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‘East-West’ or ‘North-South’?

Mapping the Corruption Levels in Post-Socialist EU-Members

**A cross section study based on the Corruption Perception Index and
the Global Corruption Barometer of Transparency International**

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Abstract

This study deals with two major questions:

1. Twenty five years after the collapse of the Communist regimes, are there still 'socialist-regime' specific characteristics in the post socialist EU member states that affect the level of corruption there?
2. Do levels of corruption differ considerably between northern and southern post-socialist states, in the same way they do in Western Europe?

In the context of the above questions there is an attempt to trace further similarities and differences between western and post-socialist EU members.

The study has a cross section nature and is based on the countries' last three yearly scores in Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency International and the last (2013) Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) survey of the same Organisation.

To tackle the questions, data are analysed with descriptive statistics and basic regression models for an interpretation of CPI with quantitative (income) and qualitative (dummy) variables.

The conducted analysis showed broad similarities between the corruption motifs of the two regions and the regression analysis of the CPI answered a clear 'no' to the first question and a clear 'yes' to the second. Still the Global Corruption Barometer identified certain notable differences between the two country groups, concerning several specific institutions examined by the survey.

Introduction

The idea of tackling the topic of this study was the result of two questions raised during the academic year of the course. The first was the reasonable question of one studying the economies of the post-socialist states to wonder whether today, 25 years after the collapse of the communist regimes, corruption in these countries is still determined by certain old 'socialist' characteristics of the society and the economy.

The second question was raised somehow coincidentally after noticing an article by Ed West (8/12/2013), titled '*The EU is corrupt because southern Europe is corrupt*' posted in the Spectator/Bloggers. The complete article is given in Appendix I. The content of the article clearly reflected its title. One could say that the article does not add something and that simply observes known facts. A north European wonders how the corrupted states of European South can stand in the same polity – European Union – together with their north (corruption free) neighbours. The question that was raised, then, was: does this north – south division in levels of corruption, notorious in Western Europe, holds in the case of post socialist Eastern Europe, too. The study considers the issues in the context of European Union Members, only.

The study is divided in three parts. Part 1 firstly considers theoretical issues regarding the particularities of the socialist societies that favoured the appearance of of extensive phenomena of corruption. Secondly it tackles the difficulties in measuring corruption and examines the Transparency International's approach to an estimation of the level of corruption in a country by recording the perceptions of people about it. The last section of part 1 sets the research questions of the study and the research approaches to be followed to answer them.

The extensive chapter 2 provides the analysis of the data as prescribed in chapter 1 and reports several interesting remarks made after the scrutiny of the data.

Finally, Part 3 discusses and summarises the findings of the analysis and reaches the conclusions of the study making some recommendations for future research.

Part 1: The Context of the Study

1.1 Understanding Corruption in Post-Socialist Countries

This section attempts to identify particularities of the socialist regimes that favoured the development of extensive phenomena of corruption. Since corruption is not easily eradicated

To this aim However some insights on the socioeconomic roots of corruption in post-Socialist countries in transition may prove useful in two aspects: first a better understanding of corruption in the country in question and second in recommending particular measures for its confinement. Again this discussion is by no means exhaustive.

Rose-Ackerman (2001) identifies two important findings of the broader literature with respect to the issue discussed. The first is a result of the extreme inefficiency and economic failure of the socialist system. A dramatic analysis of production, consumption, and bureaucratic planning under that system is provided by Verdery (1996, chapter 1). Informal relations and transactions were rendered inherent to the system. Those failures of the system cultivated an extensive cooperation and mutual reliance among the members of narrow communities: relatives and friends (Rose-Ackerman 2001, p. 1). Most systematic malfunctions were overcome through this relationships either among lowest level workers or middle rank bureaucrats. Verdery describes many such transactions (&1886). However this cooperation and trust in narrow communities was broken after the collapse of the system and was replaced by opportunism (Rose-Ackerman 2001, *ibid*).

The second finding springs from the lack of legitimacy of the governments of the socialist regimes. To the eyes of the citizens politicians and public sector officials appeared as 'self-serving' (in the wording of Rose-Ackerman, *ibid*), following their personal informal commitments and dependencies. Hence 'the new democratic governments inherited a citizenry with low levels of trust in public institutions and with the habit of relying on inter-personal relations, not public institutions and laws' (*ibid*).

This lack of trust in politicians and civil service officials as a common perception creates vicious cycles of corruption. Citizens and businesses expect the average official to be corrupt. Hence they believe that the only way to pursuit their legitimate interests (at a first stage) is through informal transactions. At a second stage given the widespread corruption, individuals and businesses may furthermore be encouraged to seek

illegitimate benefits like tax reductions or regulation evasion (Rose-Ackerman 2001, pp. 17-18).

Similarly civil service officials at a first stage may approve bribes as a common rule. At a second stage 'they may create extra rules and regulations and contracting opportunities in order to profit personally' (ibid). One could argue here that this 'common rule' may become so strong that, if an official might want to resist corruption, he/she may face a particularly adverse environment in his/her organisation enforced by colleagues.

Public sector corruption may very well reach the level of politicians 'that may demand payoffs for passing laws or issuing regulations. They may even threaten to change the legal and regulatory environment unless they receive benefits (ibid). At this point one can very well add phenomena of clientalism, quite frequent in immature democracies like those in the former socialist states.

Having examined the socioeconomic roots of corruption in former socialist states we should search into the logic of corruption in this socioeconomic context. In Rose-Ackerman words 'to understand corruption one needs to clarify what is being bought and sold in a corrupt transaction (Rose-Ackerman: 2001, p. 19). This is imperative in making any policy measure recommendations.

Having in mind the relevant field research Rose-Ackerman specifies six distinct cases of economic rationale (incentives) behind corruption (Rose-Ackerman: 2001, pp. 19-23):

(i) Allocation of state benefits among those willing to pay. In this case the official in charge behaves as a monopolist that equates demand and supply. If this is the case, officials have the (monopoly) power 'to create scarcity even when the service is not scarce, either by delaying or withholding benefits unless paid bribes' (Rose-Ackerman: 2001, p. 19).

(ii) Provision of 'incentives' to public officials. The argument is based on cases of 'insufficiently' remunerated civil servants, where bribes can provide an 'incentive' to them for higher efficiency in their job. Such cases of course necessitate loose supervision methods (Rose-Ackerman: 2001, p. 20).

(iii) Cost reduction for individuals an business. Here bribing costs less than a legal taxation or an expense demanded by a regulation. In these

cases individuals and private businesses seek this cost reduction (Rose-Ackerman: 2001, pp. 20-21).

(iv) Benefits from public procurement contracts, privatization of public enterprises and generally public capital stock. These cases understandably concern private businesses and individual entrepreneurs. The huge task of privatisation, all former socialist countries had to undergo, provided a very fertile field for such transactions (Rose-Ackerman: 2001, p. 21).

