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ISLAMIST MOBILIZATION IN AFGHANISTAN

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# ISLAMIST MOBILIZATION IN AFGHANISTAN

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## INTRODUCTION

The first war that the 21<sup>st</sup> CENTURY saw, was between opponents that seemed unequal: on the one hand, a super power, armed with the latest technology and aspiring to the presidency of the multi-faceted world, and on the other hand, a community banded with fanatical attachment to values which, though not shared by the greatest majority of its members, are traditional, individual and local, and therefore worth any sacrifice. The result of this war is not a foregone conclusion, because often in history there have been times that the fanaticism and determination proved to be the most powerful weapons. Therefore, to predict anything, we need to understand the nature of this war, try to understand why it broke, and which hidden forces drive the enemy army soldiers. Without this, we rely only on propaganda on both sides and a flood of patriotic lies, the likes of which invariably accompany such struggles. Wars tend to have different levels of conflict: economic, religious, ideological, honor, class, and many others. The relatively easiest answer is to use an economic explanation, when the war is initiated by the poorer against the richer, arguing that the richer had made at the expense of the poorer and poorer now takes what he deserves. Such themes can be easily found in today's so-called struggle of the so-called free world against terrorism. There are commentators glad to explain everything in those terms, claiming again that this ideology of militant Islam and human rights is just a cover for a brutal struggle for material success. However, this explanation is far too primitive. One has to look further; for example, follow trail questions about the ideological basis of this war. Because here we are dealing with opposing forces whose conflict has to do with far more than conflicting ideology.

War is the continuation of other policies, by military means. However, if the policy requires the generals and soldiers to obtain what is not in fact obtainable, it is not valid. It should require that which can be obtained. Democracy is friendly to the West Middle East and Afghanistan - so it's possible only when conditions are favorable.

Every ruler in fact both embodies the power and limits the exercise of power in the society and culture which he governs. Government itself, its concept, social

understanding and construction (genesis) and the practical operation is the emanation and manifestation of the culture of a tribe, group or nation.<sup>1</sup>

This paper focuses on the causes of the movements of the Islamic society in Afghanistan and also on the objectives and significance of their actions. It will look at the role of strategic, cognitive-psychological, and emotional variables affecting individual decision-making in the two parties. This raises the question: why did Afghans across clan and ethnic divisions look to political Islam as the way to extricate the state from political chaos?

This work consists of V chapters. Introduction explains the framing theory of social movements as a structure of Islamic ideology. It defines the basic concepts and classifications of social movements in Afghanistan. Chapter I describes the means we have to make sense of Islam in terms of politics. Chapter II presents a historical picture of the formation of Afghanistan, namely - the XX century-1994 and the Soviet occupation. Chapter III presents the rise of the Taliban, their policy, and governments. Chapter IV presents the U.S. occupation. Chapter V provides a summary regarding the role of Islam in society as well as its influence on the international policy of Afghanistan.

### **Militant jihad as a global social movement.**

The starting point and basis for the development of the religious teachings of Islam which also includes the right-fikh science, is the Koran and sunna. The Islamic law is closely related to religion, and the laws of Islam have religious sanction. Islam has a much greater extent than other religions regarding it's a legal character which regulates the entire life of a Muslim from the cradle to the grave. God is the source of all law and justice powers. The Islamic law covers all the duties of man towards God and men, rules of conduct towards their fellow believers primarily, but also against non-Muslim communities. Muslim jurists developed a system of Islamic law in the eighth and ninth centuries.

As noted by Marc Sageman, "global jihad (...) is a dynamic social movement that creates and breaks the bonds between different terrorist groups".<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Jolanta Sierakowska – Dyndo, Afganistan – w objęciach czy szponach tradycji?, Poznańskie Studia Środkowoazjatyckie, UAM, Poznań 2008, p. 3-29

Global jihad, or the armed movement of radical Muslims for the reconstruction of the Caliphate, came to public attention, the media and state authorities, on 11 September 2001 with the terrorist attack against the WTC and the Pentagon. Although the western authorities and the public were genuinely surprised by both the scale and effectiveness of the deadly attack, it should be noted that it didn't come out of thin air. The Leader of Al Qaeda openly declared war on America, on 23 August 1996<sup>3</sup>, repeating it on a larger scale, exactly three and a half years later,<sup>4</sup> and the U.S. and other western targets have been the epicenter of attacks, in the form of propaganda initially, already much earlier. In this article the armed jihad is presented as an example of an interesting contemporary global social movement, which can be described and understood using the concept fairly well recognized in the sociological literature. The term jihad is therefore reserved to describe a social movement, whose ideology is Islamism leadership, and terrorism is but one way of combat that this movement uses (in addition to guerrilla warfare and propaganda). Because the jihadists don't possess the means of "classic" War (army, air force, navy), they use guerrilla tactics and terrorism - whose effect is multiplied by the world's global propaganda media. Mass social movements that use violence, such as jihad need to undergo careful observation and careful analysis, as they were, as indicated by recent history, the perpetrators of the gravest crimes against humanity - an example might be a Bolshevik movement, fascist or Nazi. In each of these cases, both the movement itself and its leaders were snubbed in the beginning, and often ridiculed.

In each case, the ideological bases of these movements openly assumed the need to resort to physical violence in the process of elimination of both real and suspected enemies - the use of violence was an extremely important element, even necessary to achieve the desired social change. In each of these cases, we have the emergence of charismatic leaders who initially limit themselves to creating a small organization staffing, to later give rise to mass. In the case of Bolshevism, Fascism and Nazism, violence was used both before and after the conquest of power - but after its acquisition,

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<sup>2</sup> Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2004 , p.151

<sup>3</sup> Dodatek 1A w: Yonah Alexander, Michael S. Swetnam *Siewcy śmierci: Osama bin Laden i inni szefowie al- Qaidy* , Bellona, Warszawa 2001, str. 8

<sup>4</sup> Dodatek 1B , w: Yonah Alexander, Michael S. Swetnam *Siewcy śmierci: Osama bin Laden i inni szefowie al- Qaidy* , Bellona, Warszawa 2001, str. 107

it was greatly multiplied, with the acquisition of the state apparatus of repression. In this sense, jihad is still waiting for its big break, though it is hard not to notice that there, might be examples of it in the case of Sudan after the takeover of power by the Islamists: violence is not only limited, but multiplied by the organizational resources provided by the state apparatus. Understanding the nature and dynamics of this movement is now in general opinion necessary, as it is a constantly growing threat to the social cohesion and security of European countries.

### **Sociology of social movements.**

As noted by Piotr Sztompka: "(...) social movements (...) share (...) two properties. Firstly, they target particular goals to implement some kind of social change. Secondly, they do not run in an institutionalized way (or at least they are not fully institutionalized and formalized). In this sense, a social movement is something between collective behavior (e.g., in the crowd) and professional (e.g. at the office)."<sup>5</sup> The contemporary jihad fits perfectly in these two differentiators - its ultimate goal is a fundamental and profound social change - the perfect reconstruction of a Muslim society (which would exist at the time of the birth of their faith) and its "political" institutionalization in the form of the revived Caliphate - the Muslim areas, initially, and later throughout the world. Its tactical objective is to weaken the Western states as it is essential to limit their influence in the Muslim world. Jihadists want to go back to the days of the Prophet's humanity and liberate the latter from the oppression of unjust socio-political systems created by people to give in to the righteous and perfect rule of the one true God who has clearly expressed his will in the Koran. The core of society must therefore become Koran law, or sharia, which regulates the relationships in all their dimensions - in this sense jihad has, like communism, a totalitarian character. The ideas underlying the jihad are universal and global – everyone must submit to the will of Allah regardless of age, sex, color, belonging to social class, nationality or religion earlier (possibility of conversion is perfectly acceptable). The ideology is also deeply anti -

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<sup>5</sup> Piotr Sztompka, Od działań masowych do ruchów społecznych, w: Piotr Sztompka „Socjologia. Analiza społeczeństwa”, Znak, Kraków 2002, str. 157 - 158

modernist, which opposes the modernization of societies, although it willingly and frequently uses the tools provided by modern Western society.

Moreover, the jihadist movement is, as suggested by Sztompka, by nature not fully institutionalized and formalized – it includes registered social organizations such as foundations or associations, working side by side with loose associations and networks, including the (illegal), terrorist networks. The most important elements of a sociological description of this motion will be presented below.

### **Classification of social movements.**

The design theory of the existence of social movements focuses on the express way of communication, namely the transmission of messages by the leaders of the groups to a common support. However, the whole concept of ideology focuses on the origin, content and method of connection to faith.<sup>6</sup>

Jihad is the truest and purest form, to which all Muslims aspire; it is the determination to do well, to do justice - even against their own interests. It is an individual struggle for personal moral behavior [human]. Especially today, it is a struggle carried on many levels: self-purification and awareness, public service and social justice. Globally, it is a struggle involving people of every age, skin color and religion, the struggle for control of the Great Decisions: not only about who is to exercise authority over a particular piece of land, but about more important things - who is to receive medicine, or who can eat.

Taking into consideration sociological criteria, we can say that jihad is a movement which is new, radical, value-oriented, reactionary, revolutionary and openly referring to violence.<sup>7</sup> It is a new movement, because, despite its ideological base - the organization dates back to late 20th century, it is not character of class specific, but universalist; it refers to people of different social status, material and labor, connected by the common interpretation of Islamic religious ideas. Unlike the "old" social movements that have corporate or class character, the new are open to a wide recruitment, the decentralized organizational structures are loose and they predominate in the form of

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<sup>6</sup> Emmanuel Karagiannis, Political Islam in Central Asia. The challenge of Hizb ut-Tahir, p.5, 2010

<sup>7</sup> Piotr Sztompka, Od działań masowych do ruchów społecznych, w: Piotr Sztompka „Socjologia. Analiza społeczeństwa”, Znak, Kraków 2002, str.161



volunteer activity. This movement is also radical and focused on values, as intended to "(...) change the most fundamental, the basic principles of social order."<sup>8</sup> It is also a revolutionary movement and openly referring to violence, because its aim is to make changes on the road of armed revolution and overthrow the social order in Muslim countries replacing them with "new-old", a thing that can be achieved, jihadists assume, only with the use of violence. Violence is strongly emphasized in its ideology – hence its "terrorist" nature - the killing and intimidation of opponents of the movement, including people described as "civilians" is not only permissible, but often even necessary.

Jihad had over the centuries, two variants of meanings - the first of them more radical than the fundamental, the second quite pacific. The first, associated mainly with the thinker Ibn Taymiya (1268-1328), holds that born Muslims who fail to meet the demands of their religion, may be regarded as infidels and therefore legitimate targets of jihad. This interpretation [of jihad] has proved to be needed (as is often the case), when one of the rulers of the Muslims declared war against another Muslim rulers, only to present the enemy as not properly Muslim therefore dignifying the war as a jihad.

The second variant, usually associated with Sufis, or Muslim mystics, is the doctrine commonly called the "great jihad", but perhaps more usefully termed "higher jihad." This Sufi variant invokes allegorical interpretations, which completely change the literal meaning of jihad - as an armed struggle. Instead it calls for withdrawal from the world, to wage the fight of an individual's [with himself]'s baser instincts and pursuit of higher consciousness and spiritual depth.<sup>9</sup>

### **Frames theory**

Frames theory is often credited with "bringing ideas back in" to the study of social movements, but frames are not the only useful ideational concepts. In particular, the older, more politicized concept of ideology needs to be used in its own right and not recast as a frame. Frame theory is rooted in linguistic studies of interaction, and points to the way shared assumptions and meanings shape the interpretation of any particular event. Ideology theory is rooted in politics and the study of politics, and points to

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid, 163-164

<sup>9</sup> Douglas Streusanda. „What is the meaning of jihad?“ Middle East Quarterly, 09. 1997

coherent systems of ideas which provide theories of society coupled with value commitments and normative implications for promoting or resisting social change. Ideologies can function as frames, but there is more to ideology than framing. Frame theory offers a relatively shallow conception of the transmission of political ideas as marketing and resonating, while recognition of the complexity and depth of ideology points to the social construction processes of thinking, reasoning, educating, and socializing. Social movements can only be understood by genuinely linking social psychological and political sociology concepts and traditions, not by trying to rename one group in the language of the other.<sup>10</sup>

### **Frames in Social Movement Research**

The study of social movements has always had one foot in social psychology and the other in political sociology, although at times these two sides have seemed to be at war with each other. In the 1950s and 1960s, social psychology dominated, and social movements were theorized by collective behaviour theorists as long-lasting panics or crowds. In the 1970s, proponents of resource mobilization criticized collective behaviour theory, and stressed the importance of political and organizational factors. In the 1980s, social psychologists criticized resource mobilization and political process theories for treating social movements only in organizational and political terms, and neglecting the problems of social construction. Snow et al.'s programmatic article on "frame alignment processes" was central in the social psychological turn, and is widely credited with "bringing ideas back in."<sup>11</sup> Framing theory has provided a way to link ideas and social construction of ideas with organizational and political process factors. Over a hundred different kinds of frames linked with specific movements have been identified.<sup>12</sup>

Not surprisingly, frame theory has itself been criticized. Benford's "insider's critique" lists several shortcomings in the way the concept are applied in research studies, and assert that the term has become a cliché.<sup>13</sup> "Framing" is often inserted uncritically

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<sup>10</sup> What a Good Idea! Frames and Ideologies in Social Movement Research Pamela E. Oliver

<sup>11</sup> Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. 1986. "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization and Movement Participation" *American Sociological Review* 51(4): 546-481

<sup>12</sup> Benford, Robert. 1997. "An Insider's Critique of the Social Movement Framing Perspective." *Sociological Inquiry* 67: 409-430.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 419

wherever there is a movement-related idea being defined or debated. It has been pointed out that the concept of frame does not do justice to the ideational complexity of a social movement;<sup>14</sup> and that it tends to reduce the richness of culture to recruitment strategies.<sup>15</sup> Steinberg criticizes frame theory as too static and stresses the contextual and recursive qualities of frames.<sup>16</sup>

Frames and framing processes are powerful concepts. Frame theory's emphasis on the intentional ways in which movement activists seek to construct their self-presentations so as to draw support from others points to critical processes in social movements. There is no question that this line of theorizing has been extraordinarily productive of new research and new understandings of social movements. In seeking to back up and revisit a particular turn in framing theory, we should not be understood as trying to discount the value and importance of a whole line of work. Nevertheless, the power of frame theory is lost if "frame" is made to do the work of other concepts.

