Intervention in the post -Cold War era:

Evaluating Humanitarianism, Democratization and Intervention- The Kosovo case

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Acknowledgments

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

CivPol: UNMIK civilian police in Kosovo (international)

EU: European Union

IR: International Relation

KLA: Kosovo Liberation Army

KFOR: Kosovo Protection Force

LDK: Democratic League of Kosovo

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO: non –governmental organization

OSCE: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

UN: United Nations

UNCA: UN Civil Administration in Kosovo

UNMIK: UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

UNV: UN volunteer (contracted junior UN staff)

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

US: United States

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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Introduction

Undoubtedly, the collapse of Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent fall of Communism which set the end of the four- decade Cold War and the beginning of a new era, procured systemic political, economic and social changes not only inside the European continent, where the bi- polar system's division was more intense, but in the rest of the world as well. In the economic field the 1990's have been characterized by the tremendous project of transforming the centrally planned economies of the former communist states into free market ones, mostly through the privatization process. However, in the political and social fields of said period, the task of restructuring the political system proved to be much harder than initially thought; more specifically, the creation of new, sovereign nation states that followed the dissolution of both the USSR and Yugoslavia produced violent ethnic conflicts which in some cases escalated into civil war. This political turmoil which threatened stability and security worldwide brought once again to the surface the controversial issue of intervention, which has generated heated debate in the study of international relations through the years.

The Soviet dismemberment resulted in the widespread appliance of even more military power on behalf of the United States and NATO around the globe, in pursuit of promoting liberal democracy and providing humanitarian assistance where needed in an effort to ensure stability and peace on the one hand and strengthen their influence and global mightiness on the other. Nonetheless, it is not only the role and action of the United States that became more evident and aggressive in the form of interfering operations; the desire for stability was far and foremost the concern of the European Community too, since the challenge of transforming Europe, unifying Germany and playing the role of the arbitrator in the Balkans and the Yugoslavia dissolution was immense. Moreover, Europe could not afford a failure that would jeopardize neither the consistency of the Community's edifice nor the project of integration that was about to become the major topic in the European Community's agenda during the following years. Thusly, intervention on behalf of the EU, either low or high, was another one of the post- Cold War era realities. Within this new world order framework, the United Nations contributed significantly in its formation as well, especially with regards to the termination and reconstruction of the former Yugoslavia.

This paper aims to present to the reader a general imaging of the intentions, purposes, failures and successes of intervention guided and applied by world's superpower, the United States, as well as the European Union, the United Nations and of course the North Atlantic Alliance or else NATO since the Berlin Wall crumbled. More specifically, its intention is to simply illustrate whether and under which circumstances interventions take place, and what are the results in terms of promoting democratization and humanitarianism. This is going to be achieved through the following ways. Initially, a small

historical presentation of the current realities is going to be given. These regard the collapse of the bi-polar system and the Soviet colossus, the reconstruction of Central and SE Europe, the reunification of Germany, the concerns about Soviet nuclear arms, the challenges of economic globalization and most importantly the undertaking of humanitarian operations. Following familiarization with one of the world's greater transitions periods, the concept of intervention will be introduced. More precisely, intervention is going to be defined and be displayed in all of its forms. Next, it will be projected through the International Theories' context so as to be well understood and explained. Moreover, a small assessment of the main means of conducting intervention, NATO, will be displayed with regards to its formation and evolution, focusing mostly on its role in the post- Cold War period along with other intervention networks such is this of the United Nations.

After the theoretical background concerning intervention is provided, there will be a presentation of operations during this time worldwide with a focus in the Balkans and one of the two most significant interventions of the 1990's, taking place in Kosovo at the closure of the decade. Joining theory and practice together, we will be able to estimate the positive and negative outcomes of the above mentioned operations along with several others based not only in theoretical critiques given by both supporters and adversaries of intervention but on empirical studies undertaken through the years trying to answer the following questions: "Does intervention fulfill its democratic and humanitarian purpose after all?" and "is it worth taking it?"

Before and after the Cold War: policies and consequences

As previously pointed out, the end of the Cold War was one of the most important transformational events of the 20th century and its significance could only be compared with this of World War II concerning both the challenges and the systemic changes it caused to the structure of the world order.[1] But before proceeding to the analysis of these changes it would be necessary and informative at the same time to make a brief reference to reasons it ended and to the policies carried out by the Soviet Union in the closure of the 1980's.

Some scholars taking the constructivist approach, argue that the dissolution of the USSR was a result of the communist ideology decline[2] that had already begun since the so -called de- Stalinization period in 1956 when the oppressive and often violent methods of the regime were somehow becoming exposed

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[1] Nye, Jr (2000), 131.
[2] Kennan cited by Nye, Jr (2000), 127.

with the events in Hungary in that year, in Prague in 1968, or in Poland in 1981.[3] Others, endorsing the realist approach, argue that the Soviet collapse was due to its "imperial overstretch", pointing to its overexpansion and its great defense expenses.[4] However, none of these explanations is complete nor achieves to cover the real insights of the subject. As Nye, Jr (2000, pp. 128-129) very successfully underlines, the end of Cold War is a result of the policies followed by the man called Mikhail Gorbachev since his placement leading the Soviet Communist party in 1985. His objective was to reform communism by letting liberal ideas inside both the political and economic field in an effort to reverse the unproductive bureaucratic structure of the Union and at the same time stop the economic stagnation it was enduring. Nevertheless, his call for perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness) failed to meet its original scope; contrariwise, the previously mentioned policies set the beginning of the end. Once people had been provided with increased freedoms, they wanted to exit. The fact that there was no retaliation after Hungary and Austria let East Germans cross through their borders is clear evidence that the Soviets were neither able nor willing to take action. The anti- communist wave and the subsequent spread of democracy moved eastwards to Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.[5] Margaret Thatcher's claim in the dawn of the new decade that "we are not in a Cold War now" [6] could be considered as the marking of the dawn of a new era as well. In contrast, China, instead of uniting with Europe's efforts for democratization, chose to use liberalization policies in the economic spectrum in an effort to avoid isolation.[7]

However, as Henriksen points out (2007, p.8), "for all its difficulties the Cold War bequeathed a stable, even somewhat predictable international environment". Thusly, the new task United States and European powers had to accomplish was difficult and most importantly, unfamiliar. This task was to ensure that an economic and political transition process half of the world was experiencing would be undertaken inside a secure and peaceful context in order not to threaten international stability. This task had several branches and concerned the negotiation of control over nuclear power with the Soviet Union, the openness to new markets and thusly to economic globalization, the reunification of Germany and far and foremost the promotion of democracy as well as the involvement in humanitarian operations in cases where political transformation did not occur peacefully but on the contrary escalated into bloody ethnic conflicts.[8] Some of the stabilizing operations taken place at the time were those in Panama, Somalia, Haiti and the Balkans.[9] These latter intervening operations along with others proved to be equally important for the interveners as well. More specifically since USSR disintegrated, and their foe seized existence, the coalition between US and Europe seized significance too. This was more obvious in the North Atlantic Alliance where the absence of a common threat undermined its role. Hence, it is argued that the military interventions of the time served another scope as well; this of

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[3] Nye, Jr (2000), 129- 130.
[4] Kennedy cited by Nye, Jr (2000), 127.
[5] Henriksen (2007), 10.
[6] Henriksen (2007), 8.
[7] Henriksen (2007), 9.
[8] Henriksen (2007), 7.
[9] Ibid.

providing the great powers and NATO with a strong purpose of continuing their role and establishing their status and power within the international system.[10]

Intervention

Having examined the political, economic and social environment of the new age that was emerging due to Cold War closure and having simultaneously presented briefly the new role and duties world's superpowers were acquiring, it is time to include intervention within the above historical framework.