(v) Buying judicial decisions. Huge economic interests may be at stake at a court. If bribing is possible, the benefits for litigants, individuals or firms are obvious (Rose-Ackerman 2001, pp. 21-22).

(vi) Funds for election campaigns and personal enrichment for elected politicians. This case is clearly related to clientelist phenomena in politics. Of course transactions can take place at party level, too (Rose-Ackerman: 2001, p. 22-23).

The economic rationale behind corruption should not hide the welfare costs to the economy that are not discussed here. However attempts have been made to calculate them (<http://www.transparency.org/>).

1.2 Assessing Corruption with Perception: The CPI of Transparency International (TI)

An agreement on defining corruption is a by far easier task compared to measuring corruption. In other words it is hard to determine a measuring instrument that exhibits increased validity (that it measures the concept in question) and reliability (that it does so without bias). (Sekaran, 2003, pp. 206 and 203) Transparency International in the 'frequently asked questions (FAQ)' section of its site lists some of the difficulties. (http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/in_detail#myAnchor1)

First, most of the times corruption refers to illegal activities that understandably are conducted in secrecy and are not recorded. Such activities come to light more or less coincidentally with the outbreak of scandals and subsequent investigations. Second, there is no specific variable to measure absolute levels of corruption in a country. For example there can be no reliable figures for the size of bribes because no one can approach either the number of bribes that take place or their size. Besides many times benefits provided may not be monetary. The number of cases brought to justice is also a non-reliable variable because it reflects only the effectiveness of the prosecutors, other authorities with duties of transparency assurance, or the media (FAQ No 2).

Given the above difficulties Transparency International introduced the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), an index based on the *perception* of how corrupt the public sector of a country is. CPI is a composite index, calculated on the basis of the results of a combination of surveys and other assessments of corruption. The relative research is undertaken by 'a variety of reputable institutions' (FAQ No 1). Referring to perception may raise concerns since perceptions are subjective.

However, given the difficulties in finding a reliable other measure of corruption, perception appears to be more efficient for its purposes. This is why it is used widely by many researchers and institutions. (<http://www.transparency.org/>)

Let us now have a quick examination of the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of Transparency International. CPI is a composite index. It results from calculations of the findings of surveys as well as assessments of the level of corruption. The primary research is conducted by numerous reputable and independent institutions around the world. These institutions are specialised in governance quality assessment and business climate analysis. Detailed information on the methodology in which CPI

is derived and the identity of contributors of each survey the reader can find in the official site of Transparency International that reviews the quality standards of the surveys. (<http://www.transparency.org/>).

Given the difficulties in measuring corruption discussed above, CPI can not claim the achievement of precise estimation of the corruption levels in a country/ territory. It is obviously confined in capturing the perceptions of business people and some country experts, Whatsoever, today the CPI of transparency International is the most widely used estimator of corruption levels (<http://www.transparency.org/>).

A full list of countries and territories ranked in the last published survey (2014) is given in the appendix. In order a CPI to be calculated fir a country or territory, there must be at least three relative reliable surveys for the corruption in it. Otherwise it is not included. CPI is calculated and published since as early as 1995 (1998 for most countries considered in this study) When CPI was introduced 31 countries only were surveyed and included in the study. Today this figure has risen above 170. (<http://www.transparency.org/>).

The data gathered for the 2014 survey were collected during the 24 months before the publication. The outcome provides a score and a rank. Scores are calculated on a scale ranging from 0 to 100. 0 stands for the most corrupted country and 100 for a country free of corruption. The rank of a country/territory is the position it takes in a global ranking according the recorded score. (<http://www.transparency.org/>)

The methodology employed today for the calculation of CPI scores obviously allows comparisons between countries. It also allows comparisons between years for a specific country and hence data can be used in a time series analysis. (<http://www.transparency.org/>)

However, this methodology was not applied in CPI calculations before 2012. This is a critical landmark for CPI figures from many aspects including the use of the index for academic research. The pre-2012 CPI, apart from being calculated on a 0-10 scale, did not allow over time comparisons for a specific country.

This is a major deficiency of the old CPI, preventing us from making a time series analysis along the nearly twenty years of records. (<http://www.transparency.org/>)

The previous methodology of Transparency International calculated CPI on the basis of a country's (average) relative ranking vis a vis other countries. As a consequence "a country X's CPI score could worsen, even if corruption in country X was perceived as lower than before, if other countries' perceived corruption dropped even more. It also means that CPI scores might be very stable, or very unstable, depending on a country's relative distance from the country's ranked just above or below. When there's a big gap, even significant changes in corruption perceptions won't show up in the data. Also, and closely related to the above point, the pre-2012 CPI was rescaled every year, deliberately (or at least consciously) zeroing out any general trends in perceived corruption across the world' (Stephenson M., 30/9/2014). For a more detailed description of the 2012 change in methodology, the reader is directed to this article and the discussion that follows.

The Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International has received its critics as to what extent perceptions reflect real corruption levels. Rick Messick (19/3/2014) summarised these critics. He refers especially to the findings of recent research by Daniel Treisman who showed that in countries exhibiting high perceived corruption levels people's perceptions were not based on actual experience of bribery. He also found that people's perceptions of corruption levels are influenced by the country's level of economic development and democratization; Generally, the richer and the more democratic a country is, perceptions render her less corrupt and vice versa. than poorer, non-democratic ones.

Furthermore, Dilyan Donchev and Gergely Ujhelyi (13/8/2009) reached similar findings and also noted that the education, the age, and the employment status of the respondents in the survey also influenced their perceptions regarding.

1.3 Research Questions and Methodological Approach

The study sets two major and one complimentary questions:

1. Are there still ‘socialist regime’ specific characteristics in the post socialist’ EU member states that affect the level of corruption there?

During the communist era the formerly socialist states were characterized by a widely different economic system and societal structure. The problems of the states’ transition to a free market economy have been – and still are – studied from the perspective of all social sciences. Corruption is a complex social and economic phenomenon embedded in the culture of the peoples. Because of this it is always hard to trace and eradicate. Hence the above question appears reasonable.

2. Do levels of corruption differ considerably between northern and southern post socialist states in the same way it does in Western Europe?

The differences in corruption levels between Western European North and South is notorious and broadly observed and studied. Discussion attributes it to cultural issues, mostly the existence or not of protestant principles. Francis Fukuyama’s ‘*Trust*’ provides one nice narrative on the aspect.

Eastern Europe also involves the Orthodox religion that brings the discussion beyond the Catholic/ Protestant distinction. Furthermore, have forty years of an atheist authoritarian regime altered such history long cultures? These considerations render the above second question a legitimate one.

3. A secondary interesting question related with the ones above is: What are the broader similarities or differences between the two groups of member states of the European Union?

The methodology to be applied in tackling the above questions will be first descriptive statistics that allow comparison of the findings of Transparency International’s surveys between the two groups of states.

