



**Μεταδιδακτορική Έρευνα
της Βαΐας Μουζακιάρη**

με τίτλο:

Intra – Party Balances of New Democracy in front of “shaking” political decisions both on Economy and Foreign Affairs field for the decade between 2010 and 2020

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Introduction

This post - doctoral research aims to investigate how the ideologically opposed intra – party wings of new Democracy (the main centre-right political party of Greece) reacted upon the Economic Memoranda and the Prespa Agreement, from 2010 and onwards.

Three Greek governments (the PASOK government, the ND-PASOK-LAOS government, and the SYRIZA government) have successively signed the economic memoranda, from 2010 and onwards, to secure the economic salvation of the national economy, given the dramatic increase of the fiscal deficit and the national debt. By signing these agreements, the Greek governments were forced to proceed to a strict fiscal austerity and to meet the need for certain structural reforms – mainly reforms for liberalizing the national economy and eliminating the state intervention in the public and private economy.

As regards the Prespa Agreement, this agreement has been the outcome of the foreign policy of the government of Syriza, concerning its approach to solve the problem of the name dispute (dispute concerning the official name Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia should have), that has been a main national issue for Greece for decades. Signing the Prespa Agreement, the northern neighbor country of FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), was eventually named after “North Macedonia” and this agreement was signed from both the involved governments.

The aim of the research is to investigate the intra - party reactions that were expressed from the opposing intra - party wings in ND.

At this point we will set some points, based on which the research evolved.

First the two cases we examine are not the same. However, they can function in a complementary way, mainly in terms of the effect an external strict restriction can have on government policy.

Second, we will find that the strict restriction forced ND to shift the policy, while it was in government. As the official parliamentary opposition, ND avoided the restriction. The above was clearly seen in the case of the Memoranda. In the case of the name dispute, even when the restriction tended to be strict (Bucharest 2008), the government of ND has not changed its position. However, this restriction was not followed by a bankruptcy threat, as in the case of the Memoranda. In any case, the dimension of a party's status as a ruling party and as an opposition party can always has a special weight and must be taken into account.

The two cases are different, they have a different meaning, and they require a different approach from the governments. A liberal economic policy is mainly considered the solution as globalization expands. There is no room from state - driven policy. The engagement to a state - driven policy does not facilitate the economic growth. Up to some point, all parts accept it.

It is easier to convince about the correctness of a liberal economic policy. On the other hand, as regards the agenda of the foreign policy, states, governments, MPs, are not persuaded easily to a liberal policy, especially when they have conservative ideological positions. Based on it, we will see different approaches inside ND. However, we will see, that there have always been people inside ND, leaders, MPs, that were simultaneously in favor of the two restrictions and some that were simultaneously against them. Through the history of ND, these two groups always consisted with the same people.

Third, Greece is a small state, and this means that Greece needs to participate in stronger European and international associations, economically and politically, to survive. This exact fact generates a restriction and certain requirements a state should follow. We will use the theory of Peter Katzenstein to understand the status of a small state.

Fourth, although there is the restriction, the governments always take under consideration some other factors when they should shape their decisions and their policy. The electoral cost, the opinion polls, the position of the society and the intra - party tensions and reactions, are some of these factors. We will be based on the theory of the Neoclassic Realism here.

So, the case for Greece and our case studies is that a small state had timely certain requirements to follow and a certain restriction. However, the electoral cost and the intra - party tensions, inside ND, have always mattered.

As regards the timely intra - party fractions of ND, through the decades, different ideological positions were expressed from different intra - party poles in front of economic and foreign policy matters. Specific poles inside that political party were more in favor of liberalizing the economy and more compromising as regards the willingness to follow the solution that exogenous institutional actors have shaped and recommended to Greece for economic and foreign policy matters. On the other hand, there were also other intra - party poles that were opposing this compromising attitude and were willing to shape their own and relatively independent economic and foreign policy.

Based on the above, the economic memoranda, that were a severe milestone as regards the way Greek economic policy was shaped and implemented timely and the Prespa Agreement, which altered the timely national foreign policy as regards the subject of the name dispute with FYROM, fired intra - party reactions. These reactions we aim to write down.

Our research will be extended in the following chapters. In the first chapter we will shortly describe which were the historical evolutions concerning the under - questioned issues and which were the exogenous restrictions. We will describe the compromises Greek governments had to make in order the economic consolidation and the solution of the name dispute with FYROM to be achieved. At that chapter, we will also write down the pivotal contribution the theories of the small states and that of the Neoclassical Realism have concerning the explanation of how the governments decide.

In the second chapter we will describe the origins of the timely policy antithesis, what was expressed from different intra-party wings, inside ND.

In the third chapter we will describe the internal conflict concerning the economic memoranda and in the fourth chapter, the internal conflict concerning the Prespa Agreement. In the fifth chapter we will discuss our findings. We should mention that alongside the intra – party reaction against these decisions, there was also the societal reaction that influenced the decision-making process.

Overall, the aim of this research is the ideological conflicts inside ND to be decoded.

Concerning the methodology, first as regards the exogenous restrictions, concerning the “economic memoranda”, we will describe the European restriction concerning the necessity of fiscal discipline and structural reforms. Concerning the “Prespa Agreement”, we will describe the main claims, on behalf of European Union and NATO. The internal conflict will be decoded through writing down the opposite opinions, as they were published via the press or as they were become apparent through relative parliamentary discussions.

From the aspect of the International Relations theory, as we mentioned above, we will be based on the theory of the Small States, because Greece is a small state and faces specific challenges inside the international system as regards its survival and welfare. We will also be

based on the Neoclassic Realism, which is the most suitable theory of foreign policies for our research. We choose the theoretical explanation of Neoclassic Realism for understanding how governments proceed into the ultimate decisions. States are not black boxes and governments shape their decision, taking into consideration, both the international system and the domestic variables, that could affect the government's decision-making process (Gideon 1998).

Chapter 1

The economic and the foreign affairs restriction for Greece as regards the economic field and the name dispute between Greece and FYROM.

In this chapter we will shortly describe the challenges Greek governments have faced, both on economic field - towards more liberal economic policies - and on the field of the foreign policy, towards a solution concerning the issue of the name dispute between Greece and FYROM.

Concerning the economic field, we will first describe the challenge of the adjustment. The challenge of the adjustment reflects the need the Greek governments to re-structure the Greek national economy, by proceeding into more liberal - driven economic policies, rather than state - driven ones, which have characterized the usual economic policy in Greece. This need was born because of the economic challenges globalization and economic interdependence have generated. After 2010, the fierce need for adjustment has led to the acceptance of the economic memoranda, which were the lending agreements, among Greece, European Union (the European Commission and the European Central Bank) and International Monetary Fund.

Globalization has forced national economies to function more efficiently and competitively in the global economic scene. Greece, especially during the period of economic memoranda, was obliged to follow policies of fiscal discipline and to implement structural economic reforms that could lead to the openness of the interior market of capital and work, of products and services.

Secondly, we will focus on the history and the evolutions concerning the issue of the name dispute between Greece and FYROM. Specifically, we will describe the international

evolutions that have taken place concerning that issue and the ultimate solution that has been agreed, the Prespa Agreement. This name dispute reflects the timely dispute between Greece and Republic of North Macedonia (previously -before the Prespa Agreement -the state was named after Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)), which is referred to the name dispute between the two countries, namely the dispute about the name the second country (FYROM) should have - which should not insult the national interest of the first country (Greece).

Both the cases, the economic and the foreign policy one, were constantly accompanied from apparent exogenous restrictions - restrictions the international system has generated - which aimed to force the Greek side to change its economic policy, as well as its foreign policy, and to accept compromising solutions - suitable to the orientation and intensions of the international system, to which Greece belongs.

However, the procedure of shaping the governing action is more complex rather than a spontaneous action that can produce compromises and convergence with the strong exogenous restriction. Based on the theory of the Neoclassical Realism, national governments acknowledge the influence of the international system, but they also must take under consideration domestic, intervening variables, that may influence the direction of the decision on some level (Gideon 1998). The questions that have been risen are, what circumstances and who domestic actors, could influence the decision-making process and the ultimate decision of a Prime Minister or of a government.

During our research we will set and describe the exogenous restriction that the international system has set, but we will also see the effect of the domestic variables (subgroups in the parliamentary group or a part of the society that also opposed the exogenous restriction) which have exerted pressure against the economic memoranda and the Prespa Agreement.

In this research we focused on the political party of New Democracy. In the case of the economic memoranda - for some of the years Greece had to implement the memoranda, ND has been a government party. In the case of the Prespa Agreement, ND was the official parliamentary opposition. The Prespa Agreement was signed under the SYRIZA governance. So, for both the cases, we will see the decision that the leadership of ND took and the domestic reactions. We will inevitably see that the domestic reactions, as a domestic condition, influenced the decision of the leadership. The influence was higher during the party's term in the official opposition.

Furthermore, it was considered also as helpful to analyze Greece under its capacity as a small state. The theory of the small states could provide useful findings as regards the narrow margins, which exist for a small state to react against the intention and the desire of a larger state.

Concerning the structure of this chapter, first we will refer to the theory of the small states, in accordance with the theory of the Neoclassical Realism, for our cases. These two theories are considered suitable for understanding on some level what Greece experienced and how Greece behaved.

Secondly, we will analyze how the economic exogenous restriction, as well as the restriction about the name dispute, have been evolved through the years and third how Greece approached and reacted against the exogenous restrictions. In the second and the third chapter, we will investigate the intra - party (inside ND) reactions and the decision process.

1.1 A small state, the international order, and the intervening variables of Neoclassical Realism

According to Katzenstein, there are small states, which category is merely defined from its population (approximately 10 - 15 million people) (Katzenstein 2003). The developing challenges especially after the Cold War, during the globalization, forced small states to seek for protection and cooperation with more powerful states. The cooperation was the outcome of a necessity. The small population, the small and closed economy, the limited national resources, the limited military heft, the lack of capacity and the vulnerability, have been considered as disadvantages on behalf of the small states.

Especially through the globalization era, the economic challenges for the small states increased. The need for more competitive economies and for pursuing the profit through extending trade, has created the need for cooperation among the states, which as a fact led accordingly to economic interdependence. For Greece, that is a small state, the solution has been found through the accession into the European Communities, into NATO and later into European Union and Eurogroup.

Katzenstein also raised the importance of the democratic corporatism into the institutional framework of the small states, in order the consensus to be shaped, in front of the implementation of reforms that could reshape the interior economy and alter the traditional policies and *acquis*.

The previously described disadvantages a small state faces, made the status of the small states especially vulnerable and uncertain as regards their position and aims in the international politics. We have already mentioned that according to Neoclassical Realism, people, the society, and the states need to feel the sentiment of belonging in order to ease their uncertainty. There is a constant power struggle, in a condition of scarcity and uncertainty, and the actors struggle to fight this insecurity and to achieve survival. States

aim to combat this situation through their accession or membership in large transnational or international state correlations. Into these correlations, the big and more powerful states provide security, and the small states agree to contribute to the pursuit of the common goals of the group. For these reasons, to exit the era of poverty, of economic underdevelopment, and the reality of geopolitical threats, Greece accessed NATO, European Communities and later the Eurozone.

This membership has timely created an exogenous restriction that had to be followed from all the member - states, in order the common goals to be achieved, either in the field of economy, or in foreign affairs. Although the exogenous restrictions are always regarded as clear, often the states deviate or are considered as slow to adopt to the restriction, because of the domestic situation/reaction they face. That domestic variable could be the societal reaction that could be opposed to a particular national decision because it could change people's economic life for example or to create new conditions as regards the foreign affairs. Moreover, a domestic variable that could also influence a government's decision is the intra - party opposition or the fierce opposition of the official parliamentary opposition.

Neoclassical Realism is an ideological theory that highlights the level of influence a government could accept before a decision to be made, through the domestic variables.

As regards some of its main ideological assumptions - according to Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, first tribalism is a core element in the political and social life for humans, second, they characterize "politics" as a constant struggle among different groups, in a condition that there is scarcity - third, people, a group of people or even a state need power to secure their survival, strength or power (Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro 2009). The above can explain that under Neoclassic Realism, the influence of the international system is a matter of a high importance, because it offers the sentiment of belonging (in a wide group of states, which share the same aims and intentions and among which there is the actual possibility

of mutual assistance and support), which sentiment is necessary for people, the society and the state.

However, what makes Neoclassical Realism distinct from the other international theories of realism, is - as we have already said - its effort to also answer the question, which domestic variables influence the decision of a government. Neoclassical Realism highlights the importance of the intervening variables. There is the independent variable of the international system, the dependent variable of the ultimate decision that is to be made and the intervening variables, that have a domestic character, that are concerned to the state's material capabilities, to the national ideological sentiment and history, to the societal reaction, to the economic status-quo and the aims of the interests groups, to the political opposition's reaction etc. and that they all could lead the decision-making process to one way or another (Edwards 2013, p. 55).

Greece is a typical example of a small state, which is distinguished by the difficulties these states face. After the Second World War and after the Civil War, Greece struggled for its economic survival and there was also the need for assuring its national safety against the geopolitical threats, Greece was faced. Greece for assuring its economic and national interests entered European institutions and NATO. This membership is also explained through the theory of Neoclassical Realism, which claims that a country needs to belong in wider groups to cope with the power struggle among other states.

Neoclassical Realism can also explain the intervening variables that affect Greece's governments as regards the decision to sign the economic memoranda and the Prespa Agreement.

1.2 A new economic order: The Globalization and the European Restrictions

Towards the end of the 20th century and specifically after the fall of the Socialist Soviet Union, the capitalist economic paradigm of the West and especially that of the United States of America, was received as the only successful one to be followed in order national economies to be efficient and competitive as the globalization was expanding. This need was specifically generated from 1970s and onwards, when the economic theory distanced itself from state - driven economic policies. During 1970s, the high public debt and the high rate of the inflation, which were the consequences of the previous implemented economic policies in many national economies, have been indicated as evidence that the need for the economic policies to be re-structured towards a more flexible direction, where the private economy should have a pivotal role in the whole national economic policy.

Furthermore, many western economies came then to see the Asian economies as an imminent economic threat, concerning the enormous economic advantage these economies have begun to obtain upon the international trade and the international exports. Their comparative advantage was created because of the low labor cost, which was leading inevitably to cheaper products and services in the global market. The western economies to manage and lower their high public debt started to borrow from the international capital markets. However, the competitive character of the international capital markets has indicated that the high public debt and the low productivity were disadvantages, that could not permit the incompetent economies having easy access to low-cost credit.

The above facts constitute the main circumstances that characterized the status of the globalization and the obligations the national economies, like Greece, had to meet. In the global arena, borrowing from the international capital markets, obliged the national economies to prove themselves competitive, competent, and efficient players. So, this situation marked new obligations for the national economies (Giddens 1998).

As regards the Greek case, it has timely belonged into the so-called category of *Mediterranean Capitalism*, which is distinctly different from the capitalist systems, that exist for example in USA, in Britain or in Germany. The Mediterranean Capitalism is characterized from a series of distortions in the internal markets of capital, products, services, and labor. The main cause of these distortions has been the unwillingness of the governments to free the private economy from state - driven policies and the public economy from an expanded clientele (Amable 2002). Inevitably Greece, from 1970s and onwards, was obliged to shape and implement a differentiated, compared to the past, more liberated economic policy.