As previously mentioned, intervention is placed among the most disputable subjects of both international politics and security problems nowadays since it contributes in the composition of security in the post-Cold War period.[11] According to Nye, Jr (2007, p.148), intervention in its broadest definition refers to "external actions that influence the domestic affairs of another sovereign state." These actions could vary in aggressiveness and compulsion. More precisely, a form of intervention could be considered a simple speech such was this of President Bush in the 1990 which was encouraging the people of Iraq to depose their leader Saddam Hussein. In addition, other factors that would somehow influence the internal affairs of a foreign state are these of provision of economic aid, military advisers or on the contrary provision of support to the opposition.

Moving forward to the extent of coercion from low to high we can observe that interference actions can also take the form of limited military action or ultimately of full military intervention.[12] The latter remains a dominant agent of interference especially since the Soviet disintegration and simultaneously creates many complexities concerning its legitimacy, its morality and its effectiveness as well. Furthermore, military intervention consists itself of "hard" (armed intervention) or "soft" (or else preventive actions)[13] as a response to security crises since it covers a broad spectrum of operations.[14] These activities, often referred as "ladder of actions" or "ladder of options", vary from monitoring services in states such as Macedonia that its geopolitical position in the Balkans could become a threat to international stability, or to full- scale war operations as in Kosovo and Burundi.[15]

The most common form of intervention in the post- Cold War era is the humanitarian one, meaning the intervention takes place when armed functions meet humanitarianism. In short, humanitarian intervention could be defined as the "intervention into armed conflicts for humanitarian purposes"[16] ; in

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[10] Henriksen (2007), 18.
[11] Fixdal and Smith (1998), 283-284.
[12] Nye, Jr (2000), 148-149.
[13] Weil (2001), 84.
[14] Weil (2001), 89.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Fixdal and Smith (1998), 284.

other words, in cases of atrocities and mass violation of human rights that sometimes take the form of genocide, the international community's responsibility to protect resorts in a military intervention in order to stop, or more rarely, to prevent such events.

The first issue that arises when it comes to intervene into sovereign state affairs is the legitimacy of doing so. More specifically, the question concerns the justification of the right to apply force and thus, who is to be responsible to implement this right.[17] International relations scholars argue that the modern, Western concept of sovereign nation state is based on the so -called Westphalian Sovereignty which was established in the Westphalian Peace in 1648. Its current significance lies mainly on three criteria that concern the right of "political self determination", of "legal equality between states" and this of "non-intervention in the internal affairs" of one state into another.[18] However, state sovereignty is never completely achieved since states are not isolated and are constantly influenced by external factors. Nonetheless, they have the legitimacy to settle their issues within their own territory.[19] The idea of the Westphalian sovereignty, and consequently, for non- intervention was criticized by many, especially in the aftermath of the Second World War and the ferocities occurred in the Holocaust. The latter contributed in the establishment of human rights which were placed equally next to state rights. Nevertheless, the matter of intervention for humanitarian purposes "froze" once again due to the realities of the Cold War and international law continued to protect the principle of non- intervention. More specifically, in 1945 the United Nations Charter re- declared the usual prohibitions for non-intervention even in internal wars where human rights were extremely violated.[20]

The end of the Cold War, which changed the way the world operated until then, opened again the heated discussion for the right to intervene. The international community could not remain neutral for long to the violent ethnic conflicts occurred in the early 1990's in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Somalia, Iraq, and so on. When the states lack capacity to fulfill the duty to protect their own citizens in practice as seen in eastern Zaire in 1995- 1996 or in Somalia, then the sovereignty argument loses legitimacy.[21]

More particularly, the UN Security Council approved in 1991 and in 1992 humanitarian intervention in Iraq and Somalia, respectively. Moreover, the justification of the operation was not the humanitarian cause but the threat of creating instabilities in world peace and security. In addition, it was noted that the jurisdiction of the Security Council to intervene is valid when collective and approved by all its permanent members; unilateral force was still prohibited and its members had also the right to exercise veto power.[22]

We can also refer to other international conventions along with UNHCR, such as the Genocide and Human Rights conventions, international refugee and humanitarian laws, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Right as well as the Guiding Principles for Internationally Displaced People. All of

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[17] Fixdal and Smith (1998), 291.
[18] Cuttler (2001), 133-150.
[19] Fixdal and Smith (1998), 292.
[20] Henkin (1999), 824.
[21] Weil (2001), 97.
[22] Henkin (1999), 825.

the above are able to provide legitimacy to a humanitarian intervention.[23] In addition to the previously mentioned, it is argued that humanitarian intervention should also be justified in cases of failed states. If the authorities of states fail to create stable circumstances, and consequently this instability threatens international security, intervention should be legitimate.[24] Furthermore, this transition from non-intervention to humanitarian response is argued to be a tendency towards "positive sovereignty" or "sovereignty as responsibility not just power".[25] It also shows that the stark perceptions of Cold War have begun to loosen.[26] Despite however the progress in trying to fill legal gaps, these still remain and need to be clarified as not to slow down the process. Such leaks are the ones regarding the rights of the internally displaced population or the safety of humanitarian personnel. Moreover, another concern over the issue is that by changing the rules, International Law would provide great powers a "justification blanket" to use force at will in developing countries.[27]

One explanation that can be given regarding intervention's complexity in terms of its legitimacy and hence, the international community's increased but unequal dedication to the use of military force in humanitarian crises is the fact that it is torn between the two competing series of rules that characterize international protection. The norms sovereignty and thus, non- intervention policy carries essentially protect borders. On the other hand, we have human rights' norms which intend to protect individuals.[28] To conclude, the mixed outcomes concerning military commitment in resolving humanitarian emergencies and the simultaneous unwillingness to conduct and back such operations economically and politically suggests that the international community is yet to be convinced about the scope of intervention. Non-intervention traditional principles are still dominant despite the fact that they no longer hold "absolute primacy".[29]

In the IR context

When analyzing humanitarian intervention, it is impossible not to see it through the framework that international relation theories provide us. As Fixdal and Smith mention (1998, p. 283), humanitarian intervention stands between the idealist and realist tradition. The former, closely related to the "CNN effect" which has guided the political agenda in the West in terms of peace keeping missions in the 1990's, argues that it is states' moral duty to respond to tragedies through cooperation. Thus, states' reactions should be multilateral and transformed into political action.[30] The latter, puts in the core of collective operations states' governments which act according to their interests and not according to the common good. Consequently, humanitarian intervention could not be conceived as "purely

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[23] Weil (2001), 96.
[24] Fixdal and Smith (1998), 291.
[25] Annan cited by Weil (2001), 82.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Weil (2001), 96.
[28] Weil (2001), 82.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Fixdal and Smith (1998), 284.

humanitarian".[31] In addition, the key points of the realist tradition in international politics are both peace and order and the core institution is the balance of power. Hence, in cases that the above mentioned are threatened, humanitarian intervention should be justified.[32]