### **A Frame is a Frame**

The frame concept is rooted in the study of communicative interaction. Gregory Bateson introduced the notion of a frame as a metacommunicative device that set parameters for "what is going on".<sup>17</sup> He showed that interaction always involves interpretative frameworks by which participants define how others' actions and words should be understood. Twenty years later, frame analysis was introduced to sociological research by Erving Goffman. In *Frame Analysis*,<sup>18</sup> and *Forms of Talk*,<sup>19</sup> Goffman explored types and levels of framing activities. In *Forms of Talk*, Goffman discussed the several layers of framing in interaction, and shifted his focus to linguistic analysis of conversational conventions that mark the application and changes in interpretative frames. Researchers building on Goffman's work have developed an extensive body of

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<sup>14</sup> Munson, Ziad. 1999. "Ideological Production of the Christian Right: The Case of the Christian Coalition." Unpublished manuscript, Department of Sociology, Harvard University

<sup>15</sup> Jasper, James M. 1997. *The Art of Moral Protest*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

<sup>16</sup> Steinberg, Marc. 1998. "Tilting the Frame: Considerations of Collective Action Framing from a Discursive Turn." *Theory and Society* 27: 845-872.

<sup>17</sup> Bateson 1972 [1954]. *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*. New York: Ballentine.

<sup>18</sup> Goffman, Erving. 1972. *Frame Analysis*. New York: Harper and Row

<sup>19</sup> Goffman, Erving. 1981. *Forms of Talk*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

empirical knowledge about how speech occurs, how cultural knowledge is used, and how these interplay with interactional intentions and constraints; but this body of knowledge has not been utilized by social movement approaches to framing.

Frames are used to explain speech acts, rituals, and commonly occurring behaviours in other cultures.<sup>20</sup> The assumption is that the elements of frames can be elicited through ethnographic interview and reconstituted into a working schema or algorithm.<sup>21</sup> This approach has also been adopted by researchers in artificial intelligence to explain speech behaviour in everyday situations such as joking, gossiping, doing business, lecturing, shooting the bull, etc.<sup>22</sup>

The other way to view a frame is to see it as an inherently malleable and emergent mental construct, in Bartlett's terms an "active developing structure"<sup>23</sup>, shaped in action and especially face-to-face interaction as additional elements are added and linked to existing structures based on new incoming data. In this sense, frames are the basic tools by which "we live by inference," to invoke Goffman's famous dictum.

It draws four conclusions regarding frame analysis as it is currently practiced by social movements' scholars. First, frames are individual cognitive structures, located "within the black box of mental life" that orient and guide interpretation of individual experience. Frames "enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify and label occurrences";<sup>24</sup> and "selectively punctuate and encode objects, situations, events, experiences and sequences of actions within one's present and past environment".<sup>25</sup> They are complex interpretative schemata—not just isolated ideas—which are relevant at different levels of experience. Second, frames become important in analyzing collective action insofar as they are shared by enough individuals to channel individual behaviours into patterned social ones. This presumes an ideal-typical formulation of a frame that

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<sup>20</sup> Hymes, Dell. 1974. "Social Anthropology, Sociolinguistics, and the Ethnography of Speaking," in Dell Hymes, ed. *Foundations in Sociolinguistics*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

<sup>21</sup> Frake, Charles O. 1964. "How to Ask for a Drink in Subanum." *American Anthropologist* 66: 127-132

<sup>22</sup> Schank, Roger C. and Robert P. Ableson. 1977. *Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Deborah. 1993. "What's in a Frame?" Pp. 14-56 in *Framing in Discourse*

<sup>23</sup> Bartlett, F.C. 1932. *Remembering*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>24</sup> Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. 1986. "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization and Movement Participation" *American Sociological Review* 51(4): 46

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid*, p.137

risers above both idiosyncratic differences between participants and the contention, negotiation, and emergence that characterizes discursive behaviour about the frames. This aggregated notion freezes the buzzing and swirling confusion of individual cognitive processing at a point in time, enabling comparisons at other points of time. Third, this snapshot of a frame is a methodological artifice that, in the best of worlds, enables an inventory of what cognitive orientations are shared by individual participants. Ideally, there would be some representations of the concepts and their interrelations to show how thinking within the frame occurs, but with very few exceptions<sup>26</sup> this kind of plotting is not found in the social movement literature. Fourth, it is important to distinguish between these "snapshots," which represent the structure of cognitive frames, and framing processes which capture the emergent, contested, and socially constructed quality of cognitive frames as they are melded in interaction. Frames are mental structures or schemata. Framing is a behaviour by which people make sense of both daily life and the grievances that confront them. Frame theory, therefore, embraces both cognitive structures whose contents can be elicited, inferred, and plotted in a rough approximation of the algorithms by which people come to decisions about how to act and what to say; and the interactive processes of talk, persuasion, arguing, contestation, interpersonal influence, subtle rhetorical posturing, outright marketing that modify—indeed, continually modify—the contents of interpretative frames.<sup>27</sup> Applied to social movement studies, we can see instances of framing at the SMO level and, if we looked closely, we would see them in interaction at the membership level.

### **The concept of frame**

The concept of frame points to the cognitive process of mobilizing people's knowledge to interpret events or circumstances, and locate it in a larger system meaning. Framing processes are the ways the actors set up one frame or set of meanings, than not other when they communicate the message, thereby indicating how the message is to be understandable. In the daily contacts, cropping is often done implicitly by the subtle

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<sup>26</sup> Gerhards, Jurgen and Dieter Rucht. 1992. Mesomobiliztaion: Organizing and Framing in Two Protest Campaigns in West Germany. *American Journal of Sociology* 98: 578-584

<sup>27</sup> Johnston, Hank, and Bert Klandermans, eds. 1995. *Social Movements and Culture*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press

linguistic and non-linguistic signals. Intentional movements of business activity at the organizational level are mainly used to study the social movement framing processes.<sup>28</sup> The concept of the framework draws attention to how the propaganda movement reflects both framework writers and their perception within their goals. The concept of the framework draws attention to the interactive processes that occur at each level movement, both in the organization of traffic and between traffic and outsiders. Solid framework concept has the greatest power, when a frame is contrasted with another, when the question of how and why a person relies on one frame, and not another, in particular, context.

Frame concepts have made great contributions to our understanding of social movements, but sometimes research in a framing perspective would be more illuminating if ideology instead of frames were invoked, when the data seem clearly to point to ideological issues. Benford develops the concept of frame disputes, distinguishes types of disputes (diagnostic, prognostic, and resonance), seeking to identify the predictors of each.<sup>29</sup> But the axis along which most of the disputes in his data turned was the ongoing battle between moderates, liberals and leftist radicals, and the disputes were more unified by their ideological underpinnings in competing social theories than distinguished by their emphasis on diagnosis, prognosis, or resonance. In framing terms, Carroll and Ratner's study of the correlation of cross-movement activism with master frames in different Vancouver SMOs seems quite different from Benford's.<sup>30</sup> Their coding of interviewees' views of "injustice and domination" identified three master frames: political- economy/injustice, liberal, and identity. Those giving the political-economy/injustice frame had the most cross-movement activism, while those giving the "identity" frame had the least.

Frame is a useful concept for students of social movements, as are grievance, interest, and culture. We are not calling for the abandonment of framing theory, nor claiming that framing processes are unimportant. The language of frames is perhaps the

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid,

<sup>29</sup> Benford, Robert. 1993. "Frame Disputes within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement." *Social Forces* 71:677-701.

<sup>30</sup> Carroll, William K., and R.S. Ratner. 1996. "Master Framing and Cross-Movement Networking in Contemporary Social Movements." *The Sociological Quarterly* 37:601- 625.

best way to explain our central point. Frames can be understood as malleable, but this version of frame theory focuses on how meanings are negotiated in interpersonal contexts. At the same time, there are latent political implications in frame theory, and latent social psychological implications in a theory of ideology. Exclusive emphasis on frames can suggest that politics are unimportant, or can be reduced to simple difference of opinion. To imply that politics are unimportant and that everybody's ideas are structurally equivalent to everyone else's is apolitics. Frame theory in social movements has avoided the danger of complete depoliticization by its intellectual alliance with political opportunity theory, and its explicit models of how particular frames appeal to particular constituencies, or access particular resources, or take advantage of particular political opportunities, although this very turn has led to the most mechanistic and superficial images of frame alignment processes. Frame theory has stimulated a wide variety of research because it points to important processes in social movements. Framing concepts have been enormously valuable and productive, and should not be abandoned.

### **The Taliban and the Islamic Movements**

Support for the Taliban and social movements stemmed from the rational, strategic decision-making processes and culturally-informed emotional responses to Islamic frames.<sup>31</sup> This paper argues that in this fragmented state, revolutionary Islamic movements demonstrated a unique social mobilization capacity based on (a) their ability to redefine local and national identities in such a way that overcame pre-existing fault lines of conflict, (b) their ability to frame the solution to civil conflict in simple yet highly resonant and logically coherent terms, and (c) the legitimacy and motivational power offered by charismatic religious leadership.<sup>32</sup> These three factors led Afghans to construct its own Islam-centered Leviathans.

Regarding the first factor, in Afghanistan, Islamic movements demonstrated a unique ability to create a unified national identity based on religion, which provided an alternative to the internal fragmentation of civil war. Central to the message of the

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<sup>31</sup> Jeff Goodwin, *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements*, October 2001

<sup>32</sup> Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, *The Social Movements Reader: Cases and Concepts* (Blackwell Readers in Sociology), 2009, p.85-89

Islamic movements was the argument that other non-Islamic identities, in particular clan and ethnic rivalries, were responsible for civil chaos; the solution of an Islamic super-identity provided a normative framework for a future political order based on an inclusive conception of a nation-state.<sup>33</sup>

Through their use of Islamic frames, not only did the two movements usher in a new Islamic national identity, but they also presented similar diagnostic and prognostic framing mechanisms for understanding the civil war stalemates in respective countries; they identified the "vice" of warlord corruption as the problem, and identified the "virtue" of religious piety as the solution.<sup>34</sup> By identifying religious piety as a solution to social and political problems, these ideas-by their very definition-demanded collective and individual action.

Finally, the social mobilization success of social movements may be attributed to the fact that they were led by charismatic religious figures, whose leadership drew upon widely resonant ideas and traditional mores about the Ideal Man. It demonstrated an enormous sway in the honor-based cultures of Afghanistan, prompting a culturally-informed emotional mobilization in support of the Islamic movements' cause

### **Framing Islam's Movements**

Benford and Snow define "framing" as the active and dynamic process of interpreting and constructing reality, in which movement entrepreneurs are actively involved in the production of meaning.<sup>35</sup> Movement entrepreneurs make "diagnoses" of problems and offer their "prognoses" for correcting them.<sup>36</sup> Whether those diagnoses and prognoses result in popular mobilization depends on how resonant the diagnostic and prognostic framing is, based on the existing cultural, cognitive, and material context. If the diagnostic and prognostic frames connect to people's feelings and experiences at large, then movement entrepreneurs can prompt people to become involved in the movement.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Quintan Wiktorowicz, *Islamic activism: a social movement theory approach*, 2004, p. 7-12

<sup>34</sup> Benford, R.D. and A. David, Snow. 2000, *Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment*. *Annual Review of Sociology*, p.189

<sup>35</sup> Benford and Snow, *Framing Processes and Social Movement*, p.600

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid*, p. 612

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid*, p. 614-619



The conditions on the ground in Afghanistan in 1994-96 gave credibility and legitimacy to the Islamic movements in the country. Almost all Afghans universally blamed local warlords and divisive identity politics for their security woes. It gave credence to Islamic movements' calls for total social and political reform.

The Taliban presented a solution to state failure. It proposed a coherent political model based on highly resonant and widely held religious ideas. The Islamic message acquired its legitimacy. Quite simply, through the statement of a series of religious beliefs and through the personification of those ideals in the movement's leadership. Stories of heroism and spiritual triumph of Afghan leaders, exemplified the ideals upheld by the movements they led.

In societies that have a strong oral tradition, such popular legends, myths, and stories constitute a powerful form of political propaganda; Afghanistan gave social legitimacy to the movement objectives and generated support for the Islamic agenda. The authenticity of the movement articulators and the narrative fidelity of the stories surrounding them mobilized individuals to join the Islamic cause. Emotional and highly resonant with traditional religious and cultural mores, these leaders' personal stories generated a spirit of revivalism and hope among disempowered Afghan men. The framing process is strategic in the sense that the group makes a conscious selection of those narratives, rituals and symbols, as well as hadith and Quranic verses that serve its aims. In order to make their frames resonate, it must find consistency with deeply held cultural values.

Arguably, these stories constituted charismatic leadership, which had a profound mobilization capacity among the target audience. Charismatic leadership changes the values, goals, needs, and aspirations of followers, calling them to action "above and beyond the call of duty."<sup>38</sup> This call to arms is a highly emotional process, wherein the follower finds personal meaning and a sense of duty in action, resulting in voluntary commitment to the leader and the cause. Charismatic leaders raise individuals to a level of self-transcendence, elevating followers' needs from "lower to higher levels of

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<sup>38</sup> Shamir, *Motivational Effects of Charismatic Leadership*, 1993, p. 579

Maslow's hierarchy."<sup>39</sup> In the Taliban cases, the personal stories and character attributes of the Islamic leader constituted a form of charismatic leadership that generated movement mobilization.

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<sup>39</sup> *Ibid*, p. 612-617

## **CHAPTER I**

### **Defining Islam in Afghanistan**

It is important to illustrate various aspects of Islam in Afghanistan in order to provide background for the emergence of Islam. Although the categorization of Islamic schools and trends can be unpleasant and often misleading, it is necessary if one wants to understand the dynamics that are now playing in Afghanistan. The indications that follow are not always represented by different groups or individuals, nor are separate to each other, but rather some of the terms may overlap and be together in various combinations to describe groups or people. It is only by identifying these categories that it becomes possible to determine their impact or interact with the Islamists, who are the focus of this paper. It can also be inferred that those who are not part of Islamic movement can view Islamist groups with varying degrees of hostility, sympathy, or indifference. Moreover, understanding these names is essential to build broader categories and trends that can be used today.