Second some basic regression models will be developed in order to trace the relationship between the Corruption Perception Index first with the states’ per capita income. Western Europe includes some of the wealthiest nations in the world and Eastern Europe is considerably less

wealthy. Income levels is reasonable to affect corruption and hence income differences between the two regions should be taken into account.

Furthermore, the regression models will be expanded with dummy variables that pick important qualitative differences between states. The qualitative differences to be considered are (i) the existence or not of protestant values as key cultural element and (ii) whether or not a country has a socialist past.

Part 2: Analysis of the Data

2.1 The Current Situation in the Post-Socialist EU Members

2.1.1 The Situation According to the Corruption Perception Index (CPI)

This section will consider corruption levels in the region based on the findings of the Global Corruption Barometer of Transparency International.

Table 1

Post-Socialist EU Members: CPI 2012-2014 and Global Ranking 2014

rank 2014	country	CPI 2014	CPI 2013	CPI 2012
26	Estonia	69	68	64
35	Poland	61	60	58
39	Lithuania	58	57	54
39	Slovenia	58	57	61
43	Latvia	55	53	49
47	Hungary	54	54	55
53	Czech R.	51	48	49
54	Slovakia	50	47	46
61	Croatia	48	48	46
69	Bulgaria	43	41	14
69	Romania	43	43	44

Source: Transparency International (<http://www.transparency.org>)

The above table allows some interesting remarks:

1. As for overtime developments a three year period is not enough to show radical changes in a phenomenon so much cultural as corruption. Still if we arbitrarily consider a 3 unit change amid the above years as a notable one, then 5 out of the 11 states considered exhibit an improvement: Latvia's score increased by 6 units, Estonia's by 5 units, Lithuania's, and Slovakia's by 4 units, and Poland's by 3 units. To the opposite direction there is a deterioration of 3 units in the score of Slovenia. The remaining five states, namely Czech R., Hungary, Croatia, Romania, and Bulgaria, exhibit no notable change.

2. A geographical dimension in the scores is apparent. Balkan states exhibit the lowest scores without any indication of improvement. Northern countries exhibit distinctly higher scores and include all

improvements mentioned above. Estonia clearly leads the way with a score equal to that of France. (<http://www.transparency.org>)
The Situation According Global Corruption Barometer (GCB)

2.1.2 The situation According to the Global Corruption Barometer

This section will consider corruption levels in the region based on the findings of the Global Corruption Barometer of Transparency International. As already mentioned the Barometer is based on a specific questionnaire distributed in all countries covered by the survey. Surveys were conducted from 2003 to 2006 yearly and every two years ever since. (<http://www.transparency.org>)

To examine the current situation in the region the analysis will be based on the findings of the latest (2013) survey of the Chapter 2

Regrettably the 2013 survey did not include a major country, Poland. For this country reference will be made on the basis of the findings of the 2010/11 Global Corruption Barometer Survey. (<http://www.transparency.org>)

The complete questionnaire that was applied in the Global Corruption Barometer survey of 2013 appears as an appendix. In this section will be considered the responses to certain critical questions.

The following table presents the responses to the first question i.e. ‘Over the past two years how has the level of corruption in this country/territory changed?’

Table 2:
 GCB 2013: Responses to Question:
 ‘Over the past two years how has the level of corruption in this country/
 territory changed?’ (% of the sample)

	Increased a lot	Increased a little	Remained the same	Deceased a little	Decreased a lot
Bulgaria	19	16	49	16	1
Croatia	7	14	51	27	2
Czech R	29	28	36	7	0
Estonia	21	26	35	17	2
Hungary	34	28	32	6	1
Latvia	11	18	55	15	1
Lithuania	33	27	27	8	5
Slovakia	43	21	27	6	2
Slovenia	28	28	34	9	1
Romania	37	28	29	7	1

Source: Transparency International (<http://www.transparency.org>)

In the 2010/11 survey the same question provided a range of three possible answers (‘increased’, ‘remained the same’, ‘decreased’. In the Polish sample, 29% of the respondents said that corruption increased, 45% that it remained the same and 26% that it decreased. (<http://www.transparency.org>)

The table above allows some notable remarks:

1. Despite some differences among states, the people who believe that corruption fell in their countries form a small minority, definitely below 30%.
2. Countries could be distinguished only between those where the situation remained stable in the recent past, or it has been aggravated. Only in Croatia and Latvia the absolute majority of the peoples believed that the situation remained largely unchanged. In Bulgaria and Poland (for this country mind the time gap) a relative majority (more than 45%) believes so. In all other countries the majority believes that the situation has been aggravated in the recent years. The deterioration appears graver in the cases of Hungary, Lithuania, Romania (top case), and Slovenia. Then follow the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Slovakia. In the case of few countries this negative feeling does not conform to the improvement picked up by CPI scores shown in the previous section.

The following table presents the responses to the second question i.e. ‘To what extent do you think corruption is a problem in the public sector in this country/ territory?’

Table 3:

GCB 2013: Responses to Question:

‘To what extent do you think corruption is a problem in the public sector in this country/ territory?’ (% of the sample)

	A serious problem	A problem	A slight problem	Not really a problem	Not a problem at all
Bulgaria	55	25	19	1	0
Croatia	51	29	18	2	0
Czech R	55	28	15	2	0
Estonia	27	29	35	8	1
Hungary	27	33	32	7	1
Latvia	51	26	20	3	0
Lithuania	62	25	12	1	0
Slovakia	64	22	12	1	1
Slovenia	53	23	17	6	1
Romania	49	29	18	2	2

Source: Transparency International (<http://www.transparency.org>)

The major remark to make in considering the above table is that the majorities of all peoples unanimously stress that they consider corruption a problem in the public sector of their countries. Actually with the exception of Estonia and Hungary, the majorities consider it ‘a serious problem’ with Romania and Lithuania to lead the ranking (above 60%).

A similar question did not exist in the 2010/11 survey in order to consider the case of Poland. However, the responses to the following question provide a very good insight into the perceived corruption in the public sector of all countries, including Poland.

Let us come to the findings of this fifth question, which is arguably the most complex, broad, and interesting one. The question allows the calculation of the ‘percentage of respondents who felt these institutions were corrupt/extremely corrupt in this country/ territory?’ The institutions the question refers to are the following: political parties, parliament and legislature, military, non-governmental organisations (NGO), media, religious bodies, business (private sector), education, judiciary, medical

and health services, police, and public officials
(<http://www.transparency.org>)

The percentages calculated for all countries and institutions appear in the following table:

Table 4:
GCB 2013: Percentages of Perceived Corruption by Institution and by Country (Post-Socialist EU members)

Institution	BO	CR	CZ	ES	HU	LA	LI	RO	SK	SN	AV	ST. D.
Political Parties	76	72	73	55	68	68	78	76	64	78	70,8	6.9
Parliament	71	63	59	33	56	36	80	68	61	67	59.4	14
Military	28	24	47	8	17	17	19	19	30	24	23.3	9.9
NGO	37	28	20	18	23	18	24	21	26	24	23.9	5.4
Media	49	48	28	18	51	31	45	34	38	46	38.8	10.3
Religious Bodies	49	31	17	12	20	13	20	23	32	40	25.7	11.5
Business	63	50	45	41	63	46	56	49	45	42	50.0	7.7
Education	47	50	30	13	19	19	40	33	39	26	31.6	11.8
Judiciary	86	70	52	26	33	48	79	58	69	54	57.5	18.1
Medical Services	78	61	43	24	39	48	73	55	63	42	52.6	15.7
Police	65	51	54	17	38	47	67	54	60	39	49.2	14.2
Public Officials	64	64	71	38	36	63	69	50	66	50	57.1	12.1

Source: Transparency International (<http://www.transparency.org>) The calculation of the means, the variances, and the standard deviations was made by the writer.