Furthermore, other international relations traditions that seek either to explain or to justify intervention are statism, cosmopolitanism, internationalism and state moralism, and can be all linked with one or the other main IR monoliths. Statism puts again state sovereignty in its core and argues that when states intervene into another, there is no concern of the atrocities occurred or the restoration of democracy and other "liberal values"; contrariwise, it is because they are able to do so.[33] Cosmopolitans on the other hand, quite similarly to idealists, place justice as the key value of international politics and the society of individuals as the main institution.[34] According to this model, a state is obliged to seek for its citizens' welfare, and thusly sovereignty is of no such importance as their main objective is promotion of justice, and when this does not occur intervention should be justified.[35] Internationalists though, acknowledge the significance of states' sovereignty but they equally value an international environment. Accordingly, intervention should be permitted when authorized by "the society of states".[36] The same applies to state moralists, who recognize the importance of both state's autonomy and international law. Non-intervention is more desirable but reality sometimes imposes the implementation of a more aggressive policy.[37] Last but not least, humanitarian intervention could also be placed in the Just War context due to the fact that the latter's traditions seem to fulfill the same criteria as those of intervention. In short we could mention these of "right (legitimate) authority", the "just cause", the "right intension", the "last resort", or the "reasonable hope".[38]

Nonetheless, as pointed out in the beginning, intervention since 1989 did not serve only purely humanitarian purposes. The project of transforming the former communist states into democracies was both challenging and unprecedented and required the western liberal democracies' assistance in order to be successfully accomplished. We argue that humanitarianism and democratization via intervention are interrelated; this is due to the fact that an unstable political environment produces ethnic conflicts and thus humanitarian emergencies and vice versa. So, non- democratic and authoritarian regimes could equally become a threat for international peace and security. Accordingly, interventions did not only aim to avert violent ethnic conflicts that most of the times led to ethnic cleansing and similar atrocities, but at the same time to establish democratic regimes that would ensure political, economic and social stability. This intervention again ranged from the provision of United Nation's consultants or observers for a smooth transition as was the case in Bosnia after the resolution of the humanitarian crisis in Dayton, Ohio, to a military effort as was the case of Kosovo which intended not only to

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[31] Ibid.
[32] Nye Jr. (2000), 150.
[33] Fixdal and Smith (1998), 292-293.
[34] Nye Jr. (2000), 150.
[35] Fixdal and Smith (1998), 294.
[36] Fixdal and Smith (1998), 293.
[37] Nye Jr. (2000), 251.
[38] Fixdal and Smith (1998), 291.

prevent a genocide but to overthrow Serbia's then-leader, Slobodan Milosevic, and promote the installment of a liberal democratic regime, or more recently the intervention in Iraq.

But what exactly do liberal democracies do so as to sustain peace and stability? In this part of the essay a small assessment of the relation between liberal democracy and peace is going to be given through the prism of international relations theory and mainly through the theory of liberalism. The primary problem of international relations is war. The two monoliths that seek to interpret international politics are liberalism and realism. In short we can note that former, coming chronologically first, states that the more societies interact the more cooperative their relations will be, whilst the latter, coming as a counter -enlightenment critique on liberalism, argues that states are autonomous, independent, selfish and competitive, living in an anarchical environment. Classical realism does not believe in institutions, interdependence or in democratic peace and is suspicious about human behavior; thus, states that are run by humans are self-seeking too.[39]

The two world wars that dominated the international policy in the first half of the twentieth century and the therefore the disability in the achievement of collective security resulted in the questioning of the liberal theory and the prevalence of its stark opposite, realism. However since the 1970's when the Cold War begun to loosen in significance and especially since its ultimate ending, liberalism regained its credibility and its role in international spectrum became crucial.[40] Liberalism's approach explains international system's functioning via three branches: the political, -- divided in two parts; institutions and democracy-- the economic and the social one. For the economic strand, liberal theory argues that trade is crucial in preventing states from going to war since it creates an interdependence among them by providing them economic benefits. Consequently, the latter make peace more worth preserving since it facilitates their economic interests. [41]For liberals open trade produces growth, and growth prevails over war. The social strand focuses on the interaction between people and states that the more societies interact, the more cooperative their relation will be.[42] This promotion of understanding and elimination of hostility against the different, the foreign, the "Other", is accomplished through various levels such as contacts between businessmen, students or tourists. The creation of the so-called European identity that started emerging after World War II and flourished during the 1990's giving Europeans no reason of going to war once again is an example of the liberal social path.[43]

The political strand of liberal theory emphasizes on the importance of institutions and democracy. In liberal democracies institutions mean everything since they regulate uncertainty by establishing common practices.[44] Thus they eliminate the chance of conflict and the impact of anarchy that realists emphasize. Reversing Hobbes' point of view on war, liberals or better neo-liberals argue that instead of

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[39] Lecture, Pr. Keridis (29/02/2012).
[40] Nye, Jr (2000), 41.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Lecture, Pr. Keridis (07/03/2012).
[43] Nye, Jr (2000), 43.
[44] Lecture, Pr. Keridis (07/03/2012).

living in an environment with a tendency towards war we can create a world with a propensity to peace where people are able to think of it as stable and secure. International institutions show the way of doing so via four channels; this of continuity, this of mutuality, the resolving of conflicts via bargaining and finally via the provision of information among them.[45] The above mentioned sought to explain how liberal democracies manage to maintain peace and stability between them. Nevertheless, this does not imply in any way that they do not go to war; contrariwise, one established truth of international relations is this that democracies do not fight each other, but they do fight non-democracies.[46] For liberal democracies, "national security liberalism" and the creation of "like-minded" states is crucial for the maintenance of a secure world order. The latter can only be achieved via democracy promotion which according to world's great powers is "not only the right thing to do, it is the smart thing to do as well".[47]

Networks of intervention

At this point, after having already presented only some of the plethora of information available on such an important and broad issue as intervention, we are going to make a quick reference to the main means used when intervening in a state. These agents range from non-profit organizations such as NGOs to military forces such as NATO. This paper is interested in displaying the most significant and the most effective ones in terms of their action in various operations, their cooperation and their authority on the world stage. These include as noted earlier NGOs and NATO, EU, OSCE and of course the United Nations and its agency for humanitarian emergencies, UNHCR.

At the close of the 20th century, the world witnessed a progress in the provision of "assistance agenda" concerning democratization, socio-economic aid, institution building as well as humanitarianism and peacekeeping.[48] The development in peacekeeping or peace–building, including humanitarian intervention related to assist in the democratization process, is a proof of growing interdependence in international affairs in the twilight of Cold War's ending and the subsequent termination of the bipolar system in international relations, the disintegration of communist states and the burst of ethnic disputes.[49] The large increase in the amount and the scale of interventions is also evidence of collaboration among international organizations and local ones as well as with local populations.

