

**University of Macedonia**



**Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies**

***MA Programme in Politics and Economics of Contemporary Eastern and Southeastern Europe***

**MA Dissertation**

**Post-Cold War Ukrainian Foreign Policy: Kiev between East and West.**

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Thessaloniki

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**University of Macedonia**



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2013

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### **Abstract**

This dissertation deals with the post-Cold War Foreign Policy of Ukraine. There appears to be a split in pro-Eastern and pro-Western approaches to the Foreign Policy making of Ukraine after the end of the Cold War. This dissertation takes into account the differences of these approaches, makes an analysis and comes to the conclusion that Ukraine's foreign policy is influenced by the East and West, looking internally like a constant split in the public opinion and the leader's political response after the end of the Cold War.

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## **Foreword**

The topic of Post-Cold War Ukrainian foreign policy presents a great interest among scholars and researchers of the international relations field throughout the last two decades. This field embraces the topic in question - foreign policy, and enters into a larger field of knowledge - politology, which was acknowledged just after the second World War as a full-fledged separate scientific discipline. Foreign policy of Ukraine after the end of Cold War carries a special personal interest due to many reasons. First of all, it's a present-day issue not only for conscious citizens of Ukraine and policy makers of its direct neighbour-states, but also an issue of a big importance for regional and international security throughout the world. This topic presents a personal value to me, laying a cornerstone in my beginner's research in this field and besides glimmering a hope of possibility to change weak points to the good and good to the better in the future inside my country, should I get an opportunity of further work in this field. Personally, I encountered some difficulties, apart from making research on a common topic: this is my first work in this field which presupposed a deep plunging into a new topic and mastering more theoretical foundations as well as practical case studies. And though the present piece of work might sometimes bear a novice character, it compiles a vast material of different sources, ideas of different scholars analysed, to bring out new opinions and theories, hopefully worthy to exist.

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## Introduction:

### Designing the study of the post-cold-war Ukrainian Foreign Policy

With the change of the international political system (bipolar) and the dissolution of former USSR, the issue of a new independent state of Ukraine between East and West, have experienced vast changes and transformations.

Present-day theoretical schools of international relations are inspired by a wide range of approaches and case-studies. However, the relationship between the empiricism and theory is not always coherent. Some scholars are interested in a pro-Eastern side<sup>1</sup>, while others stick to a pro-Western theoretical approach<sup>2</sup>. As a result, there appears a split between these approaches.

The present work examines these approaches in the field of the foreign policy of Ukraine and attempts to reach a conclusion, taking into account two separate perspectives.

The main question of the present research lies in a comprehensive examination of Ukraine's foreign policy, bound by the basic orientations and limitations of the end of the Cold War and the present time. To achieve the aim of the research and answer the main question, we need to solve the following tasks:

- Trace the destiny of ex-Soviet republics and the Soviet Union disintegration and discuss the difficulties on the economic part during the system change;
- Explore the nature of Russia–ex-Soviet republics' relations and external pressures, the latter encountered while attempting to integrate into the international system;
- Study the foundations of Ukrainian foreign policy;
- Investigate historical experiences of the neighbours' rule over Ukraine with the accent on the role of geography;

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<sup>1</sup> Национальные истории на постсоветском пространстве - II / Под редакцией Ф. БОМСДОРФА, Г. БОРДЮГОВА. - М.: Фонд Фридриха Науманна, АИРО-XXI, 2009. - 372с. (National stories at the post-soviet field - II/Edited by F. BOMSDORF, G. BORDIUGOV, Moscow, Fund of Friedrich Naumann, 2009, 372p.)

<sup>2</sup> KUZIO Taras, *Ukraine is not Russia: Comparing Youth Political Activism*, Project MUSE, Scholarly journals online, SAIS Review vol. XXVI no. 2 (Summer-Fall 2006), The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 67-83

- Introspect the main diplomatic relations of Ukraine and its foreign policy goals after 1991 and today;
- Find out the way, how internal political system of contemporary Ukraine influences its international relations;
- Identify Ukraine's initial views on East and West and the importance of maintaining its independence;
- Analyse security concerns at the end of the Cold-War era; and
- Research Ukraine's relations with superpowers; fears and hopes coming from these relations.

The hypothesis of the present research question is the way the Ukraine's Foreign policy is influenced by the nature of its relations with Eastern and Western neighbours, and the influence the world's superpowers may exercise on Kiev's foreign policy making. It also attempts to decode the presence of this external influence on the country's internal policy, split in the public opinion and leaders' political response over almost 23 years of Ukraine's independence towards the modern political issues in the world.

The present work has been written in the framework of the neorealist approach interwoven with the concept of national interest which emphasises the struggle made by states and governments to secure the existence of the state. It explains the international behaviour by the international system, the structural properties of which are a result of the interaction of the big states. The main factors in this theory are the states and their unions, one of the goals of which is to defend national interests. The reason of international cooperation for neorealists it is a military security; neorealists explain the behaviour of states by restrictions and enforcement. In this key the majority of the present work's statements and analyses are being made. All this is in parallel with to our research question and the analysis made in the paper.

Such methods of research as case studies, descriptive, historical, conclusion- and decision-oriented research and such techniques as literature review, analysis of treaties and official documents as well as statistical research have been used. These methods have resulted in

analysis which draws out the reasons behind moves which the Ukrainian government took and why Ukraine is the in the state it is today.

## **Chapter 1: Ex-Soviet republics of Eastern Europe at the international arena**

### **1.1 Disintegration of the Soviet Union and the destiny of ex-Soviet Republics**

Speaking about such post-Soviet countries as Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, the object of indistinct geopolitical shifts stuffed between a larger European Union and a resurgent Russia, none of them has ever existed as a state within its present borders or could have boasted with homogeneous national identity. Each of them is located along military, transportation and energy corridors, connecting Europe and Eurasia. Some sensitive security issues that these countries have to deal with are infectious diseases, pollution, illegal migration, organised crime and even drug and human trafficking easily migrate into the EU. Post-Soviet space would benefit in democracy, pluralism and the rule of law, provided the successful becoming of these large countries; Russia's destiny will largely depend on the future of these countries and the way where Europe moves will be predetermined much by their success too<sup>3</sup>.

After the dissociation of the USSR, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus in agony and with might and main started to make use of a sudden statehood that had been thrust upon them. Having experienced first the bitterness of yoke and later - confrontation of Russia and Germany, they have undergone many challenges from both, East and West. Ukraine though with its two short cases of independence (Cossack State 1649-1654 and Ukrainian People's Republic 1917-1920), was divided between East and West, recording different historical evidences and having a split identity. Moldova, created in 1945 as a Soviet republic, faced a split in population, the main part of which desired to unite with Russia, though its other parts join Romania. Belarus did not have an incident of an independent unity at the international arena, nor had it a consensus on national identity.

In general, it was not a favourable emergence of the new eastern European states, and neither had it been clear whether they would survive in their new boundaries. However, one can see that they survived and despite all problems, they had developed their statehood and nationhood. According to D. Hamilton and G. Mangott, the way they develop will determine,

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<sup>3</sup> HAMILTON Daniel, MANGOTT Gerhard, *The New Eastern Europe: Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova*, Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2007, p.1.

whether the post-cold war Europe between Russia and the EU will be “whole and free”<sup>4</sup>. Occupying very important geographical territories, the success of the above mentioned countries will be very beneficial for further development and wellbeing of other post-Soviet states, too. Their ability to deal with conflicting identities at the national and sub-national levels might determine, where Europe ends.

Though having different degrees of democratic regime, from less democratic Belarus to more democratic Ukraine, these countries still haven’t gone far from other Eurasian states, practicing “managed” democracy, seemingly competitive elections, close connection between political and business elites and rule of political clans. One has to note that however these countries are called “Western Newly Independent States” (NIS), it will be not correct to consider them as a unique state, as they pursue different aims and trajectories.

Out of the three countries examined above, Ukraine has the richest tradition of national consciousness as well as a history of being a nation-state. However, probably only after the atrocities of the World War II and ethnic cleansing of Ukrainians and Poles, did a modern Ukrainian identity emerge. Who are Ukrainians? The Russo-Ukrainian argument goes back to the 1187 document *Lay of Ihor’s Host*, which talks about the common past. In fact the Ukrainian search for a separate national origin is a stumbling-stone in political relations with Russia, which can not accept such a theory itself<sup>5</sup>. Apart from that, Ukrainians themselves are still at a construction of their identity.

## **1.2 Transition from the central economy to ‘capitalist’ market: difficulties during the system change**

The contrast of old and new in Ukraine is striking. You can see expensive imported cars alongside poor domestic ones everywhere, modern advertising billboards on old buildings... In Kyiv, near the picturesque ancient monastery, there is a monument, surpassing in size this

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<sup>4</sup> HAMILTON Daniel, MANGOTT Gerhard, *op. cit.*, p.1.

<sup>5</sup> HAMILTON Daniel, MANGOTT Gerhard, *op. cit.*, p.4

significant historical religious artefact; it represents the defence of Ukraine from Germany, however it faces Russia. It hasn't been removed even after gaining the independence and might represent "the arrested development of Ukraine"<sup>6</sup>.

Times after Ukraine gained its independence unfortunately can not be regarded as good in its socio-economic history. During 1990-2000 Ukraine's GDP shortened by 2.3 times, its industrial output by 1.6 times, agriculture by 1.9, investments in fixed capital by 4.0 and housing by 3.1 times<sup>7</sup>. Such indices didn't even take place after the World War I (1914-1918) or the Civil War (1918-1920); in 1928 the industrial production constituted 119% compared to the level of the 1913. In 1950, ten years after the beginning of World War II, it was already 15% above the pre-war level of 1940, and the investment was 2.5 times higher than the pre-war one. At that time the indicators of the national income were not calculated and GDP is being set from 1990<sup>8</sup>.

The crisis events began not even in 1990, but in 1989, with reduced national income and the size of industrial, agricultural production and investment. The bases of this decline were laid yet in the then Soviet Union and Ukraine, at least around 5 years before the break-up.

Macroeconomic indicators of the two past decades, and primarily GDP can be conventionally divided into three periods:

- 1990-1996 - a period of "free fall". Within this period the most disastrous was 1994, when GDP shrank by 23% and industrial production by 27%.
- 1997-1999 - a period when economy, while slowing down, was saving power for a long-awaited recovery. During these three years GDP declined by only 5.0%, while industrial production rose by 2.7%.
- 2000- until today - the turning point; The results of the 2000 were very optimistic. Annual GDP grew by 5.8%, agricultural production - by 9.2%, investments in fixed

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<sup>6</sup> BANAIAN King, *The Ukrainian economy since independence*, The Ukrainian economy since independence, Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, Mass: Edward Elgar, 1999, p.viii.

<sup>7</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>8</sup> See the data about the GDP changes from 1994 to 2004 in Appendix 5.

assets - by 14.4%. It was an “over-fulfilment”, comparable with Soviet after War Five-Year Plans<sup>9</sup>.

Thus, while in the mid-1990s Ukraine was a “negative leader” among the CIS countries, in the beginning of the first decade of XXI century Ukraine became a leader in CIS according to the above mentioned indicators. National currency gained a relative stability and all this was a pledge for sustainable economic development in the future. On the other hand, the GDP growth in the early 2000s returned Ukraine just to its level in 1996, which was by 2.3 times lower than 1990’s indicators<sup>10</sup>. According to predictions in 2000, it was estimated that the country still needs from 18 to 30 years of hard work to gain its losses. This demands a high price, which is equal to the lifetime of the whole generation, comparable with 1960s, when Nikita Khrushchev promised to build communism during a lifetime of one generation.

At the same time Ukraine’s western neighbours do not stand still. Moreover, since 2000 the GDP of Ukraine, according to predictions, would remain at least by 6 times lower than in the EU member states. However, when Ukraine just obtained independence, the euphoric mood of the society and among the economists promised that in three-four years the country will at least catch up with the Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary of the 90s<sup>11</sup>.

Not taking into account for now the reasons for such a long and deep economic crisis, it is still worth to be noted the two most important factors taking place: an outrunning growth in prices for imported in Ukraine oil and gas and a break of economic relations which took part in the former USSR. In 1992 when the producers’ price index started to set, the price for fuel branch products by 5.5 times outpaced the overall PPI, which preserved up to now. In 2000 mineral products’ import, mostly comprised by oil and natural gas, accounted for 47% or 6.6 billion US dollars or around 21% of used GDP<sup>12</sup>.

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<sup>9</sup> BANAIA King, , *op. cit.*, p.xiv.

<sup>10</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>11</sup> See the data about GDP growth rate between 2000-2012 in the line-graph in Appendix 6

<sup>12</sup> РЕБЕНКО Андрей, *Макроэкономика и наша жизнь*, “Зеркало недели. Украина” №32, “Могло быть и лучше...”, 22 августа 2001 (REVENKO Andrey, *Macroeconomics and our life*, “Zerkalo nedeli. Ukraine”, No.32, “Could be better...”, 22 August 2001).

Even when a family falls apart, the difficulties are felt acutely, not to mention a collapse of the “single national economic complex”, a rupture of intra-Union economic relations and co-operative supply. Hyperinflation played its negative role, having deprived the majority of economic entities of working capital<sup>13</sup>. At the same time, apparently, the largest share of the guilt belongs to an ineffective state management of the economy, especially in the first years of the Ukraine’s independence.

In the end, it is important to mention one seldom mentioned factor, which stopped inhibiting Ukraine’s economy after its independence. These are huge military expenditures of the former USSR. Several decades it was claimed that they represent just 4-5% of the state budget of the USSR, yet at such proportions the country contrived to maintain military parity with the US and NATO<sup>14</sup>. The real figures which were given in 1989 appeared to be by 3.7 times higher than in 1988. According to the memoirs of M. Gorbachev, the President of USSR even himself had no idea of the actual scale of the country’s militarisation. Only two or three persons had access to this data. After real military spendings were counted in two years, it became clear that they constituted not 16% but 40% of the state budget; defence products constituted not 6% but 20% of the GSP; and out of 25 billion rubles around 20 billion went to the military-technical research and development<sup>15</sup>. Obviously, same proportions were observed in the economy of Ukraine. Their sharp reduction after gaining the independence, *ceteris paribus*, could have been a powerful stimulus to accelerate economic growth and raise the living standards of the population<sup>16</sup>.

### **1.3 Russia-ex-Soviet republics relation: efforts of integration into the international system and external pressures**

The decade of 90’s witnessed a transformation in the relationship between Ukraine and Russia. The key factor was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of Ukraine and

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<sup>13</sup> REVENKO Andrey, *op. cit.*

<sup>14</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>15</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>16</sup> *Idem.*



Russia as independent states. Formerly inter-ethnic questions were broadened to international issues. Problems of language, culture and interpretation of historical events were overshadowed by the security issues of state: borders, armies and nuclear weapons. Neither side, for their own reasons, was well prepared for such a dramatic change. This determined unstable and conflictive relations between the two states. It was only in mid-1997 that Kyiv and Moscow finally managed to conclude a treaty on “Friendship, cooperation and partnership”<sup>17</sup>.