Let us again refer to Poland. The similar question in the 2010/11 survey collected a different sort of answers. Respondents had to set their

perceived corruption level in the scale of 1-5. The averages published were: (<http://www.transparency.org>)

Political Parties: 3.6, Parliament: 3.4, Police: 3.2, Business: 3.5, Media: 2.8, Public Officials: 3.4, Judiciary: 3.3, NGO: 2.6, Religious Bodies: 2.7, Military: 2.4, Education: 2.6. Medical and Health Services were not included in the 2010/11 survey.

Scrutiny of the above table allows some important remarks:

1. Although there are notable differences in perceived levels of corruption between states, there is a very similar motif of national findings. Political parties and short behind them parliaments appear as the most corrupt institutions. The private sector (business) comes immediately afterwards. Public officials, judiciary businesses, medical services, police, and the media follow. The military, the NGOs, and the religious bodies appear as the least corrupt. The same picture reflects the situation in Poland, too, in the 2010/11 findings.

2. Politicians (political parties and parliament) strikingly stand as the most corrupt institutions in all countries without exceptions. The calculated mean percentage for political parties (70.8) is the highest one and that for parliament (59.4) the second highest one despite the ten percentage points difference. Besides it is definitely notable that the distribution of percentages among countries for political parties is the lowest one in the table (6.9).

3. The judiciary (57.5), the public officials (57.1), and a few points behind the medical and health services (52.6) follow in the perceptions of the respondents, regarding the level of corruption. Hence, with the exception of the military and the education, the majority among most peoples concerned finds the public sector of their countries corrupted. Standard deviations here (18.13, 12.06, and 15.73 respectively) are higher (more than double) than in the case of politicians, indicating greater differences between countries. Whatsoever, this finding is absolutely compatible with the responses given by the peoples to question 2 of the questionnaire, presented above.

4. Interestingly the private sector appears less corrupt than the public one in the perceptions of all peoples surveyed. The average percentage is found 50. The standard deviation, however, is estimated 7.66, showing rather small differences among countries, as contrasted with most other institutions.

5. Surprisingly or not corruption in the media does not appear as a problem to the majority of all peoples. The calculated average percentage for the media is 38.8 and hence the media appear less corrupted than the general private sector.

6. Similarly corruption does not appear to be a problem for the religious bodies, the education, and the NGOs. The majorities of all peoples do not consider them corrupt, despite some notable differences between countries

2.2 The Current Situation in the 'Western' EU Members

2.2.1 The Situation According to the Corruption Perception Index

Table 5

Western EU-Members: CPI 2012-2014 and Global Ranking 2014

Rank 2014	Country	CPI 2014	CPI 2013	CPI 2012
1	Denmark	92	91	90
3	Finland	89	89	90
4	Sweden	87	89	88
8	Netherlands	83	83	84
9	Luxembourg	82	80	80
12	Germany	79	78	79
14	United Kingdom	78	76	74
15	Belgium	76	75	75
17	Ireland	74	72	69
23	Austria	72	69	69
26	France	69	71	71
31	Cyprus	63	63	66
31	Portugal	63	62	63
37	Spain	60	59	65
43	Malta	55	56	57
69	Greece	43	40	36
69	Italy	43	43	42

Source: Transparency International (<http://www.transparency.org>)

The above table allows two basic remarks:

1. Considering again arbitrarily a three score units over the three year period as a significant indication of change, we observe that most countries do not present an improvement. However three countries do, namely Greece by 7 units, Ireland by 5 units, the United Kingdom by 4 units, and Austria by 3 units. On the other hand two countries, namely, Spain and Cyprus present an aggravation by 5 and 3 units, respectively.
2. A geographical divide is evident here, too. Northern countries clearly perform much better than the southern ones. Actually, Scandinavia captures the first positions of the world and the nine out of the seventeen

best performances globally are recorded by this group of countries. However, the last in the list share the 69th position on a global scale.

2.2.2 The Situation According Global Corruption Barometer (GCB)

This section considers the situation of corruption on the basis of the findings of the Global Corruption Barometer (2013 survey) in the conventionally called Western European EU members. The questionnaire applied is of course the same with that described above.

The following table presents the responses to the first question i.e. ‘Over the past two years how has the level of corruption in this country/territory changed?’

Table 6:
GCB 2013: Responses to the Question:
‘Over the past two years how has the level of corruption in this country/
territory changed?’ (% of the sample)

Country	Increased a lot	Increased a little	Remained the same	Deceased a little	Decreased a lot
Belgium	1	9	38	30	22
Cyprus	53	19	24	4	1
Denmark	4	23	68	4	1
Finland	12	32	45	10	1
France	41	31	21	4	2
Germany	23	34	36	7	1
Greece	39	16	30	12	3
Italy	45	19	32	4	0
Luxemburg	19	30	39	9	2
Portugal	57	21	18	3	1
Spain	39	28	29	4	0
United Kingdom	32	33	28	5	2

Source: Transparency International (<http://www.transparency.org>)

Five countries of the region, namely Austria, Ireland, Malta, the Netherlands, and Sweden were not included in the survey. However Austria, Ireland, and the Netherlands were included in the 2010/11 survey. In that survey the question was answered on a three grade scale, namely, 'increased', 'remained the same', 'decreased'. The answers are given below.

Table 7:

GCB 2010/11: Selected Countries' Responses to the Question:
'Over the past two years how has the level of corruption in this country/
territory changed?' (% of the sample)

Country	Increased	remained the same	decreased
Austria	46	45	9
Ireland	66	24	10
The Netherlands	51	43	6

Source: Transparency International (<http://www.transparency.org>)

Let us make some key observations on the content of the above table:

1. Belgium is the only country in the list where the people have a strong feeling (52% of the sample) that corruption decreased in their country and Denmark the only country with the strong feeling (68% of the sample) that things remain stable. To a lesser extent this holds for Finland. too.

2. In all countries, except the forth mentioned ones, the majority of the peoples believe that the situation has been aggravated. On the top of this group lie Portugal and Cyprus and follow France, Greece, Italy Spain. The negative feeling is the same in the three countries with data of the 2010/11 survey.