The main agent of guiding interventions since the 1990s has been the United Nations, whose role and initiatives has risen respectively, shifting somehow the nature of intervention from totally military to a broader conception in which armed force could also be followed by institution building and

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[45] Nye, Jr (2000), 43.
[46] Lecture, Pr. Keridis (07/03/2012).
[47] Pickering and Peceny (2006), 542.
[48] Dzelilovic , 236.
[49] Holohan (2005), 20.

governance.[50] Moreover, the UN assisted in the development of operations by facilitating agents to intervene legitimately; sovereignty is not an issue when there are human rights' violations which threaten to escalate into genocide. Another crucial factor that has eased collaboration between agents of democracy and states is the immense technological developments which in turn during the 1990s and especially in the wake of the 21st century are positioned to contribute to the effectiveness of intervention via information and communication technologies.[51] Information sharing contributed significantly in the case of Kosovo for example between NATO and UNHCR when the latter could rely in the KFOR forces of the former that were deployed in Macedonia to monitor the situation.[52] However, contemporary type of intervention which is carried out by a number of organizations and requires good coordination and cooperation between them is very challenging and demanding task. The duties of the agents might include "the support of reconstruction of key infrastructure, the maintenance of civil law and order, the promotion of human rights, the assurance of the safe and unimpeded return of refugees and displaced people".[53] Nevertheless, due to the complexity of the coordination and the variance in the mentality and culture or background of each organization, there are times when collaboration stands as an impediment in the way and consequently creates mutual mistrust slowing down the delivery of assistance. This was the negative side in the Kosovo case when NATO left UNHCR no space of contributing, as NATO dominated the planning process.[54] Furthermore, it is argued that these new actors of intervention have become somehow "policy entrepreneurs"; thusly, the military is considered to be a kind of "entrepreneur" which seeks to create a new agenda about the protection of human rights by establishing an "ethic of intervention".[55]

Regarding the players of intervention these are mainly, EU, United Nations, as stressed above, several NGOs and NATO among others. The first ones will be explained briefly whilst NATO's role will be given a greater emphasis. To begin, the European Union is a substantial agent in providing aid since it is in charge of and guides a variety of instruments such as "political dialogue and monitoring, diplomatic representations, military and civilian missions, support for institution-building." Consequently, its role in promoting peace and democratic values is considered valuable and it also show that there is more potential for growing its operations.[56] The United Nations on the other hand, founded to avert another war after the end of World War II and to replace the League of Nations, is an international organization charged with a plethora of tasks such as the protection of human rights, international law, social progress or the maintenance of world peace. These duties are carried out through a huge range of subsidiary organizations that operate under the UN umbrella. It is argued that its operations are slowed down due to its bureaucratic and centralized structure that needs to adapt to the modern technological challenges and leave space for the new culture that will dominate over the

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[50] Ibid.
[51] Holohan (2005), 21.
[52] Weil (2001), 95.
[53] Holohan (2005), 26.
[54] Weil (2001), 94-95.
[55] Weil (2001), 84.
[56] Batt (2004), 3.

traditional networks of the past and will facilitate its effectiveness since it contributes in the majority of humanitarian operations that take place worldwide.[57]

The 1990s however, where the period in which the non -governmental organizations came to be seen as a catalyst for institution building and peacekeeping policies and for the delivery of international assistance. They were considered an efficient, valid and cheaper way of contributing to the growing humanitarian or other emergencies since they were also a more flexible mechanism comparing to others such as the United Nations whose variety of tasks made it less effective as previously mentioned.[58] The OSCE, an organization whose idea of creation was originally conceived in the 1950s, became one of Europe's more well-known players in the security "game" only after the new realities the end of Cold War had created. It was institutionalized in order to assist to the ongoing needs for regional security. As Holohan (2005, p.150) states, OSCE is "an instrument of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, as well as post-conflict rehabilitation." It executes a variety of tasks that regard security issues such as arms control, preventive diplomacy, election monitoring or security –building measures.

NATO

The North Atlantic Alliance's role in the post- Cold War period, due to the fact that it remains the central agent of conducting military operations will be assessed more analytically. NATO is decidedly the mightiest military alliance worldwide.[59] It has been argued that the history of the Alliance could be divided into three major periods: the Cold War, the 1990's that followed the dissolution of the Cold War and the Warsaw Pact and, lastly, the new era that began with the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001.[60] In this part of the essay a brief historical background of the establishment of the Alliance is going to be given, along with a focus on its evolving role in the decade that succeeded the Cold War. Said role during this specific period of time has as its main area of interest the Balkans, and more specifically the ethnic conflicts that were created by the break-up of Yugoslavia. Having as a starting point the involvement in the Bosnia war and more significantly, the intervention in Kosovo, NATO aimed for redefining itself and adapting to the new challenges the new era demanded through the missions in the area.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a military alliance established with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949. The primary objective of its formation was the deterrence of a possible military attack on Western Europe by the Soviet Union. The organization's structure is based on a system of "collective defense", according to which its member states agree on a multilateral

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[57] Holohan (2005), 128- 129.
[58] Dzelilovic , 235.
[59] de Wijk (2000), 81.
[60] Akram (2009), 2.

military response in case of an external attack on any state of the Alliance, as noted in Article 5 of the Treaty.[61] However, apart from the deterrence mission, NATO was also supposed to maintain security and peace among its democratic member states, and its successful role in that contributed to the institutionalization of Western Europe's and North America's relations. [62]The war in Korea, as well as the rivalry created by the formation of a communist states' alliance known as the Warsaw Pact in 1955, strengthened its unified structure and made its goal even clearer than before. As NATO's first Secretary General, Lord Ismay, argues, "the role of NATO during the Cold War was to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down".[63] One of its basic characteristics that contributed in his continuation and growing significance through the years is the adaptation to the constantly changing international developments. This adjustment to changes begins since its foundation up until today; more precisely, the Korean war in the 1950's, or the exit of France from the Alliance in the mid 1960's denote that it was in NATO's nature to accept such challenges.[64]

Nevertheless, the fall of Communism and the disintegration of USSR along with the diffusion of democratic revolutions mostly in Central Europe and the Caucasus shifted the adaptation challenges to an unprecedented level. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact that followed the end of the communist era shifted the de facto opponent of the Alliance, forcing it to reevaluate its role, its missions and the purpose of its existence. The leaders of the member states however, along with its secretary general of the time, Manfred Woerner decided that despite all the aforementioned, NATO could contribute to the shaping of international affairs since it was "more than a military alliance and was based, in fact, on a community of values".[65] Indeed, it did not take long before its relevance in the post-Cold War era became clear, since the instabilities created by the collapse of USSR and mainly the one of Yugoslavia generated new security problems that jeopardized the peace and security in Europe.

Furthermore, it endorsed a dual role: first of all to create incentives for the former communist states that faced significant political, economic and social difficulties to complete their reforms towards market liberalization and democratization through NATO membership; secondly to intervene militarily, aiming to quell escalating violence in Bosnia in the middle of the decade and in Kosovo at its end.[66] Moreover, it was decided to move towards a more indulgent policy with regards to non-member states and especially to Russia through the construction of mutual confidence and transparency and military-to-military collaboration. At the same time it was expected to sustain its original role of collective-defense readiness in cases of later defiance that could develop in the future.[67] Last but not least, it is argued that NATO enlargement would facilitate the spread of democracy. Even if this statement is still yet to be answered, it is certain that NATO membership will reinforce it. Additionally, it is stated that by offering problematic states membership, it is possible to run a more effective and less expensive

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[61] Akram (2009), 1.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Sloan (2000), 85.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Zamfirescu (1999), 3.
[67] Sloan (2000), 83.

policy than implementing "out of area" missions in such states.[68] Last but not least, regardless, as denoted before, the ongoing cooperation between intervention agents, NATO, was and continues to remain the strongest player of all. The latter is confirmed by the fact that the military intervention undertaken in Kosovo was not approved the UN, and simultaneously states clearly that the primal world's power, the United States, does not desire the imposition of restrictions by external organizations, even if these have the status and strength of the UN, when it comes to foreign policy.[69]

To conclude, the 1990s have played a significant, albeit challenging, role in the development of the North Atlantic Alliance. At that point the Balkan region due to security concerns created by the internal ethnic conflicts contributed significantly in the adaptation of NATO's new mission in the post- Cold War era.[70] As Elena Zamfirescu (1999, p.6) very successfully points out "… although unwanted and unintended by anybody, the tragic history of the Former Yugoslavia's dismantlement and its ensuing consequences have played, in a certain way, the role of a catalyst for the Alliance's adaptation to the post-Cold War period's new challenges and risks. In turn, NATO's adaptation has favored both its willingness and ability to become an essential instrument for the gradual re-linking of the entire area to mainstream Europe". The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States have once again re-defined the role of NATO concerning security and "out of area" military interventions; nevertheless, the fight against terrorism is argued to be a fight against authoritarianism and a mission towards democratization, and should remain so.

