
- Osgood, Robert E. (1968). *Alliances and American Foreign Policy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.
- Ozalina, Z. (2008) 'European Security and Defence Policy : the Latvian Perspective', in Archer, C. (ed.) *New Security issues in Northern Europe: the Nordic and Baltic states and the ESDP*, London: Routledge, pp 115-138.

- Palosaari, T. (2013) 'Still a Physician rather than a Judge? The Post-Cold War Foreign and Security Policy of Finland', *Swiss Political Science Review*, 19(3), pp 357-375.
- Panke, D.(2012c) 'Being small in a big union: punching above their weights? How small states prevailed in the vodka and the pesticides cases?', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 25(3), pp 329-244.
- Panke, D, (2012a) 'Dwarfs in international negotiations: how small states make their voices heard', *Cambridge Review of international Affairs*, 25(3), pp 313-328.
- Panke, D. (2012b) 'Small states in multilateral negotiations. What have we learned?', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 25(3), pp 387-398.
- Papadakis, M., H. Starr (1987). 'Opportunity, Willingness, and Small States: The Relationship Between Environment and Foreign Policy.'
- Papasotiriou, Ch. (2001) *Byzantine Grand Strategy*, Athens:Piotita (in Greek).
- Papasotiriou, Ch. (2002) *American Political System and Foreign Policy* Athens:Piotita (in Greek).
- Payne, A. (2009) 'Afterword: Vulnerability as a Condition, Resilience as a Strategy', in Cooper, A. & Shaw, T. (eds) *The Diplomacies of Small States- Between Vulnerability and Resilience*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 279-287.
- Petersen, N. (1988), 'The Security Policies of Small NATO Countries: Factors of Change', *Cooperation and Conflict*, XXIII, pp 145-162.
- Plamen, P. (2010) 'The Fluid Nature of Smallness : Regulation of the International System and the Challenges and Opportunities of Small States', in Steinmetz, R. & Wivel, A. (ed), '*Small States in Europe :* ', Surrey: Ashgate, pp 103-116.
- Platias, A. (1986) 'High Politics in Small Countries : An Inquiry into the Security Policies of Greece, Israel and Sweden', Phd thesis, Cornell University.
- Plischke, E. (1977). *Microstates in World Affairs: Policy Problems and Options*.Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
- Posen, B. (2004)' *ESDP and the Structure of World Power*', *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs*, 39(1), pp 5-17.
- Prasad, N. (2009) 'Small but Smart: Small States in the Global System', in Cooper, A. & Shaw, T.(eds) '*The Diplomacies of Small States- Between Vulnerability and Resilience*', Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 41-64.
- Ramanova, T. & Pavlova, E. (2012) 'Towards neoclassical realist thinking in Russia?', in Toje, A & Kunz, B. (eds), '*Neoclassical Realism in European Politics- Bringing power back in*', New York, Palgrave Macmillan, pp 234-254.
- Rapaport, J., E. Muteba, J. Therattil(1971). *Small States and Territories: Status and Problems*. New York: United Nations Institute for Training and Research.
- Rappard, W. E. (1934) 'Small states in the league of nations', *The Academy of Political Science*, 49(4), pp 544-575.
- Rees, N., M. Holmes (2002). 'Capacity, Perceptions, and Principles: Ireland's Changing Place in Europe.' *Current Politics and Economics of Europe*, 11(1), pp 49-60.

- Reich, S.- Lebow, R. N. (2014), 'Good-bye hegemony!: power and influence in the global system, United Kingdom, Princeton University Press.
- Reichwein, A. (2012) 'The tradition of neoclassical realism', in Toje, A & Kunz, B. (eds), '*Neoclassical Realism in European Politics- Bringing power back in*', New York, Palgrave Macmillan, pp 30-60.
- Reid, G. L. (1974). *The Impact of Very Small Size on the International Relations Behavior of Microstates*. London: Sage.
- Reiter D. (1994) Learning Realism and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past, *World Politics* 46(4), pp. 490-526.
- Reiter, E. (2001) 'Introductory Comments on the Objective of Small States and Alliances Workshop', in Reiter, E., H. Gartner, eds.' *Small States and Alliances*.' Heidelberg: Physica Verlag, pp 11-14.
- Reiter, E., H. Gartner, eds. (2001). *Small States and Alliances*. Heidelberg: Physica Verlag.