The European Restriction

Greek governments struggled to achieve the above aims, first in the context of the European Economic Communities, later in the European Union and more specifically - after the adoption of the common European currency (Euro) - in the Eurogroup. The above European institutions, in accordance with European Committee, the European Council of Minister of Economic Affairs and the European Central Bank, have shaped restrictions which all member states had to adopt in order the member states to strengthen their economic competitiveness.

Specifically concerning Greece, but as also regards the rest of the member states, during 1980s, the European economic aim was to implement a stable monetary policy, in order the level of the inflation to be reduced. European Committee proceeded into the Single Exchange Rate Setting Mechanisms, for shaping certain limits, between which the inflation of each state member had to rate. Furthermore, the policy of currency devaluations should be eliminated because it has created imbalances for the Single European Market. The next target was the financial liberalization of the internal markets and later the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty.

Specifically, on 7th February of 1992, the Maastricht Treaty created a matrix of financial criteria, which all member states had to follow to create sustainable economies and later, to access the Single Monetary Union. Concerning these criteria, national economies had to keep their financial deficit lower than 3% of the GDP, the public debt lower than 60% and the level of the inflation lower than 2% (Treaty for European Union 1992).

In 1992 Greece had to reduce the rates of inflation. For achieving this target, the Greek government had to follow a prudent fiscal policy through reducing the public expenditure and increasing the public incomes (OECD 1991). Greece also had to liberate the financial capital system, to exempt the pricing policy from state intervention and to implement structural reforms for lowering the labor cost.

The Greek national economy had furthermore to adopt and implement policies aiming to increase the quality of the educational system and to highly train the employees of the public sector. Greece had also to move towards privatizations of the state - owned sectors (OECD 1991, 1992, 1993, European Commission 1993).

Later and during 2000s, European Union focused more on structural reforms to be implemented and this was particularly the aim of the Lisbon Treaty. This was translated into the aim, European Union to become the most competitive economy globally until 2010 (Treaty of Lisbon 2007). The focus was both on the sustainable fiscal policy and on reforming the internal markets. The public expenditure had to be lower, the national incomes had to rise and the tax evasion to be tackled. Concerning the target of the competitiveness, the internal markets had to become more competitive, by lowering the cost of the labor. Concerning the aim of rising the productivity of labor, the civil servants had to be more well educated and to obtain more and modern skills. As regards the educational and the health care system, the services provided had to be more quality updated and their public funding to be sustainable (OECD 2005, 2007, 2009).

Although these restrictions were shaped and the member states had to follow them, the reality eventually was that there has been a competitiveness deficit among many member states - including Greece - which as a fact made these national economies unable to handle the economic crisis that has been risen in 2008. Although the Maastricht Criteria have set a strict rule, from 1992 and onwards, eventually, many member states had accumulated high percentages of public deficit and debt. Moreover, the competitiveness disadvantage referred to the incomplete structural reforms, to an extensive clientelist system and to an incompetent banking system. All the above were the main characteristics of the Greek economy in 2008 as well, when the country had to tackle the financial crisis that was eventually turned into a debt crisis, further worsened by the threat of a national economic bankruptcy (Featherstone 2011, Frieden and Walter 2017).

The signing of the memoranda, in 2010, between the Greek governments, the European Institutions and the International Monetary Fund was seen as solution to all these problems.

The memoranda

The content of the three memoranda, in 2010, in 2012 and in 2015, that were signed from the three consecutive Greek governments (first PASOK, second ND - PASOK -LAOS, third SYRIZA), included the suggested reforms by the EU and the OECD. These included the reduction of the public expenditures, the increase of the public revenues, the strengthening of the banking system, the restoration of the liquidity, the management of the private debt, which was concentrated in the domestic banking system, the openness (liberalization) of the so-called closed professions (like the pharmacists), the active employment policies, that could reduce the labor cost and the unemployment, both in the public and private sector,

the modernization and the digitalization of the public administration, the reduction of the recruitment in the public sector and the increase of the labor productivity in the public sector, the strengthening of the educational and the health care system and the reforms in favor of a sustainable system of social and welfare insurance (European Commission 2010, European Commission 2012, European Commission 2015).

1.3 The name dispute between Greece and FYROM

The name dispute between Greece and FYROM emerged in 1991, when Greece did not consent to its northern neighbor's demand to be officially named "Macedonia" and its public to be claimed solely as "Macedonian".

The solution was sealed, after many years of negotiations, between the two involving states and through the mediation of United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU), under the Prespa Agreement, which was signed on 17th June of 2018 - from the SYRIZA government as regards the Greek part. Under this solution, which will be described more extensively in the following chapters, the name "North Macedonia" was chosen as the official name of FYROM.

The History

Through describing the history that was preceded until the final solution, we will write down the base of the negotiation claims on behalf of Greece and the fears and the doubts against the strategy that was timely followed by FYROM.

The name dispute is only the modern fixation of the whole problem that has characterized the status of the relations between the two countries. This modern fixation has arisen after the independence of FYROM from the Serbian dominance in 1991.

However, the wider conflict as regards the two countries, has started during the 19th century, when we see the competition between Greece, Bulgaria, and Ottoman Empire, each of which claimed the region of "Macedonia" to be under its own dominance and their national identity to be formed upon the population of this territory (Σφέτας 2018, p.17).

Based on the ancient history, "Macedonia" is the historical single region of the Balkan Peninsula in Southern - East Europe. Its national borders - from north to south and from east to west - were extended from the north of Skopje (the Capital of FYROM) to the Greek Mount of Olympus and from Greek Rodope Mountains to the Greek Pindos Mountain Range accordingly.

Ancient Macedonia coincides with the kingdom of Philip and his son, Alexander the Great, which has been established in the northern part of Ancient Greece. After the death of Philip, Alexander the Great has extended its kingdom, creating the "Macedonian Empire". In the 2nd century BCE Romans conquered the "Macedonian Empire". Later, in the 3rd century (AD), that whole region became part of the Byzantine Empire and in the 14th century a part of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman Empire has been disintegrated in the 19th century, and at this time, the "Macedonian Issue" arose (Nimetz 2020: 206). The wide region of "Macedonia" has been a place where many ethnic groups existed.

During the Ottoman Empire, the history of the local populations created their national consciousness. The religion and the language of the population have been the pivotal factors for this procedure. The geographic area of "Macedonia" has arisen as the most conflict issue, since four different nations, the Greeks, the Bulgarians, the Serbians, and the Albanians, coexisted. The wide region was divided geographically in three zones. The north

one included Bulgaria and Serbia, where mostly Slavic - speaking populations were located, the southern zone was extended to the Greek Thessaly, where Greek - speaking people were located and the central zone was a mix zone (Κωφός 2012, pp.199- 200, 207).

After the creation of the independent Greek state, in 1830, Greek national ideology sought for its roots in the Greek ancient history and highlighted the resilience of the Greek nation during Byzantium and Ottoman rule. As regards the region of "Macedonia", for Greeks, the interest was mainly focused - regarding the search of the roots of the Greek nation - on the kingdom of Alexander the Great and on the fact that the ancient Macedonians were Greeks (Κωφός 2012, p.206).

Through the years, the nationalisms have been fierce, in this area. In general, towards the end of the Ottoman Empire, the "Macedonian Issue" was centered to the creation of the national identity of the new - formed states in the wide Balkan region. The ideological confrontation shaped into an armed struggle among the parties (Greek, Bulgaria, Serbia and Romania), in their attempt to conquer their ethnically different neighbor, to impose on them their own national identity and to expand their territories.

Through the Balkan Wars, Greece has expanded its northern borders, obtaining the Southern part of Ancient Macedonia. On the other hand, as regards, Bulgaria and Serbia, the northern zone of the Ancient Macedonia, where mostly Slavic - speaking population existed, was divided between these two states.

Specifically, after the Balkan Wars, in 1912 - 1913, under the Treaty of Bucharest, the whole region was shared among Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia. Greece has acquired the 51% of the territorial part of Macedonia, Bulgaria 10%, and Serbia 39%, in which FYROM was located (Σφέρτσας 2018, p.41). The above status quo was also ratified under the Treaty of Neuilly, on 27th November of 1919, after the end of the First World War. In the context of

Treaty of Neuilly, a voluntary immigration convention was agreed between Greece and Bulgaria (Μιχαηλίδης 2018, p.2).

After the end of the Second World War and during the Cold War, especially when the Civil War (1944 - 1949) was unfolding in Greece, Yugoslav government, and the Socialist Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - one of the six states that were under the Yugoslav Federation, tried to revisit the above status quo against Greece by raising territorial and ethnotic claims (Σφέτσας 2018, p.95). The specific political powers have intended to create a "Slavomacedonian" identity for the Slavic - speaking population of Greece.

After years, the Socialist Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia achieved to separate itself from the demands of the Bulgarian nationalism and was engaged in a process of shaping its national identity. This process was based on the combination of the national characteristics of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Albania (Κωφός 2012, p.229).

As regards the relations between Greece and the Socialist Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the above fact, created conflicts, because the latter was aiming to combine its historic heritage with the ancient heritage of Greece. This, combined with Communist Yugoslav's policy concerning the unification of the whole "Slavo-Macedonian" population, posed threats against Greece, given that Greek Slavic - speaking people lived in Greek territory.

However, from 1941 to 1951 a population of approximately more than 25.000 Slavic - speaking people were moved from Greece to Yugoslavia (Κατσάνος 2008:53-55). For Greece there was no issue concerning the existence of a "Macedonian minority" in Greece (Κολιόπουλος, Ι. και Μιχαηλίδης, Ι. 2008, p.21). However, Skopje's insistence on the existence of a "Macedonian minority" in Greece, has been for years a timeless threat against Greece (Κολιόπουλος, Ι. και Μιχαηλίδης, Ι. 2008, p. 21). This threat did not help towards the normalization of the bilateral relations.

After the end of the Greek Civil War and after Yugoslavia turned to United States for economic help (1950 -1951 and onwards), the Greek - Yugoslavian relations were normalized. However, voices inside Yugoslavia about the existence of a "Slavic - speaking minority" in Greece, have never been eliminated.

Referring to the above facts and namely to those that took place during the Greek Civil War, we realize that a rivalry between Greece and then Socialist Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - later named as FYROM - was underway. It is a rivalry that on behalf of Greece has been translated as a threat against its national identity and perhaps even against its territory. On behalf of the other country, it has been translated into a strategy to construct its national identity.

The naming issue after 1991

After the independence of FYROM, on 25th January of 1991, the problem became even more intense for Greece. The new state chose, through a domestic referendum, the term "Republic of Macedonia" as its constitutional name and Greek governments entered to intensive diplomatic procedures in order this to be overthrown. The reactions were even more intense in northern Greece, where a peripheral region is called "Macedonia" and its population is called "Macedonian". For Greece, there was no other "Macedonian language" than the Greek one, so they could not allow FYROM to claim that its native language should be called "Macedonian" (Nimetz 2020, p.207). Furthermore, the Skopjan claims that its historical roots were attached to the history of the Alexander the Great were seen as problematic, annoying, and offensive, by the Greek side.

Overall, Skopjan historical claims- namely their unilateral act to call their country as "Republic of Macedonia" and their language as "Macedonian", together with the fact, as we have already mentioned, that it was likely that FYROM would demand the recognition of "a

supposedly existence of a Slavic - speaking minority” in Greece, as a whole led Greece to look with suspicion the strategy FYROM has followed. This is the reason why, as we will see in the exact following unit, Greece has adopted a strict national thesis and hindered the membership of FYROM in European and international institutions and organizations until 2018 and surely until the Prespa Agreement.

1.3.1 The road to the Prespa Agreement and the intermediate steps

On 16th December 1991, the European Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs was about to discuss recognition of the independence of the newborn democracies that had been shaped after the collapse of the Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia. According to the results of this Council, there were specific preconditions for the recognition to be achieved. Namely it was agreed among the European Ministers of Foreign Affairs, that each of the new democracies should accept and adopt political and constitutional guarantees that would restrain themselves from any territorial claims against their neighbor countries, from hostile propaganda against other states and that their names should not imply territorial claims against other countries. During the above conclusions however, Greek side did not press their thesis that FYROM should not be named after the term “Macedonia” (Παπαχελάς2019, p. 225).

In 1992, New Democracy (ND) - the Greek main centre right political party - was the governing party with Konstantinos Mitsotakis as the Prime Minister and Konstantinos Karamanlis as the President of the Hellenic Republic. This period coincides with the independency of FYROM from the Serbian authority. Therefore, this Greek government shaped the initial strategy as regards the issue of the official name the new state should adopt. In the early beginning of the negotiation process, the Greek side refused the official name of FYROM to include the term “Macedonia”. This thesis was explicitly expressed and was included in the conclusions of the conference among all the Greek leaders of the

parliamentary political parties, under the presidency of Konstantinos Karamanlis, that has been hold on 18thFebruary of 1992 (Συρίγος και Χατζηβασιλείου 2019, p.57).

The early years and the "Pineiro Package"

In front of the perceived, on behalf of Greece, threat that was coming from Skopje, the Greek government of ND turned to the European Economic Community and to the United Nations Security Council making its concerns clear, trying simultaneously to look for alliance in order the newly formed state not to join European Economic Community and UN under the name "Republic of Macedonia". Greek strategy has then been successful (Nimetz 2020, p. 207).

As regards the developments in the UN, on 7th April of 1993, the UN Security Council highlighted that FYROM could join UN under the name of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) - and not under its unilaterally chosen constitutional name, "Republic of Macedonia"- pending for a final solution - concerning the dispute between Greece and FYROM. The above resolution was taken, "in favor of peaceful and good relations in the region", as UN Security Council expressed (Resolution 817 (1993)/adopted by the Security Council at its 3196th meeting, on 7 April 1993). The above has been accepted by the General Assembly of UN and ultimately FYROM has joined UN, under that interim name, on 8th April of 1993. Then, UN Security Council initiated a mediation process in order the name dispute to be solved, putting into charge the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, David Owens and the former Secretary of State, Cyrus Vans. This fact led to a recommendation of the name "New Macedonia (Nova Makedonija) which was rejected from both the Greek and the FYROM's side. Later, Mathiew Nimetz, Special Envoy of USA government and then Special Envoy of UN on the name dispute, has been put in charge of the mediation procedure, on behalf of UN.

On behalf of European Union, first we see the initial approach which was summoned on the results of the European Council of Minister of Foreign Affairs, on 16th December of 1991. Later, on 17th February of 1992, the Foreign Affairs Council of EU authorized the acting president of the Council, the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joao de Deus Pinheiro, to find a solution as regards the specific dispute, in order the dispute to be solved and FYROM to begin the EU accession procedure.