#### **1 Popular Islam**

Afghanistan is a country almost entirely composed of Muslims,<sup>40</sup> and Islam permeates Afghan life, providing the basis for a system of standards and morals. The term "popular Islam" refers to the way in which religious structures of everyday life, live in language, make a meaningful experience and strengthen the cultural identity;<sup>41</sup> this is not the same as defining the local varieties of Islamic doctrine, but the latter can be diluted by pre-Islamic beliefs and sense of duty.<sup>42</sup>

In this sense, the category is not defined in contrast to religion, understood and practiced by the 'ulama (religious scholars singular: 'Ali) or Islamists, indicating a high / low division, but rather it is a common denominator for all groups of society.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Olivier Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 28

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31

<sup>42</sup> M. Nazif Shahrani, *Local Knowledge of Islam and Social Discourse in Afghanistan and Turkistan in the Modern Period*, in *Turko-Persia in Historical Perspective*, ed. Robert Canfield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.161-188

<sup>43</sup> *Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe* (New York: Harper & Row), 1978.

Popular Islam has a universal understanding of Islam as a system that requires good, and the belief that obedience provides a sense of specific economic and of social justice. Islam is also a popular Afghan 'village Islam ', which is presided by a Mulla, a mosque official who has a monopoly on religious activity in the countryside, such as circumcision, marriage and burial.<sup>44</sup>

## **2 Islam in Tribal Context**

While Islam combines virtually the entire population of Afghanistan, the society is divided along ethnic and tribal lines. The largest ethnic group, Pashtuns, is also the tribe. Tribes are formulated by a patrilineal origin, and the hypothetical ancestor of all Quays is Pashtun, who is said, to descend directly from Islam's Prophet Muhammad. Effectively, the Pashtun denied any pre-Islamic past, or the experience of conversion. Being Muslim is therefore inextricably linked to their tribal heritage.<sup>45</sup>

In this way, what is Islamic and what is tribal overlap. Defense tribal forms, for example, can easily degenerate into a defense of the faith, as shown in the first Anglo-Afghan war and jihad (struggle) against the Soviets, where tribes fought side by side against a non-Muslim entity. However, it is clear that conflicts do not exist between tribal codes, for example, and Islamic law. These conflicts are what will bring the Mulla in his leadership role. For instance, he uses the "term Book", referring to the Koran text, but also to its legal interpretation contained in fiqh (Islamic case law).<sup>46</sup>

## **3 Text Islam 'ulama**

In Afghanistan, as well as elsewhere in the Muslim world, ulama operates as a Scholastic tradition commentary and is defined by science, not membership in formal institutions. Fiqh Sharia is the body used to introduce (Islamic Law) to the public, with a commentary developed over a thousand years by trained religious scholars' ulama, who read and interpret the Sharia by a specific set of rules. The primary sources of Islam, the Koran and the Sunna, are the bases of practice of the normative Prophet, but for "ulama, these texts are not significant, as comments

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<sup>44</sup> Roy, Islam and Resistance, p.32

<sup>45</sup> M. Nazif Shahrani and Robert L. Canfield, Afghanistan, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p.274.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid, p.278

and translators. In this way, textual Islam included "the body of fiqh ulama. In Afghanistan, it means Hanafi fiqh, law school, which all of the Afghanistan Sunnis follow.<sup>47</sup>

"Ulama imagine society governed by the law deriving from the holy text. It is important to remember that 'ulama who have knowledge of the sacred text and control its interpretation, confirm the legitimacy of de facto political power that regulated areas where the text is silent. Historically, the 'ulama who seek to regulate Islamic society, the legal system, whose development and interpretation of the law does not depend on the state, are essentially concerned with the legal and legislative, and not the political. However, as the state takes on more functions previously reserved for religious institutions, such as personal status law, the ulama enter the political sphere in Afghanistan, as well as in other parts of the Muslim world. It is important to note the following mitigation factors that in combination, have disputed this characterization of one-dimensional "Ulam: Sufi, the reformist fundamentalism and Islam. These factors will be discussed at length below.

#### **4 Sufism**

Sufism is generally understood as a mystical form of Islam that distinguishes between exoteric and esoteric revelation. Sufis seek esoteric revelation, the entrance to the truth, or haqiqa during spiritual initiation by the spiritual master. Frequently, the spiritual master is also called a sheikh or pir and disciple, murid. The student follows the spiritual path (Tariq) to discover the intuitive knowledge of the divine. Sufis do not define any political agenda. On the contrary, Sufis usually avoid worldliness. The anti-materialist attitudes and practices of Sufi meditation contract mean that the Sufis can be ascetic and recluse. Many Sufi practices such as total submission to a Sufi pir, the remembrance of God (dhikr) in the ritual circle, pantheistic forms of sacred worship, are not compatible with orthodox views represented by the formal intellectualism 'ulama.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid, p.284

<sup>48</sup> Basheer M. Nafi, *The Rise and Decline of the Arab-Islamic Reform Movement* (London: The Institute of Contemporary Islamic Thought, 2000), p. 13.

"Ulam historically ranged between resistance and tolerance of these practices of piety, and, tolerance. Sufism even extended to include the number of PIR in its ranks. Three dominant Sufi Naqshbandi are found in Afghanistan, Qadiri and Cheshti. Pir-'alim (master-scholar), a form of Sufi practice does not rival a formal religion, but rather provides a more spiritual dimension of 'Ali, who first of all respects sharia. The predominant Naqshbandi order is most often associated with the more "orthodox" Sufism, but there are also some Cheshti and Qadiri brotherhoods that practice Sufism in a similar way.<sup>49</sup> Maraboutism is a variation of Sufism in Afghanistan, which includes collective loyalty to the clan or tribe to the family of saints. The student has a looser individual relation to the pir. Hence, it is more superstitious admiration than almost master-disciple relationship involved. For example, a student only makes the annual pilgrimage to his master. Pir not 'Ali is a Marabout and Sufism can be described as anticlerical. This type of Sufism is more prominent in the south, and is often associated with the Qadiri order.<sup>50</sup>

## **5 Fundamentalisms**

The introduction of the term "fundamentalism" is fraught with difficulties. However, it is a useful term, if sufficiently explained. Fundamentalism can mean a wide range of attitudes. First of all, fundamentalism implies a return to first things.<sup>51</sup> The Madrasa option requires a return to the study of the Koran and the Sunnah, on the basis of Islam, without reference to the four schools of fiqh (Hanafi, Maliki, Hanbali, and Shafi'i). As a variant of fundamentalism of 'ulama espouses a return to religious law, and, as mentioned above, includes the study of fiqh comments, as well as sacred texts. This "return" includes both science and implementation of the Sharia. Finally, the variant promotes a return to the Islamic practices of the first Muslim community, by promoting an Islamic state, through which the Islamists are trying to reconstruct the social and political life in the Muslim community of Muhammad. For Islamists, the implementation of Sharia alone will not qualify as Islamic. The head of such a state should be a virtuous

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<sup>49</sup> Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, p. 39- 40.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid*, p. 40-41

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid*, p. 42-44

commander of the faithful (amir al-mu'minin), selected in accordance with the principles of Islam, and all institutions should be based on the Quran and Sunnah.<sup>52</sup>

## **6 Shi'ism**

The development of Shi'ism is rooted in the seventh century, when Muslims dealt with the question of succession after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. A party was created by the cousin and son in law of the Prophet, to promote it as a rightful successor of the Prophet, but Abu Bakr emerged as the second leader of the Muslim community, despite these claims. Shiites, see "the descendants of Ali as rightful leaders (imams) of the Muslim community. Shiites and Sunnis also disagree on the religious dimension of leadership. Sunnis claim that the leader of the community does not have a divine power, while Shiites believe imams are imbued with infallibility, and consider them the blood, by which God gives guidance to the community. While the argument about the succession is a historical marker division, Shiites then developed their own rich theological and legal literature, and are themselves divided into many sectarian divisions. Shiites, who constitute about 15-20% of Afghanistan, are mainly consisted of the ethnic groups of Hazara and Qizilbash. At the level of popular Islam, there are many concepts and rituals common to Sunnis and Shiites, as well as at village level, where the differences between Shi'i and Sunni Mulla Mulla are difficult to determine.<sup>53</sup> Shi'i 'ulama, However, are educated in Iran and Iraq (Qom or Najaf) and each one is trained as a mujtahid (A person is qualified to interpret Islamic law through ijihad). While this work focused mostly on Sunni, the Shi'i presence in Afghanistan is center to realizing how Shiites have been subjected to a process of politicization similar to Sunni Islamists to whom emphasis is placed.

## **7 Pan-Islam**

The Unity of the entire Muslim community (umma) is for many Muslims, and especially for the 'ulama, the eternal fact of non-political realities. Political expression of pan-Islamism was a response to colonial expansion in the Muslim

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<sup>52</sup> Olivier Roy, *From Holy War to Civil War* (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1995), p. 35

<sup>53</sup> Ahmed Rashid, *Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), p.84

countries world made by science and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897). All Afghan; devoted his lifetime to traveling and promoting an anti-imperialist, pan-Islamism throughout the Muslim the world, representing a unifying ideology that mobilized believers to resist the colonial forces. Strength in the West was in direct proportion to the collapse of Muslim societies. Rebirth and purification were necessary, and a simultaneous need for Shariah returned. Al-Afghani believed that Muslim countries should not be introduced to western ethnics, and was opposed to the adoption of European courts and legal codes in Muslim countries.<sup>54</sup> This solution was resistance to foreign interference and he tried to arm the Muslims with the knowledge that their own religion was sufficient to treat each new situation. Important to this thinking was the concept of a universal caliphate to the implementation of Sharia. For this reason, the pan-Islamism rejects nationalism, seeing it as divisive. Pan-Islam as a political expression is in many ways a precursor of Islamist movements. The primary distinction is that pan-Islamism is necessarily at odds with nationalism, in which the Islamists operate, though sometimes reluctantly.<sup>55</sup>

Despite the fact that al-Afghani spent most of his early life in Afghanistan,<sup>56</sup> Pan-Islamism in the strictest sense does not take root in Afghanistan, but rather a pan-Islamic sentiment was often manipulated by the rulers in Afghanistan in the sphere of foreign policy. In this way, Islam could not only be used to consolidate the nascent state, such as a ruler Abdur Rahman used it in the late nineteenth century, but also to support the foreign policy initiatives in the name of Muslim solidarity. These initiatives included campaigns of conquest and military aid to Muslims in other countries involved in conflict with non-Muslims.<sup>57</sup> Such a policy is continued in the reign of Abdur Rahman's successor, his son, Habibullah, who was associated with the Afghan reformer Mahmud Tarzi (1933). Tarzi became familiar with the pan-Islamic ideas in a short period of exile in Damascus; He put forward the most attractive pan-Islamic arguments for modernization and against the idea of multiple Islamic caliphates.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Walid Mahmoud Adbelnasser, *The Islamic Movement in Egypt* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1994), p.30.

<sup>55</sup> Frederic Grare, *Political Islam in the Indian Subcontinent: The Jamaat-i-Islami* (New Dehli: Manohar Publishers, 2002), p.11-13.

<sup>56</sup> Nafi, *The Rise and Decline of the Arab-Islamic Reform Movement*, p.34

<sup>57</sup> Roy, *Islam and Resistance*, p.62

<sup>58</sup> Asta Olesen, *Islam and Politics in Afghanistan* (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1995), p.99



### **Islamism – Political Islam**

As mentioned above, Islamism is a natural consequence of pan-Islamism formulated by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, who was forced to operate in a modern system of nation states. When al-Afghani traveled to Egypt in 1871, he taught in al-Azhar University, and his most devoted disciple, Muhammad Abduh, al-Afghani put science in the Egyptian context. 'Abduh agreed that reform Islam had to be based in the West, and then entering the Egyptian state form of the British colonists. While he asked about the pan-Islamic ideology, its mentor, answered, abandoning the language referring to the caliphate. 'Abduh often defended the concept Watan (the nation), which was contrary to the ideal Islamic umma (Muslim community).<sup>59</sup> Generally speaking, 'Abduh concentrated his efforts more locally than al-Afghani. Abduh referred to a movement that al-Afghani advanced as the "Salafi." Salaf literally means "ancestors" and generally refers to the first generation Companions of the Prophet.<sup>60</sup> Salafis argue that the pure Islam of the first days of their forefathers was rational, practical and scientific, that is flexible and dynamic. According to the Salafis, Islam is inherently flexible, and has been weakened by rigid structure imposed on it for the next generation. In promoting a return to the Koran and Sunna, Salafism is a fundamentalist reformist movement like Wahhabism and Deobandism. However, the emphasis is to reconcile Islam and modernity, and more attention is given to the first community as an object of emulation. Al-Afghani and 'Abduh are also known as nahda (Renaissance), intellectuals, because they are treated as part of the greater Arab renaissance that arose in the second half of the nineteenth century (1850-1914) and tried to assimilate Western achievements.<sup>61</sup>

The confrontation with the West intensified; the heirs of Salafi movement were increasingly concerned about restoring the dignity of Islam, challenged by the European hegemony. With the attack of colonialism and the spread of Western culture in

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<sup>59</sup> Monroe Berger, *Islam in Egypt Today: Social and Political Aspects of Religion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p.3- 4.

<sup>60</sup> Nemat Guenena, *The 'Jihad': An Islamic Alternative in Egypt* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1986), p.32

<sup>61</sup> M. Abu-Rabi', *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996),p. 6

traditional Islam, Muslim thinkers realized many cracks in society that were political, social, economic and linguistic.<sup>62</sup>

Faced with this religious and intellectual crisis, the Islamic thinkers introduced their vision of a modern political movement, and tried to build or change the power relations in society. Islamists saw the pervasive role of Islam, which could direct society as a whole: religion, politics, law, economics and culture; all these were rooted religious terminology, although it was clearly political. Since there is no plan or agreement, concerning the principles of Islam as a political system in the sacred texts, Islamist ideas may form the basis for both conservative and liberal forms of government.<sup>63</sup>

In any case, the defining characteristics of Islamism are its political ambitions and its objectives of decidedly modern origin.