The Balkans- Yugoslavia

The post –Berlin Wall world, albeit promising, was also a puzzle concerning the future of the transforming states and the possible impact this transition would have on its international affairs. Indeed, in the early 1990s the humanitarian crises were spreading rapidly causing respectively the concerns of the US, the EU and the international community in general. Internal conflicts in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo among others (East Timor, Angola, Nagorno- Karabah region of Azerbaijan or later Iraq and Afghanistan) provoked the reaction of both public opinion and great power's leaders. In all cases intervention seemed inevitable in order to avert further violation of human rights and the creation of further instability. Needless to denote at this point the reasons why intervention did not occur in China or Russia despite the great concerns of human rights' violation of the former and nuclear disarmament of the latter. The imaging of starving populations in African Somalia as a result of the CNN effect, the unthinkable atrocities taken place in the civil war in Rwanda, a later called "shame for the West" due to late intervention, the characterized as "fifth world" Haiti[71] with its economic stagnation and political instability and the large refugee inflows to Florida were cases of great significance to investigate with regards to intervention and its positive or negative impact

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[68] Waterman, Zagorcheva, Reiter (2001-2002), 226- 227.
[69] Keridis (2000), 226.
[70] Keridis (2000), 219.
[71] Henriksen (2007), 70.

and the effectiveness in terms of democratization and humanitarian assistance, which would assist us to make conclusions on the matter. However, it would be impossible to present them in all in details in one paper; thusly, I have decided to display in short the case of Kosovo and draw conclusions on intervention based mainly on these particular case. Moreover, the critique part will be attempted to include assessments on the issue based on empirical studies concerning the impact of intervention in general.

In order to present properly the case of Kosovo and avoid any kind of Balkanism misconceptions, it is crucial to display some information on Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav federation, established after the end of World War II under the rule of Marshal Tito, was a union of sovereign states with secured borders whose citizens had the right to live anywhere within the federation.[72] A lot has already been said and written about the communist years of Yugoslavia but it is not this paper's goal to focus on that era. It could be argued, however, that communist Yugoslavia was in a much better situation than the other communist states of the USSR or the neighboring countries of Bulgaria, Albania or Romania in terms of political freedom and economic isolation. Actually, Tito had the sympathy of the West as he was considered to be not only a soft communist but also, and most importantly, an anti- Stalinist.[73] Nevertheless, the decade that succeeded Tito's death revealed all the unresolved issues of the past, mainly the economic recession that was ongoing since the 1970's and the suppressed – under the communist umbrella of "brotherhood and unity" – nationalistic sentiment. As Michael MccGwire mentions (2000, p.2), Yugoslavia's economy was seriously affected by the external debt crisis of the 1980's but its relations with the West and the protective cover of NATO due to its strategic role in the area continued to hide the real dimensions of the problem as far as the western allies provided Yugoslavia with credit. When the Cold War was terminated, Yugoslavia was no longer the center of attention of the West. The critical two year abstention from the area on the part of EU and the US, due to concerns regarding the re- unification of Germany, the Gulf War and the Soviet collapse, contributed in the deterioration of the problem and the violent later dissolution.[74]

The aforementioned problems started revealing themselves as soon as Milosevic was put in charge as the decade was drawing to a close and Communism collapsed, resulting in a bloody civil war which lasted five years and left in its aftermath thousands of people dead, missing or displaced, and the states of the former united federation torn, filled with hate, trying to rebuild not only their newly formed states but their national identities as well. The Dayton agreement signed in 1995 brought peace in the area, yet it did not manage to provide security as well as it left one major issue unsolved; that of Kosovo.

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[72] MccGwire (2000), 2.
[73] Lecture, Pr. Keridis (3/2012)
[74] Keridis (2000), 223.

The case of Kosovo

Milosevic's rise in power is considered by the West to be the catalyst for the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the evil force which generated the atrocities that took place in the area. The demonization of Milosevic, especially with regards to Kosovo, does not serve the analysis of the conflict as he was not the one who created the Kosovo problem, just the one who fueled it.[75] The Kosovo problem goes much further back in time; in brief, we could mention that ethnic Albanians had denied incorporation into Yugoslavia both in 1918 and in 1944, as their desire had always been to unite the province with Albania. On the other hand, Serbs had sentimental links with the place, mostly religious ones as Kosovo carried a sacred heritage.[76] The 1974 constitution provided the province and its people with autonomy. Moreover, the pro- communist ethnic Albanians increased their membership in the Kosovo branch of the party quite significantly.[77]

However, following Tito's death, the situation changed dramatically as Serbs began complaining about suffering mistreatment and oppression by the Albanian majority. It did not take long before Milosevic, who had already been elected president of the Serb Republic, seized the opportunity to exploit the issue along with the Serbs' nationalistic sentiment. In 1989 new laws were implemented aiming to exclude Albanians from all state's functions and to disclaim the region's autonomy as part of a dangerous homogenizing process. It is more than obvious that the latter was impossible to accomplish as by 1991 the ethnic balance between ethnic Albanians and Serbs was 90:10.[78]

The Albanians' response to these unfair measures was a passive policy whose purpose was a gradual establishment of the following goals: "an ethnically pure province", withdrawal from the federation and, lastly, unification with Albania. More precisely, the leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo, or else LDK, Ibrahim Rugova, after declaring Kosovo independent, proceeded to the formation of a self -government along with parallel institutions. This policy, among other measures, included the refusal to participate in Serbian elections, in Serbian schools where teaching of Albanian language was prohibited, the boycotting of the tax system and at the same time the creation of new educational, health, tax systems, accomplishing somehow a partial autonomy, albeit without access to the police and the army forces, and they were still considered second class citizens.[79] Rugova insisted in giving Serbians "no excuse for war" as he acknowledged the hard realistic fact that Albanians, having no access to weapons, were unable to create a decent army to set against the strong serbian one, and a possible rebellion would have catastrophic results. For LDK's leader, "it was better to do nothing and

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[75] MccGwire (2000), 3.
[76] Ibid.
[77] Ron (2001), 106.
[78] MccGwire (2000), 3-4.
[79] Kuperman (2008), 65.

stay alive… than to be massacred".[80] Furthermore, both Kosovar politicians and intellectuals supported the passive resistance, claiming that it would be appreciated by the West and this appreciation and sympathy would result in acknowledging Kosovo's independence.