- Rickli, J. M. (2010) 'Neutrality Inside and Outside the EU: A Comparison of Austrian and Swiss Security Policies After the Cold War', in Steinmetz, R. & Wivel, A. (eds.), *Small States in Europe: Challenges and Opportunities*. Surrey: Ashgate, pp 181-198.
- Rickli, J. M. (2008) 'European small states' military policies after the cold war: from territorial to niche strategies', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 21(3), pp 307-325.
- Ripsman, N. (2009) 'Neoclassical realism and domestic interest group', in Lobell, S., Ripsman, N. & Taliaferro, J. (eds), *Neoclassical realism, in the state, and foreign policy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp 170-193.
- Ripsman, N., Taliaferro, J. & Lobell, S. (2009) 'Conclusion: The state of neoclassical realism', in Lobell, S., Ripsman, N. & Taliaferro, J. (eds), *Neoclassical realism, in the state, and foreign policy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp 280-299.
- Risse-Kappen, T. (1995). *Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Risse, Thomas (2000) "'Let's argue!' Communicative Action in World Politics', *International Organization* 54 (1), pp 1-39.
- Robinson, E. A. G., ed. (1960). *Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations (Proceedings of a Conference Held by the International Economic Association)*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Rood, J. (2010) 'In a League of its Own? The Netherlands as a Middle- Sized EU Member State', in Steinmetz, R. & Wivel, A. (ed), '*Small States in EUrope : Challenges and Opportunities*', Surrey: Ashgate, pp 117-130.
- Rosenau, eds. *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*. Boston: Allen & Unwin: 409-432.
- Rostoks, T. (2010) 'Small States, Power, International Change and the Impact of Uncertainty', in Rothstein, R. L. (1966) 'Alignment, Nonalignment, and Small Powers: 1945-1965', *International Organization*, 20(3), pp 397-418.
- Rothstein, R. L. (1968). *Alliances and Small Powers*. New York and London: Columbia University Press.

- Rottenberger, N. (2010) 'Austria and Finland: two European neutrals on their way to and in the ESDP', *AARMS*, 9(2), pp 275-283.
- Russett, B. M., Singer, D. J. , Small, M. (1968) 'National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A standardized List', *The American Political Science Review*, 62:3, pp 932-951.
- Ryan, C. 'Jordan: The Politics of Alliance and Foreign Policy', in Hey J. (ed), *Small States in World Politics,- Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado, pp 135-155.
- Saine, A (2003) 'Gambia: The Military and Foreign Policy' in Hey J. (ed), *Small States in World Politics,- Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado, pp 117-134.
- Sanchez, P (2003) ' Panama: A 'Hegemonized' Foreign Policy', in Hey J. (ed), *Small States in World Politics,- Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado, pp 53-74.
- Sangiovanni, Mette, E.(2003) 'Why a Common Security and Defence Policy is Bad for Europe', *Survival*, 45(3), pp 193-206
- Sarasvathy, S. D. and S. Venkataraman (2010), 'Entrepreneurship as Method: Open Questions for an Entrepreneurial Future', *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice*, 35(1), pp 113-135.
- Schmidl, E. (2001) 'Small States and International Operations', in Reiter, E., H. Gartner, eds.' *Small States and Alliances.* Heidelberg: Physica Verlag, pp 85-89.
- Schmidt, B & Juneau, T. (2012) 'Neoclassical realism and power',in Toje, A & Kunz, B. (eds), *'Neoclassical Realism in European Politics- Bringing power back in'*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, pp 61-78.
- Schimmelfennig, F. (2001) 'The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union', *International Organization*, 55(1), pp 47-80.
- Schou, A., and A. O. Brundtland (eds.) (1971) *Small States in International Relations*. Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell.
- Schure, P. and A. Verdun (2008) 'Legislative Bargaining in the European Union. The Divide between Large and Small Member States', *European Union Politics*, 9(4), pp 459-486.
- Schweller, R. (2009) 'Neoclassical realism and state mobilization: expansionist ideology in the age of mass politics', in Lobell, S., Ripsman, N. & Taliaferro, J. (eds) *Neoclassical realism, in the state, and foreign policy*. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, pp 227-250.
- Schweller, R. (1994) 'Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In', *International Security*, 19(1), pp 72-107.