However, the first serious conflicts between Ukraine and Russia came after Ukraine’s declaration of independence on 24 August 1991. The president of Russia, B. Yeltsin, issued a statement saying that Russia raises the border issues, which applied to Crimea, Donbass and Northern Kazakhstan, regions with substantial Russian minorities. Russia could hardly agree to give these territories just like that. On the 27 August, interrupting the meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet, “an emergency situation” was announced and a Russian delegation headed by Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoi, started its way to Kyiv. Its purpose was to tell Ukrainian people, if they stayed in the Union, Russia would not make territorial claims. After night-long negotiations, with the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation acting as observers, the Ukrainian and Russian sides produced an eight-point communique promising joint efforts to avert “the uncontrolled disintegration of the Union state”<sup>18</sup>. It was the moment when the phrase “former USSR” was coined<sup>19</sup>.

Ukraine and Russia continued to drift apart in the final months of the Soviet Union’s existence. At the end of August 1991, Kravchuk maintained that Ukraine could not work on the new Union treaty until after its referendum on independence. Leaders of the three countries, Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Nazarbaev committed to continue their negotiations in Novo Ogarevo<sup>20</sup>. Several months later, in November, Kravchuk argued that the Novo Ogarevo process no longer existed and that Gorbachev’s efforts were a “fraud” in which he would not participate. Relations

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<sup>17</sup> HAJDA A. Lubomyr, *Ukraine in the World: Studies in the International Relations and Security Structure of a Newly Independent State*, Cambridge, Massachussets, Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University Press, 1998, p.19.

<sup>18</sup> HAJDA A. Lubomyr, *op. cit.*, p.25

<sup>19</sup> HAJDA A. Lubomyr, *op. cit.*, p.26.

<sup>20</sup> *Idem.*

between Kyiv and Moscow became strained. Because of the press misinterpretation of the negotiations about the fate of Russians and Russian speakers in the non-Russian republics, the press in Moscow presented a version of Russian leaders considering a preventive nuclear strike against Ukraine<sup>21</sup>. Meanwhile, the referendum for independence shocked with its results many in Russia. From Kyiv's standpoint, its results put an end to any plans for a renewed Union. Yeltsin and the Russian leadership continued to express support for some sort of arrangement with the center until the eve of the Belovezha meeting on 7-8 December<sup>22</sup>. Only addressing Belarusian parliament two days later, Russia conceded that the attempt to reconstitute the USSR was a failure. Ukraine and Russia then turned to the difficult process of dismantling the Soviet Union, bringing even more tensions to the surface<sup>23</sup>.

Later on, at the Belovezha meeting, Russia was ready to entertain wide ranging concessions on the draft Union treaty as long as Ukraine affixed its signature. In the final analysis, Kravchuk refused to sign the existing draft, make amendments or propose his own version to the treaty. As a result, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus agreed to create the Commonwealth of Independent States<sup>24</sup>. Yeltsin later admitted that "it was not Russia that seceded from the Union", but that the pressure for independence in most of the republics forced Russia to agree to the CIS<sup>25</sup>. In April 1992, the Congress of Russian People's Deputies declared its dissatisfaction with the level of political, economic and military integration among the CIS member states and called for further efforts along these lines. At the same time in Ukraine, Kravchuk was faced with criticism from the parliamentary opposition, which argued that Ukraine's membership in the CIS threatened its independence. However from the very start it was clear that Ukraine and Russia had different views as to the nature and purpose of the CIS. For Ukraine it was a mechanism for "divorce process" while Russia gave every indication that it wanted to strengthen the organisation and later assume its leadership.

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<sup>21</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>22</sup> HAJDA A. Lubomyr, *op. cit.*, p.27

<sup>23</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>24</sup> See Appendix 10, An official document "Agreement on the Creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States".

<sup>25</sup> HAJDA A. Lubomyr, *op. cit.*, p.27

Favourable for Russia was an appointment of the prime minister Leonid Kuchma, whose planes included establishing closer economic ties with Russia, as “anti-Russian actions in politics led to anti-Ukrainian economic consequences”<sup>26</sup>. As a result a partial reappraisal of earlier policies with regard to the CIS was pursued. And though when Kuchma was elected as the president of Ukraine promising economic improvement through the restoration of ties with Russia, and taking part in creation of the Inter-State Economic Committee at October 1994 CIS summit, he was quick to add that Ukraine had not affixed its signature to any documents that conflicted with its constitution of laws, neither that he himself is going to become a vassal of Russia<sup>27</sup>.

At the same time Russia’s foreign policy rejected the Western-oriented course pursued by Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and turned itself to the doctrine that proclaims the entire geopolitical space of the former Union to be the sphere of its vital interests, securing from the world community the understanding and recognition of Russia’s special interest in this space<sup>28</sup>. The CIS committee in Russia headed by Konstantin Zatulin, defined Russia’s policies toward the CIS as falling within its domestic affairs and stressed that most of the former Soviet republics had to become Russia’s satellites or face extinction<sup>29</sup>. Russia’s official policy with regard to the CIS was reflected in plans for development of a long-term CIS integration plan with the main task to create an economically and politically integrated union of states. Moreover, Russia’s State Duma in March 1996 passed two resolutions denouncing and retracting Russia’s role in the dissolution of the USSR and reaffirmed the validity of the Gorbachev referendum of March 1991 on preserving the Soviet Union. Zatulin’s successor had got a new task of gathering together the Great Mother Rus’ and prepare the necessary groundwork.

Ukraine, on the other hand, moved increasingly toward a more balanced foreign policy course between East and West. The January 1994 Trilateral denuclearisation Statement laid the ground for the development of the relations with the West. In February Ukraine became the first

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<sup>26</sup> HAJDA A. Lubomyr, *op. cit.*, p.29.

<sup>27</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>28</sup> HAJDA A. Lubomyr, *op. cit.*, p.30.

<sup>29</sup> *Idem.*

of the CIS to sign on to NATO's Partnership for Peace Program. During the spring-summer 1996 Ukraine set a course for its "return to Europe". Thus, Kyiv set aside the multilateral aspect of its CIS policies and emphasised its preference of bilateral cooperation with the CIS member states<sup>30</sup>.

A decade after the end of the Cold War, Russia changed its foreign policy fundamentally. Kremlin defined Russia as a self-standing great power again and insisted on being treated as an equal partner by both United States and the European Union. It further strengthened relations with China and India, seeing them, alongside Brazil, as the actors of the future, on the way of pluralistic world order in place of post-Cold War US hegemony. Today Russia is not shy to compete openly with the United States and the Europeans, politically as well as economically, in the former Soviet states. Central Asia, the South Caucasus and Ukraine are all battlefields in that intensifying rivalry<sup>31</sup>.

Today, the Russian economy is controlled by political leadership as well as to some extent by economic elites, and its foreign policy has never been driven so much by economic considerations. The political system attracts solid and stable popular support for the head of the state without a viable opposition. The intersecting notions "sovereign democracy" and "energy super-power" both came to the fore in 2005. Russia believes that it is one of the few truly sovereign states in the world and also that it is a super-power in terms of international influence<sup>32</sup>. Russia is not going to integrate into or with the West, but has been tasked with creating its own "solar system" in the former Soviet Union. Though the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has been pronounced by Moscow a clinically dead institution, the area covered by CIS as the principle "operating field" for an active Russian foreign policy<sup>33</sup>. These territories feature a high concentration of Russia's vital interests in various spheres, a space for Russian economic expansion, political influence and cultural

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<sup>30</sup> HAJDA Lubomyr A, *op. cit.*, p.32.

<sup>31</sup> HAMILTON Daniel, MANGOTT Gerhard, *op. cit.*, p.196

<sup>32</sup> HAMILTON Daniel, MANGOTT Gerhard, *op. cit.*, p.197

<sup>33</sup> HAMILTON Daniel, MANGOTT Gerhard, *op. cit.*, p.197.

primacy. Thus, from this perspective the US or European influence in the CIS is a main obstacle to Russia realising its goals, while creating the situation of a zero-sum game<sup>34</sup>.

Russia's success or failure in Ukraine will affect the realisation of its ambition to construct a new power center. Ukraine here is important but not critical. And the fact, whether democracy will win or fail in Russia, will not be determined by the outcomes of Moscow policies in Ukraine. On the contrary, it's Ukraine's own democratic evolution that will impact on internal socio-political developments in Russia<sup>35</sup>.

There are several factors of Ukraine's importance to Russia that can be pointed out. First of all it is a transit corridor across Ukraine for Russian oil and gas to the European Union. The next one is different economic assets in Ukraine, which are of interest to Russia. Further, Ukraine has the largest Russian-speaking population outside of the Russian Federation. Finally, the Russian Orthodox Church regards Ukraine, alongside with Russia and Belarus an inviolable part of its "canonical territory"<sup>36</sup>.

Much of the 1990's was wasted in the Russo-Ukrainian relations over the disputes on nuclear legacy, status of the Black Sea Fleet and of the Russian language, and of course arguing over the terms of the gas transit. Meanwhile, Ukraine was getting valuable experience of an international player.

In 2003 Russia attempted to bind Ukraine closer to itself again. Within the framework of Single Economic Space (SES) project, initially leading to an economic union, and eventually a political and security alignment, under Moscow's aegis, including Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, had a purpose to sway Ukraine away from the EU and NATO and draw closer to Russia. However, Russian policy didn't get any success, crowned by the 2004 presidential election in Ukraine, culminating in the Orange Revolution.

The possibility of Ukraine entering a fast track reform path following the Orange Revolution was exaggerated. Ukraine's revolution, like Serbia's, did not lead to a knockout

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<sup>34</sup> HAMILTON Daniel, MANGOTT Gerhard, *op. cit.*, p.198.

<sup>35</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>36</sup> HAMILTON Daniel, MANGOTT Gerhard, *op. cit.*, p.199.

defeat for the previous regime and the revolutionary crisis was not a breakpoint in history that suddenly made everything possible<sup>37</sup>.

### **Conclusion**

Ex-Soviet republics such as Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus had undergone many challenges such as yoke and later - confrontation from more powerful neighbours of Russia and Germany. Thus in early '90s with the break-up of the USSR they fully used the opportunity of a sudden statehood. However the emergence of the Eastern European states was not very favourable and had a threat of survival, they fought all problems and completing the development of their statehood and nationhood.

The success of these countries will be very beneficial for further development and wellbeing of other post-Soviet states, including overcoming of the conflicting identities.

The transition economies which resulted from the breaking of the Soviet Union, have had their ups and downs on the road to a full market economy. The socio-economic history of Ukraine in particular started to experience bad times. During the first ten years of independence the country's GDP shortened by 2.3 times. It went through hyperinflation periods, corrupt power and a large inequality in the distribution of wealth, but still gained the title of a leader among the CIS countries.

The split of the Soviet Union also brought a sense of bad will between Russia and Ukraine, with many issues not resolved after the declaration of independence. Inter-ethnic questions came out to the international arena such as language, culture and interpretation of the historical events. They also were overshadowed by the security issues of the state. Neither side being not prepared for such a change, came into conflictive and unstable relations between each other. These issues resulted in many conflicts, and Russia being the dominant power influenced Ukraine's and the other CIS countries' decision making process in a major way. The general rhythm of these countries moving to the international stage has not been as smooth with Russia always watching, while frequent periods of economic decline made progress even more difficult.

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<sup>37</sup> HAMILTON Daniel, MANGOTT Gerhard, *op. cit.*, p.199.

On the other hand Ukraine started to pursue a more balanced foreign policy between East and West, consisting in a denuclearisation policy, signing on to NATO's Partnership and setting a course of "returning to Europe". There have been many attempts of Russia to bind Ukraine to itself, but meanwhile Ukraine was getting a valuable experience of an international player.

## Chapter 2: Ukrainian Foreign Policy

### 2.1 Foundations of Ukrainian foreign policy

As a country where at least its two parts are segmented, Ukraine's foreign policy can not be called coherent. The reason for it is heading to the pro-Russia or pro-Western directions and at times even neglecting its foreign policy and solving the domestic policy issues. Looking at not always successful attempts of cooperation with big or super-powers and international organizations/unions, such as USA, NATO or European Union, one can often see the non-fulfilment of obligations given by each of the sides. On the other hand, while changing its direction towards Russia, Ukraine can not sacrifice its independence, and as a consequence, fails the expectation of Russia as well.

President Viktor Yushchenko (2005-2010) seemed to follow a polar-opposite policy while leading Ukraine towards Euro-Atlantic institutions, but it was not the right time for Ukraine at the moment, and all the attempts of his, later split apart, government, were in vain. Viktor Yushchenko made many promises during his campaign (2004) with praised potential policies as a ground for maneuvering, but these policies never came to be<sup>38</sup>. In regard to the orange revolution and the events of Autumn 2004 there was no revolutionary change in the functioning of the Ukrainian State, this was in contrary to the expectations of most. The so-called constitution reform was rather a collection of political compromises that were made at the time than the premeditated policies that Yushchenko had promised. While the events curtailed excessive presidential powers, they also introduced ill-conceived, ambiguous and sometimes mutually contradictory mechanism for the system of government<sup>39</sup>. The resulting conflicts of responsibilities, which are unavoidable in such situations, nearly paralysed the Ukrainian state institutions. Even the greatest success of the Orange Revolution, namely reduced state control over the media, has been undermined by its own structure of ownership. The oligarchs who

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<sup>38</sup> EBERHARDT Adam, *Rewolucja, której nie było, Bilans pięciolecia "pomarańczowej" Ukrainy*, listopad 2009, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia, s.44 (EBERHARDT Adam, *The revolution that never was, Five Years of "Orange" Ukraine*, November 2009, Centre for Eastern Studies, p.44)

<sup>39</sup> EBERHARDT Adam, *op.cit.*, p.45.



control the mass media, treat them as instruments for promoting their own interests, leading to censorship on their part<sup>40</sup>. Internally the democratic mechanisms that were promised from the outset of the orange revolution were anything but durable and this can be said about the foreign relations that resulted from the revolution as well.

There were two main foreign political issues during Yushchenko's term. The first one was the Gas conflicts with Russia which resulted in "gas wars", where restriction to Ukraine's gas supplies were made in January 2006, March 2008 and January 2009. The second one was Ukraine's ambitious European policy which was characterised by unrealistic expectations and neglect of Euro-based state reforms. The latter squandered the trust which manifested itself after the Orange Revolution and any new found goodwill of the European states.

After the arrival of the new president, Viktor Yanukovich (2010), the country, seems, returned to the previous strategies in foreign policy, following Russia<sup>41</sup>. Yanukovich was Yushchenko's prime minister, appointed after he dismissed his former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko (2007-2010). After he took power, within a 100 days his Party of Regions disposed of the government of Yulia Tymoshenko (the main party was Batkivshchyna or the All-Ukrainian Union "Fatherland"), and replaced it with its own, which is closely subjected to the head of state; created a parliamentary majority by subjugating its coalition partners, and also increased its control over the administration of courts. Moreover, due to this close relationship with Russia and pressure imposed by Russia using gas, Yanukovich rejected any NATO perspectives for Ukraine (2002-2004) as well as the EU-integration (November 2013). The latter decision has brought with it controversial events, in the form of protests and how the government has handled these protests. Rather than joining the European Union, Yanukovich made a decision to maintain Ukraine's relations with the East and meet with Vladimir Putin on 17 December 2013 to enlist help in funding from Russia. This meeting was a success in given situation. The two signed an agreement that would reduce the gas prices for Ukraine, saving the country at least US\$2.5 billion US dollars and allowing the country to avoid bankruptcy<sup>42</sup>. Putin also announced that

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<sup>40</sup> EBERHARDT Adam, *op.cit.*, p.46.