The following table presents the responses to the second question i.e. 'To what extent do you think corruption is a problem in the public sector in this country/ territory?'

Table 8:

GCB 2013: Responses to the Question:

‘To what extent do you think corruption is a problem in the public sector in this country/ territory?’ (% of the sample)

Country	A serious problem	A problem	A slight problem	Not really a problem	Not a problem at all
Belgium	38	28	22	11	1
Cyprus	47	32	17	4	0
Denmark	0	9	23	38	26
Finland	9	17	36	30	9
France	47	27	17	8	1
Germany	37	28	22	11	2
Greece	70	20	8	1	1
Italy	61	26	12	1	0
Luxemburg	18	18	37	20	7
Portugal	70	20	9	1	0
Spain	65	23	12	0	0
United Kingdom	29	32	25	12	2

Source: Transparency International (<http://www.transparency.org>)

Similar responses can not be found for the remaining countries of the group because such a question was not included in the 2010/11 survey.

The table above splits the countries into two groups. Peoples in countries with limited corruption indicators (Scandinavia) and Luxemburg do not consider corruption in the public sector to be a problem. In all other countries of the table the majorities of the peoples believe otherwise if we add together the responses of 'a serious problem' and 'a problem'. Actually, in Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal the vast majority marks the answer 'a serious problem'.

Table 9:
GCB 2013: Percentages of Perceived Corruption by Institution and by
Country (Western EU-members)

Institution	BE	CY	DK	FI	FR	GE	GR	IT	LU	PO	SP	UK	AV	ST.D.
Political Parties	67	91	30	45	73	65	90	89	53	73	83	66	68.8	18.11
Parliament	51	76	18	31	52	48	83	77	33	66	67	55	54.8	19.31
Military	32	54	17	7	19	25	31	25	25	66	19	17	28.1	15.86
NGO	25	20	15	13	26	31	39	26	20	39	15	18	23.9	8.54
Media	37	68	30	35	54	54	86	45	37	41	41	68	49.7	16.14
Religious Bodies	56	44	39	15	31	34	49	39	44	35	41	34	38.4	10.25
Business	41	37	31	42	61	61	65	52	48	51	43	49	48.4	9.88
Education	17	27	6	7	16	19	45	29	21	35	11	18	20.9	10.98
Judiciary	43	38	5	9	34	20	66	47	24	66	51	24	35.6	19.22
Medical Services	22	64	13	17	28	48	73	54	21	36	14	19	34.1	19.84
Police	41	76	9	5	41	20	56	27	29	38	37	32	34.3	18.51
Public Officials	51	59	11	25	48	49	66	61	40	46	42	45	45.3	14.56

Source: Transparency International (<http://www.transparency.org>) The calculation of the means, the variances, and the standard deviations were made by the writer.

Table 10:
GCB 2010/11: Percentages of Perceived Corruption by Institution and by Country (selected Western EU-members)

Institution	AUS	IRL	NETH
Political Parties	3.2	4.4	3
Parliament	2.7	4.0	2.7
Military	2.5	2.3	2.5
NGO	2.3	2.5	2.5
Media	2.8	3	2.7
Religious Bodies	2.7	3.9	2.9
Business	3.3	3.5	3.1
Education	2.3	2.5	2.3
Judiciary	2.5	2.7	2.6
Police	2.6	3.0	2.6
Public Officials	2.8	3.3	3.0

Source Transparency International (<http://www.transparency.org>)

The tables that result from the above question are always the most interesting since they provide numerous insights into the perceptions of the peoples regarding corruption in their countries. Let us make some key remarks on the content of the above tables:

1. As CPI scores have already indicated there are huge differences between perceived differences in levels of corruption among the states of the group. Still there are important similarities in the rank taken by the various institutions among countries. Political parties and short behind them parliaments appear as the most corrupt institutions in all countries except Denmark. The average percentages estimated are 68.8 and 54.8 respectively. The private sector (48.4) and the media (49.7) follow close to each other. Then come public officials. The judiciary, the police (34.3), and the health and medical services (34.1) follow at a distance. However, the ranking of these institutions varies considerably among the states of

the list. The military, the education and the NGOs, appear as the least corrupt. The picture is not different in the three countries for which 2010/11 findings are considered. However the ranking of the institutions after the political parties, the private sector, and the public officials is more obscure.

2. Politicians (political parties and parliament) are notoriously found as the most corrupt institutions in all countries (except Denmark), either with high corruption levels or with low ones. The calculated mean percentage for political parties (68.8) is the highest one and that for parliaments (54.8) the second highest one. However, standard deviations calculated are comparatively high indicating a high gap between the top and bottom countries (e.g. Denmark's percentages for political parties and parliament are 30 and 18 respectively, where as those of Cyprus are 91 and 76).

3. Corruption in the public sector is more obvious in the case of public officials (45.3). Then come the judiciary (35.6), the police (34.3), and the medical and health services (34.1). Hence, corruption in these fields of the public sector is evident in the perceptions of the respondents, with grave differences among states, however, as standard deviations indicate. The military and the education stand further behind. Whatsoever, the observed feeling is absolutely compatible with the responses given by all peoples to question 2 of the questionnaire, presented above.

4. The average percentage for Business was estimated 48.4. Interestingly the private sector exhibits the second smallest standard deviation (after NGO) among nations i.e. 9.88. The peoples' perceptions for it seem much similar. Hence in less corrupted countries the private sector appears more corrupt than the public sector, whereas the opposite holds for the most corrupted countries. There the private sector appears less corrupt than the public one.

5. The media appear considerably corrupt with an average percentage of 49.7. Despite enormous percentage point differences among states, the media are ranked at comparatively high corruption levels in all countries.

6. Interestingly religious bodies with an average percentage of 38.4 appear considerably corrupt, in several western countries.

7. On the other hand corruption does not appear to be a problem for the education and the NGOs. The average percentages are estimated 20.9 and

23.9 respectively. The majorities of all peoples do not consider them corrupt, despite some notable differences between countries.

2.3 A Basic Regression Analysis of the 2014 CPI

In this section a few regression models are produced and tested in an attempt to capture the influence on CPI of three factors:

1. People's wealth. This factor is captured with the use of variable per capita income. The data are provided by the World Bank and per capita income is measured in constant 2005 US dollars for year 2013.
2. History long culture. To capture culture we make use of the major religion of the state. A dummy variable is introduced taking value 1 if a country is protestant and 0 otherwise. While doing so we keep in mind that many countries have important religious minorities that sometimes reach 40% or more (e.g. the Catholics in Belgium and Germany and the orthodox in the Baltic States). Furthermore we do not disregard that in certain countries recent censuses showed increased atheism (e.g. in Czech Republic and Estonia). Still we accept that the major religion and especially the existence or not of the protestant values determine history long culture.
3. The socialist culture. A second dummy variable is introduced here, taking value 0 for the 'western EU-members and 1 in the post socialist EU-members. This dummy variable attempts to capture the effect of the socialist past in the behaviour of a nation as far as corruption is concerned.