The above should be regarded - on behalf of EU -as a move to de-escalate the tension that has been created in Greece, because of reactions the European dietary "Badider Committee" has caused. The "Badider Committee" was authorized initially to solve the problem, but in a written statement, it referred to FYROM as "Republic of Macedonia" and declared that this state has met all the necessary preconditions for its accession to EU. The EU accession of FYROM under the name of "Republic of Macedonia" was not accepted neither from the Greek political scene, nor from the Greek society. The Committee's reference to the country as "Republic of Macedonia" led to a Greek intense reaction, which in turn led to a massive - over one million protesters - rally in Thessaloniki, on 14th February of 1992. Greek people manifested that FYROM could not be accessed into EU under the name of "Republic of Macedonia".

So later, on 1st April of 1992, Pinheiro recommended the following solution, known as the "Pinheiro Package", which involved the proposal, FYROM to be named after "New Macedonia (Nova Macedonia)" and a clause that FYROM had to leave territorial claims, any hostile propaganda and to agree upon the thesis that there is not any "Slavic -Macedonian minority" in Greece.

The Pinheiro's solution was favored by the Greek Prime Minister, Konstantinos Mitsotakis, however the firm intra - party opposing reaction - and its thesis of "no reference of the term "Macedonia" for the official name of FYROM", in combination also with the fact that there

was a weak parliamentary majority made Mitsotakis withdraw and not eventually accept this solution.

Overall, on 26th June of 1992, European Economic Community did not recognize FYROM under the name of "Republic of Macedonia", taking into consideration the Greek political position upon the name dispute (Στέφος 2018:33).

The Interim Accord between Greece and FYROM: 13 September 1995

On 13th September 1995, in New York, the Interim Accord between the two countries, was signed after the mediation of Cyrus Vans, who tried to construct the conditions for a new agreement between the two parts (Nimetz 2020, p.208).

From the Greek side, under the government of Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), Karolos Papoulias, Minister of Foreign Affairs, took part in the negotiations.

As specifically was agreed upon the Interim Accord, Greece should recognize the independence and the sovereignty of the other part, under the name of FYROM, and the two parts should facilitate bilateral good relations. A liaison office should be instituted both in Athens and Skopje and both parts should confirm their common existing borders. Neither part should allow the interference of a third part, which could target against "the sovereignty, the territorial integrity or the political independence of the other part". Furthermore, based on the Article 6 of the Interim Accord, FYROM's constitution could never generate claims against any Greek territory and should not try to interfere in the internal affairs of Greece, supposing aiming in protecting the "status and rights of persons other than those who are citizens of FYROM".

The Interim Accord also highlighted the obligation, FYROM to disengage from any hostile propaganda and to “cease to use in any way the symbol displayed on its national flag”. Both parties should engage in refraining from imposing impediments to the movement of people or goods and to work in accordance with international law and customs. Furthermore, FYROM accepted to remove the “Star of Vergina” from its national flag and Greece to stop the commercial embargo as regards products from FYROM, which has been imposed from the then Greek government.

Greece also agreed not to object against the application of membership of FYROM in international, multilateral or regional organizations and institutions, in which Greece was a member. However, Greece could have the right to object against the application of that membership in the case FYROM would adopt a behavior about its name that could disturb the peaceful bilateral relations (Resolution 817/1993). Specifically, referring to the naming issue, “each party should reserve all its rights consistent with the specific obligations implied in the Interim Accord”. During these negotiations, Matthew Nimetz, as a Special Envoy of the United States of America, under Bill Clinton’s presidency, with reference to the dispute, played an important role. Later, since 1999, and for 20 years, Nimetz has been the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as regards the naming dispute between Greece and FYROM.

Next stop: Matthew Nemitz’s compound solution of 2008 and the NATO Summit in Bucharest

On 19th February 2008, as well as on 25th March 2018, the UN Special Envoy Matthew Nemitz has recommended compound name solutions, which Greece, under the governance of ND with Prime Minister, Costas Karamanlis, has turned down. However, this time, a new official line on behalf of Greece about the naming issue has been expressed. Specifically, a solution that could be accepted from Greece would be a compound name,

with a geographical term, which could be followed from the term “Macedonia” *erga omnes* (for all usages and all purposes).

This new round of negotiations aimed in influencing the Skopjan side to accept a compromising solution. This aim was particularly challenging, since now the Skopjan side, under the governance of VMRO-DPMNE, with Prime Minister, Nikolas Gruevski, has been intransigent (Kechagiaras 2012).

Concerning USA, their specific aim at that time, was Georgia, Ukraine, Croatia, Albania and FYROM to join NATO.

On behalf of Greece, even though the Greek government were seeking a solution, its intention to pose veto against the membership of FYROM into NATO, if FYROM insisted on using its constitutional name, was clearly expressed.

On behalf of UN and aiming to conclude in a solution before the NATO Summit of Bucharest, on 19th February of 2018 the UN Special Envoy proposed five alternative recommendations, which were not accepted from the Greek side, because first and foremost these included names that followed the spirit of the Skopjan Constitution and secondly, because they did not ensure a name *erga omnes*. Furthermore Nimetz proposed that the name “Macedonia”, either as a national regional name, or for its commercial use, could not be used for neither the two sides, from the podium of the Hellenic Parliament. Gruevski sustained his intransigent thesis, claiming that FYROM could accept a solution, like “Popular Democracy of Macedonia” or “Independent Democracy of Macedonia”, two alternatives that were clearly dismissed by Greece. Nimetz’s recommendations in March of 2018 were again rejected from both sides. Ultimately, during the 2008 NATO Summit, in Bucharest, Greece threatened to pose veto against FYROM joining NATO. NATO’s invitation was not eventually sent.

The Prespa Agreement

On 17th June 2018, after years of the negotiation procedures, the two involving parts, Greece, under the governance of SYRIZA, and FYROM, under the governance of Social Democratic Union of Macedonia, signed an agreement, trying to close the name dispute issue.

Under the Prespa Agreement, as this agreement was named after, because it was signed at the region of the Prespa lake in Greece, the two involving parts resulting in naming the second part (namely FYROM), as the "Republic of North Macedonia". According to the first article of the statement, the two countries have agreed, this name to be the constitutional name of the country and that this should be used *erga omnes*. The nationality of the Republic of North Macedonia should be "Macedonian/Citizen of the Republic of Macedonia" and its official language should be the "Macedonian language". According to the agreement, the term "Macedonia" and "Macedonian", on behalf of the Republic of North Macedonia should be used under the acknowledge - on behalf of both countries - that these terms refer to a different - between the two countries - historical context and cultural heritage. For Greece the reference would denote "not only the Greek area and the Greek people of the northern area of the country, but also their attributes, the Hellenic civilization, history, culture and heritage of that region from antiquity to present day".

For the second country, the reference would denote "its territory, language, people and attributes - with their own history, culture and heritage, distinctly different from those referred to under to the previous paragraph". North Macedonia also accepted that the "Macedonian language" belongs to the South Slavic languages. Both parties noted that, "the official language and other attributes of North Macedonia are not related to the ancient Hellenic region, history, language and heritage of the northern region of the first party (Greece)".

In reference to the North Macedonia's membership in NATO and EU, Greece agreed to not object against its application. Furthermore, both states confirmed their common frontier "as an enduring and inviolable international border". Neither party should "support any claims to any part of the territory of the other party or claims for a change to their common existing frontier". Neither party should also "support any such claims that may be raised by any third party."

Furthermore a reference to the agreement that could be connected with the timely threat for Greece- concerning the other country's claim of a "supposedly Slavic - speaking minority" in Greece , the two parties agreed that, "each party hereby commits and solemnly declares that nothing in its Constitution as it is in force or will be amended in the future can or should be interpreted as constituting or will even constitute the basis for interference with the internal affairs of the other Party in any form and for any reason including of the status and rights of any persons that are not its citizens".

Moreover, both states agreed to "take effective measures to prohibit any hostile activities, actions or propaganda by state agencies. Both states also agreed to take effective measures to "discourage and prevent any acts by private entities likely to incite violence, hatred or hostility against the other party".

According to Article 8 of the agreement, Greece and North Macedonia also agreed on, "if each party believes one or more symbols constituting part of its historic and cultural patrimony is being used by the other party, it shall bring such alleged use to the attention of the other party and the other party shall take appropriate corrective action to effectively address the issue and ensure respect for the said patrimony". North Macedonia also agreed that within six months following the force into entry of the agreement should renew the monuments, the public buildings, and the infrastructures whose reference was to ancient Hellenic history.

According also to Article 8, both countries also agreed that within one month after signing the agreement, an Inter - Discipline Committee, including experts on historical, archaeological, and educational matters, would be established. This aim of the Committee would be the "objective scientific interpretation of historical events, based on authentic evidence and scientific sound historical sources and archaeological findings". During the work of this Committee, that would be supervised by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of both parties, and if it comes out as appropriate, then both countries should proceed to revise any school textbooks, maps, etc., in accordance with UNESCO and Council of Europe's Conventions (Prespa Agreement 2019)

Results

In this chapter we have presented the European and international frame, that has been established for both the under - questioned cases, as regards the economic and the foreign affairs case. These were developments that were in par with the wider aims the European and international institutions and powers have shaped concerning the strategy for a solution of the two issues. There were aims that had put pressure on the Greek side in order the country to accept certain routes in order the solutions to be found. Both in the case of the economic and the foreign affairs matters, Greece was a pivotal player that - according to the exogenous restriction - had to adjust. However, before the outburst of the need the economic memoranda to be signed and before the Prespa Agreement, we saw a hesitation on behalf of Greece in implementing the suggesting policies. Greece was insisting on past strategies s, through which the country foresaw that stability could prevent itself from making mistakes. Mistakes, that in the first case would cause adverse effects, disturbing the living standards of Greeks and in the second case effects that could cause committed acts that could disrupt its national interests. It is a hesitation, that has also been obviously expressed by a certain part of ND, as we will see in the following chapter. Hesitation that

ran against demands and needs of the European and international system on a case - by case basis.

As regards the case of the economic memoranda, it seems that Greece did not have much room to challenge the external constraint, as the risk of the national bankruptcy was more than obvious. As regards the case of the name dispute, we saw the restraints, as they were shaped over time concerning the under - questioned issue. In the following chapters we will describe the intra - party (into ND) reaction, which sometimes was supportive of the European and international restriction and other times was up to disobedience and struggled to eliminate the extent of the exogenous restriction.

So, in the following chapters, we will see that although Greece has been a small state and specific restrictions should have been followed, Greek governments, specifically in our research government of ND, examined further parameters, divergent to the restriction. In the end the strength of the exogenous restriction dictated the governing policy of ND. We should mention that the effect is obvious only when ND has been the ruling party.

1.2 A new economic order: The Globalization and the European Restrictions

Towards the end of the 20th century and specifically after the fall of the Socialist Soviet Union, the capitalist economic paradigm of the West and especially that of the United States of America, was received as the only successful one to be followed in order national economies to be efficient and competitive as the globalization was expanding. This need was specifically generated from 1970s and onwards, when the economic theory distanced itself from state - driven economic policies. During 1970s, the high public debt and the high rate of the inflation, which were the consequences of the previous implemented economic policies in many national economies, have been indicated as evidence that the need for the

economic policies to be re-structured towards a more flexible direction, where the private economy should have a pivotal role in the whole national economic policy.

Furthermore, many western economies came then to see the Asian economies as an imminent economic threat, concerning the enormous economic advantage these economies have begun to obtain upon the international trade and the international exports. Their comparative advantage was created because of the low labor cost, which was leading inevitably to cheaper products and services in the global market. The western economies to manage and lower their high public debt started to borrow from the international capital markets. However, the competitive character of the international capital markets has indicated that the high public debt and the low productivity were disadvantages, that could not permit the incompetent economies having easy access to low-cost credit.

The above facts constitute the main circumstances that characterized the status of the globalization and the obligations the national economies, like Greece, had to meet. In the global arena, borrowing from the international capital markets, obliged the national economies to prove themselves competitive, competent, and efficient players. So, this situation marked new obligations for the national economies (Giddens 1998).

As regards the Greek case, it has timely belonged into the so-called category of *Mediterranean Capitalism*, which is distinctly different from the capitalist systems, that exist for example in USA, in Britain or in Germany. The Mediterranean Capitalism is characterized from a series of distortions in the internal markets of capital, products, services, and labor. The main cause of these distortions has been the unwillingness of the governments to free the private economy from state - driven policies and the public economy from an expanded clientele (Amable 2002). Inevitably Greece, from 1970s and onwards, was obliged to shape and implement a differentiated, compared to the past, more liberated economic policy.

The European Restriction

Greek governments struggled to achieve the above aims, first in the context of the European Economic Communities, later in the European Union and more specifically - after the adoption of the common European currency (Euro) - in the Eurogroup. The above European institutions, in accordance with European Committee, the European Council of Minister of Economic Affairs and the European Central Bank, have shaped restrictions which all member states had to adopt in order the member states to strengthen their economic competitiveness.

Specifically concerning Greece, but as also regards the rest of the member states, during 1980s, the European economic aim was to implement a stable monetary policy, in order the level of the inflation to be reduced. European Committee proceeded into the Single Exchange Rate Setting Mechanisms, for shaping certain limits, between which the inflation of each state member had to rate. Furthermore, the policy of currency devaluations should be eliminated because it has created imbalances for the Single European Market. The next target was the financial liberalization of the internal markets and later the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty.

Specifically, on 7th February of 1992, the Maastricht Treaty created a matrix of financial criteria, which all member states had to follow to create sustainable economies and later, to access the Single Monetary Union. Concerning these criteria, national economies had to keep their financial deficit lower than 3% of the GDP, the public debt lower than 60% and the level of the inflation lower than 2% (Treaty for European Union 1992).

In 1992 Greece had to reduce the rates of inflation. For achieving this target, the Greek government had to follow a prudent fiscal policy through reducing the public expenditure and increasing the public incomes (OECD 1991). Greece also had to liberate the financial

capital system, to exempt the pricing policy from state intervention and to implement structural reforms for lowering the labor cost.

The Greek national economy had furthermore to adopt and implement policies aiming to increase the quality of the educational system and to highly train the employees of the public sector. Greece had also to move towards privatizations of the state - owned sectors (OECD 1991, 1992, 1993, European Commission 1993).

Later and during 2000s, European Union focused more on structural reforms to be implemented and this was particularly the aim of the Lisbon Treaty. This was translated into the aim, European Union to become the most competitive economy globally until 2010 (Treaty of Lisbon 2007). The focus was both on the sustainable fiscal policy and on reforming the internal markets. The public expenditure had to be lower, the national incomes had to rise and the tax evasion to be tackled. Concerning the target of the competitiveness, the internal markets had to become more competitive, by lowering the cost of the labor. Concerning the aim of rising the productivity of labor, the civil servants had to be more well educated and to obtain more and modern skills. As regards the educational and the health care system, the services provided had to be more quality updated and their public funding to be sustainable (OECD 2005, 2007, 2009).