<sup>41</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>42</sup> WIERZBOWSKA Agata, SARNA Arkadiusz, 'The Moscow deals: Russia offers Yanukovich conditional support', *OSW* (The Center for Eastern Studies), Warsaw, 18 December 2013.

Russia would invest US\$15 billion in Ukrainian Eurobonds, acquiring bonds to a value of US\$3 billion for two years at a 5% interest rate<sup>43</sup>. However, no formal document regarding this purchase was signed. This deal may signify a reliance on Russia by Ukraine in a more extensive way than has been shown, as all of the details of this meeting are yet to be released; the real terms of Russia's support are still unknown. Using the information that has been revealed, it can be concluded that the agreements include mechanisms which make Russia's assistance dependent on the stance taken by the Ukrainian government<sup>44</sup>. Thus any further attempts by Kyiv to reduce its dependence on Moscow or resume relations with Brussels have been thwarted. Following this agreement, the Kremlin also decided to continue supporting Viktor Yanukovich for the 2015 presidential race<sup>45</sup>, as there is no possibility of real co-operation with the west and if he will, owe his victory to Russian support. Russia's goals of Ukraine becoming integrated with the Customs Union will be a driving force behind the price, he will have to pay for this support. Furthermore, because of this decision, the Ukrainian economy and Yanukovich himself will be ever more bound to Russia and the implementation of these deals.

Both Yushchenko and Yanukovich have changed the governmental procedure soon after they were elected. Yushchenko made his change to give the president less power in a similar fashion to the American system, whereas Yanukovich changed it back after Yushchenko's failure and loss of the Ukrainian people's respect<sup>46</sup>.

## **2.2 Historical experiences, rule of Poland, Austro-Hungarian empire and Russia. The Role of political geography**

One can not overestimate the geostrategic significance of Ukraine, a large, important European state between Russia and NATO member states - Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and

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<sup>43</sup>WIERZBOWSKA Agata, SARNA Arkadiusz, *op.cit.*

<sup>44</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>45</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>46</sup> *Idem.*

Romania. Throughout history this area in Europe has been in a constant state of change due to its significance. During the 14th century Ukrainian territory was put under the rule of Lithuania and Poland after wars were fought against their Mongolian invaders<sup>47</sup>. Later Ukraine became a part of the Crown of the Kingdom of Poland. During this rule many Polish peasants were mixed with the Ukrainian population and the nobles of Ukraine had the Polish language and culture imposed on them<sup>48</sup>. The opportunity for Ukrainians to find their voice under Polish rule was low as even though Poland possessed a “Congress” Kingdom, the Ukrainians were unable to participate in politics on a governmental level<sup>49</sup>. Due to the assimilation of the Polish culture, in particular religion on Ukraine, the Khmelnytsky uprising was started. This was a Cossack rebellion between the years of 1648 and 1657 which later turned into a Ukrainian war of liberation from Poland. During the conflict the reconstituted Ukrainian state sought protection from Russia and signed the Treaty of Pereyaslav in 1654, and later the territory was split in two between the Lithuanian-Polish Commonwealth and Russia under the Treaty of Andrusovo. This treaty was in fact considered a significant mistake of the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth, as it tipped the balance of power in the region, making the emerging Russian Empire the most dominant state, thus is the importance Ukrainian territory holds<sup>50</sup>.

The next exchange in the territory of Ukraine was during the three Partitions of Poland. The extreme West of Ukraine fell under the control of the Austrians and due to the Russo-Turkish Wars the rest of Ukraine was left under the Russian empire. During this period Ukrainians were yet again in the centre of a power struggle for Central and Southern Europe, this time between Russia and Austria. In Russian controlled Ukraine strict limits were imposed on the

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<sup>47</sup> WILLIAMS Brian Glyn, *The Sultan's Raiders: The Military Role of the Crimean Tatars in the Ottoman Empire*. Washington, D.C., 2013, The Jamestown Foundation, p.22.

<sup>48</sup> KOŁODZIEJCZYK Darjusz, as reported by KIZILOV Mikhail, *'Slaves, Money Lenders, and Prisoner Guards: The Jews and for the Trade in Slaves and Captives in the Crimean Khanate'*, *The Journal of Jewish Studies*, Vol.LVIII, No.2, Autumn 2007, p.6.

<sup>49</sup> MAGOCSI Paul Robert, *A history of Ukraine*, University of Washington press, Seattle, 1996, pp.147-216.

<sup>50</sup> RYZHKOV Vadym, *'The Cossack Palestine: Samara Monastery, the Zaporozhians' shelter and sanctuary, History and I'*, *The Day*, №33, Kyiv, 28 October, 2008.

Ukrainian language and culture, banning their use and study, due to fears of separatism<sup>51</sup>. This led to an exodus of a number of Ukrainian intellectuals into western Ukraine, although many Ukrainians met great success with Russia. The conditions in the Russian Empire were such that an overt political life on a nongovernmental level was impossible, at least until 1905. In this respect, Ukrainians in Austria had a great advantage over the majority of those living under Russian rule<sup>52</sup>. After the 1848 Revolution, Galician Ukrainians took part in elections, possessed a parliamentary representation, a political press, parties, and civil organisations.<sup>53</sup>

The end of World War I brought many conflicts and revolutions which resulted in more separations of the territory. Both the Russian and Austrian Empires were shattered by revolution, with the Ukrainian people once again being caught in the middle. Between 1917 and 1919 several separate Ukrainian republics declared independence forcing the area of Ukraine to fall into warfare and anarchy<sup>54</sup>. Apart from Ukrainian republics the territory was also fought over by German and Austrian forces, the Red and White Armies of Russia and the Polish Army. During this time Kyiv itself was captured by a multitude of armies; the Bolsheviks on the 9th of February 1918, the Germans on the 2nd of March 1918, the Bolsheviks again on the 5th of February 1919, by the White Army on the 31st of August 1919, by Bolsheviks for a third time on the 15th of December 1919, by the Polish Army on the 6th of May 1920, and finally by the Bolsheviks for the fourth time on 12 June 1920. The Ukrainian loss of the Polish-Ukrainian war of 1918-1919 left the western territory of Galicia under Polish rule and after signing the Peace of Riga in March 1921, Ukraine was once again split in two and shared between Poland and the Soviet Union<sup>55</sup>. It was only until the beginning of World War II that Ukraine was united again and was under the name of the Ukrainian SSR, allowing the republic to act as a separate subject of international law. After the Declaration of Independence from the Soviet Union, Ukraine has

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<sup>51</sup> PIDKOVA Ihor, SHUST Roman, 3 Volumes *Handbook in history of Ukraine*, Kiev, 1993–1999, <http://history.franko.lviv.ua/IIm.htm>

<sup>52</sup> PIDKOVA Ihor, SHUST Roman 'Dovidnyk z istorii Ukrainy', *op.cit.*

<sup>53</sup> RUDNYTSKY L. Ivan, 'The Role of the Ukraine in Modern History', *Slavic Review*, Vol. 22, No 2, June 1963, p. 203.

<sup>54</sup> PIDKOVA Ihor, SHUST Roman 'Dovidnyk z istorii Ukrainy', *op.cit.*

<sup>55</sup> *Idem.*

finally become a national and seemingly stable state. The country possess it's own laws, government and its people are given the rights, which they themselves provide through democratic elections.

Ukrainian territory has been the subject of constant change throughout its history, this is due to the fact that other empires view it as a borderland. Constantly being labelled as the borderland, the people of Ukraine have struggled to find their identity and have been heavily restricted in their search thanks to the enforced prohibitions on Ukrainian culture. Even now that Ukraine is an independent state things are still yet to change, locked in an economic power struggle between the European Union and Russia, Ukraine is still being viewed as just a piece of territory. This is especially true in the case of Russia, which has already laid its claims to the economic benefits which Ukraine provides.

### **2.3 The diplomatic presence and activity of Ukraine in the world today**

The main normative documents, defining the priorities of the foreign policy of Ukraine are “Main courses of the foreign policy of Ukraine” (1993)<sup>56</sup>, “Concept of the national security of Ukraine” (1997)<sup>57</sup> and “The military doctrine” (2004)<sup>58</sup>. According to these documents, the strategic task is provision of Ukraine’s competent taking part in all-European and regional systems of collective security, acquisition of the EU and NATO memberships, while preserving neighbourly relations with the Russian Federation, other CIS countries and the other states of the world.

Ukraine is maintaining the diplomatic relations with 169 countries. In Kyiv the ambassadors of 117 states are accredited (including the concurrent ones), the representatives of 13 international organisations are acting - the UN, UNHCR, NATO, the European Commission, OSCE, the Council of Europe, the IMF, the World Bank, the EBRD, the Red Cross.

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<sup>56</sup> <http://ukrmap.su/en-uh11/1094.html>

<sup>57</sup> <http://www.rieas.gr/research-areas/eurasian-studies/1956-defining-national-security-ofukraine.html>

<sup>58</sup> *The Day*, ‘Ukraine Adopts New Military Doctrine’, №21, 22 June 2004. <http://www.day.kiev.ua/en/article/day-after-day/ukraine-adopts-new-military-doctrine>

Ukraine has embassies and legations in 88 countries (including the concurrent ones), and 8 permanent representations (under UN, department of the UN in Geneva, UNESCO, international organisations in Vienna, the Council of Europe, NATO, the EU, coordination institutes of the CIS), 39 trade and economic missions as part of embassies and 22 general consulates. Ukraine is a full associate member or an observer in 80 international organisations.

Ukrainian staff and armed contingents take part in peacekeeping operations by the UN and OSCE in 10 countries, including Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Transnistria and a number of Balkan states.

#### **2.4 Ukraine's foreign policy goals: after 1991 until today**

Talking about Ukraine's foreign policy from 1991 onwards, it will be convenient to split it into several sectors. The first sector of Ukraine's foreign policy we are going to study concerns NATO. Despite the US and almost all Central European NATO members' support, Ukraine was rejected at the April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest in a Membership Action Plan (MAP) by NATO<sup>59</sup>. It is likely, that Germany and France were blocking Ukraine's attempt, fearing the deterioration of ties with Moscow. Thus, Ukraine was promised a membership in NATO, without a specific date, and instead of this in December 2008, as a compromise, there was given an opportunity to Ukraine of work on "annual national programs" within the framework of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, assisting Ukraine's defence reforms<sup>60</sup>.

In 2010 the situation changed with a new president Viktor Yanukovych and his new policies, who abandoned the MAP, continuing to cooperate with NATO, but without seeking membership in it, and having pleased Russia with such a move. However, Russia doesn't like Ukraine's consultations with NATO on different defence and military issues, including the Black Sea Fleet. Ukraine has not given sufficient numbers of troops to Afghanistan, however it deployed 164 troops to KFOR, the NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo. As for the future plans, Ukraine is going to contribute a frigate to NATO-led anti-piracy operations off Somalia in late 2013.

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<sup>59</sup> WOEHREL Steven, *'Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy'*, Congress Research Service, May 24, 2013, p.6

<sup>60</sup> *Idem.*

Another important sector of Ukraine's foreign policy concerns the European Union. The relations between the European Union and some Soviet successor states, like Ukraine, were taking shape since early 1990s parallel to the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) after the break-up of the USSR. They evolved on the basis of the Partnership and Cooperation agreements concluded with Ukraine and other successor states in the middle 1990s, as well as, in some cases on the basis of the CFSP Common Strategies towards individual countries, and decisions of the Council of Ministers. The enlargement of the European Union in 2004 and the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU in January 2007 have pushed the borders of organisation and interest closer to Ukraine.

Ukraine has been seeking the EU membership. However, till summer 2013 most EU countries had been opposing the idea of Ukraine's possible membership, supporting their decision with the country's "large territory, poor economy, high level of spreading diseases, trafficking and polluted environment"<sup>61</sup>. At the same time, the advantages from a possibility of looking at Ukraine as a potential EU-member, seems to outshine all the possible threats, which we will be looking at later.

The EU and Ukraine have initiated an 'Association Agreement', which does not contain a perspective of future membership, but only a free trade accord and will allow for deeper cooperation between the EU and Ukraine in a wide variety of fields. The EU and Ukraine are working on visa-free travel to the EU for Ukraine's citizens, which is meant for a more distant future<sup>62</sup>.

Moreover, the EU has been promising to sign the 'Association Agreement' when Ukraine makes "tangible progress" in carrying out reforms of its election laws and legal system, as well as improving its climate for foreign investment. Another criteria for the Association Agreement signing is the release of Yulia Tymoshenko, the ex-prime minister, out of the prison. However, at the last Eastern Partnership summit in November 2013 in Vilnius, Ukraine's Government suspended temporarily the process of preparations for signature of the Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area between the EU and Ukraine.

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<sup>61</sup> WOEHREL Steven, *op. cit.*, p.7.

<sup>62</sup> *Idem.*

Such EU member states as Lithuania and Poland were supporting Ukraine, trying to “protect” it from a deeper dependence on Russia<sup>63</sup>. Another reason for their support to Ukraine was their economic links with Ukraine and the prospect of not being at the “margin” of the Union, giving way to Ukraine instead. On the other hand, some western European countries within the EU remained more sceptical about signing the agreement, motivating it by the fact of “human rights deterioration” in Ukraine<sup>64</sup>.

Another important sector of Ukraine’s foreign policy, we’d like to cast light on, lies in the uneasy relationship with Russia. Ukraine’s relationship with Russia is the closest, but the most complex one out of the other directions, considered above. There are many points between Ukraine and Russia in common. First of all, the population composition, which makes up 17.3% of ethnic Russians of the whole country’s population. According to the 2001 Ukrainian census, ethnic Russians are concentrated in the southern and eastern parts of the country<sup>65</sup>. Russia still has close ties with Ukraine after the break-up of the Soviet Union, such as the home base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, many plants in common, the oil-gas pipes, performing a transit to the European consumer states<sup>66</sup>. Many Ukrainians feel akin with the Russian people, as well as the other way round. And apart from that, Ukraine, Russia and Belarus constitute a cultural, historical and religious centre of a related people, which developed many traits in common. After the dissolution of the USSR Russia have been still ‘dreaming’ of the reunion of the CIS, and often tried to use these ethnic and regional ties<sup>67</sup>.

When the president Viktor Yushchenko came to power, the relations with Russia were rocky. Russia didn’t approve Yushchenko’s efforts “to support greater democratisation” in the region, impose more border control on Transnistria within neighbouring Moldova and forge closer links with Georgia<sup>68</sup>. As for the next president, Viktor Yanukovich, he has initially come

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<sup>63</sup> WOLCHIK L. Sharon, ZVIGLYANICH Volodymyr, *Ukraine: the search for a national identity*, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000, p.166.

<sup>64</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>65</sup> See Appendix 2.4 Diagram “Ukraine’s ethnic-linguistic structure according to censuses from 1989 and 2001”.

<sup>66</sup> WOLCHIK L. Sharon, ZVIGLYANICH Volodymyr, *op. cit.*, p.167.

<sup>67</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>68</sup> WOEHREL Steven, *op. cit.*, p.8



to improve relations with Russia. Under this policy falls the question of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea, which had its stay extended until 2042. In exchange Ukraine got discounted prices for natural gas supplies for 10 years, a benefit worth \$40 billion<sup>69</sup>. Besides, Russian companies with Russian government support started buying key industrial assets in Ukraine since Yanukovych has come to power. However, soon they faced opposition from Ukrainian oligarchs who desire to maintain control of major companies<sup>70</sup>.