The following table exhibits the above data.

Table 11:
EU members: Per capita Income, Major religion, and Socialist Past

Country	CPI 2014	Per Capita Income	Protestant or not	post socialist or not
Denmark	92	47230	1	0
Finland	89	39087	1	0
Sweden	87	45588	1	0
Netherlands	83	42893	1	0
Luxembourg	82	79532	0	0
Germany	79	39214	1	0
United Kingdom	78	40231	1	0
Belgium	76	37559	1	0
Ireland	74	47281	0	0
Austria	72	41247	0	0
Estonia	69	35620	0	0
France	63	20517	0	0
Cyprus	63	18210	0	0
Portugal	60	25134	0	0
Poland	55	16736	0	0
Spain	43	18222	0	0
Lithuania	43	29409	0	0
Slovenia	69	11997	1	1
Latvia	61	16752	0	1
Malta	58	12549	0	1
Hungary	58	18635	0	1
Czech Republic	55	8803	0	1
Slovakia	54	11430	0	1
Croatia	51	14638	0	1
Greece	50	15369	0	1
Bulgaria	48	10563	0	1
Italy	43	4808	0	1
Romania	43	6073	0	1

notes: (i)The countries appear in the order of the CPI 2014 ranking.
(ii) per capita income in constant 2005 US dollars for year 2013. Source:
<http://www.worldbank.org/>.

The following models were calculated:

1. CPI regressed on per capita income for 'western countries' only. The results are the following:

Constant	46,76351
Std Err of Y Est	11,15176
R Squared	0,468682
No. of Observations	17
Degrees of Freedom	15
X Coefficient(s)	0,000662
Std Err of Coef.	0,000182
t-test	3,637537

The t-test indicates that the coefficient of per capita income is significant at 95% significance level. However, R^2 says that only 47% of the CPI variation is explained by the per capita income.

2. CPI regressed on per capita income and religion for 'western countries' only. The results are the following:

Constant	45,59658
Std Err of Y Est	7,580432
R Squared	0,770864
No. of Observations	17
Degrees of Freedom	14
X Coefficient(s)	0,000506 16,72773
Std Err of Coef.	0,000129 3,893
t-test	3,925843 4,296873

The t-tests indicate that the coefficients of both per capita income and the religion dummy are significant at 95% significance level. R^2 now increases to 77% showing the joint significance of the variables. The protestant religion seems to add 16.7 score points to a country's CPI.

3. CPI regressed on per capita income for 'post socialist countries' only. The results are the following:

Constant	41,31528
Std Err of Y Est	6,771915
R Squared	0,321777
No. of Observations	11
Degrees of Freedom	9

X Coefficient(s)	0,00103
Std Err of Coef.	0,000498
t-test	2,066391

The t-test indicates that the coefficient of per capita income is significant at 90% significance level only. R^2 says that only 32% of the CPI variation is explained by the per capita income of these countries.

4. CPI regressed on per capita income and religion for post socialist countries only. The results are the following:

Constant	39,81695
Std Err of Y Est	4,39017
R Squared	0,746627
No. of Observations	11
Degrees of Freedom	8

X Coefficient(s)	0,001027 16,86406
Std Err of Coef.	0,000323 4,604463
t-test	3,178441 3,662547

The introduction of the religion dummy improves the model significantly. First it renders both variables significant at the 95% significance level and second it raises R^2 to 75%. Quite interestingly the coefficient of the religion dummy is so close to the corresponding coefficient of the 'western countries' (16.9 versus 16.7). Similarly close stand the two R^2 (75% versus 77%).

On the other hand the income coefficient for the post socialist countries appears double as compared with the corresponding one of the 'western EU members', indicating a greater effect of income in these considerably poorer countries.

5, The next model, that was calculated pooled together all EU members and regressed their 2014 CPI on both per capita income and the religious dummy.

Constant	45,70852
Std Err of Y Est	6,355685
R Squared	0,835706
No. of Observations	28
Degrees of Freedom	25
X Coefficient(s)	0,000511 16,50301
Std Err of Coef.	7,79E-05 2,916546
t-tests	6,566461 5,658409

The outcome provides a really good model with both coefficients to appear significant at all significance levels and the R^2 to testify that per capita income and the religion dummy are able to jointly explain 83.5% of the CPI variation.

6. The next model, that was calculated kept pooled together all EU members and regressed their 2014 CPI on all: per capita income, the religious dummy, and the 'socialist past' dummy. The results are the following:

Constant	44,71369
Std Err of Y Est	6,475208
R Squared	0,83629
No. of Observations	28
Degrees of Freedom	24
X Coefficient(s)	0,000532 16,57622 1,049886
Std Err of Coef.	0,0001072,981913 3,588621
t-tests	4,993365 5,558923 0,29256

The coefficient of the socialist past dummy is calculated greatly insignificant. Apart from the t-test, its insignificance is demonstrated by the fact that its introduction leaves almost intact all: the coefficients of both other variables and the coefficient of determination (R^2).

For an additional confirmation of the above conclusion, one final model was calculated. It was the same with the above but the religion dummy was removed. The results are the following:

Constant	46,13103
Std Err of Y Est	9,595692
R Squared	0,625502
No. of Observations	28
Degrees of Freedom	25
X Coefficient(s)	0,000679 -0,62427
Std Err of Coef.	0,000153 5,299262
t-tests	4,442909 -0,1178

Here again per capita income appears as a highly significant variable, while the socialist past again quite insignificant.

Hence the confirmed conclusions of the above cross section regression analysis are:

1. Per capita income and historical culture can explain much of the CPI variation among EU members today.
2. The socialist past does not appear to affect CPI twenty five years after the political change.

2.4 Further Similarities and Differences between East and West European Union

In this section it will be attempted to trace further similarities and difference between the two parts of the Union. The contrast will be based on the findings of the Global Corruption Barometer in both regions and the subsequent analysis.

Too many interesting similarities and differences can be stressed:

1. Peoples in all countries of the Union (except Denmark) consider the Political Parties and the Parliaments as the most corrupted institutions among those listed in the questionnaire. The average percentages of the two groups are very close: 70.8 in the East and 68.8 in the West (political parties) and 59.4 and 54.8 respectively for the parliaments. However, standard deviations in the West are much higher than in the East. All together these figures show that the situation is somehow worse in the East.
2. The broader public sector appears more corrupt in the East. The average percentages calculated for East and West are: Public Officials 57.1 vs 45.3, Judiciary 57.5 vs 35.6, Medical and Health Services 52.6 vs 34.1, Police 49.2 vs 34.3, Education 31.6 vs 20.9. However, the relative standard deviations in the West are bigger indicating considerable differences among states in the group. Further scrutiny of the figures shows that high values in the West are encountered in the poorer not protestant nations.
3. The private sector (Business) interestingly exhibit quite similar figures in the two regions with actually small standard deviations: The average percentage in the East is 50.0 and the standard deviation 7.7, whereas the two figures in the West are 48.4 and 9.9 respectively. The private sector appears moderately corrupted and at the same level in the perceptions of all peoples.
4. Surprisingly or not Media and Religious Bodies appear considerably less corrupt in the East than in the West. The average percentage for Media in the East is 38.8 and in the West 49.7 with standard deviation in the East to be much smaller, too (10.3 vs 16.14) For Religious Bodies in the East the average percentage is 25.7 and in the West 38.4. Standard deviations are similar, a bit more than 10.