Although these restrictions were shaped and the member states had to follow them, the reality eventually was that there has been a competitiveness deficit among many member states - including Greece - which as a fact made these national economies unable to handle the economic crisis that has been risen in 2008. Although the Maastricht Criteria have set a strict rule, from 1992 and onwards, eventually, many member states had accumulated high percentages of public deficit and debt. Moreover, the competitiveness disadvantage referred to the incomplete structural reforms, to an extensive clientelist system and to an incompetent banking system. All

the above were the main characteristics of the Greek economy in 2008 as well, when the country had to tackle the financial crisis that was eventually turned into a debt crisis, further worsened by the threat of a national economic bankruptcy (Featherstone 2011, Frieden and Walter 2017).

The signing of the memoranda, in 2010, between the Greek governments, the European Institutions and the International Monetary Fund was seen as solution to all these problems.

The memoranda

The content of the three memoranda, in 2010, in 2012 and in 2015, that were signed from the three consecutive Greek governments (first PASOK, second ND - PASOK -LAOS, third SYRIZA), included the suggested reforms by the EU and the OECD. These included the reduction of the public expenditures, the increase of the public revenues, the strengthening of the banking system, the restoration of the liquidity, the management of the private debt, which was concentrated in the domestic banking system, the openness (liberalization) of the so-called closed professions (like the pharmacists), the active employment policies, that could reduce the labor cost and the unemployment, both in the public and private sector, the modernization and the digitalization of the public administration, the reduction of the recruitment in the public sector and the increase of the labor productivity in the public sector, the strengthening of the educational and the health care system and the reforms in favor of a sustainable system of social and welfare insurance (European Commission 2010, European Commission 2012, European Commission 2015).

1.3 The name dispute between Greece and FYROM

The name dispute between Greece and FYROM emerged in 1991, when Greece did not consent to its northern neighbor's demand to be officially named "Macedonia" and its public to be claimed solely as "Macedonian".

The solution was sealed, after many years of negotiations, between the two involving states and through the mediation of United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU), under the Prespa Agreement, which was signed on 17th June of 2018 – from the SYRIZA government as regards the Greek part. Under this solution, which will be described more extensively in the following chapters, the name "North Macedonia" was chosen as the official name of FYROM.

The History

Through describing the history that was preceded until the final solution, we will write down the base of the negotiation claims on behalf of Greece and the fears and the doubts against the strategy that was timely followed by FYROM.

The name dispute is only the modern fixation of the whole problem that has characterized the status of the relations between the two countries. This modern fixation has arisen after the independence of FYROM from the Serbian dominance in 1991.

However, the wider conflict as regards the two countries, has started during the 19th century, when we see the competition between Greece, Bulgaria, and Ottoman Empire, each of which claimed the region of "Macedonia" to be under its own dominance and their national Identity to be formed upon the population of this territory (Σφέτας 2018, p.17).

Based on the ancient history, "Macedonia" is the historical single region of the Balkan Peninsula in Southern - East Europe. Its national borders - from north to south and from east to west - were extended from the north of Skopje (the Capital of FYROM) to the Greek Mount of Olympus and from Greek Rodope Mountains to the Greek Pindos Mountain Range accordingly.

Ancient Macedonia coincides with the kingdom of Philip and his son, Alexander the Great, which has been established in the northern part of Ancient Greece. After the death of Philip, Alexander the Great has extended its kingdom, creating the "Macedonian Empire". In the 2nd century BCE Romans conquered the "Macedonian Empire". Later, in the 3rd century (AD), that whole region became part of the Byzantine Empire and in the 14th century a part of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman Empire has been disintegrated in the 19th century, and at this time, the "Macedonian Issue" arose (Nimetz 2020: 206). The wide region of "Macedonia" has been a place where many ethnotic groups existed.

During the Ottoman Empire, the history of the local populations created their national consciousness. The religion and the language of the population have been the pivotal factors for this procedure. The geographic area of "Macedonia" has arisen as the most conflict issue, since four different nations, the Greeks, the Bulgarians, the Serbians, and the Albanians, coexisted. The wide region was divided geographically in three zones. The north one included Bulgaria and Servia, where mostly Slavic - speaking populations were located, the southern zone was extended to the Greek Thessaly, where Greek - speaking people were located and the central zone was a mix zone (Κωφός 2012, pp.199- 200, 207).

After the creation of the independent Greek state, in 1830, Greek national ideology sought for its roots in the Greek ancient history and highlighted the resilience of the Greek nation during Byzantium and Ottoman rule. As regards the region of "Macedonia", for Greeks, the interest was mainly focused - regarding the search of the roots of the Greek nation - on the

kingdom of Alexander the Great and on the fact that the ancient Macedonians were Greeks (Κωφός 2012, p.206).

Through the years, the nationalisms have been fierce, in this area. In general, towards the end of the Ottoman Empire, the "Macedonian Issue" was centered to the creation of the national identity of the new - formed states in the wide Balkan region. The ideological confrontation shaped into an armed struggle among the parties (Greek, Bulgaria, Serbia and Romania), in their attempt to conquer their ethnically different neighbor, to impose on them their own national identity and to expand their territories.

Through the Balkan Wars, Greece has expanded its northern borders, obtaining the Southern part of Ancient Macedonia. On the other hand, as regards, Bulgaria and Serbia, the northern zone of the Ancient Macedonia, where mostly Slavic - speaking population existed, was divided between these two states.

Specifically, after the Balkan Wars, in 1912 - 1913, under the Treaty of Bucharest, the whole region was shared among Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia. Greece has acquired the 51% of the territorial part of Macedonia, Bulgaria 10%, and Serbia 39%, in which FYROM was located (Σφέτας 2018, p.41). The above status quo was also ratified under the Treaty of Neuilly, on 27th November of 1919, after the end of the First World War. In the context of Treaty of Neuilly, a voluntary immigration convention was agreed between Greece and Bulgaria (Μιχαηλίδης 2018, p.2).

After the end of the Second World War and during the Cold War, especially when the Civil War (1944 - 1949) was unfolding in Greece, Yugoslav Government, and the Socialist Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - one of the six states that were under the Yugoslav Federation, tried to revisit the above status quo against Greece by raising territorial and ethnic claims (Σφέτας 2018, p.95). The specific political powers have intended to create a "Slavomacedonian" identity for the Slavic - speaking population of Greece.

After years, the Socialist Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia achieved to separate itself from the demands of the Bulgarian nationalism and was engaged in a process of shaping its national identity. This process was based on the combination of the national characteristics of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Albania (Κωφός 2012, p.229).

As regards the relations between Greece and the Socialist Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the above fact, created conflicts, because the latter was aiming to combine its historic heritage with the ancient heritage of Greece. This, combined with Communist Yugoslav's policy concerning the unification of the whole "Slavo-Macedonian" population, posed threats against Greece, given that Greek Slavic - speaking people lived in Greek territory.

However, from 1941 to 1951 a population of approximately more than 25.000 Slavic - speaking people were moved from Greece to Yugoslavia (Κατσάνος 2008:53-55). For Greece there was no issue concerning the existence of a "Macedonian minority" in Greece (Κολιόπουλος, Ι. και Μιχαηλίδης, Ι. 2008, p.21). However, Skopje's insistence on the existence of a "Macedonian minority" in Greece, has been for years a timeless threat against Greece (Κολιόπουλος, Ι. και Μιχαηλίδης, Ι. 2008, p. 21). This threat did not help towards the normalization of the bilateral relations.

After the end of the Greek Civil War and after Yugoslavia turned to United States for economic help (1950 -1951 and onwards), the Greek - Yugoslavian relations were normalized. However, voices inside Yugoslavia about the existence of a "Slavic - speaking minority" in Greece, have never been eliminated.

Referring to the above facts and namely to those that took place during the Greek Civil War, we realize that a rivalry between Greece and then Socialist Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - later named as FYROM - was underway. It is a rivalry that on behalf of Greece has been translated as a threat against its national identity and perhaps even against its territory. On

behalf of the other country, it has been translated into a strategy to construct its national identity.

The naming issue after 1991

After the independence of FYROM, on 25th January of 1991, the problem became even more intense for Greece. The new state chose, through a domestic referendum, the term "Republic of Macedonia" as its constitutional name and Greek governments entered to intensive diplomatic procedures in order this to be overthrown. The reactions were even more intense in northern Greece, where a peripheral region is called "Macedonia" and its population is called "Macedonian". For Greece, there was no other "Macedonian language" than the Greek one, so they could not allow FYROM to claim that its native language should be called "Macedonian" (Nimetz 2020, p.207). Furthermore, the Skopjan claims that its historical roots were attached to the history of the Alexander the Great were seen as problematic, annoying, and offensive, by the Greek side.

Overall, Skopjan historical claims- namely their unilateral act to call their country as "Republic of Macedonia" and their language as "Macedonian", along with the fact, as we have already mentioned, that it was likely that FYROM would demand the recognition of "a supposedly existence of a Slavic - speaking minority" in Greece, led Greece to look with suspicion the strategy FYROM has followed. This is the reason why, as we will see in the exact following unit, Greece has adopted a strict national thesis and hindered the membership of FYROM in European and international institutions and organizations until 2018 and surely until the Prespa Agreement.

1.3.1 The road to the Prespa Agreement and the intermediate steps

On 16th December 1991, the European Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs was about to discuss recognition of the independence of the newborn democracies that had been shaped after the collapse of the Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia. According to the results of this Council, there were specific preconditions for the recognition to be achieved. Namely it was agreed among the European Ministers of Foreign Affairs, that each of the new democracies should accept and adopt political and constitutional guarantees that would restrain themselves from any territorial claims against their neighbor countries, from hostile propaganda against other states and that their names should not imply territorial claims against other countries. During the above conclusions however, Greek side did not press their thesis that FYROM should not be named after the term "Macedonia" (Παπαχελάς 2019, p. 225).

In 1992, New Democracy (ND) - the Greek main centre right political party - was the governing party with Konstantinos Mitsotakis as the Prime Minister and Konstantinos Karamanlis as the President of the Hellenic Republic. This period coincides with the independency of FYROM from the Serbian authority. Therefore, this Greek government shaped the initial strategy as regards the issue of the official name the new state should adopt. In the early beginning of the negotiation process, the Greek side refused the official name of FYROM to include the term "Macedonia". This thesis was explicitly expressed and was included in the conclusions of the conference among all the Greek leaders of the parliamentary political parties, under the presidency of Konstantinos Karamanlis, that has been hold on 18th February of 1992 (Συρίγος και Χατζηβασιλείου 2019, p.57).

The early years and the "Pineiro Package"

In front of the perceived, on behalf of Greece, threat that was coming from Skopje, the Greek government of ND turned to the European Economic Community and to the United

Nations Security Council making its concerns clear, trying simultaneously to look for alliance in order the newly formed state not to join European Economic Community and UN under the name "Republic of Macedonia". Greek strategy has then been successful (Nimetz 2020, p. 207).

As regards the developments in the UN, on 7th April of 1993, the UN Security Council highlighted that FYROM could join UN under the name of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) - and not under its unilaterally chosen constitutional name, "Republic of Macedonia"- pending for a final solution - concerning the dispute between Greece and FYROM. The above resolution was taken, "in favor of peaceful and good relations in the region", as UN Security Council expressed (Resolution 817 (1993)/adopted by the Security Council at its 3196th meeting, on 7 April 1993). The above has been accepted by the General Assembly of UN and ultimately FYROM has joined UN, under that interim name, on 8th April of 1993. Then, UN Security Council initiated a mediation process in order the name dispute to be solved, putting into charge the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, David Owens and the former Secretary of State, Cyrus Vans. This fact led to a recommendation of the name "New Macedonia (Nova Makedonija) which was rejected from both the Greek and the FYROM's side. Later, Mathiew Nimetz, Special Envoy of USA government and then Special Envoy of UN on the name dispute, has been put in charge of the mediation procedure, on behalf of UN.

On behalf of European Union, first we see the initial approach which was summoned on the results of the European Council of Minister of Foreign Affairs, on 16th December of 1991. Later, on 17th February of 1992, the Foreign Affairs Council of EU authorized the acting president of the Council, the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joao de Deus Pinheiro, to find a solution as regards the specific dispute, in order the dispute to be solved and FYROM to begin the EU accession procedure.

The above should be regarded - on behalf of EU -as a move to de-escalate the tension that has been created in Greece, because of reactions the European dietary "Badider Committee" has caused. The "Badider Committee" was authorized initially to solve the problem, but in a written statement, it referred to FYROM as "Republic of Macedonia" and declared that this state has met all the necessary preconditions for its accession to EU. The EU accession of FYROM under the name of "Republic of Macedonia" was not accepted neither from the Greek political scene, nor from the Greek society. The Committee's reference to the country as "Republic of Macedonia" led to a Greek intense reaction, which in turn led to a massive - over one million protesters - rally in Thessaloniki, on 14th February of 1992. Greek people manifested that FYROM could not be accessed into EU under the name of "Republic of Macedonia".

So later, on 1st April of 1992, Pinheiro recommended the following solution, known as the "Pinheiro Package", which involved the proposal, FYROM to be named after "New Macedonia (Nova Macedonia)" and a clause that FYROM had to leave territorial claims, any hostile propaganda and to agree upon the thesis that there is not any "Slavic -Macedonian minority" in Greece.

The Pinheiro's solution was favored by the Greek Prime Minister, Konstantinos Mitsotakis, however the firm intra - party opposing reaction - and its thesis of "no reference of the term "Macedonia" for the official name of FYROM", in combination also with the fact that there was a weak parliamentary majority made Mitsotakis withdraw and not eventually accept this solution.

Overall, on 26th June of 1992, European Economic Community did not recognize FYROM under the name of "Republic of Macedonia", taking into consideration the Greek political position upon the name dispute (Στέφος 2018:33).

The Interim Accord between Greece and FYROM: 13 September 1995

On 13th September 1995, in New York, the Interim Accord between the two countries, was signed after the mediation of Cyrus Vans, who tried to construct the conditions for a new agreement between the two parts (Nimetz 2020, p.208).

From the Greek side, under the government of Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), Karolos Papoulias, Minister of Foreign Affairs, took part in the negotiations.

As specifically was agreed upon the Interim Accord, Greece should recognize the independence and the sovereignty of the other part, under the name of FYROM, and the two parts should facilitate bilateral good relations. A liaison office should be instituted both in Athens and Skopje and both parts should confirm their common existing borders. Neither part should allow the interference of a third part, which could target against "the sovereignty, the territorial integrity or the political independence of the other part". Furthermore, based on the Article 6 of the Interim Accord, FYROM's constitution could never generate claims against any Greek territory and should not try to interfere in the internal affairs of Greece, supposing aiming in protecting the "status and rights of persons other than those who are citizens of FYROM".

The Interim Accord also highlighted the obligation, FYROM to disengage from any hostile propaganda and to "cease to use in any way the symbol displayed on its national flag". Both parties should engage in refraining from imposing impediments to the movement of people or goods and to work in accordance with international law and customs. Furthermore, FYROM accepted to remove the "Star of Vergina" from its national flag and Greece to stop the commercial embargo as regards products from FYROM, which has been imposed from the then Greek government.