Finally, some of Russian attempts to improve ties with Ukraine have gone further than Kyiv can support. As a result of that Viktor Yanukovych keeps stressing Ukraine's neutral, "non-bloc" status. Ukraine headed by Yanukovych, is not going to join Moscow's counterpart to NATO, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. Ukraine is rejecting the idea of joining the Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan, explaining it by its incompatibility with obligations, given to other countries, including the possibility of signing the EU-Ukraine free trade agreement in the future<sup>71</sup>. Ukraine itself is just going to consider the "observer status" in the Customs Union, hoping to join only its selected parts. So far, Russia hasn't agreed to such a partial compromise, accepting either a full membership or nothing<sup>72</sup>.

The last sector of Ukrainian foreign policy which we would like to consider, has to do with the USA. The relations between Ukraine and the USA were formally established in January 1992, after Ukraine's referendum on independence and developed rapidly after the resolution over nuclear disarmament. A bilateral commission has been formed to tackle outstanding foreign policy, security and economic issues. In 1996 the two nations declared their relationship a "strategic partnership". Washington and Kyiv developed a special relationship across a broad range of issues. Depending on how some obstacles on its way are tackled, the question of how far and fast will this relationship develop, will remain. Among the obstacles are Ukraine's unfinished work of internal consolidation, the abnormal nature of Ukrainian-Russian relations,

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<sup>69</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>70</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>71</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>72</sup> *Idem.*

Ukraine-EU uncertain relations and a split within the US over the extent of its long-term national interests in Ukraine.

In the early 1990s Ukraine started appealing for better relations with the US, however it was spurned, as the US worried about Ukrainian fragility or nuclear ambitions<sup>73</sup>. However, Kyiv understood the necessity to build mainly political and material support for its independence in Washington as well as in major European capitals. The support of the US and West Europe helps Kyiv in order to improve its situation for overcoming such strategic challenges as consolidating a secure and prosperous state and normalising its relations with Russia<sup>74</sup>. A real question is whether the United States is similarly committed to Ukraine as a weaker partner. Further, we will examine some policies, showing that the bilateral relationship will endure.

Unfortunately, the beginning of the bilateral relations had a difficult start, as little foundation was laid for them<sup>75</sup>. First of all, there was an uncertainty in the opinions of the US officials, how the things will change after the Ukraine's declaration of sovereignty and separation from the USSR. President Bush warned against "suicidal nationalism" in Kyiv, just around a month before the events that led to the fall of the Soviet Union<sup>76</sup>.

There is a large Ukrainian-American community, who at a need approached both the legislative and executive branch with advice and insight, at this time. However, they were not as close to the emerging Ukrainian political leadership as, for example, their Baltic-American counterparts<sup>77</sup>. There was no message sent from senior posts in the new Ukrainian state to the members of the diaspora community.

Difference in policy-making and implementation in Washington and Kyiv was an important obstacle on the way for a productive relations. As for the nuclear issue, Ukraine as well as Russia, have never treated it as an autonomous issue, but rather as part of a package of issues. From the side of the US there was the community of strategic and arms control analysts

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<sup>73</sup> WOEHREL Steven, *op. cit.*, p.10.

<sup>74</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>75</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>76</sup> WOEHREL Steven, *op. cit.*, p.11.

<sup>77</sup> *Idem.*

and practitioners, which expected Ukraine to try to keep its weapons. According to the US, the nuclear problem should and could be separated from nation-building and the formation of international relations<sup>78</sup>. However, because of the differently designed military branch, few progress could be made without the intervention of a small group of very senior officials, including the prime minister, the foreign and deputy foreign ministers and senior advisors to the president.

For the US and the West it was the best way to approach Ukraine and its independence by handling a nuclear question. In spring 1992 the Lisbon Protocol was signed, however it was the time when economic hardship and regional tensions seemed to challenge the very notion of Ukraine's survival. This crucial phase lasted till the conclusion of the Trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian agreement in January 1994<sup>79</sup>. Later came the implementation of Ukraine's commitments and broadening of US-Ukrainian ties.

The most impressive fruits of strategic partnership of Ukraine and the US in security field have come in 1996. In 1996-1997 Ukraine voiced strong support for NATO enlargement. The US directed their efforts to establish a NATO-Ukrainian partnership, fixated in a special charter adopted at the mid-1997 Madrid Summit<sup>80</sup>. In 1998 Ukraine agreed to withdraw from a Russian-led deal to provide nuclear technology to Iran, which costed substantially to Kharkiv region. It is one of the steps on the way of the US-Ukrainian relationship and a result of the nuclear talks<sup>81</sup>. The last Soviet warhead left Ukraine in mid-1996. The period after June 1996 is characterised as a post-nuclear one, in which there will be only political, economic and security - not nuclear - issues.

During the intense two-and-a-half-year period, US-Ukrainian relations several times got to the verge of the collapse. But at crucial moments the trilateral negotiations brought to the right compromise. Thus, the nuclear issue created a basic personal and institutional link between the US and Ukraine.

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<sup>78</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>79</sup> HAMILTON Daniel, MANGOTT Gerhard, *op. cit.*, p.32.

<sup>80</sup> BILINSKY Yaroslav, *Endgame in NATO's Enlargement: The Baltic States and Ukraine*, Westport, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999, p.73.

<sup>81</sup> BILINSKY Yaroslav, *op.cit.*, p.74.

## Conclusion

Foundations of Ukraine's foreign policy were mainly laid by the Soviet regime. Although foreign policies of independent Ukraine have produced good results, the decisions that have been made, can not show much continuity, with each new president of the newly independent state presenting their own trajectory, and leading the state into new or slightly changed old channels. Thus there is a need to build new foundations of the foreign policy, following the strengths of previous presidents and doing very best in this sphere in the nearest future. Looking further back, Ukraine's foreign policy was determined much by the rulers, governing its territories changing throughout Ukraine's history and viewed as borderland. One can distinguish the rule of Lithuania and Poland, Austro-Hungary and the Russian empire. However, Ukraine never gave up and managed through big difficulties to make its way to independence. The main normative documents, defining the priorities of the foreign policy of Ukraine are also considered above. According to these documents, the strategic task is provision of Ukraine's taking part in all-European and regional systems of collective security, acquisition of the EU and NATO memberships, while preserving neighbourly relations with the other states of the world. Ukraine is maintaining the diplomatic relations with 169 countries and has embassies and legations in 88 countries. Being a full associate member or an observer in 80 international organisations, Ukraine also takes part in peacekeeping operations by the UN and OSCE in 10 countries. Undoubtedly, Ukraine is currently interacting and has further plans to cooperate with its important neighbours, such as EU, Russia and US.

Basing an analysis of the Ukrainian political system from recent years, it can be seen as unstable and susceptible to change. Thus a foundation still needs to be laid to bring about change in the long run, rather than thinking about the current issues. This foundation is not a political issue but a cultural one, the presidents of the nation must look to what their predecessors were doing and thinking during their term, see strengths and build upon them, rather than build a nation on their own present interests as Yushchenko and Yanukovich have. Currently with the president Viktor Yanukovich, whose foreign policy initially was turned to the pro-Russian direction, treating every single neighbour correspondingly and with a compromise. However a

very desired direction towards the EU temporarily halted, it is evidently a time for a breathing space before a new go.

## **Chapter 3: Internal political system of contemporary Ukraine and its influence on its international relations**

### **3.1 Ukrainian identity and the creation of a distinct political culture. The nationalist agenda in domestic politics**

It is not a secret, that Ukraine is a deeply divided society, being diverse from region to region. However, Ukraine has always strived to independence, possessing a strong will towards being sovereign. As independent polity it existed only briefly, in the late seventeenth century and in the beginning of the twentieth century. Ukrainian lands, according to their ethnic subgroups differentiated by historical development, were under the rule of several states. With one of the ruling states, Russia, the relationship has always been close and complex, first of all common history and traditions. At the large territory of Ukraine the adherents of the two main theories among others are defending their viewpoint: those with nationalist views and pro-Russian views. Another big part, however, tends to believe that 11.4 million ethnic Russians, ethnic Ukrainians and other nationalities can coexist in the same cultural continuum<sup>82</sup>.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the remaining cultural, historical, ethnic and linguistic differences are inhibiting the development of Ukrainian ethno-nationalism and creating a polarisation of Ukrainian society. Thus, unlike other post-communist states like Poland or Lithuania, Ukraine has to deal with a state-building and also a nation-building<sup>83</sup>. This historic precondition encloses the political culture of modern Ukraine.

In March 1990, Ukraine held its first elections, having voted for a large block of deputies favouring Ukrainian statehood. In August 1991 the country declared its independence. During the referendum in December 1991, 90.3% of voters supported the declaration of independence. However, variating across regions, the ardent supporters of independence came from the west and the center of the country, while eastern figure of supporters was slightly lower. In Crimea just around a half of voters supported the August declaration. As Henry R. Huttenbach noted,

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<sup>82</sup> WILSON Andrew, *Ukrainian nationalism in the 1990s: a minority faith*, Cambridge., Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.1.

<sup>83</sup> WILSON Andrew, *op.cit.*, p.2.

“the road from external independence to *bona fide* internal unity remained rocky: much turbulence lies ahead”<sup>84</sup>. According to Ian Bremmer, the difference between dissimilar viewpoints at independence was conditioned on the political and sociopsychological soviet legacy, “Ukrainians identified themselves as a minority in the Soviet Union and were subject to creeping Russification and de-ethnification. Upon independence they found themselves in the majority, but with a predominantly minority mentality that precipitated confusion and a search for new bearings. Conversely, the Russians who were formerly in a majority found themselves in the minority, a situation that invariably provoked uncertainty and a crisis of identity”. It was in interests of nationalist and Communist politicians to manipulate these contradictions in chase of influence and resources<sup>85</sup>.

After the independence declaration, the state apparatus mainly consisted of the old ruling class that adopted nationalist features<sup>86</sup>. As if the “nationalised” Ukrainian elite decided to stay leaders of an independent state, rather than provincial bosses of a centralised federation, as well as regional elites tried to increase their autonomy, passing their power to local governments rather than to become administrators of a new political center<sup>87</sup>. This was happening still under the remaining Soviet leaders, and not Kyiv. The fact of losing control at times during the decentralisation, did not facilitate a fast emergence of a powerful new center, especially taking into account a development that could be attributed to Ukraine’s limited experience of integral statehood.

Having developed with contrasting historical, demographic, political, economic, ethnic traditions, different regions demonstrated various levels of national consciousness and did not have a common national identity. It was even complicated by slow pace of economic reform, disagreement of the industrial and agricultural sectors interests, shrinking of the internal Soviet market and certainly a decline in living standards. Because of these main reasons, a trust to Kyiv

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<sup>84</sup> WOLCHIK L. Sharon, ZVIGLYANICH Volodymyr, *op. cit.*, p.166.

<sup>85</sup> See Appendix 9 The diagram “How Ukrainians identify themselves”.

<sup>86</sup> WOLCHIK L. Sharon, ZVIGLYANICH Volodymyr, *op. cit.*, p.166

<sup>87</sup> *Idem.*

decreased, and the attractiveness to Russia rose instead, especially in eastern regions. At the time there was a small trust towards the newly independent state<sup>88</sup>.

With the first president of the independent state, Leonid Kravchuk, the unification of the country was a process difficult to manage as well as the integration and loyalty to the new state. This type of policy seemed to be inappropriate and counterproductive as it led to a loss of interest by regional elites as well as to reluctance of regions to centralise.<sup>89</sup> A problem of the rise in organised crime and corruption arose, connected with economic and political competition among the regions, bringing separatist tendencies growth against central state interference. Such kind of struggles led to an attempt of an assassination on Prime Minister Pavel Lazarenko in July 1996, which undoubtedly deteriorated Ukrainian political stability and its state-building program.

Supporters of different ideologies were advocating polar tendencies of nation-building. Thus regionalists backed economic reforms, involving decentralisation, marketisation and privatisation to be accompanied by administrative devolution and regional autonomy until the two tendencies don't generate a conflict<sup>90</sup>. From their point of view, increasing regional autonomy doesn't undermine national integrity or state independence. Regionalism and even separatism to some extent were brought up by a slow pace of administrative reorganisation under the Kravchuk government as well as the absence of a coherent economic problem.

The integralists, however disagreed with the statement that different ways of autonomisation, traced in Ukraine, were fracturing the new country. The supporters of integralism favoured the phenomenon of orderly decentralisation instead of "spontaneous regionalisation", as in the former one the central government determined the pace of devolution. There was a dispute between the two opposing trends: Ukrainian national democrats, centrists and nationalists supported a unitary state with limited local autonomy, in particular in the political realm. In contrast, the center-left, Communists, Socialists, some liberals and regional elites in southern and eastern Ukraine favoured a federal system with regional autonomy,

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<sup>88</sup> WOLCHIK L. Sharon, ZVIGLYANICH Volodymyr, *op. cit.*, p.167.

<sup>89</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>90</sup> *Idem.*



especially in economic sphere<sup>91</sup>. However when the administration of the next president Leonid Kuchma came to power, the disputes faded, which was a consequence of the Ukrainian constitution adoption in June 1996, defining Ukraine as a unitary state.

The disputes of different ideologies supporters were aggravated by the confrontation among “easterners” and “westerners”. Western Ukrainians had an opinion that “easterners” only think about privileges that they can preserve if the southeastern part gets a regional autonomy, which will only improve the material conditions of the east and huddle a state sovereignty and national integrity<sup>92</sup>. Western politicians believe that because east is so russified, it will be difficult and take much time to construct a new national identity, at least a whole generation, as it was necessary to adopt Ukrainian as a state language in governmental offices and education<sup>93</sup>. Not doing so would undermine the unitarist’s principles. At the same time “easterners” had fears that western Ukrainians would construct a new ethnonational identity based on west Ukrainian principles. Besides, regional Donbass and Crimea elites feared a loss of political and economic influence if federal solutions were not implemented<sup>94</sup>. The position of president in this issue was unclear. He was supported by easterners for his pro-Russian aspirations, but on the other hand Kuchma didn’t support a federal type of a country arrangement, which could stumble the centralisation process<sup>9596</sup>.

After Kravchuk’s government, there had been too much power, shared by regional governments. Responding to political critics’ prognoses of the disintegration of the state, Kuchma made a move of attesting his presidential authority. A draft law on local government was submitted in October 1994, stating that the President could obtain the power to veto any decisions by the chairmen of *oblast* and city councils that contradicted the Ukrainian constitution

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<sup>91</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>92</sup> WOLCHIK L.Sharon, ZVIGLYANICH Volodymyr, *op. cit.*, p.168

<sup>93</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>94</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>95</sup> see Appendix 7, the Bar-graph “The presidency of Leonid Kuchma (1994-2004) in opinion of the society”

<sup>96</sup> KONIECZNA Ioanna, “*The Orange revolution in Ukraine. An attempt to understand the reasons*”, Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, July 2005, p.28

and other laws<sup>97</sup>. As the answer to parliamentary opposition, criticising the notion of a presidential control over the regions, presidential spokesmen exposed the protesters in seeking the recreation of a Soviet-type system with a leading role of parliament. In September 1994, President Kuchma created a consultative and advisory organ, the ‘Council of Regions’, consisting of chairmen of *oblast* councils of Kyiv and Sevastopol and was directly answerable to the presidency.