- Schweller, R. (2014) 'Maxwell's demon and the golden apple: global discord in the new millenium', *United States*, Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Senor, D., Singer S. (2011). *Start-up Nation. The Story of Israel's Economic Miracle*. New York: Twelve.
- Sharp, G. P.(1987) 'Small States Foreign Policy and International Regimes: The Case of Ireland and the European Monetary System and the Common Fisheries Policy.' *Millenium: Journal of International studies*, 16(1), pp 55-72.
- Shlapentokh, D. (2012) *The Role of Small States in the Post-Cold War Era: The Case of Belarus*. London: Strategic Studies Institute-SSI.

- Shlapentokh, D. (2014), 'Ukrainian and Belorussian dimensions of Turkmenistan foreign policy: small states in a multipolar world', *Defense and Security Analysis*, 30(2), pp 163-175.
- Sheffer, G.(1997)' The Security of Small Ethnic States: A Counter Neo-Realist Argument', in Inbar, E.(ed)' *The National Security of Small States in a Changing World*', London: Frank Cass & Co. LTD, pp 9-41.
- Singer, M. (1972). *Weak States in a World of Powers: The Dynamics of International Relations*. New York: The Free Press.
- Singer, D. , Small, M. (1966) ' The composition and status ordering of the international system: 1815-1940', *World Politics*, 18:2, pp 236-282.
- Singer, D. J. & Small, M. (1974) 'The wages of war,1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook', *The journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 4:4, pp 661-665.
- Sirmen, A. (1979) 'The notion of the small state: Cyprus, its security and survival, in Worsley, P. & Kitromilides, P. (eds), ' *Small states in the modern world: the conditions of survival*', Nicosia, Zavallis Press Limited, pp 81-96.
- Sisay, H. B. (1985). *Big Powers and Small Nations: A Case Study of United States- Liberian Relations*. Landham, MB: University Press of America Inc.
- Smith, Michael E. (2001) 'Conforming to Europe: the domestic impact of EU foreign policy co-operation', *Journal of European Public Policy* 7 (4), pp 613-631.
- Smith, N., Pace, M., Lee, D. 'Size Matters: Small states and International Studies', *International studies perspectives* vol. 6(3), University of Birmingham.
- Sjursen, Helene (2002) 'Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40 (3), pp 491-513.
- Sjursen, Helene (2004) *Towards a post-national foreign and security policy?* ARENA Working Paper No. 12.
- Spyropoulos, G. (2010) *International Relations, A Realist Approach:Theory and Practice* Athens:Piotita (in Greek).
- Steinmetz, R. & Wivel, A. (ed), '*Small States in EUrope : Challenges and Opportunities*', Surrey: Ashgate, pp 87-102.
- Steinsson, S. (2016) 'The Cod Wars: a re-analysis', *European Security*, DOI:10.1080/09662839.2016.1160376.
- Sterling-Folker, J.(2009) 'Neoclassical realism and Identity: peril despite profit across the Taiwan Strait',in Lobell, S., Ripsman, N. & Taliaferro, J. (eds), *Neoclassical realism, in the state, and foreign policy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp 99-138.
- Stokke, K. (2012) 'Peace-building as Small State Foreign Policy', *International Studies* 49, pp 207-231.
- Sutton, P., A. Payne (1993). *Lilliput Under Threat: The Security Problems of Small Island and Enclave Developing States.* *Political Studies* 41, pp 579-593.
- Sutton, P.,(2011) 'The concept of small states in the international political economy, The round table: The Commonwealth Journal of international affairs', 100:413, pp 141-153.

- Taliaferro, J. (2000), 'Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited', *International Security*, 25:3, pp 128-161.
- Taliaferro, J. (2009) 'Neoclassical realism and resource extraction: State building for future war', in Lobell, S., Ripsman, N. & Taliaferro, J. (eds), *Neoclassical realism, in the state, and foreign policy*, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, pp 194-226.
- 'Small States reconsidered, *The Round Table: The commonwealth journal of international affairs*, 85:340, pp 399-405.
- The Economist* (2004), 'European Union enlargement: Smallness pays. How the rich and tiny manage to win the most privileges', February 26th. Available at: [www.economist.com/node/2461814](http://www.economist.com/node/2461814)
- The Economist* (2013) 'The Nordic countries: The next supermodel. Politicians from both right and left could learn from the Nordic countries', February 2nd. Available at: <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21571136-politicians-both-right-and-left-could-learn-nordic-countries-next-supermodel> .