The example the rest of Eastern Europe had set in the transition process reinforced their idea that "being non- violent meant being modern and European". At the same time they took no action towards a co-operation with the Serbian opposition, since they thought that the unpopularity of the former communist and non-democratic Milosevic would soon provoke the West's reaction.[81] Although this campaign seemed to work during the first years and managed to attract international sympathy, there were still many who urged for a more aggressive policy. Among them was the militant faction Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which was founded in 1993 but did not take action until 1997. This was the year that saw Kosovo's relative stability and security come to an end, as Albanians were provided for the first time with access to new weapons and a territorial base, due to the political and economic collapse of Albania caused by the breakdown of the pyramid schemes.[82]

The rebellion started with a mass KLA shooting against Serbian police in late 1997; Belgrade counter attacked in February of 1998, killing about 75 Albanians, but it is argued that Serbs, fearing the international community's response, did not resort to the atrocities and ethnic cleansing that had marked their operations in Bosnia some years earlier from the beginning.[83] On the one hand, the more the Serbs withdrew the more aggressively the KLA behaved, creating anxiety and insecurity within the international community – which is obvious from the fact that in 1998 KLA was still characterized as a terrorist organization by the State Department. On the other hand, Kosovars had learnt their lesson from Bosnia as well, and recognized the importance of gaining the USA's support through self-victimization. The Serbs responded to this role serving KLA's goal perfectly.[84] The media's reaction to the Kosovar's suffering raised the issue of humanitarian intervention in the area once again. NATO warned Milosevic that it would resort to bombing Yugoslavia in case Belgrade did not retreat. Milosevic indeed backed down but KLA took advantage of the Serbs' retreat and launched further attacks against them, provoking once again their response, which came later that year. By February 1999 violence had escalated to the point that the international community, fearing the consequences of a continuing bloody war, took the initiative to organize an international conference in Rambouillet, France in order for the opposing forces to reach an agreement, whose key point though, drafted by the US, favored the Kosovar Albanians.[85] Consequently, the agreement failed to be achieved and NATO's military intervention through aerial bombing was realized in late March 1999. The expectations the international community held that the intervention would end the conflict quickly proved false; the Serbs' forces counter-attacked more violently than before with genocidal and ethnic cleansing

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[80] Ron (2001), 108.
[81] Ron (2001), 108-109.
[82] Ron (2001), 107-108.
[83] Kuperman (2008), 65-66.
[84] MccGwire (2000), 6.
[85] Kuperman (2008), 66.

missions. It took eleven weeks of NATO bombing, which left hundreds of people dead or displaced as well as a huge economic damage, before Milosevic asked for peace with less demanding terms than the ones he had set in Rambouillet.[86]

As soon as the military operation was over, the Group of Eight foreign ministers approved a series of "general principles on the political solution to the Kosovo crisis".[87] These principles regarded measurements needed to be taken for the violence and oppression to end through the retraction of Serb military forces from the province, and above all through the disposition of international community's presence. The latter included a variety of agents that were deployed to establish effectively peace and stability as well as assist in the institution –building process as to achieve Kosovo's physical, administrative and governing infrastructure.[88] The actors deployed for the implementation of this project were mainly the UN's specially contacted for Kosovo branches UNMIK, UNV, UNCA and CivPol, the EU, NATO's forces for Kosovo KFOR, NGOs and OSCE. All the above, cooperating closely with each other and with Kosovo's leaders and people, established four Pillars each of which was to be responsible for different duties that aimed at covering all administrative areas and services such as this of health, education, banking and finance, telecommunications and law and order. Apart from the administrative functions, they also sought to provide with civilian functions such as substantial autonomy and self –government, coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief, promotion of human rights, insurance of safe return of displaced people and refugees and so on.[89] In October of 2000, local elections were held in the province's twenty- nine municipalities. Almost a year later in November of 2001, province-wide elections took place, after Kosovo had adopted its "new Constitutional framework" in May of the same year.[90]

Evaluation

After attempting to display intervention and its agents within a historical and international relations theory framework and concurrently to make it applicable to the case of Kosovo, it is time to evaluate intervention in general, and of course, with regards to the Kosovo case. The contradiction between liberal democracies' principles and the practice of intervention will be examined as well as the extent of its legitimacy and the problem of sovereignty vis-à-vis human rights violation. Moreover, the issue of a potential moral hazard will be presented, and finally, intervention will be assessed in terms of its effectiveness on the promotion of democracy and the subsequent stabilized and peaceful environment.

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[86] Kuperman (2008), 67.
[87] Holohan (2005), 25.
[88] Holohan (2005), 26.
[89] Holohan (2005), 26-27.
[90] Ibid.

To begin, it is argued that intervention applied by liberal democratic states is in essence a conflicting act since it contradicts the very principles of liberal democracy and the theory of liberalism itself; these of self-determination and individual autonomy. This notion does not aim to criticize intervention on the basis of its effectiveness and the positive or negative impact it might have on the state being intervened. It attempts however to highlight the fact that it is questionable whether liberal states could implement such a policy and at the same time be truly engaged to the basic axioms of liberalism.[91] As denoted before when trying to explain intervention when seen through the liberal point of view, some of the most significant and fundamental values of this theory are the absolute and indubitable right of individual's autonomy within a political system, state's sovereignty as well as the issue of self-determination. The concept of "self- help" as examined by the known just war theorist Walzer stresses that "the members of a political community should seek for their own freedom, just as the individuals must cultivate his own virtue. They cannot be set free, as he cannot be made virtuous, by any external force".[92] This notion also implies that it is upon states' will to resolve their internal conflicts and that an external interference it is not only unlikely to assist in resolving the issue, but also it is going to undermine people's right to be free from coercive action. Furthermore, Walzer underlines another contradiction relevant to the matter. This is the idea that when violating liberty as a means to dispense, it is impossible not to fail in doing so, given what liberty is all about in the end.[93]

Another argument deriving from the issue of sovereignty with regards to intervention is this of legitimacy which was briefly presented earlier in the paper. At this point, it remains pointless to elaborate once again on the legal information about the UN Charters or Articles on the matter. However, it is important to point out some further tensions that arise from the legitimacy problem. First of all, one central issue for the legitimacy and success of an intervention is the matter of "timing and mandates". It is indeed a common phenomenon that operations, especially those involved armed forces, are possible to replace actual political will.[94] Moreover, belated military intervention as in the case of Somalia and principally in the case of Rwanda, place further impediments in the operation and eliminate the possibility of success. Intervening "too much, too late" does not replace prevention.[95] It is also denoted that UN authorization is crucial since without it a state's liberties are violated, not only morally as mentioned above, but legally as well.[96] In the case of Kosovo however this did not happen as it was not authorized by the UN Charter. Nevertheless, most scholars – even those who were severely critical of the intervention – argue that NATO's mission was not one-sided, hence, unlawful; on the contrary, it was mutual since it was implemented not by a single state but by the recognized, trusted Alliance.

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[91] Greaves (2008- 2009), 62.
[92] Greaves (2008-2009), 62-63.
[93] Greaves (2008-2009), 65.
[94] Weil (2001), 97.
[95] Weil (2001), 98.
[96] Greaves (2008-2009), 66.