The law on Ukrainian citizenship from October 1991 declared Ukraine to be a territorial rather than ethnic unit. Besides, there were equal political, economic, social and cultural rights (including the right of any national group for its language) guaranteed for all individuals and nationalities in the November 1991 Declaration. However, the language issue became in fact one of the most obstructing on the way of the “Ukrainisation” of the country<sup>98</sup>. There have been fluctuations about the possibility to give Russian an official status alongside Ukrainian, but this didn’t happen. Russian was only permitted to operate with two official languages in oblast administrative affairs.

To add more civic orientation to the state, the nondiscrimination enactments toward ethnic minorities were introduced, granting the latter opportunities for cultural development and political participation<sup>99</sup>. “The draft of the Ukrainian constitution confirmed the right of all citizens to preserve and protect their national affiliation<sup>100</sup> and to equality before the law regardless of nationality, language, religion, or race<sup>101</sup>; it also specified a host civil, political, economic, and cultural rights. It stressed the creation of a “civil society” based on equal rights, self-organisation, and self-government, and avoided any overt focus on ethnicity or national identity”. There was a fund for ethnic minorities established in Kyiv, to promote their cultural, social, and economic development. Though, there were budgetary constraints in the implementation of these reforms, evidently good intentions were traced in this sphere of the state

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<sup>97</sup> WOLCHIK L.Sharon, ZVIGLYANICH Volodymyr, *op. cit.*, p.169.

<sup>98</sup> WOLCHIK L.Sharon, ZVIGLYANICH Volodymyr, *op. cit.*, p.170.

<sup>99</sup> WOLCHIK Sharon L., ZVIGLYANICH Volodymyr, *op. cit.*, p.171

<sup>100</sup> See Appendix 11, Article 16 of *Treaty between the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic*

<sup>101</sup> See Appendix 12, Article 15, *Treaty between the Ukrainian, op. cit.*

life. At the same time, at different regions of the country ethnic identity has become politicised to different extents since the proclamation of national independence.

### 3.2 Ukraine's struggle for democracy

The folk has lived under many rulers: the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires, and Polish rule. And thus the isolated inhabitants had little consciousness of links between each other.

In 1648 a Cossack uprising under Bogdan Khmelnytsky led to the first period of Ukraine's existence as an independent state, having lasted until 1654. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was an early reference to independence, with the West Ukrainian People's Republic as a base of Ukrainian nationalism. It included administrative districts of Lviv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk - known as Galicia; Volhynia-Podolia, Bukovina and Chernivtsi. The Ukrainian Catholic Church or the Uniate Church was based in this region as well as the two early movements of Ukrainian nationalism, the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgents' Army (UPA), the latter working against Soviet rule in Galicia until 1954<sup>102</sup>. The right bank of Dnipro had been with Western Ukraine under a Polish protectorate until 1772, when it was shifted under Russia.

The rest of Ukraine constitutes other three regions. The left bank of Dnipro River had been under the control of Russia since the seventeenth century, comprising Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Poltava and Sumy. The east has been a heart of industry, comprising Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk and Luhansk, with almost 45 percent ethnic Russians. The least ethnically Ukrainian part of the country is the south of it and the Crimea, a former area of dispute between Turkey and Russia<sup>103</sup>. After the end of World War I, there was a second period of independence: the Ukrainian People's Republic was formed, with the First Universal in January 1917. However, soon the Red Army liquidated it. Parallel to it, in the West Ukraine another republic was formed, but liquidated by Poland. As D. Hamilton and G. Mangott underline, "*In the interwar years,*

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<sup>102</sup> BANAIAN King, *The Ukrainian economy since independence*, Northampton, Edward Elgar, 1999, p.4.

<sup>103</sup> BANAIAN King, *op. cit.*, p.5.

*when Ukrainians lived either in the USSR or Poland, national consciousness evolved in response to the perceived twin evils of Polish and Russian rule*<sup>104</sup>.

However, it was not easy to express the national consciousness within imperial Russia. Compared to western Ukraine, its eastern part had not as much nationalistic independence movement as a cultural one, which tried to preserve history and literature. After the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II, Ukrainian Central Council was formed with a leader, a famous historian Mikhaïlo Hrushevskyi<sup>105</sup>. The leader, who became later President, notes that Ukrainian Central Council had political parties, workers' cooperatives, soldiers, professional organisations, uniting members who abandoned their political and class differences for an idea of independence. After having laid the grounds of a complex system of the Council, unfortunately the provisional Government was thrown out in November by Bolshevik Revolution once the war became even worse for Russia<sup>106</sup>.

However during the nearly two years between the end of tsarist rule and the end of World War I Ukraine fought against Bolshevik forces for its independence. Though different parts of the country didn't listen to others' plight, which shown up even more in 1919. At the peace conference of Versailles western Ukraine was divided between Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia. The rest of the western Ukraine joined General Simon Petlyura, who was fighting then on two fronts: the Bolsheviks in the northwest and a White Russian army from the southwest. It brought Petlyura down by the end of 1919 and the republic didn't exist any longer. Thus, Ukraine had been able to express itself in statehood only when hegemonies were weakened. Later Ukraine became the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and joined the USSR.

Things after the World War I didn't become better. Collectivisation influenced Ukraine more than any other areas of the Soviet Union, as Ukraine had a big number of individual farmers who held their own land. The individual pieces of land were withdrawn and farmers forced to work at collectives, state farms. Forced collectivisation turned out to be disastrous as the distribution of land and capital were badly allocated and made worse by Stalin's policies.

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<sup>104</sup> HAMILTON Daniel, MANGOTT Gerhard, *op. cit.*, p.5.

<sup>105</sup> BANAIAN King, *op. cit.*, p.6.

<sup>106</sup> *Idem.*

Angry farmers slaughtered collective animals. There was a drought and a famine. However all agricultural products were taken to Russia, and Stalin kept giving orders, which didn't provide for existence of Ukrainian peasantry. According to different sources, an amount between 8 and 13 million people passed away during the famine. These events conspired to destroy Ukrainian agriculture and a generation of its political leaders<sup>107</sup>.

Same horrifying policies Stalin did apply on Ukrainian industry. Ukrainians supported Germans to fight Bolsheviks, but German distrust kept Ukrainian friendly troops from developing. In the end, Ukrainians fought both Germans and Soviets. Ukrainian industry was laid waste and Ukraine itself existed between the wars disorganised and destroyed. After the end of the World War I there was only a consumer's relationship of Moscow towards Ukraine. Russia, treating Ukraine casually, "gave" Ukraine Crimea, with two-thirds of its population being ethnically Russian, to spread international brotherhood around the regions of Ukraine promoting Russian-based culture, thus dividing and controlling the peripheral states of the USSR from the center<sup>108</sup>. Having in Crimea an independent area, the borders of Ukraine are determined by political forces, and the identity of the country is more cultural and linguistic than geographic. After the end of the World War II and a war between Poles and Ukrainians, a larger Ukrainian SSR within the USSR was formed, which was one more step to Ukrainian identity.

During the 1945 and 1991 the relationship between Ukrainians and Russians were complex. It's worthy to remember that after the disintegration of the USSR, Ukraine, like other Soviet republics, was not yet well prepared for independence. Not all the countries were prepared to move quickly away from the USSR. However, primarily Ukraine and Belarus insisted on the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States and Ukraine was one of the first among the other ex-Soviet republics to declare its independence. For the reason of long time conflicting with or colonised by Russia or Poland and such events as Stalin's collectivisation in the late 1920s and the World War II, the economy of Ukraine was substantially destroyed<sup>109</sup>.

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<sup>107</sup> BANAIAN King, *op. cit.*, p.9.

<sup>108</sup> BANAIAN King, *op. cit.*, p.10.

<sup>109</sup> BANAIAN King, *op. cit.*, p.11.

After the World War II any nationalist movements would be squelched by the Soviet authorities and memories of the famines and purges. Three parties: OUN, UPA and Ukrainian Nationalist Front (UNF) were forced into hiding by repressions from Moscow. Other dissident movements continued appearing from the 1960s. The Ukrainian Helsinki Group, implementing the Helsinki Accords published 60 documents highlighting national and civil rights for Ukraine. It was not purely a Western Ukrainian phenomenon. However, its members by the 1980s were repressed as well. Another group was a religious one, the Uniate Church, in response to the religious schism between the west of Ukraine and Moscow. The dissident movement remained weak until the two events, able to challenge the power of the Communist Party of Ukraine<sup>110</sup>. One of them was the amnesty for political prisoners granted by Gorbachev in April, while another was a Chernobyl disaster which helped to unify the independence movement and organise a November 1988 demonstration with ecologic and broader, independence goals. The initiative group wrote a draft program for a popular front, which was published on 16 February 1989 with hopes for a united front of independent movements and acceleration of perestroika and democratisation reforms<sup>111</sup>. However in 1989 elections Leonid Kravchuk, a representative of CPU “For Soviet Ukraine” won elections and the party politics became more strident. After changes in main party’s structures, as Banaian King points out “*the movement for independence turned to the one person who had the experience of party politics and the national presence to make independence happen: Kravchuk*”<sup>112</sup>. It is clear that the reason, why Kravchuk turned against the center in Moscow is that Communist bureaucrats had a “*limited ability to get away, which limited their freedom*”<sup>113</sup>. It doesn’t mean changes in belief of the established system, but existing as an independent mechanism that encourages the apparat to help the current regime survive.

This history of August-September 1991 is quite telling for the early political economy of Ukraine. Alongside with new changes, Ukraine moved first towards independence rather than

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<sup>110</sup> BANAIA King, *op. cit.*, p.12.

<sup>111</sup> BANAIA King, *op. cit.*, p.13.

<sup>112</sup> BANAIA King, *op. cit.*, p.14.

<sup>113</sup> BANAIA King, *op. cit.*, p.16.

removal of the Communists. The latter reorganised themselves under Moroz, forming the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU). Kravchuk had an advantage during the presidential elections and was a symbol for independence<sup>114</sup>.

### 3.3 Nationalisation of history in Ukraine

The process of the nationalisation of history and historiography in Ukraine of the end of 1980s - beginning of 1990s was developing in the same way as in the other post-Soviet countries. After revision “white spots” in history of Ukraine in the Soviet period became the basis of the denial of its soviet version, namely crimes of Stalinism, repressed personalities, national tragedies such as famine of 1932-1932 and others<sup>115</sup>.

In 1993 Leonid Kravchuk adopted symbols of Ukrainian statehood kept from 1920s, which witnessed that finally Ukraine became an heir of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. One can not accuse Ukraine in spontaneous invention of its own history straight after the dissolution of the USSR, as the fight for the independence right had been going for centuries. Already by the end of 1980s Ukraine started rising its head and even before the fateful 1991 the history of Ukraine had been mostly recovered and to some respect opposed to some places of its Soviet variant and lit by the communist heritage.

During the Soviet regime, with its mono-ideological variant of soviet history, there was no room for any other interpretation of reality. Thus after Ukraine’s gaining independence and with the attempts to return to its beginnings, an independent state got an opportunity to have a say and recover its roots and traditions without any threat of “treason”<sup>116</sup>. Ukraine was able to look back and review its own history of an important for Ukrainian statehood period of the end of the World War I. An important time of the Central Rada and Ukrainian People’s Republic

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<sup>114</sup> As for the data about the political parties’ composition, they are represented in the Appendix 3 ‘The colour-coated map of Ukraine’, representing the results of the elections to the Supreme Council of Ukraine in 1998.

<sup>115</sup> Национальные истории на постсоветском пространстве - II / Под редакцией Ф. Бомсдорфа, Г. Бордюгова. - М.: Фонд Фридриха Науманна, АИРО-XXI, 2009, с.117. [http://vk.com/doc9520999\\_213527707?hash=54120b4db2a046f56c&dl=5e351f5b22131831d3](http://vk.com/doc9520999_213527707?hash=54120b4db2a046f56c&dl=5e351f5b22131831d3) (National stories at the post-soviet field - II/Edited by F. Bomsdorf, G. Bordiugov, Moscow, Fund of Friedrich Naumann, 2009, p.117.)

<sup>116</sup> Национальные истории на постсоветском пространстве (National stories at the post-soviet field), *op. cit.*, p. 118.

becoming, present a prototype of a current Ukrainian state. These events are very important for every conscious Ukrainian citizen, who feels responsible for their country's independence and flourishing, as a strong, perspective country that deserves to develop on its own and get a better future.

### **Conclusion**

Ukraine is a deeply divided society, diverse from region to region. However it has always strived for independence, with a desire to be sovereign. There exist adherents to the two main theories of internal policies: those with nationalist views and pro-Russian views and those who tend to believe in a friendly coexistence of all nationalities inhabiting the territory of Ukraine.

The cultural, historical, ethnic and linguistic differences inherited after the collapse of the USSR, on the internal level, are inhibiting the development of Ukrainian ethno-nationalism and creating a polarisation of society, enforcing Ukraine to deal with the nation-building.

The internal political system of Ukraine is the result of a nation split in two. While the newly independent country has a strongly pro-Russian half, another nationalist half of the country has forged the country's policies and leaders' political agendas. This split of opinion between the country, however, does not effect the state of nationalism that can be found throughout the history of Ukraine. This rich history of a people of a small yet important land fighting for its rights and sense of identity against much larger empires, has built a sense of nationalism like none other. Nationalism has been the defining factor of the state's move to independence and this does not change for the state's internal and foreign policies, being a key factor for political decision making. Whether such nationalism will make or break the country is only for time to tell.



#### 4. Ukraine's views on West and East and importance of maintaining independence

##### 4.1 Ukraine's initial views on West and East

Many countries from Atlantic to Ural and Caucasus had to answer one and the same question of where is the borderline between the dichotomy “East” - “West”. Ukraine was not an exception. First of all, the country had to identify itself together with its nation in the spatial coordinate system in the civilised systems in general. Under the notion “East” sometimes the forms of cultural, state, economic old traditions were implicated, where an individual was subordinate to a collective and a state, while as for “the West”, however bearing not always strict and classic understandings of cultural forms, had more individual freedom, ideologic pluralism and “democracy” in the understanding of an average Ukrainian, with certain exceptions, now<sup>117</sup>. Besides, the separation into a new state was presented as the alienation from the empires both from “the West” and “the East”, while opposing of a new, separated nation's features to previously common area's features, played an important role. Besides, such process includes attempts of integration into another common space, seen as a better alternative. Thus, the space from which Ukraine separated was “the East”/Russia and the one where it is going to integrate is “the West” or the rest of Europe<sup>118</sup>.

Unfortunately, as far as in the frame of the previous Soviet, communist and cultural-political experience it was impossible to stand out as a cultural-political all-sufficient unit, Ukraine with varied success, is currently heading for “the West”. Very likely, just because Ukraine hasn't still determined its position of who it should belong, such opinions are traced inside the state as either Ukraine fulfils a mission of “*a barrier between East and West*”, or combining traits of the both sides in its history and culture, Ukrainian nation is being unique “*at the borderline of the two powers*”<sup>119</sup>.

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<sup>117</sup> Национальные истории на постсоветском пространстве (National stories at the post-soviet field), *op. cit.*, p. 128.

<sup>118</sup> Национальные истории на постсоветском пространстве (National stories at the post-soviet field), *op. cit.*, p. 129.

<sup>119</sup> Национальные истории на постсоветском пространстве (National stories at the post-soviet field), *op. cit.*, p. 132.