In Central Asia, Islam comes in three basic dimensions. First, as an element of individual and group identity, the awareness of being a Muslim does not involve the strict observance of Sharia and is reflected in the Sufi tradition growing out of the forms of popular piety, not underpinned by a sound theological knowledge. Secondly, as a factor of national-and country-creation. Thirdly, as the ideological and logistical base to fight for a change of the political, social and cultural life.<sup>64</sup>

Islam is an important factor in the collective identity and individual societies in the region. Muslim elites and structures (especially the descendants of the holy fathers) are a highly social authority. This situation is seen by authorities as a threat, and therefore limited freedom of action, is used by imams as a tool of social control. But without education, Muslim elites cannot confront fundamentalism. Fundamentalism is threatens mainly the southern part of Central Asia. The reason lies not in Islam, but the problems of social, economic and political nature of the region. Throughout the Muslim world, fundamentalism is growing in areas particularly affected by social change such as population growth, social stratification, alienation of elites, political infighting, and the erosion of traditional social structures associated with migration. Fundamentalist

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<sup>62</sup> Ibid, p.8

<sup>63</sup> Gudrun Kramer, *Islamist Notions of Democracy*, in *Middle East Report* (July/August, 1993), p.2-8. See also Mumtaz Ahmad, *Parliament, Parties, Polls and Islam: Issues in the Current Debate on Religion and Politics in Pakistan*, in *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, 2/1 (1985), p.15-28

<sup>64</sup> Aneta Jerska, *Rozdroza Islamu, Recycling Idei*, 2/2004

movements play a large role in Central Asia and have their facilities in the Fergana Valley.

The Influence of Islam on the reality of the region increases with the tightening of the political situation in individual countries and limiting the role of opposition. Suppression of the democratic opposition and nationalist movements make Islam with its structures and rootedness in the community an attractive alternative to the political and social groups rejecting the policy of the authorities. Another factor is the economic and social crisis (rising unemployment, population explosion, the crisis of the education system), resulting in a widening group of dissatisfied and without prospect individuals, usually young people for whom renewal under the banner of Islam brings hope to improve the situation. In addition to state failure, burning out propaganda slogans rebuild their former glory and act as passwords to discredit democracy and market economy, the benefits of which despite declarations - Central Asia societies have not experienced, growing popularity of their own way, based on the universalistic teachings of Islam, proclaiming equality among other things, for social justice.

Although Islam is not an economic strategy for the economic crisis, it does propose a socio-economic support program for the poor and unemployed. The Islamic idea of egalitarianism is an alternative to corruption. Interestingly, the religious factor plays a role totally different from that which a few years ago it was designated to play in the international debate, mainly by the vision of the coming "clash of civilizations".<sup>65</sup> Conflicts take place within the Muslim community and Islam has never been an official cause of conflict. The strength and importance of Islam in the region is determined mainly by the function it plays in social life (especially at the level of families and local communities), influencing the attitudes and behaviors of individuals and small communities. In this way, Islam as a works preservative and stabilizing force. It is close to all aspects of social life and plays a major role in regulating the social relationships.

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<sup>65</sup> Aneta Jerska, Rozdroza Islamu, Recycling Idei, 2/2004

## CHAPTER II


### Beginnings of Afghanistan

Afghanistan is a country not of terrorists, nor semi-fanatical, militant Islamists. This mosaic of tribes and peoples forms a country of multiple languages and cultures. The population of Afghanistan consists, in fact, of some 57 ethnic groups speaking nearly 50 languages and dialects.<sup>66</sup> The Afghans are a proud, hospitable and honorable people.<sup>67</sup> Pashtuns, have for centuries now guarded a code of honor – much like the Japanese samurai – to which the elite of Afghanistan still adheres, the Pashtun code. For the Pashtuns, death is better than breaking the rules of the tribe, and losing honor. They prefer to die than breach the rules and face lifetime banishment, as the latter means exile, without the right to return to the circle of their life-giving group or tribe. Exile equals darkness, away from the heat and light of warmth and home, where the outlaws will not help anyone and everyone can kill them with impunity. The Code requires that the Afghans guard the sacred land and home from invasion by strangers guard their women from shame and that they learn to respect every person, even a mortal enemy, who crosses the threshold of an Afghan home.

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<sup>66</sup> J. Pastrusińska, *Afghanistan 1989 in Sociolinguistic Perspective*, Central Asian Survey, Incidental Papers Series No 7, p. 3 -17.

<sup>67</sup> J.Sierakowska-Dyndo, *The Meaning of Honor In the Afghan's Traditions and its Contemporary Dimensions*, Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia, No 14, 2001.



Ethnolinguistic Groups in Afghanistan.

Source: The University of Texas at Austin, University of Texas Libraries

<http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/afghanistan.html>

Afghanistan has an extremely long and rich history. The first traces of man's presence are about 100-200 thousand years old and date back to Paleolithic times<sup>68</sup>. However, the main topic of this work is the period of modernization and the creation of a modern, contemporary Afghanistan. These processes concern the last two hundred years, and, it is on this period that this paper concentrates. Extensive historical introduction to the topic serves to emphasize the role of Afghanistan in the international arena and to stress the fact that one cannot evaluate the internal conflicts in that country neutrally and independently of the policies of the great powers, because of their age-old interest in the area of Central Asia.

<sup>68</sup> J. Sierakowska-Dyndo, Granice wyobraźni politycznej Afgańczyków. Normatywno-aksjologiczne aspekty tradycji afgańskiej, Wydawnictwo Akademickie Dialog, Warszawa 1998, s. 24


Pashtuns have given the modern name of Afghanistan and determined the shape of that country. Paradoxically, however, they haven't played that great a role in its long term history. They probably derived from the tribes living in the mountains on the border of present-day Pakistan and Afghanistan, which engage in military operations against neighboring peoples, or in predatory raids on the inhabitants of the surrounding territories. Pashtuns claim to be the best Muslims in the world, derived from one of the companions of the Prophet, Abdur Rashid Ghaisa. At the same time, those who do not speak the language of Pashtun are not considered to be leading a more enlightened living in the remotest mountain villages.<sup>69</sup> Pashtuns in Afghanistan's traditional ethnic hierarchies are at the top of the social pyramid, are "governing people", while the lowest Hazars are Shiite. The proper history of Afghanistan begins in the first half of the eighteenth century, when it was united in a Pashtun tribal military confederation under the chairmanship of the tribe of Ahmad Shah Durrani, who was obeyed approximately by the whole area of present-day Afghanistan and the many territories that are today in Iran, post-Soviet Central Asia, Pakistan and India. Then, to determine the short-lived kingdoms, the name Afghanistan emerged, namely 'the country of Afghans (Pashtuns)'. Ahmad Shah Duran's state disintegrated and its inhabitants, now beyond the usual attacks on neighbors also plunged in a series of wars with them.

An important moment in the formation of the Afghan state is the end of the nineteenth century; the contemporary borders of Afghanistan were the result of the colonial policy of the British Empire. The north boundary line was drawn as the maximum limit of further expansion of Tsarist Russia by the British. The course of setting the southern and eastern boundary was determined by the need to provide security for British India. The western boundary line has been designated by the areas in which the Shah of Iran could enforce his authority. Within these boundaries stood the country whose shape was the result of governments formed by the strong hand of one of the descendants of Ahmad Shah Durrani, the King Abdurrahmana (not without reason called the "Iron Emir" - 1880-1901) and the British. This great ruler with the help of British funding and weapons organized a centralized state on territories conquered by them. Afghanistan became a British protectorate this way – a buffer so separate and

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid, p. 41- 42.

independent to bar the way for further colonial conquests of Russians in Central Asia and isolate itself from the British India, and so archaic, weak, closed and divided so as not to disturb the British in achieving the objectives of their regional policy.



National borders of Afghanistan.

Source: The University of Texas at Austin, University of Texas Libraries  
<http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/afghanistan.html>

### Soviet occupation

Under the rule of Abdur Rahman's descendants, the state slowly began to modernize. Rapid modernization efforts led to a rebellion against traditional society's 'godless' power, but were too slow to catch up with neighbors to try to bring the revolt's most progressive and well-educated (though at the same time very few) social strata - mostly students and officers. In 1964, King Mohammed Zahir Shah 'gave' the national

constitution. In 1973, while traveling through Europe; he was removed from power in a coup organized by his cousin<sup>70</sup>, former Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud. Daud forged a friendship with the Soviet Union, which since its inception, led the consistent policy of the Afghan staff training (mostly technical and intelligence officers) and the simultaneous development of illegal activities of the Communist Party. In 1978, Daud was deposed, and took power in the communist elite educated in the USSR. He began the rapid modernization of the country in the brutal style of King Abdur Rahman before nearly a hundred years. Just like then, modernizers were dependent on military aid and financial support by their powerful neighbor. Just like a century ago, the state was led to the rapid changes of armed uprisings and revolts throughout Afghanistan. Soviet authorities decided to withhold some of the revolutionary ideas of their pupils who had not reckoned the possible social and economic costs of reform. In 1979 the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, toppling the previous communist government<sup>71</sup>. Soviet troops remained in Afghanistan until 1989, trying with varying degrees of anti-government forces to destroy the guerrillas. It was a difficult task, because they received massive support from abroad, from the USA (Americans rightly counted in the Cold War rivalry, the Soviet armed forces for Afghanistan to become a new 'Vietnam') and the mainly Muslim countries passing through Pakistan, as well as China. The border with Pakistan supplied the partisans with weapons and money, as volunteers came from all Muslim countries (but mainly Arabs) to fight the godless communist regime persecuting religion.<sup>72</sup> Similar groups of guerrillas were also those who (though President Ronald Reagan referred to them as "fighters for freedom and democracy ") primarily fought to restore religion in its rightful place in a society that had already been affected by the reform of individual monarchs.

In 1989, Soviet troops were withdrawn from the country, leaving guerrilla forces and government troops fighting each other. The country was terribly devastated, and an estimated 9% of the residents were killed<sup>73</sup>. According to various estimates, between

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<sup>70</sup> M. K. (Omar) Nydell, *Zrozumieć Arabów*, Warszawa 2001, p. 100

<sup>71</sup> L. Unger, *Widziane z Brukseli. Wielki brat: czerwony i czarny*, 'Kultura' (Paryż) 1998, nr 9 (612), p. 82

<sup>72</sup> Shaisya Wahab, *A Brief History of fghanistan*, 2007, p. 153

<sup>73</sup> M. Śliwiński, *Afghanistan 1978-87. War. Demography and Society*, 'Central Asian Survey Incidental Papers Series' No. 6, London 1988, p.20, cyt. za M. Gawęcki, *Mapy etniczne Afganistanu - fakty a polityka*, 'Sprawy Narodowościowe' - Seria nowa, t. II (1993), z. 1(2), p. 87



three and five million people fled to Pakistan and Iran (some say 1 / 3 of the entire population); and the whole economy was turned onto the tracks of war, including such tasks as manufacturing and drug trafficking, smuggling and other<sup>74</sup>. Ultimately, government forces were defeated in 1992, and since then, the Civil War has been fought in a different form: 'holy war', by the mujahedin.

### **The birth and development of the Taliban movement**

To thoroughly understand the motivations of the Taliban one must go back at least to the end of the seventies. Then, with the start of fighting in Afghanistan, a wave of refugees was launched, most of whom settled in camps in the border region of Pakistan - North West Province Frontier. At its peak there were more than three million Pashtuns, seeking refuge with their relatives. This rising exodus disrupted all social structures.<sup>75</sup> This was particularly important for the rural population, for which relationships of the family, clan and tribe ceased to exist, meaning that refugees were deprived of support coming in, living in a bad financial situation in which they felt very lost. Often having no job, deprived of purpose in life, these people were fertile ground for groups disseminating radical ideologies. The young generation, devoid of tribal traits changed in poor urban youth were quite commonly educated in religious schools, the madras, run and conducted by the movement deobandii.<sup>76</sup>

The Deobandii intellectual trend was formed in the mid-nineteenth century, created for the defense of the interests and identity of Indian Muslims. After creating Pakistan, it initially dealt with the development of education and maintaining their specific religion, in opposition to modernist movements. But gradually, with support from tens of thousands of students and graduates of the madras, the ulama became more actively engaged in politics, pushing its vision of Islam.<sup>77</sup> At the beginning of the 1980, the movement began to vigorously fight their religious and political opponents with

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<sup>74</sup> S. Boulouque, *Komunizm w Afganistanie*, w: S. Courtois, N. Werth, J.-L. Panné, A. Paczkowski, K. Bartosek, J.-L. Margolin (red.), *Czarna księga komunizmu. Zbrodnie, terror, prześladowania*, Warszawa 1999, s. 660-680; 1998, II, p. 360-362.

<sup>75</sup> J. Modrzejewska – Leśniewska, *Talibowie*, Pułtusk 2001, p. 39

<sup>76</sup> G. Kepel, *Święta wojna: ekspansja i upadek fundamentalizmu muzułmańskiego*, Wydawnictwo Akademickie Dialog, Warszawa 2003, p. 145

<sup>77</sup> G. Kepel, *Święta wojna: ekspansja i upadek fundamentalizmu muzułmańskiego*, Wydawnictwo Akademickie Dialog, Warszawa 2003, s. 231-232

violence. Its alumni opposed the modernist-oriented Sunnis, fighting in Kashmir, and above all attacked Pakistani Shiites. This provided them with generous financial support from Saudi Arabia, for which this was another front of competition with Shiite Iran for primacy in the Islamic world. Guns became very easily accessible, and crime, including trafficking in heroin and opium from Afghanistan, flourished<sup>78</sup>.