- Thomas, A. J. (1979) 'International law and the turkish invasion of Cyprus', in Worsley, P. & Kitromilides, P. (eds), 'Small states in the modern world: the conditions of survival', Nicosia, Zavallis Press Limited, pp 187-198
- Thomas, A. V. W. (1979) 'The turkish invasion of Cyprus: legal aspects of the regional and united nations aspects', in Worsley, P. & Kitromilides, P. (eds), 'Small states in the modern world: the conditions of survival', Nicosia, Zavallis Press Limited, pp 199-212.
- Thorhallsson, B. (2000) *The Role of Small States in the European Union*. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing.
- Thorhallsson, B. (2007) 'The Size of States in the European Union: Theoretical and Conceptual Perspectives', *Journal of European Integration*, 28(1), pp 7-31.
- Thorhallsson, B. and Wivel A., (2006) 'Small States in the European Union: What Do we Know and What Would we Like to Know?', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 19(4), pp 651-668.
- Thorhallsson, B. (2002) 'Consequences of a Small Administration: The Case of Iceland', *Current Politics and Economics of Europe*, 11(1), pp 61-76.
- Thorhallsson, B. (2009) 'Can Small States Choose Their Own Size? The Case of a Nordic State- Iceland', in Cooper, A. & Shaw, T. (eds) *The Diplomacies of Small States- Between Vulnerability and Resilience*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 119-142.
- Thorhallsson, B. (2010), 'The Icelandic Crash and its Consequences: A Small State without Economic and Political Shelter', in Steinmetz, R. & Wivel, A. (ed), 'Small States in Europe: Challenges and Opportunities'. Surrey: Ashgate, pp 199-216.
- Thorhallsson, B. (2011) 'Small states in the UN security council: Means of influence?', *The Hague journal of Diplomacy*, 7, pp 135-160.
- Thorhallsson, B. (2012) 'Financial Crises in Iceland and Ireland: Does European Union and Euro Membership Matter?', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 50(5), pp 801-818.

- Tiilikainen, T. (2001) 'Nordic Integration Policy Seen From Abroad', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 36(1), pp 95-98.
- Tiilikainen, T. (2007) 'Finland - An EU Member with a small State Identity', *Journal of European Integration*, 28(1), pp 73-87.
- Toje, A. (2008) 'The European Union as a Small Power, or Conceptualizing Europe's Strategic Actorness', *European Integration*, 30(2), pp 199-215.
- Toje, A. (2010) 'The European Union as a Small Power -After the Post-Cold War', Palgrave: macmillan, Basingstoke.
- Toje, A. & Kunz, B.(2012) '*Neoclassical Realism in European Politics- Bringing power back in*', New York, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Toje, A & Kunz, B. (2012) 'Introduction: neoclassical realism in Europe',in Toje, A & Kunz, B. (eds), '*Neoclassical Realism in European Politics- Bringing power back in*', New York, Palgrave Macmillan, pp 1-16.
- Toje, A & Kunz, B. (2012) '*Conclusion: the future of neoclassical realism in Europe*', in Toje, A & Kunz, B. (eds), '*Neoclassical Realism in European Politics- Bringing power back in*', New York, Palgrave Macmillan, pp 255-263.
- Torreblanca José, (2001) 'Ideas, Preferences and Institutions: Explaining the Europeanization of Spanish Foreign Policy'. ARENA Working Paper 01/26.
- Tonra Ben, (2001) *The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001
- Tuschhoff, C. (2001) 'Gaining Control', in Reiter, E., H. Gartner, eds.' *Small States and Alliances*.' Heidelberg: Physica Verlag, pp 51-62.
- Tziampiris, A. (2013) 'Greek Foreign Policy in the Shadow of the Debt Crisis: Continuity and New Directions', in Sklias, P. and N. Tzifakis (eds.), *Greece's Horizons*. Athens: Institute for Democracy Series on European and International Affairs, pp 27-40.
- Tziampiris, A. (2015) 'In the shadow of a long and glorious past: Understanding Greek Foreign Policy', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 26(2), pp 63-79.