There is an interesting opinion of one Polish researcher Olya (Alexandra) Gnatyuk on the aspect of Ukraine between East and West that merits to be mentioned. According to O. Gnatyuk there are five contending intellectual tendencies in Ukraine, when seeing it between East and West<sup>120</sup>. First is the Ukrainian culture as a borderland culture, between the East and West, which, from the researcher's words, is a substance of Ukrainian identity. The interest to this tendency is especially great towards the period of XVI-XVII c., when Ukrainian lands had multiple contacts with East and West, being a cultural intermediary with an advantage of presence of different cultures in the Ukrainian culture<sup>121</sup>. Another tendency or intellectual vision of Ukraine is seeing its culture as a field, at which there contended two foreign civilisations. It shows Ukraine as a territory of a conflict, a watershed of these civilisations. Another concept is based on differences between the Western and Eastern Ukraine. Here within the limits of the national reach one can distinguish its own East and West. This predetermines, in contrast to cultural synthesis, the conflict and division of society. The fourth approach talks about the common culture and art traditions which can unite Ukraine with the West. Finally, the last vision, though not very plausible, states that Ukraine was initially the center of Europe. This sounds somehow extremist, however, has right for life in the investigations of the above mentioned researcher.

Returning to the first tendency in viewing Ukraine among the two different cultures, we would like to add that according to Igor Shevchenko's outlines, during XI-XVIII c. Eastern and Western influences, such as Byzantine and Greek art, the style of baroque, were either interchanging or coexisting in Ukrainian culture<sup>122</sup>. However, there is a certain difficulty, as Byzantium doesn't lie to the East, but to the South, or even South-West from Kyiv. Thus, talking about the influence of Byzantium on Ukraine, we mean the influence of a part of Mediterranean civilisation. However, instinctively we know that Byzantium means "East", and "West" means

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<sup>120</sup> Национальные истории на постсоветском пространстве (National stories at the post-soviet field), *op. cit.*, p. 134.

<sup>121</sup> Национальные истории на постсоветском пространстве (National stories at the post-soviet field), *op. cit.*, p. 137.

<sup>122</sup> ШЕВЧЕНКО Ігор, *Україна між Сходом і Заходом. Нариси з історії культури до початку XVIII століття*, Авторизований переклад з англійської Марії Габлевич, під ред. Андрія Ясіновського. Львів, Інститут Історії Церкви Львівської Богословської Академії 2001. (SHEVCHENKO Igor, *Ukraine between East and West. Outlines in history of culture up to the beginning of XVIII c.*, Authorised translation from English by Mariia Gablevich, edited by Andriy Yasinovsky, Lviv, Institute of Church History of Lviv Theologic Academy, 2001.)

Europe. At the same time, Shevchenko shows that alternative notions of “East” and “West” turned into speech even several centuries before Ukraine joined the civilised society<sup>123</sup>. The fact of this notion’s entry into the historical consciousness during the age of late antiquity is predetermined by administrative division of the late Roman Empire into the Eastern and Western parts. The border between them was lying along the Eastern borderland of the lands, which up to the 90s of XX c. built up Yugoslavia. Hence, in the past, almost all the former Yugoslavia belonged to the West. The Slavs’ wedging into the Balkan peninsula in the VI c. divided East and West even more. Church distinguished Western and Eastern communities as well, calling the latter *ecclesiae orientales*. Such a division, however, didn’t have an “anti-Eastern” directionality, on the contrary, early Christians of the Mediterranean treated East with a special respect, as to a land which gave birth to the Saviour. Such a division is also obvious from the geographic point of view: factually Constantinople lied to the East of both Ravenna - one of the capitals of the Western empire and of Rome - centre of the cardinal Western patriarchy. However, after the attack of Byzantium by the crusaders, the notion “East” gained in the eyes of the West a different connotation, while the Byzantines got filled with reluctance towards the Catholic West<sup>124</sup>.

The riot or usurpation of Charles the Great, and his coronation in the year 800 as a person which was ruling over a ‘Roman Empire’ were the events of antibyzantium orientation that laid down the grounds of modern Europe. While still in the year 369 one of the Greek Church Fathers called Constantinople “the prominent European city”, in X-XV c., as the texts show, the Byzantines themselves stopped perceiving their own capital as a part of Europe<sup>125</sup>. Thus, when Kyiv under the prince Volodymyr adopted Christianity, it entered the cultural sphere which was “the East” even in the eyes of the West, and didn’t attribute itself to Europe, however belonged geographically. Such a view has been lasting up to the present. The orientation of Ukraine “to Europe” can both support or reject this opinion. On the one hand, an educated European can argue such a perception of “the East”. On the other hand, in the Eastern European folklore a notion of “the East” has an inherited from late-antique paganism positive colouring, extant in

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<sup>123</sup> ШЕВЧЕНКО Ігор, *Україна між Сходом і Заходом* (SHEVCHENKO Igor, *Ukraine between East and West*), *op. cit.*

<sup>124</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>125</sup> *Idem.*

early Christianity. As it is correct to pray with one's face to the East, to "the gods/God's home", in contrast to the West, the opposite<sup>126</sup>.

If the notions "the East" and "Europe" still need more precision, then the very notion of "West" stays clear, as its geographical and cultural meanings coincide. Not stopping at separate events of early history, namely relations of Ukrainian and Western lands, we will move to other events of cultural history. From this point of view, some regions of Ukraine fell under the Western influence even before 1349. After 1569 this influence increased and broadened, having lasted till 1793. As for the Polish "West", which influenced Western and Right Bank Ukraine, its time limit reaches up to 1918 or even 1939<sup>127</sup>. During the critical times, XVI-XVII c. the Polish Counter-Reformation was happening, and in Ukraine of those times the interest to the Greek language was awoken, as a response of the Latin language imposition. In the first half of the XVII c., for the first time in Ukrainian history, the elite could apply to antique sources directly. At the same time, the main language with the help of which Ukraine exchanged its culture with the West was Polish, which created together with Ukrainian language a mixture, used by the local Orthodox and Uniate elites<sup>128</sup>. Their reaction to a cultural offence from the West was partially hostile, which revived the Russian belief. For the same reasons the Ostrog and Mohyla academies as well as some other schools were created. Thus, paradoxically, Ukraine tried to protect the "native" East, Byzantium, with the help of Western means - Jesuit pedagogics and Catholic learnings<sup>129</sup>. Same tendencies were traced in Europe of XVI-XVII c., as well as at the borderland of the Western and Byzantine cultures.

Notwithstanding the penetration of the West into the Ukrainian land, which had been lasting several centuries, Ukrainians became "the East" in the eyes of the Western Europe long ago, before the division of Poland. And it happened not only because Ukrainians confessed "the Eastern belief" and were mostly, except Uniats, were subjected to the Eastern patriarch. It happened because the Polish-Lithuanian state, considered a West even in XVI c., from the mid

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<sup>126</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>127</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>128</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>129</sup> *Idem.*

XVII c. and up to XVIII started groundlessly belong to the East. Another proof for it is ideas, expressed in Rubens' painting, on the Herodotus' plot is in Boston Art museum. Tamiris, the princess of Scythian Massagets of the VI c. b.c., who lived in the basin of the Caspian sea. In Rubens' picture of 1625, the members of the princess' attendants are dressed as Polish gentlemen. The fashion for the Eastern clothing is explained by good relationship of Ukrainian cossacks and Polish-Lithuanian Rzeczpospolita with the Ottoman Empire. Besides, the clothing preferences of Rzeczpospolita was opposed to that of the Jews, and were represented by frocks and white powdered wigs<sup>130</sup>.

At the same time the counterattack of "the East" began in 1650s, covering more and more of Ukrainian territory. We should keep in mind, that before we talked about the influence of the Byzantine "East", which came to Ukraine from the South, from Constantinople, the Byzantine capital, as well as through Balkans. The second wave of the Byzantine influence came from the North, from Moscow kingdom and later from the Russian empire<sup>131</sup>. Here the Byzantine, protecting its own values, used achievements and human resources of Ukraine. It lasted till the last quarter of the XVII c.; what happened later was that Neobyzantium, a cultural footing for Moscow kingdom, lost the fight. Thus, in less than fifty years the Russian empire started importing big portions of Western culture, and soon the Western values moved to its Ukrainian possessions<sup>132</sup>. In 1730s and 1740s, an Italian Rastrelli and a German Johann Gottfried Shedel were building or planning Kyiv buildings - Andriyivska Church, the Great Lavra church bells; taking into account that these artists came to Kyiv not from Italy or Germany, but from St. Petersburg.

To sum up, such occasions like the one with Rastrelli remind us an important trait of Ukrainian cultural ties both with "East" and "West", namely lack of a direct access to original sources, which Ukraine often didn't have. Foreign cultural values came here with intermediaries. In Kyivan Rus the Greek language was almost not known, so Byzantine literature was coming there through Bulgaria. The culture of 'Counterreformation' was coming mostly through Poland.

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<sup>130</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>131</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>132</sup> *Idem.*

Classicism in architecture was brought here through the Russian empire. Literary neoclassics of the XX c. turned to French symbolic poetry under the influence of “the Silver Age” of the Russian poetry. Similar “secondary importance” can be traced not only in Ukraine; however this fact meant a certain weakness of the Ukrainian culture<sup>133</sup>.

Turning now to another axis of the North-South, we usually say that there lies Moscow, Byzantium and its heiress, the Ottoman Empire. The latter in the frames of its possessions protected Orthodoxy from danger, coming from the West. Cultural contacts among the Orthodoxy centres in the frames of the Ottoman Empire were carried out on the axis North - South, and Ukraine of the XVI-XVII c. took part not only as a recipient: cultural influences were not only imported but also exported from Ukrainian lands in the direction of South<sup>134</sup>.

The representatives of Post-Byzantium Eastern church in Ukraine were mostly Greek. They all having lived there for a certain time while helping Orthodox fraternities or teaching, moved later to Moscow. There they found power of rule and money, but according to the testimonies of one of them, a Syrian Pavel Aleppsky, only in Ukraine they could breathe freely<sup>135</sup>. Another string of mutual influence was among Ukrainian-Byelorussian and Balkan lands. Kyiv metropolitan Petro Mohyla gave a support to printing houses in Moldova and Walachia; in Kyiv hymnography of the XVII-XVIII c. one could find the influence of contemporaries - Greeks, Bulgarians and Moldavians, who also obtained education abroad. First books, printed in Ostrog, Lviv and Kyiv found their way to Serbia and Bulgaria. On the other hand, in Lviv museums one can find Gexameron, printed in Montenegro in 1493 and Euchologium, printed in 1519 in Venice for Balkans, and many other works.

All in all, national elites inside the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires were fated for cultural provincialism, which was compensated by exaggerated or even unprecedented statements about their own nation. Besides, in the end of the XVII - first half of the XVIII c. Russians decided to apply to the West directly, and not through the Ukrainian mediation, and this decision made them a very good service. An unprecedented flourishing of the

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<sup>133</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>134</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>135</sup> *Idem.*

Moscow and later - Russian culture, beginning with tsar Alexey Mykhaylovych and to Oleksandr I, in whose times lived and was writing Pushkin, can be explained mostly by direct contacts with the West.

During the Soviet times an opinion about necessity of contacting West directly prevailed in the circles of writers Hvylyovy and Zerov, who pursued an aim to refuse from the intermediary of the North. Currently we are living in other conditions, when such a wish can come true, if one approaches this task without polemics. Today “the West” can be understood broadly - as different cultures of the western world.

The latest changes in independent Ukraine do not solve problems, risen above. On the other hand, they inevitably direct the views of local elites and Ukrainians abroad, to the West and towards the future, which is a good sign. There is a concern not to overlook and blur a historical perspective. Byzantine heritage with their long lasting tendencies afterwards - even such as cultural influence of Russia on significant part of Ukrainian lands - can, in the course of sudden changes, recede to the background, whereas their consequences will not effloresce for a single night. Those who realise it will strive to establish contacts with the wide world at the appropriate intellectual level<sup>136</sup>.

#### **4.2 The importance of maintaining independence and balancing the threat from the East and/or the West**

The Ukrainian independence of 1991 came so abruptly and unexpectedly and had enormous consequences for the future of the country. Virtually no one in or out of the government was prepared for independence or its aftermath. Inexperienced and untrained, Ukraine’s post-imperial elites had now to cope with the herculean task of transforming a “colony” into an independent state and creating everything that totalitarianism had destroyed or stifled: a civil society, a market, the rule of law, democracy, the machinery of the state<sup>137</sup>. In many respects, the challenges facing post-Soviet republic were greater than those of most

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<sup>136</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>137</sup> Национальные истории на постсоветском пространстве (National stories at the post-soviet field), *op. cit.*, p. 139.

colonies, such as the new states that emerged from the French or British empires. However disadvantaged, these colonies had to overcome only the legacy of empire. By contrast, Ukraine and other post-Soviet states had to overcome the legacy of totalitarianism.

Ukrainians have an overwhelming preoccupation with Russia. It is their foremost foreign policy concern, and their primary source of negative identity. Indeed for many Ukrainians, it is their major, if not the only, problem. So powerful an obsession that has deep historical roots. For several hundred years Ukraine has been the colony and Russia - the empire; Ukraine - the province, and Russia - the metropolis; Ukraine - the borderland and Russia - the center. Ukraine has traditionally defined itself with reference to, and against, Russia: Ukraine is that which Russia is not. It is for these views and reasons that Russia poses a threat to an independent Ukraine. While Russia's pressure on Ukraine was reinforcing the Ukrainians' efforts at creating a new national identity, such pressure could undercut solidarity from within if, on the one hand internal conditions in Ukraine deteriorate so much as to make Russia begin to appear as an alternative and more attractive source of loyalty, and, on the other hand, if the Kremlin, not just extremists within the government, officially begins to pursue a distinctly anti-Ukrainian policy. The second possibility should not be discounted, as unlike Ukrainians and other non-Russians, the Russians have to contend with an imperial mentality that reinforce overbearing attitudes toward other peoples<sup>138</sup>.

Looking to the west, Ukraine had another security problem. Poland, Moldova, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were all pressing for the withdrawal of Russian troops while several other republics were beginning to build their own armies. Seen from this perspective, the evolution of Ukraine's foreign policy after independence made perfect sense<sup>139</sup>. Kiev had gone out of its way to court American favour and recognition. Ukrainian policy makers have been even more energetic about establishing a high profile at the United Nations, lobbying at the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and inserting themselves into European institutions. As former Foreign Minister Anatoly Zlenko put it, "*Ukraine is a European nation, more than that,*

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<sup>138</sup> Национальные истории на постсоветском пространстве (National stories at the post-soviet field), *op.cit.*, p.139

<sup>139</sup> FURTADO F. Charles jr., 'Nationalism and foreign policy in Ukraine', *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol.109, No. 1, Spring 1994, p.96.



*Ukraine is a great European nation which can enrich the all-European process. Everything European is characteristic of us*<sup>140</sup>. Ukraine had also built its relations with neighbouring EU countries - Poland, Romania, Hungary and Slovakia on its road to the European Union. Although Ukraine's prospects for joining Western Europe may have been good in the long run, the legacies of empire and totalitarianism demanded immediate solutions to its pressing problems. These solutions are still to be found and were evident in Russia's imperialistic actions while Ukraine was moving towards EU-partnership in 2013.