5. The Military and the NGO appear comparatively corruption free all across European Union (except Cyprus for the military).
6. There is a widespread feeling across the vast majority of the nations that corruption has increased in the recent years. Besides most peoples believe that corruption in the private sector of their countries is an important problem.

Part 3: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations for Future Research

The first question that the study posed was whether there is indication of 'post-social' elements that affect the corruption level in Eastern EU-member states. The regression analysis conducted here answered 'definitely, no'. Of course, it does so without providing any clue on the historical evolution of corruption levels. It only considers the present day situation, twenty five years after the collapse of the Communist regimes.

The recent Global Corruption Barometer survey also shows a rather similar motif of perceived corruption across institutions with the politicians to strikingly the first in almost all countries. The picture for the private sector, the military, and the NGOs is also similar between the two groups of countries.

However, deeper scrutiny of the findings of the Global Corruption Barometer survey identifies considerably higher perceived corruption in the post socialist countries as far as the broader public sector is concerned. This is valid for several areas of the public administration examined, namely, the public officials, the judiciary, the police, the education, and the medical and health services.

The motif between the two regions also differs in the case of the media and the religious bodies. Both these institutions appear more corrupt in the western citizens' eyes rather do in the East's.

The second question that was considered in the study was whether the cultural division between protestant and non-protestant nations that is traced in the West, also holds for the East.

The regression analysis conducted answered 'definitely, yes'. In Eastern Europe there is only one historically protestant nation, Estonia. This nation stands first in the CPI ranking of the group leaving all the rest considerably behind. Estonia outperforms France and other considerably wealthier catholic nations of the West. If one takes into account the rather low per capita income of the country and the fact that nearly 40% of the population are mostly orthodox Russians, the country could very well stand next to its western Scandinavian counterparts.

The 'harmonisation' of corruption levels between East and West is also apparent in the Balkans. Croatia, and especially Bulgaria and Romania, stand very close to Greece. In the west the only country that presents a 'Balkan' score is Italy.

I final remark to make is that the present analysis is contemporary to the major financial crisis in Europe. This coincidence may influence the performance of the states that was mostly affected by the crisis in both East and West. It may also have created this widespread feeling among peoples the corruption phenomena were aggravated in the last years.

Future research in corruption can always be wide. However, regarding the scope of this study, what is always challenging for the researcher is to overcome the frustrating inability of the pre-2012 CPI scores of Transparency International to allow a time series and generally a time depth analysis. Perhaps a series of cross-section analyses, like the one here, for every, say, two years of the last one and a half decades, based on both CPI scores and contemporary Global Corruption Barometer support, could provide an appraisal of the evolution of the topic over the years. It could probably capture whether there have been 'post-socialist' specific features that affected East Europe in earlier years as far as corruption is concerned. It could also provide some indication of how major critical junctures like market liberalisation steps and accession to EU contributed to this 'harmonisation' of Eastern records with the Western ones.

Such further research could introduce more variables apart from the per capita income and the religion and 'post socialist' dummies of the present study. Widening the cultural element in the topic more cultural dummies could be tested. More quantitative variables, like public finances, could be tested, too. If significant parameters are identified in such cross section studies, then these parameters could be analysed on a time series basis.

APPENDIX I

Article by Ed West (The Spectator Bloggers, posted on 6/12/2013)

What with Britain's dreadful performance in the PISA educational rankings, there has been comparatively little attention given to another international league table— Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index.

The good news is that Bulgaria and Romania, with whom we will become much more intimate next month, are already in the EU's top 5 for corruption, placed 2nd and 4th, with Greece, Italy and Slovakia filling out the leader board.

I don't object to Romanian and Bulgarian EU citizens being able to come to Britain as such, I object to the very idea of these countries joining the polity of which I am a member.

But then I'm not too happy about being part of the same state as Greece and Italy, for the same reason. Perhaps I have to add some sort of caveat here about liking Italian and Greek people, as if not wanting to move in with someone and share their bank account or bed meant you hated them; yet although such a caveat would be absolutely true, corruption levels are a reflection of public morality.

Italians have a great deal of *campanilismo*, which translates as a sense of concentric loyalty, so that a good Italian is devoted to his village, region, province and only then his nation. It is a word with no English translation, and I'm guessing no equivalent in Dutch, German or the Scandinavian languages. It's partly why Italy and Greece, while having the best architecture, food and history, and being home to wonderful, warm people, are by northern European standards failed states.

I'm currently reading Paul Collier's *Exodus*, which makes some compelling points about the social effects of immigration, and further confirms my (deeply ingrained and prejudiced) belief that economists who make pronouncements on matters of policy while ignoring the social implications are the great charlatans of our age. Collier looks at how game theory applies in different societies and suggests that Nigeria is riddled with corruption and theft because enough people are corrupt (and

it doesn't have to be that many) that it makes no sense to be an honest person.

For societies to avert this situation free-riders need to be punished (shamed, ostracised, prosecuted) by other individuals acting with the support of the rest of society, and almost as importantly, for those punishers not to be punished in turn, as happens in clannish societies where people care more about their family than the well-being of the wider society. Destroying the power of the clans can take a very, very long time; around the North Sea it began a good millennium ago.

Collier also made a point that is relevant both to migration and super-national states. He points out that as well as minorities integrating into a society's norms, the majority may start to integrate into the minority, if it is large enough, or if its cultural norms give an individual an advantage. He uses a study of diplomats in New York to show that, when a group of people from a more honest society and a group from a corrupt one join together, the former begin behaving like the latter. This is known as Steyn's Maxim, after Mark Steyn's comments about ice cream, dog faeces and the UN, and it fits perfectly into evolutionary game theory. Why would you be honest if everyone around you is on the fiddle? This has major implications for welfare, too.

The European Union might work well if it only accepted countries with a maximum level of corruption, which would in effect be a North European Union, but the EU must expand to further pressure troublesome members (ie Britain) thinking of seceding. This month the union will make a decision on admitting Albania, the most clannish society in Europe and with corruption levels off the scale.

How can Albania and Denmark fit inside the same polity? Only an economist would think that a good idea.