Adherents were students and graduates of madras, mostly Afghan refugees, and children coming from social lowlife young Pakistanis. Their education was based on deobandii ideology - emphasis on the strict application of sharia law and obedience to the fatwa<sup>79</sup> ulema. The Madras offered some kind of shelter from the poverty and lack of prospects in the refugee camps. They were often the only alternative for orphans and refugees arriving from Afghanistan, who, cut off from their ties traditional tribes felt lost and lonely. The Madras offered free education, nourishment, shelter, but also the care and education without the rest of the cast of teachers.<sup>80</sup> The price was the absolute compliance, training in an isolated group of men, based on the Koran and the collection of medieval texts, which had to be respected and blindly adhered to.<sup>81</sup> This allowed the suppression of all manifestations of individualism and transformed passive students into fanatics, by touching them not only with the verses of the Koran, but also the cult of martyrdom. Their knowing of the land consisted only of war, so they had no alternative, they could only be militants from their childhood, joining the jihad.

The specificity of this version of radical Islam was the symbiosis of science with the traditional Afghan code of honor of Pashtuns. It was based on three concepts - protection, revenge, and hospitality.<sup>82</sup> So great was its importance that the Taliban refused to give up Osama bin Laden, who was after the Gulf War in 1991, residing in their territory. Around those times the movement gained importance. This happened because the previously favored by Saudi Arabia parties lost their privileged position.

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<sup>78</sup> Pakistan's border regions with Afghanistan, enjoying internal autonomy, G. Kepel, *Święta wojna...*s147

<sup>79</sup> Fatwa - a high opinion of a scholar - a Muslim theologian, explaining the theological controversy, theological - legal or purely legal, issued only in writing (often erroneously identified with the curse or death sentence).  
[www.fatwa-online.com/](http://www.fatwa-online.com/)

<sup>80</sup> W. Jagielski, *Modlitwa o deszcz*, Wydawnictwo W.A.B., Warszawa 2004, s. 322

<sup>81</sup> Ibid, p. 232

<sup>82</sup> Traditional Pashtun code of honor binding. Characterized by three basic terms: the protection - should be given shelter to anyone who needs it; revenge - must correspond to the injury suffered; hospitality - must take every guest, even when there is no money to pay, and the person and belongings are protected.: J. Modrzejewska – Leśniewska, *Talibowie...* ,s. 40.

They stood against Riyadh, because it rejected their proposal to help in the fight against Saddam Hussein's regime, and agreed to the stationing of "wicked" troops on Saudi soil. In view of these events, the Saudis stopped their assistance. An additional argument for this step was previous support of the troops to defeat the forces of Massoud Hekmatyar. Saudi Arabia needed a new representative of their interests in the region, clearing the way for the development of contacts with the Taliban. Soon after, the deobandii movement gained an even more important ally. It was the Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's government, which in the name of the fight with his political opponents, decided to support deobandii. They even gained the position of the government, which soon enabled a significant increase in activity on the Pakistan Afghan arena.

### **The Taliban and Their Image**

Their ethnicity was one of the reasons for their success, because the traditional hierarchy of ethnic Afghanistan, where Pashtuns ruled, was disturbed by both the Communists and the mujahideen, often based on population of non Pashtuns. The name, under which this movement is commonly known, was first attributed to the group that first arrived in Afghanistan. Taliban armed groups were composed entirely of students' madrassas, religious schools teaching the Quran and religious law. In Poland, the word talibim distortion (in the singular, the plural tulaba), which in Urdu means the student was used to signify the Taliban. The name has played a role in the initial assessment of this movement in Afghanistan and around the world. Regarding the image of the Taliban in the global media reports of Taliban activities in the Western media, it could still be noted up to 1994 that the identification of the Taliban as the students favored the adoption of a declaration in good faith with the leaders of the movement pursued by the cells. The journalists portrayed the image of the Taliban as they were spontaneous, organized on the basis of religious unity movement supporters in Afghanistan, opposing the split of the country divided by warring commanders of armed groups, reminiscent more of medieval rather than predatory barons of the era mujahideen fighting the Soviet army fought. This picture corresponded with the rest of the Taliban hopes in the movement of a large part of society in Afghanistan, believing that a Taliban victory would put an end to the endless wars conducted by the warring mujahideen commanders

who fell victims of the civilian population. The Taliban largely met those expectations, hence their high popularity, especially among rural residents, who were the easiest victims of looting and rape carried out by the Mujahideen. Another important factor was the success of the Taliban rule of admission to its ranks of all those who declared their willingness to cooperate with them. The financial and logistical support from the state of Pakistan (and especially the intelligence and the army), had great importance as well as from various Pakistani parties, foundations and religious organizations, as well as influential people, the various lobbies and on the part of ordinary frontier Pashtun Mafia. All these forces supported the Taliban as the people promoting the moral, religious lifestyle, fighting 'for the faith', as well as carrying out (to some extent) Pakistan's foreign policy goals, as well as, simply, because of the possibility of doing business with them. The great strength was the religious aura surrounding the Taliban, who entered many cities without firing a single shot, bringing peace to a tormented country. A large role in their victory was also played by ethnic solidarity, because of their party en masse passed other Pashtuns, bribing the enemy, where other measures have not helped. Most of these measures failed in the areas of liberal big cities, where religion was no longer such a force of attraction, as well as in northern Afghanistan, inhabited mainly by non - Pashtun people (Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazar, Turkmens, Kazakhs and others.), Some longstanding Shiite Islam, different from sunism, and even more from its specific forms, was professed by the Taliban. Then the Taliban began to establish their order by using a variety of repression of subjects. It is these elements only that are discouraged by the foreign media, so far focusing on similar criminal offenses of their opponents. But when the Taliban captured Kabul and declared Afghanistan an Islamic state (under the name of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, further IEA), and announced the applicable law Sharia, Islamic religious law is when the situation really went out of hand. They issued a ban against watching television, playing football, chess, and the flying of kites was forbidden by law. Homosexuality, pedophilia and sodomy became a crime punished by death. Women are forbidden to appear in public without veils and also work in rooms where they may be exposed to contact with men who are not members of their families. Girls were banned from going to school. All men were required to wear beards. Officials who do not obey the order of prayer five times a day were threatened by dismissal. All these measures

contributed to the condemnation of the Taliban by the western media and turn to world public opinion turning against them.

## **CHAPTER III**

### **Road to Victory (1994 - 1996)**

The symbol of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan was their leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar. Many legends have arisen around his life that does not allow a fully credible presentation of his life. Even after learning of Afghanistan by the Taliban he avoided meeting with Western journalists and refused to be photographed (like all the rest of the Taliban). He was probably born in the first half of the sixties, near the city of Kandahar. Educated at the theological seminary, perhaps he was also trained by the CIA and the ISI in the refugee camps in Pakistan. During the Soviet invasion, as a mujahedeen he fought in the branches and earned well-deserved fame by shooting a grenade launcher. He was seriously wounded, by a grenade, which took out his eye. After this he settled in the village of Singesar where he led prayers and taught in the rural madras,<sup>83</sup> which was very much the typical catechetical school of Afghanistan; they fit in the existing mosques in every village. People like Mullah Omar taught there - not educated, not having any knowledge of theology, and repeating without much understanding the verses of the Koran. Most of their adult life was filled with the struggle against the Soviet invaders, who were seen not only as a threat to the state, but, above all, to religion. This strengthened the traditional and conservative views, which were then transferred to pupils of the madras, the poor country boys who grew up in the spirit of jihad against infidels. Just like their Pakistani colleagues, they were suspicious of what is alien, fueled by fanatical faith and instilled with obedience.

According to his associates, Mullah Omar stood out for fanatical religiosity. At the same time, paradoxically, lack of education seemed to work in his favor, because it allowed him to become a charismatic leader who did not doubt that people could change the surrounding reality. His first action that initiated the Taliban movement in Afghanistan is also shrouded in a fog of mystery. It is certain that it occurred in the first half of 1994. After a two-year struggle for inheritance after President Nadzibullah, Afghanistan bordered on chaos. The country was torn into small pieces ruled by mujahedeen commanders, or even common thugs warring among themselves. The main forces were fighting for control, which meant that the land around Kandahar had become

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<sup>83</sup> W. Jagielski, *Modlitwa...s.29-33*

a land of violence and terror. According to legend, Mullah Omar asked to help the villagers, and with a group of 30 students defeated an armed band which terrorized the countryside, hanging their leader on the barrel of a tank. Thus began the myth of Omar, which is encouraged by the population which treated him as a kind of Robin Hood, who fought with local bands, gathering in this way, more, more and better-armed followers.<sup>84</sup>

Omar's first confirmed performance dates back to 12 October 1994, when thanks to the considerable assembled forces, he took the small town at the Afghan-Pakistan border, while intercepting a large part of arms. It also allowed the department to support the volunteers with the Pakistani mullah madras. In this way, he stood at the head of a large army, which became an important force in southern Afghanistan. Soon there was an interesting event, which quite clearly published the policies of Pakistan.

November 2<sup>nd</sup> he was arrested by one of the commanders of the mujahedeen, who hoped to obtain ransom. This was one of the reasons which lead a few thousand well-armed Taliban to attack Kandahar a day later.<sup>85</sup> At this point began the victorious march of the Taliban, who in less than two years managed to get Kabul and occupy most of the territory of Afghanistan. Their successes have several sources. First, as already mentioned, the mujahedeen forces were extremely fragmented and slow to cooperate in fighting a new enemy. This allowed the Taliban to overcome or absorb small and scattered groups of warriors and enabled them to carry out a lightning campaign, which in a few months resulted in their getting into Kabul defended by the forces of Massoud. Second, the Taliban could count on help from Pakistan. They were supplied with weapons, political support, intelligence, and provided with a continuous supply of new forces from Pakistani madras. Another important source of money was Saudi Arabia. They allowed for the efficient conduct of the fight, and weakened the resistance of opponents through bribery of minor commanders. Thirdly, it must be concluded that after years of unrest, the emergence of a force which carried with it a sense of order and security, assured the support of ordinary Afghans, who are eagerly waiting for peace.

In spring 1995 the Taliban had suffered the first major defeat when they failed to defend themselves against Massoud Kabul. The successes of the Taliban fighters led to

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<sup>84</sup> W. Jagielski, *Modlitwa...*s.34-37

<sup>85</sup> J. Modrzejewska – Leśniewska, *Talibowie...* ,s. 23.

an alliance, which in spite of counteracting on the part of Pakistan, was formed in the spring of 1996. The Alliance, however, was powerless against Pakistani and Saudi intelligence to change the tactics of the Taliban. Instead of attacking Kabul, they began to occupy smaller, less-defended cities, cutting off the supply routes of the capital. Against the simultaneous attack from three sides, on September 27 1996, Massoud was forced to surrender the capital without a fight to withdraw to the safe region Panczszir Valley.<sup>86</sup>

Several months before, a decisive Mullah Omar decided to step in to strengthen the morale of his warriors and support the struggle by Muslims around the world, using the most scared relic of Afghanistan, his cloak, which he believed belonged to the original Prophet Mohammed. In this way, ordinary, unlearned rustic mullah became the heir of the Prophet, the Caliph of all Muslims. This step provoked considerable outrage in the Islamic world. Many scribes protested against the usurper and blasphemer. For this reason, he failed to inspire broad support for the Afghan revolution, but Omar's second goal was achieved - he had established his leadership of the Afghan Taliban.<sup>87</sup> After losing Kabul, opposition forces retreated north to the Panczszir Valley and beyond, on the border with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Most of the territory of Afghanistan was in the hands of the Taliban, who could begin to alter reality in accordance with their faith. At the same time north of the country, combat continued with varying intensity, sometimes with the Taliban gaining the upper hand, others with the mujahedin gathered in the Northern Alliance led by Massoud. Neither side was able to gain advantage over the other. The demolition of the unstable equilibrium was brought about before 2001. On September 9 an assassination of Massoud was attempted resulting in his death several days later. On September 11, bombers sent by Osama bin Laden struck the United States.

### **The reality in the country of Taliban**

After the capture of Kabul, the Taliban began the transformation of reality, striving to implement practices that assimilated of the teachings in madras. The groups of deobandii traditionally focused on shaping society and inculcating universal respect for religious prohibitions. The state as such, was regarded as impious, which had a very clear

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<sup>86</sup> J. Modrzejewska – Leśniewska, *Talibowie...*, s. 24-27

<sup>87</sup> W. Jagielski, *Modlitwa...*, s. 21-23.



impact on the shaping of Afghanistan in 1996 - 2001. By taking power, the Taliban took over the ministries, offices and administration, mastering and completely changing them. For the deobandii ideology, there was no room for state standing on upholding the principles of Islam and the moral can only be subordinated to the religious community. Therefore, it provided a semblance of normal functioning of the state, but actually, it focused on supervising public morals, trade and war.<sup>88</sup>

The functioning of the Afghan population was to be based on a very extreme interpretation of Koran law and fatwa, which helped to obey the rules of the Koran. The Taliban wanted to create a state modeled on the original community of the first caliphs, returning to the old values and views of the world. It was to be a utopia modeled on the words of the Koran, which is described in every part of life. It was necessary only to adapt reality to the words of the Koran and eliminate what does not occur in them. The Taliban wanted to go back and create a world in which there is no room for doubt and confusion, and there is a general happiness. As Pashtuns, they had their own code of honor to follow, creating a specific hybrid, which is reflected in God's creation of their country. Their rigorous vision of social relations was not shocking for the Afghan countryside, which cultivated the traditional and conservative views. Especially in the south east of the country, inhabited by Pashtuns, the Taliban were welcomed as those who bring peace and order. Years of chaos caused people to think that the moral rigors were not a high price for security. Otherwise, they were welcomed to the north and west, where the Pashtun tribal rules were foreign and the population consisted of other tribes as well. One of these was Hazar, who have paid a high price for their otherness and disobedience - fanatical Taliban have made several massacres of the population (e.g. in Mazar-i-Sharif in August 1998, which almost led to open war with Iran).