According to Louis Henkin (1999, p.826), the NATO intervention was more than necessary, since serious human rights violations were taking place and the international community had to act somehow. Apparently, due to veto power, it was impossible for the Security Council to authorize such a mission. Therefore, NATO, a responsible, "collective" organization, had to be entrusted with the responsibility to avert the instabilities that jeopardized peace and security and most importantly to avert genocide from taking place. In addition, the Security Council was able to control the intervention and command its termination if it wanted to. Another element contributing to the Council being in favor of the military operation was the fact that twelve out of fifteen of its members declined the Russian proposition for the resolution for the Kosovo case, approving in this manner the existing one. There are cases when the international law is unable to provide for solutions and when necessary, suitable and judicious, violations should be permitted.[97] Christine M. Chinkin (1999, p.843) seems to make arguments which are similar to those of Henkin, although she is aggressively critical of the humanitarian purpose of the intervention. More precisely, she mentions that NATO cannot be considered a one-sided body since it is obviously a "collective defense organization" which has cooperated with the UN in Bosnia and in other similar cases. Moreover, when the UN Security Council fails to respond to its duties adequately, as it did in Kosovo, it indicates its support for other European or International Institutions – like the EU, OSCE and NATO – to do so. Perhaps this is a way for the Council to justify its blessing for military operations "in view of its own paralysis".[98] Last but not least, the Kosovo case illustrated the deficiencies of the UN Charter law: on the one hand, it proved unready to respond to a humanitarian emergency and legitimate a military intervention by another body[99]; on the other hand, it demonstrated its weakness to impose its authority since it was bypassed easily by the Alliance, which did not wait for Security Council' approval.[100] However, apart from its legitimacy, interventions, as of Kosovo should also be evaluated in terms of its humanitarian purposes and ways of implementation as well as of its effectiveness. Regarding these matters, most scholars apply severe criticism, since the way it was exercised, as well as its selectivity on similar cases, was not justified by its humanitarian intentions.

With respect to the ethical concerns of the matter, it is argued, mainly from intervention's adversaries or the skeptics of it, that there are cases in which it is not very clear whether the agents of an intervention are in position to maintain their neutral and non political character.[101] Moreover, the altruistic declaration of the "responsibility to protect" is arguable as well. Displaying the conclusion of Walzer's surveys regarding the matter, Greaves (2008-2009, p.66) points out the fact that he (Walzer), was impossible to find a single intervention that was implemented for purely humanitarian purposes, making him to state that "states do not send their soldiers to other states, it seems only to save lives". Similarly, it is also suggested that international community's interventions lack lucidity on what is

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[97] Oscar Schachter cited by Henkin (1999), 826.
[98] Chinkin (1999), 843.
[99] Henkin (1999), 828.
[100] Chinkin (1999), 843.
[101] Weil (2001), 83.

actually being protected by the plethora of agents and interests involved every time.[102] Moreover, when connecting placing interventions in the old -new imperial context, it is argued that great powers intentions could indeed remind these of colonialist past.[103]

Finally, there is the issue of selectivity that raises questions on the ethical grounds of intervention. Regarding the matter, it is argued that it can take two forms. First of all, the West differentiates between its allies and its enemies – when ethnic conflicts occur and violence escalates rapidly taking the form of a massacre, liberal democracies of the West intervene to avert the deterioration of the situation, however, if the state that resorts to atrocities to oppress its rebelling minority is an ally of the West, then the issue does not receive the appropriate attention. For example Turkey, a NATO member and US ally, repeatedly mistreated the Kurdish minority in its southeastern boarders following the Gulf War.[104] When comparing the case of Kosovo and the KLA rebellion to this of PKK (Kurdish Workers' Party), it is easy to discover similarities between them. The Turkish counter-attack to the Kurdish rebellion resulted in the violent evacuation of many Kurdish villages and in the death or displacement of thousands of people.[105] Another example is this of the US tolerance over the paramilitary regime in Colombia, which again caused the displacement of thousands of people. Both cases show us that when interests intermediate, intervention is ignored even when needed.[106] On the contrary, these two examples set by the literature, although justifying the non-intervention policy to the similar cases of Turkey and Colombia (NATO member and narcotics), fail to explain why Serbia was so harshly demonized by the West during the 1990's. [107] The second form of selectivity concerns the preference for defending the human rights of some people over those of others. Atrocities and humanitarian abuses take place worldwide; still, the West seems to carefully select in which cases intervention is needed and in which ones it is not. Humanitarian intervention, though crucial, did not arrive in places like Ethiopia, Sudan or East Timor and it was significantly delayed in Rwanda. As Christine M. Chinkin (1999, p. 847) underlines, "it is better to be a refugee in Europe where they look like us than in Africa". Furthermore, funding of humanitarian missions can also be selective; this discrimination in evaluating people's human rights cripples moral authority and highlights the fact that the gap between the human rights rhetoric and reality is far from being bridged.[108]

Furthermore, intervention raises the question of moral hazard. In economics, moral hazard in the phenomenon in which insurance accidentally causes the exact opposite result from the one wanted and expected. For example, automobile insurance against theft might make us more careless, increasing that way the chances of car theft. Accordingly, it is argued that the "responsibility to protect", a norm that dominated the post-Cold War era, might increase genocidal violence instead of averting it.[109] In

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[102] Weil (2001), 81.
[103] Jamieson (2005), 166.
[104] Chomsky cited by Ron (2001), 112.
[105] Ibid.
[106] Ibid.
[107] Ron (2001), 112.
[108] Chinkin (1999), 847.
[109] Kuperman (2008), 50.

other words, humanitarian intervention tends to raise the expectations of oppressed minority groups for outsiders' aid and protection in case of a bloody revolt, consequently, these groups, though knowing that a possible rebellion will likely result in a massacre, either rebel or provoke retaliation by the majority group somehow in order to attract intervention. [110]When explaining the moral hazard of intervention, it seems that suppressed citizens resort in such a "solution" when they have become so vulnerable to the majority's threats that they have nothing else to lose, or when they believe outsiders' protection will ensure their victory.[111] In the case of Kosovo, the shift from pacifism to rebellion has been already examined, but the moral hazard could be a complementary explanation of the KLA rebellion, the ethnic cleansing and finally the victimization of ethnic Albanians.[112]

Before proceeding to the most crucial and final part of the evaluation, the effectiveness, which will seek to answer the question whether intervention in fact serves its humanitarian or democratization purposes, the operational factors will be presented in terms of military force. The advocates of military action argue that the latter are the most adequate way of implementing an intervention since it is much more experienced and capable of doing so and act successfully when it comes to humanitarian emergencies for example. Furthermore, they possess the necessary resources and they also have access to plethora of information and equipment. Logistics play a significant role in such operations and the international community is fully equipped with the best material and personnel as well. It is also stated that in some cases military forces might be the best option to save human lives.[113] According to the UN Secretary General "arms control are an essential prerequisite for a successful peace- building process.[114] Nevertheless, even if intervention actors could be well –organized there are cases in which they were unable to respond due to they sometimes carry the legacy burden of failures of the past such as in the case of Somalia.