Greece also agreed not to object against the application of membership of FYROM in international, multilateral, or regional organizations and institutions, in which Greece was a member. However, Greece could have the right to object against the application of that membership in the case FYROM would adopt a behavior about its name that could disturb the peaceful bilateral relations (Resolution 817/1993). Specifically, referring to the naming issue, "each party should reserve all its rights consistent with the specific obligations implied in the Interim Accord". During these negotiations, Matthew Nimetz, as a Special Envoy of the United States of America, under Bill Clinton's presidency, with reference to the dispute, played an important role. Later, since 1999, and for 20 years, Nimetz has been the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as regards the naming dispute between Greece and FYROM.

Next stop: Matthew Nemitz's compound solution of 2008 and the NATO Summit in Bucharest

On 19th February 2008, as well as on 25th March 2018, the UN Special Envoy Matthew Nemitz has recommended compound name solutions, which Greece, under the governance of ND with Prime Minister, Costas Karamanlis, has turned down. However, this time, a new official line on behalf of Greece about the naming issue has been expressed. Specifically, a solution that could be accepted from Greece would be a compound name, with a geographical term, which could be followed from the term "Macedonia" *erga omnes* (for all usages and all purposes).

This new round of negotiations aimed in influencing the Skopjan side to accept a compromising solution. This aim was particularly challenging, since now the Skopjan side, under the governance of VMRO-DPMNE, with Prime Minister, Nikolas Gruevski, has been intransigent (Kechagiaras 2012).

Concerning USA, their specific aim at that time, was Georgia, Ukraine, Croatia, Albania and FYROM to join NATO.

On behalf of Greece, even though the Greek government were seeking a solution, its intention to pose veto against the membership of FYROM into NATO, if FYROM insisted on using its constitutional name, was clearly expressed.

On behalf of UN and aiming to conclude in a solution before the NATO Summit of Bucharest, on 19th February of 2018 the UN Special Envoy proposed five alternative recommendations, which were not accepted from the Greek side, because first and foremost these included names that followed the spirit of the Skopjan Constitution and secondly, because they did not ensure a name *erga omnes*. Furthermore, Nimetz proposed that the name "Macedonia", either as a national regional name, or for its commercial use, could not be used for neither the two sides, from the podium of the Hellenic Parliament. Gruevski sustained his intransigent thesis, claiming that FYROM could accept a solution, like "Popular Democracy of Macedonia" or "Independent Democracy of Macedonia", two alternatives that were clearly dismissed by Greece. Nimetz's recommendations in March of 2018 were again rejected from both sides. Ultimately, during the 2008 NATO Summit, in Bucharest, Greece threatened to pose veto against FYROM joining NATO. NATO's invitation was not eventually sent.

The Prespa Agreement

On 17th June 2018, after years of the negotiation procedures, the two involving parts, Greece, under the governance of SYRIZA, and FYROM, under the governance of Social Democratic Union of Macedonia, signed an agreement, trying to close the name dispute issue.

Under the Prespa Agreement, as this agreement was named after, because it was signed at the region of the Prespa lake in Greece, the two involving parts resulting in naming the second part (namely FYROM), as the "Republic of North Macedonia". According to the first article of the statement, the two countries have agreed, this name to be the constitutional name of the country and that this should be used *erga omnes*. The nationality of the Republic of North Macedonia should be "Macedonian/Citizen of the Republic of Macedonia" and its official language should be the "Macedonian language". According to the agreement, the term "Macedonia" and "Macedonian", on behalf of the Republic of North Macedonia should be used under the acknowledge - on behalf of both countries - that these terms refer to a different - between the two countries - historical context and cultural heritage. For Greece the reference would denote "not only the Greek area and the Greek people of the northern area of the country, but also their attributes, the Hellenic civilization, history, culture and heritage of that region from antiquity to present day".

For the second country, the reference would denote "its territory, language, people and attributes - with their own history, culture and heritage, distinctly different from those referred to under to the previous paragraph". North Macedonia also accepted that the "Macedonian language" belongs to the South Slavic languages. Both parties noted that, "the official language and other attributes of North Macedonia are not related to the ancient Hellenic region, history, language, and heritage of the northern region of the first party (Greece)".

In reference to the North Macedonia's membership in NATO and EU, Greece agreed to not object against its application. Furthermore, both states confirmed their common frontier "as an enduring and inviolable international border". Neither party should "support any claims to any part of the territory of the other party or claims for a change to their common existing frontier". Neither party should also "support any such claims that may be raised by any third party."

Furthermore a reference to the agreement that could be connected with the timely threat for Greece- concerning the other country's claim of a "supposedly Slavic - speaking minority" in Greece , the two parties agreed that, "each party hereby commits and solemnly declares that nothing in its Constitution as it is in force or will be amended in the future can or should be interpreted as constituting or will even constitute the basis for interference with the internal affairs of the other Party in any form and for any reason including of the status and rights of any persons that are not its citizens".

Moreover, both states agreed to "take effective measures to prohibit any hostile activities, actions, or propaganda by state agencies. Both states also agreed to take effective measures to "discourage and prevent any acts by private entities likely to incite violence, hatred or hostility against the other party".

According to Article 8 of the agreement, Greece and North Macedonia also agreed on, "if each party believes one or more symbols constituting part of its historic and cultural patrimony is being used by the other party, it shall bring such alleged use to the attention of the other party and the other party shall take appropriate corrective action to effectively address the issue and ensure respect for the said patrimony". North Macedonia also agreed that within six months following the force into entry of the agreement should renew the monuments, the public buildings, and the infrastructures whose reference was to ancient Hellenic history.

According also to Article 8, both countries also agreed that within one month after signing the agreement, an Inter - Discipline Committee, including experts on historical, archaeological, and educational matters, would be established. This aim of the Committee would be the "objective scientific interpretation of historical events, based on authentic evidence and scientific sound historical sources and archaeological findings". During the work of this Committee, that would be supervised by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of both parties, and if it comes out as appropriate, then both countries should proceed to revise

any school textbooks, maps, etc., in accordance with UNESCO and Council of Europe's Conventions (Prespa Agreement 2019)

Results

In this chapter we have presented the European and international frame, that has been established for both the under - questioned cases, as regards the economic and the foreign affairs case. These were developments that were in par with the wider aims the European and international institutions and powers have shaped concerning the strategy for a solution of the two issues. There were aims that had put pressure on the Greek side in order the country to accept certain routes in order the solutions to be found. Both in the case of the economic and the foreign affairs matters, Greece was a pivotal player that - according to the exogenous restriction - had to adjust. However, before the outburst of the need the economic memoranda to be signed and before the Prespa Agreement, we saw a hesitation on behalf of Greece in implementing the suggesting policies. Greece was insisting on past strategies s, through which the country foresaw that stability could prevent itself from making mistakes. Mistakes, that in the first case would cause adverse effects, disturbing the living standards of Greeks and in the second case effects that could cause committed acts that could disrupt its national interests. It is a hesitation, that has also been obviously expressed by a certain part of ND, as we will see in the following chapter. Hesitation that ran against demands and needs of the European and international system on a case - by case basis.

As regards the case of the economic memoranda, it seems that Greece did not have much room to challenge the external constraint, as the risk of the national bankruptcy was more than obvious. As regards the case of the name dispute, we saw the restraints, as they were shaped over time concerning the under - questioned issue. In the following chapters we

will describe the intra - party (into ND) reaction, which sometimes was supportive of the European and international restriction and other times was up to disobedience and struggled to eliminate the extent of the exogenous restriction.

Chapter 2

New Democracy: The ideological roots, the intra - party conflicts.

The internal conflict as regards both economy and foreign affairs, before economic memoranda and before the Prespa Agreement

In this chapter we will first focus on the timely internal conflicts that have been created inside ND, which were against the economic liberal reforms, before 2010. Secondly, we will focus on the internal reactions that have been created as regards the name dispute, between Greece and FYROM then, namely before 2018.

In the beginning of this chapter, we will focus on the ideological roots of ND. Specifically, we need to highlight that this chapter is focused on the period before the signing of economic memoranda and the Prespa Agreement. The aim of the chapter is to investigate any intra - party dynamics, that were generated and were opposed the need for the liberal economic reforms and any compromises concerning the issue about the name dispute with FYROM.

2.1 The ideological roots of ND

New Democracy (ND) is the main Greek centre - right political party. It has been created on 4th July of 1974 by Konstantinos Karamanlis and its coming to governance in 1974 has symbolized the initiation of *Metapoliteusis*, namely the Greek transition into the parliamentary democracy, after the seven-year Dictatorship of Colonels.

The ideological roots of ND have been initially expressed by Konstantinos Karamanlis, who named the ideology of ND after the term "Radical Liberalism". This ideological identity has reflected the content of a previous ideology current that was generated approximately

during the decade of 1930, and which was characterized after the term “Bourgeois Radical Liberalism”. That ideological current had been expressed by dominant political figures of that time, who they later joined “National Radical Union (ERE)”. ERE was the political predecessor of ND and was existed from 1956 to 1967. “Bourgeois Radical Liberalism” was expressed - among others - by Panagis Papaligouras, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Konstantinos Tsatsos and afterwards even by Konstantinos Karamanlis. Under the existence of ND and the presidency of Karamanlis, all these political figures, as well as members and MPs of ERE were moved into ND (Χατζηβασιλείου 2003).

Bourgeois Radical Liberalism has been the fermentation of political and economic positions for achieving economic development and social welfare for Greece, after the end of the Second World War. Its main pillars focused on, shielding the parliamentary democracy, demolishing the monarchy, opposing, and restraining ideological extremes and on strengthening the education system. On the economic field, the focus - that time - was on expanding the state, mainly by creating and enhancing the social security and the welfare state. However, the above political aims were remained certain and unchanged, the economic aims were characterized mainly as dynamic, because the state expansion was not always considered as the most suitable solution for achieving economic development and securing social welfare.

This dynamic has been apparent, because during 1950’s, the position concerning the most suitable economic strategy has changed and it was substituted from an idea about a more prudent fiscal policy. In 1950’s, adherents, and exponents of Bourgeois Radical Liberalism, in government positions in ERE, aimed for limiting the state intervention and leaving more room for private economy (Χατζηβασιλείου 2010).

However, many years later, during 1970s, the economic orientation has changed again. Specifically, as regards the economy, in 1974 we see again an ideological turnover and specifically ND, under Karamanlis, to proceed towards state expansion and towards

widening the social welfare. That was an economic policy that was implemented during the first two terms of ND governments.

Later and specifically under the presidency of Konstantinos Mitsotakis, we see that ND aimed for a prudent fiscal policy, for limiting the state expansion and enhancing the private economy. There is ultimately the fact, that the alternating focus, either on the state expansion, or on the retrenchment, has created an internal ideological bipolarism. Inside ND, there have been MPs and party members that were in favor of the state expansion and the public social welfare. On the other hand, inside ND, there have also been MPs and party members that were in favor of limiting the state expansion, enhancing the private economy, and privatizing the social welfare. The first group were adherents and supporters of the ideas of Konstantinos Karamanlis and the second group has met its representative in the face of Konstantinos Mitsotakis.

In parallel with the dual approach of ND concerning the economic field, as regards the matters of foreign affairs, ND has overall maintained a more stable stance, having as basic aims, the cooperation within the European Union and NATO and securing its national interests against the hostile national positions on behalf of Turkey and FYROM. However, even though this stable approach was timely apparent and indisputable, we see that even in the foreign policy, there was also a form of intra - party bipolarism. Some MPs of ND and party members were more willing to find compromising solutions concerning Greece's open national issues, than others who maintained a stricter national strategy, which have not permitted any compromises. For the first group, the international system was a matter of high importance and Greece should follow the compromising solution that the international system was indicated as suitable. In front of this situation, the second group was opposed. In this case, we also see the internal distinction between the adherents of Konstantinos Karamanlis and the adherents of Konstantinos Mitsotakis, mainly after 1984, after the period Mitsotakis took over the leadership of ND.

In the following sub-chapter, we will see the internal conflicts concerning the economy before the era of the economic memoranda.

Internal Dichotomy upon the economic policy before the economic memoranda. Conflict between state driven and open economy.

On economic field, there has been an intra - party pole, which has been characterized as merely attached to the political ideas and actions of Konstantinos Karamanlis. That pole has timely been in favor of the state intervention in the economy, to secure the public funded welfare state system. On the other hand, there was also an internal second pole, which was characterized as favoring the limitation of the state intervention and enhancing the private economy. The people of the second pole were mainly adherents of Konstantinos Mitsotakis.

On the field of foreign affairs, this bipolar system was again apparent and has constituted accordingly, by the so-called wing of Karamanlis and the wing of Mitsotakis. On behalf of the first pole, the ideological and government strategy has been stricter, often ruling out the possibility of developing and resolving disputes concerning foreign policy issues, following a compromising solution that could not reflect Greece's national positions 100%. On the other hand, the second pole has been characterized as more open in dialogue and in compromises.

The tension and the opposition between these two poles have often been intense. That was a fact that often led to intra - party crisis, the exit from the party, and ultimately the hinderance of the governing work, in cases where ND was the government ruling party.

Moreover, the competitive nature that characterizes the relations between these two intra - party groups has been obvious in each intra - party electoral procedure for the leadership. With no exception, every time the internal electoral procedure was taken place, the

claimants and candidates for the leadership were come from one of the two distinct internal poles.

More specifically, the tension - concerning the economic field - has started to climate from the time Mitsotakis was the leader of the party and later the Prime Minister of Greece. Konstantinos Mitsotakis has expressed, shaped and tried to implement a governing financial policy, which focused on a prudent fiscal program, that included the elimination of the fiscal deficit and public debt, privatizations, the increase of the economic competitiveness, the demolition of the state monopoly in the banking sector and in the capital market, more flexible work relations, the elimination of the rights of the trade unions and the modernization of the public sector (Μητσοτάκης 1985, 1990).

During his service as a Greek Prime Minister, from 1990 to 1993, he tried to implement the above governing program. His approach faced the tough resilience of the other party pole - and the reaction from certain parts of the Greek society as well. Miltiadis Evert, as a Minister in the Mitsotakis' government, was a fierce representative of the opponent party pole. During Mitsotakis' government, Evert condemned the government of ND, claiming that the government work was linked to social injustice (Μηρατάκος 2000, p. 580). More fierce critique was expressed by other members of the party later - that were belonged to the same intra - party pole as Evert, especially in front of the decision of the party leadership to proceed to privatization of public sectors.

Especially concerning the issue of the privatization of public transportation of Athens, the criticism against Mitsotakis' intentions has been escalated. The same critics and reactions were also generated in front of the decision concerning the liberalization of the telecommunication sector, namely the privatization of the Organization of Telecommunications of Greece (OTE), which until then was under public ownership.

Many decades later, in 2017, Mitsotakis, during his TV interview, highlighted that that critique against him was expressed from those members of the party that were attached to a particular intra - party wing, to whom he referred as “Karamanlikoi”, describing specifically the structure of the bipolar intra - party system of ND (Μητσοτάκης 2017).

A similar pattern of intra - party conflict, we would see again a few years later, under the leadership of Kostas Karamanlis, nephew of Konstantinos Karamanlis. Before Kostas Karamanlis becomes Prime Minister, as a leader of the Parliamentary Opposition, he led a frontal attack against the Prime Minister of the then ruling party, PASOK, Kostas Simitis. Under Simitis’ governance, a governing policy was tried to be implemented with focus on making the working relations in the public sector more flexible and on making a flexible social security system.