- Vandenbosch, A. (May, 1964) 'The small states in international politics and Organization', *The journal of Politics*, 26 (2), pp 293-312.
- Van Staden, A. (2005)' Close to power?',in Mouritzen, H. & Wivel, A. (eds)' *The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration*.' London:Routledge, pp 71-91.
- Vayrynen, R.(1997) 'Small States: Persisting Despite Doubts', in Inbar, E.(ed)' *The National Security of Small States in a Changing World*', London: Frank Cass & Co. LTD, pp 41-76.
- Väyrynen, R. (1971) 'On the definition and measurement of small power status', *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association* 2, pp.91-102.
- Jakobsen, P.(2009) 'Small States, Big Influence: The overlooked Nordic Influence on the Civilian ESDP', *JCMS*, 47(1), pp 81-102.
- Vital D. (1967) *The Inequality of States: A study of the Small Power in International Relations*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

- Vital D. (1971) *The Survival of Small states: studies in Small Power Great Power Conflict* London: OUP.
- Vital, D. (1997) 'Minor Power/ Major Power Relations and the Contemporary Nation-State', in Inbar, E.(ed) *'The National Security of Small States in a Changing World'*, London: Frank Cass & Co. LTD, pp 197-214.
- Wallace, W. at al (1998) 'Small European States and European Policy-Making. Strategies, roles, possibilities.' Proceedings from ARENA Annual Conference, ARENA Report No1, pp 11-26.
- Walt, S. (2009) 'Alliances in a Unipolar World', *World Politics*, 61(01), pp 86-120.
- Wedin, L.(2008)' Northern Europe and the ESDP: the case of Sweden', in Archer, C. (ed)' *New Security issues in Northern Europe: the Nordic and Baltic states and the ESDP'*, London: Routledge, pp 38-55.
- Wiberg, H. (1987) 'The Security of Small Nations: Challenges and Defences', *Journal of Peace Research*, 24(4), pp 339-363.
- Wivel, A. (2000) 'Theory and prospects for Northern Europe's Small States', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 35(3), pp 331-340.
- Wivel, A. (2005) 'The Security Challenge of Small EU Member States: Interests, Identity and the Development of the EU as a Security Actor', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 43(2), pp 393-412.
- Wivel, A. (2005) 'The constellation theory applied outside Europe', in Mouritzen, H. & Wivel, A. (eds) *The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration*. London:Routledge, pp 228-246.
- Wivel, A. (2010) 'From Small States to Smart State: Devising a Strategy for influence in the European Union', in Steinmetz, R. & Wivel, A. (eds.), *Small States in EUrope : Challenges and Opportunities*. Surrey: Ashgate, pp 15-30.
- Wivel, A. (2013) 'From Peacemaker to Warmonger? Explaining Denmark's Great Power Politics', *Swiss Political Science Review*, 19(3), pp 298-321.
- Wohlforth, W. C. (2015) 'Conclusion: A small middle power', in de Carvahlo B. and I.B. Neumann (eds.) *Small State Status Seeking*. New York: Routledge, pp 146-155.
- Wong Reuben, 'The Europeanisation of foreign policy', Ch.7 of Christopher Hill and Smith Michael (eds.) *International Relations and the European Union* (OUP, 2005).
- Worsley, P., Kitromilidis, P.(1979) 'Small states in the modern world: The conditions of survival', Nicosia, Zavallis Press Limited.
- Stark, H. (2002) 'Paris, Berlin et Londres: vers l'émergence d'un directoire européen?' *Politique Étrangère* 4/2002
- Shaohua, Y. (2009) 'How Can Weak Powers Win?', *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 2, pp 335-371.
- Sverdrup, B. (1998) 'Odysseus and the Lilliputians: Germany, the European Union, and the smaller European States', *Journal of Peace Research*, 35(6), pp 759-770.
- Studies, 40(5) 921-952.
- Vandenbosch, A. (1964) 'The Small States in International Politics and Organization', *The Journal of Politics*, 26(2), pp 293-312.

- Verdun, A. (2013), 'Small states and the global economic crisis: an assessment', *European Political Science*, 12, 276-293.
- Wallbott L. (2014) Keeping discourses separate: explaining the non-alignment of climate politics and human rights norms by small island states in United Nations climate negotiations *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 27:4, pp 736-760.