The way military intervention in Kosovo was implemented has also undergone serious critique, even by those who were advocates of a NATO operation from the beginning. The fact that NATO, although aware of the ethnic cleansing efforts in Kosovo, was unprepared to manage a huge outflow of refugees indicates that humanitarianism was not given the attention it was supposed to have been given.[115] Daalder and O'Hanlon[116], despite justifying and supporting the operation both for ethical and strategic purposes, also argue that NATO's war strategy through aerial bombing did indeed ease the Serbian attempts of ethnic cleansing. Moreover, when opting for intervention for humanitarian purposes, it is crucial that the methods used be in accordance with the humanitarian purposes they serve. NATO, as well as the UN Security Council, being responsible for the realization of such operations are at the same time responsible to ensure and respect the political, social, economic and cultural rights of the

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[110] Kuperman (2008), 51.
[111] Kuperman (2008), 55.
[112] Kuperman (2008), 64-72.
[113] Weil (2001), 92-93.
[114] Weil (2001), 92.
[115] Chomsky cited by Ron (2001)), 113.
[116] Ibid.

population. Apparently, aerial bombing fails to achieve this goal.[117] It is also argued that if the international community was sincerely willing to solve the Kosovo case, bring peace and security in the area and prevent the tragic events of 1998-1999, it would have done so already in Dayton. On the contrary, the Kosovo issue was ignored in 1995; the West trying to solve the Bosnia tragedy as soon as possible resulted in hard compromises by offering legal impunity to people like Milosevic, who some years later would be accused for war crimes.[118]

In respect to the effectiveness of intervention opinions here vary as well. What is most frequently stated is the fact that the international community in the majority of the cases looked for and implemented half measures. Temporary solutions cannot disburden the suffering of people in the recipient of intervention states. Unless there is a long- term commitment on behalf of the intervener in order to proceed to an institution building process and support its actual humanitarian scope there is no point in trying at all since the intervention is doomed to fail.[119] Besides the "whether to intervene or not" dilemma, there is also the subsequent one of "whether to stay or not". There is a motto towards the intervention agents that states that: "don't do it unless you are prepared to make it work and stick it out when things get rough, which they will".[120] Moreover, there is the concern that supply of assistance is possible to generate winners and losers in a society which may bring further negative consequences in the end.[121] In the Kosovo case for example the military operation might not have been well organized and implemented as denoted it above. However, yet not resolving the problem, the international community, committed to its duty to bring peace and stability in the area, managed to create and maintain a relatively stable condition comparing to the 1990s on the one hand, and on the other it provided a way to promote democratization in Serbia with the overthrow of Milosevic. Furthermore, EU integration has facilitated towards this way of democratization since it creates motives for the Serbian state to continue this way.

As regards the impact of intervention implemented for democratization purposes, the opinions here range as well. However, the majority of studies concerning the matter suggest that the record of such interventions is negative.[122] In this final part of the paper there are going to be presented arguments on the effectiveness of the subject based on several empirical studies carried out which seek to find out whether intervention encourages the development of democracy or not and what are those factors that affect the success or failure of such operations. To begin, some scholars state that the central causes of democracies are internal and that none external actor could possibly change that. Domestic illiberal conditions will always place impediments that no intervention will ever overcome. In addition to that, the act of military intervention involves the danger of creating even further problems to the target state

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[117] Chinkin (1999), 844.
[118] Chinkin (1999), 846.
[119] Greaves (2008- 2009), 68-69.
[120] Ibid.
[121] Jamieson (2005), 167.
[122] Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006), 627.

by reducing its chances for democracy.[123] Moreover, the priorities of the intervener are questioned since it is stated that interveners' interests could lead to negative consequences for the target state.[124] If the interest of the intervener are materialistic then there are several complexities created since in order to be achieved there should be in accordance with the interests of the target state's leadership. The regime receiving the intervention might be given some "trappings for democracy" but in essence it will "lack institutional arrangements" vital for liberal democratic development such as the freedom of speech, fair elections and press independence.[125] An example that strengthens this argument is this of US intervention in Iraq in 1991 for the liberation of Kuwait which was implemented with promises for reforms and political change but in the end did not serve its purpose.[126] On the other hand, contemplating on this matter, other scholars argue that regardless the primer objectives, whether those are altruistic or they serve material interests, interventions on non- democratic regimes should be implemented due to the fact that they are in place to overthrow authoritarian leaders form power, demolish domestic impediments to democracy and give motivations for autocratic collaborators to change their regime and liberalize it whilst creating a stable environment by being friendly and cooperative allies.[127]

Nevertheless, the negative or supporting arguments on the topic could go on forever without actually assisting us to draw strong conclusions. Empirical studies implemented on the democracy promotion through intervention though, can indicate results on intervention's effectiveness. First and foremost, the nature of the intervener matters. Indeed, it is proven that the likelihood of the success of an intervention depends on the actor that implements it. Democratization outcomes prove less strong when there is a unilateral force guiding an intervention such as the US and more affective when there is the United Nation's involvement.[128] This is explained due to the fact that UN most of the time undertakes interventions when there is a fertile ground to receive as such and the relative readiness on behalf of the target state.[129] In addition, evidence shows that despite the fact that the majority of interventions does not appear to lead to democracy, there are conditions under which this record can be improved or even reversed. More precisely, these conditions relate to previous experience on intervention on behalf of the target state as well as serious commitment and actual support towards the main scope, this of democratization.[130] Nations that have already experienced interventions in the past are more likely to show democratic development. Further studies also suggest that "hostile military interventions" are capable of resulting in success whilst in the long- term show that they can actually assist in domestic economic improvement of the target state.[131] Last but not least, with regards to democratization and regional peace, evidence shows that imposed democratic polices do not help towards peace or

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[123] Pickering and Peceny (2006), 540.
[124] Ibid.
[125] Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006), 632.
[126] Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006), 633.
[127] Pickering and Peceny (2006), 540.
[128] Pickering and Peceny (2006), 555.
[129] Ibid.
[130] Meernik (1996), 400.
[131] Pickering and Kisangani (2006), 374.

democratic stabilization; contrariwise it threatens to reduce them.[132] For instance, intervention in Iraq which aims to impose democratization is unlikely to provide the region, in this case Middle East, with peace, prosperity and democracy. However, it is denoted that the greater the extent to which intervention reflects democratic institutions, the greater the possibility to better regional outcomes.[133]

Conclusion

It is clear that when analyzing intervention, which is such a broad and controversial issue, it is very hard to examine every aspect of it. This paper's objective was to introduce the reader to the concept of intervention since its introduction, its significance through history and the explanation of it provided by international relations theories. Additionally, it focused on the application of intervention in the post-Cold War era for humanitarian and democratization purposes in general and in the Kosovo case in particular.

Whether one belongs to the realist or to the liberal school, it is obvious intervention sits in the intersection between them and could be explained by both sides. In regards to Kosovo, the moral duty to stop the violent ethnic conflicts between Serbs and ethnic Albanians explains the issue, albeit not every part of it. This is because it fails to clarify why this duty was not applied in other violent conflicts occurring elsewhere, causing to doubt its humanitarian guise. On the other hand, those who exercise severe critique on military intervention fail in turn to propose different ways of averting violence and authoritarian oppression.

No matter what the driving forces of such interventions are (states' interests or states' moral duty), the main point is how Western liberal democracies will manage to provide unstable and vulnerable states and its people with peace and security; intervention when applied should be neither unilateral nor rapid. Military forces cannot achieve anything but short- term solutions or in some cases they cannot achieve anything at all. Peace and institution –building processes, yet hard to be applied and succeed, are the only way to establish stable liberal democratic states that respect human rights and seek for cooperation and international stability. We do not live in a perfect world and unfortunately, the tensions and conflicts, domestic and international, continue to dominate world scene. Europe, despite the economic crisis, has more or less managed to achieve stability and democratization and incorporate within the EU states that after the Cold War were involved in violent ethnic conflicts, such as Croatia. However, there are still countless cases worldwide where authoritarian regimes rule and violate basic human rights. Recent events in the constantly unstable Middle East prove it so. Moreover, lack of adequate and successful solution in Iraq and Afghanistan confirm the argument that "intervention at gunpoint" can do less or nothing to resolve political and social issues. It is a challenge whether the West is capable and at

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[132] Enterline and Greig (2005), 1095.
[133] Enterline and Greig (2005), 1076.

the same time willing to reverse the so far unsuccessful project or whether it will continue to maintain a two-speed world.

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