ND voted then against the specific law schemes that included the above reforms, however seven members of the parliamentary group of ND, did not vote at all, expressing with this way their opposition to the decision of Karamanlis. Specifically, these politicians, among whom we see Konstantinos Mitsotakis (the former Prime Minister), Giorgos Souflias (former Minister of Education in Mitsotakis’ government), who voted “Present” and Stefanos Manos (former Minister of Economics again in Mitsotakis’ government) had previously expressed verbally their opposition to the Karamanlis’ decision, implying that the specific reforms could facilitate the national Greek economy. After the vote, Karamanlis erased George Souflias, Stefanos Manos and Vasilis Kontogiannoulos from the party parliamentary group (Μπρατάκος 2000, p.759).

More recently, another conflict has been created in ND, between the two opposing poles, as regards the economic memoranda, from 2009 and afterwards, which have been the agreements Greek governments have signed with the European Institutions and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in order Greece to receive loans to face the threat of national bankruptcy. This reaction will be furtherly described in the third chapter.

Internal Dichotomy upon the name dispute between Greece and FYROM then before Prespa Agreement. Conflict between solution or no solution.

The intra-party competitive poles concerning the economy, were also competitive as regards the foreign policy, and especially as regards the issue of the name dispute, between Greece and FYROM then. In fact, the intra-party competition until 2008 was presented as an intra - party dichotomy. There were those that were in favor of a strict line and disagreed with the term "Macedonia" to be included in the official name of FYROM, and those who were in favor of a compromising solution. In 2008, the whole of the party of ND has moved to a more mediocre position and specifically they agreed to a compound name erga omnes. Later after the signing of the Prespa Agreement, we will see the trichotomy of the party, based on the reactions they expressed in front of the Prespa Agreement. The intra - party reactions as regards the Prespa Agreement will be described in the fourth chapter.

During the service of the Prime Minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis, from 1991 to 1993, the aim of then European Economic Community was the recognition of the new states that were shaped after the demolition of the Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia, like FYROM, Slovenia and Croatia. On 18th February of 1992, the results of the Conference among the leaders of the parliamentary Greek political parties, under the President of the Hellenic Democracy, Konstantinos Karamanlis - except for the Communist Party of Greece - led to the conclusion that Greece, through the negotiations with the European Economic Community and UN - could recognize the state of FYROM unless a solution about the name of FYROM would include the term "Macedonia". This position, namely that the official name of FYROM should not include the term "Macedonia", was the official position, as regards the part of Greece, approximately until 2008.

However, during the negotiations Greece was pushed for an immediate solution, not taking under consideration the Greek thesis. At this period, European Economic Community could recognize FYROM even under the name of "Republic of Macedonia".

Mitsotakis was more willing to proceed towards a compromising solution. During the negotiations in April of 1992, Portugal Prime Minister, Joao de Deus Pinheiro, who was then in charge for the mediation between the two involving states, has recommended a solution on the name dispute, the "Pinheiro Package", which included the name "New Macedonia (Nova Macedonia)". As regards the "Pinheiro Package", the rest political leaders of the Greek political parties were expressed their opposition against it, on 13th April 1992.

Many years later, Mitsotakis would declare that in 1992, he was willing to accept the "Pinheiro Package", but he faced the fierce opposition, coming from the other political parties in Greece and from the opposing intra - party wing of ND and ultimately, he could not convince them for solution to be found (Μητσotάκης 2011). In fact, inside ND, the adherents of Karamanlis and Konstantinos Karamanlis himself were occupied with the thought that the people of Skopje were fanatical and that territorial claims would be raised, against Greece, through the propaganda that was exercised on the Slavic - speaking Greeks by Skopje (Kofos 1986, p. 167). This point of view was even expressed by the ND historical member and previous President of ND, Evangelos Averof Tositsas in a letter to Konstantinos Karamanlis in April of 1974 (Σφέτας 2018). Antonis Samaras has been the adherent of Averof and we could say that this party - group, the adherents of Averof, have adopted the more intense line against Skopje, in comparison perhaps with the adherents of Karamanlis.

The tension escalated when Mitsotakis dismissed the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Antonis Samaras. After this event, Mitsotakis took over himself the office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and started a new round of diplomatic actions. He achieved the European Prime Ministers during negotiations in the Summit of European Economic Community, on 26th

June of 1992, in Lisbon, European Economic Community to not recognize the northern neighbor of Greece under the name "Republic of Macedonia".

Later, on 7th April of 1993, FYROM then joined UN under the name "FYROM". Under the same conference, a mediation procedure upon the solution of the name dispute has been decided and the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of United Kingdom, David Owens, and the former Secretary of State, in USA, Cyrus Vans were positioned as mediators in this process. Their approach was led to the recommendation of the name "Nova Macedonia", which again Mitsotakis could not accept, because of the opposition of the majority of the other leaders of the Greek political parties, who were attached to the thesis that the name should not contain the term "Macedonia".

Overall, during his three-year office, Mitsotakis' stance upon the specific issue - as we have already seen - has been moved from the initial strict thesis that the name for the Skopjan side should not include the term "Macedonia" to a more compromised compound solution, that could include the term "Macedonia" in it. The above indicated his willingness a solution to be found (Μητσοτάκης 2011). Later in 1994, as the negotiations were continued, Mitsotakis said in a televised interview that Greece should accept the compound name (Mitsotakis 1994).

His willingness for a solution has also been expressed in 1996. Specifically, then, Mitsotakis said that the conditions during his governance were also in favor for a solution, because President Kiro Gligorov, then the President of FYROM - from 1991 to 1999 - was a politician that pursued and wanted good, cooperative, and friendly relations between Greece and FYROM (Μητσοτάκης 1996).

Inside ND, there was created a major intra - party crisis, as we have also mentioned. In October of 1992, a particular intra - party group was shaped into which Athanasios Kanellopoulos (then Vice - President of ND), Miltiadis Evert and Stavros Dimas were

included. These politicians, adherents of Karamanlis, were opposed the stance of Mitsotakis and have adopted a strict line as regards the negotiations about the name dispute. Staying to the strict ideological line of the party, they specifically called the government to not accept a name that would include the term "Macedonia" (Μηρατάκος 2000).

An even more reactive approach has been adopted by Antonis Samaras. Eventually Mitsotakis dismissed him from the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs in April of 1992 and Samaras exited the party, in October of 1992. Samaras claimed later that he was against the strategy that Mitsotakis had followed, which could lead to a compound name with the term "Macedonia" in it (Σαμαράς 1992).

After the collapse of the Mitsotakis' government in 1993, one year later in 1994, Miltiadis Evert, as the successor leader of ND, addressing the Hellenic Parliament, declared that Greece should not accept the recommended solution, with the term "Macedonia" in it. Furthermore, he mentioned that the dialogue as it has evolved through the European Communities has not led to results in favor of the Greek interests and so Greece should veto the accession of FYROM then in the European Communities (Έβερετ 1994).

From the exit of Samaras to the Prespa Agreement, we do not see another equivalent conflict inside ND for this issue.

Specifically, under the presidency of Kostas Karamanlis, all political parties, except for LAOS, agreed to the strategy that should be followed as regards the name dispute. This strategy included a compound name, erga omnes, the revision of the constitution of the norther neighboring country, elimination of redemption and of hostile propaganda on behalf of Skopje (Kechagiarias 2012, Σφέτας 2018, p. 32).

In 2004, after the re-election of President George Bush Jr in USA, it was obvious that the newly elected US government wanted FYROM to join NATO. That accession would be a part of the NATO's overall enlargement strategy in the widely Balkan and East - European region. The US willingness was explicitly expressed to the Greek government of ND, under the presidency of Kostas Karamanlis, when the Prime Minister, Karamanlis, visited USA. During the visit, the Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, has expressed the opinion that Greece should accept the FYROM's accession into NATO, because this was a part of USA's strategy to halt Russia's penetration in the Balkan countries.

However, the question was, under which name FYROM then could join NATO, given the fact that the mediation process through UN, had not been yet fruitful. Furthermore, at that time, US and FYROM then had signed two transnational agreements, according to which the US government referred to FYROM as "Republic of Macedonia". The unilateral act on behalf of USA was indicative of stance they would follow (Kechagiaras 2012).

USA unilaterally have recognized FYROM as the "Republic of Macedonia" and according to information USA government wanted the NATO enlargement to be concluded in April of 2008 with the accession of Georgia, Ukraine, Croatia, Albania and FYROM. However, despite this fact, Greece could not allow its northern neighbor to join NATO after the name "FYROM". In fact, in February of 2008, Kostas Karamanlis, addressing the national delegation at the Hellenic Parliament, clearly stated that "No solution means no invitation" (Καραμανλής 2008).

Greek government believed that if FYROM could achieve its membership in NATO and EU under the temporary name of FYROM, Greece could lose any leverage upon the name dispute and could not achieve a solution later that would take under consideration the Greek national interests.

So, on behalf of Greece the UN mediation was at this time a matter of high importance, in order a bilateral solution soon and before the NATO Summit of 2008 to be found.

Greek government struggled the UN mediation process to begin again. On 8th April of 2005 Mathiew Nimetz recommended a new solution, which was involved the name "Republic of Macedonia - Skopje". Greece agreed this solution to be the initial basis of a new round of negotiation, so the negotiations to start again. This period, under the Skopjan government of VMRO, with Prime Minister, Nikolas Gruevski, FYROM's stance in front of the new negotiations was characterized as intransigent. The government of Gruevski was attached to the name "Republic of Macedonia". However, the negotiations have started again (Στέφος 2018).

Concerning the new proposals of Mathiew Nimetz, as they were described in the previous chapter, on 29th February of 2008, the Greek Prime Minister, Kostas Karamanlis rejected them all, during his speech in front of the national delegation in the Hellenic Parliament. "A clear, practical and sustainable solution could not be constructed, in front of a proposal that describes the Skopjan Constitution", Karamanlis declared (Karamanlis 2008).

The Greek thesis was clearly then expressed by the Prime Minister, Kostas Karamanlis, during the NATO Summit, on 3rd April of 2008, in Bucharest. There, the Greek side met the USA's strong resistance, which was driven through their firm willingness FYROM to join NATO. The Greek Prime Minister threatened to veto the potential invitation towards FYROM to join NATO. President George Bush Jr retreated and ultimately an invitation to FYROM was not sent.

As regards the above issue, in 2008, we realize that there was no intra - party conflict in ND. There was not an apparent conflict, and this perhaps could be explained by the fact that the representatives of the two timely intra - party poles, Kostas Karamanlis, the Greek Prime Minister, and Dora Bakoyiannis, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs - joined their forces

and struggled FYROM not joining NATO, with no bilateral mutual solution previously to has been found.

Based on the facts that we have described in this chapter of our research; we see first and foremost that the two distinct and opposing intra - party were existed poles in ND. The dichotomy is apparent on both economic and foreign affairs fields. The only moment we see that this dichotomy had not generated conflicts was then when its representatives joined their forces and alienated. However, in the next chapter we will see that this internal dichotomy is active and that had generated intra - party conflict when the economic memoranda had to be signed and in front of the Prespa Agreement.

Results

In this chapter we tried to highlight moments in the history of ND, where the intra - party dichotomy has been apparent and led to internal conflicts. First for the issue of the economy, Greece then and until the international economic crisis of 2008, has not faced the threat of bankruptcy, so no immense action had been taken in order the national economic policy to adjust to the demands of the globalization. The statistics inside ND were gaining ground until 2008.

Secondly for the issue of the foreign affairs, although Greece tried to be realistic and to find a compound and compromising solution, FYROM's hostility and nationalism during 2000s was a deterrent factor for a viable and mutually acceptable solution.

At this point we should mention that concerning the intervening variables of the Neoclassical Realism, along with the intra - party and societal conflict, the position, and the stance of the other involving part (FYROM then) should be mentioned. During 1990s Mitsotakis believed that the cooperative stance of Gligorov offered a great opportunity for

a solution. Later, during 2000s Karamanlis could not proceed a solution with a compound name because Gruevski was not cooperative for a mutual solution.

For both the cases, a certain intra - party bipolarism has been generated inside ND. For the economic field, statistes were gaining ground and imposed a certain state - driven economic policy inside ND. Only the huge economic crisis made them change their opinion. Even under the leadership of a liberal Mitsotakis, the liberal reforms have not fully implemented due to the intra - party reaction. According to the name dispute issue, the inelastic initial stance of ND was changed. Especially under the leadership of Mitsotakis, Greece got close to a deal. Again, the intra - party reaction did not allow for a solution. In 2000s, under Karamanlis, Greece got again close to a deal, but the political leadership of Skopje did not allow for a mutual solution.

Until 2008 for the economic field, and until 2019 for the name dispute issue, ND could not lead Greece to a policy aligned with the exogenous restriction. It seems a stagnation.

Chapter 3

New Democracy: The intra - party conflict in front of the economic memoranda

In this chapter our focus is turning to the internal conflicts that have been created inside ND in front of the economic memoranda, from 2010 to 2019. This is the period when the economic memoranda were implemented in Greece. The internal partisan tension will be examined through the content of the parliamentary discussions, where the opposite views were clearly expressed and through the relative journalistic pieces, which highlighted the tension and hosted specific and relative statements of the opposing groups.

3.1 The internal conflicts inside ND

In 2008, USA was suffered from a fierce banking crisis, which aimed to be diffused into the whole European economy and evolved into a debt crisis for many European national economies, including the Greek one. In general, this crisis led to the inability of economies to achieve low-cost credit in the international fiscal markets. The high spreads and interests made national borrowing a pivotal problem, especially for economies that were for years characterized as weak, because they had weak internal markets and a competitiveness deficit. Greece was timely such a case. Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Italy as well.

This weakness reflected the fact that the previous years those European economies had not achieved to shield themselves through structural reforms and fiscal prudence, that could lead to the increase of their competitiveness.

Concerning the problem that has been created, a problem that could lead to the bankruptcy of a series of European economies and to a severe economic problem for the whole Eurogroup, a specific decision was made, on behalf of European institutions, as were the European Committee, the European Central Bank and the European Council of the Ministers of Finance, to proceed to the memoranda. Under the term "memorandum", a specific agreement is meant, between the European Institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the under fiscal threat European economies. Under this agreement, European Union (European Committee and European Central Bank) and IMF became the borrowers, under the precondition that the governments of the lending economies should proceed into a prudent fiscal program, in order the fiscal deficit and the public debt to be eliminated and into a program of structural reforms, in order the internal economic competitiveness to be increased.

As regards the commitment on behalf of Greece, the public expenses had to be eliminated, the public incomes had to be increased, the internal market of product and labor to be liberalized and the whole public sector to be restructured. The aim of the above policies were the increase of labor productivity and the decrease of the public cost. These were policies, that again in the past, some Greek governments were struggled to imply, with no positive result, because of the fierce resistance of a major part of the political world and the Greek society.