### **Conclusion**

The newly formed country of Ukraine has established a significant presence in the region through a series of moves and policies that portrayed its desire to stay independent. These policies were centred on Russia as well as Ukraine's neighbours to the West, and were mainly derived to maintain good relations, usually to appease these countries for future gains. This strategy has worked well for Ukraine, it has maintained and will maintain its independence for a long time thanks to the presence it has developed. Appeasement does not come without its downsides though, Russia has retained the imperialistic complex it has over Ukraine and hinders its moves to the West. Western countries still see Ukraine as a child state of Russia even though they recognise and appreciate Ukraine as a sovereign state<sup>141</sup>. The world and even the Ukrainian people are still having a hard time deciding if the country is an eastern one or a western one, to the point where the issue has split the country in two. The time of being recognised for Ukraine is over now; it has dealt successfully with the post-independence issues which were of concern and now needs to deal with the issues at hand to secure not only a state of independence but a cultural independence as well.

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<sup>140</sup> MOTYL J. Alexander, *Dilemmas of independence: Ukraine after totalitarianism*, New York: Council on foreign relations Press, 1993, p.87.

<sup>141</sup> FURTADO F. Charles jr., *op. cit.*, p.97.

## **5. Ukrainian security concerns at the end of the Cold-War era.**

### **Fears and hopes**

#### **5.1 The way of perceiving security threats by Ukraine in its neighbourhood from 1991 onwards**

With the closing of the Soviet Union the security concerns of Ukraine moved from external threats towards threats from its own neighbourhood. It was not the relationship between Ukraine and its neighbours that concerned the country's security, but it was the interrelationships and conflicts that were being played out so close to home. Conflicts like the Yugoslav Wars, the Romanian Revolution and the War of Transnistria have incited policy being developed with national security as the object of most concern. From the outset of Ukraine's declaration of Independence, the opportunities for better relations within its neighbourhood arose. Poland was the first country to recognise Ukraine's independence one day after the referendum was held, and the reigniting of relations between Poland and Ukraine had begun. Ukraine saw good relations with Poland as both a way to stabilise the region and a road to the west. With the "Declaration on the Foundations and Fundamental Directions in the Development of Polish-Ukrainian Relations" signed two months prior to the declaration of independence, the territorial claims of the two countries had been put to rest and relations could proceed more peacefully<sup>142</sup>. In mid January 1992 the Ukrainian defence minister visited Poland and agreed to the cooperation in personnel training, supply of spare part for military equipment and training in flight safety with the Polish Air Force. Subsequently, Poland received assurances that the nearly 500,000 troops stationed on Ukraine's territory would be reduced to 230-240,000 which would pose no threat to Poland. In May of 1992 Kravchuk visited Poland to sign the important treaty on 'Good neighbourliness, friendly relations and cooperations'. This document mainly addressed each state's minority populations in the other country, allowing them to propagate freely their religion and culture, form their own educational, cultural and religious institutions, to be educated in their native language and to be able to use their names and surnames in the form in which they are written in

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<sup>142</sup> ZIĘBA Ryszard, *The "Strategic Partnership" between Poland and Ukraine*, The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest, Vol. 2, No.3(4), 2002, Warsaw, The Polish Institute of International Affairs, p. 195.

their native language<sup>143</sup>. This treaty attempted to repair the damage caused by the “Akeja Wista” in which minorities on both sides suffered due to the ramifications of the forced relocation of Ukrainians in Poland. Ukrainians and Poles, who fought armed conflicts in the aftermath of World War I and whose partisans committed atrocities in World War II, were working together on their relations for the first time, in order to get a foot in the ground they own and keep it there.

The relationships between Ukraine and its neighbours were not all friendly from the outset. The Romanian parliament made a clear-cut territorial claim to parts of Ukraine: Southern Besarabia and Northern Bukovyna as well as a Serpent Island (Snake island)<sup>144</sup>. These territories had been taken in 1918 by Romania<sup>145</sup>. The claims were expressed via a *note verbale* of the Romanian Embassy in Kyiv to the Foreign Ministry dated 22 April 1993. The note declared the treaty on borders between the Soviet Union and Romania of 1961 as one which had ceased to exist. These Ukrainian-Romanian negotiations were going on at a time when Bucharest was vigorously seeking its place as one of the first candidates for NATO membership. Ukraine faced accusations that it was trying to impede the aspirations of Romania for NATO membership, to which it denied, but voiced its concerns over the deadlocked bilateral negotiations over territorial claims<sup>146</sup>. In June 1997, Romania signed a bilateral treaty with Ukraine which sought to resolve the territorial claims but till this day the claims have not been completely resolved. The Serpent Island dispute has been the only dispute to be closed. It was closed by the Hague International Court of Justice in the favour of Romania which did not bode well with Ukrainians. These two neighbours have not had the best of starts but have agreed on some matters: Romania had backed Ukraine in its efforts to establish closer relations with the EU and also granted the NATO Membership Action Plan to Ukraine showing that not all actions Romania has taken have been negative.

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<sup>143</sup> GÁL Kinga, “*Bilateral Agreements in Central and Eastern Europe: A New Inter-State Framework for Minority Protection?*”, ECMI WORKING PAPER No.4, Flensburg, Germany, May 1999, p.6

<sup>144</sup> IWANŃSKI Tadeusz, “*Ukraine - Romania: a sustained deadlock*”, OSW Commentary, Issue 68, 29.12.2011, Centre for Eastern studies, p.1.

<sup>145</sup> For the location of the area in question on the map see Appendix 4, “The Danube delta”.

<sup>146</sup> IWANŃSKI Tadeusz, “*Ukraine - Romania: a sustained deadlock*”, OSW Commentary, Issue 68, 29.12.2011, Centre for Eastern studies, p.6.

Ukraine had also participated in some 'Euroregions' after its independence. 'Euroregions' are self-initiated forms of cooperation among regions, local governments lying on both sides of common borders and having the main goal of stimulating prosperity of citizens and development of borderline regions by common activities and incentives<sup>147</sup>. Some of the known Euroregions that Ukraine participated in are:

- Carpathian Euroregion (Polish-Hungarian-Slovakian-Romanian-Ukrainian)
- Bug Euroregion (Polish-Belorussian-Ukrainian)
- The Lower Danube Euroregion (Romanian-Moldovian-Ukrainian)
- The Upper Prut Euroregion (Romanian-Moldovian-Ukrainian)<sup>148</sup>

All of these regions have brought different regions together to improve processes and solve problems in co-operations both improving the way of life for their people and giving a sense of identity within the Euroregion.

Ukraine's efforts to keep its own security in check were the result of the unassured survival of the newly formed country. The aim was to keep its neighbours happy while still making reforms and improvements to itself. Through these precise actions Ukraine has brought a sense of stability to the region.

## **5.2 Ukraine-US, Ukraine-Western Europe and Ukraine-Russia relations. Fears and hopes**

Ukraine and the US had three main obstacles blocking the improvement of their political relationship; these were the American frustration over Ukrainian nuclear disarmament, Ukraine's slow pace of economic reform, and the focus on Russia coming from the US at the expense of other post-soviet states<sup>149</sup>. In June of 1993 Ukrainian-American relations began to change for the

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<sup>147</sup> BRIE Mircea, KOSMA Gabor, *From Smaller to Greater Europe: Border Identity Testimonie*, Volume 2, Autumn 2006, Oradea University Press, pp.5-7

<sup>148</sup> ZSUZSA Ludvig, *Hungarian-Ukrainian Cross-border Cooperation with Special Regard to Capathian Euroregion and Economic Relations*, Warsaw, The Stefan Batory Foundation, 23 November 2002, p.6.

<sup>149</sup> HAJDA Lubomyr A., *op.cit*, p.58.

better, this was following the Massandra meeting in which Yeltsin forced the alienated Kravchuk to submit to his diktat and agree to turn over the Black Sea Fleet. The American assumption on about Russian behaviour within the CIS were being re-evaluated as Russia overtly increased support of Abkhazian separatists in Georgia and military involvement in Moldova's breakaway Transdnister region. The United States feared that Russia's tendency to capitalise aggressively on CIS instability across the former Soviet Union may remain an integral part of its foreign policy. Moreover, growing tensions in Moscow between Yeltsin and the Russian Supreme Soviet, led by its speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov, suddenly raised new doubts over the variability of Russia's political and economic reform. As US-Russian relations floundered, US-Ukrainian relations flourished<sup>150</sup>. By autumn 1993, while still insisting that Ukraine comply with the Lisbon protocols to the Non-proliferation Treaty as a future nonnuclear state, the United States linked, albeit indirectly, Ukraine's nuclear disarmament with broader security and economic needs. On January 14, 1994, Ukraine, Russia and the United states signed the Trilateral Agreement, which required Ukraine to dismantle its entire nuclear arsenal by June 1996. The Trilateral Agreement came with many advantages for Ukraine, some of which were not present in the initial Lisbon protocols. First, Ukraine finally received economic relief. Second, by becoming a partner in the Trilateral Agreement the United States established its presence in the region. Third, Ukraine won security assurances from Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom and later both France and China as the recognised nuclear powers<sup>151</sup>. The greatest breakthrough in Ukraine-US relations that resulted from the signing of the Trilateral Agreement that was under Kravchuk and his visit to Washington in March 1994, where he secured \$350 million to expedite disarmament and another \$350 million in economic assistance. This success however is overshadowed by Kuchma's projection of trust and reliability in Western matters. The election of Kuchma, followed by Ukraine's cooperation on nuclear disarmament and its greater commitment to macroeconomic stabilisation, led to rapid improvement in Ukraine-US relations. As US relations with Russia were becoming even more strained due to the Russian sales of weapons and nuclear reactors to Iran, improving Sino-Russian relations, and Russia's attempts to

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<sup>150</sup> WOLCHIK L. Sharon, ZVIGLYANICH Volodymyr, *op. cit.*, p.24.

<sup>151</sup> WOLCHIK L. Sharon, ZVIGLYANICH Volodymyr, *op. cit.*, p.25.

assert control over the Caspian basin, Ukraine-US relations continued improving. By 1995 Ukraine became a vital component to United States European Policy and preceded Russia as a member of both the Council of Europe and NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP). While Russia was proving to be an awkward partner for the NATO force sent to implement the Dayton agreements, Ukraine's contingent in the Balkans actually helped the US in their effort to arm Bosnia as part of their exit strategy to build a well-armed Bosnian state<sup>152</sup>. The United States also changed their outlook on visiting Ukraine with the country not only hosting Bill Clinton but higher cabinet officials and military delegations as well. In the summer of 1995 Ukraine also hosted joint military exercises of United States, Slovak, Hungarian and Ukrainian troops under the PfP. Even though the Ukraine-US relationship was improving on some ends, it is not to say the two countries did not encounter serious difficulties. For its part the US did not move past its issues in the nuclear question<sup>153</sup>. Most recently Washington has focused on Ukraine's alleged export of military technology to China, Iran and Libya. With the absence of a unifying agreement between the two countries, combined with The United States' growing frustration over Ukraine's poor efforts towards economic reform, a relapse into weaker relations maybe observed between the two countries. The US will continue to attach significance to its relations with Ukraine, as it represents the primary barrier to Russia and its drive to rebuild a superstate within the CIS<sup>154</sup>.

Like the US, the West Europeans rediscovered Ukraine as they reassessed Russia's long-term intentions. Their concern increased when Russia's Duma made territorial claims on Ukrainian Crimea in July 1993. Russia startled Britain with their involvement with the overthrowing of the pro-Turkish regime in Azerbaijan and the limiting of Britain's Petroleum activities in the Caspian basin. Russia's struggle with Turkey alarmed Germany and Britain further as these countries viewed Turkey as the foundation of stability on Europe's east Mediterranean flank<sup>155</sup>.

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<sup>152</sup> WOLCHIK L. Sharon, ZVIGLYANICH Volodymyr, *op. cit.*, p.25.

<sup>153</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>154</sup> FURTADO F. Charles jr., *op. cit.*, p.81.

<sup>155</sup> WOLCHIK L. Sharon, ZVIGLYANICH Volodymyr, *op. cit.*, p.25.

By 1996 the Western Europe was actively seeking closer ties with Ukraine. Furthermore, the British government recognised that the Ukrainian fear of becoming a buffer zone between Russia and NATO countries, rather than an intransigence, which could scuttle NATO expansion. Accordingly, Britain started going to great lengths to assure Ukraine of its support, with the Foreign Secretary as one of the most consistent advocates of increased aid to Ukraine and stronger ties between Western Europe and Ukraine<sup>156</sup>. With Kuchma visiting Bonn in the summer of 1995 for the signing of agreements to promote Ukraine-German economic partnerships, it can be seen that his diplomacy skills improved Ukraine's foreign image<sup>157</sup>. In May 1996, Hans van den Broek, the EU's commissioner for External Relations, bolstered a drive to support Ukraine by declaring that an independent Ukraine serves as a crucial element to European security<sup>158</sup>. By the spring of 1996, Kuchma was speaking of EU membership as a "strategic aim" while hastening to add that such an aim remained contingent upon economic reform rather than simply Ukraine's offering itself as an emergency bulwark against Russian expansion<sup>159</sup>. This view of Ukraine has not subsided even today with the EU reaching towards Ukraine for a possible ascension and Russia influence on the countries postponement of discussions.

Looking towards the east after both Ukraine and Russia terminated the union, several acute disputes were formed<sup>160</sup>. The first was the question of the Crimea which the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic had administered since 1954. This however was largely resolved in an agreement that allowed for Crimea to remain part of Ukraine, provided its Autonomous Republic status is preserved. The second major dispute of the 1990s was the city of Sevastopol, with its base of the Black Sea Fleet. Unlike the rest of the Crimea peninsula, the city of Sevastopol carried a special status within the Soviet Union. During the fall of the Soviet state the city along with the rest of Ukraine participated in the national referendum for independence of Ukraine

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<sup>156</sup> WOLCHIK Sharon L., ZVIGLYANICH Volodymyr *op. cit.*, p.25

<sup>157</sup> WOLCHIK Sharon L., ZVIGLYANICH Volodymyr *op. cit.*, p.25

<sup>158</sup> FURTADO F. Charles jr., *op. cit.*, p.81.

<sup>159</sup> FURTADO F. Charles jr., *op. cit.*, p.82.

<sup>160</sup> *Idem.*

where 58% of its population voted for the succession of the city in favour of the Ukrainian state, yet the Supreme Soviet of Russia voted to reclaim the city as its territory in 1993 (a vote unrecognised by Boris Yeltsin, at the time the Russian parliament and president were at a political stand-off). After several years of intense negotiations, in 1997 the whole issue was resolved by partitioning the Black Sea Fleet and leasing some of the naval bases in Sevastopol to the Russian Navy until 2017<sup>161</sup>. Another major dispute became the energy supply problems as several Soviet-Western Europe oil and gas pipelines ran through Ukraine. In the 1990s Leonid Kuchma in the interview with Spiegel acknowledged the fact that Ukraine siphoned off Russian gas. Later after new treaties came into effect, the enormous debts were paid off by transfer of several Soviet weaponry and nuclear arsenals that Ukraine inherited, to Russia such as the Tu-160 bombers. During the 1990s both countries along with other ex-Soviet states founded the Commonwealth of Independent States and large business partnerships came into effect<sup>162</sup>. While Russian share in Ukraine's exports declined from 26.2 percent in 1997 to around 23 percent in 1998-2000, the share of imports held steady at 45-50 percent of the total. Overall, between one third and one half of Ukraine's trade was with the Russian Federation. Dependence was particularly strong in energy. Up to 70-75 percent of annually consumed gas and close to 80 percent of oil came from Russia. On the export side, too, dependence was significant. Russia remained Ukraine's primary market for ferrous metals, steel plate and pipes, electric machinery, machine tools and equipment, food, and products of chemical industry. It has been a market of hope for Ukraine's high value-added goods, more than nine tenths of which were historically tied to the Russian consumer. Old buyers gone by 1997, Ukraine had experienced a 97-99 percent drop in production of industrial machines. At the same time, and in spite of the post-communist slowdown, Russia came out as the fourth-largest investor in Ukrainian economy after the USA, Netherlands, and Germany. With Ukraine moving to the centre of interest for both the East (Russia) and the West (Western Europe and the US), a balance of relationships must be maintained. As maintaining old relationships can keep the country afloat and building new

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<sup>161</sup> FURTADO F. Charles jr., *op. cit.*, p.83

<sup>162</sup> WOLCHIK L. Sharon, ZVIGLYANICH Volodymyr, *op. cit.*, p.26.



relationships can instil growth, this balance is important and should be always taken into account<sup>163</sup>.