Definitely the worst situation was in the heart of Kabul. For those raised in the countryside and in the refugee camps of the Taliban, the city appeared as a habitat of evil and corruption that must be converted by introducing Sharia. Therefore, the capital was regarded as the main front against the depravity and focused efforts to create a perfect society. A special office, the Department of Promotion of Virtue and the Eradication of vices was created, its sole purpose being the observance of ascetic morality in a spirit of

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<sup>88</sup> W. Jagielski, *Modlitwa...*s. 21-23

unquestioning obedience. Subordinate to that were police spies and informers on a payroll. Afghans had to pray five times a day, it was mandatory for men to wear turbans and chin (like the Prophet), every detail of the clothing was regulated (to the extent of the Pakistan football team being beaten for wearing too short pants), television and music were banned (TVs triumphantly hung from lampposts), and traditional entertainment of any form was canceled. Non-Muslims were repressed, and visits of representatives of humanitarian organizations and journalists were restricted. Even the use of paper bags was banned, because they can be made from torn sheets from the Koran. Regulations deeply interfered in every sphere of life, based on commandments and prohibitions. The Taliban wanted every detail to reconstruct the only environment known to them – the environment of the raw madras, where they were raised. Infidels were forced to respect the rights of the force or risk imprisonment. Anyone breaking the law was threatened with the very severe penalties. Every Friday at Kabul stadium spectacles of violence were organized in which offenders were cruelly punished for a derogation of the rules in force - whipped for drinking alcohol, having limbs cut off for stealing. According to the law, punishment enforcement was also exercised by the victims' families.<sup>89</sup>

The situation of women under the new rulers of Afghanistan raised particular attention in the global community. As the Taliban sought to reproduce the restrictive environment of madras, women were a major concern for them, which meant devoting them a lot of attention. Tribal law required the separation of boys and girls after the completion of seven years.<sup>90</sup> Moreover, the sight of a woman's face outside the immediate family was forbidden. And since the Taliban were brought up outside the barrack-like families in the madras, the women were foreign to them. Ignorance induced aggression and a sense of danger that contributed to a rationalization of the mistreatment of women. Therefore, women had to disappear from the streets, offices, hospitals or schools. They found themselves on the margins of society, their lives describing in detail the restriction and prohibition orders, which did not leave a bit of freedom and liberty.

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<sup>89</sup> Kepel, *Święta wojna...*, s. 237.

<sup>90</sup> Modrzejewska – Leśniewska, *Talibowie...*, s. 59-62.

Afghan women had to wear covering from head to toe, the chador; they could not wear tapping walking shoes, and could leave the house only in the presence of the relatives. The windows of houses in which a woman lived had to be painted. Women were forbidden to work together with men, which in practice resulted in almost complete prohibition of work. The most disadvantaged were widows and women whose husbands were unable to work.<sup>91</sup> Needless to say, they also had restricted access to health services and education. The way in which the Taliban treated women, seeking to remove them from the political, social and economic development, led to a revival of interest of the international community in Afghanistan. Numerous criticisms and condemnation were provoked, and public opinion was negatively refocused on the state of the Taliban. But the biggest international protests came after the destruction of two giant Buddha statues found in Bamiyan found. These were part of the UNESCO World Heritage List. On February 26 2001 Mullah Omar issued an edict ordering the destruction of the statues. Despite requests and protests from Buddhists from around the world, calls of the Western world, China and India, and representatives of Muslim countries, the Taliban were intransigent. Rejecting the proposed deportation of the unique statues, they blew them into the air in March 2001. At the same time, more than 6,000 small statues of Buddha in the whole country were also destroyed.<sup>92</sup> This barbaric behavior led to the final isolation of the Taliban in the international arena.

The main sources of funds in the country, whose main task was to convert people to the only correct way of life for the Prophet and the shaping of reality to the model provisions of the Koran was the foreign aid and trade. The money that allowed the state to maintain key features of the Taliban and to buy equipment for the troops came from Pakistan and, to a certain point, from Saudi Arabia. Only trained professional soldiers of the former army of Najibullah, received regular pay, having been recruited by the Taliban for the use of tanks, planes or artillery.

The second source of revenue was trade, which grew by the improvement of the conditions resulting from the relative peace in the country, since one order was now in power. Trade increased between Central Asia and Pakistan, although it significantly

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<sup>91</sup> Draconian penalties minimize the crime which is a very big problem during the reign of mujahedeen

<sup>92</sup> J. Modrzejewska – Leśniewska, *Talibowie...* ,s. 46-49

reduced the scale of the lack of good roads. Border trade also flourished. However, the Taliban obtained the highest revenue from the smuggling of opium and heroin, going to both neighboring countries and to Europe and the United States. Despite the declared fight against drugs, poppy cultivation increased significantly. In 1997, Afghanistan produced 1 265 tones of opium; two years later, 4 600 tons.<sup>93</sup> The temptation to obtain significant revenue was stronger than the allegiance to the Koran verses. The long war in Afghanistan brought in a fatal economic situation. Areas of agricultural land decreased steadily through the destruction of irrigation systems and the disastrous drought (from 1975 - 1998, farmland acreage has declined from 3 882 thousand to 2 704 thousand hectares, according to estimates, and around 12 million Afghans were affected by drought)<sup>94</sup>. Afghan agriculture could not feed the population, which further increased the migration to the unprepared neighboring countries. The existing low level of economic development required a comprehensive plan, decisive action and significant cash, but the Taliban were unable to provide any of these factors.

### **States supporting the Talibans**

Since the beginning of the emergence of Taliban as a significant force in Afghanistan, they received support from Pakistan. It stemmed from political calculation on the part of Islamabad, which hoped that the Taliban who ruled the neighboring country will be a useful ally, for the improvement of the situation of Pakistan and its position in the region for multiple reasons. First of all, the Taliban movement, as a fanatical warrior's deobandii, considered Shiite Iran an "unholy" state. Secondly, Russia's reluctance to be the heir to the Soviet Union and India's movement had made them enemies. If these countries were to challenge Pakistan, Afghanistan could become a significant ally. The Hostility of Iran due to the presence of a large Shiite minority in Pakistan, and the rivalry with Russia due to Pakistani plans to gain influence in Central Asia further inflamed relations with India over Kashmir dispute. The Taliban were strengthened and the situation was bound to end in animosity but for the bargaining position of Pakistan. Firstly it could help control the Muslim militants fighting in

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<sup>93</sup> J. Modrzejewska – Leśniewska, *Talibowie...*, s. 46-49.

<sup>94</sup> J. Modrzejewska – Leśniewska, *Talibowie...*, s. 63

Kashmir. Secondly and in every scratch – each – other’s – back - way Afghanistan created an opportunity to stabilize Pakistan's economic expansion in former Soviet republics of Central Asia. Good, safe roads and the elimination of countless groups of mujahedeen who collected fees for transportation could contribute to increased trade and allow Pakistan to import much-needed energy resources from places such as Turkmenistan. Thirdly, the calming of the situation in Afghanistan could persuade millions of refugees in northern Pakistan to return to their homes. It would tackle the problem of humanitarian assistance, lack of control over the region, increasing competition and massive smuggling. Religious Taliban could also reduce the flow of drugs from Afghan territory. Finally, the Taliban came from the Pashtun tribe, like much of the officers of the Pakistani army and ISI intelligence.

The passage of time has proved that Pakistan's calculations were extremely wrong. With their help, the Taliban managed to create a state, but it does not behave as a protector for Pakistanis. It resulted in stabilization of the trade routes of smuggling rather than a legitimate trade, which was torpedoed by poor quality roads. This activity has caused huge financial losses due to unpaid duties and other measures. At the same time it did not decrease, but rather increased the flow of drugs, of which some portion remained in Pakistan. Most importantly, there was a threat of Islamization of the society, since the Taliban began to promote the Pakistani fundamentalists, and thus wished to shed its divine revolution to other countries. The changing international situation in the face of terrorist attacks was the decisive factor for Pakistan joining the antiterrorist coalition after the events of September 11.<sup>95</sup>

### **The Role of Pakistan**

In the current situation in Afghanistan, Pakistan becomes an important link in the war on terrorism. This is not only due to the fact that its territory is a major organizational and training facility for the Afghan Taliban, Al-Qaeda and other related movements, but also because of the role that this country has for logistics operations of international forces in Afghanistan .<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> J. Modrzejewska – Leśniewska, *Talibowie...* ,s. 74

<sup>96</sup> Bill Roggio, „*The state of Jihad: 2008*”, „The Long War Journal”, 2.01. 2009

The political situation in Pakistan has been deteriorating steadily for over two years, and most recently in addition to a permanent political crisis increasingly manifest itself also through an economic downturn associated with the global slump in financial markets. The weak civilian central government in Islamabad is not fully controlling its greatest and all-powerful special service (Inter-Services Intelligence, ISI), which is suspected of secret support of Pakistani and Afghan Islamic extremists, and is not able to suppress the Taliban insurgency. It is not surprising that Islamabad has practically lost control over the tribal areas bordering with Afghanistan (North-West Province and the federally administered Border Tribal Territories). In areas of both provinces, Islamic extremists have formed more than 150 training camps and hundreds of other installations and facilities.<sup>97</sup> The process of strengthening the extremists in Pakistan has already reached the level of threatening the stability of that country.<sup>98</sup>

Meanwhile, if the success of the operation in Afghanistan is the key to winning the war against Al-Qaeda, provided that the West win the Afghan war the goal is to stabilize the political and military situation in Pakistan. Today, because there is no longer doubt that the two countries are a kind of "system of connected vessels", which must be addressed comprehensively. Pakistan's key role in shaping the geopolitical realities of South Asia region was revealed in November 2008, when terrorists from Pakistan organization Lashkar e-Taiba (LeT) - very close links with the "old" Al-Qaeda - carried out a spectacular series of coordinated terrorist attacks and attacks on a series of targets in Mumbai. The place and time to make this operation prove an excellent orientation of terrorists in the strategic situation of the whole region and the overall traffic situation in the war on jihad with the West. Organizers plan the attacks in Mumbai, assumed to lead to a worsening of relations between Pakistan and India (with an open armed conflict and earlier), and thus to divert attention from developments in Islamabad on the border with Afghanistan and the strengthening of the Taliban movement there. An important element of the geopolitical plan was also the complexity of the strategic location of the West against the Afghan operation. This is particularly true of U.S. policy, which currently is not only forced to act to improve the position of the international forces operating in

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<sup>97</sup> Pakistan bridge blast cuts supply", internet service BBC z 3.02. 2009

<sup>98</sup> The spread of Talibanization beyond the Pashtun regions", „Stratfor“, 30.03. 2007

Afghanistan, but also undertake intensive diplomatic efforts to resolve the India-Pakistan conflict.<sup>99</sup>

Precision and strategic planners calculating the depth of the attacks in Mumbai are attesting to a resurgence of Osama bin Laden organization, a "reactivation" of the structure responsible for the attacks on the United States ten years back. It could also be taken as a clear sign that the war on Islamic extremism and terrorism does not work on Western thought.

The other country supporting the Taliban regime was Saudi Arabia. Its assistance was due primarily to changes in the situation after the Gulf War in 1991, when it supported Afghan mujahedeen before (including Hekmatyar) voting on the side of Saddam Hussein. Saudi princes decided to support the new force in Afghanistan. In part, they counted on their companies' involvement in the construction of pipelines from Central Asia to Pakistan. But the main premise was the Taliban's religious convergence with the Saudis. Deobandii traffic rules were quite close to the ruling in Saudi Arabia rendering a Taliban state the perfect bridge to Central Asia, helpful in spreading the Saudi version of Islam. The reversal of the Saudi Arabia towards the Taliban was the result of two factors. First, it was associated with Osama bin Laden, who used the welcome of Afghanistan. During his activity he became a fierce enemy of the United States, which was an ally of Saudi princes, after all. He also turned against Saudi Arabia itself, because it allowed the desecration of the holy land by allowing the stationing of "infidel" troops. The second reason was the international criticism of the Taliban associated with the treatment of women and strict observance of the principles of Sharia. Saudis feared that the publicity of this topic will draw the attention of the world to their country where the situation does not differ so much from the Afghan realities.<sup>100</sup> In view of the reversal of its two greatest allies, and isolation by the international community, the only support of the Taliban state was Osama bin Laden and the associated network of al-Qaeda.

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<sup>99</sup> Dominik Jankowski, „Geopolityczne konsekwencje zamachów terrorystycznych w Bombaju”, „Policy Papers” Fundacji *Amicus Europae* nr 10/2008,

<sup>100</sup> G. Kepel, *Święta wojna...*, s. 234-236.

### **Afghanistan and Al Qaeda - the road to collapse**

Osama bin Laden was one of the many sons of a Yemeni contractor, who by doing work for the Saudi ruling family had earned its trust, and fabulous wealth. He was a typical representative of the Arab tribe of the sons of the rich, who quickly made their fortunes on petrodollars. He felt lost, torn between an attractive West, which though despicable, was alluring and a traditional upbringing that required obedience to parents and consent to their chosen path of life. Sent to the best schools in the world, he got a taste of freedom, like young Arabs of the West, modernity and moderation. All they wanted was to assimilate to Western elites, but they were despised and measured only by the state of their account. Knowing the values of the West, they felt contempt for the state of order in their homes and were opposed to the prevailing conservatism, and also saw the hypocrisy of the oil sheikhs. Overwhelmed with new ideas and willingness to change, they wanted to rebel against their fathers, but it would deprive them of wealth. They were lost in a world of contradictions, from which there was no way out. In just such a situation, a chance that would allow directing their energy presented itself. In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The young bin Laden, among many like him, went to war to find his purpose in life. Many of them came back believing that this is the holy war, a fight against the infidels who want to disgrace, humiliate and destroy Islam. First it was the Soviet Union; shortly after, this role was taken over by the United States.