Moreover, in the past specific Greek governments' initiatives to proceed into the above economic direction fired intra - party conflicts. This was the case, for example, of the presidency of Konstantinos Mitsotakis, where, as we have already seen, an internal resistance was created that threatened the internal party and the cohesion and the survival of the governments.

European institutions have undertaken the responsibility and the power of monitoring the implementation of the memoranda in the national economies. The European restriction that has been shaped is described as strong and intense.

The strong exogenous restriction, which indicated that implementation of the memoranda has been the viable solution in order national economies to avoid the national bankruptcy came to smooth inevitably the intra - party reaction, because under the threat of the bankruptcy the majority of those MPs of ND that were opposed, chose to be loyal to the need this policy to be implemented.

However, timely inside ND there was a specific part of politicians who believe that the fiscal austerity and the liberal structural reforms would negatively affect the income of the society and that these could not lead to the necessary economic development. As regards the "era of the memoranda" the intra-party reaction was firstly expressed approximately in 2009.

Specifically, the outburst of the global economic crisis in 2008, coincides in Greece with the governments of ND with Prime Minister, Kostas Karamanlis. During this governance (from 2004 to 2009), certain expansive fiscal and social provisions were implemented, particularly in the period between 2006 and 2008. Even though this government had to follow a strict fiscal program until 2006, in order the fiscal deficit to be eliminated under the margin of 3% of GDP (Treaty of European Union 1992) afterwards and until 2008, fiscal discipline and structural reforms, according to the Lisbon Treaty, have not been implemented.

However, in 2008 the Greek governments had to adopt fiscal policies, that could shield the national economy in front of the consequences of the global fiscal crisis. The Greek Prime Minister understood the seriousness of the circumstances

and especially before the national elections of 2009, on 5th September of that year, Kostas Karamanlis, speaking during the Thessaloniki International Exhibition, announced a series of economic measures that reflected the liberal economic approach that should be followed onwards. Specifically, Karamanlis announced strict controls upon public spending, measures against the tax evasion and structural reforms in the internal market of products, services, and labor - towards a more flexible - with less state intervention - direction (Καραμανλής 2009).

Specifically, Karamanlis announced the freezing for the upcoming years of public sector recruitment, except for the health and the education sectors, the freezing of the increase of pensions, except for the low - income pensioners, the digitalization of control mechanisms for tackling tax evasion and the intensification of the privatizations.

As regards the internal market of labor, the Greek Prime Minister announced the extension of part - time employment, the extension of fixed - term employment contracts and the broadening of active employment policies (Καραμανλής 2009).

In front of this change of policy, there were reactions, as these that have been expressed from the ND's MP Ioannis Manolis. The intra - party cohesion was weak. That was a fact that could cause problems against the government's ability to continue stably its work, given the fact that at that time ND had only 151 MPs. Under the threat that MPs could vote against the bills, Kostas Karamanlis called for early elections, which ND lost.

ND lost the election, Karamanlis' strategy for consolidation has not been implemented and Greece walked down the road that led inevitably to the economic memoranda. Concerning the era of economic memoranda, the intra -

party rivalry, that has been created was intense and constant for many years. The conflict is always translated into the rivalry between certain MPs and the leadership. In cases where the leadership was against the economic memoranda, the reaction was born from the intra - party liberal pool. On the contrary, in cases where leadership has been in line with the implementation of the economic memoranda, the reaction was born from the intra - party statist pool. In the following section we will write down the above intra - party reactions, through the "era of the memoranda".

The case of the first Economic Memorandum

The Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) won the national elections on 4th October of 2009 and the new government of PASOK, with Prime Minister, George Papandreou, signed the first loan agreement with the European Institutions and the IMF. The relative bill was voted on May 6th of 2010. The new leader of ND, Antonis Samaras, decided ND to vote against the bill.

However, this decision was not a unanimous decision inside ND. Only few days later, Dora Bakoyannis, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of Kostas Karamanlis, and then a MP of ND, had declared that she would vote in favor of this bill during the plenary of the Hellenic Parliament. Antonis Samaras erased Bakoyannis from the parliamentary group of ND, on 6th May of 2010.

Antonis Samaras had adopted a firm opposite thesis against this first loan agreement. His opposition was expressed during the relevant parliamentary discussion of 6th May. Specifically, during his speech on that day, Samaras said that the policy of the new fiscal agreement was translated into "a vicious cycle of recession, persistent deficits that necessitate new tough measures - tougher each time - cuts, which will lead to an even greater recession." Samaras mentioned that

this is the reason why ND would not vote in favor of this bill, also highlighting his position that, “today we are all called to discuss the actual dependence of the country on foreign control mechanisms” (Σαμαράς 2010).

After Dora Bakoyannis was erased from the parliamentary group of ND, she declared through an announcement the reasons why she deviated from the official party line. Specifically, she mentioned that “We are in a moment, where there are no more options. In exchange for these sacrifices, there is an offer of funding of 110 billion euros in order Greece to avoid bankruptcy. And it is offered to us now when no one else lends us”.

Furthermore, she continued by saying that “given the real situation in the country, without the supportive stance of the official parliamentary opposition, it is likely that the measures will not be implemented effectively. The people will eventually shoulder both the sacrifices and the huge cost of bankruptcy”.

Bakoyannis also mentioned that her position was, “the official parliamentary opposition (ND) to vote in principle in favor of the bill, because its acceptance is a precondition for us to get the “salvation package” and to vote against some unjust and ineffective articles. Articles as the reduction of the income of the poor pensioners and the increase of the VAT, which can be replaced by others of equivalent fiscal effect” (Το Βήμα 2010). After Bakoyannis exited ND, she created a new political party, which was named after “Democratic Alliance”. Some MPs of ND, such as Lefteris Avgenakis, Christos Markogiannakis and Ilias Kontogiannis followed her. Avgenakis was also erased from ND, after he referred to the creation of this new party with positive comments, while Markogiannakis and Kontogiannis proceeded to their independence from ND. Theodoros Skylakakis, then Member of the European Parliament, that has been elected with ND,

proceeded also to his independence and to his accession to the Democratic Alliance (Νασόπουλος 2010).

Concerning this time, the intra - party reaction is condensed in the rivalry between a liberal intra - party fraction and the leadership of ND that was opposed to the first memorandum. Next, concerning the period of the second memorandum, the rivalry was reversed. The second memorandum, the continuation of the first one - was signed from ND as well. Then a statist intra - party fraction was opposed to the same leadership that now was in favor of the implementation of the second memorandum. The differentiated position of the leadership of ND sparked the reaction of the intra - party statist. On the other hand, the smoothed new position of the leadership of ND led Dora Bakoyannis, before the elections of June 2012, to return to ND and to suspend her own newly - shaped political party.

The case of the Second Economic Memorandum

In 2011 circumstances have changed and ND did not have the margin to deviate from the acceptance of the implementation of the memorandum. ND's acceptance was put as a precondition in order in 2011 the sixth installment to Greece to be disbursed. Finally, Samaras decided to support the fiscal policy of the memorandum, placing as a precondition, a new allied government - with the support from other parties - to be formed. According to Samaras the existing PASOK government should be replaced.

Eventually, in November of 2011 a new government was formed, with the parliamentary support of PASOK, ND and the extreme right political party of

LAOS, with Prime Minister the former Vice - President of the European Central Bank (ECB), Lukas Papademos.

During the parliamentary discussion of the Program Statements of the new government and of the Vote of Confidence from the Parliament to the new government, Samaras mentioned - explaining his support to the new formed government, from the plenary step - that, "after the unfortunate initiative of the previous Prime Minister (George Papandreou) for a referendum that completely shook the credibility of the country, Greece was left as an ungovernable ship in a global storm. The danger the country at that time faced was not small. It was rather big and there was no small need for a solution to the impasse. It was immediate and compelling.

So then, we took the initiative to demand the cancellation of the indescribable referendum and the creation of a transitional government that will restore Greece's credibility abroad, normalcy at home and that will lead the country to elections as soon as possible. We did it with determination, with perseverance, with religious reverence in the constitutional order and we achieved it.

We have clearly defined its mission and it is summoned to the following triptych, to unlock the sixth installment that is already ready to be disbursed from October 27th - when it climbed against then Prime Minister's announcement conceding the referendum - to promote the completion of the loan agreement, which from the first moment I considered it as inevitable concerning the route the circumstances have taken and to lead the country to elections on 19th February" (Σαμαράς 2011).

This turnover, on behalf of Samaras and ND, caused severe reactions internally in ND. One of the most severe criticisms against this new government and the

relative supportive decision of the party leadership, was expressed by MP of ND, Panagiotis Kammenos. Specifically, on 16th November of 2011, Kammenos declined to give a confidence vote in favor of the new government and as a result Samaras erased him from the parliamentary group of ND (Iefimerida 2011). The intra - party reactions were climaxed on 12th February of 2012, during the parliamentary discussion upon the approval of the second memorandum. First, the MP of ND, Nikos Legkas resigned from his office. Later, 19 MPs of ND did not vote in favor of the second memorandum, and they eventually were erased from the parliamentary group of ND (News247.gr 2012). Some of the above MPs were accessed into the new political party that Panagiotis Kammenos had created on 24th February of 2012, and which was named after "Independent Greeks".

The Papademos government completed its government work in the Spring of 2012 and in May and June of the same year, national elections were held. Before the elections of June, Dora Bakoyannis returned to ND, suspending her own newly stated political party. The results of the election led an allied government, among ND as the first party (having obtained most of the seats), PASOK and Democratic Left (DIMAR). Antonis Samaras was put as the Prime Minister.

During the years of this new government, although we do not realize any outburst of internal reactions - such those of 12th February - however there were moments, where MPs of ND have expressed their disagreement against the structural reforms that this government was implemented, and which were included in the second memorandum. For example, there is the case of today MP and then Deputy Minister of Development, Maximos Charakopoulos, who expressed his reaction against the reforms of the Ministry of Development. Specifically, when Minister of Development, Kostis Chatzidakis, struggled to institutionalize more flexible relations upon the market of products (ex. the time regulation of disposal

and sale of milk), Charakopoulos resisted and finally quitted from his office (Τερζής 2014).

However, although these reactions did not lead to another major internal conflict inside ND, we can see, as this has been investigated in previous research projects, that this resistance has a share of responsibility upon the failure of this government to implement efficiently certain structural reforms during this time of period (Μουζακιάρη 2020, pp.438-442).

In January of 2015, ND lost the national elections and government of SYRIZA was shaped, with Alexis Tsipras as Prime Minister. The economic strategy of the new government led finally to a third memorandum, against which the whole of ND, now with a new leader, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, collectively was expressed.

The collective reaction of ND against the policy SYRIZA and against the third memorandum, was translated as a reaction against a controversial strategy SYRIZA was followed, blaming SYRIZA that its costly and anti-European strategy has been the cause for the third memorandum. However, inside ND there was not a differentiated pole, that could applaud the third memorandum of SYRIZA, against the willingness of the leadership of ND.

Results

In this chapter we saw that the so - called state - wing of ND has agreed to consolidation of the Greek economy, only when it had no more room for defiance. On the other hand, it was found that the so - called liberal wing of ND was opposed the decisions of the statist wing. However, the influence and the power of the leader of ND and the high levels of the party discipline which derive and meet the face and the decisions of the leadership do not permit at a large

extent the expression of the differentiation against the central political line inside ND.

For the leadership of ND, having a strict exogenous restriction, combined with the threat against its national interests' detriment. This as a fact does not allow disobedience. In any case, ND was divided in front of the decision of the economic consolidation and specifically in front of the economic memoranda.

However, the party leadership of ND usually complied with external restrictions. The margin of its disobedience was developed only during the period of its tenure as the official opposition and certainly not during its tenure as the Greek government. On the contrary, as a government, when there were immediate reasons for compliance with the exogenous restriction, the leadership of ND chose to comply.

It is therefore understood - as regards the matters of economic policy - that in ND the decision for disobedience comes when those who react against do not have the major responsibility of policy implementation. We saw that they, being away from the seats of major responsibility, can bring up ideological causes or follow merely partisan strategies, reacting against the external liberal restriction.

The internal party MPs, who are supporters of the liberal exogenous restraint are proved to be more sincere, as their action and their ideology are usually close.

Yet another question that can be answered is whether ND saw the liberal exogenous restriction as the only way that as a government party should follow. Since, following the exogenous restriction then, as a fact meant that the national economy could avoid the threat of bankruptcy and of exit from Eurozone and

European Union, we understand that the decision of compliance was considered as the only way, nevertheless just up to a point.

There are reasons that could lead a government of ND to stop complying. In the case of ND, in 2009 the weak parliamentary majority and the intra - party reaction against the policy of retrenchment, led Karamanlis to call for early elections and eventually to stop any strategy for consolidation. In the case of Samaras government, the mild but real intra - party reaction against the second memorandum and the fast and worrying rise of SYRIZA, led Samaras first in 2014 to reshuffle, putting MPs in government that in the recent past were opposed the memorandum and secondly in 2015 to proceed to early elections putting an end to the structural reforms that his government has initiated. The rise of SYRIZA was the willingness of an opposing -against the memoranda - Greek society, that could not vote political parties that had previously voted and implemented memoranda. Alexis Tsipras, leader of SYRIZA, had declared that he would not follow the obligations that the memoranda have generated, so a significant part of the Greek society moved towards SYRIZA.

So, the answer is that intervening variables, such as the intra - party reaction, the weak parliamentary majority, the electoral agony, and the threat of losing the elections, led governments of ND to stop the consolidation and to move to elections. As we have already mentioned in the first and the second chapter, Neoclassic Realism explains the strength of the intervening variables in the process of a government to shape its policy. Evidently the great threat as it has been created in 2008 and later, made ND, only as a governing party, to proceed into a liberal shift and to embrace the economic liberal policy. There, we see the significance of the status of the small state. The great need led ND to proceed into liberal reforms.

Chapter 4

New Democracy: The intra - party conflict in front of the Prespa Agreement

4.1 The internal conflicts in ND in front of the Prespa Agreement

In the second chapter we described that concerning the name dispute, between Greece and FYROM, an internal (ND) ideological conflict has been expressed, especially during the presidency of Konstantinos Mitsotakis (1990-1993). Later, in 2008, during the presidency of Kostas Karamanlis, when the issue was again emerged through external conditions (NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008), the parliamentary group of ND remained aligned with the leadership, expressing the decision, that FYROM could not access NATO, under the interim name of FYROM, but a mutual accepted -between the two countries - solution had to be found.

Until 2018, no solution has been found between the two parts. However, in 2018, the government of SYRIZA proceeded and achieved a solution with the northern neighbor of Greece. Greece and FYROM ultimately signed the Prespa Agreement. That time, ND under the presidency of Kyriakos Mitsotakis, was the official parliamentary opposition and voted against the Prespa Agreement at the procedure of ratifying this agreement at the Hellenic Parliament, on 25th January of 2019.

The rallies against the Prespa Agreement and the ND's participation into them

The advent of the news concerning the new agreement was accompanied with feelings of tensions and frustration from a specific part of the Greek society and from ND.