### **Conclusion**

Coming straight into independence, Ukraine had many foreign issues to deal with. First off there was its recognition from its neighbours, which turned out to be quite successful especially in the case of Poland. The EU neighbourhood policy allowed for Ukraine to build relations with its neighbours to the west, with a kind of advantage of EU good will. Looking further to the West, the US was becoming more and more accepting and appreciative of Ukraine, as the two countries were tackling the obstacles that prevented good relations between them. This new increase in relations was also partly due to the decrease in that between Russia and the US, as Ukraine made the right moves when Russia was down (especially in the Georgian issue) putting itself on the world stage. Due to the separation of the Soviet Union, the territorial disputes between Russia and Ukraine made the building of a new foreign policy very difficult for Ukraine, as these matter came first and Russia is a very important ally for the Ukrainian economy. With all these issues considered, the newly formed Ukraine handled each of them quite well. Even though some mistakes were made, in the case of foreign policy Ukraine did everything possible. Ukraine did struggle during this time not because of its foreign policy but because of the internal economic policies which brought the newly formed and fragile economy down. With the course of time through all its struggles, Ukraine has been fully accepted by its neighbours and the world as an independent European state, cooperating on peaceful terms with both, its closest neighbours and distant and major world powers.

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<sup>163</sup> *Idem.*

## **General Conclusions**

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Ukraine remained the country with the richest tradition of national consciousness and a history of being a nation-state. The newly independent states of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, however, have always been the object of geopolitical shifts between Europe and Russia, located along military, transportation and energy corridors. These countries would add to the world's security, and their ability to deal with conflicting identities at the national - and sub-national levels might determine, where Europe ends.

Coming straight into independence, Ukraine had many foreign issues to deal with, especially recognition from its neighbours. Due to the separation of the Soviet Union, the territorial disputes between Russia and Ukraine caused difficulties in Ukraine's foreign policy. Through all the difficulties and occasional mistakes, Ukraine handled the task quite well and has been fully accepted by its neighbour states, cooperating on peaceful terms with each of them, both close and distant neighbours, as well as major world powers.

The transition from central economy had its ups and downs on the road to a market economy. Having gone through the long and deep economic crisis, hyperinflation periods, corruption and financial inequality, Ukraine managed to gain the title of a leader among the CIS countries. However, after Ukraine's declaration of independence Russia remained a dominant power greatly influencing the Ukraine's as well as the other CIS countries' decision making process.

The roots of Ukraine's foreign policy grow mainly from the Soviet regime. Ukrainian political system has proven to be not coherent and unstable, susceptible to change, heading to the pro-Russia or pro-West directions. Its foundation still needs to be laid to bring about a change in the long run.

Throughout the history Ukrainian lands were subject to a constant change, while its people were struggling to find their identity. Currently locked in the economic power struggle between the European Union and Russia, people rioting in central regions of the country and

expressing the nation's view on foreign policy of the country. There is a split between the two sides, which doesn't add more stability - neither to foreign policy, nor to the issues of freedom and democracy.

Talking about the main diplomatic relations of Ukraine, its aim is a provision of country's competent taking part in all-European and regional systems of collective security, acquisition of the EU and NATO memberships, while preserving neighbourly relations with the Russian Federation, other CIS countries and the other states of the world.

Since the proclamation of national independence, ethnic identity at different regions of the country became politicised. The internal political system of Ukraine thus got split in two. One half is strongly pro-Russian, another is a nationalist half. However the split doesn't influence the state of nationalism in Ukraine. The sense of identity has not changed for the state's internal and foreign policies, and remains a key factor for political decision making process of the country.

Ukraine has had a long process of self-identification in the spatial-cultural coordinate system of the world. Having lived under the rule and influence of different states, Ukraine has had cultural impact from both, East and West.

Maintaining its independence, Ukraine got appreciated and recognised as a sovereign state, while still deciding whether it is an eastern or a western state. Now having dealt with the post-independence issues, Ukraine needs to secure not only a state independence but a cultural one as well. The actual security threat was presented not in the closest regions, but rather in those of Romania and Transnistria. These events incited Ukraine's policy of national security of the country. Ukraine's efforts to keep its own security came down to keeping its neighbours happy while still making reforms and improvements to itself, which brought a sense of stability to the region.

The analysis of Ukraine's foreign policy in the frame of neorealist approach enables us to make a conclusion which proves our hypothesis of Ukraine's foreign policy making

influenced by the East and West. Internally it is proven by a constant split in the public opinion and the leader's political response from 1991 onwards and up to the present.

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
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## Appendices

### 1. Colour-coated map “Results of the 1st round of the presidential election in Ukraine in 2004”.




Source: KONIECZNA Ioanna, *The Orange revolution in Ukraine. An attempt to understand the reasons*, Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, July 2005, p.27. [http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/prace\\_18.pdf](http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/prace_18.pdf)

## 2. Political map of contemporary Eastern Europe



Source: <http://www.jrank.org/history/pages/8351/How-Has-History-Affected-People-Eastern-Europe-Russia.html>

**3. Map of Ukraine “Results of the elections to the Supreme Council of Ukraine in 1998” by regions.**




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
#### 4. The map of the Danube Delta

The Danube Delta




Source: IWĄŃSKI Tadeusz, "Ukraine - Romania: a sustained deadlock", OSW Commentary, Issue 68, 29.12.2011, Centre for Eastern studies, p.7.

**5. Line-graph “GDP changes in Ukraine in 1994-2004 (in the case of 2004, forecast) as compared to the percentage of people satisfied with the opportunity to earn extra money”**




Source: KONIECZNA Ioanna, *The Orange revolution in Ukraine. An attempt to understand the reasons*, Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, July 2005, p.21. [http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/prace\\_18.pdf](http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/prace_18.pdf)

**6. Line-graph “Ukraine’s GDP growth rate between 2000-2012”**




Source: MATUSZAK Sławomir, SARNA Arkadiusz, *From stabilisation to stagnation, Viktor Yanukovich's reforms*, Warsaw, Centre for Eastern Studies, No.32, March 2013, p.23. [http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/pw\\_32\\_ang\\_net.pdf](http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/pw_32_ang_net.pdf)

**7. Bar-graph “The presidency of Leonid Kuchma (1994-2004) in opinion of the society”, data in percentage, April 2004**




Source: KONIECZNA Ioanna, *The Orange revolution in Ukraine. An attempt to understand the reasons*, Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, July 2005, p.21. [http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/prace\\_18.pdf](http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/prace_18.pdf)

**8. Diagram “Ukraine’s ethnic-linguistic structure according to censuses from 1989 and 2001”**



Source: OLSZAŃSKI Tadeusz A., *The language issue in Ukraine. An attempt at a new perspective*, Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, May 2012, Number 40, p.17 <http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-studies/2012-05-16/language-issue-ukraine-attempt-a-new-perspective>

## 9. Diagram “How Ukrainians identify themselves”



Source: OLSZAŃSKI Tadeusz A., *The language issue in Ukraine. An attempt at a new perspective*, Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, May 2012, Number 40, p.18

<http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-studies/2012-05-16/language-issue-ukraine-attempt-a-new-perspective>

## 10. Official document “*Agreement on the Creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States*”

We, the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation (RSFSR), and Ukraine, as founding states of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which signed the Treaty of Union of 1992, hereinafter referred to as the High Contracting Parties, hereby state that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as a subject of international law and as a geopolitical reality, ceases to exist.

Based on the historical communality of our peoples and the ties that have developed among them, taking into account the bilateral treaties concluded among the High Contracting Parties,

desiring to build democratic states under the rule of law,

intending to develop our relations on the basis of mutual recognition and respect for state sovereignty, the inalienable right to self-determination, the principles of equal rights and non-interference in internal affairs, the renunciation of the use of force or of economic or any

other methods of coercion whatsoever, the resolution of disputes by methods of conciliation, and other generally recognised principles and norms of international law,

considering that the further development and strengthening of relations of friendship, good-neighbourliness, and mutually beneficial cooperation among our states correspond to the fundamental national interests of our peoples and serve the cause of peace and security,

reaffirming our loyalty to the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and other documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,

obligating ourselves to observe generally recognised international norms of the rights of individuals and peoples,

have agreed to the following:

### **Article 1**

The High Contracting Parties hereby create the Commonwealth of Independent States.

### **Article 2**

The High Contracting Parties guarantee their citizens, regardless of their nationality or other distinctions, equal rights and freedoms. Each of the High Contracting Parties guarantees the citizens of the other Parties, as well as persons without citizenship who are living on its territory, regardless of their nationality or other distinctions, civic, political, social, economic, and cultural rights and freedoms in accord with generally recognised international norms of human rights.

### **Article 3**

Desiring to promote the expression, preservation, and development of the ethnic, linguistic, and religious identity of the national minorities inhabiting their territories, and the unique ethnocultural regions that have developed, the High Contracting Parties take them under their protection.

### **Article 4**

The High Contracting Parties shall develop the cooperation of their peoples and states on a basis of equal rights and mutual benefit in the areas of politics, economics, culture, education, health care, environmental protection, science, commerce, in the humanitarian and other fields; shall promote an extensive exchange of information; and shall conscientiously and unwaveringly honour their mutual obligations.

The Parties consider it essential to conclude agreements on cooperation in these areas.

### **Article 5**

The High Contracting Parties recognise and respect each other's territorial integrity and the inviolability of existing borders within the framework of the Commonwealth.

They guarantee open borders, and the freedom of movement of citizens and exchange of information within the framework of the Commonwealth.

### **Article 6**

The states members of the Commonwealth shall collaborate in safeguarding international peace and security and applying effective measures for the reduction of arms and military spending. They aspire to the elimination of all nuclear arms, and to general and full disarmament under strict international control.

The Parties shall respect each other's aspirations to attain the status of a nuclear-free zone and a neutral state.

The states members of the Commonwealth shall preserve and support a common military-strategic space under joint command, including single control of nuclear arms, the manner of implementation of which is to be determined by a special agreement.

They also jointly guarantee the necessary conditions for the deployment, functioning, and material and social welfare of strategic armed forces. The Parties obligate themselves to conduct a policy by consensus in matters of the social insurance and pension benefits for military personnel and their families.

### **Article 7**

The High Contracting Parties recognise that the following belong to the sphere of their joint activity, which is carried out on the basis of equal rights by joint coordinating institutions of the Commonwealth:

- the coordination of foreign-policy activity;
- cooperation in the formation and development of a common economic space, a pan-European and Eurasian market, in the area of customs policy;
- cooperation in the sphere of environmental protection and participation in the creation of an all-encompassing international system of environmental safety;
- issues of migration policy; and
- the struggle with organised crime.

### **Article 8**

The Parties are aware of the global nature of the Chernobyl catastrophe and obligate themselves to unite and coordinate their efforts to minimise and overcome its effects.

With this aim, they have agreed to conclude a special Agreement, which will take into account the gravity of the consequences of the catastrophe.

#### **Article 9**

Conflicts regarding the interpretation and application of the norms of this Agreement are subject to resolution by way of negotiation among the appropriate organs, and where necessary, on the level of the heads of governments and states.

#### **Article 10**

Each of the High Contracting Parties reserves the right to terminate the effect of this Agreement or of individual articles thereof by notifying the parties to the Agreement one year in advance.

The terms of this Agreement can be supplemented or amended by mutual agreement of the High Contracting Parties.

#### **Article 11**

From the moment of signing of this Agreement, application of the norms of third-party states, including the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, is prohibited on the territories of the states that have signed it.

#### **Article 12**

The High Contracting Parties guarantee the performance of international obligations arising for them from the treaties and agreements of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

#### **Article 13**

This Agreement does not affect the obligations of the High Contracting Parties towards third-party states.

This Agreement is open to accession by all states belonging to the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as by other states that share the aims and principles of this Agreement.

#### **Article 14**

The official place of residence of the contracting organs of the Commonwealth is the city of Minsk.

The activity of the organs of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the territories of the states belonging to the Commonwealth is terminated.

Concluded in the city of Minsk on 8 December 1991 in three exemplars, each in the Belarusian, Russian, and Ukrainian languages, all three texts having equal force.

For the Republic of Belarus

S. SHUSHKEVICH

V. KEBICH

For the RSFSR

B. YELTSIN

G. BURBULIS

For Ukraine

L. KRAVCHUK

V. FOKIN

[*Translated from the Ukrainian by Andrew D. Sorokowski.*]

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**11. The official document “*Treaty between the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic*”. (parts)**

The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, hereinafter referred to as the High Contracting Parties,

on the basis of the Declaration on the state sovereignty of Ukraine of 16 July 1990 and the Declaration on the state sovereignty of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic of 12 June 1990,

desiring to build democratic states of Ukraine and Russia based on the rule of law,

intending to develop their inter-state relations on the basis of principles of sovereign equality, non-intervention in internal affairs, renunciation of the application of force or of



economic methods of pressure, resolution of contested problems through conciliation, as well as other generally recognised principles and norms of international law,

considering that the continued development and strengthening of relations of friendship, good-neighbourliness, and mutually beneficial cooperation between them correspond to the essential national interests of the peoples of both states and serve the cause of peace and security,

guided by the desire to develop the friendship of sovereign states,

affirming their dedication to the goals and principles of the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and other documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,

obligating themselves to observe generally recognised international norms on the rights of individuals and peoples, have agreed to the following: [...]

#### Article 16

This Treaty does not affect the obligations of the High Contracting Parties towards third-party states, nor their right to conclude treaties with third parties concerning their participation in the sphere of joint activity of the Parties determined by this Treaty, and in the sphere of collective security.

For the Ukrainian Soviet

Socialist Republic

President of the Supreme Soviet

of the Ukrainian Soviet

Socialist Republic

L. KRAVCHUK

For the Russian Soviet

Federative Socialist Republic

President of the Supreme Soviet

of the Russian Soviet

Federative Socialist Republic

B. YELTSIN

[Russian and Ukrainian originals. Translated by Andrew D. Sorokowski]

WOLCHIK Sharon L., ZVIGLYANICH Volodymyr, Ukraine: the search for a national identity, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000, Appendix A.

**12. The official document “*Treaty between the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic*”.**

Article 15

Disputes regarding the interpretation and implementation of the norms of this Treaty are subject to resolution by way of negotiation.

Source: WOLCHIK Sharon L., ZVIGLYANICH Volodymyr, *Ukraine: the search for a national identity*, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000, Appendix A, pp.291-296.