The Effectiveness of the EU’s Conditionality Policy in the Western Balkans

Abstract

Despite having many common characteristics such as their Yugoslav history, their transitioning economies, the presence of many ethnic minorities in their territories and their geographical area, the Western Balkans comply at very different rates with the EU’s recommendation with one another. Thus, to examine the effectiveness of the EU’s conditionality policy, additional factors must be found. The focus here is on domestic factors and more specifically party competition and policy salience. To examine the above, a Rational Institutionalist Approach of the determinants of the effectiveness of the EU’s Conditionality is used, that views conditionality as “Reinforcement by Reward”. The method used to analyse the question and the stated hypothesis is a comparative case study between the energy and the environmental sectors of Bosnia & Herzegovina and Montenegro. Finally, conditionality was found to be more effective in Montenegro than in Bosnia & Herzegovina, especially in the energy sector. Concerning the first factor, party competitiveness, it seems that the number of democratic, pro-EU parties is significant. However, governmental changes after elections are not. Concerning the second hypothesis, according to the literature, energy should be more salient than the environment, especially in BiH. However, this was not supported by the evidence. The results of the analysis showed that there are no significant differences between the effectiveness of the EU’s conditionality in the energy and the environmental sector in BiH, while in Montenegro, compliance is better in the energy sector. Based on the above, further research is needed on the ways political systems affect the effectiveness of the EU’s conditionality in the Western Balkans, especially concerning Bosnia & Herzegovina and the lack of administrative capacity, especially concerning Montenegro.