From January of 2018 to January of 2019, massive rallies were held, both in Thessaloniki and Athens in Greece, and in other Greek cities as well, during which the protesters have expressed the demands, the new name of the country to not include the term "Macedonia" and neither "Macedonian" identity nor "Macedonian" language to be recognized in favor of the people of the northern country. According to the Prespa Agreement, the two parts agreed the previously named country FYROM to be named after "Republic of Northern Macedonia" and a "Macedonian" identity, as well as a "Macedonian" language to be recognized for the people of this country.

The first and the second rally, on 21st January of 2018 and on 4th February of 2018, in Thessaloniki and in Athens, accordingly, were the largest ones.

The main organizer of the rallies was the "Pan-Macedonian Confederation", while distinct "Pan-Macedonian" associations, local cultural associations, as well as Christian-Orthodox associations from Greece and abroad also participated in the organization. Many MPs of the Hellenic Parliament and specific many MPs of ND joined the rallies as well.

Antonis Samaras, the previously Prime Minister and leader of ND, Adonis Georgiadis, Konstantinos Tasoulas, MP of Ioannina, Giorgos Koumoutsakos, the head of the Foreign Policy then - during ND was the official opposition in the Hellenic Parliament, Konstantinos Karamanlis, the MP of regional district of Serres and nephew of the former Prime Minister and leader of ND, Konstantinos Karamanlis (1973-1980), Apostolos Tzitzikostas, the Regional Governor of Central Macedonia and former candidate for the presidency of ND, Stavros Kalafatis, Lefteris Avgenakis, Vasilis Kikilias and many other MPs of ND participated in the rallies (Πρώτο Θέμα 2018).

Furthermore, the mayor of the municipality of Amarousio, later - after 2019 - Governor of the regional district of Attiki, and a timely member of ND, George Patoulis has been one of the organizers of the rally of 4th February of 2018 (Πρώτο Θέμα 2018, Σουρέλης 2018).

In 2018, ND, as the official parliament opposition, was against the signing of this agreement. However, the tense of the reaction among the MPs of ND was different. Among the MPs of ND, we distinct the milder reaction, the opposition and the more intense opposition.

Specifically, the milder reaction was expressed from the so-called liberal wing of ND. First, the President of ND and leader of the official parliamentary opposition, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, a main representative of the liberal intra - party wing, did not attend the rally. Furthermore, milder opposite voices were expressed from Nikos Dendias, Marietta Giannakou and Dora Bakoyannis. Moreover, adopting the same argument, Miltiadis Varvitsiotis, said that he would join the rally, simply for declaring his opposition against the SYRIZA government's handling concerning the negotiations about the name dispute (Κρουστάλλη Δήμητρα 2018). In July 2018, long before the Prespa Agreement had been ratified by the Hellenic Parliament (which happened on 25th January of 2019) Mitsotakis declared his position that ND - as a government in the future will abide by the Prespa Agreement, after it was ratified by the Hellenic Parliament (Η Καθημερινή 2018).

Furthermore, we may describe this mild opposition through the words, Kostas Fragogiannis, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Mitsotakis government (after the elections of 7th July of 2019), chose to describe the Prespa Agreement. Specifically, in September of 2021, during a session of the Parliamentary Committee of National Defense and Foreign Affairs, the Deputy Minister of

Defense, Kostas Fragogiannis, referred to the Prespa Agreement. Specifically, Fragogiannis said that, "Even though we have severe disagreements with the Prespa Agreement, even though the difficulties it presents for its implementation, practical difficulties, about which I could refer, because I have not done that before in the Hellenic Parliament, we are focused the countries of Western Balkans to be part of the European Union and we are focused on peace in a region that faces difficulties concerning the relations between the states" (Φραγκογιάννης 2021). The liberal wing also highlighted the need the Skopjan side to implement fairly the Prespa Agreement. Specifically, in October of 2020, during a meeting Mitsotakis had with the President of North Macedonia, Stevo Pendarovski, the Greek Prime Minister mentioned that "the strengthening of the relations between the two countries and Athens's support in the European accession of the neighbor country, are dependent on the full, consistent, good, and faithful implementation of the Prespa Agreement (Skai.gr 2021).

This milder opposition intended, through compromising policy, to peace, political stability, and economic development for the whole region of the Balkans. They say that they could end up in a better solution as regards the name dispute, in case they were in charge as a government, however, since the Prespa Agreement has been ratified, the ND government, under the presidency of Kyriakos Mitsotakis, will abide by it.

For distinguishing particularly, the difference between the opposite and the more intensively opposite stance as regards the rest of the MPs of ND, we will write down their reaction as regards the stance they declared that they would follow as regards the voting of the three implementing laws - concerning the Prespa Agreement. These implementing laws should be voted during the governance of ND, after July of 2019, under the presidency of Kyriakos Mitsotakis. Until now, the

moment this research is being written, these implementing laws have not been voted by the Hellenic Parliament.

Concerning the opposite line against the Prespa Agreement, this is expressed in a less intense way, comparatively obviously with the rest of the intra - party reaction, that we will describe later. We could say that the opposite line is expressed by the internal pole of "Karamanlikoi", which has as a main representative the previous Prime Minister and previous leader of ND, Kostas Karanalis. Karamanlis has not himself declared that he would vote against the leadership decision, although there are rumors that he may do so. His stance is firmly opposite to the Prespa Agreement. According to a press release in June 2021, the former Prime Minister (Kostas Karamanlis) said to Kyriakos Mitsotakis that Athens should not hurry as regards the voting of the implementing laws as regards the Prespa Agreement, but the other side must prove its consistency to the implementation of the issues that have been agreed in the Prespa Agreement. According to the press release, no one could expect that Karamanlis could vote these memoranda, whether and when they come (Σαμαρά 2021).

Specifically, during a speech, Karamanlis gave in 2019 in Thessaloniki, referring to the Prespa Agreement, he said that the acquis, that has been achieved in Bucharest in April 2008, has not been used properly. He also said that Greece should and could have demanded and achieved much more during the negotiation process. Recent developments, he also mentioned, have confirmed that the other part (FYROM) was in a hurry to join NATO and the EU, and they still had a long way to go (Καραμανλής 2019).

Concerning Kostas Karamanlis, we could look back during his governing stance and actions in 2008, when he threatened to pose veto against the accession of FYROM in NATO, unless previously a mutually accepted name solution could

have been found. Many of the supporters of the internal pole of “Karamanlikoi” have attended the rallies, expressing their opposition to the strategy followed SYRIZA and against the fact that with the Prespa Agreement, there is recognized a “Macedonian identity” and a “Macedonian language” for the people of North Macedonia.

As regards the intensively opposite line, the previously Greek Prime Minister and previously leader of ND, Antonis Samaras, firmly declared that he would vote negatively, namely against the implementing laws, when these laws will come to the voting procedure from the Hellenic Parliament. Antonis Samaras, as we have already described, has historically followed an uncompromised line, as regards the national issues of Greece. Moreover, Samaras, during an interview he gave in January of 2021, (referring to the Prespa Agreement) mentioned that “neither the problem was solved, nor Greece saw any good. Only an unbearable national damage by giving name, identity, and language”. The wording the former Prime Minister has used is indicative of the high level of his disagreement (Παπαντωνίου 2021). During the rallies, Samaras has attended them, as we have already mentioned. So did the rest of the MPs of ND that constitute his supporting pole inside ND.

Between the two previously Prime Ministers, Kostas Karamanlis, and Antonis Samaras, we should say that there is a distinct difference in the political tone they use. Samaras uses an offensive tone as regards this Agreement. On the other hand, Karamanlis has not made any relative mentions, but his political speech is more mediocre. As an example, we could refer to his recent political speech, during an event that has been hosted by the Institution of Konstantinos Karamanlis, where he stressed the need for national unit around national issues. Specifically, using a quote from Konstantinos Karamanlis, that he had used it, addressing the Hellenic Parliament, on 30 October of 1975, Kostas Karamanlis

said that “History teaches that the Greeks lose everything they gain in war times during the peace time. We lose it because we have the bad habit of making our national issues the subject of intense political rivalries, which often take the form of patriotism and end up in divisions” (Καραμανλής 2021).

We should mention again that until now, namely now when these lines are being written, these implementing laws concerning the Prespa Agreement have not been submitted to the Parliamentary Committee of National Defense and Foreign Affairs, in order subsequently to be introduced in the parliamentary plenary for voting.

So, the three distinct levels of disagreement inside ND are accordingly referred to the stance MPs will follow in front of the voting procedure. Samaras has adopted the intense hard line, some other MPs, even though they disagree, they will vote in favor, being attached to the decision of the leadership, and the liberal wing, including PM, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, will vote in favor of the agreements, hopefully assuming the faithful implementation of the Prespa Agreement could bring stability and economic development for North Macedonia and good diplomatic and economic relations between Greece and North Macedonia.

This trichotomy fits perfectly, one would say, with the way the reaction was differentiated in front of the evolvments regarding the name dispute during the government of Konstantinos Mitsotakis (1990-1993).

The potential internal conflicts that could be born, inside ND, in front of the voting of the three memoranda (which are combined with the Prespa Agreement), does not seem to bend the willingness of Mitsotakis’ government to abide by the Prespa Agreement. In any case, however, it is noted, at least in the press, but also concerning the

parliamentary procedure, a delay on behalf of Mitsotakis' government to submit to the Parliament the implementing laws of the Prespa Agreement.

Certainly, the above can be interpreted, in the terms of Neoclassical Realism. The intervening variables are the intra - party conflict and surely the disagreement that a certain part of the society expresses, that affect the decision making.

Despite the delay that we see, Mitsotakis, even before he becomes the Greek Prime Minister, had declared that since the Prespa Agreement was ratified, his government would be obliged to abide by it. However, the delay indicates his unwillingness a major intra - party conflict to be generated inside ND under his watch and his unwillingness a part of the society to react against his actions.

This delay is a fact due to the absence of a strict exogenous restriction. When there is not a strict exogenous restriction, the intervening variables have a lot of influence upon the decision - making process, either when the party is in the opposition or in government.

Conclusion

The economic memoranda and the Prespa Agreement, as political decisions, are a different conclusion comparing the way ND has implemented the economic and the foreign policy in the past. About the economic policy, governments of ND were timely tied to a state-driven economy. As much as every ND government has programmatically claimed that a more liberal economic example was in its intentions, ultimately the liberal reforms were not implemented, either fully or at all.

The debt crisis from 2009 and onwards pushed ND to see closely the need to implement a different policy, which at first level should consolidate the public finances and at a second or a simultaneous level, to implement liberal structural reforms. After 2010 and before 2019, ND applied a liberal economic policy only as a governing party.

One of the reasons ND was so late about the liberal economic transform, was the fear of the reactions that would be created, either at the level of the Greek society or at the party level. Even though it was understood - from the governments and the political elites - that Greece, as a small state, in an interacting international system, had to be shielded against capitalist crises, the delay is a fact, which fact led to immediate, economically, and socially painful policies, due to their intensive and compelling nature.

As for the case of the name dispute with previously FYROM and now North Macedonia, ND has been oscillating for years between the more compromising intra-party wing and the less compromising one.

Later, in 2018, the left-wing government of SYRIZA, which neither was occupied by the same ideological history of ND, nor had the same ideological position and optics with ND, proceeded to conclude an agreement with the Skopjan government of Social Democratic Union of Macedonia, under the presidency of Zoran Zaev. Against the accomplishment of the Prespa Agreement, we saw the reactions from ND side, as well as the social reaction.

While in the case of the economic memoranda, ND was divided within itself, in front of the Prespa Agreement, an obvious trichotomy was observed within the party.

The preceding analysis of the previous chapters led to a series of conclusions. First, the exogenous restriction for a small state is a matter of great importance. The electoral cost and intra - party reaction, as intervening variables, have been taken into consideration by the government of ND only when there was not a strict exogenous restriction.

Under a strict exogenous restriction, ND hold an opposite stance only when in parliamentary opposition. Even the liberal leaderships of ND, as a governing party, were being afraid of the intra - party statist reaction and they hold back the liberal policy.

The economic crisis of 2010 marked the importance of an efficient economy, especially for a small state. This as a fact affected ND and after 2019, we see that the whole of the parliamentary group of ND has voted in favor of the liberal economic laws the liberal leadership shaped. The situation is different as regards the foreign policy. A group inside ND is against the solution that has been given with the name of "North Macedonia" and specific MPs hold a fierce opposite view and declared their refusal to vote in favor of the implementing laws of the Prespa Agreement. In economy, things have changed, and the economies had to be efficient to survive. This as a fact makes governments obliged to the liberal economic policy. As regards the foreign policy, ideology is a variable of great importance inside the political parties.

The "intervening variables" of Neoclassical Realism, which we hypothesized would lead ND to listen to the internal party reaction, were immediately demolished in the economic field, due to the severe economic threat with which the economic external restraint was accompanied.

In the case of the Prespa Agreement, these intervening variables were not collapsed. In current terms, today, the liberal leadership of ND, as the ruling party, is still moving very slowly towards the obligations (implementing laws to be voted from the Hellenic Parliament), fearing internal party pressures. In this case, there is no external constraint, equivalent to the economic one, which could directly demolish the intervening variables.

The difference between the reaction of ND, as the party of the official parliamentary opposition and as the ruling party, is of great importance, as it has been proved for both the cases.

Either in the case of the first economic memorandum or for the Prespa Agreement, ND has not been the government. The decisions for these agreements were taken from the PASOK government and from the SYRIZA government respectively. ND, as the successor government in both cases (after the PASOK government and after the SYRIZA government) undertook the continuation of the policy the agreements brought to Greek policy system.

The status of a small state is also a factor that should be in mind when the power of the external constraint is analyzed. This evident conflict between the internal reaction and the external constraint, is a difficult fate for a small state, especially if consensus and convergence have not been reached.

Greece as a small state faced and faces certain external restrictions. As in government, ND had and has the responsibility to proceed to a certain policy, according to these restrictions. ND had to retain financial discipline and to implement structural reforms. ND should also respect and implement the Prespa Agreement. As in opposition, through the years ND denied the necessity of structural reforms in the national economy. As in government ND did not implement or did not fully implement structural reforms. The situation has changed with the debt crisis during the 2010s. ND needed to proceed to a liberal economic policy. About the name dispute, through the years ND did not manage to have a solution. Under

the Prespa Agreement, it should respect and implement it. The intra - party reaction against the memoranda and liberal economic shift has succumbed to the severity of the economic threat, which also has intensified the external restriction. The intra - party reaction against the Prespa Agreement has not succumbed. In the second case, there has not been an corresponding exogenous restriction.

The existence of a threat as was in the case of the economic memoranda always brings a shift in the policy as well. The strong constraint demolishes the internal reaction and other intervening variables as well. We could assume that the above as a situation can have a certain and basic explanatory value for any policy and ideological shift on behalf of a ruling political party.

ND vacillated between what it wanted to do and what it was obliged to do. In 2010 and in 2018, it was in front of decisions that were taken from opposite political parties. ND had to respect them. ND needed to change. It changed up to a point and at the same time, it has always detected the room to manage the intra - party and electoral loss.

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