There are conflicting reports on the effectiveness of the young Osama in direct combat with Soviet troops, but certainly he was a great organizer and mediator. Taking advantage of his enormous wealth he was the attraction, offering accommodation and training for Arab volunteers willing to participate in jihad. On the Pakistani-Afghan border he created "hostels", training camps for militants, while providing a living for them and their families. He also collected donations among the powerful Saudis who supported the move, hoping that this way, the radical revolutionaries would stand being away from their homes. Around 1988 bin Laden had started to create a database, a kind of directory of fighters from around the world, who passed through his camps and were ready to fight in a holy war, wherever it appeared. In this way, to quote one of the theories, the famous Al-Qaeda - "base" was founded. After the Soviet withdrawal bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia. When, shortly after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, he



turned to King Fahd to help him by offering their warriors of jihad. He later, however, appreciated the seriousness of the threat and did not want to increase the strength of fundamentalists, choosing the assistance of the United States. Thus, Osama bin Laden joined the opponents of the king, who left their homeland and went into exile in Sudan. Thus began his greater career as leader of Islamic fundamentalists, professional jihadists, who, often excommunicated in their own countries, were prepared under his leadership to fight the infidels. His main objective was to get rid of U.S. troops stationed in Saudi Arabia after the war with Iraq, thereby defiling "the earth's two Holy Places." At the same time, he called on all Muslims to abandon the litigation, to unite and overthrow the Saud, the coalition partners' cross-Zionist alliance.<sup>101</sup> Given the growing number of terrorist acts against Americans and their Muslim allies, with which bin Laden began to be associated, he was forced to leave Sudan, and in the summer of 1996 he returned to Afghanistan.

The Taliban then found a key moment in the war, wishing to ask a final blow and beat the mujahedeen of the country's capital. Osama bin Laden with a group of his well-trained, ready-for-everything warriors was a great help to them. According to the rules, they adopted a Code of Pashtuns in search of refuge, and this in turn reciprocated in many ways. First, using his vast wealth, Bin Laden significantly supported the Taliban financially, both during the ongoing war, and later, during the construction of the new state. Secondly, with his associates - experienced fighters from the period of battles with Soviet troops and volunteers, he created a new army to help the Taliban in fighting against the mujahedin.<sup>102</sup> Thirdly, he promised support in post-war reconstruction of Afghanistan, investing in roads, public buildings, promising to build a new capital and the largest mosque in the world.<sup>103</sup>

Osama bin Laden had a particularly great impact on the person of Mullah Omar, unfolding before him a vision of Afghanistan as the first country in which Muslims can truly live in accordance with the principles of the Koran. He also, against the advice of

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<sup>101</sup>J. Modrzejewska – Leśniewska, *Talibowie...*, s. 80-92.

<sup>102</sup>J. Modrzejewska – Leśniewska, *Talibowie...*, s. 92-97

<sup>103</sup>There are different sources about the size of these units and their participation in the fighting. Some of them even estimate their number at 40% of the Taliban forces, although it is probably overstated. For: J. Modjeska - Leśniewska, *the Taliban ...*, p. 68 They also mention of Ahmad Shah Massoud, calling "the best armed and division in the army of the Taliban," by W. Jagielski, *Prayer ...* s. 392

some of the Taliban, persuaded Omar to don the mantle of the Prophet and announced him the Caliph of all Muslims. Omar conquered people's minds by presenting himself as a leader of world revolution leading to the triumph of Islam. He built Omar a magnificent palace, and surrounded him with flatterers. To return the favor, Omar gave bin Laden refuge in his country, helping him hide from those who wished him dead. He allowed him to create the training camps of volunteers willing to participate in jihad, leaving him a free hand in the development of training facilities and the movement of militants. He created ideal conditions for the development of Al Qaeda, the international grid connections between local organizations and fundamentalists at the ready for jihad warriors and planned the next attacks that periodically shook the world public opinion and forced governments to pay attention to the importance of the problem. Attacks against terrorists linked to Osama bin Laden on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, made the United States step up the pressure on the Taliban state. Saudi Arabia asked Kabul about the issue of bin Laden. The Taliban did not intend to betray their donor, but still hoping to pacify international opinion, the Afghan Supreme Court began in early November 1998 a hearing related to allegations of Saudi terrorist activities. In view of evidence not being presented evidence by the Americans, bin Laden was acquitted, and thus rejected the request of Saudi Arabia.<sup>104</sup> The refusal resulted in the imposition of economic sanctions by the United States, and then by the UN Security Council (November 1999). The front of countries interested in the fall of the Taliban expanded, joined by Russia, China and India who were concerned about the activities of Islamic fundamentalists in their countries. It was also supported by the European Union, interested in reducing drug smuggling going on within its territory.

At that time, Osama bin Laden, because of the intense activities of the government of the United States and the world media was promoted to the role of public enemy number one, and was held responsible for all the evils associated with Islamic fundamentalism. Simultaneously, the Taliban, as those who give him refuge, became co-responsible for acts of terror. In the eyes of international public opinion Bin Laden, Al Qaeda and the Taliban melted into the one body that had to be condemned and combated.

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<sup>104</sup> . Jagielski, *Modlitwa...*s. 392-398.

The protests broke out in greater force against the Taliban, and especially against their way of treating women. Shaped by the media vision, Afghanistan was reduced to the image of the great trainer of terrorists training camp in which human rights are violated. Therefore, international sanctions were met with approval and the growing number of voices calling for action.

Since people gradually drifted to assist their countries - Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, the Taliban became completely isolated, thus thrown in even greater dependence on Osama bin Laden, his money and weapons. Mullah Omar, overcome by a vision of global Islamic revolution, became a kind of hostage to bin Laden. Afghanistan's economy was in crisis, further in-depth by international sanctions, and the Taliban needed funds to continue the fight against the Northern Alliance to maintain its regime. Saudi Arabia was the only one who could deliver them. At the same time international demands no longer confined to the issue of bin Laden, but also affected the changes in Afghanistan. Against the wall, Mullah Omar chose to follow the rules and did not regard Pashtuns his guest enemies. This strategy has not changed even after the September 11 attacks. When on September 20, President Bush gave an ultimatum to Afghanistan; the Taliban rejected it, but at the same time announced that bin Laden had been called on to leave their territory. Torn between the fidelity to the Islamic Revolution and the desire to save his skin, Omar at this point no longer had any impact on the situation and Bin Laden himself. As a result, the coalition attack of 7 October 2001 brought the collapse of their regime.

Al Qaeda is an example of a new type of terrorist structure. This multinational network is complex and associated with at least a dozen fundamentalist organizations operating independently in different parts of the world.<sup>105</sup> What unites them is hatred of the West, pro-Western and "secular" governments in the Muslim world and the influence of fundamentalist interpretations of Sunni branch of Islam. Individual organizations are fragmented and partly "dormant" and conspiratorial.

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<sup>105</sup> J. Bryla, Near and Middle East in international relations, in: W. Molendowski, International Relations, Wrocław 2000, p. 146

Al Qaeda is a self-financing structure not directly supported financially or politically controlled by the governments of individual countries.<sup>106</sup> Observing the development of the Al - Qaeda, professional coordination of its activities, it can be concluded that it began to resemble the shape of the agenda for intelligence and counterintelligence.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>106</sup> Szymborski, the Bush Doctrine. Bydgoszcz 2004, pp. 94-95.

<sup>107</sup> L. Williams, The Al Qaeda Connection: International Terrorism, Organized Crime, and the Coming Apocalypse, September 2005, p.32

## CHAPTER IV

### The war on terrorism.

George W. Bush, Bill Clinton's successor, had to face the demon, which already in the twenty-first century, was reborn with renewed strength. The fight against terrorism became one of the most difficult tasks, as it stood before a new American administration, as well as the whole world.

Even before the attacks on the WTC and the Pentagon, proposals had been put forward proposals to increase military spending and the strengthening of the U.S. presence in the world by tackling totalitarian or authoritarian regimes.<sup>108</sup> There was a strong reference to "threats from rogue regimes and hostile states, which represent the potential for terrorism and development of weapons of mass destruction."<sup>109</sup> September 11 had many consequences. " It destroyed the confidence that America can be not attacked, proved that the country is facing the same risks that other countries have to deal with every day, showed the danger of actions on their own."<sup>110</sup> It graduated from the "holiday from history."<sup>111</sup> The rhetoric of George W. Bush quickly began to take almost religious significance. Convinced of his own mission, the president began to view the fight against terrorism as the eternal struggle between good and evil.<sup>112</sup> The Congress passed a resolution authorizing him to "use all necessary and appropriate force against those countries, organizations or persons who, according to his assessment, planned, implemented and provided support for the terrorist attacks of September 11, or against those who gave shelter to such organizations or persons". Those words meant a lot. The U.S. Congress had given consent to the action, but this president and his administration had the task of defining the enemy of America.<sup>113</sup> Thus, the fight against terrorism became a priority. It was treated as a mission articulated in the interests of the entire international community, not just for the sake of the USA.<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>108</sup> Justyna Zając, *Polityka zagraniczna Stanów Zjednoczonych po Zimnej Wojnie*, wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2005, s. 27

<sup>109</sup> Condolezza Rice, *Promoting the National Interest*, "Foreign Affairs", January/February 2000, Vol. 79, No. 1, s. 45-62.

<sup>110</sup> Ivo H. Daalader, James M. Lindsay, *Ameryka bez ograniczeń. Rewolucja Busha w polityce zagranicznej*, tłum. Andrzej Niedzielski, Warszawa 2005, s. 101.

<sup>111</sup> George F. Will, *The End of Our Holiday from History*, "Washington Post", 11.09 2001, s. A27.

<sup>112</sup> Ivo H. Daalader, James M. Lindsay, *Ameryka bez ograniczeń...*, op.cit. s. 111.

<sup>113</sup> Ibidem, s. 117

<sup>114</sup> *Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People*, Washington D.C., September 20, 2001

The attack on Afghanistan began the first phase of the war against global terrorism. Americans were feeling the need to do something. They did not want to feel helpless anymore.<sup>115</sup> According to President Bush, the United States should use its power, should "go abroad to destroy monsters." Such thinking lay at the root of the war with Afghanistan and propelled the action against rogue states. It was decided to take the fight against terrorism in the broadest sense. It was decided to strike hard, using all forces. The idea was to show that America is not afraid. On the forum of the United States Congress, the president gave a speech. "We demand as U.S. authorities that all al-Qaeda leaders hiding in the territory of Afghanistan be released. (...) We demand the immediate and complete closure of all training bases in Afghanistan, the issuing by the appropriate authorities of every terrorist, every person participating in the structures of support. (...) There will be no negotiations or talks. The Taliban must respond, and do so as soon as possible. They have to give up terrorists, or share their fate."<sup>116</sup> GW Bush said in one of his speeches that the Taliban "have to pay a price", but that does not obey the will of the United States.<sup>117</sup> We can see so clearly that it was not only the terrorists. United States wanted to show the whole world that no one can threaten their safety that is still hegemonic, in spite of "turbulence" that they have control.

The United States have shown the world that, thanks to their advanced technology, they are able to perform a fast, efficient and victorious military operation in a country so remote and "difficult" as Afghanistan.<sup>118</sup> The action in Afghanistan, codenamed "The ongoing freedom" was considered militarily successful. But it was only the tip of the iceberg. "What Afghanistan needs is a kind of Marshall Plan."<sup>119</sup> The moment of victory proved to the world that the United States is a power that can defeat a country about eleven thousand kilometers away. It was a remarkable demonstration of the effectiveness of modern technology and the U.S. military. Anything else? Yes, the Taliban regime was overthrown, but Osama bin Laden and his tops remained at large for

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<sup>115</sup> Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay, *Ameryka bez ograniczeń...*, op.cit., 126

<sup>116</sup> George Bush, *Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People*, Washington, D.C., 20.09. 2001, [www.whitehouse.gov](http://www.whitehouse.gov), 07. 2003.

<sup>117</sup> G. W. Bush, *Presidential Address to Nation*, [www.whitehouse.gov](http://www.whitehouse.gov)

<sup>118</sup> Paweł Frankowski, *Hegemonia Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki w warunkach turbulencji*. Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2006, s. 169

<sup>119</sup> Grzegorz Indulski, Marek Kęskrawiec, *Afganistan. Po co nam ta wojna?*, Warszawa 2007, s. 84.

the years to come. The road to a full internal stabilization of Afghanistan was and is still very long;<sup>120</sup> even with the eventual capturing and killing of Bin Laden.

The war in Afghanistan gained the support of many countries of Western Europe and the Middle East. Nonetheless, it created a dangerous precedent, giving each state the right to use force in the face of terrorist threats.<sup>121</sup> This international support for action taken by the U.S. created the impression that from that moment a truly multi - polar world will emerge. It happened; however, the next goal of the "global policeman" has become Iraq.<sup>122</sup>

### **UN Activities Since 2002**

In the autumn of 2002, the Secretary-General needed to address the international community's growing impatience with deteriorating security, sluggish reconstruction and the central government's difficulty in imposing its authority throughout the country.<sup>123</sup> The community's fears were gradually confirmed and, unfortunately, obscured some real progress that was being made through development programs. Starting in 2005, the security situation deteriorated badly. The Secretary-General's report of September 2006 said that a third of the country was "racked by violent insurgency."<sup>124</sup>

### **Political Activity**

As noted earlier, the Bonn process in late 2001 called for the establishment of an interim administration, the convening of a Loya Jirga, the appointment of a transitional authority, the ratification of a new constitution, and the holding of free and representative elections. The Loya Jirga, comprising a thousand representatives from 37 regions of the country, met from 11 to 19 June 2002 under the protection of the ISAF. A constitution was adopted almost unanimously in January 2004 by a 500-member constitutional Loya

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<sup>120</sup> Ivo H. Daalader, James M. Lindsay, *Ameryka bez ograniczeń...*, op.cit., s. 139.

<sup>121</sup> Frankowski, *Hegemonia Stanów Zjednoczonych...*, op.cit., s. 170.

<sup>122</sup> Woodwar, *Wojna Busha*, tłum. W. Jeżewski, Wydawnictwo Magnum, Warszawa 2003, s. 99

<sup>123</sup> Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, *The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security*, Document A/57/487, 21 October 2002, para. 29; see also para. 52.

<sup>124</sup> Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, *The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security*, document A/61/326, 11 September 2006, para. 76.