APPENDIX II

Corruption Perception Index: Ranking of All States and Territories - 2014

1 Denmark	92	91	90
2 New Zealand	91	91	90
3 Finland	89	89	90
4 Sweden	87	89	88
5 Norway	86	86	85
5 Switzerland	86	85	86
7 Singapore	84	86	87
8 Netherlands	83	83	84
9 Luxembourg	82	80	80
10 Canada	81	81	84
11 Australia	80	81	85
12 Germany	79	78	79
12 Iceland	79	78	82
14 United Kingdom	78	76	74
15 Belgium	76	75	75
15 Japan	76	74	74
17 Barbados	74	75	76
17 Hong Kong	74	75	77
17 Ireland	74	72	69
17 United States	74	73	73
21 Chile	73	71	72
21 Uruguay	73	73	72
23 Austria	72	69	69
24 Bahamas	71	71	71
25 United Arab Emirates	70	69	68
26 Estonia	69	68	64
26 France	69	71	71
26 Qatar	69	68	68
29 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	67	62	62
30 Bhutan	65	63	63
31 Botswana	63	64	65
31 Cyprus	63	63	66
31 Portugal	63	62	63
31 Puerto Rico	63	62	63
35 Poland	61	60	58
35 Taiwan	61	61	61
37 Israel	60	61	60
37 Spain	60	59	65
39 Dominica	58	58	58
39 Lithuania	58	57	54
39 Slovenia	58	57	61
42 Cape Verde	57	58	60
43 Korea (South)	55	55	56
43 Latvia	55	53	49
43 Malta	55	56	57

43 Seychelles	55	54	52
47 Costa Rica	54	53	54
47 Hungary	54	54	55
47 Mauritius	54	52	57
50 Georgia	52	49	52
50 Malaysia	52	50	49
50 Samoa	52	#N/A	#N/A
53 Czech Republic	51	48	49
54 Slovakia	50	47	46
55 Bahrain	49	48	51
55 Jordan	49	45	48
55 Lesotho	49	49	45
55 Namibia	49	48	48
55 Rwanda	49	53	53
55 Saudi Arabia	49	46	44
61 Croatia	48	48	46
61 Ghana	48	46	45
63 Cuba	46	46	48
64 Oman	45	47	47
64 The FYR of Macedonia	45	44	43
64 Turkey	45	50	49
67 Kuwait	44	43	44
67 South Africa	44	42	43
69 Brazil	43	42	43
69 Bulgaria	43	41	41
69 Greece	43	40	36
69 Italy	43	43	42
69 Romania	43	43	44
69 Senegal	43	41	36
69 Swaziland	43	39	37
76 Montenegro	42	44	41
76 Sao Tome and Principe	42	42	42
78 Serbia	41	42	39
79 Tunisia	40	41	41
80 Benin	39	36	36
80 Bosnia and Herzegovina	39	42	42
80 El Salvador	39	38	38
80 Mongolia	39	38	36
80 Morocco	39	37	37
85 Burkina Faso	38	38	38
85 India	38	36	36
85 Jamaica	38	38	38
85 Peru	38	38	38
85 Philippines	38	36	34
85 Sri Lanka	38	37	40
85 Thailand	38	35	37
85 Trinidad and Tobago	38	38	39
85 Zambia	38	38	37
94 Armenia	37	36	34
94 Colombia	37	36	36
94 Egypt	37	32	32

94 Gabon	37	34	35
94 Liberia	37	38	41
94 Panama	37	35	38
100 Algeria	36	36	34
100 China	36	40	39
100 Suriname	36	36	37
103 Bolivia	35	34	34
103 Mexico	35	34	34
103 Moldova	35	35	36
103 Niger	35	34	33
107 Argentina	34	34	35
107 Djibouti	34	36	36
107 Indonesia	34	32	32
110 Albania	33	31	33
110 Ecuador	33	35	32
110 Ethiopia	33	33	33
110 Kosovo	33	33	34
110 Malawi	33	37	37
115 Côte d'Ivoire	32	27	29
115 Dominican Republic	32	29	32
115 Guatemala	32	29	33
115 Mali	32	28	34
119 Belarus	31	29	31
119 Mozambique	31	30	31
119 Sierra Leone	31	30	31
119 Tanzania	31	33	35
119 Vietnam	31	31	31
124 Guyana	30	27	28
124 Mauritania	30	30	31
126 Azerbaijan	29	28	27
126 Gambia	29	28	34
126 Honduras	29	26	28
126 Kazakhstan	29	26	28
126 Nepal	29	31	27
126 Pakistan	29	28	27
126 Togo	29	29	30
133 Madagascar	28	28	32
133 Nicaragua	28	28	29
133 Timor-Leste	28	30	33
136 Cameroon	27	25	26
136 Iran	27	25	28
136 Kyrgyzstan	27	24	24
136 Lebanon	27	28	30
136 Nigeria	27	25	27
136 Russia	27	28	28
142 Comoros	26	28	28
142 Uganda	26	26	29
142 Ukraine	26	25	26
145 Bangladesh	25	27	26
145 Guinea	25	24	24
145 Kenya	25	27	27

145 Laos	25	26	21
145 Papua New Guinea	25	25	25
150 Central African Republic	24	25	26
150 Paraguay	24	24	25
152 Congo, Republic of	23	22	26
152 Tajikistan	23	22	22
154 Chad	22	19	19
154 Congo, Democratic Republic of	22	22	21
156 Cambodia	21	20	22
156 Myanmar	21	21	15
156 Zimbabwe	21	21	20
159 Burundi	20	21	19
159 Syria	20	17	26
161 Angola	19	23	22
161 Guinea-Bissau	19	19	25
161 Haiti	19	19	19
161 Venezuela	19	20	19
161 Yemen	19	18	23
166 Eritrea	18	20	25
166 Libya	18	15	21
166 Uzbekistan	18	17	17
169 Turkmenistan	17	17	17
170 Iraq	16	16	18
171 South Sudan	15	14	#N/A
172 Afghanistan	12	8	8
173 Sudan	11	11	13
174 Korea (North)	8	8	8
174 Somalia	8	8	8

APPENDIX III

Global Corruption Barometer 2013 survey - Questionnaire

1. Over the past two years how has the level of corruption in this country/territory changed?
2. To what extent do you think corruption is a problem in the public sector in this country/ territory?
3. To what extent is this government run by a few big entities acting in their own best interests?
4. How effective do you think your government's actions are in the fight against corruption?
5. Percentage of respondents who felt these institutions were corrupt/extremely corrupt in this country/territory?
6. Have you or anyone in your household paid a bribe to one of these eight services in the last 12 months?
7. To what extent do you agree that ordinary people can make a difference in the fight against corruption?

Source Transparency International (<http://www.transparency.org>), research section

Literature and Sites

Sites

<http://www.transparency.org/>

<http://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2014/09/30/pre-2012-cpi-scores-cannot-be-compared-across-time-so-please-stop-doing-it/>

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