Jirga. The presidential election was held a few months later than planned, in October 2004, and President Karzai was elected with 55.4% of the votes. Logistical and security problems delayed legislative elections to 18 September 2005. The UN prepared the voters' list and candidates' registration – a laborious undertaking given the number of candidates and the choice of an electoral system that was not fully representative.<sup>125</sup> The vote count prompted protests, but not of a kind that affected the results.<sup>126</sup> The fact that elections were held at all constitutes a spectacular success. Alarm was expressed, however, in response to the fact that members of the Taliban and people accused of crimes against humanity were among those elected to the Legislative Assembly. Many instances of corruption, links with illegal armed groups and intimidation have undermined the Assembly's credibility. Over the course of 2007, the UN has become increasingly critical of the Karzai government.<sup>127</sup>

#### Institution-Building

The main problem remains the government's inability to extend its authority to the provincial and local levels, which has had the effect of limiting development to Kabul and a handful of urban areas. On a more positive note, however, the organization of higher levels of the public service now permits budget planning objectives to be met independently.<sup>128</sup>

#### Humanitarian Relief and Development Assistance

Since the fall of the Taliban in the autumn of 2001, there has been considerable development in Kabul and a few other cities, but “despite these achievements, the economic and developmental challenges facing Afghanistan remain daunting.”

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<sup>125</sup> Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, *The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security*, Document A/61/799, 15 March 2007, para. 12.

<sup>126</sup> Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, *The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security*, Document A/60/712, 7 March 2006, para. 5.

<sup>127</sup> Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, *The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security*, Document A/61/799, 15 March 2007, para. 5.

<sup>128</sup> Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, *The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security*, Document A/58/868, 12 August 2004, para. 54.



<sup>129</sup>Between 2002 and 2005, the international community contributed US\$8.4 billion toward these efforts.

The UN has played a key role in bringing emergency aid to the people who suffered the most during years of drought and warfare, although security problems make distribution very difficult. The establishment of a central administration has enabled the UN to withdraw gradually from this sector of activity, but “the capacity of Afghan institutions ... remains highly dependent on external actors.”<sup>130</sup>

Twenty percent of children die before the age of five, life expectancy is 44.5 years, and a quarter of the population has no access to potable water.<sup>131</sup> One of the most successful programs has been the poliomyelitis vaccination campaign, carried out through UNICEF, which has reached over three million Afghan children. By 2007, polio had been virtually eradicated from Afghanistan. Access to health care has been greatly improved, and infant mortality can be expected to drop markedly.<sup>132</sup>

With regard to education, some seven million children have been attending school in 2007, one third of them girls. UNICEF has played a direct role in this success, which is all the more remarkable in view of the fact that the insurgents have been targeting schoolgirls.

Two programs launched in the mid-1990s also bore fruit after the fall of the Taliban: between 2002 and 2005, some 3.5 million refugees returned to Afghanistan, three-quarters of them from Pakistan and most of the others from Iran. A landmine-clearing program has made it possible for farming to resume on thousands of square kilometers of land.

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<sup>129</sup> Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, *The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security*, Document A/60/224, 12 August 2005, para. 50.

<sup>130</sup> Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, *The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security*, Document A/60/712, 7 March 2006, para. 36.

<sup>131</sup> Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, *The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security*, Document A/60/224, 12 August 2005, para. 50.

<sup>132</sup> UNICEF, “[Child Alert Afghanistan](#),”

A number of other programs of varying size have been launched under the coordination of one of the many UN institutions present in Afghanistan: the UNDP and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) are coordinating a program designed to create 15,000 jobs, mainly in the construction sector, and the WHO has launched programs to distribute vitamin supplements and medicines and to provide mental health and family medicine services and anti-tuberculosis interventions. Other projects focus on urban development (UN-Habitat), natural resources (through the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization), and culture and the media (UNESCO).

Before the fall of the Taliban, UN intervention had resulted in the realization that success was impossible in the absence of any real desire on the part of either the belligerents or the international community to reach a political settlement. At the end of 2001, the military intervention by the US-led coalition routed out the Taliban and made possible the formulation of an ambitious reconstruction plan. The plan's implementation was greatly facilitated by the lessons that the UN had learned from its many previous failures. But the enthusiasm that reigned when the Bonn Agreement was signed and UNAMA was set up seems to have dissipated, to be replaced by scepticism not only about the ability of the international community to act effectively in rebuilding Afghanistan but also about the relevance of this role.

It appears to be more and more difficult for the ISAF to maintain a climate of security. The limits of UNAMA's ability to support the Afghan government in rebuilding institutions and infrastructures against a backdrop of acceptable governance seem to have been reached, and UNAMA is powerless to coordinate a consistent joint campaign against drug trafficking. On the other hand, since the signing of the Bonn Agreement in November 2001, the population as a whole has enjoyed a clearly superior quality of life, and the number of civilian deaths attributable to conflict has plummeted.<sup>133</sup>

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<sup>133</sup> R. Reuveny and A. Prakash, "The Afghanistan war and the breakdown of the Soviet Union," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 25, 1999, pp. 693 to 708.

The conclusion to be drawn about UN intervention in Afghanistan depends entirely on the point of comparison used: at one extreme, the improbable dream of a model state, capable of melding Islamic traditions, modernity and Western ideals, and, at the other, the nightmare scenario of a derelict state dragging its people into an endless spiral of fratricidal wars. Afghanistan today seems to be suspended between these two extremes, caught in an undertow of insurrection, drugs and corruption while it strives to grasp an elusive peace.

## **CHAPTER V**

### **CONCLUSIONS**

The war on terrorism has spurred a truly global social movement that has embraced an international and compassionate perspective in its advocacy for peace. The collective behavior employed by the activists helps, refine understanding of how social movements are formed, utilize resources, appeal to the general public, and achieve their goals. Independent yet interconnected SMOs have organized to foster a global sense of collective identity, framing and attributing their grievances under the rubric of global justice and international norms to support local grievances and ferment a sense of mutual responsibility. By articulating the broader interconnectedness of issues activists have made several governments an arena of struggle over resistance to their support for the war on terrorism. Citizens have used their leverage to take advantage of democratic spaces to hold governments accountable and to influence their decisions while increasing their own public image as a legitimate representation of civil society. They have made issues such as equality, dignity, well-being, and human right a central focus of contention, thus enabling them to question the legal and/or moral basis for preemptive war and to ultimately make substantial inroads into undermining the political institutions and infrastructure that support the war on terrorism. The formation of collective identity on a global scale has resulted in a common sense of connectedness through the common experience of all people affected by violence worldwide.

This research highlights the importance of the POS theoretical framework in a few ways. It demonstrates how social movement actors, by launching a multilateral approach in their struggle, have taken advantage of opportunities to voice their grievances, taken advantage of public anxieties and dissatisfaction with government policies at home and abroad regarding security issues, and have used the clash among elites on a domestic and international level to question the accountability of governance and state legitimacy. It also illustrates how resource management, organizational dynamics, framing, and the use of the "mobilization of shame" in exerting moral pressure and persuasion on the opposition are all significant variables in understanding collective

behavior. And finally, it adds to our understanding of how the utilization of POS and resource mobilization can affect social movement outcomes. Through its organizational skills and wide variety of tactics the peace movement has altered public opinion, influenced policy makers to change their goals or replaced elected officials that resisted their demands, influenced the agenda regarding participation in the coalition of the willing, and ultimately altered individual state policies. Though the war on terrorism continues, the occupation of Iraq is currently much more difficult to sustain due to the growing coalition of the unwilling, and the debate within the United States itself has clearly shifted toward a policy of withdrawal. The undermining of the original coalition of the willing and the shaming of the U.S. government are certainly factors in the anticipated exit from Afghanistan--both consequences of the efforts of the contemporary antiwar movement.

In assessing the five years of Taliban rule, one should take into account both the goals that guided their activities and the results that they brought to Afghanistan. Their primary task was to seize power over the country and introduce an order similar to the words of the Koran interpreted in a literal way not fitting the present. Their goal was reached after a two-year military campaign, when the Taliban rule was established by taking the capital and spreading to a large part of Afghanistan. Their success was the undeniable establishment of order and provision of some sort of stability in a country that since the entry of Soviet troops was torn by continual strife. Undoubtedly, they managed to stop the various warlords and lawlessness of ordinary criminals who had benefited from years of chaos and weak power. Especially the southern Taliban managed to bring improvement, which meant that they enjoyed the greatest support.

Analyzing the results of their operations, however, it becomes apparent that, the negative aspects far outweigh the benefits of relative stability. In hindsight, the Taliban's noble and laudable intentions of the introduction of a state of God on earth resulted in the imposition of radical demands, responsibilities and patterns of behavior that were not accepted by a large proportion of the population, and their enforced observance involved applying absolute penalty. New orders hit particularly hard at women in order to strip them of all hope of political, social and economic development. Despite the assurance of

relative peace, the regime was unable to improve the terrible state of the Afghan economy. Instead, it has greatly increased its reliance on the manufacturing and trade of opium and heroin. Religious fanaticism linked to the Taliban and with Osama bin Laden led to international isolation of the country and eventually ended in an attack by international forces, which are still stationed on Afghan territory. Looking back, one can say that the period of Taliban rule was the source of the problems that still remain unresolved, providing significant obstacles to the development in Afghanistan. The escalation of jihad activities, development of trade routes, weapons and drugs, and the increasing of the acreage of poppy and marijuana cultivates are just some of the factors destabilizing the situation. And despite the reassurances of representatives of NATO forces, one can assume that the Taliban regime might not have said its last word.

The purpose of the war in Afghanistan was violent, and forced a fundamental and complete change of culture of the Islamic society of Afghanistan. The size and scope of cultural and civilization changes proposed by the administration of George W. Bush in Afghanistan can only give a comparison to the scope and changes in European culture, that the Taliban would hypothetically like to see in the West. The Military draft, forced liberalization of Islamic culture is equal of terms of momentum to an Islamization of Europe with the introduction of Sharia. Liberalization of Islam, in the new scenario, can only be compared with an Islamization of Europe. The purpose of American neo-conservatives is formally the same as the Afghan Taliban's. In both scenarios cultural fundamentalisms want to redo the whole world on their own, in a manner that resembles the treatment of the Indians by the settlers after the conquest of America.

Such an objective is in itself contradictory. It is therefore not possible to carry out any liberating crusades solely with military or political means. Because education is what ultimately identifies the training, results in a culture of violence. No liberal man Muslim or otherwise, resorts in violence. Liberalism imposed by a neo-conservative idea of violence is analogous in its logical quality to the Communist "socialist democracy". Liberalism militarily imposed upon Islamic countries is a political target internally contradictory, and therefore not feasible. Yet for many years, with persistence worthy of a better cause, it has been realized. Therefore, the local liberal utopian absurdity becomes a global nightmare dystopia.

Why the Afghan conflict seems to have no end? The war in Afghanistan aims to achieve the objectives because neither the military nor unattainable political means. And ISAF or NATO troops in Afghanistan are taking part in a big, poorly designed, and internally contradictory social engineering experiment on a global scale (NATO is the military and political alliance of global importance). The leaders of NATO seem, therefore, to come to the aid of a NATO member - like World War I for the Axis – in what one can only hope will not turn out to be a conflict, lasting until the complete exhaustion of economic resources, military and political strength. History shows it is not advantageous situation. The other side of the coin, doomed to failure, however, is, in a sense, winning. Afghan highlanders somehow survived 60 years of war with the British, and 20 years of war with the Soviet Union units. Afghans have survived, but the British Empire or the Soviet Union did not. Is this to be the fate of the European Union and NATO?

The current course of the war with Islamic extremism and terrorism shows that the anti-terrorist coalition to concentrate efforts on the military methods of solution to the problem of Islamic radicalism and terror will not lead to success.

The war with Islamic Jihad should be so treated by the state coalition primarily as a struggle for the "hearts and minds" of Muslims. It is clear that any action without the psychological dimension and the ideological struggle is not bringing in the long term results and effect on the growing reluctance of Muslim societies to the West, which is the greatest victory of the Islamists. The strategic, long-term goal of the campaign against Islamic fundamentalism must thus seek to persuade the masses of Muslims around the world that the West does not lead another crusade, nor fight with Islam as such.

In the short term, however, it is necessary to prove that Western countries are able to exercise political and military for activism in defense of their values and ideals.

The great difficulty in obtaining success in the war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan - and indirectly with Islamic extremism and terrorism in general - is born today, through the lack of cohesion and determination of anti-terrorist coalition. There is a lack of political will of Western governments and the acquiescence of their populations to increase military efforts in Afghanistan and active engagement in

combating Muslim fanaticism. There is a growing war-weariness and discouragement commonly perceived - especially in Europe - as "not ours".

What is worse, the current geopolitical situation in the region indicates that there is no longer enough military and political victory in Afghanistan. The war front has also expanded into Pakistan, where the West's ability to act is limited for now, in fact, to only diplomatic means.<sup>134</sup> The direction of events in Pakistan will, however, be crucial to the success of the mission in Afghanistan and the future of the war with Islamic extremism.

In the mountains of Afghanistan, there is a clash of two visions of the truth of life; one based on full confidence in the world and God, and the other to total lack of trust in them. Both appear to the educated observer, equally lame, because both the Islamic fanatics showed contempt for the life and faith of Western troops and the Westerners exhibited a total disregard for Muslim codes of conduct. As experience shows, they concentrate on just one thing: to dominate the every aspect of life, leaving no room for even simple tolerance. Ideology is often a substitute for spirituality, because it knows how to liberate, but its energy is used for purposes known only to the individual, far from the performance of members of the community governed by the ideology. The idea of uniting people under indoctrination is, therefore, far from new.

The ideas driving people today are already familiar and tame. It's just totalitarianisms in a new guise. There is no consolation nor hope that this is the last war that humanity will engage in; It appears rather as a further step in the process, which lasts from the end of World War II, and which is based on the current discharging aggression in countless local conflicts that do not save anyone. As a result of these wars, the most aggressive individuals of our species simply engage in combat, and the accidental victims of the struggle - if they survive - often realize how illusory their views, is driven by a massive propaganda, which nurtures in them, the ideology of domination of one community over another. How deceptive is that ideology to the collapse of the hopes, and, in many cases, lives. And if this senseless war in total becomes an opportunity for someone to remember that the spirituality of humanity degenerates rapidly, and that the road to peace is lead rather by a spiritual renewal of people, than a technical renewal of arms - at least the sense of sacrifice will not have been futile, offering humanity valuable

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<sup>134</sup> Bill Roggio, „*The state of Jihad: 2008*“, „The Long War Journal“, 2.01.2009



insights into understanding the obvious truths, and - just as it turns out - the most difficult ones to assimilate.

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